Abstract
As the writers in this symposium illustrate, dealing with Iran's nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it difficult to see exactly where progress has been made and what efforts are worth pursuing. In this Global Forum, leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on the options for how to move forward with Iran—from diplomacy to fuel swaps to military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering (2010), Lawrence J. Korb (2010), and Bennett Ramberg (2010); from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2010); from Iran, Kayhan Barzegar (2010); and from Israel, Emily B. Landau. Over the months of November and December, this forum will continue at www.thebulletin.org.
Keywords
Iran is pushing its nuclear program forward as fast as it can, and is steadily accumulating ever-increasing stocks of low enriched uranium, some to the level of 20 percent. While Iran insists that its developing nuclear program—which involves both uranium enrichment and plutonium-based nuclear activities—is for peaceful purposes only, the evidence pointing to the country’s military intentions is by now sufficient to constitute a virtual smoking gun. Debates as to how much time Iran needs to “reach the bomb” are thus beside the point. If the growing consensus is that Iran is moving toward military capability, then the time to get serious was yesterday. There is no point for governments to insist that there is still more time to deal with Iran if that only means more time to waste. Nor are Western discussions of redlines for “tougher measures” particularly useful, especially as these lines tend to get crossed, as has been the case with regard to repeated threats that Iran must cease uranium enrichment—or else. This approach only gives Iran a stronger sense that it can overcome the international community in its race to a military capability.
When considering how to improve international efforts to curb Iran’s military nuclear ambitions, three straightforward and practical questions must be asked: Should Iran be stopped? Who should take the lead in this regard? And what approach should be taken?
Should Iran be stopped?
Of the three questions, this is the easiest to answer. There is no doubt that every effort should be made to stop Iran from reaching a military nuclear capability. Since 2008, significant information and developments have made it quite clear that Iran has military nuclear intentions. In fact, one would be hard-pressed to make a convincing argument otherwise.
In February 2008, Olli Heinonen, then-deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told a meeting of the member states that information in the hands of the IAEA does not square with any explanation other than that Iran is working on the development of a nuclear weapon. Since then, report after report on Iran issued by the IAEA director-general to the board of governors has highlighted the unanswered questions about Iran’s past activities, the lack of Iranian cooperation with inspections and inspectors, and general expressions of concern about the nature of Iran's activities. Iran has consistently maintained that information in these reports that raises questions about military intentions is nothing but lies and fabrications.
Nuclear experts have generally regarded the enrichment facility near Qom, uncovered in September 2009, as evidence of a military program, as the relatively small number of centrifuges planned for the facility would not make sense in the context of a civilian program. 1 Iran's decision to begin to enrich uranium to 20 percent ostensibly for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) in February of this year is similarly revealing. Though Iran explained that it wanted to turn this enriched uranium into fuel rods for the TRR, the puzzle is missing a piece: Iran does not have the technology to do so.
The negative implications of a nuclear Iran are dire. And for this to happen under the close watch of the IAEA would underscore the helplessness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the face of a determined proliferator. It would demonstrate that by the time the international community becomes convinced that a state’s military intent is beyond a doubt, their ability to take effective action is severely impaired. Moreover, it shows that when the UN Security Council receives an IAEA complaint of a state's non-compliance with its safeguard obligations, the dynamics of international politics—with the full range of states’ conflicting economic and strategic interests—kicks in and renders swift and determined international action against the offending state difficult.
But the implications of an NPT non-nuclear member state going nuclear are compounded in this case by the nature of the Iranian regime and its regional—and even global—ambitions. Iran has been cheating and deceiving the international community in the nuclear realm 2 in order to achieve a military capability that will enhance its hegemonic grip on the Middle East. Iran’s foreign policy vocabulary draws heavily on the themes of hatred, destruction, and rejection, especially of its self-proclaimed enemies—the US and Israel. 3 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials seem to thrive on beseeching crowds to chant “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” Commentators who insist on pointing out that Ahmadinejad did not say he wants to wipe Israel off the face of the map, but rather that the state of Israel would be wiped off the map because it is a criminal entity, should consider the prudence of defending this leader on the grounds that he “merely” expressed his wish list. 4
For all of these reasons, every effort must be made to stop Iran from reaching its goal of military nuclear capability.
Who should take the lead?
The eight-year saga of international efforts to stop Iran has included two years of negotiations led by the EU-3, with the US taking a backseat; attempts by the IAEA to get answers from Iran; and a UN Security Council dynamic that has included both sanctions and attempts to negotiate in a P5 + 1 format (including Germany). Further, though President Barack Obama came into office with the intent of engaging Iran, he has proceeded multilaterally, in the P5 + 1 framework, trying to negotiate a fuel deal in October 2009.
None of these attempts has been successful. Early attempts to stop Iran were hindered by lingering doubts as to Iranian intentions, and differing interpretations of the available evidence. Efforts by the international community have been constrained by a lack of agreement among those taking the lead on Iran (the P5 + 1), on almost every aspect of the crisis: the state of Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s intentions, and the best way to influence Iran’s behavior. Iran itself has skillfully used this lack of accord to its advantage, dragging its feet in the negotiations and using the pressure-free time to advance its program.
As the process vis-à-vis Iran continues to unfold with no real prospect of success, some are trying to put Israel in the hot seat, discussing, more frequently, the conditions under which Israel might take military action against Iran. Israel’s consistent position on Iran has been that it is a challenge to be dealt with by the international community, preferably through diplomacy. Israel, under Ehud Olmert’s premiership and under that of Benjamin Netanyahu, (although the current prime minister seems more open to the possibility of a military strike), has insisted, emphatically, that Iran is not a uniquely Israeli challenge, and Israel does not believe it must take matters into its own hands. Israel has certainly made it clear through its behavior that it has no desire to act militarily.
The Iranian challenge has, no doubt, a clear Israeli component to it, but there is also a very strong Gulf component, as well as a broader Middle East component. In addition to the concerns of the Arab Gulf states, it is instructive to follow Egyptian statements on Iran, especially over the past two years, to get a sense of how other states in the region regard the threat of Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and interference. 5 And of course Iran is also a global concern in terms of nuclear proliferation. It would represent a true failure of the international community were Israel left feeling that it, alone, must “take care of the problem.” This is not, and should not be construed as, Israel’s role.
President Obama—armed with evidence of Iran’s virtual smoking gun—is the best candidate to take the lead on Iran. The most meaningful action the Obama administration could take right now to drive home its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament would be to make Iran its top priority. Although the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the formulation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty are important, stopping Iran clearly takes precedence. After all, what would be left of the nonproliferation regime if, after almost a decade of close monitoring, Iran were to go nuclear?
But this will require a change of approach on the part of the US administration: First and foremost, it must assume the lead, and then it must devise a clear and focused strategy.
What approach should be taken?
If the US is the one to take the lead on dealing with Iran, the obvious next question is: How? Ultimately—short of an internal dynamic that would result in the replacement of the Islamic regime (not government) with a more benign one—the best option would be a negotiated settlement with Iran on the nuclear issue. But past experience of negotiating with Iran has demonstrated this state is adept at using negotiations to play for time—employing multiple stalling tactics, while pushing its nuclear program forward.
This dynamic must be stopped. Successful negotiations hinge on employing smart bargaining tactics; the Obama administration needs to draw not only on the general principles of negotiations and bargaining in the international sphere, but fine tune these prescripts to meet the specific challenge of negotiating with Iran. This means reconsidering some principles the administration holds dear. For example, negotiations with Iran should not be thought of as “engagement” or a process of “confidence-building.” To stop Iran in the nuclear realm, there is no alternative to tough bargaining. And pressure plays a critical role in this regard. Iran must come to the conclusion the US is strong, determined, and in control of the situation. Iran must be convinced the US will take action if necessary; it must feel pressured and credibly deterred.
Decisions made in June and July on sanctions were certainly a step in the right direction, but this pressure must be leveraged and taken to the next stage. Moreover, with regard to the military option, the administration must keep in mind the difference between threats of military action (deterrence) and actual military action. When a US official clearly states that military action will be “disastrous” for the US and the region, it drives home to Iran that it is the one practicing successful deterrence vis-à-vis the US (rather than the other way around). Much of the fear expressed in the US stems from repeated Iranian threats of retaliation to any attack on its facilities. All of this is detrimental to bargaining effectively with Iran.
Another principle that is preventing the administration from successfully negotiating with Iran is “multilateralism.” Obama’s preference for dealing with international challenges in multilateral frameworks is good up to a point. It is not, however, a recipe to be followed in all cases; in bargaining situations, for example, it can be the kiss of death. If on one side there is a single and determined entity (Iran), while the other “party” is actually six states (P5 + 1) divided among themselves on important aspects of the challenge, the former gains an important structural advantage.
As correctly pointed out in a recent piece in the New York Times, the task of global leadership “involves clarity, and on Iran’s sprint toward a nuclear weapon, there’s reason to see the Obama administration heading into confusion” (Vinocur, 2010). Therefore, it is imperative that the US assumes leadership, clarifies its goals, and then devises a clear and tough diplomatic strategy for following through on those goals. A decision must be made as to whether the US is mainly interested in stopping Iran in the nuclear realm or in improving US-Iranian relations—and whether it intends to bargain with the current administration or try to hasten a regime change.
Once the goals are clarified, the US needs to focus on tactics, because that is where the war of wills between the US and Iran will be “fought.” And it will not be an easy battle.
Footnotes
1
According to Senior White House officials, the Qom facility is designed to hold
about 3,000 centrifuges, whereas the facility at Natanz is built to hold about
54,000. The very small number at Qom, while not relevant for civilian purposes,
would make sense as a clandestine facility where Iran would secretly enrich to
weapons-grade levels. Using it solely for this purpose, Iran could enrich enough
for 1–2 bombs a year. See 
.
2
The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that Iran stopped work on a military nuclear program in 2003. While there has been considerable debate as to whether the country actually did stop in 2003 or, in fact, continued such work, the assessment means that at least until 2003 Iran was working on a military program in the nuclear realm under government direction—a clear violation of its commitments as an NPT member.
3
In February 2008, Ahmadinejad called Israel a “dirty microbe” and a “wild animal.” Jaafari, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, was quoted as saying “the cancerous bacterium called Israel” would soon vanish. See Ynet News (2008).
4
In a recent comment to the media, Ahmadinejad said Israel had no place in the
future of the Middle East. See
Haaretz (2010).
Israel's president Shimon Peres repeated Ahmadinejad's words in his speech to
the UN General Assembly. See
.
5
For example, following “Operation Cast Lead,” Egypt's
foreign minister accused Iran of fanning Middle East conflict to serve Iranian
interests (
Ynet News,
2009). See also MEMRI (2009). Most recently, Iran
accused Egypt and Jordan of betraying their people when they joined the Israelis
and Palestinians in the latest effort to renew peace negotiations. Egypt reacted
immediately and forcefully by canceling a planned visit to Egypt by Iran's
foreign minister (Javedanfar,
2010). On attitudes in the Gulf, see .
Author biographies