Sea level rise and climate change exiles: A possible solution

Why rising, why now?

The rise in sea level is largely due to the expansion of water and the melting of glaciers on land, although human activity that leads to land subsidence also contributes to coastal flooding. Greenland and Antarctica contain enough ice to cause nearly 400 feet of sea level rise if it all were to melt. While no one anticipates that this complete melting could happen in this century, the median projection of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is that the sea level will rise about two feet—a figure that may be too conservative, as paleoclimate records suggest that there could be much higher average sea levels. For example, during the Pliocene epoch—the time period between about 5.3 million to 2.6 million years ago—sea levels were about 100 feet higher than they are today, while average global temperatures were only about three to four degrees Celsius warmer. Given that the understanding of land ice dynamics is still relatively undeveloped, no one can say, for example, how quickly the vertical shafts within glaciers (known as “moulins”) in Greenland will carry meltwater from the surface down to the underlying rock—effectively greasing the way for glaciers to be transported more swiftly into the sea. Nor can scientists predict precisely when the West Antarctic Ice Sheet might collapse, or how warming ocean currents could accelerate such a change. These and other feedback loops in the climate system remain poorly understood. And yet abrupt climatic change could theoretically help to cause the seas to rise tens of feet by the century’s end, although most climatologists project it would be in the range of three to six feet.

Because of these concerns, some scientists have accused the IPCC of being “reticent” (Hansen, 2007) on the issue of sea level rise (Smith et al., 2009). The IPCC is not alone in this foot-dragging; there has been virtually no acknowledgement by the major emitters that they have caused tens to hundreds of millions of people to be at permanent risk of losing their homes—and possibly their countries—by the end of the 21st century.

In addition, the dire consequences of sea level rise are not limited to just the physical act of water covering the land on which one lives. Long before there is complete permanent submersion, rising sea levels cause wells to be flooded with saltwater, coastlines to erode, shoreline homes to wash away, more frequent and deeper floods to occur, and more intense storms to strike, all of which render large swathes of land unfit for human life and activities.

Consequently, even when there is less than two feet of sea level rise, many coastal regions of the world could become difficult, if not impossible, to inhabit. This is true not just for the people living on small islands, but also for the residents of many low-lying delta regions. A foretaste of these pre-submersion effects can already be seen in the Pacific islands and in low-lying deltas such as the Ganges and the Brahmaputra (CARE International, 2009).

How many people would be affected?

For thousands of years, people have chosen to live along coastlines because of their rich and diverse ecosystems and the livelihoods they offer. For this reason, most of the world’s megacities are along the coast: New York City, Shanghai, Mumbai, Dhaka, and Ho Chi Minh City. In fact, about 10 percent of the world’s population lives within a mile or so of the shoreline and below 10 meters in elevation.

Consequently, there are millions of people living in densely populated coastal cities and deltas who are vulnerable to the changes expected from global warming. In countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam, Egypt, and Guyana—where a significant fraction of the population lives near coastal deltas—a rise in average sea levels beyond three to four feet could be devastating. In a recent paper for the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, researchers estimated that a four-foot rise in sea level by the end of the century would mean that nearly five percent of the world’s population would be subject to annual flooding (Hinkel et al., 2014).

If forced to relocate to other countries because of sea level rise, these climate exiles would have little or no legal standing under current international law. Their numbers would be huge: In Bangladesh alone, roughly 75 million people, or about 40 percent of its projected population for the year 2100, would be affected. Their entire country would become non-viable as an entity, with most of its productive agricultural land inundated and its economy defunct (Byravan and Rajan, 2008).

And these coastal dwellers are not vulnerable to sea level rise alone: Multiple, simultaneous other environmental and economic changes would also take place. For example, in addition to experiencing more frequent and intense cycles of drought and flooding, afflicted communities would also suffer from famine, disease, inflation, loss of income, siltation, and the introduction of pollutants to their environment. Understanding vulnerability and how to respond to it therefore becomes a complicated issue.

Making the situation worse, the most drastically afflicted regions are likely to have the fewest tools to combat the effects of sea level rise caused by global warming. In developing countries, where most of the affected live, people are poor, their economies are still emerging, and there is not much technological infrastructure. Realistically, they cannot build dikes or seawalls or floating cities—and in any case, even rich countries that can afford these expensive technological fixes find that they are not fully protective. Given this situation, plus their extreme vulnerability and the minuscule contribution of developing countries to the problem of climate change, it is imperative that these developing countries be compensated for their losses by the rest of the international community (Byravan and Rajan, 2010).

Unfortunately, concerns about the arrival of a large number of climate exiles or boat people knocking on their doors has driven some countries to build even stronger borders. Such “fortress worlds” promote even stricter migration policies toward affected neighbors. We argue that such fortresses are unethical, since climate exiles are hardly responsible for their plight, and it is the duty of those responsible to recognize this fact and provide assistance. In addition, it is likely that an influx of new citizens, with their talents and skills, would generate net economic benefits for host countries—particularly those with declining birthrates—and legal immigration would provide a prudent long-term answer to tensions relating to international refugee crises.

While assistance in combatting sea level rise could take several forms, migration and permanent resettlement would seem to be the only possible “adaptation” strategies available for the millions of people whose countries and lives are at extreme risk. Unfortunately, existing international law provides no help for these individuals; the closest legal mechanism is the 1954 Refugee Convention, designed to protect those forced to flee their homes as a result of war or persecution.

Legally speaking, at present those forced to move due to environmental or climate reasons cannot be referred to as refugees.

What should we do?

The only just remedy to the climate-driven migration problem would seem to be the development of a new, special right of free global movement and resettlement in regions and countries on higher ground, in advance of actual disaster.

Some of this could fall under the rubric of Loss and Damage, a legal concept originally introduced through the Association of Small Island States and Bangladesh, which has received support from other developing countries (UNFCCC, 2008). The idea is rooted in the principles of state responsibility under international law, and began to get more visibility after the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change held its conference in Poznan, Poland, and was further reinforced after the Cancun Climate Change Conference of 2010.

Until quite recently, advocacy groups that worked on issues of migration, human settlement, and relocation—including Oxfam and World Vision—considered the problems related to poor countries suffering damage from climate change mostly as a human rights concern. While this is an important approach and acknowledges that there is a positive duty to help people who are suffering, it does not grapple with the responsibility that rich countries have toward poor countries for occupying their global development space and causing them harm through the effects of global warming; rich countries have an obligation toward poor countries as a consequence of the cumulative burden of greenhouse gas concentrations they have contributed to in the past (Byravan and Rajan, 2010; cf. Pogge, 2005). In other words, while providing support to climate exiles as a charitable effort to assist people in harm’s way is certainly necessary, those countries that have historically been large emitters have contributed the most to the burden of greenhouse gas stocks in the atmosphere and therefore have a special responsibility to make proportionate amends to those who are experiencing destruction from global warming.

In policy terms, it is important to recognize that climate exiles are a special category of international migrants who need protection of an even stronger sort than that given to other refugees. They are stateless persons who are either already or soon will be stripped of rights—but what is exceptional about them is that theirs will be a permanent condition, unlike most other types of statelessness, since the original state and its territory either no longer exist or will be rendered largely unviable for all practical purposes. They will therefore need special protection in terms of being provided civil, political, and economic rights, typically by becoming full citizens in countries away from their original homes. This could mean that climate exiles need to be recognized as such and given special status, either through a new international treaty or through some framework of regional and international cooperation.

One way this could take place would be by including the millions of people who live on small islands in the existing immigration quotas of rich countries—who are the most responsible for the cumulative effects of greenhouse gases in the first place. Accordingly, we have proposed (Byravan and Rajan, 2006) that rather than deal with climate exiles in an ad hoc manner as the problem arises, there should be a mechanism in which these exiles would be given accelerated immigration benefits. Under our proposed framework, people living in areas likely to be obliterated or rendered uninhabitable would be provided the option of early migration after having received some training and skills to be prepared to be full citizens of host countries. Thus, host countries could demonstrate their commitment to climate justice and provide a pragmatic solution to the problem.

Such a mechanism, operating in advance of climate-induced disaster, would be a fair way of addressing the problems faced by climate exiles and offer a modicum of climate justice. Once the basic principle is accepted, there could be several ways to determine who should be considered for immigration benefits, which countries should bear the costs of immigration, and what institutional and political mechanisms should be established to minimize the risk of a massive refugee crisis as climate impacts become more severe.

There are other approaches as well. For instance, regional agreements could identify potential hosts for their more vulnerable neighbors without having to wait for international negotiations to provide a solution. Large countries that are themselves not at risk could take the initiative in these processes. For instance, the Maldives and Bangladesh face the greatest danger of obliteration in the South Asian region; therefore, India could take the lead in promoting an agreement for phased migration to India and other countries in the region over the course of this century. Similar efforts could be led by Australia in the Indian Ocean and parts of the Pacific, and by China and the United States for the Americas and island regions within their respective spheres of influence. Even here, subsequent international treaties would be necessary to seal these relationships and provide formal ways of sharing the financial costs associated with putting them into effect.

Regional agreements are more important than experts and negotiators usually recognize, because of the synergies they generate for peace and prosperity among neighbors. In many cases, regions experience the same climatic disaster events such as cyclones and floods, and share similar weather-related systems (such as monsoons and melting glaciers) and comparable cultural features and histories. But not all regional neighbors have neighborly relationships, and that could be a big challenge. In South Asia, for example, while India and Nepal have a relatively relaxed policy on movement between countries, the same cannot be said of the other countries around India.

The issues related to cross-border migration, unfortunately, are almost always viewed through the lens of a national security threat. In light of cross-border migration pressure from climate change and weather-related disasters, however, there are many opportunities to be explored regarding new regional policies on labor, migration, and adaptation.

While there appears to be some acknowledgement of the challenge of climate exiles within the international community, much more needs to be done. Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, stressing common but differentiated responsibility, has been one of the core principles behind the concept that wealthier nations would contribute more to resettlement efforts, but unfortunately that concept has been eroded bit by bit in recent years, becoming nearly irrelevant in the current negotiations. Similarly, the legal concepts of Loss and Damage and other initiatives could fall by the wayside in their usefulness for vulnerable populations unless these are fortified through legal protection and regional cooperation.

Adjusting to living in a warmer world and reducing the greenhouse gas emissions responsible for global warming are dual responsibilities, shared by all. Both of these are huge challenges that the world will have to deal with in the coming centuries.