Exploring the Role of Dynamic Social Capital in Collaborative Governance

Abstract

The literature indicates that social capital plays a crucial role in facilitating collective action in collaborative governance. Despite this important role, the extant literature has not systematically conceptualized what forms of social capital exist in the context of collaborative activities and when and where such social capital contributes to the effectiveness of collaborative regimes. Reviewing the role of social capital as addressed by prior studies, this article advances a theoretical lens to assess how social capital fosters collaborative governance. Specifically, multiple forms of social capital can help participants to achieve collaborative goals throughout sequential phases and substantive arenas of collaboration.

Keywords

social capital collaboration trust network collective action

In the last two decades, collaborative governance has received much attention from scholars and practitioners, primarily because collaboration among public, private, and nonprofit organizations results in achieving policy goals through collective decision making and management (Ansell & Gash, 2007). In collaborative governance, cross-boundary or cross-sector entities achieve complex policy goals through collaborative efforts by utilizing public–private partnerships, intergovernmental agreements, community-based alliances/councils, and relational contracts of service delivery (Huxham & Vangen, 2005).

Despite the advantages of collaborative governance, there are inherent obstacles to producing collective policy goals. These obstacles arise from conflicts or power imbalances, uncertainty, and the lack of resource identification or resource flows. Conflict and skewed power may result in poor outcomes by triggering goal incongruence among conflicting partners or by promoting powerless actors to be passive in the collaborative process (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Purdy, 2012). Furthermore, uncertainty in the collaborative process may prevent partners from substantively engaging in joint decision making due to the high transaction costs in maintaining self-organizing governances or common-pool resources regimes (Feiock, 2007; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). Resource-related problems may also lead to failed collaboration. Although multisector partners actively engage in search of limited resources to achieve their goals, they may hesitate to commit to collaborative efforts when they confront difficulties in identifying or acquiring the resources needed to accomplish their desired outcomes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Van de Ven, 1976).

The social capital literature posits that networks, trust, and norms can reduce barriers and improve the effectiveness of collaborative governance (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993, 1995). At the community level, social capital embodies important aspects of a community’s beliefs, goals, and willingness to cooperate; without social capital it would be vastly more difficult to pursue collaborative efforts. For instance, social capital may be used to facilitate network activities that strengthen the interdependence between groups through the flow of resources and information. Establishing a high level of social coherence is also a crucial factor in pursuing collective goals based on mutual trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993). Finally, shared norms foster collective efforts by mitigating conflict or power asymmetries due to diverse values and cultures (Coleman, 1988).

Despite social capital’s relevance to collaborative governance, few studies have clearly described the specific roles of social capital in collaborative processes. The purpose of this study is to conceptualize the dynamic role that social capital plays in facilitating collaboration. The contribution of this research is to describe the role of social capital in fostering collaborative governance by understanding when and where different forms of social capital exist in the context of collaborative activities.

To develop this conceptualization, this article reviews prior studies that address the roles of social capital in collaborative governance and advances a new framework to assess how social capital contributes to the success of local collaborative governance. In particular, this research demonstrates what forms of social capital (networks, trust, and norms) lead to successful governance by improving the effectiveness of collaborative activities. Furthermore, the evolutionary phases of collaboration (formation, process, and outcome) describe when social capital is used to facilitate collaborative action. Finally, the arenas of collaboration (structure, cognition, and content) represent where social capital is utilized in working toward common objectives.

Description of Social Capital in Collaborative Governance Studies

Much of the literature touches on the importance of various forms of social capital in creating successful collaboration. Specifically, three research streams¹ exist in collaborative governance studies in public administration that describe the roles of social capital (Table 1).

Table 1.

The Assessments of Social Capital in the Studies of Collaborative Governance.

Research stream	Research focus	Roles of social capital	Primary studies
Integrative approach	Modeling the structures, processes, and elements of collaborative governance	Social capital is a core element that affects the inclusion, innovation, and adoption of cross-boundary systems	Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006)
			Thomson and Perry (2006)
			Thomson, Perry, and Miller (2007)
			Ansell and Gash (2007)
			Emerson, Nabachi, and Stephen (2012)
			Sørensen and Torfing (2011)
Public management approach	Examining how collaboration enhances the effectiveness of public management and public sector performance	Social capital is associated with the collaborative goal setting, structures, behaviors, and communication that improve the outcomes of public service delivery and policy implementation	Milward and Provan (2000)
			Provan and Milward (1995)
			Agranoff and McGuire (1998, 2001, 2003)
			Meier and O’Toole (2003)
			Agranoff (2006); McGuire (2006); Amirkhanyan (2009)
			Milward, Provan, Fish, Isett, and Huang (2009)
Transaction cost approach	Overcoming barriers to collective action by reducing uncertainties surrounding self-organizing or common-pool resource governance	Social capital reduces collective action problems in the adoption or creation of particular policies, institutions, and agreements	Ostrom (1990, 1998, 2005)
			Lubell and Scholz (2001)
			Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, and Mete (2002)
			Schneider et al. (2003)
			Feiock and Scholz (2009)
			Feiock, Steinacker, and Park (2009)

The first stream seeks to conceptualize an integrative model of collaborative governance to identify the overall processes and mechanisms of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2007). Even though these studies do not directly address social capital, they depict social capital as a key factor that affects the contextual dynamics of collaboration. In the integrative model, social capital plays a role in determining who is included, how actors interact, and what innovations or outcomes are produced across the stages of collaboration.

Collaborative public management studies are the second stream of related research (Agranoff, 2006; Agranoff & McGuire, 1998, 2001, 2003; Amirkhanyan, 2009; McGuire, 2006; Meier & O’Toole, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2000; Milward, Provan, Fish, Isett, & Huang, 2009; Provan & Milward, 1995). These studies emphasize that collaboration is an emerging management practice that facilitates problem solving in the complex environment of modern public management. The public management approach examines how collaborative governance contributes to the effectiveness and outcomes of public management activities. Collaborative management studies identify the role of social capital as enhancing the outcomes of public service delivery and policy implementation in the areas of social, human, and educational services or economic development. This stream provides important research questions and propositions that explain the role of social capital in improving the success of collaborative management.

A third research stream discusses institutional and transaction cost approaches that focus on the obstacles to creating policies, institutions, and agreements that facilitate self-organizing or common-pool resources governance (Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009; Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002; Lubell & Scholz, 2001; Ostrom, 1990, 1998, 2005). This research attempts to discover the mechanisms that overcome barriers to collective action within collaborative governance. This stream demonstrates that social capital plays a crucial role in overcoming collective action problems by reducing transaction costs. The Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework describes how social norms or rules contribute to institutional arrangements that foster collective action among actors.

Although the prior literature addresses some aspects of social capital in collaborative governance, analyzing the dynamic role of social capital remains a challenge. One reason that this challenge persists is that the conceptual focus in prior studies is not centered on social capital. Social capital has been regarded only as a tool to mitigate power imbalances, facilitate value or goal consensus, and produce outcomes through collective action. Therefore, our field remains unclear as to what forms of social capital exist in collaborative governance, when social capital is utilized, and where social capital facilitates collaborative processes. To address these questions, this study conducts an integrative conceptual analysis that advances a generalized framework of social capital across various aspects of collaborative governance. This framework is operationalized as the forms of social capital (networks, trust, norms), the evolutionary phases of social capital (formation, process, outcome), and the arenas of social capital (structure, cognition, content).

Varieties of Social Capital and Collaborative Governance

Forms of Social Capital: Networks, Trust, Norms

The concept of social capital is studied by scholars across academic fields. Recently, studies within sociology, economics, and political science have engaged the concept of social capital to describe the dimensions of collective action in cross-boundary governance (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Ostrom, 1998, 2005; Putnam, 1993). From these studies, social capital is defined as the trust, networks, and norms that facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual interest in collaborative governance. Networks, trust, and norms are characterized by structural and cognitive forms of social capital (Grootaert & Bastelaer, 2001; Park & Feiock, 2004; Uphoff, 2000). These forms of social capital are important because they account for what contributes to collective activities within collaborative governance.

Networks are structural in that they serve as an organizing factor and conduit for social capital, which helps to define the structure of collaborative governance. There are various types of networks according to their strength (strong/weak), formality (formal/informal), openness (open/closed), and density (dense/disperse; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003; Stone, 2000). Despite various types of networks, overall, strong and weak ties are the primary forms that reflect the different attributes of networking. Many network nodes are linked through weak ties, which are conducive to actors’ acquiring resources and information from external groups (Granovetter, 1973). A member’s early connection within such a network structure may be considered weak because his or her interaction is informal, open, and disperse. However, as actors interact with other partners in more intensive and frequent ways, they form a strong tie that is more formalized, closed, and dense. For example, informal community clubs are disperse and inclusive to new members, whereas governmental committees have formal and dense structures due to a small number of members and a formal decision-making process.

In addition to networks, trust and norms represent cognitive forms of social capital, which are subjective and contain less tangible dimensions. Trust is the core concept of social capital, which encompasses an individual’s perception of others (Fukuyama, 1995). Cooperation in networks builds trust in individuals, groups, and institutions by sharing information, resources, and promoting values of reciprocity (Cox, 1997; Hogan & Owen, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1997). A high level of trust among partners is critical to the success and effectiveness of collaborative governance because it encourages collective action among actors. A high level of trust is also indispensable to the social stability of collaborative governance. Alternatively, norms are the collective or shared values among participants. Stolle (2000) argues that social capital should be understood from the collective perspective because it exists within commonly embedded contexts among group members. Common experiences or repeated collective action develops common norms and values that are shared by partners in collaborative governance (Hawkins, 2010; Olberding, 2002). At the community level, Cox (1997) describes such collective beliefs as a sense of community that is created by engaging in frequent and long-term interactions. For example, common-pool resources problems in managing forestry or watershed resources demonstrate that regional norms may solve shared problems within common-pool resource regimes (Lubell et al., 2002; Ostrom, 2005). Table 2 displays the different forms of social capital, which are conceptualized as networks, trust, and norms, and further details their operationalization.

Table 2.

Forms of Social Capital.

Networks: Structural form	Trust and norms: Cognitive form
Weak tie	Trust: Individualistic
Informal	Trust in individuals
Open	Trust in groups
Disperse	Trust in institutions
Strong tie	Norms: Collective
Formal	Shared values or beliefs
Closed	Customs or manners
Dense	Cultural identity

Phases of Collaborative Governance: Formation, Process, Outcome

A precondition for the conceptual development of the role of social capital in collaborative governance is to define the dimensions of collaborative governance. Several studies assess the sequential dimensions of collaborative governance by suggesting integrative models or frameworks (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson et al., 2012; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). These studies describe the sequence of collaborative governance as antecedent (driver/starting or initial conditions), process (dynamics/action arena), and consequence (outcome) stages, which are similar to the heuristic of policy making that is explained in three stages of decision, implementation, and evaluation (Sabatier, 2007). In accordance with these studies, this article presents three evolutionary phases of collaborative governance in terms of formation, process, and outcome to explain when social capital affects collaborative governance.

Formation is the phase at the outset of collaboration where collective efforts are initiated or created within the preconditions of certain contexts. These preconditions affect the formation of collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006). At this phase, individual actors identify internal resources or values, search for external resources and partners, and negotiate with partners to achieve their internal goals. The initial context may either facilitate or discourage ongoing cooperation, engagement, and commitment within the collaborative process (Emerson et al., 2012). In the formative phase, when preconditions match the collective actors’ needs, goals, and values, collaborative governance may emerge as a result.

Process is the phase in which participants convene and interact in the collaboration by eliminating obstacles that were posed in the initial context of the collaborative effort. The characteristics of the collaborative process are multifaceted and may be operationalized as linear/sequential or cyclical/iterative. The linear processes include prenegotiation, postnegotiation, and implementation (Gray, 1989) or preparation, policy development, and decision making (Edelenbos, 2005). Alternatively, the cyclical processes generate the cycles of communication, trust, commitment, understanding, and intermediate outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2007) or principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action (Emerson et al., 2012). The process phase encourages actors to conduct the work of collaboration to build commitment and achieve intermediary outcomes that will lead to the attainment of joint objectives.

Outcome is the last phase, which produces tangible outputs in collaborative governance. The results of the outcome phase may vary between collaborative efforts and thus, it is difficult to define its boundary and scope. Some prior literature conceptualizes the range of outcomes as first, second, and third order outputs (Innes & Booher, 1999; Lubell, Leach, & Sabatier, 2009); however, this article operationalizes the outcome phase as the creation of institutionalized structures, achieving goal/value consensus, and joint decision making/action that emerges as a result of collaborative efforts. This operationalization is consistent with literature that considers the outcomes of collaboration, such as enacting new rules or laws, policy making, and reaching value/goal alignment as a result of collective action (Ansell & Gash, 2007).

Arenas of Collaborative Governance: Structure, Cognition, Content

While the formation–process–outcome model is well defined in the sequential dimensions of collaborative governance, collaborative governance also has structural, cognitive, and content arenas that lead to effective collaborative efforts. The existing literature does not clearly define these components in collaborative governance although they refer to structural and cognitive aspects through network analyses and social trust studies (Cox, 1997; Grootaert & Bastelaer, 2001; Milward & Provan, 2000; Olberding, 2002). In addition to evolutionary phases of when social capital is utilized, identifying substantive dimensions of where social capital is utilized is conducive to understanding complex collaborative processes. Because previous studies have not addressed these substantive dimensions, this research deductively conceptualizes the structural, cognitive, and content dimensions of collaborative governance and investigates the facilitating role of social capital in this arena. Refining these dimensions provides a relevant analytical frame for assessing where dynamic social capital works to enhance collaborative governance.

Structure is an exogenous arena where participants contact, interact, and cooperate with other partners in each phase of collaborative governance. This arena exists outside of actors’ internal belief systems, norms, and values, and represents external sources and uses of power in collaborative governance. The literature argues that even collaborative governance contains aspects of conflict and power asymmetries despite an underlying cooperative and mutual spirit (Agranoff, 2006). In this sense, this arena describes the uses, structures, and levels of authority in respect to who is included or excluded in the collaboration, how decision making and communication are formalized, what resource flows are made available, and what institutions are created as a result of collaborative governance.

Cognition represents a perceptual arena where participants’ trust, norms, and values exist. These endogenous dimensions constrain or promote participants’ behaviors in the decision making and compliance associated with collaborative governance. In collaborative governance, stakeholders’ belief systems are affected by the context of collaborative governance and play a critical role in the formation, process, and outcome phases by influencing actors’ trust, internal judgment, and commitment to collaborative efforts.

Content is the last arena where collaborative governance is substantively conceptualized. This arena is associated with functional issues and outcomes that are required to attain the goals of collaborative governance. Such issues and outcomes are identified in both structural and cognitive arenas; thus, the content arena encompasses the integration of both structural and cognitive aspects of social capital in achieving the goals of collaborative governance. The content arena specifies what issues and alternatives are addressed or what common outcomes are sought through collaboration (Purdy, 2012). If the scope of issues and outcomes are identified, participants may exchange their resources and knowledge to address these issues and pursue outcomes through joint decision making or collective action.

Roles of Dynamic Social Capital in the Phases and Arenas of Collaborative Governance

This conceptualization assumes that collaborative dynamics contribute to a social capital loop in which forms of social capital have a cyclical and snowballing effect on initiating, facilitating, and developing collaborative governance throughout the phases and arenas (Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Warner, 1997). The virtuous cycle expands the different forms of social capital that exist throughout the sequential phases of formation, processes, and outcomes as well as the arenas of structure, cognition, and content. An integrated conceptual analysis to assess the roles of social capital within collaborative governance is deduced by juxtaposing the three phases along with the three arenas of collaborative governance. Table 3 presents the conceptual framework and propositions that describe how different forms of social capital contribute to the success of collaborative governance by removing barriers to collaboration across the phases and arenas of collaborative governance.

Table 3.

The Role of Dynamic Social Capital in the Phases and Arenas of Collaborative Governance.

	Sequential phase
Substantive arenas	Formation	Process	Outcome
Structure	Weak tie (open/disperse/informal)		Strong tie (closed/dense/formal)
	Recognizing partners, power sharing, and mitigating conflict	Leading to decentralized, flexible, and horizontal structures of collaboration	Creation of formal authority structures: Policies, rules, and institutions
Cognition	Trust (individualistic)		Norms (collective)
	Reducing uncertainty in starting collaborative activities	Building reciprocity, shared commitment, and understanding on the importance of collaboration	Reaching goal, mission, and value consensus
Content	Weak tie, trust		Strong tie, norm
	Resource identification and initiating resource exchange	Structuring channels in resource exchange and facilitating flows of resources, information, and knowledge	Joint decision making/actions for achieving substantive goals/purposes

Roles of Dynamic Social Capital in the Formation, Process, and Outcomes of Structural Arenas

Social capital affects how stakeholders participate in the collaborative structure, how participants’ authorities are defined, and what structural outcomes are authorized to achieve collaborative goals across the sequential dimensions. In particular, networks play a salient role in structuring collaborative governance. Different types of networks exist in the context of collaborative activities and may evolve across the phases of collaborative governance. Generally, weak tie networks exist early in the collaborative structure, but weak ties may evolve into strong ties as the collaborative activities mature. As the collaboration progresses over time, collaborative structures may become more formalized with the connection between partners becoming highly dense through frequent interaction among collaborative partners.

During the formation phase, weak forms of networks play an important role in creating collaborative governance because the structural aspects are informal, open, and disperse to include new members. Initial actors may not be aware of essential information including where other partners may be found, potential power asymmetries, and if potential partners have divergent goals. Among the barriers to selecting partners, power inequalities and conflict are the most salient components in prohibiting the formation of collaborative governance, even though they are problematic across all phases of collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012). Identifying appropriate partners is indispensable to initiating collaborative activities. Power imbalances may arise when some stakeholders do not have authority, resources, or legitimacy, which causes powerless actors to hesitate in becoming involved in the collaboration out of fear of manipulation (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Purdy, 2012). Conflict may also emerge as a result of different goals and expectations among participants and can discourage the initial collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006). Ex ante social networks can help identify potential partners as well as transform uneven power into shared power arrangements to subdue conflict and promote the formation of collaborative governance. Particularly, disperse networks enable partners to identify who is credible through the extended links that are weakly connected within and across collaborative arrangements (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). In addition, conflict between powerful and powerless stakeholders may be substantially relieved by sharing common values and exchanging resources in open and informal networks. Here, powerful participants may choose to voluntarily constrain their power because they value their reputation in broad networks. Put simply, social networks can transform a “power-over” into a “power-with” mentality that facilitates the initiation of collaborative structures (Agranoff, 2006).

At the process phase, the structure of governance is complex and may vary in the type of networks that carry out collaborative activities (Provan & Patrick, 2007). A variety of contexts may create diverse channels of governance. For instance, the boundaries of open and disperse networks narrow in the selection of collaborative partners during the initial stages, and the chosen partners’ connection is enhanced throughout the initial period of negotiation. A collaborative network may also foster common objectives and reciprocal relationships among participants, which results in a collaborative structure that is more voluntary, decentralized, and flexible. Frequent and reciprocal interaction in horizontal networks is integral to creating decentralized structures for collaborative processes. The capacity and commitment to pursue joint problem solving is embedded in stakeholders who have previously participated in local networks (Bardach, 1998). Collaborative stakeholders may also be aware that more flexible and voluntary structures are the most effective in achieving intended outcomes by identifying problems, formulating ideas, and adding knowledge in a shared learning system (Innes & Booher, 1999). These network systems facilitate participants to exchange new ideas in problem solving through horizontal and voluntary communication channels where power is shared among participants.

At the outcome phase, a strong social network is indispensable to institutional results as the structural sources of authority may yield collective aims. As collaborative efforts proceed to achieve common goals, participants become closely connected through more frequent and intensive contact. Collaborative partners feel that their interactions and decisions need to become more formalized to ensure the stability of their collaborative activities. Thus, they structurally legitimize collaborative activities through issuing mandates of rules and practices whereby formalized authority emerges in the last phase of collaboration (Provan & Patrick, 2007). Prior studies have empirically examined how networks affect the creation of formalized authority in collaborative governance (Hawkins, 2010; LeRoux, Brandenburger, & Pandey, 2010; Olberding, 2002; Ostrom, 1998; Park & Feiock, 2004). In regional governance, a variety of rules are created or enacted as a result of participant interactions in a self-governance network. Collaborative experiences in regional policy networks and associations facilitate the creation of institutional procedures for interlocal joint action, partnerships, and agreements (Hawkins, 2010; LeRoux et al., 2010). Interlocal cooperative norms and trust are cultivated in solidifying regional partners’ strong ties and foster institutional formations by boosting collective action on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity (Hawkins, 2010; Olberding, 2002).

Roles of Dynamic Social Capital in the Formation, Process, and Outcomes of Cognitive Arenas

Social capital may reduce a participant’s perceptual barriers to collaboration, cultivate the norms of reciprocity, and, finally, help to reach a goal or value consensus for the collaboration. Particularly, intangible forms of social capital such as trust and norms play a primary role in the cognitive arena of collaborative governance. Individual actors’ trust in collaborative partners is a key factor that initiates collaborative activities and weakens the cognitive barriers to collective action. Trust in other partners yields collective norms as partners share common knowledge and experiences throughout collaborative processes. Eventually, participants achieve genuine goal consensus due to shared beliefs and values regarding collaborative activities.

At the formative phase of collaboration, uncertainty is a primary cognitive challenge. Organizations may select different forms of governance to reduce uncertainties related to transaction costs that may arise (Williamson, 1981). Likewise, rational actors may join the collaborative process when they believe that the benefits of collective action outweigh their costs (Ostrom, 1998). Voluntary governance emerges when transaction costs are mitigated in bargaining, coordinating, and enforcing collective action (Feiock, 2007). Trust also reduces collaborative partners’ concerns regarding uncertainties at the formative stage. A prior history of cooperation in a community or interlocal network builds trust that yields a positive cycle of collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Potential participants are confident that other partners are trustworthy and credible in the division of joint gains and the implementation of collaborative agreements.

At the process phase, both individual trust and collective norms play an important role in strengthening the participants’ belief systems. The literature depicts collaboration as a process where trust, commitment, shared understanding, and motivation are developed by face-to-face communication, shared learning, and resource/knowledge exchange (McGuire, 2006). The process of building shared beliefs may not be linear but cyclical. For instance, a prehistory of antagonism makes it difficult to cultivate trust and shared commitment among stakeholders, while ex ante trust reinforced in the initial negotiation creates a cycle of building shared norms, commitments, and values in the collaborative process (Brinkerhoff, 1999). Alternatively, the collaborative process itself develops collective social capital through a trust-building loop (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Ansell and Gash (2007) identify an integrative model that supports that cognitive social capital—including trust, commitment, and shared understanding—is developed by face-to-face dialogue and achieving intermediate outcomes in horizontal networks. A collective understanding and beliefs may be cultivated in a cyclical collaborative process that enhances the level of social capital within collaborative governance and produces intermediate outcomes of the collaboration.

At the outcome phase, cognitive results of collaborative governance are accomplished by reaching a consensus of goals, missions, and values. The literature conceptualizes consensus as common ground and aims (Huxham, 2003; Padilla & Daigle, 1998; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Despite reaching a tentative consensus in the formative stage, individual stakeholders may have hidden aims due to their own personal or organizational goals (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). However, stakeholders may build shared values or understandings related to the importance of collaborative goals in the cyclical process of collaboration. Such collective norms can help participants reach a consensus on genuine and explicit aims of the collaboration. Common beliefs motivate individual participants to adapt discrepant goals through cooperative communication to reach the authentic goal or value consensus of collaborative governance.

Roles of Dynamic Social Capital in the Formation, Process, and Outcomes of Content Arenas

Collaborative partners exchange their resources, knowledge, and information. Here, both structural and cognitive forms of social capital exist in the content arena, which contributes to ensuring substantive outcomes by helping participants identify and exchange needed resources, structuring the flow of resources, and fostering joint decision making. In this arena, social capital helps partners exchange substantive content including resources, knowledge, and information. Specifically, weak networks and individual trust are conducive to initiating the content arena of collaborative governance, whereas strong networks and shared norms make greater contributions to the final outcomes of collaborative governance in the content arena.

At the initial phase, one of the driving forces in collaboration is resource scarcity (Alter & Hage, 1993; Levine & White, 1961). Resource dependency theory contends that organizations take advantage of strategies to acquire needed resources to achieve their goals (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Collaboration is a horizontal and voluntary strategy for acquiring additional resources for an organization. However, barriers develop when participants have difficulty in identifying which actors possess the needed resources and whether the partners are credible in exchanging those resources. Here, a weak network is more beneficial to the identification of resources because of the various links to external groups. Actors collect a variety of information on the extent of others’ resources by using their connections within and across their organizations. Although actors identify resources in widely connected networks, they may hesitate to exchange resources when they are not sure of other actors’ credibility. However, when there is trust in potential partners or the recognition of a positive reputation in relation to external resources, actors may decide to participate in the collaborative process to acquire needed resources.

At the process phase, prior studies also examine how the actual flow of resources and knowledge occurs between organizations after the collaboration is initiated (Agranoff, 2006; Emerson et al., 2012; Van de Ven, 1976). In the process of collaborative governance, the flow of resources and knowledge is an important component that leads to substantive outcomes. For instance, collaborative partners may exchange financial and human resources, materials, knowledge, and innovative ideas to work toward collaborative aims. The level of information flow is measured by the intensity, variability, and frequency of the exchange of resources among stakeholders (Van de Ven, 1976). Social capital, such as networks, trust, and norms, expands the flow of resources in the collaborative process. Horizontal and decentralized networks provide useful channels that increase the intensity of resource and knowledge flows in collaborative governance. Collaborative stakeholders also build trust in other partners and common norms by identifying their level of commitment and experiencing intermediate outputs known as “small wins.” The participants expect that sharing their resources and knowledge will produce benefits in the long term. These expectations gradually increase the flow of resources, knowledge, and information among the participants in a positive loop of the collaborative process.

At the outcome phase, social capital enhances the substantive outcomes of collaborative governance. The conceptualization of substantive outcomes varies across the literature, including the achievement of actual goals (Gray, 2000), socially embedded relationships (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), impacts resulting from collaborative dynamics (Emerson et al., 2012), and self-governing collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). This research incorporates these prior studies by defining substantive outcomes as “collaborative decision-making and joint action for achieving substantive goals or purposes.” The content of substantive outcomes, then, includes the products achieved by joint decision making and action. Social capital is essential to reaching the desired outcomes that are targeted by the legitimate stakeholders of collaboration. Collaborative networks and shared norms are strengthened by creating formalized institutions and reaching goal or value consensus, which extends the flow of resources and knowledge. Eventually, collaborative actors may achieve desired outcomes, based on broad problem solving, innovation, and transformational learning (Rhodes, 1997; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).

Discussion and Conclusion

In collaborative governance, we find that social capital is indeed dynamic. Here different forms of social capital are utilized in various ways—such as to establish important structural channels of exchange, to increase the overall level of trust and commitment to collective objectives, and to identify important information and resources—across the phases and arenas of collaboration. The study conceptualizes that various forms of social capital exist in collaborative governance and that these forms play a dynamic role in the success of collaborative governance. The conceptualization identifies that social capital is influential in different ways at various stages of collaboration, and without social capital, it would be difficult to pursue collaborative efforts that lead to joint decision making and action.

Our conceptual framework makes practical and theoretical contributions to a variety of collaborative projects and studies. Practitioners may be interested in this conceptualization of social capital and its implications due to the fact that public managers operate in an increasingly complex environment that involves shared governance between public, private, and not-for-profit partners. As a result, a practitioner’s need to foster effective collaboration to achieve substantive outcomes in the public interest is paramount. Here we describe how social capital can be utilized to delineate shared authority, beliefs, and resources within a collaboration that may be particularly helpful to practitioners who operate in policy arenas that are competitive, lengthy, and uncertain. Furthermore, this new approach helps public managers understand when and where different types of social capital are influential across the phases of collaborative governance by providing an integrative conceptual framework. Specifically, public managers can diagnose the uses of social capital across the phases and arenas of collaborative governance and can choose a strategy to enhance collaboration between the partners.

From a theoretical standpoint, analyzing social capital through the lens of collaborative governance expands on existing theories surrounding the complex mechanisms of collaboration. This approach refines our understanding of collaborative arrangements by conceptualizing what forms of social capital exist, when social capital is used, and where social capital facilitates progress toward multifaceted policy objectives. This approach integrates both the social capital and collaborative governance literatures and represents a new theoretical contribution to the field. By developing an integrated framework, we explore how collaborative stakeholders may use social capital to compile the necessary authority, information, and resources to navigate the collaborative governance phases to pursue common objectives.

Although our study examines how various forms of social capital may enhance collaboration conceptually, future studies need to substantiate the role of dynamic social capital in collaborative governance by analyzing cases at the local state, national, and international levels. In addition, quantitative studies will be valuable in generalizing the roles of social capital in collaborative governance. Future studies can systematically test how different types of social capital contribute to the creation of collaborative projects and their substantive outcomes with large N samples.

Despite the need for such future research, this study is an initial step toward understanding the complexity of the dynamic role of social capital in collaborative governance. In addition to utilizing a new framework to increase our understanding of collaborative efforts, we expect that our study will provide public managers with meaningful insight into the role that social capital plays as they seek collaborative arrangements to achieve complex policy goals.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Youngmin Oh is an Associate Fellow in the Korea Institute of Public Finance. His research interests include local policy and management, public finance, policy analysis and evaluation, performance management.

Carrie Blanchard Bush is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Justice Studies at Appalachian State University. Her research interests include the collaborative aspects between the public and private sectors as well as local economic development.

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