Strategic Styles and Organizational Capability in Crisis Response in Local Government

Abstract

In recent years, challenges in terms of both man-made and natural disasters as well as the lack of resources to deal with such challenges have become increasingly critical to local government. This article adopts an alternative view of strategy-based approach to examine how different strategic styles affect organizational capability in a crisis response. The results of a survey of middle managers in Taiwan’s local government highlighted the relations between strategic styles and crisis response capability. Such results provide public managers with a better understanding of what strategic styles they should adopt to improve their organizational capability in responding to crises.

Keywords

strategic contents strategic processes crisis response capability local government middle managers

Introduction

Taiwan is an area where 73% of the land and population are exposed to three or more hazards, such as typhoon, earthquake, or landslide (The Earth Institute, Columbia University, 2005). During the past decade, reports about disaster management written by the Taiwan government have referred to the lack of equipment, resources, agencies, and coordination as being the major challenges and limits of disaster responses (National Fire Agency, Ministry of the Interior, 1999; National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, 2013, pp. 46-49). In some cases, crisis responses have become seriously criticized by the mass media and citizens and have led to the resignation of high ranking political appointees (Yang, 2009).¹ Because of the vulnerability to disasters, the lessons and experience of Taiwan in the past decades have drawn attentions from around the world.

In August 2013, Southern Taiwan suffered two tropical rainstorms. These storms caused extensive flooding. The way Taiwan handled the flooding raised complaints from both civilians and government officials. In addition, as a special 8-year NT$80 billion (US$2.7 billion) flood control program ends in early 2014, mayors and magistrates in the local government are in serious discussions about the flood control budget for the next few years (Wei, 2013). Officials in the central government consider the crux of the problem to be the flood control and response performance, not the funding amounts. Consequently, a “comprehensive flood control” and “watershed management partnership” has been considered as a future viable crisis management solution (Editorial, 2013).²

Due to the unexpected occurrence of natural disasters and the consequent time limitations for making decisions, the response phase of crisis management is often the most dramatic phase of the crisis cycle (Sylves, 2008). In light of these crises and disasters, there needs to be a shift in central government toward decentralizing power to the local governments, as the local government has to adopt and develop a sense of locality in emergency planning and implement the crisis management actions (Kusumasari, Alam, & Siddiqui, 2010).

From the theoretical point of view, considerable concern has arisen over the importance of organizational capabilities in both public and private sector research (Horton, 2000; Winter, 2003). Different types and aspects of organizational capabilities are embedded in an organization’s process and system, which affects its competitive advantage or disadvantage (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). For public organizations, how they respond to a crisis or emergency situation is found to be directly related to citizen satisfaction levels with the government. More specifically, a dramatic proliferation of research has emerged on “public governance” that is concerned with emergency management (Comfort, Waugh, & Cigler, 2012; McGuire, Brudney, & Gazley, 2010; Schneider, 2011).

In light of the increasing threats of natural and man-made crises, emergency prevention and response requirements for the government—particularly the local government—have become more critical. This is true although the local government was one of the most understudied institutions in the emergency management literature (Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). As a result of the large number of dramatic crises that occurred over the past two decades, researchers have begun focusing their investigations on the role and function of local government in emergency management (Henstra, 2010; McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Somers & Svara, 2009).

This article further develops the theme of crisis management by synthesizing the research on well-recognized managerial influences on organizational capabilities, specifically those regarding the resource-based view and strategic management. The theory of the resource-based perspective has been used to explain how organizations widely develop their capabilities in business management (Bhatt, 2000). However, because strategy captures strategic processes and strategic contents, the effects of strategy on response capability warrant further attention. Indeed, strategy processes are concerned with how objectives and actions are selected and, thereby, encapsulate the internal dynamics of decision making in public organizations. As a result, strategy content refers to an organization’s approach to service delivery (Walker, Andrews, Boyne, Meier, & O’Toole, 2010, p. 732).

The major purpose of this study is to investigate the crisis response capability in local governments and examine which factors influence these capabilities in the context of Taiwan. More specifically, given the theoretical position adopted for the study and the field, as was previously discussed, the study aims to analyze the effect of strategic management on organizational capability during a crisis response.

Organizational Capability During a Crisis Response: From the Resource-Based Approach Toward a Strategy-Based Approach

Organizational capability has become a key element in organizational success. It can be defined as an ability to perform a coordinated task, utilizing organizational resources, for the purposes of achieving a particular end result (Helfat, 2003). It typically involves patterned activities oriented to relatively specific objectives (Winter, 2003). Building an organizational capability has helped corporations respond to the environmental challenges in the 1990s (Ulrich & Lake, 1991).

Crisis management usually involves mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Mileti, 1999). Crisis response is usually viewed as the most dramatic phase of the crisis cycle (Sylves, 2008). Its corresponding activities include emergency sheltering, search and rescue, damage assessment, and other emergency procedures (Mileti, 1999). Crisis response capability is “required to address the importance of need assessment, coordination, information exchange, and logistics management” (Kusumasari et al., 2010, p. 448). However, it is difficult to know what persons will assume what roles and what they will decide to do in terms of immediate actions during a crisis (Aminoff, Johansson, & Trnka, 2007).³

Traditional View of the Resource-Based Approach

Central to the theme of the resource-based approach, organizations are viewed as heterogeneous in relation to resources and capabilities; this largely determines organizational competitiveness. Organizational capabilities are rooted in the ability of the organizations to develop, deploy, reconfigure, and recombine scarce resources that cannot be easily imitated (Bhatt, 2000; Wernerfelt, 1984).

Amit and Schoemaker (1993) argued that organizational capability refers to how an organization deploys resources, usually in combination with and using organizational process, to affect a desired objective. Kogut and Zander (1992) suggested that organizational capabilities are developed around particular resources. Organizations are required to develop different capabilities, while the context and organizational environment change.

Recent literature has presented that policymakers allocate resources to communities to prevent terrorist attacks and improve emergency response capabilities (Bier, Haphuriwat, Menoyo, Zimmerman, & Culpen, 2008; Simonoff, Restrepo, Zimmerman, Naphtali, & Willis, 2011). Here, a resource is defined as “an asset or input to production (tangible or intangible) that an organization owns, controls, or has access to on a semi-permanent basis” (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003, p. 999). Tangible resources usually refer to organizational members, machinery, or financial capital, whereas intangible resources are knowledge-based resources.

Limitations in the resource-based approach have emerged in the public sector. Public management has been found to be distinct from business management (Perry & Rainey, 1988; Rainey, Backoff, & Levine, 1976). One of the most dissimilar attributes is the fact that public organizations are more bureaucratic and hierarchical (Boyne, 2002; Rainey, 2009). Traditionally, the necessary elements of the bureaucratic systems were the focus on formal rules and operations that emphasize the process, rather than the outcomes (Kusumasari et al., 2010). One of the purposes of hierarchy and bureaucracy is effective oversight and control; however, too many structural constraints or rules usually affect organizational effectiveness and performance (Kaufman, 1977).

Another issue is that governments have faced serious financial pressure since the 1980s. The financial deficit has pushed politicians to adopt a large-scale administrative reform over the past decades. Designing a response structure is a difficult task, particularly when public resources are limited (Koehler, Kress, & Miller, 2001, p. 293). In addition, challenges have become increasingly serious since the global financial crisis in 2008 and European debt crisis in the late 2009. Looking for an alternative approach to enhance crisis response capability has become an urgent priority for the government.

Alternative View of the Strategy-Based Approach

A growing number of studies in recent years have shed light on how strategic management affects organizational capability and performance (Boyne & Walker, 2010; Bryson, Berry, & Yang, 2010; Vinzant & Vinzant, 1996; Walker et al., 2010). However, to date, few empirical studies have examined the relationship between strategic management and organizational capability.

What is strategy and how does it function? Strategy is viewed as “an ‘operator,’ which is designed to transform the firm from the present position to the position described by the objectives, subject to the constraints of the capabilities and the potential” (Ansoff, 1965, p. 205), or “the ‘pattern or plan’ that integrates an organization’s goals, policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole” (Quinn, 1998, p. 3). Boyne and Walker (2010) also pointed out that strategy is believed to “set a direction for collective effort to complete desired goals and promote consistency in managerial actions over time and across the organization” (p. S185).

Well-formulated strategies help assemble and allocate an organization’s resources based on its relative internal competencies and shortcomings. These strategies also help in monitoring and anticipating changes in the environment (Goodstein, Nolan, & Pfeiffer, 1993; Quinn, 1998). In other words, a strategy-based approach enables the organization to respond to both internal and external environments.

By reviewing the literature on how organizational strategy relates to capability or performance, the conceptual frameworks of “strategic contents” and “strategic processes” provide an approach for realizing how actual substances and actions of organizational strategy are used (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2007; Boyne & Walker, 2010; Walker et al., 2010). The outcome of strategy making is viewed as a strategy content or stance, defined as an organization’s approach to a service provision (Walker et al., 2010).

Because the focus on strategic processes is critical to organizational success, Hanafizadeh and Moayer (2008) underlined the importance of defining the strategic processes or processes with a strategic nature. The analytical framework of this study presents more details on the linkages of strategic contents, processes, and organizational capabilities.

Analytical Framework and Hypotheses

McGuire and Schneck (2010) pointed out the need for the strategic management of crisis, arguing that learning to manage actions supporting disaster response and recovery operations consistently and effectively requires strategic, not reactive, thinking. Such thinking includes issue-focused, externally oriented, and opportunity-seeking management. The purpose of this article is to analyze the factors affecting organizational crisis response capability. More specifically, we examined the effect of strategic management on crisis response capability in the local government.

Rubin (1988) defined strategy content in a public organization as “a pattern of action through which [organizations] propose to achieve desired goals, modify current circumstance and/or realize latent opportunities” (p. 88). Miles and Snow (1978) provided a classic typology of strategies that covers private firms, as well as public and non-profit organizations. They designated three different strategies from entrepreneurial problems, engineering problems, and administrative problems: the prospector, defender, and analyzer.

Boyne and Walker (2004, 2010) omitted the category of the analyzer, because it combines elements from the prospector and defender categories. Thus, they adopted the three categories of prospector, defender, and reactor for empirical testing. Prospectors are defined as “almost continually search for market opportunities, and they regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. Thus, these organizations often are the creators of change and uncertainty”; defenders are organizations “that take a conservative view of new product development, and they typically compete on price and quality rather than on new products or markets”; finally, reactors “seldom make adjustment of any sort until forced to do so by environment pressures” (Miles & Snow, 1978, p. 29). They are “organizations in which top managers frequently perceive change and uncertainty in their organizational environments but lack a consistent and stable strategy” (Walker et al., 2010, p. 732).

One question that is frequently posed is whether organizational strategy matters. Boyne and Walker (2010) attempted to investigate this question and claimed that strategy is necessary for organizational effectiveness based on at least three assumptions: (a) Strategy matters concern performance that is not completely determined by the technical, institutional, or internal organizational characteristics. (b) The causal mechanisms are concerned with linking strategy to performance. A strategy that is linked to identifiable goals for improvement may help generate support from managers and frontline staff. (c) Strategic management varies across public organizations.

Salaman and Asch (2003) proposed an E-S-C (environment, strategy, and organizational capability) model to better understand the effect of strategy on capability. They argued that environmental information can be used to develop intelligent, alert, sensible strategies, and those appropriate organizational structures, systems, processes, and cultures can support strategies. Finally, certain changes to organizational structures, cultures, and systems are in themselves found to be useful and beneficial; an example is improving efficiencies (Salaman & Asch, 2003, p. 25).

The application of the concepts of strategic content to the organizational capability of crisis responses in the local government leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Organizational crisis response capability is likely to be positively related to an organization with a prospector stance.

Hypothesis 2: Organizational crisis response capability is likely to be positively related to an organization with a defender stance.

Hypothesis 3: Organizational crisis response capability is likely to be negatively related to an organization with a reactor stance.

Strategy processes refer to “how an organization’s objectives and actions are selected or formulated” (Hart, 1992; Walker et al., 2010, p. 732), which can also be defined as “a set of logically related activities and resources needed to transform inputs to outputs” (Bask, Tinnilä, & Rajahonka, 2010, p. 164). The degree of organization in terms of member participation in strategy formulation typically follows the “commanding” and “participatory” models from the public organization strategy process. The command mode refers to strategy making as a conscious and controlled process that is centralized at the very top level of the organization. In other words, the hierarchy of authority plays an important role in the strategy formation process (Glisson & Martin, 1980; Hart, 1992; Mintzberg, 1973; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005).

In the participatory mode, the strategy-making process is based on the interactions and understanding of the organization members, rather than on the execution of a predetermined plan (Ashmos, Duchon, & McDaniel, 1998; Hart, 1992; Whetten, 1978). Hart (1992) argued the strategy-making mode exhibits significant performance differences, due to the role balance/imbalance of top management and other organizational members. Dean and Sharfman (1996) pointed out that the variation in strategic decision-making processes will influence different strategic choices, which will, in turn, influence the effectiveness of strategy.

As such, the hypotheses of the relationships between the strategic processes and organizational capabilities are as follows:

Hypothesis 4: The command mode strategic process is likely to have a negative impact on the organizational crisis response capability.

Hypothesis 5: The participatory mode strategic process is likely to have a positive impact on the organizational crisis response capability.

Data and Method

Data Source and Unit of Analysis

The disaster management system in Taiwan is involved with organizations and their functions, disaster management plans, and operation systems in three levels of governments: central, municipality or county, and township. Article 12 of the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (DPRA) regulates that in case a disaster takes place or the risk of a disaster presents itself, the disaster response center should be created by and operated in the local government. Agencies with different professionals in local government are responsible for different categories of disaster. For example, the fire department responds to disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and fires whereas the departments of agriculture or public work (varies in different local government) respond to landslides. Due to the important role of local government in terms of crisis response, this study collected quantitative data from middle managers within Taiwan’s local authorities.

According to the official websites in Taiwan city/county governments, study participants were involved with 488 public agencies, including departments and bureaus, in 22 of Taiwan’s county and city governments. More specifically, respondents included mid-level public managers, such as directors or section/division chiefs. The survey instruments were written in Mandarin Chinese and were developed from crisis response literature (Henstra, 2010; Kusumasari et al., 2010, p. 448) and strategic management literature (Boyne & Walker, 2004; Hart, 1992; Walker et al., 2010). Likert-type measurement scales were adopted for each instrument to collect data from the respondents’ self-reported answers. To address the research questions effectively, the unit of analysis of this study is defined as an “organization.”

The Ministry of Civil Service (MCS) in Taiwan assisted us in getting a list of 3,214 mid-level managers who worked in 488 public agencies in Taiwan’s local government in June of 2011. The MCS then aided identified contact person in city/county government personnel departments who would help in personally distributing the surveys. We carried out a census to those managers by mailing the questionnaires to the contact persons who assisted with distributing and collecting the mail questionnaires throughout the 488 public agencies.

The data collection period was from late July to late November 2011. For our analysis, 2,190 valid questionnaires were collected, resulting in a response rate of 68.14%. The respondents came from 397 of the 488 agencies in Taiwan’s local government. To analyze the organizational level data (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Bliese, 2000; James, 1982; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000), we first calculated the average values for each individual agency for each instrument of the questionnaire and then coded the organizational data for the follow-up analysis. Table 1 illustrates details about survey response rates, while Table 2 illustrates the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Table 1.

Distributed and Responded Samples in Taiwan’s 22 City/County Governments.

City/county	Target samples (A)	Response samples (B)	Organizational samples (C)	% response rate (= B / A)
Taipei City	262	156	28	59.54
New Taipei City	274	199	24	72.63
Taoyuan County	207	61	12	29.47
Hsinchu County	123	70	13	56.91
Hsinchu City	123	99	18	80.49
Miaoli County	131	118	19	90.08
Taichung City	249	158	23	63.45
Changhua County	139	112	21	80.58
Nantou County	125	111	21	88.80
Yunlin County	117	58	15	49.57
Chiayi County	121	94	19	77.69
Chiayi City	102	84	18	82.35
Tainan City	218	112	18	51.38
Kaohsiung City	238	166	24	69.75
Pingtung County	120	106	24	88.33
Taitung County	105	56	13	53.33
Hualian County	116	113	20	97.41
Yilan County	121	88	16	72.73
Keelung City	117	98	17	83.76
Lienchiang County	34	31	10	91.18
Penhu County	86	84	18	97.67
Kinmen County	86	16	6	18.60

Source. The authors.

Note. Target samples = 3,214; response samples = 2,190; respondent rate = 68.14%; total organizational samples = 397.

Table 2.

Characteristics of Respondents.

Variables	Characteristics	Frequency	Valid %
Organizational attribute	Line	1,475	69.2
	Staff	628	29.5
	Others	27	1.3
Seniority	Under 10 years	1,262	60.01
	11-15 years	249	11.84
	16-20 years	250	11.89
	21-25 years	146	6.94
	above 25 years	196	9.32
Gender	Male	1,312	60.5
Gender	Female	857	39.5
Education	Senior high school or below	27	1.3
	College/university	1,227	56.6
	Master/doctorate	913	42.1

Source. The authors.

Note. This table only calculated the percentages of valid answers in each personal background questionnaire.

Variables Measurement

The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between strategy styles and relevant factors in terms of organizational crisis response capability among local authorities. Table 3 presents a description of the items designed to measure the dependent variable (DV) and independent variables (IV). It also summarizes the descriptive statistics and reliabilities of all items used in this study.

Table 3.

Variables Measurement, Descriptive Statistics, and Reliabilities.

Factors	Questions	Likert Scale	M	SD	% of variance	Communalities extraction	KMO	Cronbach’s α
Crisis response capability (Y)	Q118. Faced with challenges, we have a high degree of resistance to stress.	1-7	4.95	0.65	77.51	0.687	0.92***	.958
	Q119. Faced with challenges, we have rapid response capabilities.	1-7	5.00	0.64		0.794
	Q120. With limited time resources, we have the ability to communicate effectively.	1-7	5.02	0.65		0.827
	Q121. With limited time resources, we have the ability to fully integrate.	1-7	4.98	0.64		0.861
	Q122. With limited time resources, we have sufficient ability to mobilize.	1-7	5.06	0.65		0.819
	Q123. When an emergency occurs, we can quickly obtain external support.	1-7	4.81	0.65		0.711
	Q124. After an emergency occurs, we can quickly return to the original state.	1-7	4.96	0.62		0.788
	Q125. Colleagues deal with emergencies with a high degree of commitment.	1-7	4.90	0.68		0.714
Coordination (Z1)	Q101. Will be sufficient shared resources with other organizations in the county/city.	1-7	4.45	0.63	76.02	0.758	0.84***	.921
	Q102. Will be sufficient coordinated complex issues with other organizations in the county/city.	1-7	4.50	0.65		0.768
	Q103. Will be sufficient shared resources with other organizations with the central government.	1-7	4.34	0.71		0.785
	Q104. Will be sufficient coordinated complex issues with other organizations with the central government.	1-7	4.39	0.68		0.799
	Q105. Will be sufficient coordinated complex issues with other organizations with the County/City Council.	1-7	4.56	0.67		0.691
Red tape (Z2)	Q96. “Red tape” means “cumbersome administrative rules and procedures that have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the organization.” Please indicate the degree of “red tape” in your agency.	1-7	3.87	0.81	—	—	—	—
Budget autonomy (Z3)	Q81. Degree of autonomy in deciding how to organize the budget allocations.	1-7	4.70	0.73	—	—	—	—
Personnel autonomy (Z4)	Q82. Degree of autonomy in deciding human resource allocations.	1-7	4.77	0.73	—	—	—	—
Prospector stance (X1)	Q25. We seek to be first to identify new modes of delivery.	1-7	5.06	0.67	85.96	0.836	0.76***	.918
	Q26. Searching for new opportunities is a major part of our overall strategy.	1-7	5.11	0.69		0.874
	Q27. We continually redefine our service priorities.	1-7	5.11	0.66		0.868
Defender stance (X2)	Q28. We seek to maintain stable service priorities.	1-7	4.63	0.66	62.19	0.433	0.60***	.682
	Q29. The service emphasizes efficiency of provision.	1-7	5.46	0.69		0.672
	Q30. We focus on our core activities.	1-7	5.38	0.58		0.760
Reactor stance (X3)	Q33. We change provision only when under pressure from external agencies.	1-7	3.61	0.81	84.13	0.841	0.50***	.811
Reactor stance (X3)	Q35. The service explores new opportunities only when under pressure from external agencies.	1-7	3.49	0.85	84.13	0.841	0.50***	.811
Command mode (X4)	Q9. The senior officer is the most important person for determining our organizational vision.	1-7	5.97	0.65	92.89	0.929	0.50***	.923
Command mode (X4)	Q10. The senior officer is the most important person for determining our organization’s main strategic objectives.	1-7	5.97	0.64	92.89	0.929	0.50***	.923
Participatory mode (X5)	Q17. Strategy process based on discussions from different classes’ constant interaction has emerged.	1-7	5.01	0.69	86.84	0.882	0.75***	.923
	Q18. All levels of staff provide significant contributions for strategy process.	1-7	5.04	0.69		0.898
	Q19. All levels of staff are involved in the strategic process.	1-7	4.80	0.73		0.825

Source. The authors.

Note. Extraction method: Principal component analysis. KMO = Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin.

***

p < .001.

DV: Organizational crisis response capability

The DV in this study is the organizational crisis response capability. To measure the concept appropriately, this study uses eight items (Questions 118-125 in Table 3) associated with many concerns of the degree of participants’ organizational responses during emergency situations (e.g., response stress, communication, integration, and mobilization). All of these items were measured using a 7-point Likert-type ordinal scale. The internal reliability of these eight items reached an acceptable level (Cronbach’s α = .958). As these items represent the multidimensional components of the concept of organizational crisis response capability, this study conducted a factor analysis using the principal component method and set the eigenvalue at >1 to extract the underlying concept. The results indicated that these eight items can be reduced to one factor. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) Measure of the Sampling Adequacy was 0.92 (p < .001), with a highly explained variance of 77.51%.

IV: Strategy content (prospector, defender, and reactor)

Based on the theoretical discussions, this study analyzed the influences of strategies on organizational crisis response capability. We also analyzed the impacts of different typologies of “strategy content” and “strategy process.” Three typologies of “strategy content” were measured by nine items, all of which used a 7-point ordinal scale and showed high reliability (Questions 25-35 in Table 3). After conducting a factor analysis using the principal component method and reaching a respectively acceptable criterion of KMO and explained total variance, this study extracted the three underlying concepts of prospector, defender, and reactor (Andrews et al., 2007).

IV: Strategy processes (command and participatory)

In addition to the strategy content focusing on the desired outcome of strategy making, we also analyzed the influences of the strategy process typologies that refer to how an organization’s objectives and actions are selected or formulated (Hart, 1992). This current study divided two typologies of strategy process into commander (i.e., a strategy emphasizing the key role of the senior officer in determining the vision or strategic objective of the organization) and participatory (i.e., a strategy of active participation in providing contributions or being involved in the decision-making process).

The two strategy process typologies (commander and participatory) were measured using five items (Questions 9-10 and Questions 17-19, respectively, in Table 3), using a 7-point ordinal scale. After conducting a factor analysis using the principal component method, we extracted the underlying concepts of commander and participatory to reach an acceptable criterion of KMO and explained total variance. More details and the statistical results are also reported in Table 3.

External and internal controls

Organizational crisis response capability might be influenced by both strategic management and the traditional variables related to organizational attributes. Based on the discussions in the theoretical literature, we deliberately considered these organizations’ attributes within our analytical framework, viewing them as external and internal control variables.

Red tape

The public administration field has experienced a dramatic proliferation of research viewing red tape as a critical variable for exploring organizational behavior and performance in bureaucracy. Although red tape may be a frustrating process, it can provide social benefits (Bozeman, 1993, p. 275). However, in a disaster management situation, the elimination of red tape may improve efficiency in crisis responses; this is considered more critical than the social benefits that red tape provides. The White House of the United States (2006) reviewed the experience of Hurricane Katrina and stated, “Most importantly, we must eliminate the extraordinary red tape and resulting delays in the process of requests for assistance in response efforts” (p. 70).

In this study, rule constraints are designed as a “general red tape” item in the questionnaire (Question 96), which asks organization respondents about their perceived degree of “cumbersome administrative rules and procedures that have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the organization” based on a 7-point scale. The mean value of red tape (3.87) illustrates their slightly high perception of red tape’s negative impact on organizational effectiveness.

Coordination

The ability of the public organization to share resources or coordinate their diversity opinions with other organizations is also an important factor influencing organizational crisis capability (Comfort, 2007; Yang, 2010). In this study, we combined five items associated with coordination ability characteristics to extract this concept. These items demonstrated high reliability (Cronbach’s α = .921). After the factor analysis, this study extracted one factor of coordination with a high acceptable criterion of KMO and explained total variance. More details about these five items (Questions 101-105) and the statistics from the factor analysis are reported in Table 3.

Budget/personnel autonomy

Kogut and Zander (1992) and Amit and Schoemaker (1993) asserted that organizational capability refers to how an organization deploys its resources, usually in combination with using the organizational process to affect a desired objective. These researchers suggested that organizational capabilities are developed around particular resources, as organizations are required to develop different capabilities while the context and organizational environment change. In short, resources, such as personnel and finances, are necessary to ensure organizational competitiveness in terms of public administration.

In the context of Taiwan, although the Local Government Act was adopted in 1999, the financial and personnel resources in the local government were found to still be influenced by the central government. Therefore, instead of asking about how many resources the respondents’ agencies had, we asked about “the degree of autonomy in an agency’s budget allocation” (Question 81) and “the degree of autonomy in an agency’s personnel” (Question 82), respectively.

Statistical Models and Results

This article used a multiple regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the relationship between the relevant factors of the crisis response capability of the local authorities. To capture and differentiate the effects of the variables between the traditional organizational attributes and the strategic management thinking of contemporary public management reformers (Walker & Boyne, 2006; Walker & Brewer, 2009), this study deliberately constructed three empirical models in the following sequence: (a) the Organizational-Attributes Model (Model 1, OA); (b) the Strategy-Based Model (Model 2, SB); (c) and the Full-Integration Model (Model 3, FI).

Model 1 only contains traditional organizational attribute variables (e.g., red tape, coordination, budget/personnel autonomy). Model 2 only contains the typologies of the two classifications of strategic management (i.e., strategic contents and strategic processes) variables within the local authorities. In Model 3, we integrated all relevant factors from Model 1 and Model 2 that were affecting the crisis response capacities.

Table 4 provides the multiple OLS regression results for the statistical test of the impact of organizational attributes and strategic styles on crisis response capability.

Table 4.

Multiple OLS Regression: Testing the Impact of Strategic Styles on Crisis Response Capacity.

	DV: Crisis response capacity
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3
Independent variables	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
External and internal controls
Red tape	−0.204***	0.047	—	—	−0.107*	0.043
Coordination	0.350***	0.043	—	—	0.245***	0.040
Budget autonomy	0.208**	0.080	—	—	0.110	0.071
Personnel autonomy	0.349***	0.079	—	—	0.172*	0.071
Strategic styles
Content
Prospector stance	—	—	0.352***	0.062	0.219***	0.058
Defender stance	—	—	0.333***	0.053	0.260***	0.048
Reactor stance	—	—	−0.070^†	0.039	−0.093*	0.037
Process
Command mode	—	—	−0.090*	0.041	−0.077*	0.038
Participatory mode	—	—	0.118*	0.052	0.028	0.049
Constant	−1.851	0.379	2.80e−09	0.036	−0.921	0.352
Model statistics	N = 394 F(4, 389) = 83.15 p < .001 R² = .461 Adjusted R² = .455		N = 394 F(5, 388) = 78.97 p < .001 R² = .504 Adjusted R² = .498		N = 394 F (9, 384) = 64.74 p < .001 R² = .603 Adjusted R² = .593

Source. The authors.

Note. Among all of the variables, the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) was below 3.5. OLS = ordinary least squares; DV = dependent variable.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

We tested the goodness of fit of the three models. The models’ statistics all showed that the F test of the null hypothesis of all the variables parameters when each model is equal to 0 was rejected (p < .001). The variance inflation factors (VIF) of these three models were acceptable which the highest was below 3.5, indicating that these statistical results do not have the problem of multicollinearity.

Table 4 also illustrates that these models provide a very good statistical explanation of the variation of these relevant factors in organizational response crisis capability. The adjustments R² (Adj R²) of the OA Model (Model 1), the SB Model (Model 2), and the FI Model (Model 3) reached 45.5%, 49.8%, and 59.3%, respectively. Compared with the OA Model, after adding the measures of the two main strategic management styles, the FI Model had a significantly (13.8%) higher explanatory power for total variance. This demonstrates that strategic management has a considerable degree of importance for public organizational crisis response capacities. The following discussion will further interpret the influence of these variables.

Discussion

Organizational Attributes and Crisis Response Capability

The first model focused on whether organizational attributes determine an organization’s crisis response capability. The regression results of Model 1 shown in Table 4 provide strong support that the relationships between organizational crisis, response capabilities, and the four internal and external control variables are all significant. First, red tape is found to have a negative impact on crisis response capability. These results are consistent with the view of contemporary thought of public organization and management.

As the literature has proposed, the removal of red tape could facilitate organizational effectiveness (Feeney, 2012; Pandey, Coursey, & Moynihan, 2007; Thompson & Riccucci, 1998). The results particularly correspond to practical experiences. Immediate and real-time response and decision making are inevitable in crisis responses, and red tape usually delays the progress of crisis management.

In addition, as crisis management might involve inter-agency communication (Comfort, 2007; Yang, 2010), we are not surprised that coordination illustrates a significant influence on an organization’s crisis response capability (Model 1). Finally, Model 1 results illustrate that tangible resources are still important for governments when responding to crisis situations. However, due to the deterioration of the global economic and financial environment in recent years, governments around the world have faced serious challenges in terms of budget deficits and fiscal debt. Hence, looking for an alternative approach to enhance crisis response capability has become increasingly important for local governments.

Strategic Styles and Organizational Crisis Response Capability

Based on the literature review and our framework, the strategic style base is the alternative approach adopted in this study. Model 2 highlights the relationships of strategic styles and organizational crisis response capability. In our framework, strategic styles refer to strategic content and processes. All three variables of strategy content—namely, prospector, defender, and reactor—as well as those of strategy process—namely, participatory and command—have statistically significant correlations (p < .10) on organizational crisis response capability. These results are consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Andrews et al., 2007; Boyne & Walker, 2010; Miles & Snow, 1978; Walker & Boyne, 2006; Walker et al., 2010) and correspond to our hypotheses.

The empirical results provide strong support that strategic styles are key variables associated with the operational effectiveness for organizations. In this study, we prove that, as long as the organization can obtain strategic direction, regardless of whether it is looking for new opportunities or defending existing strategic objectives, it will help improve its crisis response capability. Organizations that only respond to the external environment, however, inherit ambiguous or even conflicting strategic directions when they face environmental pressures, resulting in a negative impact on their crisis response capability.

Strategic processes include the command mode and participatory mode in this study. Conventionally, we might have a stereotype that command control will ensure the efficiency of the crisis response. The results of Model 2 indicate that the command mode has a negative impact on organizational crisis response capability, but the participatory mode effect positively affects the capability. In terms of the functions of strategic management, organizational members are expected to form the common strategic goals more effectively, where participation means more communication and coordination (Goodstein et al., 1993; Hart, 1992).⁴

Organizational Attributes, Strategic Styles, and Crisis Response Capability

To examine the synthesized effect on the organizational capability of the crisis response, Model 3 demonstrates the more comprehensive results. First, when we added the external and internal controls to Model 3, all the strategic style variables, except for participatory mode, still significantly affected the crisis response capability and had the same relationships as in Model 2. However, it is interesting to note that when comparing Models 1 and 3, the effects of the organizational attribute variables to the crisis response capability were reduced. In particular, the significant effect of the budget autonomy in Model 1 was drastically diminished in Model 3. These results provide evidence to support that the adoption of strategic management would somehow compensate for the limitations of scant resources.

Theoretically speaking, strategic management is aimed at answering the following fundamental questions (Goodstein et al., 1993; Wheelen & Hunger, 2002): (a) Where is the organization going? (b) What is the environment? and (c) How does the organization get there? These questions imply that strategic management not only seeks more resources but also considers how to reallocate resources rationally.

Practical cases provide proof of the importance of strategic thinking to crisis management. On one hand, typhoons and floods have been the major natural disasters in Taiwan in the past few decades. Despite both central and local governments spending huge amounts of money on regulating rivers and other water resources, serious damage has still occurred in recent years. That is to say that civil engineering projects are not a key element in ensuring effective crisis prevention or response. We believe that strategic style for crisis response will provide more benefits for this issue.

On the other hand, democratic development in Taiwan may also lead politicians to a myopic situation in the face of pressure from stakeholders or when considering their term of office. This also makes politicians more inclined to take reactive strategic stances.

Conclusion

The impact of strategic management on organizational capability has drawn widespread attention in public management (Boyne & Walker, 2010; Walker et al., 2010; Winter, 2003). With dramatic changes in the environment, organizations must enhance their response capability to maintain a competitive advantage and overcome uncertainty and ambiguity.

In this article, we analyzed how strategic styles matter in terms of organizational capabilities during a crisis. The theoretical arguments on strategic content and processes were partially confirmed through a statistical analysis of the determinants in Taiwan’s local governments. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications.

More specifically, our analysis demonstrated that strategic management provides an alternative view for examining factor impacts on organizational capability. The traditional resource-based approach argues that resources are critical in developing organizational capability. Yet, when we realize that resources cannot guarantee organizational success and understand that governments lack resources, especially after financial crises, finding an alternative approach becomes a major task for both practitioners and academicians.

At the same time, very little evidence has been conducted on the effect of strategic style on organizational capability during a crisis. We have extended the existing literature by theorizing and empirically exploring the effects of several key organizational activities on the development of organizational capabilities. Our results illustrate that a higher organizational capability with a prospecting or defending stance may facilitate local government response to a crisis. For example, a local public agency with a defending stance during a crisis may encourage organizational members to determine how to overcome the limitations in rules or regulations of the public sector or at least cope with the crisis under standard operating procedure (SOP). This also reflects the current situation of Taiwan’s disaster management approach. According to the DPRA, local governments should draw up local disaster prevention and response plans, with the goal of positive guidance in a disaster response.

Nevertheless, a prospecting stance is usually more effective than a defending one (Boyne & Walker, 2010; Walker et al., 2010). This has been illustrated across regional, large-scale, and multidisaster cases. This is the reason that Taiwan’s central government proposed the ideas of “comprehensive flood control” and a “watershed management partnership” after the hit of Typhoon Morakot in 2009 and two tropical rainstorms in August of 2013.

It may take time and money to coordinate and network agencies across the local and central governments to develop a comprehensive plan and partnership; however, once the ideas are accepted and practiced by the governments, the efficiency and capability will be highly improved in terms of disaster responses.

Although a commanding process has a negative effect on organizational response capability, as Hart (1992) argued, we do not want to disclaim its possible functions flatly. Not all top managers are experts in responding to a crisis; thus, it may be helpful to introduce participation to improve the decision-making process. However, we believe that the effects should be investigated, because crises have different characteristics and personnel might have different experiences with the strategy.

The findings we present also raise further questions about organizational capabilities in terms of responding to crises that are worth a systematic analysis. In this study, we only used tangible resources as control variables. However, understanding the influence of intangible resources, such as knowledge, on crisis response capability is also important. In addition, organizational activities, institutions, and culture may affect organizational capability. Therefore, an in-depth investigation of these factors could broaden the discussion.

Finally, organizational capability could be viewed in terms of a learning or dynamic approach. Theories regarding resilience and agility in crisis response operations have provided insight into this topic. This may complicate the debates, but it may also yield more valuable findings on the subject.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express their appreciation to Minister Without Portfolio and Professor Chung-yuang Jan (Examination Yuan, Taiwan), Associate Professor Jun-yi Hsieh (University of Taipei, Taiwan), and Assistant Professor Chung-an Chen (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) for their support and comments to this study.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The research was supported by the grant from the National Science Council (NSC 99-2410-H-009-018-) of Taiwan.

Notes

Author Biographies

Chun-yuan Wang, Ph.D., is an associate professor, Department of Police Administration, Central Police University, Taiwan. He also serves as the secretary-general at Chinese Association of National Competitiveness in Taiwan. His research interests are crisis management, strategic planning and management, and policy analysis.

Ming-feng Kuo, Ph.D., is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Graduate Institute of Public Affairs, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan. His research interests include public policy, performance evaluation, local governance, applied econometrics.

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