Gender Mainstreaming in the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence: Lessons on the Implementation of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+)

The Canadian Case: The Implementation of GBA+ in the DND and the CAF

In Canada, gender mainstreaming takes the form of GBA+. GBA+ is an analytical tool designed to help advance gender equality in Canada by assessing “how diverse groups of women, men and non-binary people may experience policies, programs, and initiatives” (Status of Women, 2017c). This approach also acknowledges that a multiplicity of identities shape our experience and therefore also considers factors including “race, ethnicity, religion, age, and mental or physical disability” (Status of Women, 2017c). The approach first began to take shape in 1995, when the Government of Canada “committed to implement gender-based analysis throughout its departments and agencies” (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009) after signing onto the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (UN, 1995). Notably, this declaration was in keeping with Canada’s commitment to equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) and the Canadian Human Rights Act (1985), both of which prohibit discrimination based on sex, although the scope of Canada’s initial adoption of gender mainstreaming was minimized under the Harper government (for more details, see Tiessen & Carrier, 2015). ³ GBA was extended and rebranded to GBA+ in 2011, after an external audit found that the process applied unevenly to Canadian women (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009). A plus sign denotes the intersectional component of the reimagined approach (GBA+), which goes beyond gender to assess “how sex and gender intersect with other identities” (Status of Women Canada, 2017a). Importantly, an intersectional approach does not simply imply that identities can be looked at in isolation; rather, it stresses that challenges faced by individuals from different identity groups are compounding. This means, for example, that a White woman and a woman of color can, and often do, experience sexism in different ways. ⁴

As a form of gender mainstreaming, GBA+ has the potential to be used as a mechanism for substantive change or what Jahan would call agenda-setting. Indeed, the purpose of gender mainstreaming is to “change institutional structures, policy instruments, and priorities from a gender equality perspective” (Caglar, 2013, p. 340). In reality, the realization of such large-scale aspirations is often replaced with more limited goals that focus on the integration of women and diverse groups within existing organizations without considering how these institutions might be reorganized or adapted to achieve gender equality (e.g., an integrationist approach). Absent a clear template for the implementation of GBA+, it is left to the discretion of individual departments and agencies to develop their own approach.

Although the process is not mandatory in Canada, ⁵ in 2016, the CAF announced their intention to apply GBA+. In 2017, the DND, the civilian-led government department that is highly integrated with the CAF, began working to implement a series of joint initiatives on GBA+ with the CAF. The DND and the CAF are collectively known as the Defense Team and make up Canada’s “largest federal government department” (Government of Canada, 2018b). Together, they have committed to ensuring that “every element of the implementation of Canada’s new defence policy is informed by GBA+” (DND & CAF, 2018, p. 105). The specific motivation for the decision to implement GBA+ across their platforms has not been clearly articulated but has been presented “as a means to both improve operational effectiveness and meet the needs of those who are disproportionately affected by conflict and crisis” (DND & CAF, 2018, p. 24).

After announcing its intention to enact GBA+ in 2016, the CAF worked to deploy the process quickly. A directive by the Chief of Defence Staff in January 2016 called for the full implementation of GBA+ in “planning and operations” by the end of August 2017 and the complete integration across the CAF by the end of March 2019 (CDS, 2016). The first stage of this project included the appointment of GENADs, charged with providing advice to the commanders responsible for the integration of GBA+ in operations. No real guidance as to the overarching policy objective was provided in the directive; instead, it contained references to integrating the requirements of Canada’s National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, as well as additional direction on GBA+ by the Government of Canada (CDS, 2016), which advocated for a decidedly integrationist approach to GBA+. ⁶

In the early days of its implementation, only limited infrastructure was in place to support the approach. Initially, the members of the DND and the CAF were introduced to GBA+ through an online module designed by Women and Gender Equality Canada (formerly Status of Women Canada), which all members were required to complete (Government of Canada, n.d.). This module was meant as a general training tool and was not specifically designed for the DND and the CAF. Nonetheless, it was the only training available for most members of the forces. The government’s decision to require all relevant memorandums to the Treasury Board of Canada and the Cabinet to have undergone GBA+ vetting in 2016 further accelerated the need for training in the DND and the CAF, as well as other agencies and departments (Status of Women, 2017b).

In order to provide support, a more robust GBA+ infrastructure was put in place, but its implementation came after the requirement to implement GBA+ came into force. These supports included the training of more specialized personnel as either gender focal points—“[m]ilitary or civilian personnel appointed within the branches at a headquarters level, and within units on a tactical level, to integrate gender perspectives within the plans, tasks and evaluations of their branches and units” (Global Affairs Canada [GAC], 2018, p. 16) or GENADs (described above). The training of gender focal points began in June 2018 (Johnstone & Momani, 2019). ⁷ Of these support personnel, gender focal points are the most commonly allocated role and are meant to dedicate 10%–15% of their time to GBA+. Importantly, the roles, responsibilities, and training of gender focal points across the forces were not raised in the Chief Defence Staff directorate (CDS, 2016) or any subsequent directives, leaving their definition and training to GAC. Although the DND and the CAF require their members to undertake their own GBA+ analysis, gender focal points are the first points of contact for civil servants and military personnel in need of guidance or resources (DND & CAF, 2018). At the top of the hierarchy sits a joint responsibility center, established in 2018, which houses both the Directorate of Gender Diversity and Inclusion (DND) and the Directorate of Integration of Gender Perspectives (CAF), who collectively oversee the implementation of GBA+.

Understanding how the goals of GBA+ were internalized by members of the Defense Team necessitates more than an understanding of the approach’s supporting infrastructure; it requires an appreciation of the other events and policies that occurred in tandem with the enactment of GBA+. The CAF’s decision to implement GBA+ came shortly after the release of the highly publicized 2015 Deschamps Report (the External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the CAF), which identified “an underlying sexualized culture in the Canadian Armed Forces that is hostile to women and LGTBQ members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault” (p. i). The report led to an initiative called Operation HONOUR later that year which, although it did not meaningfully incorporate GBA+, aimed to eliminate incidents of “harmful and inappropriate sexual behavior in the Canadian military” (Government of Canada, n.d.). ⁸ The need for culture change was also underscored by other contemporaneous policy documents. Canada’s Defence Policy, for example, acknowledges the need to implement “a new comprehensive Diversity Strategy and Action Plan, which will promote an institution-wide culture that embraces diversity and inclusion” (National Defence, 2017, p. 23). It was in this climate that the CAF were facing pressure to roll out GBA+ quickly and did not fully lay out the infrastructure or overarching policy objectives for the approach before attempting to apply it. Absent decisive guidance, and facing a recent gender-based scandal, there was space for a disconnect to develop between the actual and perceived purpose of the initiative, even among those trained in support roles in GBA+, like gender focal points. As a representative from the Directorate of Gender, Diversity, and Inclusion explained in an interview, “GBA+ came a few years after Operation HONOUR, and in people’s minds it’s one in the same.” As will become evident in the following sections, many personnel internalized the goals of GBA+ early on as agenda-setting and spoke about the need for fundamental cultural change, even though this was not the framing presented by the Chief of Defence Staff. When the goals of GBA+ were finally articulated in 2018, albeit not in an authoritative capacity (as discussed in “The Goals of GBA+” section), they were much less ambitious and fell more in line with an integrationist approach. However, the time lag between the implementation and articulation of GBA+—which is still lacking clear policy foundations within the DND and the CAF—and the context in which it was implemented, has led to the internalization of often contradictory understandings of GBA+.

This disconnect is especially troubling as recent events, coupled with a long history of critiques of the masculine culture in the CAF, mean that the DND and CAF have a special interest in getting GBA+ right. This is true despite widespread agreement that the potential of gender-mainstreaming approaches, like GBA+, to fundamentally alter institutional culture and advance gender equality is limited (Caglar, 2013; Office of the Auditor General, 2009, 2015; Scala & Paterson, 2018). If the objective is the transformation of the Canadian government’s most “masculine” institution—the CAF—we expect success to be yet more elusive.

The CAF is known to have a culture of militarized masculinity (Lane, 2017; Poulin et al., 2018; Taber, 2018). Militarized masculinity relies on the valorization of a narrow range of hypermasculine traits, including courage and the capacity for violence, exemplified by the warrior ethos. The assumption is that the “ideal soldier” is defined by their masculine traits (Eichler, 2014, p. 81). In this way, militarization is understood to be a “gendered process” that reinforces “patriarchal hierarchies of sex and race” (Lane, 2017, p. 466), which is achieved by “policing masculinity and femininity through social pressure to conform to heteronormative roles” (Poulin et al., 2018, p. 60). The maintenance of this specific gender culture in the CAF, which is justified by an appeal to the need for cohesion and order (Poulin et al., 2018, p. 68), has meant the cultivation of a masculine culture. This militarized masculinity “accords primacy to toughness, skilled use of violence, presumption of an enemy, male camaraderie, submerging one’s emotions, and discipline,” all attributes traditionally coded as male (Enloe, 2014, p. 151). And, just as classically masculine characteristics are stressed, so too are feminine characteristics and behaviors devalued (Poulin et al., 2018, p. 68). Even when recruits are male, the masculinity of soldiers cannot be taken for granted and must be developed and nurtured by the military through training and socialization. Thus, “becoming a ‘soldier’ entails becoming a ‘man,’ even if—especially if—the recruit is a woman” (Lane, 2017, p. 471).

This representation stands in stark contrast to the presentation of the CAF on paper, as a fully integrated environment in which women have been able to enroll in any occupation for the last 20 years (CAF, n.d.). It does, however, shed light on the common refrain that “whatever the rhetoric, women are not accepted as full, equal participants in the Canadian military” (Lane, 2017, p. 467). Rather, the messaging they receive is that “their presence within the military has violated an unstated military ethos, one that does not fully recognize their presence in the first place” (Whitworth, 2008, p. 111). Those that have risen through the ranks have faced significant challenges, as they have been required to navigate “a culture within which they did not readily fit” (Davis, 2009, p. 451). These cultural norms also help to illustrate why the inclusion of gendered perspectives, and those of other minority groups, can be perceived as uniquely threatening to the militarized culture within the DND and the CAF and the desire of some to change the culture itself. Implementing GBA+ within this cultural context comes with obvious challenges. How does an organization, whose identity is grounded in gendered divisions, begin to pursue gender equality?

This process is complicated by the fact that GBA+ is not a methodology—its adoption does not come with a clear tool kit for enacting substantive change. Indeed, it could not, as the process of gender mainstreaming does not have a defined end goal, beyond the promotion of gender equality. With no definitive way to operationalize approaches like GBA+, let alone foundational concepts like intersectionality and gender equality, the implementation of this approach is often fraught. While efforts have been made by Women and Gender Equality Canada to provide a framework in which to develop GBA+, precise objectives are left to the discretion of individual organizations. Although, as will be discussed in later sections of this article, many gender focal points within the DND and the CAF understand the implementation of GBA+ as the catalyst for major changes (often talked about in terms of an internal cultural shift), evidence of the way the approach has been conceptualized and implemented reveals it to have a more limited, integrationist character.

To date, little scholarly work has focused on the implementation of GBA+ by departments within the Canadian federal government (for exceptions, see Paterson, 2010; Scala & Paterson, 2017a, 2017c, 2018). From this work, a number of themes emerge. Scala and Paterson (2017b) stress the role of bureaucratic culture in determining the successful implementation of GBA+, highlighting the pivotal role played by gender analysts in its implementation. They also express concern about a perceived shift away from policy analysis and development and toward accountability frameworks (Scala & Paterson, 2018). Paterson (2010) warns of the potential drawbacks of the way GBA+ has been implemented. More specifically, she suggests that the processes of gender mainstreaming create “gender experts” whose work often positions gendered analysis as objective, obscuring the normative and theoretical issues at stake (p. 397). Moreover, because these experts exist within bureaucracies, they are unlikely to interrogate the ways in which these organizational structures contribute to the problems they are working to address. This work echoes many of the findings of the broader gender-mainstreaming literature, which suggests that the implementation of gender mainstreaming is normally integrationist, that is, it encourages institutions to change their policies, tools, and targets, which normally produce only surface-level shifts that do not fundamentally change the status quo (Jahan, 1995; Tiessen, 2007). In this article, we use the Canadian military’s implementation of a gender-mainstreaming approach—GBA+—to explore the actual and potential effectiveness of gender-mainstreaming approaches in a military context.

Method

In order to gain a better sense of how personnel experience, frame, and implement GBA+, we employed a mixed method approach, consisting of small group interviews and surveys of DND and CAF personnel, participant observation of a gender focal point training course, and document analysis. We conducted a total of four small group interviews during October 2018. At our request, a representative of the Directorate of Gender, Diversity, and Inclusion sent out a call for participants to all current gender focal points in the DND and the CAF. In total, we had 10 respondents, whom we asked to attend one of three group interviews over the course of 1 day based on their general attitude toward GBA+ (e.g., positive, neutral, or negative). Each interview lasted approximately 1 hr, and participants were prompted using a general list of questions about their perceptions of GBA+ and their experiences of its implementation. ⁹ One respondent was not able to attend the roundtable and completed a phone interview the week following the course. The results of these interviews were then anonymized to protect the identities of the participants. The final group interview was conducted with seven members of the Directorate of Gender, Diversity, and Inclusion (DND). This Directorate is the counterpart to the CAF Directorate Integration of Gender Perspectives.

Also, in October 2018, we observed the 2-day gender focal point training put on by the DND and the CAF. All gender focal points are meant to receive this training, or earlier iterations of the same training, before taking on their new roles. These courses are offered approximately every 2 months, and there is currently a waitlist to attend. At the time of our participant observation, six courses had been offered (two 2-day courses and four half-day courses) since the course was first delivered on June 19, 2018. In addition to observing the course, we designed and administered a pre- and postsurvey, which asked participants to reflect on the lessons they took from the course. We received a total of 27 surveys from the 28 participants. Each survey measured 16 knowledge-related skills based on the policy goals of the GBA+ training. Question concepts ranged from more abstract and theoretical ideas, such as describing gender and intersectionality, to specific applications of gender- and intersectional-sensitive knowledge to events in the workplace, like explaining how to conduct gender- and intersectional-sensitive research.

The results of our surveys were coded using a matched sample design. Participants were asked to rate their knowledge of both theoretical and practical questions relating to gender and intersectionality on a 5-point Likert-type scale, from very unconfident to very confident, both before and after the training. We were then able to match these responses to assess what effect, if any, the training had on these indicators. ¹⁰ Our posttraining surveys contained additional questions relating to comprehension, perceptions of the training, engagement, and suggestions for future training. The objective of these questions was to better understand how and why training worked, or did not work, for participants. We then utilized analysis of variance, linear regressions, χ² testing, descriptive statistics, and linear modeling to identify patterns in the data. Differences in our pre- and posttraining surveys, which we elaborate on in the following sections, were considered statistically significant when they occurred beyond a 95% confidence interval.

To determine their demographic profile, we asked participants to identify their racial background, religion, age, gender, whether or not they were born in Canada, whether they identified as having a disability, and whether or not they identified as a member of LGBTQIA+. Additionally, we asked for their highest level of completed education, whether they worked for the DND or the CAF. There was near gender parity in the group (52% women, 48% men) and an equal number of participants from the DND and the CAF, of which most participants (81%) were White with a mean age of 41. Only a small minority (15%) reported being immigrants or LGBTQIA+ (11%), but a majority (70%) reported being Christian, while the remaining 30% identified as Agnostic, Atheist, or irreligious. No participants reported being indigenous or as having a disability, and the average participant reported having at least the equivalent of an undergraduate degree. Using difference-in-means testing, we then matched the surveys to compare group differences, but no statistically significant differences were found.

Analysis

Using these data, alongside extensive document analysis, we are able to piece together a more complete picture of the DND and the CAF’s approach to the implementation of GBA+. In so doing, we find that, in the absence of a clear policy framework, but within a larger climate where higher ups have been committing to the need for culture change to address ongoing diversity issues, a decidedly integrationist approach to GBA+ has been implemented, but that many of those charged with overseeing its implementation believe their approach to be one with agenda-setting implications. Just how these disconnects have arisen, and what they mean for the success of GBA+, is discussed in the following sections. More specifically, we look at the published and internalized goals of GBA+, and the values underlying it, and the attitudes of gender focal points charged with assisting in the implementation of GBA.

The Goals of GBA+

GBA+ was rolled out by the DND and the CAF very quickly. As noted in the previous section, the speed of the initiative meant that neither the complete infrastructure nor a description of the goals of GBA+ within the Defense Team was in place before the initiative was launched. As a result, individuals who were trained in support roles, like gender focal points, did not have a clear understanding of the purpose of the initiative from the outset. Uncertainty about the goals of the approach and its underlying values has led to ongoing disconnects between the actual and perceived purpose of GBA+. Moreover, the discrepancies between these goals and values have led to confusion among those implementing GBA+. All told, these disconnects have created challenges for the consistent implementation and acceptance of GBA+ and weakened its potential internalization.

Although the CAF committed to the use of GBA+ in 2016, albeit only in operations at that point, and the DND since 2017 (National Defence, 2017), it was only in 2018 that the goals of GBA+ were provided in writing within the Autumn 2018 handbook for gender focal points—and these are by no means authoritative. Still, even this attempt to clarify the goals of the approach by those instructing the next group of gender focal points failed to resolve many questions relating to its underlying values. The handbook lists the goals of GBA+ as follows:

To ensure the benefits do no accrue unequally to some and that the risks are not unequally borne by others;

As evidenced by these descriptors, GBA+ is justified for both its intrinsic and instrumental value. Its intrinsic value is evident in Points 1 and 3, which suggest that equality, diversity, and inclusiveness are values worthy of promotion for their own sake. The instrumental, or what the Defense Team might call operational value of the approach, is found in the second point, which concerns the value added by GBA+—the improvement of programs and identification of deficiencies.

All three goals seem firmly embedded within an integrationist camp, premised as they are on increasing inclusiveness within an existing institutional structure—even the suggestion of a need to promote equality is limited to amending the current system. Even within this more limited approach, there have been serious implementation issues. The first concerns timing. Since GBA+ was launched before these goals were made available, and many gender focal points and GENADs were trained without these goals in mind, the result has been a disconnection between the actual purpose of the approach, as laid out by the senior management, and the perceived purpose on the ground.

We established the perceived role of GBA+ by gender focal points in three ways: through surveys, group interviews, and participant observation of gender focal point training. In our group interviews and participant observation, we noted systematic misunderstandings of the goals at stake in the implementation of GBA+, as well as the relationship between these goals. Even when individuals expressed confidence about the goals and implications of GBA+, we noted disconnects in their understanding.

First, we focused on the goals of GBA+ within the DND and the CAF. Although there were trends in the answers we received, the substance of the answers varied. For example, in our posttraining survey, we asked participants to rank, in order of importance, their perception of the DND and the CAF’s goal in implementing GBA+ across the Defense Team. They were given five options: increase awareness of discrimination, increase recruitment and retention of women and visible minorities, transform the culture, improve operational effectiveness, and to improve public image. We coded their responses using five social choice theories—Borda count, Pareto rule, plurality, simply majority, and pairwise majority—to establish any preferences expressed by the group. ¹¹ Our overwhelming finding, using all but the Pareto rule, which necessitates the entire sample give the same response, was the culture change was seen to be the motivator for change, with operational effectiveness coming in second, based on Borda count, plurality, and pairwise majority measures. These findings suggest some consistency in views about the goals of GBA+ following the latest training.

When we asked the same question of current gender focal points (who had not had access to the goals in the updated handbook) during group interviews, the answers we received were wide and varied. Gender focal points identified the goals of GBA+ in a range of different ways, including as a means to increase the recruitment and retention of women and minority groups, as a way to improve operational effectiveness, as a response to bad press, because of an institutional commitment to culture change, and because of governmental pressure, with most acknowledging that they felt uncertain about their knowledge of the approach. As the first point of contact for personnel conducting GBA+ analysis, these disconnects help to explain the widespread confusion about the purpose and implications of GBA+ that we encountered during out-group interviews.

Notably, even when there was agreement about the goals of the approach, or its underlying values, group interview discussions suggested that there was still disagreement about the implications of both. Two of the most prevalent issues raised by gender focal points concerned operational effectiveness and gender.

One of the most common concerns raised was in our interviews and participant observation was that GBA+ could compromise operational effectiveness, despite messaging to the contrary. Many gender focal points harbored concerns that GBA+ could be acting in competition with operational effectiveness rather than in support of it. This is an especially significant concern because arguments relating to operational effectiveness are often used to animate individuals within the CAF, as a means of legitimating the inclusion of women and other marginalized groups. There are, however, a number of problems with this approach. First, justifying GBA+ on the grounds that it can improve operational effectiveness is an outcomes-based justification that pressures women and other groups “to demonstrate their added value in an environment that is not adapted to their needs” (Ghittoni et al., 2017, p. 19). While there is ample evidence to show that women and marginalized groups can make significant contributions to the CAF in its current form (see Canada, 2019a; Edgar et al., 2019), these lines of argument place the burden on groups facing discrimination to adapt rather than putting the onus on the organization which has developed an unwelcoming and even threatening culture to adapt to them. These concerns were raised in the 2019 Standing Committee on National Defence, in which Dr. Alan Okros stresses that “efforts to achieve integration [in the CAF] were more often experienced…as assimilation” (Canada, 2019a, p. 16). Second, when we focus first on operational effectiveness, it is not clear what the appropriate course of action is in situations where a focus on diversity might impede an objective—an issue many gender focal points seemed to pick up on. While we do not mean to suggest that this is likely to be the case, indeed, ample evidence points to diversity improving operations (Canada, 2019a), it is conceivable that a situation will arise in which diversity is not beneficial. Other policy documents addressing diversity in the DND and the CAF also fail to provide guidance. For example, the 2019 Standing Committee on National Defence reifies both the strategic and intrinsic value of diversity (p. 57) but does not offer direction in instances where these values conflict. Similarly, the CAF Diversity Strategy takes a value-based approach, stressing the need to create a culture of diversity, suggesting the intrinsic value of difference, but again without offering guidance about what to do in the event of a conflict (quoted in Canada, 2019a, p. 21). If GBA+ is only justified on its instrumental value, the implication is that it is okay to ignore the values of equality underlying the approach in these situations. Rather than stressing the material benefits to the organization, a focus on the values advanced by a commitment to equality could have a more meaningful effect on the DND and the CAF. As stressed in the Elsie Initiative, a pilot project for the meaningful improvement of women’s participation in peace operations, “a greater emphasis on socio-political arguments in favour of increasing the participation of women in peacekeeping might be needed to reconnect policy to practice” (Ghittoni et al., 2017, p. 26). Moreover, Davis (2009, pp. 450–451) contends that a focus on operational effectiveness “ignores significant potential differences among members of the CF [Canadian Forces] that will otherwise yield valuable information and contributions in terms of both equity and operational success.”

We also noted widespread skepticism about the branding of GBA+ by gender focal points, many of whom, for a variety of reasons, expressed concern about the focus on gender. For some, the inclusion of gender in the name of the approach evokes a focus on women. For an institution deeply embedded in masculine norms, the perception of a woman-focused policy directive was a major source of concern, both because they anticipated or had experienced resistance to GBA+ as a result of the name. One gender focal point pointed to the evolution of the approach, which was focused exclusively on gender in its initial iteration, only to include intersectional factors later on, suggesting “GBA+ requires a new branding within the organization that indicates GBA+ is not only about gender and more about intersectionality.” Another gender focal point suggested that choice of terminology “sabotaged it [GBA+] right off the bat,” saying, “I wish they’d talked about diversity or identity factors instead.” In our presurvey, multiple participants expressed similar concerns about the focus on gender in GBA+, saying “Why do we insist on ‘gender’ based analysis when we are really talking about ‘social factors’? ‘Gender’ limits the understanding and the discussion.” Similarly, other participants requested more focus in future courses on “the reality that ‘G’ is one part of the ‘+’,” suggesting that guidance in the application of GBA+ must go “beyond gender” and recognize that the “name and branding are no longer accurate.” Cumulatively, these responses both recognize the importance and challenges of employing an intersectional approach and showcase the continued resistance to a focus on gender equality. While focusing more on intersectional factors is important, erasing the focus on gender could be taken as an attempt to erase, or in the very least subvert, the potential value of GBA+ for women.

The nature of the rollout of GBA+ in the DND and the CAF has meant that many of these disconnects are somewhat inevitable. Ongoing concerns remain, however, even with the newly articulated goals underlying the approach. The potential for conflict between the goals has not been addressed and has already led to confusion among gender focal points, and certainly the broader DND and CAF community. Moreover, the notion among many gender focal points that culture change is the goal of GBA+ does not map clearly onto the goals themselves or, as we will see, the approaches taken to realizing them.

Attitudes Toward GBA+

Despite the hierarchical nature of both bureaucracies and the military, the DND and the CAF have attempted a bottom-up approach to the implementation of GBA+, with all members of staff responsible to complete their own GBA+ assessments. The goal of this approach, according to the Directorate of Gender Diversity and Inclusion, is to internalize the value of GBA+ and to ensure that all staff participate actively in a cultural shift—a goal that suggests a desire to pursue agenda-setting change. At the same time, support for the initiative is coming from the top-down. The result of this approach, in combination with the unique cultures within the DND and the CAF, including respect for hierarchy and confusion about the goals and underlying values of GBA+ noted in the previous section, has led to some disconnects between the avowed and revealed attitudes of gender focal points.

Previous research on GBA+ in Canada suggests that support positions, like gender focal points, are normally staffed by individuals who are committed to the values of GBA+ and are often populated by staff willing to go above and beyond to achieve their mandate. For example, Scala and Paterson (2018, p. 227) gathered stories of gender focal points in the federal public service, many of whom suggested that working through the official channels was not the most effective way to secure change. They offer the example of one gender focal point, who recounted their approach of taking computer techs out for coffee to ask them to modify online forms to integrate diversity considerations rather than going through senior management. The findings of their study suggest that personal conviction could have an impact on the outcomes of the role. Bearing this in mind, when we spoke to existing gender focal points, we asked how they came to be in their current position. Of the 10 gender focal points who participated in small group interviews, five were ordered to take on the role, two volunteered, and the other three were nominated or recruited to become gender focal points. We saw a similar pattern when we asked personnel undergoing gender focal point training, who were evenly split along gendered lines and between membership to the DND and the CAF, how they came into the role, with 59% of participants volunteering. In this group, because we were able to differentiate respondents based on their membership to either the DND or the CAF, we also know that, of the CAF personnel, only 35% volunteered. Given that the research suggests gender focal points need to go above and beyond, often in an unorthodox and self-directed fashion, to achieve their mandate, and given that gender focal points have come to occupy their positions for many different reasons, we contend that it is plausible that gender-focal points will be more or less effective in their roles depending on how they came into them. While our research did not seek to measure the effectiveness of individual gender focal points, we believe this could be a fruitful area for further research to help establish the efficacy of the support structures surrounding GBA+.

Despite gender focal points participating for a range of reasons, the course did not appear to affect any notable shifts in the worldview of participants. To establish their perspectives, we asked a series of three yes or no questions to ascertain their views on GBA+ (e.g., Do you agree with the following statement: Women and men are not equal in Canada, so gender-sensitive analysis is needed) in the presurvey and repeated these questions in the postsurvey. Most participants agreed with the validity and necessity of gender- and intersectional-sensitive training. The vast majority (or >81%) of participants disagreed with all three statements. This implied they held worldviews that were likely consistent with the goals of the GBA+ training.

These findings were consistent with what we heard during our interviews. Regardless of their general attitudes toward the implementation of GBA+, none of the participants wanted to claim outright that GBA+ was a bad idea. Instead, we encountered some surreptitious undermining of GBA+ through a disconnect between the attitudes people avowed and their revealed attitudes. For example, while no one wanted to claim that equality was a bad objective, some spoke about concerns that GBA+ would hinder operational effectiveness and damage unit cohesion by prioritizing diversity over skill and implied that, insofar as they conflict, they would choose operational effectiveness.

The fact that calls for the implementation of GBA+ are coming from the top-down, and that many gender focal points have been ordered to take key positions in its implementation, also carries significant weight in the forces because no one wants to undermine a direct order. Here, too, we saw some attempts to justify, at the very least, a more lackluster implementation of GBA+. During our interviews, a number of gender focal points mentioned hearing of attitudes (which they, themselves, claimed not to hold) that suggested GBA+ was a pet project of the Trudeau government and that implementation could be waited out. Zahariadis and Exadaktylos (2016, p. 67) point out that “civil servants can wait out their elected or appointed supervisors because they have tenure” and can therefore “resist implementing programs they perceive might adversely affect them.” Of course, in our example, this is only true of the DND employees, because members of the CAF are not civil servants, and neither are their superiors. That said, the narrative of GBA+ we heard suggested attempts by some members of the CAF to distance the forces from the policy initiative, by suggesting it was political rather than internal. Others suggested that carefully cloaked dissent was coming from higher ups, which gave them space to justify ticking the boxes of GBA+ without making substantive changes. For instance, one interviewee, explained that,

If you talk to the leadership, they all agree that we need to be doing this, but where it becomes a difficulty is when GBA+ intersects in a way they don’t like with operations. If it slows things down or doesn’t achieve the goal they’re aiming at, they don’t like it. There’s frustration and a bit of push back when you put forward data that doesn’t influence your goal.

Although the idea of bringing all members of the DND and the CAF on board with GBA+ implementation to help them internalize its value is laudable, this approach does not ensure that the most marginalized groups within the organization will have power to shift the culture. Jahan (1995, p. 13) stresses that the “participation of women as decisionmakers” is key to bringing about agenda-setting change. While involving all members of an organization has the potential to help internalize the value of gender-mainstreaming approaches, it does not ensure that organizations will be able to adjust in substantive ways to incorporate a gendered perspective. As we see above with the DND and the CAF, it also has the potential to bury resistance rather than change minds.

Gender Mainstreaming and the Military

The Canadian case of gender mainstreaming in the military offers valuable insights for other militaries that are serious about improving diversity and promoting gender equality using gender mainstreaming. The gendered underpinnings of military culture highlighted in this article demonstrate the urgent need for gender mainstreaming to both create a more effective institution, able to answer the changing needs of militaries, and to protect the life, security, and dignity of individuals who serve. At the same time, we find that the masculine culture within militaries creates unique challenges for the application of a gender-mainstreaming approach. Our study of the Canadian Defense Team highlights many of these challenges and suggests that even integrationist change can be impactful in a military context. Even so, integrationist changes are limited, and we suggest that, if the military is serious about gender equality, their longer term goals need to take an agenda-setting tact.

As evidenced by the Canadian case, military culture poses unique challenges to the implementation of gender-mainstreaming approaches. First, unlike other organizations, a masculine culture is overtly valued by militaries, and these values are deeply held. These beliefs continue to hold strong, even as joining the military is increasingly seen as a job rather than a vocation (Davis, 2009, p. 439). Second, shifts to the culture can come at great cost. In some cases, undermining the effectiveness of an operation can compromise the life or health of personnel or those they are protecting. Of course, failing to make these changes can have the same or similar effects. Although, as Hardy and von Hlatky (2020, p. 137) point out, “[t]he military’s institutional design explains why it would be quick to implement change that seems contrary to its cultural predisposition,” they make this contention based on NATO’s adoption of gender mainstreaming for reasons of operational effectiveness. But, as the Canadian case demonstrates, although the hierarchical structure of the military does allow for swift and significant internal change, this change must be of a certain type (e.g., motivated by practical concerns and in line with existing mandates and objectives) and perceived as fully supported by higher ups. Relatedly, a lack of clarity in the objectives and approach to gender mainstreaming, apparent both in formal guidance, or the lack thereof, and assumptions and perceptions shaped by related issues and the political or social climate, lead to disconnects and misunderstandings in its application that risk limiting its impact. However, these same uncertainties may also create space for different interpretations of gender mainstreaming to entrench themselves in the institution that may, in the long run, contribute to an agenda-setting approach.

All told, Canada is further along in its implementation of gender mainstreaming than other militaries, having made significant strides in its application and its approach to implementing GBA+. Importantly, Canada’s experience can provide valuable lessons for other militaries as they work to implement gender mainstreaming. Below, we reiterate three of these lessons: (1) Confusion about the objectives of GBA+ and its implementation limit the impact of the approach but also create room for more transformative interpretations of the approach to take root, (2) a bottom-up approach to an initiative in a hierarchical organization has potential to secure culture change but also risks undermining it, and (3) when details of an approach are unclear, or when gender mainstreaming is implemented seemingly in response to civilian-led initiatives, these realities can meaningfully influence the perception of personnel, for better or for worse, in their implementation of the approach.

First, our research shows that developing goals and a value framework for the application of gender and diversity issues is complex, often contested, and necessitates a deep understanding of the issues at stake and some grasp of the theories that underlie them. Absent a clear policy objective, including the enumeration of the goals and/or values underlying GBA+, there has been widespread confusion about the expectations regarding its implementation in the DND and the CAF. Even after attempts were made to articulate the goals, they were so wide-reaching that they were open to interpretation. We noted some conflicting interpretations of the values underlying these goals, which sometimes took the form of veiled resistance to the approach. For instance, in the event that intrinsic values and operational goals conflict, what should be done? These inconsistencies and concerns point to the unsettled nature of GBA+ within the DND and the CAF. In the Canadian case, we suggest that these inconsistencies limited the potential force of GBA+ in the military because it was often unclear how to use GBA+.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the very inconsistencies which cause confusion in the short term could be the foundation of more agenda-setting change in the long term. As discussed at the outset of this article, the implementation of gender mainstreaming in other military contexts has taken a strictly integrationist approach, focusing almost exclusively on the value of operational effectiveness as a metric for success. As such, it is conceivable that this lack of clarity in Canada’s implementation may have the effect of fostering a more robust understanding of GBA+ among the members of the DND and the CAF that could eventually lead to agenda-setting change. We did, after all, encounter many gender focal points who cited much more expansive goals for GBA+, including institutional cultural change, than the Defense Force eventually outlined. Of course, we also encountered resistance to the approach as a result of its inconsistencies, making ambiguity a risky approach for anyone interested in agenda-setting change.

Second, we noted issues with the structure of GBA+ implementation and its relationship to the Defense Team. Of course, even if the results are not immediately stellar, the motivation behind the bottom-up implementation of GBA+, in which all members of the Defense Team are responsible to conduct their own GBA+ analysis, is admirable. By ensuring that everyone is required to participate in its implementation, the expectation is that the values of GBA+ will be internalized by all and its significance more directly understood. In the long term, the idea is that ownership of the approach could bring about culture change. The reality, however, is not as straightforward. Because of confusion about the goals and implications of GBA+, perceptions of disorganization have contributed to resistance toward the approach. Moreover, the hierarchical nature of the CAF has also caused issues, as many of our interviewees interpreted a perceived lack of support from the top as a reason to find ways around implementation.

Finally, we noted the value of perception to the implementation of gender-mainstreaming approaches. Gender mainstreaming, including a previous iteration of Canada’s GBA+ approach, has been around since 1995, and military commitments to address gender discrimination were made clear 5 years later with the passing of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. In 2007, the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Policy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 was enacted, to be followed 4 years later by a Canadian Action Plan. Even though iterations of gender mainstreaming, and Canadian military’s commitment to abide by them, have deep roots, the Canadian Defense Team did not formerly commit to adopting GBA+ until 2016, just 1 year after the release of the Deschamps Report on sexual misconduct and harassment in the CAF. This decision was also made in a political climate in which the Prime Minister was stressing the value of gender equality policy, including GBA+. Although no formal connection was made between the Defense Teams’ policy commitment and the Trudeau government or the Dechamps Report, many personnel understood these actions to be linked. Our research shows that the calls for culture change in the Dechamps report were internalized as part of the GBA+ initiative by many within the Defense Team, such that goals of both initiatives were seen as deeply intertwined, even after the provision of formal guidance to the contrary. In many instances, these beliefs meant that personnel were attempting to enact, or in the very least expecting, more agenda-setting change as a result of GBA+. In other instances, the perceived connections of GBA+ with government and external reports mandating action were sufficient grounds to resist their implementation, which they did not believe were authentically desired by higher ups.

As a whole, the way GBA+ was talked about by many in the DND and the CAF suggests a desire or an expectation of achieving agenda-setting change, but the eventual articulation of the goals, and the implementation of GBA+ on the ground, relies on an integrationist approach. Although much of the language surrounding GBA+ in general, and the military culture surrounding diversity in particular, continues to send the message that culture change is important (Canada, 2019a, p. 47; Deschamps, 2015; National Defence, 2017, p. 23), few substantive mechanisms to achieve this change, or clear vision of what this change might look like, have been made available. ¹² Thus, the DND and the CAF continue to have a serious problem with gender and diversity. That said, we believe that the integrationist approach continues to have value in a military context.

Jahan’s division of approaches to gender mainstreaming treats agenda-setting change as a gold standard. These substantive changes require that we do more than make adjustments that seek to incorporate women and diverse people into existing environments without challenging the power dynamics that have systemically disadvantaged these groups (Verma, 2014, p. 191). It does not follow, however, that an integrationist approach is undesirable simply because it may not be the best approach. Indeed, we believe that the integrationist approach may be especially valuable in male-dominated institutions, like militaries, that are likely to face greater resistance to fundamental change, particularly from a gendered perspective. Of course, we mean for the integrationist approach to serve as a stepping-stone for agenda-setting change. Indeed, in the year following our fieldwork, the 2019 Standing Committee on National Defence echoed this sentiment. While recognizing the value of initiatives like Operation HONOUR and recruitment and retention strategies to “creating the conditions for enhanced diversity in the CAF,” the committee emphasized that, to be successful, “these efforts must be part of an overarching objective: achieving transformational cultural change in the CAF” (Canada, 2019a, p. 47). Moreover, a number of witnesses for the Standing Committee singled out GBA+ as a tool that “can contribute to cultural change in the CAF ” (Canada, 2019a, p. 49).

While it is still too early to measure the success of GBA+ within the Defense Team, the enactment of GBA+ has, at the very least, signaled the need to recognize and rethink discrimination within the DND and the CAF. It has also meant that all members of the DND and the CAF have had to participate in some form of GBA+ training (often the online module created by Women and Gender Equality Canada) and consider these issues in the drafting and delivery of policy. Our interviews showed a wide range of comfort with, and understanding of, GBA+ among gender focal points, some of whom admitted that they had not previously considered the impact of gender or other identities on individuals within the DND and the CAF, suggesting that even limited training is meaningful. As such, despite the potential for the creation of a backlash against gender-oriented policies if they are not effectively integrated, we believe that even surface-level changes serve a valuable purpose, provided they are not framed as more impactful than they are. If these changes are accepted as important incremental steps, they may pave the way for future change. If, however, the notion that they will fundamentally change the culture is foregrounded, the small-scale changes they bring about risk obscuring the very problems GBA+ has set out to address, thereby limiting the application of GBA+ to a bureaucratic tool and depoliticizing issues of gender inequality altogether.