Another Civil War in America? Comparing the Social Psychology of the United States of the 1850s to Today

Themes in Contemporary Prognostications of Severe Political Dysfunction

Works referencing simultaneously the U.S. Civil War and the current era are becoming too numerous to list comprehensively. Within this corpus, Brownstein’s (2008) analysis of the modern, long-term trajectory has proven especially prescient. Yet lacking to date are rigorous, direct, and theoretically complex comparisons of our current era with that of the Civil War.

Some existing literature focuses on documenting historical and crossnational party polarization that has led to conflict (McAdam, 2018; Melleuish, 2022; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, 2023). Jacobs, for instance, examines the distance between the parties, using voting metrics to illustrate how the hyper-partisan politics of the Jim Crow era (stretching from the Civil War until just after World War I) increasingly reemerged starting in the 1980s (Jacobs, 2014). Walter, on the other hand, compares contemporary civil wars around the world with the deterioration of democratic norms in the United States (Walter, 2022).

The growth and nature of social partisanship is a common topic among scholars (Box, 2022; Chua, 2019; Calhoun et al., 2022; Finkel et al., 2020; Kahn, 2022). Occasionally, it is studied behaviorally as “affective polarization,” the reflexive tendency to denigrate opposing partisans while elevating one’s own “team” (Druckman et al., 2021; Iyengar et al., 2019). Other scholars and political commentators look at the rise of conservative hyper-partisanship and its associated dangers, particularly in light of the long liberal cycle that largely functioned from the 1960s until the end of the Obama presidency. These studies emphasize the potency of a conservative cultural backlash (Box, 2021, 2022; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), especially revolving around social justice for BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color), Latinx, LGBTQ, women, and other minoritized identities (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; DiAngelo, 2018; Hage, 1998; Jardina, 2019).

Another major thematic concern—generally integrated with others—relates to the corruption of democratic norms of civility, fairness, reciprocity, and, importantly, outright process corruption (Foa & Mounk, 2021; Gidengil et al., 2022; Kingzette et al., 2021; Sabato et al., 2021). Yet another literature focuses on the corrupting influence of specific individuals (Ben-Ghiat, 2020; Patapan, 2022); in the American context, this has been dominated by profiles of former President Trump (e.g., Woodward & Costa, 2021).

Environments Prone to Violent Political Conflict

Concern, then, is widespread among academics and “within the Beltway.” Despite grave woeeies about current levels of civil discord, most academics and political commentators consider the prospects of a successful coup or civil war to be relatively low (Kelly, 2022; Pan, 2022). A civil war is not nearly as simple as the American “North versus South” paradigm appears (at least prima facie). Many factors can interact and lead to a major violent political conflict. In what follows, we assume that the more entropic factors that exist—and the greater the intensity and duration of those factors—the more plausible a civil war becomes (Goldstone et al., 2022). As with any major historical development, however, civil wars are not inevitable even when the conditions seem ripe, because trigger events may not occur, opposition may be disorganized and unrealistic, or autocratic controls are too well entrenched (e.g., Reisch, 1991).

Nevertheless, social, economic, and political factors can create a more conducive environment for civil war. Social dysfunctionalities comprise—inter alia—violent protests and riots, high crime rates, vigilantism, and extralegal expulsions from a community. American history is replete with violent protests and major riots such as the New York Draft Riot of 1863, the Tulsa Riot of 1921, and the Watts Riot of 1965. High crime rates, moreover, are associated with the Reconstruction Era as well as the 1970s and 1980s (Levitt, 2004; Vandal, 2000). Vigilantism was rife through the Jim Crow era, while quasi-legal and extralegal expulsions were conducted on a massive scale against citizens branded as Tories during and after the American Revolution and involving Hispanic U.S. citizens and immigrants during the Great Depression (Balderrama & Rodríguez, 2006; Bateson, 2021; Equal Justice Initiative, 2017; Jasanoff, 2012).

Economic conditions leading to various levels of civil strife often occur with sudden or extended economic contractions and other negative economic indicators, including high inflation, a declining standard of living, rising privation (such as homelessness), and wealth inequity. The United States, for instance, experienced relatively high inflation from 1973 to 1981, which caused a restructuring of the economy. Since then, the rise in the U.S. middle class standard of living has stalled and, for some groups, has declined (Leonhardt & Quealy, 2014). Meanwhile, wealth disparities have ballooned (Piketty, 2013; Saez & Zucman, 2020). Such economic dysfunction is more likely to lead to political instability when (personal, regional, and other) income disparity is extreme, unemployment is rampant and growing, and traditional safety nets are eroded amid economic flux—especially when some groups feel oppressed or economically threatened (Druckman et al., 2021; Rotberg, 2010). The reverse also holds: political instability is less likely when people sense “government” is effectively trying to aid them, even during bad economic times (Andrews, 2012; Caprettini & Voth, 2022; Knack, 2002).

Another prominent catalyst for civil strife and/or radical changes in power is the lack—or erosion—of civil and economic liberties, whether acquired legally or otherwise. Many political commentators note the increased likelihood of violent confrontation when democratic and civil liberties decline (Bauer et al., 2021; DiMaggio, 2022). Somewhat counterintuitively, but well-documented empirically, Walter (2022) argues that civil wars in the modern era are most common among quasi-democratic and quasi-autocratic states rather than fully autocratic (or fully democratic) states. Examples of weakened democratic and civic norms include voter suppression laws, extreme gerrymandering, politicization of the judiciary, various types of governmental and private sector corruption, politicization of the military, reductions in press liberties, reductions in free speech, and intra-country travel restrictions (Reeves & Smyth, 2021; Repucci, 2021). Such are the concerns of the present.

Types of Major Civil Strife

Just how ominous are these signs? It can be a bit tricky to interpret what is accurate given the commercialization and polarization of the modern media, where stories are spun ever higher, faster, and louder in hopes of increasing viewership; hyperbole is a well-worn tool in the modern media’s kit. One of the challenges of interpreting and understanding political commentators’ assessments about the risks for civil war is related to the very definitions of civil war and other species of socio-political unrest. As the political scientist Ted Robert Gurr noted, although “No country in the modern world has been free of [strife] for as much as a generation,” nonetheless “[r]elatively few occurrences of strife are ‘revolutionary” (Gurr, 1969). Further delineation of these terms is, therefore, essential. For the purpose of this discussion, we heuristically identify five types of overlapping socio-political unrest. We also point out eight plausible outcomes based on precedents from U.S. history. These types and outcomes are highly interrelated, and, in some cases, mutually constitutive—for example, a regime change can both lead to and result from civil war. We enumerate these processes to highlight the complex and multidimensional role of socio-political unrest as a historical catalyst.

(a) Major civil strife occurs when there are numerous, or very intense, instances of mass demonstrations and protests, strikes, riots, vigilantism and hate crimes, civil disobedience such as peaceful occupation of buildings (or land), quasi- or extra-legal expulsions, and political sabotage, among others (Tarrow, 2022). Closely related and overlapping are (b) insurrections (i.e., rebellions), which are defined here as armed conflicts planned and/or sustained (unlike riots, which tend to be less planned and more spontaneous) largely by those out of power, but that fail to take on national scope (D. French, 2004; Rasmussen, 2011). (c) Coups d’état occur when there is an extralegal change in the succession of government—often but not always by those close to or already in power (such as a military leader or regent)—without a war (Hale, 2005). A (d) refusal to relinquish power results in the blockage of normal electoral cycle regime change, leading to a quasi or full dictatorship (Ben-Ghiat, 2020). A full-fledged (e) civil war is an armed conflict on a national scale occurring over several years involving different elements of a single population. It is widespread and involves extensive carnage. Drivers of modern civil wars are viewed as a “consequence of greed, grievances, and opportunities” (Cederman & Vogt, 2017; Taylor, 2016).

These five categories of socio-political unrest can result in at least eight possible “outcome types,” of which civil war is only one. (a) Civil strife and/or insurrections may lead to legislative and political modifications of law or practice; however, (b) sometimes civil strife and/or insurrections also can also lead to greater regional differentiation. (c) Civil strife and insurrections sometimes are not successful in bringing about significant regime modifications. (d) A coup d’état may be attempted but fail. (e) A refusal to relinquish power may block the process of democratic regime change. (f) Civil strife, insurrections, and failed coups may not lead to change, but instead produce long-term, inter-regional political gridlock. (g) A successful coup d’état may lead to a regime change. (h) Intense socio-political unrest may lead to civil war in which rebels may or may not be successful. Space does not allow a comprehensive examination of the likelihood of phenomena other than civil war. Instead, this list provides context for the array of possible outcomes stemming from major socio-political unrest – and underscores the difficulty researchers face when trying to predict the likelihood of any one specific outcome.

Positive Social Capital

Before looking in depth into what pulls societies apart, it is salutary to seek out what keeps them functioning effectively in the first place. For this, it helps to turn to social capital theory as a conceptual framework (Jabareen, 2009). Social capital theory is based on broad philosophical assumptions about the good society, enlightened leadership, and democracy. In “good-society’” theory there is a core belief in robust inclusion. Galbraith (1997), for example, critiques modern democratic countries when he asserts “there is democracy, but in no slight measure it is a democracy of the fortunate.” Good society theories hold that inclusive societies occur not only through individuals, but also through institutions (Bellah et al., 1992). Most modern democratic theory proponents hold that society should maximize civic participation and civic choice to the degree possible—without excessive loss of efficiency and cohesion (Brummel, 2021; Dahl & Dahl, 1956; Dewey, 1998).

Many scholars have constructed models of social capital theory, which today incorporates social, political/administrative, and economic aspects of society (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Gannon & Roberts, 2020; M. O. Jackson, 2020). Among these theorists, one of the best-known is Robert Putnam, who focuses on the positive aspects, or the virtuous cycle, of social capital in good, enlightened, and democratic societies (Putnam, 2000; Putnam et al., 1994). The overall philosophy often incorporates the idea of economic fairness but is still in line with capitalistic systems (Guy & McCandless, 2012; McCarty et al., 2006). Seven positive social capital concepts include:

Low and Negative Social Capital

Putnam’s arguments generally posit that low social capital leads to dysfunction and societal under-performance over time, just as it did in lower social-capital regions of southern Italy compared to the higher social-capital Italian North (Putnam et al., 1994). He further asserted that the United States is experiencing declining social capital formation (Putnam, 2000). In essence, low social capital leads to greater transaction costs (e.g., more security), more corruption, and less economic creativity over time. In low social-capital societies, trigger events are more likely to precipitate unexpected civil disturbances, as occurred with the Arab Spring in the early 2010s (Gordon, 2018).

In addition to low social capital, Portes (1998) famously pointed out that social capital also can exist in negative forms and potentially result in a “vicious” cycle, rather than a virtuous one. That is, social capital can be used in a negative way to unite some subgroups of society in order to suppress other parts of society. Negative social capital leads to intolerance, group grievances, fear, excessive group-based self-interest, group-based exclusion, social isolation of opposing groups, and demonization of opposing social groups (Bishop, 2009; Tourish, 1998; Williams et al., 2019). Nazis selectively used and manipulated social capital ideas to strengthen German hyper-nationalism to isolate and denigrate Jews and others in order to implement the Holocaust (Satyanath et al., 2017). Table 2 identifies seven aspects of low or negative social capital—essentially the reverse of positive social capital elements.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 2.

Seven Major Elements of Negative Social Capital.

Social patterns leading to low and negative social capital	Description of negative social capital	Leads to a sense of. . .
1. Different values and norms as well as low tolerance for values diversity	Widely divergent macro-level political, civic, economic values exist in society. Low tolerance for divergent norms and values.	Foreignness of nonaligned “other” groups, intolerance, threatened values.
2. Lack of cultural inclusion	There is hostility among subgroups of various races, ethnicities, genders, classes, etc. because of perceptions of past wrongs or current exclusion.	Group grievance and ostracism.
3. Pervasive sense of political mistrust of others in society	A sense of mistrust pervades society regarding election integrity, political tactics, the justice system, policing, and intolerance of social and political differences.	Fear of others and anger at economic disparity.
4. Lack of reciprocity with the perceived opposition	Perceptions that “others” plan poorly, take advantage of goodness of others, and will become a future burden if requests for assistance are met.	Impassiveness toward others and self-interest.
5. Absence of organizations and networks that work to bring together groups with fundamentally different perspectives	Lack of social and political structures that integrate groups to work on shared goals or work out differences among them.	Separation from others and desire for exclusion.
6. Different communication channels and distrust of facts from nongroup members	Groups consistently rely on different news media, consume different social content and entertainment, and disparage the factual basis or appropriateness of the communication channels of other groups.	Xenophobia about others and a preference for isolation.
7. Stronger identification with one’s group than one’s community or nation	Groups either appropriate community or national identity as only belonging to them or withdraw their regard for the overall community or nation as corrupt or immoral.	Others as adversaries and apostates.

Different Values and Norms as Well as Low Tolerance for the Values of Other Groups

The breakdown of shared norms and values was dramatic in antebellum America. Their breakdown is similarly pronounced today. Before the Civil War, Southerners generally believed in the benefits of slavery for both Blacks and Whites, in states’ rights over federal preemption, in low tariffs on manufactured goods, and in the overall benefits of a genteel landed aristocracy (Elazar, 1982). On the other hand, the old North advocated abolition (but not necessarily Black enfranchisement), the preeminence of the federal prerogative, high tariffs to protect New England manufacturers, and the benefits of an industrial economic system headed by banking and industrial leaders (Varon, 2008).

Today, American conservatives tend to coalesce around the following notions: states’ rights, the prominence of the Christian church, pro-life policies, opposition to gay rights, relatively unrestricted gun ownership, a strong stance on law and order, anti-immigration, low taxes, limitations on welfare support, and weaker environmental protections (Brownstein, 2008; Graham et al., 2009). Liberals, however, tend to support strong federal oversight, strict separation of church and state, abortion rights, federally enforced civil rights, gun control, immigration by authorized refugees, higher taxes on the wealthy, expansion of the social safety net, and strong environmental protections (Graham et al., 2009). Liberals also tend to support the idea that American society has disenfranchised Blacks through a system of mass incarceration that leaves Black men branded for life (e.g., as felons, parolees, and so on) (M. Alexander, 2012). Critically, the emotional intensity of the two perspectives has increased dramatically over the last 20 years, permeating even national sports, real estate selection, and public education (J. W. Jackson & Hinsz, 2022). The extreme Right now dominates the Republican Party in many statehouses and the U.S. House of Representatives, as demonstrated by its ability to block Kevin McCarthy as speaker of the House until numerous concessions by a far-right were met, and ultimately ousting him early in his tenure (Edmondson, 2023).

Although shared values leading to consensual action are relatively rare in the last decade, a counter example is the wide initial opposition to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, even though continued economic support is increasingly less bipartisan (Britzky, 2022). This support is particularly notable since former President Trump had close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Although legislative gridlock has been become increasingly common in trying to pass major legislation, bipartisan bills are also sometimes passed by Congress (e.g., The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002; the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, or JOBS Act of 2012; and the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act of 2022).

Lack of Cultural Inclusion

Social exclusion—or a sense of deprivation of opportunity for fair participation in society—is a powerful catalyst for radicalization (Byrne, 2005; Renström et al., 2020). Even today, racial bias exists in administrative institutions (J. Alexander & Stivers, 2020). Southerners complained of neglect during the 1860 election since all party tickets with a Southern-leaning candidate were beaten in the general election. As it turned out, the Northern (Democratic) opponent of Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, was a good vote-getter, though he failed to siphon off more than three Electoral College votes in the North. John Bell, a Southerner from a border state, on the other hand, received 39 electoral votes from his fellow Southerner, John Breckinridge. The North, for its part, had become exasperated by the physical bullying by Southern legislators, who were generally better trained for dueling, as exhibited in the deadly Cilley-Graves clash in 1838 (Freeman, 2018). Still more famous is the episode involving Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina, who in 1856 used a walking cane to beat the unarmed Senator Charles Sumner nearly to death with dozens of blows in the Senate chamber. Two Southerners, one of whom brandished a pistol, blocked others from rescuing Sumner, who received lifelong injuries (and likely a stress disorder) in the confrontation. These attacks prohibited Sumner from Senate participation for 3 years; Brooks, on the other hand, was seen as a hero and handily reelected by Southern voters (Freeman, 2018).

This perceived lack of fairness also played out during and after the 2020 election. Conservatives disputed the victory of Joe Biden, despite official results indicating his victory by 74 Electoral College votes and more than 7 million popular votes (Sprunt, 2021). Conservative politicians and pundits dismissed these results and claimed massive voting fraud. This in turn was matched by liberal outrage over the Capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021, when protesters attempted to overturn the process of officially certifying the Electoral College vote counts from the respective states. This perceived lack of fairness has fueled deep divisions in the administrative functions of government as well (Moynihan & Roberts, 2021).

Past grievances played an important role in the events leading up to the Civil War. Southerners, for instance, perceived that they had only cautiously accepted the transition from a confederation to a federal state (under the Constitution in 1787). Such reluctance, in their view, was only overcome by building into the Constitutional text a three-fifths compromise for Congressional representation and a prohibition on laws limiting the importation of slaves until 1808. There was also a promise of legislation that would require free states to repatriate slaves to their owners, which did occur in 1793. Southerners generally accepted prohibition on the importation of slaves but grew increasingly concerned about their place in the Union by the time of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (Upchurch, 2011). Even after passage of the compromise, Thomas Jefferson, with remarkable prescience, said, “this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed indeed for the moment, but this is a reprieve only” (Jefferson, 1820). Southern concerns grew with the rise of a new, more vociferous strain of abolitionism marked by the publication of The Liberator by William Lloyd Garrison in 1831. In his first issue, Garrison stated, “I will be as harsh as truth, and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject I do not wish to think, or speak, or write, with moderation. . .I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—AND I WILL BE HEARD” (Liberator, 1831). By 1832, the nullification crisis started by South Carolina, over what it considered an abusive Northern tariff system, demonstrated the extent to which regionalism was shaping ideology. The South considered the legislative tradeoff in 1850 not so much a compromise as an ongoing effort to protect their way of life from increasingly fierce abolition sentiments in the North. On its side, many in the North had come to believe that legally endorsed enslavement was well past its expiration date in a civilized society, and that freedom was now due, even if they were not as concerned about the voting franchise of Blacks or their inclusion in other legal, economic, or social systems (Ayers, 2005; Varon, 2008).

Today, insufficient recognition of past wrongs or atrocities fuels liberals in their assertion of Critical Race Theory, a legal and conceptual framework that points to the lack of recognition of minority contributions to society, ongoing structural impediments to genuine and consistent inclusion, and other discriminatory patterns—a perspective that has moved headfirst from the left wing of liberals to their mainstream (Dixson & Anderson, 2018; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). Conservatives, too, perceive past wrongs deeply. The South still simmers over the perceived brutality of the Civil War and Reconstruction; the West is aggrieved at the extent of federal land in their midst and of its perceived mismanagement; the Rust Belt remains angry at its sense of abandonment with the decline of the traditional industrial economy; and Evangelical Christians have grown increasingly upset with what they perceive as the rejection of traditional family values (DeSantis, 2023; Wallace-Wells, 2021). Functionally, the United States is far more inclusive today than in the 1850s or the Jim Crow era. Nonetheless, the intensity of the perceptions of past wrongs and corruption of “American” culture runs deep on both the left (with worries about civil rights and other backsliding) and the right (with its concerns about urban and coastal “wokeness”) (Bauer et al., 2021; Druckman, et al., 2021).

It is notably difficult to identify instances where perceptions of social inclusion have improved, given the rampant virulence of the ‘‘culture wars’’ (Calhoun et al., 2022). However, a concrete example of improved inclusions for liberals is the continued dismantling of Confederate symbols in public places, even in Southern cities (Benjamin et al., 2020; Hernandez, 2021). The removal of statues has been very unpopular among conservatives in Republican-dominated states. On the other hand, conservative states feel more comfortable in legislating highly conservative education curricula statewide, aggressive crime control in their states and passing laws specifically overriding Democratic-leaning cities (Brownstein, 2008). Of course, this begs the question, does this exemplify cultural inclusion or tactical gains by opposing sides?

Pervasive Sense of Political Mistrust

Within the American context, political mistrust was strongest in the old South because the conflict’s major issues affected the South most directly (Dew, 2017). For example, in the famous Mud Sill Speech delivered in the United States Senate in 1858, Senator John H. Hammond of South Carolina stated: “But what guarantee have we. . . that you will not plunder us with tariffs; that you will not bankrupt us with internal improvements and bounties on your exports. . .what guarantee have we that you will not emancipate our slaves, or, at least, make the attempt? We cannot rely on your faith when you have the power. It has been always broken whenever pledged” (Hammond, 1858). Already in the early years of the American republic, a perceived lack of fairness formed around Southerners’ sense that their slavery-based “way of life” was being challenged; in defense of this way of life, Southerners pointed to the North’s brutal exploitation of free labor without a social support system. The antebellum South had low trust in the North for decades due to fear of abolitionists and slave revolts, adverse federal economic policies, and potential political domination by the North (not least because of a greatly expanding population, notably from enormous immigration surges). Yet, in the lead-up to the Civil War, the South dominated the presidency, legislative leadership, and the U.S. Supreme Court, and had held off anti-slavery legislation in the Senate. Even though the two presidents prior to the Civil War were Northerners (Pierce and Buchanan), both were considered strong Southern sympathizers, and they had Southern vice presidents. Lincoln was considered by Southerners to lean toward abolition, even though Lincoln went to great lengths not to take a direct stand against slavery, largely because his first vice president was a stalwart abolitionist (Goodwin, 2009). The Republican team was so unpopular in the South that its ballots were only able to circulate (according to the conventional practices in both the North and South) in one of the Southern states that eventually seceded. Lincoln’s election, which garnered only 40% of the popular vote but nearly 60% of the Electoral College vote, crystallized Southern fear for their long-term future and sparked the decision to secede.

Although political mistrust was not as great in the old North, many had come to malign the widespread enslavement of Blacks and Natives, a practice gradually phased out in Northern states (Warren, 2016). Many in the North resented the South for making them complicit in sustaining the institution of slavery with the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850, and they felt morally culpable in allowing the expansion of slavery in the territories and newly admitted states. Additionally, Northern members of Congress found the tactics of many Southerners to be physically intimidating, especially the frequent practice of calling them out for duels, which had developed in part because of the militaristic readiness of plantation owners vastly outnumbered by their slaves (Phillips & Sandy, 2021). Northern fear of secession also embodied a fear of a much-weakened national state and diminished economy.

As was the case with 19th century Southerners and their repudiation of Lincoln’s election, the legitimacy of the 2020 election was denied by a majority of the Republican party (Jacobson, 2021; Yourish, 2022). This more recent denial was built not only on a sense of outright election fraud but also on the perception that liberals had bullied them for decades on policy (Zimmer, 2021). Conservatives perceived the success of the liberal agenda—from the beginning of the civil rights movement to President Obama’s time in office—as having gone too far. Even the rhetoric of popular politics has grown more violent. Christian nationalists, for instance, tend to believe the United States was founded as a Christian nation. Those who reject the evangelical interpretation of Christianity are, accordingly, not “real” Americans; Christian “patriots” must be warriors in restoring the country to its religious orthodoxy (Whitehead & Perry, 2020). In an echo of earlier complaints common in the antebellum South, the “Religious Right” tends to believe that its way of life is under attack, no matter whether it is the imposition of godless values on their children related to sexual orientation or modern reinterpretations of history. They want to see the liberal 1954 to 2016 “reconstruction-of-society” agenda not only stopped, but even pushed backward (DeSantis, 2023; Fawcett, 2022). In another parallel to the past, today’s liberals are similarly determined not to retreat from their civil rights agenda (Fawcett, 2018). Rather, they want to make further progress, pointing to the unfairness of excessive wealth inequalities and the continuing marginalization of underrepresented minorities (Kettl, 2022; Piketty, 2013).

Yet, although liberal distrust of conservatives may not be significantly weaker than conservatives’ distrust of liberals, liberals and Democrats remain less extremist as a party and more robust in their beliefs in elections (Agiesta, 2022). To the degree that the Democratic Party is currently more centrist and more open to compromise, its relative successes in the elections of 2020 and 2022 inhibits (for the time being) that portion of the Republican Party that routinely denies documented electoral results and abhors compromise (Cilliza, 2020; Stewart, 2022).

Lack of Reciprocity with the Perceived Opposition

Before the Civil War, the South was furious with the North for what it perceived as weak enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and the inhospitable climate for recapturing runaway slaves (Woods, 2012). Further, some Northern states like Wisconsin and Vermont had passed laws largely intended to circumvent federal law, and the Underground Railroad was functioning effectively for thousands of escaping slaves each year (Eggert, 1985). The North was distraught about Southern insistence on expansion of slavery to new territories and states. The Compromise of 1854 (aka the Kansas-Nebraska Act) essentially invited political violence by making slave-versus-free state admission a plebiscite in the newly formed Kansas-Nebraska territories, which served as a preliminary battleground for the Civil War. Because Kansas was located above the dividing line established earlier in the 1820 Missouri Compromise, the North was deeply perturbed.

Today, liberals are deeply disturbed by what they perceive as the unfair tactics that have led to an enlargement of the conservative majority on the Supreme Court (Basinger & Mak, 2020), while conservatives are incensed at what they perceive as insufficient efforts to restrain protests such as the Occupy and Black Lives Matter movements (Rothbart & Stebbins, 2022; Updegrove et al., 2020).

Still, to the degree that decorum and collegiality are indirect indicators of reciprocity, the executive and judicial branches are in fact currently led by a liberal and a conservative institutionalist respectively: President Joe Biden and Chief Justice John Roberts, who are as much concerned with compromise and institutional integrity as individual policy successes or decisions (Cilliza, 2020; Rosen, 2021). No institutionalists are likely conservative candidates for the 2024 presidential election, and the overwhelming majority of conservative justices on the Supreme Court are likely to accelerate an aggressive swing to the right, making for more precedent reversals, and further diminishing the likelihood of reciprocity.

Absence of Organizations and Networks that Bring Different Ideological Groups Together

Bridging organizations and networks have an outward look (as opposed to bonding organizations that have inward perspectives) and bring together those with diverse ideological beliefs to accomplish social goals, thereby mitigating some of the effects of social exclusion (Leonard, 2004). Churches offer an excellent example of such “bridging,” particularly when they extend over large geographic areas with diverse views, as did the larger Protestant denominations in the early history of the United States (Smidt & Smidt, 2003). By the mid-1840s, however, both Baptists and Methodists officially split over the issue of slavery, with the new Southern denominations—the Southern Baptists and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South—holding that slavery was biblically sanctioned, in direct opposition to the Northern branches (Goen, 1983).

In the current era, fraternal organizations have long been in decline (Putnam, 2000). The rise of interest groups and narrowly gauged ideological alliances, on the other hand, have been on the increase, including organizations such as Americans for Prosperity on the Right, and MoveOn.org on the left (Hertel-Fernande, 2019). Membership in fraternal organizations like masonic and oddfellows lodges has reached historic lows. It is worthy of note that the large Protestant denominations are again undergoing a period of division, with local congregations dissociating from their national bodies over social issues including gender and sexuality of the clergy. Since 2019, nearly 8,000 congregations have received approval to leave the United Methodist Church (UMNews.com, 2024).

Congress has long been conceived as a bridging institution for people from different regions, professions, and generations, and today, for different genders and races, too. Increasing lack of civility affected the pre-Civil War Congress and led to brawls on the floor of the House and the brandishing of weapons (Freeman, 2018). In the current era, there have not been examples of members of Congress accosting one another physically. But suggestions of violence are not infrequent and examples of violent sentiments toward adversaries have occurred in the United States House, political advertisements, and social media as well as the presidency (Frum, 2022; Mascaro & Amiri, 2023; Nacos et al., 2020). Violence in the Senate is not out of the question; yet, in November, 2023, Republican Senator Markwayne Mullin challenged a union boss testifying before a Senate Committee to a fistfight (Bedigan, 2023).

A powerful trend to counter extreme adversarial institutional and organizational behaviors can be seen in the increase in organizations devoted specifically to collaboration and centrism (ICCCR, 2020). For example, the Bridge Alliance includes over 100 member organizations that are part of a broad coalition dedicated to “engaging citizens in the political process, working with our civic leaders to face tough challenges, and promoting respectful, civil discourse” (Bridge Alliance, 2023).

Different Communication Channels and Distrust of Facts from Nongroup Members

Siloed communication tends to amplify ideological difference (Wilson et al., 2020). Siloed political communication (a) encourages the selection of different facts to distribute to different audiences, (b) encourages provocative and inflammatory rhetoric, (c) fosters untruths and unfounded conspiracy theories, and (d) impedes or completely disallows the correction of factual errors and out-and-out falsehoods. Local newspapers in the old North and South became increasingly polarized by the 1850s (C. Jackson, 2021; Ratner & Teeter, 2010; Sachsman & Borchard, 2019). For example, the Preston-Sumner beating was seen in remarkably different terms. The North saw it as a thuggish armed attack on a weaponless Senator at his desk in the Senate (Freeman, 2018). The South perceived it as the “well-deserved” beating for perceived slander by a “wily” politician. One Southern editorial remarked:

Now, for our part, we never have believed that Sumner was sufficiently hurt to make it necessary for him to take to his bed at all. Least of all do we believe that the well-deserved gutta-perching he received was of so severe a character as to detain him in confinement for more than a week. But we believe it is a miserable Abolition trick from beginning to end—resorted to keep alive and diffuse and strengthen the sympathy awakened for him among his confederates at the North Nigger-worshipping fanatics of the male gender, and weak-minded women and silly children, are horribly affected at the thought of blood oozing out from a pin-scratch. And Sumner is wily politician enough to take advantage of this little fact (Richmond Dailey Whig, 1856).

Even cultural tastes can become siloed. While in its day Uncle Tom’s Cabin was widely read in the North, in contrast, pro-slavery fiction books such as Aunt Phillis’s Cabin or Southern Life As It Is were widely read in the South (MacKethan, 2004).

Today, as in the 1850s, partisanship has again noticeably increased among the news media, illustrated by the rise of Fox News, NewsMax, MSNBC, and other networks that offer polarized interpretations of the same events (Mastrangelo, 2022). Conservatives call out traditional mainstream media sources for what they perceive as extreme liberal bias, intellectual elitism, and “fake news.” For their part, liberals excoriate popular news outlets on the Right such as Fox News, Newsmax, Breitbart, and Gateway Pundit as being unreliable and slanted at best, and racist, xenophobic, and fascist at worst (Chan et al., 2021; Wilson et al., 2020).

Outright and routine denial of the facts presented by opposition leaders contributes to the likelihood of significant civil unrest. Southern firebrands known as “fire-eaters” and “secession commissioners” led to extremist commentary and propagandistic hyperbole in the South, as did abolitionists in the North (Ratner & Teeter, 2010). Today, the radicalization of the Republican Party has led to innumerable “firebrands”—from Donald Trump as president and citizen to legislators such as Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene—whose goal more often is to inflame than inform (Green, 2019; Greenberg, 2022; Hassan, 2020; Weaver, 2023).

A challenge in the United States, in terms of reducing polarizing facts and fiction, is the legality of most hate speech that is not directly connected to threats or violence. The Supreme Court gives wide berth to freedom of speech (with the exception of governmental employees) and the protection of the “publisher” role by interactive computer service providers. Under the 1996 Communications Decency Act: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)). This has been a major challenge for technology companies such as Facebook and Twitter (now X) that who want a wide base of users—even those who are racist and xenophobic—but also fear the loss of advertisers if hate speech is not combatted by either reactive or proactive censoring protocol regimes. Because of the economic implications, tech companies have attempted to cope with the problem of hate speech, bots, and fake profiles—an example of a counter-indicator—even if their efforts to date have been found by many to be less than satisfactory (Ullmann & Tomalin, 2020).

Stronger Identification with Region or Identity Group than Community or Nation

Before the Civil War, the lack of a shared national identity was typified by a strong identification in the South with a bucolic, agrarian America led by large landowners; the North, on the other hand, identified the American state as an industrial community led by the chief executive officers of companies and banks (Osborn, 2015; Walther, 2006). Regionalism may not be as cleanly split today, but it is nonetheless quite stark. Fervent conservativism dominates much of the South and the plains states, along with the rural areas in virtually all states. Fervent liberalism dominates much of the coastal areas other than the South as well as in many urban (and some suburban) areas across the country that are otherwise conservative—sometimes referred to as bright blue dots in really red states. The upper Midwest, it should be noted, has the most heterogeneous identifications overall as a region, but nonetheless has seen partisanship within the region grow (D. French, 2020).

A nationwide poll in the late spring of 2021 found 37% of citizens showing a willingness to secede; however, a 2023 poll found that only 16% of liberals and 26% of conservatives currently would vote for their state to secede (Failla, 2021). Conservative fears today center on the political views of Muslims and Blacks, as well as the immigration pressures exerted by Hispanics, Asians, and other non-Europeans (Greenblatt, 2022). Many on the political Right have a deep fear of a malignant “deep state” that subverted an election that otherwise would have brought Donald Trump to a second term (Economist, 2023). Liberals, on the other hand, see their fears manifested in a rise in hate crimes, systemically biased policing strategies, structural discrimination in the legal and economic systems, and erosion of democratic processes and—potentially—even the ascendence of outright fascism (Greenblatt, 2022). Currently, over half the American public think that it is more “likely that a future election in the United States will be overturned for partisan reasons” than not (Agiesta, 2022).

Although the construct of patriotism is inevitably reshaped by the fundamental values of the left (e.g., diversity, equity, and inclusiveness) and right (e.g., Christian values, traditional family, and self-reliance), a potential counter indicator is a relatively broad feeling of pride in country, despite its faults and challenges (Thompson, 2011). In one survey, 87% of Americans say they are moderately to extremely proud of the United States, although how the question is asked can lead to a much lower proportion (Schaeffer, 2021; Statista, 2023). Some scholars assert that American unity is still significantly more important than contemporary political trends would indicate (Pan, 2022).