Abstract
In this article, we show how the U.S. military treats domestic violence and sexual assault as distinct forms of abuse, which has particular consequences for victims of intimate partner sexual violence. We explore how a specific U.S. military branch, the Marine Corps, complicates these issues further by providing services to intimate partner sexual violence victims from two different programs. Analyzing military orders and documents related to Family Advocacy Program and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program, interviews with eight military prosecutors, and the experiences of one military lawyer, we examine program and interactional-level factors that shape victim services, advocacy, and processes. We find that there are program differences in specialized services, coordinated services, and potential breaches of confidentiality related to victim’s cases. We recommend that the Marine Corps recognize the intersections of sexual violence and domestic violence and offer more tailored services to victims of intimate partner sexual violence.
Intimate partner violence, specifically intimate partner sexual assault, is an issue facing all militaries, which has not been carefully dealt with in the scholarly literature nor well addressed by militaries themselves. While prior research has explored the issue of sexual assault within the military and domestic violence within the military, these two forms of violence have often been treated as separate and distinct. Like many militaries, the U.S. military has programs, policies, and guidelines to address both sexual assault and domestic violence, yet it does not have specific programs and policies aimed at the intersection of these two forms of violence: intimate partner sexual assault. This article explores intimate partner sexual assault in the military though a case study of two programs in the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), The Family Advocacy Program (FAP) was designed to address family violence, and the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program was designed to address military sexual assault. Intimate partner sexual violence overlaps these programs’ missions and provides an opportunity to explore the institutional response to this specific form of assault, one that has unique risk factors, health outcomes, and barriers to reporting. The objective of this article is to use the example of intimate partner sexual assault in the U.S. military to highlight the importance of scholarly and program attention to unique vulnerabilities that individuals experience in military organizations.
The U.S. military has allocated a great deal of resources to address sexual assualt within the institution. In the most recent Department of Defense (DoD, 2018) report on military sexual assault, it was estimated that one in three victims reported their sexual assaults to the military. This is an improvement in estimated reporting, which was estimated to be one in 14 victims in 2006 and one in four victims in 2014 (DoD, 2016). While the 2016 SAPR program report estimated an all-time low of sexual assault prevalence across military branches (4.3% of women and 0.6% of men), the 2018 report found an increase in the estimated prevalence of sexual assault (6.2% of women and 0.7% of men). The increasing number of estimated sexual assaults and an estimated increase in proportion of sexual assaults reported to the U.S. military means that the institution is handling a growing number of cases. Therefore, it is important to understand how the U.S. military is responding to victims and providing them with services. This is particularly true for the USMC, a branch where an estimated 10.7% of female Marines experienced sexual assault, twice the rate of women in the Air Force (4.3%) and higher than the rate of women in the Army (5.8%) and the Navy (7.5%; DoD, 2018).
Most research and reports on military sexual assault in the United States, including the statistics cited above, focuses on data produced by the SAPR, which omits those sexually assaulted by an intimate partner whose cases are referred to the FAP. This is directly related to the fact that domestic violence and sexual assault in the U.S. military have been treated as two distinct forms of abuse addressed by two separate programs. In this exploratory research, we show that while institutions often design and implement programs to targeted populations, it is when they fail to identify who is excluded from program services when confusion in program goals, services, and eligibility abound. The FAP was designed to address issues of child abuse and domestic violence perpetrated by service members. As a part of its work on family violence, the FAP addresses many cases of intimate partner sexual assault (Gielan et al., 2006; Shewmaker & Shewmaker, 2014). However, due to the military definition of intimate partner, some victims of intimate partner sexual assault in the U.S. military are filtered into the SAPR program. Therefore, not only is intimate partner sexual assault a form of violence occurring at the intersection of domestic violence and sexual violence, but the U.S. military addresses this unique population through two separate programs. In this article, we use an in-depth analysis of the orders outlining the FAP and SAPR programs, interviews with eight Marine Corps Prosecutors, and the cases prosecuted by the second author to compare these programs. We highlight how victims of sexual assault are advantaged or disadvantaged in services, advocacy, and case prosecution based on program-level factors they may not be aware of. We demonstrate how factors such as victim advocates’ military insider or outsider status and potential breaches of confidentiality by victim advocates can shape victim experiences with FAP or SAPR. We highlight processes and factors that shape victim cases as they are filtered through the U.S. military’s bureaucracy, many of which are often invisible to victims. Identifying these processes can provide a clearer depiction of program benefits and consequences, especially if the U.S. military wants to offer unique services designed for intimate partner sexual assault victims. The programs are analyzed through a lens of victim support, services offered, and structural and interactional constraints on program services. Overall, this article highlights a gap in institutional response to victims of intimate partner sexual violence and argues for more targeted assistance for these victims. More broadly, by highlighting the case of victims of intimate partner sexual assault in the U.S. military, we show that institutions should design programs and services with targeted populations in mind as well as clearly define who is ineligible for these services. Clearly stating who is eligible, who is not eligible, and how individuals are filtered into programs would allow for institutions to identify gaps in program goals and services.
“FAP” Overview
The FAP was established 30 years ago to address domestic violence and child abuse in the U.S. military. FAP falls under the umbrella of Marine and Family Programs, an organization tasked with providing various morale services to marines including behavioral health, family care, personal development, and career counseling programs. It is managed by the installation commander of a Marine Corps base rather than by an operational unit commander or General Court Martial Convening Authority. Therefore, those who meet the eligibility criteria on the same Marine Corps base will have their case managed by the same FAP regardless of their unit. Eligibility for the FAP is restricted to: Service members on active duty and their dependent family members, regardless of their location, and Department of the Navy civilian employees and their family members in a foreign country who are eligible for Military Treatment Facility services may obtain services for child abuse or domestic abuse by self-referral to [Family Advocacy Program]. (USMC, 2012, Ch. 4: 3) An offense under the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or State law involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence against a person, or a violation of a lawful order issued for the protection of a person who is: a current of former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a child in common, or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common domicile. (DoD, 2015b, p. 36)
Family Advocacy Program and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Overview.
FAP victim advocates are civilians and must have a bachelor’s degree in one of six relevant fields as well as 2 years of experience in victim advocacy related to domestic violence and sexual assault (USMC, 2012). FAP victim advocacy is a full-time job. Victim advocates can provide referrals for Military Protective Orders and Civil Protective Orders. Additionally, they are required to provide ongoing victim advocacy; this includes making contact at a minimum of every 30 days; ensuring the victim has a safety plan; support the victim in decision making by discussing options; if eligible, educating the victim on Transitional Compensation for Abused Family Members and assisting them with the application; if applicable, assist the victim with contacting the Victim Witness Assistance Program representative; advise the victim of FAP resources; accompany the victim to medical and court appointments; and act as a liaison between the victim and the chain of command for issues related to the reported incident.
The FAP understands intimate partner sexual assault as a part of domestic violence and related to coercive control (Stark, 2007) and offers unique domestic violence services to victims (DoD, 2017b). Services unique to the FAP include safety planning, offender treatment, and couples/family therapy. Safety planning includes short- and long-term strategies that can help victims survive abusive incidents, plan escape routes, and leave an abuser (Rizo, 2016).
“SAPR” Overview
The SAPR was implemented in 2005 to address sexual assault in the U.S. military, which had been receiving increased media and congressional attention. The program is governed by Marine Corps Order 1752.5C. The stated mission of the program is: to utilize a comprehensive approach to preventing sexual assault within [the Marine Corps] while providing comprehensive prevention and response services to those affected by this crime. The [Sexual Assault Prevention and Response] program provides training and education to Marines, Sailors, dependents, and eligible civilians in an effort to foster an environment where sexual assault is not tolerated, provides guidance on how to respond and report, and works with key stakeholders to hold offenders accountable. (USMC, 2019, p. 2)
The SAPR is led by individual unit commanders instead of installation commanders, the General Court Martial Convening Authority, who is an individual unit commander, has many responsibilities in running a SAPR program. Every General Court Martial Convening Authority is required to appoint an individual to the billet of Sexual Assault Response Coordinator. The Sexual Assault Response Coordinator must be of the rank of Major or above or a civilian equivalent. Commands can opt for a civilian Sexual Assault Response Coordinator who is then a civilian member of the unit (USMC, 2019, p. 4-1). Each Battalion or Squadron within the unit must have at least two uniformed victim advocates. Most commonly, a battalion or squadron is below the level of a General Court Martial Convening Authority; therefore, each General Court Martial Convening Authority will have many uniformed victim advocates within their command located at each of their subordinate battalions or squadrons. Smaller commands not collocated with a battalion or squadron must establish SAPR standard operating procedure and identify the local services available that can provide services to victims within the unit (USMC, 2019, p. 3-3). The ultimate oversight of the program across the Marine Corps is handled by Headquarters Marine Corps SAPR. This differs from the FAP, which utilizes only one program per military installation or base. Under the FAP, an installation commander establishes one program for the entire installation, while under the SAPR, each unit at an installation will have its own program.
A Sexual Assault Response Coordinator is the General Court Martial Convening Authority’s primary SAPR representative. While the General Court Martial Convening Authority is ultimately responsible for the SAPR within their command, the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator is the member of the General Court Martial Convening Authority’s staff charged with the daily operations of the program. The Sexual Assault Response Coordinator is a member of the General Court Martial Convening Authority’s staff and is therefore a member of an individual unit, not part of an entity run by the installation or the base for the benefit of all units at that installation. Their official duty is to “provide an integrated response capability and system accountability for all awareness, prevention and response training and care for adult sexual assault victims” (USMC, 2019). Sexual Assault Response Coordinators are responsible for coordinating the provision of all victim services for sexual assault victims within the command including medical treatment and emergency care as well as overall tracking of a case from initial reporting to final disposition. They supervise all SAPR victim advocates within the General Court Martial Convening Authority’s command. Victim advocates conduct required annual training on sexual assault for unit personnel. SAPR victim advocates are usually members of the military. If they are civilians, they are members of the unit. Victim advocacy in the SAPR program is not a full-time position.
SAPR does not offer safety planning, offender treatment, or couples’ therapy, but it does offer referrals to therapy and counseling services for the victim. The SAPR order specifies that “[Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocates] provide non-clinical crisis intervention and ongoing support, in addition to making referrals to supportive services for victims of sexual assault. Support includes providing information on options and resources to victims” (DoD, 2019, p. 5-1). Additionally, SAPR offers military-specific services such as an expedited transfer for victims (victims can ask to be located to a different base and be moved quickly as a result of their assault). SAPR also offers a reporting stream for victims who experience retaliation for reporting sexual assault, whereas this is not specifically mentioned in the FAP order or under explanations of FAP services.
Under both the FAP and SAPR programs, victims have the option to make a restricted or an unrestricted report of sexual assault. Restricted reporting became available in 2005 in response to victims not reporting for fear of retaliation within their units and due to concerns over their privacy (DoD, 2015a). A restricted report ensures that a victim is able to receive medical care and therapeutic support without command or military justice involvement. Victims have the option under both programs to convert their restricted reports to unrestricted reports. Unrestricted reports allow victims to receive medical and therapeutic services but also alert the command and initiate military legal proceedings. Now that we have outlined each program, we turn to the literature on intimate partner sexual assault victimization.
Victim–Offender Relationship
Previous scholarship on nonmilitary populations has found that there are differences in violence level (Ullman & Siegel, 1993), injuries (Logan et al., 2007; Stermac et al., 2001), mental health outcomes (Culbertson & Dehle, 2001; Ullman & Siegel, 1993), acknowledging, reporting, and seeking services for an assault (Koss et al., 1988; Littleton et al., 2008) based on the victim–perpetrator relationship. For example, it has been found that victims of intimate partner sexual assault have more physical injuries and more nongenital injuries than victims of nonintimates (Logan et al., 2007; Sterman et al., 2001) and are at an increased risk of being killed by their intimate partners (Campbell et al., 2003). Further, victims of sexual assault from intimate partners are at risk of repeated, frequent, and prolonged victimizations as perpetrators have more frequent interactions and access to them (Koss et al., 1988). They also face unique barriers to reporting these abuses as they might live with, be financially dependent on, and share children with their abusers (Bermea et al., 2017). Further, intimate partners have access to victim’s phones, computers, bank accounts, and social media accounts (Garcia, 2010; Woodlock, 2017) and more intimate knowledge of their victim’s support networks, meaning they can better prevent them from reporting. These findings suggest differences in experiences, outcomes, and responses between those assaulted by intimate partners regardless of cohabitation status and those assaulted by friends, casual lovers, acquaintances, and strangers. While this prior research suggests that the victims of intimae partner sexual assault should receive targeted services, only some Marine Corps victims of this type of abuse are receiving them. Additionally, the fact that sexual assault and family violence are considered separate in the organization means that victims of sexual assault are receiving services from two different programs. This article demonstrates the structural, organizational, and interactional differences in how sexual assault cases are addressed within each program.
Method
To understand the institutional response to intimate partner sexual violence within the military, we conducted an exploratory program evaluation on the programs designed to address domestic violence (The FAP) and sexual assault (the SAPR) in the USMC. To start, we analyzed textual sources and documents pertaining to these two programs. Not only do documents and textual sources often provide insight into the nature and structure of an organization (Noaks & Wincup, 2004), but they also provide the explanations for when and how the Marine Corps responds to sexual assault. We analyzed the documents in light of how they would shape victim services and advocacy. The primary documents that we examined were the Marine Corps orders outlining each program as they apply in the Marine Corps (Marine Corps Order [“MCO”] 1754.11 [“FAP Order”]; and MCO 1752.5B [“SAPR Order”]) as well as the 2019 Manual for Court-Martial United States. We also examined documents that constitute higher authorities and therefore influence how programs operate within the Marine Corps (Public Law 113-66 [“2014 NDAA”]; DODI 6400.01; DODI 6400.06; and DODI 6495.02). These documents are made publicly available on the Federal Government web page of the relevant agencies. We read and reread the orders to explore each one’s response to sexual assault as well as differences between them. These documents allowed us to identify structural and organizational differences between the programs that we then analyzed in the context of victim services and advocacy capacity.
To understand the interplay between these different documents, it is important to understand their levels of authority and purpose. The highest level of authority is the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. It is a Federal Law signed into law on December 26, 2013, and serves as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. The main purpose of the annual National Defense Authorization Acts is to authorize the annual expenditures of the DoD. However, it is common that Congress will also include various other provisions related to the operation of the DoD in such a bill. In this case, we specifically analyzed the portions of the law that pertained to mandatory changes to the provision of sexual assault services across the DoD. DODIs are the next echelon of authority that we examined. DODI are issued by the Secretary of Defense and apply to the entire DoD. The Family Advocacy Program Order and SAPR order are both Marine Corps Orders, applying only to the Marine Corps. If there is a conflict between different authorities, it will be resolved in favor of the higher echelon of authority; in this case, a federal law has more authority than a DODI, which has more authority than a Marine Corps Order. This can set up a potentially difficult situation where there is a change in federal law or a relevant DODI and the Marine Corps does not update the relevant Marine Corps Order to bring it into agreement with higher authority. Often, this is not a deliberate failure to change an order and results more from an oversight by the Marine Corps. When this happens, Marine Corps practitioners must disobey their service’s own order so that they are in compliance with higher authority. These conflicts in authority highlight the importance of examining the second author’s personal experiences with working on sexual assault cases alongside of analyzing these documents.
To understand the interactional-level factors that shape victim services and advocacy, the first author conducted interviews with eight military lawyers who have served as prosecutors in the USMC. All of the lawyers had experiences with both FAP and SAPR sexual assault cases. The first author asked participants to describe cases from each program and their interactions with the victim advocates from each program. The first author asked about participants’ perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of each program as it related to their ability to prosecute a case. The first author transcribed all of the interviews and read and reread the transcripts to develop themes for analysis, writing analytic memos to explore potential patterns (Charmaz, 2006; Emerson et al., 2011; Lofland et al., 2006). Interviewing prosecutors rather than victim advocates themselves allowed for us to see how outsiders perceived, understood, and interacted with individuals from each program. This allowed for us to uncover interactional level barriers to advocacy that victims and victim advocates might not be aware of.
Higate and Cameron (2006) argue that autobiographical insights can be valuable to research analyses. Therefore, we also drew on the experiences and the cases of the second author, who has served in the Marine Corps for 9 years, including 7 years as a Judge Advocate. The second author worked with both the FAP and SAPR programs while prosecuting sexual assault, while serving as one of the Marine Corps’ first Victims’ Legal Counsels, and while providing legal advice to Marine Corps Commanders on sexual assault cases as a Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for one of the Marine Corps’ largest units. We critically examined this lawyer’s cases and interaction with victim advocates. Finally, we examined whether and how the second author’s experiences were in line with the orders that outline each program. Using the second author’s autobiographical experiences allows for us to explore discrepancies between orders, policies, and practices. Additionally, the second author’s experience with each program, as well as interactions with others working with those programs, provides insights into how U.S. military culture, climate, and assumptions can shape program experiences and outcomes (Bayard de Volo & Hall, 2015).
Analysis
Specialized Services and Program Eligibility
Service members comprise the majority of SAPR victims and between 35% and 38% of FAP victims each year (DoD, 2016, 2017). Therefore, active duty victims of sexual assault are currently assisted through two different programs that have different focuses, services, and approaches. The SAPR order first states that all active duty service members are eligible for the program. Yet, at another point in the order, it states “The Family Advocacy Program provides the full range of services to victims of domestic violence who are sexually assaulted by someone with whom they have an intimate partner relationship” (USMC, 2012, p. 3) and regarding confidentiality, “Disclosure of sexual assault by a spouse will be deemed a domestic violence case and shall be referred to [The Family Advocacy Program]” (USMC, 2012, p. 1: 1–2). This means most victims of intimate partner sexual assault will be referred to The FAP. However, eligibility for the FAP is limited in scope based on how an intimate partner is defined by the Marine Corps, a definition that excludes intimate partners who are not cohabitating, do not share a child, or have never been married to each other (USMC, 2019).
As mentioned above, previous research has found that victims of intimate partner sexual violence have differences in injuries, frequencies of violence, acknowledging sexual assault, effects, and recovery when compared to victims of sexual assault perpetrated by nonintimate partners (Koss et al., 1988; Littleton et al., 2008; Logan et al., 2007; Ullman et al., 2006). For all of these reasons, victims of intimate partner sexual assault should receive specialized services through the FAP. Yet, not all who self-identify as a victim of intimate partner sexual assault will be referred to FAP services. If one program is better equipped to address the unique factors associated with intimate partner sexual assault, all individuals who identify as victims of intimate partner sexual assault should be eligible for that program. FAP is designed to connect victims with medical resources, provide clinical services, engage in victim advocacy, provide safety planning, provide couples counseling, offer offender therapy, and provide preventative education, all of which might be helpful to individuals who are dating but have never lived together nor had a child together. This is especially true in the U.S. military context where individuals who are unmarried are often required to live on base in group housing units called barracks. Couples living on base might not be ready to get married, yet they might be in a committed relationship where they see one another regularly. Further, military couples that are not married are unable to live with one another due to requirements that unmarried enlisted service members are often required to live in the barracks. Under the current system, these victims would be ineligible for the FAP yet might want and need these the unique services it offers. Further, a victim who had once lived with the attacker might not want or require services tailored to victims of intimate partner sexual assault. Beyond FAP including specialized services aimed at victims of intimate partner violence and SAPR excluding these services, there are structural and interactional program differences that can shape a victim’s experience. We now turn to exploring these differences to highlight processes that shape the effectiveness of each program as it relates to victim advocacy, coordinated services, and victim reporting and disclosure.
Prosecutor Perceptions of Victim Advocacy
Prosecutors interviewed for this study found victim advocates from both programs helpful in communicating with victims and keeping them informed. One prosecutor stated that “the more avenues people have is helpful. They were all professional and cared about victims…and they sort of took off of us the victim maintenance piece. Not entirely…but they played a big role.” Prosecutors stated that victim advocates from both programs managed victim expectations and feelings and communicated victim needs and desires to prosecutors.
Prosecutors stated that while advocates had access to documents and information that could help their cases, they had a difficult time obtaining this paperwork from advocates. One prosecutor stated: “People will gripe about all of these programs because…you know we couldn’t get documents from them.” Prosecutors explained that advocates likely did not share documents with them due to the fact that victim–advocate communications are protected. Another Marine Corps prosecutor acknowledged this, stating “they were not always forthcoming with information because it was privileged.” There was a consensus among prosecutors that if victims agreed to release documents, the FAP victim advocates often had greater access to information that could assist with legal cases. Since the FAP is focused on domestic violence, and has a more comprehensive incident recording system, any prior incidents of domestic violence can be recorded and used in court to show a pattern of problematic behavior by the perpetrator. However, while prosecutors thought FAP advocates had access to more information that could help their cases, they stated that documents were more difficult to obtain from Family Advocacy Victim Advocates than SAPR advocates. One prosecutor stated, They (victim advocates) act as obstructions. They don’t know the definition of privileged information and FAP is notorious for that. It kills privilege if someone else is in the room. If a guy says something in therapy. I need to know that. FAP advocates always think this is privileged information and it’s not.
Commander–Advocate Rapport and Trust
As outlined in the SAPR order, the decision-making process for a sexual assault case occurs at several different levels of a unit’s command structure, and this process is the same for all victims of sexual assault regardless of the victim is working with the SAPR or the FAP. A General Court Martial Convening Authority is usually, but not always, a General officer, in the military pay grade of O-7 or above. The first decision maker in a Marine Corps sexual assault case is the first O-6 or above commander in the accused’s chain of command this commander is referred to as the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority. After a sexual assault is reported, investigated, and a military prosecutor has made an assessment of the case, the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority then makes an initial decision on the case. In making the initial decision, the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority is required to consider the investigation, the victim’s preference as to disposition, and the advice of the unit’s attorney. If the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority believes that the case requires no action or can be handled at a forum lower than general court-martial, they can take that action and the case will never be forwarded to the General Court Martial Convening Authority. If the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority believes the case should go to a general court-martial, then they must make that recommendation to the General Court Martial Convening Authority. The General Court Martial Convening Authority can then either agree with that recommendation or decide that a lower forum is more appropriate. The General Court Martial Convening Authority responsible for the accused has ultimate authority over who goes to court-martial for a sexual assault offense regardless of whether the victim is receiving services from FAP or SAPR. Due to the fact that the individuals making decisions about whether a victim’s case will go to court-marital are all service members, prosecutors believed that SAPR victim advocates, as military and/or unit insiders, would be more familiar with these key decision makers.
Prosecutors interviewed for this study stated that SAPR victim advocates, particularly uniform-victim advocates, were better acquainted with key decision makers for sexual assault cases due to their positions as military and/or unit insiders. One prosecutor stated, Victim advocates are the liaison between the victim and the command and they communicate victim preferences and needs. Both [The Family Advocacy Program] and [Sexual Assault Prevention and Response] victim advocates do this, but someone the commander knows is likely to get further. Especially if the commander relies on that person for other issues…this is more likely to be a SAPR victim advocate because they are members of the unit and have other responsibilities in that unit.
The FAP is managed by Marine and Family Programs, a military program composed of civilians, and not military units. Additionally, FAP victim advocates are civilians, not service members, and they are not associated with a particular unit. Prosecutors stated that FAP victim advocates were not as well known to the commanders making decisions about victim cases. Thus, the FAP victim advocates’ status as both a nonunit member and a military outsider might shape how a commander handles a case or provides services to the victim. While there are other interactional factors associated with a commander’s decision-making process, such as gender and race differences between commanders and advocates, these identities vary similarly among FAP and SAPR advocates. While military insider status is but one potential individual-level factor in commander and victim advocate rapport, it is the one that is different for advocates from the SAPR and advocates from the FAP program.
Additionally, as civilians and not service members, military decision makers may have a lower level of trust in FAP victim advocates’ opinions. The U.S. military’s education, legal, policing, and medical systems are distinct from civilian systems. Additionally, the U.S. military encourages the idea that service members are different from civilians through its discourse, training, and daily operations that all reinforce military insiderness as unique (Hale, 2012; Higate, 2001). In the United States, the military permeates many aspects of service members’ lives, so much so that some scholars theorize that military members might have a hard time transitioning back into civilian life after their service (Higate, 2001). Additionally, the notion that service members are unique, particularly Marines, whose motto is “the few, the proud,” is often used by service members to elevate themselves over others, usually civilians, to reinforce their insider status (Hale, 2012). Indeed, Hale (2012:711) states, “A crucial aspect of military identity is that it is not civilian.” In a context where military insiderness often encourages trust between service members (Hale, 2012; Verweij, 2007), and where civilians are often considered outsiders, victims within the SAPR might have an easier time achieving a decision in accordance with their wishes from a Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority or ultimately the General Court Martial Convening Authority than a victim receiving services from the FAP who have civilian advocates that are neither unit members nor service members. In this case, trust based on insider status could operate favorably for victims in the SAPR program even when the advocate is not well known to the key decision makers. However, it is important to note that all of this depends on the SAPR victim advocates’ level of comfort and ability to negotiate with those key decision makers. It is possible that because SAPR victim advocates must rely on commanders for nonvictim advocacy related needs, they may be more apprehensive to approach key decision makers on behalf of victims. Further, if the commander perceives sexual assault as contributing to a negative image for the unit, SAPR victim advocates, as insiders, might be pressured to downplay these cases. In such instances, FAP victim advocates who do not have unit and insider constraints on their role might be more effective in assisting victims.
Coordinated Services
Both SAPR and the FAP encourage coordinated services for sexual assault victims. However, the SAPR order specifically outlines and requires meetings to ensure coordinated services are provided. One such meeting is the “8-day brief” given by the victim’s immediate commander to the General Court Martial Convening Authority within 8 days of receipt of an unrestricted report. The brief brings together all relevant parties to review the initial response and ensure a coordinated effort for victim care. Generally present at the 8-day brief are immediate commander, the General Court Martial Convening Authority, the Staff Judge Advocate, Executive Officer or Chief of Staff, Sexual Assault Response Coordinator, and the command’s senior enlisted advisor. During these briefs, discussions of what relevant parties could have done differently serve as suggestions to improve future initial responses. It is important to note that the SAPR order requires this brief for all cases involving an active duty victim, not just where victim services are being offered by SAPR, including military member victims whose services are being provided by the FAP. However, because these meetings focus on the command’s response to the victim, FAP advocates are less likely than SAPR advocates to be included and attend because they work outside of the unit. Absence at the brief effects the FAP victim advocates’ ability to communicate victim goals and needs to those providing services.
Another example of coordinated services is the Case Management Group meeting, a monthly meeting of interested parties that come together to discuss and review all open unrestricted reports of sexual assault at a base involving active duty military victims stationed at the installation, regardless of the status or location of the perpetrator (USMC, 2019). The meetings ensure that relevant services are provided to victims, the parties providing services can coordinate their efforts, and all parties working on a case have the most up-to-date information (USMC, 2019). The members of the Case Management Group include the installation commander, the installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinator, all other Sexual Assault Response Coordinators aboard the installation, SAPR victim advocate and/or victim’s legal counsel; command staff judge advocate; Naval Criminal Investigative Service and other law enforcement personnel; health care and mental health representative; victim’s commander; the command chaplain; and if necessary, the command Equal Opportunity Advisor (USMC, 2019). The “command” personnel are only in the meeting when a victim from their unit is being briefed. When all of their victims have been briefed, that command team leaves the meeting and the next command team comes in. The Case Management Group is outlined in the SAPR order, but FAP cases with active duty military victims are included in the monthly Case Management Group meetings. However, while the order requires the presence of SAPR victim advocates, it does not require FAP advocates to participate. The meeting chair (the installation commander and the installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinator) includes others at their discretion, meaning they may choose to include a FAP victim advocate or not. The absence of a FAP advocate at the Case Management Group could lead to a lack of coordination in services and increase the likelihood of gaps in services for victims proceeding through the FAP. Further, in preparation for the Case Management Group, Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (who are a part of the SAPR program) are trained to ask victims whether anyone has retaliated against them for reporting their assault (DoD, 2017a). If retaliatory behavior has occurred, they ask the victim whether they want this behavior to be addressed by the Case Management Group. In 2017, 66 of the 69 individuals seeking to have retaliations handled by the Case Management Group were SAPR sexual assault victims (DoD, 2017a). If FAP victim advocates are not required to be at the Case Management Group, and they are not specifically trained to “regularly inquire” about retaliation, the service members whose cases are in the FAP are unlikely to know that they can have retaliation addressed in this manner.
Victim Advocate Experience and Confidentiality
For the FAP, victim advocacy is a full-time job. Further, FAP victim advocates have considerable training and education related to victim advocacy. To be hired, they must have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field in addition to 2 years of experience in victim advocacy related specifically to domestic violence and sexual assault (USMC, 2012). In contrast, SAPR victim advocacy is not a full-time position. SAPR uniformed victim advocates perform this role as a collateral duty to their main position in the unit. SAPR uniformed victim advocates must be ranked sergeant or higher, and the criteria for their selection includes having the skills necessary to interact with victims and that their past record is free from misconduct as well as domestic violence and sexual assault accusations against them. Uniformed victim advocates’ initial training is conducted by the installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinator, but then their ultimate supervision largely falls to their unit Sexual Assault Response Coordinator. FAP victim advocates are required to have more victim-related training than SAPR advocates; therefore, they may have more tools to help them better interact with victims. This includes tools designed to specifically address intimate partner sexual violence, including understanding violence progression in intimate relationships. Therefore, victims of sexual assault perpetrated by a noncohabiting partner might want and need advocates with this specialized training yet would be unable to obtain it due to the eligibility criteria of the program. Further, FAP advocates’ training combined with their status as military and unit outsiders has an effect on confidentiality of victim information.
The Military Rules of Evidence confer confidentiality on communications between victim advocates and victims on par with attorney–client privilege in regard to the potential use of those communications as evidence for either side at court-martial. While this last point is written in rules of evidence, it is not always practiced as such. One prosecutor stated that while victim advocates had privileged communications with their clients that: “they aren’t always good at managing that privilege. They tend to treat the prosecutor like he is part of the trust tree and he is not.” When probed as to whether or not this was true of all victim advocates across programs, he stated, “[Sexual Assault Prevention and Response] victim advocates are probably worse because they tend to work closer with the prosecutors.” Later in the interview he stated, “They [SAPR victim advocates] are also just more lone operators…operating without as much institutional guidance.” This is likely due to the fact that SAPR advocates are members of the unit and have more frequent interactions with service members who might be working on the case or who are key decision makers in the case. While this might be a benefit in terms of advocating for a victim or pushing for a desired outcome with decision makers, it can invite breaches of confidentiality. As noted above, prosecutors know that advocates have access to information and sometimes documentation that could assist their cases. Therefore, they might be inclined to press for this information, which SAPR victim advocates may be more willing to give them based on their shared rapport as military insiders, more frequent interactions with military personnel, as well as the fact that they receive less training than FAP victims.
The unit model used by the SAPR poses a potential issue of the confidentiality of restricted reports and information given to the SAPR victim advocate by a victim in an unrestricted report. When a SAPR victim advocate is drawn from a unit, there is greater potential that information will be inadvertently shared within the unit. All victim advocates are educated on the confidentiality of communications from the victims they represent. However, since SAPR victim advocates only fill the role as a secondary position, and their training is not as extensive as FAP victim advocates, they might be more likely to breach confidentiality. The second author has seen this lead to breaches, primarily during the 8-day brief and the Case Management Group meetings mentioned above, where individuals involved in assisting the victim are gathered together discussing the case and trying to coordinate the command’s response. During both of these events, a SAPR victim advocate is included (and sometimes a FAP victim advocate) in the meetings to ensure that a victim is receiving the necessary services. The victim advocate will then be asked questions about the victim, many of which either require confidentiality to be breached or invite a breach. For example, in the second author’s presence, victim advocates have frequently been asked to relay the facts of a victim’s assault to the commander and other personnel assembled for the 8-day brief. Assuming that the victim advocate learned this information from the victim, it would be privileged. In the Case Management Group, even well-intentioned beaches can occur, for example, even a safety concern that the victim shared with their advocate is privileged unless the advocate asked the victim for permission to disclose the information at the Case Management Group. In an unrestricted report, a victim advocate communicates that a report is made but not the specific facts related to them about the assault since these are confidential. While it is important for a Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority to understand the facts of a sexual assault for later decision making, asking a victim advocate what a victim has communicated to them about the assault is not appropriate. Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authorities and SAPR victim advocates can too often attempt to seek appropriate information from inappropriate sources for that information. Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authorities should be receiving this information from the initial unrestricted report and later Naval Criminal Investigative Service Investigation rather than asking victim advocates. Recall that SAPR victim advocates are required to attend the Case Management Group while FAP victim advocates may be invited to attend, thus placing SAPR victims at enhanced risk of these confidentiality breaches.
Further, even if SAPR advocates know they should not answer these questions, in a context where there is a strict hierarchy and chain of command are emphasized as key to military effectiveness (Redmond et al., 2015), these questions put active duty victim advocates working in the unit in a difficult position. Typically, the SAPR victim advocates are many ranks junior to the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority and, in the experience of the second author, feel that they have to answer the question and adhere to the hierarchy, even when to do so would breach confidentiality. Additionally, since the victim advocate will know the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority, conversation between the two parties might be more familiar and informal, which also invites a breach. A FAP victim advocate may not be present for an 8-day brief since they are not part of the unit, even though their client, the victim, is a topic of discussion during the meeting. If the FAP victim advocate attends the brief, they are not under the same organizational pressure to answer questions since the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority is not their commander, and they have not been trained in the same way as service members to follow a hierarchical chain of command. While both FAP and SAPR victim advocates receive training in the necessity of their duties to their client, it may be more difficult for an active duty military member to deny the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority information that they request. This is especially true when the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority maintains complete authority over them in their primary duties apart from serving as a victim advocate. Additionally, due to less familiarity and fewer interactions between the parties, it is less likely that a FAP advocate would be asked these questions. Further, FAP victim advocates are civilians with prior experience with domestic violence or sexual assault advocacy, have bachelor’s degrees related to the position, and have more training than their SAPR counterparts. These qualifications, in comparison to SAPR victim advocates who do not have this background and similar level of training, are conducive to them protecting their clients’ privileged information. This is likely why prosecutors expressed more frustration with FAP victim advocates who kept information they deemed confidential even when it could assist with the victim’s legal case. While it is unlikely that victims would know about these breaches in confidentiality because they are not at the Case Management Group meetings, highlighting this issue provides a key difference in victim advocacy between the two programs.
Recommendations for Victim Informed Response
Military sexual assault victims would benefit from more victim-centered care and more information exchange between victims and advocates regarding services. We recommend that the U.S. military response to sexual assault take into consideration victim needs, desires, and requests for particular services rather than assigning them to either FAP or SAPR based on a strict set of criteria that might not align with victim perceptions of their assaults and the victim–perpetrator relationships. The U.S. military’s definition of intimate partner might differ from the victim’s perception of their assailant, meaning that they would either want, yet be ineligible for FAP services, or want and be ineligible for SAPR services based on the institution’s definition of intimate partner. For example, if a service member is sexually assaulted by an ex-spouse who they divorced 10 years prior, they might not want or need resources such as healthy relationship support groups, resources on how to leave an abuser, or family counseling. Additionally, they might prefer to speak with a victim advocate who works in their unit, was located in their building, and who they already had a relationship with. Military victims also possess insider status and may be comfortable being represented by an individual who shares the military experience over an outsider. Finally, they might want to seek an expedited transfer to be relocated to a base away from the abuser and closer to family/friends for support. An expedited transfer is a service specifically outlined in the SAPR program, making it easier to obtain for a victim receiving services from that program. However, based on their status as divorced from the perpetrator, they would be filtered into FAP even though their preferences and needs align better with services offered by the SAPR. Similarly, service members sexually assaulted by someone they were dating for several years might need and desire the specialized domestic violence resources that the FAP offers. Yet they would be ineligible for these services based on the fact that they had never been married, cohabitated with, or had children with the perpetrator. For example, they might want and need safety planning because intimate partners (including boyfriends and girlfriends who have never lived together) often have more informed knowledge about one’s daily routines than acquaintances and strangers. Further, partners are more likely to know work schedules, where the victim’s friends and family live, and be able to access the victim’s social media or email accounts than friends, acquaintances, and strangers (Garcia, 2010). This knowledge can be exploited by an abuser to cause further harm, which might require services like safety planning. Further, these victims may want their intimate partner to go to treatment, or they might desire couples’ counseling and healthy relationship support groups, but they would not receive such resources through SAPR.
Individualized approaches might be difficult to implement and present a number of logistical and practical challenges. However, if victims are presented with the option of choosing a program, they will not only be getting the services that they want and need, but they are more likely to commit to the program. This includes follow-through with legal appearances, medical appointments, therapy, and courses (Cattaneo et al., 2011). While there will need to be a standard so that obvious nondomestic violence cases are not using the FAP’s ability to provide specialized resources, it is clear that sexual assault response in the Marine Corps would benefit from more victim-centered self-determination of which program handles their case. Therefore, our recommendation if the Marine Corps continues to address sexual assault through two separate programs is that victims of intimate partner sexual should default into the FAP but that the definition of intimate partner be updated to include noncohabitating partners. Further, all service member victims defaulted into FAP should have the option of taking their case to SAPR. Additionally, being able to opt into SAPR as a FAP victim might be particularly important because the rules governing which program a victim goes to are convoluted and might be difficult to navigate. Knowing they have a choice to go to a different program and receive different services could alleviate the pressure and stress to research these programs prior to reporting. The choice allows victims to weigh the potential costs and benefits of each program outlined in this article and decide for themselves which program best aligns with their needs. Due to the fact that SAPR already exercises some authority and oversight over FAP through the 8-day brief and case management group, and the Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authority decision-making process, this would be a simple change. Additionally, since SAPR exclusively addresses the need of service member victims, it would not require a significant extra burden or program modification to allow service member victims of intimate partner sexual assault to receive services from this program. Opening up the SAPR to civilian-dependent victims of intimate partner sexual assault may not be appropriate due to this program’s focus on the needs of service members.
Finally, victims of sexual assault have a variety of preferences when it comes to reporting their victimization. In a sample of civilian women who had been sexually assaulted, it was found that women most often disclosed to friends (91.2%), then to mental health professionals (59.9%; Ullman, 1996). This demonstrates that in the civilian population, the victim’s trust and relationship with a person can be an important factor in disclosure. Similarly, it may be that some service members would prefer to disclose to and work with a military insider who they trust over a civilian, an option not currently available to FAP victims. Conversely, research exploring methods of interviewing victims of sexual violence has suggested that some victims prefer more anonymous forms of participation, such as phone interviews or surveys, because they feel these forms ensure confidentiality (Rosenbaum et al., 2006). Many military personnel may be apprehensive of reporting whether it might end up in their official military record and go on to impact their military careers. A study on military sexual assault found service members often use drugs or alcohol to manage trauma rather than seeking mental health resources due to the fear that this would negatively affect their careers (Tinney & Dichter, 2015). While the U.S. military tries to mitigate this through encouraging SAPR victim advocates to inquire about retaliation victims might experience, offering the option to report to a more anonymous source, such as a civilian, might help victims overcome other barriers to reporting, including the fear of potential retaliation. Thus, some victims of military sexual assault might prefer a more anonymous form of disclosure, with a civilian in an office far from their own work space where their colleagues will not see they are meeting with an advocate. Others might prefer to disclose to someone they know and trust and who they believe understands the military context. Therefore, it is recommended that to encourage reporting, victims be given the option to disclose to either another service member or to a civilian victim advocate outside of their unit. These practitioners could then listen to the needs of victims and refer them to the appropriate program. In this article, we highlight how eligibility for the FAPs filters out some victims of intimate partner sexual assault. If the Marine Corps wants to serve intimate partner sexual assault victims differently than others, it should be more inclusive in its program eligibility requirements. Further, almost all sexual assault prevention education and training is focused on nonintimate partner sexual assault as it is directed by the SAPR program, which is not charged with addressing this form of abuse. We recommend that SAPR include trainings and resources on intimate partner sexual violence including the services provided by FAP, which would begin to make intimate partner sexual assault more visible and would acknowledge the intersections of these forms of abuse.
Importantly, this article is limited to a detailed analysis of the orders outlining the FAP and SAPR programs and interviews with Marine Corps prosecutors who work on sexual assault cases within each program. We did not interview victims of sexual violence who used either of these programs to inform the analysis. While our interviews with prosecutors revealed information about program function and issues of confidentiality that victims would likely be unaware of, speaking with victims directly would have allowed for us to highlight a fuller depth of the impact of these programs. It would also have allowed for us to explore victim goals and desires and how programs fulfilled these needs. Future research should explore how victims perceive services from each program. Interviews with victims could also reveal victim preferences and whether they felt their priorities were met by either FAP or SAPR. We also did not include victim outcomes. Exploring victim outcomes as well as victim satisfaction with outcomes would enhance our understanding of how each program addressed the goals and needs of victims of intimate partner sexual assault. Finally, if our approach is adopted, future research could examine the benefits and unintended consequences of allowing a victim to choose a program.
Overall, we find that in an organization that handles domestic violence and sexual violence separately, victims of intimate partner sexual assault face unique issues as their abuse is experienced at the intersections of these two forms of violence. The USMC complicates this even further by funneling victims of intimate partner sexual violence to two different programs. We have highlighted how institutional definitions of intimate partner exclude victims who might self-identify as an intimate partner sexual assualt victim. We urge all branches of the U.S. military to adopt a broad definition of intimate partner when considering domestic violence services. Further, our findings demonstrate the organizational and interactional constraints on program services. Organizational processes and policies are different for each program creating a disparity between victims. While FAP victims receive more specialized services tailored for intimate partner abuse victims (such as safety planning), SAPR victims are more likely to receive coordinated services and services tailored to military careers (such as an expedited transfer or the ability to address retaliation for reporting). We recommend that all victims be eligible for services fitted to their needs based on victim–perpetrator relationship as well as military status. Finally, we have highlighted interactional and informal constraints placed on victim advocacy based on factors such as trust, rapport, and confidentiality. The U.S. military should consider our results related to potential issues of confidentiality in victim advocate and commander trainings related to sexual assault. Overall, this article calls for more attention across militaries to be paid to a neglected victim group: intimate partner sexual assault victims, as they have unique experiences, goals, and needs. Further, we demonstrate the needs for institutions to clarify their program goals, services, and desired outcomes based on not only identifying who is eligible for services but also who is ineligible. Militaries should also evaluate the services they offer in the institution as a whole to identify gaps in victim services. If the USMC had defined ineligibility for both FAP and SAPR, they would have recognized that some victims of intimate partner sexual assault were being sent to FAP while others were being sent to SAPR, forcing them to address this unique population and contemplate tailored services. We hypothesize that other militaries similarly create programs based on specific populations while failing to identify who their programs are not designed to assist. This has implications for program implementation, effectiveness, and adequately addressing specific forms of victimization. Therefore, when creating eligibility requirements and distinctions in services, specifying and justifying requirements for inclusion and exclusion can help clarify program goals and services.
Footnotes
Authors’ Note
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
