Engagement of Military Peacekeepers in Brazilian Politics (2011

Abstract

Peacekeepers are seen as a UN tool for promoting domestic changes in host countries, but little is known about the political consequences when officers return home. During the last 10 years, Brazilian presidents appointed a significant number of former peacekeepers to key political functions. How and why do former peacekeepers end up so involved in government affairs? To answer this question, this paper focuses on the array of skills acquired by peacekeepers in domestic missions and reinforced abroad. Drawing on a set of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires to military, former political decision-makers, and researchers, as well as other primary and secondary sources, this paper details how political articulation, experience in conflict management, and prestige empowered Brazilian military officers to resume their tradition of intervention in politics. This paper also shows that peace operations can produce deleterious outcomes for troop-contributing countries in the Global South.

Keywords

armed forces Brazil MINUSTAH political skills peacekeeping operations peacekeepers

Throughout the 20th century, generals, colonels, and captains intervened in the politics of African, Latin American, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries (Klay & Ogaba, 2004; Rouquié & Suffern, 1997; Stepan, 1988). Although the third wave of democratization¹ put an end to military-led authoritarian regimes, military leaders still secure political autonomy and corporate privileges in many countries. Establishing and maintaining democratic control over the military in new democracies remain a challenge, as military leaders often believe that they have the right to play a decisive role in a country’s political life (Blair, 2013). The Brazilian military is now back in politics, with the highest number of military ministers since the re-democratization, while more than 6,000 active-duty military officers hold positions in the current administration (Lis, 2020).

The politicization of the Brazilian military is not exceptional, but reflective of Latin American dynamics. In countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, the military has assumed a key political role that extends from interfering in episodes of crisis to having a permanent veto power in government policies (Passos, 2021). It is, however, remarkable that a significant proportion of the Brazilian military now in politics has been assigned to peacekeeping missions before joining cabinets and ministries. In the most recent Brazilian governments (2011–2021), 20 peacekeepers were appointed to high-level political posts. This paper aims to understand how and why former military peacekeepers acquired such a crucial role in the Brazilian political system during the latest governments, especially during the administration of Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022). By tasking the military with peacekeeping operations, are Brazilian political elites also supporting their return to politics?

There is a history of military intervention in Brazilian politics. Driven by a sense of superiority and their will to govern in the name of assumed national interests, military officers intervened as a “destabilizing force” during the entire 20th century (Carvalho, 2005). When the military dictatorship was defeated in 1985, the curriculum of military schools remained virtually unchanged (Amaral, 2007). An increase in violent crime in the principal urban centers led to an expansion of the military role to policing-related activities from the 1990s onward. Operations to ensure law and order (GLO operations) provided a new mission for the armed forces.

Brazilian military officers are now back to their usual business, occupying a significant proportion of cabinets and ministries. There are some explanations regarding the return of the Brazilian military to politics. Two of our military interviewees suggest that the existing personal ties between certain military officers and the president (who is a retired Army captain himself) are key to understanding the present politicization of the military (Interview with former military peacekeeper Sérgio Aguilar, personal communication, January 11, 2020). Neto and Acácio (2020, p. 8) argue that the appointment of military peacekeepers is a tool for Brazilian elected presidents to ensure governance. The current Brazilian party system is highly fragmented, competitive, and volatile (Ames & Power, 2008). The president can lean on the political skills former peacekeepers acquired abroad, especially their prestige and ability to negotiate and mediate conflicts, to form and maintain a coalition, crucial to guaranteeing some level of governability.

Yet, little attention has been paid to the experience of the Brazilian armed forces in commanding and deploying their force during the 13 years of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Up until the present day, it is the longest United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) to which the Brazilian army was deployed. Peacekeeping missions can reinforce the military’s self-image as political arbiters due to their multidimensional character. Capabilities for negotiation, political articulation, and conflict management are necessary to support the fulfillment of peace agreements, to secure order, to facilitate the political electoral process, and to assist with the establishment of institutions of governance (Clayton & Dorussen, 2021; Friis, 2010, p. 56). We argue that the existing self-image of the Brazilian military as a political arbiter was reinforced when military officers were deployed in UN peace operations, especially MINUSTAH. Political skills and symbolic resources acquired abroad facilitated their insertion into domestic politics back home. By occupying key political positions, former peacekeepers transfer their political and symbolic resources to political elites or the political system, ensuring governance.

Method

Information was collected and analyzed following two steps. First, data was extracted from semi-structured interviews, conducted in person or via email between January and August 2020, about how and why Brazilian peacekeepers engaged in politics.² These interviews cover three categories of respondents: five former peacekeepers and other military officers, three members of political elites who acted as decision-makers in national defense, and four Brazilian researchers. Respondents were selected based on the criterion that they displayed “significant journeys” in peacekeeping operations. Respondents were asked to comment on a wide array of topics³ that relate to the choices of the three most recent Brazilian administrations to appoint peacekeepers to high-level positions. Furthermore, we have organized a time-series chart for each peacekeeper incorporated into the government, from Dilma Rousseff’s first government (2011–2014) to Jair Bolsonaro’s current administration (2019–present). We have also drawn from official documents (from the Ministry of Defense and United Nations Peacekeeping data), as well as newspaper articles.

Regarding data analysis, we rely on fragments of interviews and empirical evidence extracted from secondary sources to (1) consolidate the historical background of each former peacekeeper during the latest three Brazilian federal governments (see Table 2) and (2) identify cases of peacekeepers acting in national politics. Counterfactual analysis is used to corroborate our findings. In addition, a conceptual framework based on the participation of peacekeepers in domestic policy (Clayton & Dorussen, 2021; Fey & Ramsay, 2010; Gowan, 2019; Hörner et al., 2015; Kydd, 2006) and the political exploitation of symbolic resources (Loveman, 1999; Schiff, 1995) is applied to the data analysis in each one of the three dimensions that constitute our argument. Finally, to reach conclusions and minimally reliable results, we have used the observation of actions as the criterion for assessing both the means (how) and the reasons (why) underlining the mobilization of political skills and symbolic resources by former Brazilian military peacekeepers.

While there is abundant scholarship emphasizing the potential democratizing effects of peace operations (Bruneau & Mendee, 2015; González & Jenne, 2021; Levin et al., 2016; Sotomayor, 2014), our contribution attends to the dreary results peace operations can bring to the civil-military balance in new democracies. This paper shows that a specific category of military officers, peacekeepers, is expanding and renewing the long tradition of the presence of the Brazilian military in politics (Carvalho, 2005; Marques, 2018; Stepan, 1988). The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. Section 1 reviews the literature on peacekeeping, specifically studies that address the politicization of officers from troop-contributing countries when they return home. Next, we analyze the three dimensions of their political action, and how the support of former peacekeepers to authoritarian practices and discourses challenges Brazilian democracy. In the final remarks, we evaluate our findings and assess the regional impacts that the politicization of former peacekeepers may entail.

Peacekeeping Operations: Impacts on Domestic Policy and Tools for Engagement in Politics

Unlike the traditional peacekeeping operations that transpired during the Cold War, contemporary operations are multidimensional, encompassing institution-building and state-building tasks to ensure sustainable peace in the host country (Paris & Sisk, 2009). Most studies focus on the positive consequences for countries contributing with personnel to peacekeeping operations (Beauvais, 2001; Fheterston, 1995; Friis, 2010; Pouligny, 1999). A few works point to problems created in host countries, especially when democracies in these countries have not fully consolidated a considerable level of civilian control over the armed forces (see Dwyer, 2015). Research has also focused “on soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions and the [socio-cultural] challenges they experience in adapting to the home environment in the post-deployment phase” (Heinecken & Wilén, 2021, p. 415).

According to the literature on civil-military relations, peace operations are external military missions and, thus, unlikely to undermine democracy. The model of objective civilian control, elaborated by Huntington (1957) and updated by Michael Desch (1996), states that as military leaders are concerned with external, instead of domestic, affairs, their relations with civilian authorities would be satisfactory and conducive to healthy civil-military relationship patterns inside a country. Peace operations should be a tool to consolidate or maintain democratic control over national armed forces, to the extent that they “submit the military to democratic rule” and keep officers away from politics (Gonzáles & Jenne, 2021, p. 435; Worboys, 2007). South American governments send troops abroad as a way to demonstrate their country’s commitment to liberal democracy and to improve the reputation of the national military (Sotomayor, 2013, p. 46). In addition, peacekeeping operations are a tool to move segments of the armed forces away from politics. This is the case in Argentina, Chile, and Indonesia, all of which were ruled by military-led authoritarian regimes in the past (Fauzia, 2018; Sotomayor, 2010).

However, there is a lack of understanding about the dreary effects that peace operations can entail. Non-Western countries are the main troop contributors to United Nations’ peace operations (Friis, 2010, p. 49) and often have not fully established democratic control over their military. Cunliffe’s (2018) study on civil-military relations in Bangladesh, Fiji, and the Gambia found that peacekeeping helped consolidate military rule in Asia during the 1990s. In this sense, Kenkel (2021) contests the myth of the “democratic peacekeeper” in Brazil, whereas Sotomayor (2014, p. 189) highlights that peace operations “neither empowered diplomats nor increased civilian intervention in defense policies.” Furthermore, Levin et al. (2016) and Cunliffe (2018) argue that Asian authoritarian regimes have drawn on peacekeeping to bolster and maintain centralized rule.

There is some empirical evidence concerning the activism of peacekeepers in domestic politics. However, the existing literature does not describe how peacekeeping operations transfer skills and resources (political and symbolic) to peacekeepers, which could later be deployed by decision-makers and politicians in the domestic sphere.

Military personnel can improve their political skills when they take part in peacekeeping operations in three ways. First, officers can improve and develop skills related to political articulation. Peacekeepers are not only committed to operations and tactics regarding military functions but also to domestic political goals throughout their mission (Gowan, 2019). Force commanders or members of staff heading a peacekeeping force engage in negotiations at multiple levels including (1) with the United Nations Security Council and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), (2) with international non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross or the United Nations Security Council, and (3) at a local level, by coordinating actions with local authorities and civil society groups (Fauzia, 2018). As Kathman and Benson (2019, p. 1610) explain, “peacekeeping can assist local parties to progress from a partial agreement towards a comprehensive settlement. Peacekeepers thus not only try to ‘keep’ but also make peace.”

A second ability that can be used in domestic politics is the experience acquired in conflict management. Peacekeepers learn about mediation to ensure that international actors pursue actions in a coordinated manner (Friis, 2010). Mediation between belligerent parties is also key for the fulfillment of peace agreements. Furthermore, peacekeeping allows nonviolent political actors, such as civil society organizations, to become relevant, and builds a framework that is more conducive to mediation (Clayton & Dorussen, 2021, p. 6). It is common for transformative peacekeeping to take place during ongoing hostilities, blurring the lines between peacekeeping during and after the conflict (DeRouen Jr. & Chowdhury, 2018). Peacekeepers provide information on the development and implementation of agreements, supporting effective conflict mediation (Fey & Ramsay, 2010; Hörner et al., 2015; Kydd, 2006). In short, mediation offers a bridge toward self-enforcing arrangements and makes it more likely that open hostilities will cease (Beardsley, 2011; Gurses et al., 2008). National decision-makers can take advantage of those skills by requesting peacekeepers to perform internal political mediation or advise regional conflict resolution.

Finally, national decision-makers can rely on the good reputation enjoyed by some peacekeepers to ensure domestic legitimacy. Rebeca Schiff (1995) questions the prevailing institutional approach to civil-military relations, as it insufficiently addresses historical and cultural aspects. According to Schiff’s (1995, p. 10) view, values, symbols, and attitudes are important for informing not only the image that society has of its military members but also the military’s perception of its own role. When the army recruits its soldiers, it must draw from existing civilian sectors with distinctive cultural norms and values (Schiff, 1995, p. 11). Furthermore, Schiff’s theory, which she calls the “concordance theory,” emphasizes dialogue, accommodation, cooperation, and shared values and goals among political elites, the military, and society. Thus, for Schiff, military involvement in the decision-making process takes place in the context of active agreements, decrees, or constitutional laws based on long-standing historical and cultural values. In this sense, Brian Loveman (1999) understands that beliefs and expectations define the scope and content of military roles. Intensively relying on secondary sources and historical archives, he concludes that a uniform and long-lasting martial mythology frames the Armed Forces as the “ultimate guardians of the nation” in Latin American countries.

Regarding the symbolic dimension, the participation in UNPKO is perceived as a strategic instrument to create a positive image within international security cooperation, as well as national prestige as a world-peace-loving state (Bellamy et al., 2010). Multilateral forums, such as the United Nations, are a strategic arena in which to build the image of the military as pacifists and cosmopolitan democrats (Fauzia, 2018). Brazilian General Santos Cruz, later appointed minister, was commended for his successful leadership of MINUSTAH and MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo). General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono inherited the success of a highly acclaimed mission both at home and abroad. Yudhoyono was appointed by the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) as Chief Military Observer in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. The former peacekeeper was later elected president of Indonesia for two terms (2004–2014) (Fauzia, 2018). In Bangladesh, the interest in maintaining the Army’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions pushed the military in “a certain direction with regard to holding elections and supporting political parties.” In short, the responsibility for ensuring the succumbent party’s victory in a managed election fell upon the shoulders of the military (Islam, 2010, p. 10).

Brazilian military Andrea Firmo mustered her peacekeeping experience when running for the city of Rio de Janeiro’s mayoral election, in late 2020. Between 2018 and 2019, Firmo was the first woman in the Brazilian Army to become a military observer, taking the role of Team Site Commander in the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Her campaign poster depicts Lieutenant Colonel Andrea Firmo herself wearing a typical UN blue helmet, alongside President Bolsonaro and Mayor Crivella (Kenkel, 2020) see Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Source. Coalition electoral propaganda of PROS, Patriota and PRB parties in the elections for Mayor in Rio de Janeiro in 2020.

Army General Guido Manini Ríos’ journey also illustrates the influence of peacekeeping prestige in domestic politics. Between 1988 and 1989, Ríos was a member of the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observers Group (UNIIMOG), and he also participated in the United Nations Peace Mission to Mozambique (UNOMOZ) between 1993 and 1994. In June 2019, General Manini Ríos ran in the presidential election as the candidate for the Cabildo Abierto Party, receiving the third highest number of votes (El Observador, 2019).

The narrative about peacekeepers’ effectiveness was also utilized to justify the expansion of military roles in public security (Harig, 2019a, 2019b). General Santos Cruz, deployed in MINUSTAH and MONUSCO, was appointed National Secretary for Public Security, from April 2017 until June 2018. General Braga Netto, who was part of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), later commanded the federal intervention in the state of Rio de Janeiro, from February 2018 until January 2019.

It is important to highlight that some scholars are cautious when referring to the development and transference of skills during peace operations. The literature around this issue questions the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in reducing violent conflicts, calling attention to the difficulties of specific peace operations in training peacekeepers (Greentree, 2013; Hultman et al., 2014). Yet, we are not arguing that the Brazilian military was a blank slate before MINUSTAH. Brazilian officers have long had a prior tendency to engage in politics, supported by their self-perception as guardians of the nation. The experience in MINUSTAH enhanced this perception by providing military officers with skills and attributes that are useful in politics: a good reputation, political articulation, and experience in conflict management. The next section details the intervention of Brazilian peacekeepers in politics.

The Brazilian Blues Helmets Come Into Power

Like other Latin American countries, the Brazilian military has a long tradition of political activism. The history of Brazilian military intervention in politics reached its apotheosis with the dictatorial regime that was established in 1964 and ended in 1985. The departure of military rulers from power in 1985 has not prevented the military from maintaining its influence over Brazil’s political life. The military has sustained a strong presence in Federal Executive ministries: between 1985 and 1999, 22.5% of the ministers in the Federal Executive came from the armed forces. In contrast, from 2003 to 2018, military engagement in the Federal Executive dropped to 3.02% (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Military Ministers in the Brazilian Governments (1985–2021).

President	Number of ministries in each government	Number of military ministers in each government
José Sarney (1995–1988)	27	7^a
Fernando Collor (1989–1992)	12	4^a
Itamar Franco (1992–1993)	28	5^a
Fernando H. Cardoso I (1994–1998)	24	4^a
Fernando H. Cardoso I (1999–2002)	26	5^a
Luis I. Lula da Silva I (2003–2006)	34	1
Luis I. Lula da Silva II (2007–2010)	36	1
Dilma Rousseff I (2011–2014)	37	1
Dilma Rousseff II (2015–2016)	39	1
Michel Temer (2016–2018)	39	1
Jair Bolsonaro (2019–)	23	11

Note. From Villa and Passos.

Including the three military ministers representing the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

Initiated in 2019, Jair Bolsonaro’s government clearly represents a “return of the military” to politics (Martins, 2020; Soares, 2018). As demonstrated in Table 1, Bolsonaro’s administration appointed a historically unprecedented number of military personnel to key political positions. At the beginning of 2021, almost half of Jair Bolsonaro’s executive cabinet hailed from the armed forces, which corresponds to 11 out of 23 ministers. This number is lower only than that of General Castelo Branco’s government (1964–1967) (Romano, 2019).

The segment of the military most incorporated into high-level executive positions was that of former peacemakers. Approximately 73% of the 11 military ministers during Bolsonaro’s administration had been deployed to a peace operation. In the 1990s, Brazil resumed its interest in becoming a proactive international player. The main aspiration of Brazilian foreign policy was to become a permanent member of the Security Council (Cavalcante, 2010; Kenkel, 2013a; Villa & Jenne, 2020). Troops were sent to UN peace operations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. With the onset of MINUSTAH (2004–2017), the country placed itself as a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping operations due to both the number of Brazilian troops deployed, around 37,000 officers, and the fact that all MINUSTAH force commanders were from the Brazilian military. However, little attention has been paid to peacekeeping operations in Brazilian domestic politics. The one exception is the use of peacekeepers’ expertise in public security functions, especially in cities like Rio de Janeiro, where they perform police duties to maintain public order (Harig, 2019a, 2019b; Marques, 2018).

Brazil’s robust participation in peacekeeping operations has not gone unnoticed by national decision-makers. During Dilma Rousseff’s first government (2011–2014), General José Elito Carvalho Siqueira, former force commander in MINUSTAH, was the first MINUSTAH military to be named for a key government position. General Elito was appointed Chief Minister of the Institutional Security Office for the President of the Republic. President Temer designated two other peacekeepers for political positions. During Bolsonaro’s government (2019–2022), the political role of former peacekeepers gained unprecedented importance. The number of former military peacekeepers in ministerial positions jumped from two, during the governments of Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer, to 16 during Bolsonaro’s administration. In the following subsections, we demonstrate how former Brazilian peacekeepers took advantage of skills and symbolic resources, mainly acquired during internal functions and missions within the military corporation, and reinforced during peacekeeping functions, to leverage their ascension into domestic policies.

Peacekeeper as Political Articulators

Peacekeepers are expected to negotiate with distinct political groups, assist local parties in maintaining governance, and help with the development of agreements (Kathman & Benson, 2019). Mediation implies conveying to opposing parties their shared views, reducing the cost of an agreement, and making it possible to find a political solution for a contested issue (Clayton & Dorussen, 2021, p. 2). Before troops are sent to a peace operation, military personnel also engage in negotiations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the UN (Andrade et al., 2019, p. 13). These skills are valuable in politics. By transposing the role of the peacekeeper into domestic politics, military officers can improve the flow of credible information and also help belligerents to reveal their true preferences (Beardsley et al., 2006). Peacekeepers could contribute to the governing of the fragmented political system in Brazil (Neto & Acácio, 2020) by acting as a political articulator between different parties, much as they do during peace operations. This could lead the peacekeeper to “consider the political context of his performance. He thus acquires experience [in dealing] with other groups” (Interview with General Santos Cruz, Brasília, February 13, 2020). In other words, once peacekeepers step into politics, they can mobilize and transfer their political articulation skills to other areas of the political system or among political actors who are part of a given coalition in parliament. In politics, their skills could work toward maintaining governance, negotiating with distinct political groups, assisting local parties, and progressing from a partial to a substantial agreement (Kathman & Benson, 2019).

A remark from an interview with a former defense minister in Lula da Silva’s second government corroborates this point: “A mission abroad provides [peacekeepers with] the ability for political articulation. The military . . . will have to articulate with the government [and] local units. It provides them with better training, [and] a more sensible view on everything [about] negotiations” (Interview with Nelson Jobim, São Paulo, March 24, 2020). Luiz Eduardo Ramos, former force commander of MINUSTAH, is a clear example of such a role. As minister for the Secretariat of the Government, General Ramos was put in charge of gathering support for the government’s agenda during negotiations with deputies and senators of the Brazilian National Congress:

Ramos left the barracks, in July 2019, to assume the first position in Planalto, the Government Secretariat. At that time, he was already willing to play the political game. From 2011 to 2012, he commanded the UN Peace Mission in Haiti, In Port-au-Prince [Haiti], his negotiation skills were decisive in speeding up the peacemaking process of Cité Soleil, a rebel nucleus where the UN force was struggling to enter. (Godoy & Natai, 2021)

When military ministers from the Brazilian Civil House or the General Secretariat of the Government are brought into the political arena, they bargain with other political and social groups represented in Congress and civil society. As highlighted by General Eduardo Barbosa, who explained why peacekeepers have been employed by decision-makers during the last three Brazilian governments, “I would say that this is more linked to the power of articulation that the military has in the government . . . the fact that he is a peacekeeper gives him further capacity for negotiation” (Interview with General Eduardo Barbosa, Rio de Janeiro, March 24, 2020).

It is not a coincidence that another peacekeeper, General Rego Barrros, a high-ranking officer of the army, served between 2019 and 2020 as the government spokesman (see Table 2), a position that aims to improve the quality of the dialogue between government, society, and political parties. As a former force commander of MINUSTAH reinforces, “the best qualified military men are sent to peace operations. The same logic applies when they return to their country: the best qualified join the government” (Interview General Fernando Goulart, Brasília, February 13, 2020).

Table 2.

Peacekeepers in High-Level Positions in the Political System, 2011–2021.

President	Name of the former peacekeeper	Participation in UN peacekeeping force	Position in the Brazilian political system
Dilma Rousseff II (2014–2016)	General José Elito Carvalho Siqueira	Force Commander (2006–2007) of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Chief Minister of the Institutional Security Office (GSI), January 2011–October 2015
	General Fernando de Azevedo e Silva	Head of Operations for the Second Contingent of Brazil-MINUSTAH (2004–2005)	President of the Olympic Public Authority during the 2016 Olympic Games
Michel Temer (2016–2018)	General Carlos Alberto Santos Cruz	Force Commander (2007–2009) at MINUSTAH and Force Commander (2013–2015) at United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	National Secretary of Public Security, April 2017–June 2018
	General Márcio Braga Netto	Military observer (1999–2000) at United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	Federal interventor in Rio de Janeiro, February 2018–January 2019
Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022)	General HamiltonMourão	Military observer (1995–1997) at United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)	Vice President of Brazil, January 2019–present
	General Carlos Alberto Santos Cruz	Force Commander (2007–2009) of MNUSTAH, and Force Commander (2013–2015) of the MONUSCO	National Secretary of Public Security and General Secretariat of Government, January–June 2019
	General Augusto Heleno	Force Commander (2004–2005) of MINUSTAH	Chief minister of the Institutional Security Office (GSI), January 2019–present
	General Fernando de Azevedo e Silva	Head of Operations for the Second Contingent of Brazil at MINUSTAH (2004–2005)	Defense Minister, January 2019–April 2021
	General Floriano Peixoto	Force Commander (2009–2010) of MINUSTAH	Minister of General Secretariat of the Presidency, February 2019–June 2019 and president of the National Postal Company, June 2019–present
	General Luiz Eduardo Ramos	Force Commander (2011–2012) of MINUSTAH	Minister of the Government Secretariat, June 2019–March 202, and Chief Minister of the Civil House of Brazil, March 2019–present
	General Márcio Braga Netto	Military observer at the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), (1999–2000)	Chief Minister of the Civil House of Brazil February 2020–March 2021.and Minister of Defense, March 2021–present.
	General Edson Leal Pujol	Force Commander (2013–2014) of MINUSTAH.	Army Commander January 2019–present.
	Admiral Bento Costa Lima de Albuquerque Junior	Military observer (1992–1993) at United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Minister of Energy and Mines, January 2019–present
	Army Officer Tarcísio Gomes de Freitas	Chief-engineer (2005–2006) of MINUSTAH	Minister of Infrastructure, January 2020–present
	Vice-Admiral Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga	Member of the MINUSTAH Staff (2004–2005)	Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense, January 2020–present
	General Ajax Porto Pinheiro	Force Commander 2015–2017) of MINUSTAH; military observer at United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in 1991; military observer at United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in 1992	Special Advisor to the Federal Supreme Court, January 2019–present
	General Francisco Mamede de Brito Filho	Military Observer of the United Nations in Mozambique-1994. In 2012 he commanded the Brazilian contingent (BRABAT) at MINUSTAH	Chief of staff of the National Institute of I EES at Ministry of Education, January–April 2019
	General Rego Barros	Commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion of MINUSTAH (2004–2005)	Spokesman for the Presidency of the Republic, 2019–2020
	Colonel José Arnon dos Santos	Commander of BRABAT-24, (2016)-MINUSTAH	Acting Secretary of Security Public (2016)
	Colonel Freiberg Rubem do Nascimento	Commander of BRABAT-24-MINUSTAH, (2016)	Public officer of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs 2012–Current

Source. Villa and Passos, based on data from the Brazilian Ministry of Defense of Brazil (2021) and United Nations Peacekeeping (2021).

Peacekeepers in Conflict Management

There is abundant scholarship emphasizing the key role of mediation for a UN peacekeeping operation to succeed (Beardsley et al., 2019; Clayton & Dorussen, 2021; DeRouen Jr. & Chowdhury, 2018; Kathman & Benson, 2019, p. 14). As Schwarcz (2020) suggests, the incorporation of former peacekeepers in government affairs is “[. . .] a sign of appreciation for soldiers with a solid career and who have acquired the capacity to manage and resolve conflicts abroad.” Evidently, the skill for conflict management is useful in politics. Former peacekeepers have appeased political conflicts triggered by Bolsonaro against the legislative and the justice powers, even at a regional level. “This ability of participants of peacekeeping operations to talk, to go to the offices [in Congress or other instances], [it] makes things easier” (Interview with General Eduardo Barbosa, Rio de Janeiro, March 24, 2020).

That coincides with the fact that some research in Brazil has been exploring the capacity of its military, for specific situations of conflict, to develop diplomatic capacities and skills to mediate or manage such conflicts (Pereira, 2021; Silva, 2018). The journey of two military officers, both in high-level political positions within Bolsonaro’s government, illustrates this point. First, Minister Fernando Azevedo: “Throughout the institutional crisis in the first half of 2020, when Bolsonaro attended demonstrations that called for the closure of the Supreme Federal Court and the Congress, Azevedo had to balance pressure from all sides” (Gielow, 2021). Azevedo was seen as a bridge between the government, the judiciary, and the military, although he openly embraced Bolsonaro’s ideological agenda.

In February 2019, the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela hit boiling point. The U.S. government and the opposition in Venezuela were lobbying the government of Nicolas Maduro to allow humanitarian aid to enter the country through the Colombian and Brazilian borders. Since this operation failed, the United States, with support from Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Peru, favored an international military intervention in Venezuela to stall the ongoing social unrest. In contrast to Vice President General Hamilton Mourão’s position, Brazil’s foreign ministry was favorable to the possibility of a militarized intervention. “When disembarking in Colombia [in early March 2019] to lead conversations about the crisis in Venezuela, Vice President General Hamilton Mourão was direct: “We will maintain a line of non-intervention. Without [joining] adventures” (as cited in Iglesias & Gamarski, 2019). As a Brazilian congressman claimed, “There was an inversion of roles. Diplomacy preaching ‘force and weapons’ while the [military], professionals in force and national defense, said ‘caution, mediation, serenity’” (as cited in Campos, 2019).⁴ Or, as former Minister of both Foreign Affairs and Defense, Celso Amorim, stated in an interview: “[. . .] It was the military that curbed the wish of the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for an intervention [in Venezuela] (Interview to Celso Amorim, personal, Brasília, February 27, 2020).”

During missions abroad, peacekeepers can reward continued cooperation, provide diplomatic support for the implementation of any agreement, hold parties accountable, and offer a bridge toward self-enforcing arrangements to make open hostilities cease (Beardsley, 2011; Gurses et al., 2008). When peacekeepers return home, they can use these same skills in politics. Conflict management abroad implies helping actors to reach and implement agreements, as well as assisting parties to progress toward a political settlement. This set of skills sometimes overlaps with similar functions within the political system. Such elasticity is quite useful for decision-makers, which explains why blue helmets are occupying several high-level positions at the Executive level.

Peacekeeper’s Prestige in Internal Politics

National pride and prestige are symbolic dimensions associated with Brazilian participation in peacekeeping (Kenkel, 2013b; Uziel, 2009, pp. 340–341). Soldiers chosen for peacekeeping operations already enjoy recognition for their skills inside the military corporation to which they belong (Interview with Army Major Selma G. Moura, Brasília, January 31, 2020; Interview with General Eduardo Barbosa, Rio de Janeiro, March 24, 2020). An international mission reinforces their high esteem in society. The Brazilian military presence in Haiti for 13 years is claimed to be “an outstanding achievement” by military officers (Peixoto, 2017, p. 6), while others mention that it inaugurated a Brazilian way of promoting peace operations (Alves, 2020).

The journeys of two peacekeepers provide evidence of this. First, the case of General Santos Cruz. Both Michel Temer’s and Jair Bolsonaro’s governments appointed him, respectively, to the National Secretariat of Public Security and as chief minister of the Secretariat of Government, mainly due to his famously victorious role as a force commander in both MINUSTAH and MONUSCO. After Santos Cruz’s service at MONUSCO, he was commissioned by the UN to write a proposal to improve the security conditions in which peacekeepers operate (a report currently known as the Cruz Report). Both Temer’s and Bolsonaro’s administrations aimed to leverage his prestige to gain support for their political agendas within the Brazilian Congress (Castro & Marques, 2019). “A symbol of military presence at Esplanada [headquarters of the Federal power in Brasilia], [Santo Cruz also commanded] the Secretariat of Government” (Gielow, 2021), which is a key role in negotiations with Congress.

The first force commander of MINUSTAH, General Augusto Heleno, also illustrates the preeminence that some peacekeepers achieved when returning home. Although Heleno already enjoyed great prestige within the Brazilian armed forces before joining MINUSTAH, it was after his return from Haiti that he, alongside General Santos Cruz, became frequent interviewees in national newspapers and TV programs. Between 2008 and 2015, both officers were invited to national scientific events about political science, international relations, and defense. Santos Cruz and Heleno gave lectures at the main national universities and business organizations in the country.

Personal ties between peacekeepers and decision-makers have been mobilized by the military officers interviewed to explain their recent role in politics. Santos Cruz highlights his friendship with President Bolsonaro since “the time [they] played sports together at the Military Academy” (Interview with General Santos Cruz, Brasília, February 13, 2020). Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Eduardo Ramos joined the parachute brigade in the same year (Interview with former peacekeeper Sérgio Aguilar, personal communication, January 11, 2020). The “domino effect” of the MINUSTAH group is another explanation as to why when “one [military officer] arrived in government, he called others with whom he had served” (Interview with General Fernando Goulart, Brasilia, February 13, 2020). Life stories and military careers surely facilitated access to politics in the overall context of the high prestige enjoyed by peacekeepers.

Reputation, values, symbols, and media representations are important for informing the image that society attributes to the military (Loveman, 1999; Schiff, 1995). As another Brazilian expert in military affairs argues for the case of MINUSTAH, “[. . .] Brazilian Army Generals led the military component, [in MINUSTAH] throughout that period [2004–2017], thus showing their prestige and reputation in the international community” (Alves, 2020). The social and political status of these peacekeepers was recognized, since Brazilian decision-makers were aware of the convenience of their political skills. As noted by the former director of the UNASUR’s Defense School, “[. . .] In the case of ex-peacekeepers, not only did they gain prestige due to the good services provided in these missions, but they also developed professional skills, useful in the current [political and social] climate” (Antonio J. Ramalho, personal communication, January 13, 2020). Furthermore, it was politically valuable to assemble political support within the Armed Forces. As stated by former Minister of both Foreign Affairs and Defense, Celso Amorim:

What do I think Bolsonaro wanted? He wanted to have military support. What did he do? He placed prominent military personnel [in government], [such as the] force commander from MINUSTAH . . . He enlisted outstanding soldiers, who had prestige within the troop. (Interview with Celso Amorim, Rio de Janeiro, February 27, 2020)

Prestigious peacekeeping operations such as MINUSTAH and MONUSCO empowered Brazilian peacekeepers to occupy high positions in the national political system.

Challenging the Explanatory Dimensions

It is important to highlight that the broad participation of peacekeepers in Brazilian politics did not fulfill its expectation of ensuring governability. The main challenge relates to peacekeepers acting as political articulators. As ample research on democracy has suggested, the military should be subordinated to the rule of law and policies defined by civilians (Fitch, 2001; Huntington, 1957, pp. 62–62; González & Jenne, 2021, p. 441). So, this raises the question of how the presence of peacekeepers as political articulators is affecting the quality of democracy and the civil-military balance in sending countries from the Global South, particularly in the case of Brazil. By occupying high-level political positions in the current government, Brazilian military peacekeepers, who were trained in UN liberal values, end up supporting authoritarian practices. During Jair Bolsonaro’s administration, the president has made coup threats against the Congress and the Supreme Court, accusing both of conspiring against him (Folha de São Paulo, 2021). By going to pro-military intervention rallies alongside Bolsonaro supporters, former peacekeepers have played a game of intimidation to make the president’s threats to democratic institutions more credible (Leitão, 2020).

Considering the political role of former peacekeepers, Kenkel argues that current developments in UN peace operations can “[. . .] negatively affect civil–military relations in postcolonial sending countries” (Kenkel, 2021, p. 1). Although fostering democratic control over the military has never been a declared objective of Brazil’s contribution to peacekeeping, it certainly has been a latent aim (Kenkel, 2013a; Sotomayor, 2013). During the Bolsonaro years, the concentration of peacekeepers in government positions has militarized the decision-making process in key areas of national politics, to the detriment of civil society.

The political activism of peacekeepers also undermines the conflict management aspect. General Augusto Heleno is an example of this, as he played a strategic role heading the Institutional Security Office (GSI). During his office, General Heleno endorsed the most radical ideological sectors of Bolsonaro’s government, which then led him and his ministry to be in continuous conflicts with sectors of Parliament and the Federal Supreme Court (STF) (Mendonça, 2020). He was forced to publicly recant after endorsing the need to reestablish Institutional Act n. 5 (AI5) in the case of the radicalization of leftwing groups.

Finally, it is important to highlight that the actual experience of military officers in power, fueling polarization and supporting an authoritarian president, might erode the positive image associated with their UN missions. When Brazilian peacekeepers returned from Haiti, one of the main reasons that leveraged their incorporation into the political system was the prestige they acquired in MINUSTAH, which was commanded by Brazilian officers in Haiti (Neto & Acácio, 2020; Schwarcz, 2020). “Names who are or were part of Jair Bolsonaro’s government worked in the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH), which lasted between 2004 and 2017 and had Brazil in charge” (Sakamoto, 2021). Although there are peacekeepers in high positions of power within the government who were able to detach themselves from the image of professional military men, high-ranking military officers have contributed to the ongoing destabilization of Brazilian democracy.

To conclude, Brazil’s case confronts the argument that peacekeeping is always a tool to promote democratic values and draw the interest of officers away from domestic politics (Bruneau & Mendee, 2015; Worboys, 2007). Our findings resonate with a growing literature that questions the effectiveness of UN peace operations in promoting democratic practices in troop-contributing countries from the Global South (Greentree, 2013; Hultman et al., 2014; Kenkel, 2020). As Sotomayor (2013) argues, peacekeeping has “contributed to mostly illiberal and non-democratic causes,” since peacekeepers at home have failed to “improve transparency and accountability, empower civilians, persuade the armed forces to democratize or acquiesce, or fully reorient officers away from their interest in domestic politics.”

Final Remarks

Researchers have discussed the regular involvement of the Brazilian military in the struggles of domestic political groups over the past 150 years. However, the bulk of those analyses does not thoroughly discuss how and why specific branches of the military corporation meddle with politics. Our results show that Brazilian peacekeepers increased their role in government affairs since the first term of Dilma Rousseff’s administration. When they return home, peacekeepers seemingly present a set of political skills that are valued by governments in the political arena. The prestige, experience in conflict management, and political coordination that are associated with UN peace operations reinforce this perception.

Thus, our contribution is to provide an explanation as to the gradual incorporation of former peacekeepers into Brazilian national politics since the second decade of the 2000s. For this purpose, we have gathered empirical evidence consistent with our initial argument. Peacekeepers have increased their role in government affairs since the first term of Dilma Rousseff’s government because they present a set of political skills that are valued by elites in the political arena. By inviting these military officers to government positions, political elites aim to transfer their prestige and legitimacy to the government.

The perception of these elites regarding the political potential of soldiers’ skills is reinforced in multilateral forums, such as the United Nations. The UN is a strategic arena in which to build the image and prestige of the Brazilian military as competent managers and democrats. Those perceptions may entail domestic reverberations, allowing peacekeepers to expand their political leverage within domestic politics.

Our findings also show that there is no automatic relationship between experience with peacekeeping abroad and a positive contribution to governability back home. The analysis of different dimensions of Brazilian peacekeepers’ political actions (political articulation, conflict management, and prestige) showed their connection with authoritarian practices and the discourse of rulers who destabilize democratic institutions, compromising the civil-military balance. UN peace operations cannot only fuel authoritarian practices and militarize domestic politics, but also reinforce the perception that the military corporation has skills and abilities that the civilian political class lacks, especially in new democracies such as Brazil. With that, however, peacekeepers could assume a political role that distances them from their military professionalism.

Although peacekeepers belong to a specific category of the Brazilian military, they often support a structural trait of their institution: its long tradition of activism in domestic politics. Analogously, other countries that contribute significantly to UN peace operations and present a history of military intervention in politics may experience similar processes. Deteriorating patterns of civil-military relations in Brazil can entail regional reverberations, as aspirations to a military career could easily turn to politics. This is not a remote possibility. Peacekeepers in regions such as South America, Asia, and West Africa have also competed electorally or supported electoral processes. What impact will the increasing integration of peacekeepers in Brazilian politics entail for the region and, specifically, for South American countries? This is a potential topic for future studies on civil-military relations in the region.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor of the AF&S for their thoughtful comments which greatly helped to revise and improve the article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors received funding from the Brazilian Federal Agency for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES).

ORCID iD

Rafael Duarte Villa

Notes

Author Biographies

Rafael Duarte Villa is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science and the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo, Brazil and Director of the International Relations Research Center at the same university. His articles have appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as Contemporary Security Policy, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Conflict and Security, Latin American Politics & Society, Latin American Research Review, Defense Studies, International Relations, and Global Studies Quarterly. His most recent, co-edited book is titled Power Dynamics and Regional Security in Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

Anais M. Passos is an Associate Professor of Political Science in Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. She earns a PhD from Sciences Po Paris and a Post-Doc from Universidade de São Paulo. She has published in journals such as Third World Quarterly, Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa, Bulletin of Latin American Research, and Armed Forces and Society.

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Engagement of Military Peacekeepers in Brazilian Politics (2011–2021)

Abstract

Keywords

Method

Peacekeeping Operations: Impacts on Domestic Policy and Tools for Engagement in Politics

The Brazilian Blues Helmets Come Into Power

Peacekeeper as Political Articulators

Peacekeepers in Conflict Management

Peacekeeper’s Prestige in Internal Politics

Challenging the Explanatory Dimensions

Final Remarks

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

Author Biographies

References