Legitimacy and Disaster

Abstract

The very existence of the new state of Manchukuo was contested throughout the 1930s. Despite its colonial reality, its form as a nation-state necessitated an attempt to generate legitimacy, and its best hope lay in performance legitimacy as a modernizing and developmental state delivering public goods and offering honest and efficient government. Less than a year after its establishment, the new state faced a crisis caused by large-scale floods in the north of the region. This article examines how it attempted to build performance legitimacy even in a quasi-colonial situation by establishing institutions and raising funds to mount a relief effort, providing food, shelter, and medical care, and in the longer term restoring state capacity by maintaining order, reopening communications, and instituting flood prevention measures. At the same time, it generated a narrative that linked that effort to its broader ideological claims to legitimacy.

Keywords

Manchukuo Harbin performance legitimacy flood relief Kingly Way

Less than a year after its establishment following the Japanese seizure of the region in 1931, the fledgling state of Manchukuo was faced with a significant challenge from a major natural disaster—the 1932 floods in north Manchuria. How it responded could potentially affect its reputation and legitimacy. This article examines how the new state attempted to build performance legitimacy by alleviating the worst effects of the floods and developed a narrative of its response that highlighted both its ideological claims to legitimacy and the positive role of its backers, the Japanese.

Manchukuo’s sovereignty and very existence were contested throughout the 1930s. Its reality was essentially that of a colony: Japanese officials occupied most key government positions, and policy was determined so as to further the interests of Japan and its nationals. Nevertheless, as Prasenjit Duara (2003: 59–61, 246–47) showed, its form was that of a nation-state, and it is more appropriately designated as “quasi-colonial.” This increased Manchukuo’s need to build legitimacy among the local elites and populace. Both the fiction of nationhood and the limited resources of the Japanese meant that co-opting groups within Chinese society and winning over collaborators in the elite were necessary for the new regime to function (Mitter, 2000: 18–19). Winning any legitimacy among the populace would, however, be an uphill task. Even British journalist H. G. W. Woodhead (1932: 86), seen by many as a propagandist for Japan, reported that he did not “meet a single Chinese outside Manchukuo official circles who favored the new regime.” Legitimacy is therefore used in this article in a weak sense: it was probably more realistic for the state to aim merely for acquiescence from the Chinese population.

The state’s ideological claim to legitimacy centered, particularly in the early stages, on the vague and partly traditional Confucian concept of the “Kingly Way” 王道. This concept, embodying the idea of moral government and linked to the idea of the “mandate of heaven,” goes back at least to Mencius, and has recently been popularized by Chinese thinkers as an alternative to Western democracy. In the 1930s it was used as a legitimizing slogan for the Manchukuo state, implying a contrast with the rule by force 霸道 during the preceding warlord period. As such, it did have some appeal to conservative elites (Mitter, 2000: 93–100; Jones, 1949: 53). The slogan explicitly encompassed racial harmony and the transcending of ethnic divisions, reflecting the need to accommodate Japanese control and to appeal to non-Chinese minorities, notably the Mongols, Koreans, and Russians (Han, 2004: 465).

Manchukuo’s most likely appeal, however, was through “performance legitimacy,” as a modernizing and developmental state delivering public goods and offering honest and efficient government—in Rana Mitter’s words, “good roads as propaganda” (Mitter, 2000: 124). Zhao Dingxin (2009) has suggested that performance legitimacy has played a key role in Chinese history since the Zhou dynasty. The “mandate of heaven” imposed on rulers the need to assume responsibility for a range of public goods that contributed to the people’s welfare as well as for maintaining social order and the functions of government. A ruler needed not only to demonstrate virtue but also to deliver actual benefits to the populace (Schneider and Hwang, 2014: 640).

In China and elsewhere, the successful management of society has historically provided some basis for collaboration even with alien rulers (Mitter, 2000: 18–19; Hechter, 2009: 292). Leo Goodstadt (2005: 2) argues that the survival of British rule in Hong Kong after World War II essentially depended on performance legitimacy. In the case of Manchukuo, while acknowledging the government’s overall failure to win positive support, F. C. Jones (1949: 54) recognized that benefits from Japanese development efforts in areas such as finance, industry, urban construction, and sanitation led to some level of acquiescence among the people (see also Duara, 2003: 71). Even in this respect, however, Woodhead (1932: 88) wrote that Japanese efficiency was “distasteful to the Chinese.”

Into this difficult political situation came a major natural disaster: the severe floods in 1932 along the Songhuajiang 松花江 (Sungari) and its tributaries in north Manchuria (JACAR, 1932d: 39–50; Harubin, 1934: 15–16). Although the Asahi shimbun (August 15, 1932: 3) put the catastrophe on a par with the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the most obvious comparison was with the 1931 floods in the Yangzi 長江 and Huai 淮河 valleys. Those floods were a much—even ten times—larger national-level disaster, but in relative terms the Manchurian floods had a similar impact on a very substantial area. Around 42,200 square kilometers—more than 25%—of the Songhuajiang basin was inundated (SMR, Keizai chōsakai, 1935: 441). The Manchuria Daily News (October 1, 1932: 14) estimated that a quarter of the 14.5 million people of Jilin 吉林 and Heilongjiang 黑龍江 provinces lost their livelihoods, with 2.5 million refugees and 300,000–600,000 people dependent on government support (for 1930 boundaries and place names mentioned in the text, see Map 1). Total financial losses, mostly in the form of destroyed goods, crops, and buildings, were around 200 million yuan, about 10% of Manchuria’s entire GDP (Harubin, 1934: 217; Zheng, 1994: 103). While in many ways rural areas were worse hit, press coverage and government activities centered on Harbin 哈爾濱, the region’s main city, most of which, as shown in Figure 1, was flooded. Of its 380,000 inhabitants, 240,000 became refugees and 120,000 wandered around destitute (Zheng, 1994: 103).

Map 1.

Northeast China around 1930.

Figure 1.

Harbin under the floods.

These floods posed a particular challenge to the new state, while possibly also offering it an opportunity to win some legitimacy by demonstrating its capacity for governance. In many societies ever since the Roman Empire, disaster relief has been closely linked to political legitimacy. In China ideas such as the “mandate of heaven” traditionally placed even greater obligations on the state, which developed sophisticated mechanisms to deal with famines and disasters (Janku et al., 2012: 9; Zhao, 2009: 421; Li, 2007: 166–76). Although in the 1910s and early 1920s weak state capacity left most relief activities to the voluntary sector, the rise of the Guomindang in China and later of the puppet government in Manchukuo led to a renewed emphasis on the role of the state (Wang, 2013: 90). An inadequate response could be seen as detracting from a government’s legitimacy, but states could also approach disasters as a chance to strengthen their positions. Reporting of the famine in northwest China in 1928–1930 stressed the opportunities for nation-building, and the Guomindang government hoped effective handling of the 1931 Yangzi floods would bolster its reputation (Janku, 2012: 231–32, 242; Pietz, 2002: 64, 75), while in 1935 the provincial government used the floods in Shandong 山東 as a means of enhancing its legitimacy (Li, 1991: 474). In 1932, both the Japanese and the Manchukuo authorities realized that the Songhuajiang floods were a serious test, and that their ability or otherwise to maintain order and protect the people through humanitarian measures and longer-term planning might push the population’s “wait-and-see” attitude one way or the other (LSD, 1932c: 4; Binjiang shibao, September 11, 1932: 6; Shengjing shibao, August 12, 1932: 1).

This article will demonstrate that the young state constructed its own ideological narrative of the relief effort, emphasizing the Japanese contribution in an attempt to win acquiescence to their presence. At the same time, it mounted a substantial and relatively successful effort on the ground, in terms both of humanitarian aid and of restoring state capacity and the functioning of society.

Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda in Manchukuo

In general, states attempt to manage the meanings of disasters and the corresponding relief efforts in ways that further their own political interests (Janku et al., 2012: 8–12; Schneider and Hwang, 2014: 641, 644). So, at the same time as mounting its relief effort, the Manchukuo state constructed a narrative of its response that resonated with its ideological claims to legitimacy. This narrative attributed the state’s actions to its adoption of the principles of benevolent government encapsulated in the Kingly Way. It highlighted the importance of interethnic collaboration, and laid great stress on the specific contribution of the Japanese, as a way to justify or win some acceptance of their presence. By contrast, Chinese nationalists downplayed the effectiveness of the relief effort and attempted to link the disaster to broader issues of Japanese imperialism.

To promote their views the Manchukuo state and its Japanese backers both utilized the press and published their own reports. The Japanese had long used the region’s most widely read newspaper, the Japanese-owned Chinese-language Shengjing shibao 盛京時報, to propagate their views, often in a quite sophisticated way, achieving some limited success in winning over Manchurian elites before and after 1931 (Mitter, 2000: 44–47; Qi and Lin, 2009). After the take-over, they made similar use of other newspapers, such as the Binjiang shibao 濱江時報 in Harbin (Qu and Yu, 2010). In addition, the Manchukuo government, the Harbin city authorities, and the fund-raising committee in Japan each published a retrospective report on the floods (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933; Harubin, 1934; Hoku Man, 1932). All were designed to promote a particular view of Manchukuo and the relief effort.

Centrally, states attempt to put their relief efforts in the context of their main legitimating slogans—for the Guomindang, Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of People’s Livelihood (Janku, 2012: 244, 255), for the twenty-first century Communist Party state, “putting the people first” 以人為本 (Schneider and Hwang, 2014: 644), for the Manchukuo state, the Kingly Way. The Shengjing shibao (August 12, 1932: 1) editorialized that the response to the floods would show whether the Kingly Way was more than a mere slogan, and whether things had really changed since the warlords. According to the region’s main Japanese-language newspaper, the relief effort embodied the Kingly Way in transcending ethnic differences (Manshū nippō, August 14, 1932: 2). Likewise, another press article (Binjiang shibao, September 14, 1932: 6) asserted in the context of the floods:

The real spirit of the establishment of Manchukuo is to transcend racial divisions and break down the previous narrow thinking of demarcation. The various peoples living together will help each other in anticipation of the age of great harmony and lasting peace in East Asia.

The narrative went on to stress that the relief effort in practice manifested “the spirit of the Kingly Way and of benevolent government” (JACAR, 1932d: 25; Asahi shimbun, August 10, 1932: 11).

The state’s narrative claimed that the relief effort would have been beyond the capacity of the former warlord governments. The Harbin authorities contrasted disease-control efforts in 1932 with the lack of action (except in terms of self-preservation) by Manchurian politicians during an earlier cholera epidemic in 1919 (Harubin, 1934: 121). In fact, in the 1910s and 1920s weak state capacity probably did prevent policies and systems that sounded good in theory from always being implemented in practice (Binjiang shibao, September 11, 1932: 6; Tan and Fan, 2011: 107).

In particular, the narrative claimed that the response illustrated the benefits of collaboration with Japan. Clearly the Japanese presence was the biggest barrier to the state’s legitimacy, and emphasizing their role drew attention to that presence. Equally, however, without the Japanese Manchukuo would not exist, so focusing on any positive aspects of their presence made the best of a bad situation. According to newspaper stories, the anti-flood and anti-cholera measures showed the spirit of collaboration between the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities, breaking through the previous narrow racially based thinking (Binjiang shibao, September 11, 1932: 6, September 14, 1932: 6). The Binjiang shibao (September 11, 1932: 6) paid particular attention to Japan’s contribution, without which the refugees would have had no recourse, and which showed the benevolence of its policy toward Manchuria. This, the paper argued, would surely overcome any hesitation the population might have about the new state. Later, in the official retrospects, Zhang Jinghui 張景惠, Manchukuo defense minister and dominant Chinese military leader in north Manchuria, portrayed the successful relief effort as testimony to Japanese-Manchurian collaboration (Harubin, 1934: preface, 1–2), while the Manchukuo government stressed that the Japanese army showed great kindness and sympathy, working night and day to maintain order, rescue refugees, control disease, and promote flood prevention (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 30; see also Binjiang shibao, August 24, 1932: 6).

Chinese nationalists constructed a very different narrative. The Northeast National Salvation Society described Manchukuo’s version as mere propaganda “slandering” the old regime (UKNA, 1932c: 134). Shanghai’s major newspaper, the Shenbao 申報, decried the relief effort, criticizing the government for neglecting flood precautions and the Japanese for using the situation to oppress the refugees (Shenbao, September 1, 1932: 12, September 2, 1932: 10–11). It alleged that the Japanese acting head of the Harbin Emergency Flood Commission 哈爾濱水災非常委員會 had delayed the drainage of the city by accepting bribes to give the work to a Russian company; further delays were attributed to politicking between the region’s two main Chinese leaders (Shenbao, September 17, 1932: 10). Another newspaper highlighted Japanese censorship of stories coming out of the area and claimed that formal state organs played no part in the distribution of food relief, leaving it to nongovernmental organizations (Dagongbao, September 9, 1932: 3).

The Communists developed their own version. The party committee in Manchuria described the floods as a greater disaster even than the Japanese invasion, blaming the crisis on Japanese imperialism and the Nationalists’ betrayal of the people. Claims that this was a purely natural disaster were false, in their view, because the diversion of tax revenues to upholding Japanese control meant that dikes, dams, and river beds were not maintained. Measures such as work-based relief merely exploited and deceived working people, while forestalling organization against the occupation. The Communists called on the people to demand relief, refuse rent and loan repayments, forcibly appropriate grain, and confiscate Japanese goods (Zhongyang dang’anguan, 1988: 11.15–31). They tried to back up their narrative by organizing relief and flood prevention work in areas such as Manzhouli 滿洲里, portraying themselves as the saviors of the people (JACAR, n.d.: 64).

Efforts to respond to the 1932 disaster were therefore ideologically presented or interpreted in ways to serve particular political agendas. For a regime whose main hope lay in performance legitimacy, however, it was crucial not just to make ideological assertions but also to show concrete actions that would support its claims. These actions included creating appropriate institutional and financial arrangements for disaster management, delivering humanitarian relief, and providing the basis for post-flood reconstruction.

Institutional and Financial Prerequisites

The magnitude of the crisis meant that for the state to respond—and be seen to respond—it had both to use existing institutions and to set up new ones specific to the purpose. It also needed to allocate funds from its own budgets and to raise money from the public and abroad. Both institution-building and fund-raising have to be seen in the context of the needs of establishing the new state. The former both required and constituted a pretext for collaboration with elements of the Chinese elite. The latter could be used to paint a favorable picture of the new authorities and to highlight Japanese “generosity.”

Institutions

One way the state could demonstrate its response was to establish new institutions along the lines of the National Flood Relief Commission 國民政府救濟水災委員會 set up in China to deal with the 1931 Yangzi floods, or even of organizations established by warlord regimes in Manchuria, for example after serious floods in Liaoning in 1930. In 1932, faced with diverse conditions over a vast area, the Manchukuo state only gradually realized that the floods were more than just a local threat, but from August 12 it drew on both Chinese and Japanese precedents to establish new central, provincial, and municipal institutions (Jiao and Zhang, 2011: 30–31). At the center, the North Manchuria Flood Relief Commission 北滿水災中央救濟委員會 under Premier Zheng Xiaoxu 鄭孝胥 coordinated fund-raising and relief, while the provincial governments in Jilin and Heilongjiang set up committees (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 28–29, 37, 59; JACAR, n.d.: 75–76; Asahi shimbun, August 17, 1932: 3). At the municipal level, the Harbin authorities were also active. On August 10, the region’s most powerful Chinese politician, Zhang Jinghui (Mitter, 2000: 87–91), took the lead in establishing the Emergency Flood Commission. Given the newly established Japanese dominance, this organization was necessarily a collaborative venture, giving a key role to the Japanese police chief (Harubin, 1934: preface, 12; Dagongbao, September 9, 1932: 3; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 40; JACAR, 1932–1933: 13). These institutions were intended for a specific purpose, and at the end of October the Emergency Commission, charged with an immediate response, was superseded by a Reconstruction Commission 哈爾濱清理水災善後委員會, to which were assigned more long-term issues of health, shelter, and public works (Shengjing shibao, November 6, 1932: 5; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 48).

Working with local governments and co-opting local elites were important parts of the attempt to establish Manchukuo as a quasi-autonomous entity (Mitter, 2000: 102–10). In 1932, county governments mounted relief efforts in collaboration with local elites. As early as August 3, the magistrate of Yilan 宜蘭, some 250 kilometers down the Songhuajiang from Harbin, joined with local elites to set up a relief committee (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 29; Atsumi, 1934: 271). Taonan 洮南, Yanji 延吉, and Hulan 呼蘭 followed later (Shengjing shibao, August 9, 1932: 5, September 2, 1932: 5; Teraoka, 1936a: 17), and the Jilin government ordered other counties along the lower Songhuajiang to do the same (Shengjing shibao, October 4, 1932: 5).

Nongovernmental organizations, and in particular the redemptive societies (salvationist and often syncretic organizations frequently having a philanthropic mission that emerged in Republican China), were another channel through which the regime could build links with local and provincial elites. Though the Japanese were cautious about the societies’ religious elements, they nevertheless saw them as useful in promoting non-Western ideas of governance and potentially therefore in legitimating the Kingly Way (Duara, 2003: 111). Such societies could also make a humanitarian contribution similar to that of philanthropic organizations during the 1931 Yangzi floods (Sun, 2008).

Most prominent was the Red Swastika Society 紅卍會, established in Shandong in the 1920s by the syncretic Daoyuan 道院 group. Its Manchukuo branch severed ties with the parent body following the creation of the new state, becoming a potentially important instrument of the regime’s rule (Sun, 2013). In 1932 the authorities initially planned to entrust the society with the delivery of relief in Harbin, but later discovered that the scale of the disaster required more coordinated measures (JACAR, 1932a: 36; Binjiang shibao, August 14, 1932: 2). Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 2, the Red Swastikas played a prominent role in Harbin and elsewhere, opening camps, running soup kitchens, distributing clothing, and providing medical supplies and inoculation against cholera. In November, they reported on the severity and duration of the disaster, and estimated that at least 240,000 yuan would be needed over six months to prevent refugees who survived the floods from perishing from hunger in the aftermath (Shengjing shibao, August 9, 1932: 4, August 17, 1932: 5, August 25, 1932: 5; Shenbao, September 6 1932: 10, November 5, 1932: 15).

Figure 2.

Red Swastika workers take a patient to the cholera clinic.

Not as well known but even more directly linked to provincial elites was the White Swastika Society 白卍會. This was set up by Zhang Jinghui in 1931 as the World Philanthropic Society and played a prominent part in charity work in Harbin. In 1932 it dispatched five boats to rescue stranded refugees, provided food and clothing, and helped with medical provisions. Conditions at the refugee camp it ran for 500–600 refugees were, however, poor and disease was rife. The society also promoted traditional religious practices, such as a ceremony to welcome the Dragon King. In the spring of 1933, as the relief effort wound down, the White Swastikas became less active but continued to offer some charity throughout the city (Cheng, 1990; Binjiang shibao, August 5, 1932: 6).

Fund-raising

Supplying and raising funds also enabled the state to show it was addressing the crisis. In 1932, direct allocations by the Manchukuo authorities and money raised by public subscription, principally in Japan, constituted the main sources of funding—about half a million yen each (Harubin, 1934: 153). Both could play an important part in the narrative constructed by the regime. The two sums together compared reasonably well with funding raised after other disasters in China. In 1930 a comparable amount supported a similar number of refugees during serious floods in Liaoning 遼寧 (Jiao and Zhang, 2011: 31). Of course much larger amounts were obtained for the 1931 Yangzi floods, but there the number of people affected was over ten times greater. The high proportion of the 1932 funds that came from a single foreign source (Japan) was, however, unusual and clearly linked to Manchukuo’s quasi-colonial status.

States need to be seen to show concern for the victims of disasters (Janku et al., 2012: 9). In 1932, direct disbursements, such as the 50,000 yuan contributed by Chief Executive Puyi 溥儀, were portrayed in this way (Chūō shakai jigyō kyōkai, 1940: appendix 1.1). The government also allocated 500,000 yuan from contingency funds and levied contributions from official salaries. The Central Bank provided goods worth 100,000 yen to Harbin and 50,000 in cash to other areas (JACAR, n.d.: 75; Asahi shimbun, August 13, 1932: 3; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 33, 36–37). Central allocations were supplemented by disbursements from provincial governments, with Heilongjiang allocating 300,000 (later 700,000) yuan for emergency relief (JACAR, n.d.: 75–76; Asahi shimbun, August 17, 1932: 3).

Raising subscribed funds by appeals through the media can also have an important symbolic value (Janku et al., 2012: 10–11). Manchukuo’s Relief Commission raised its profile through newspaper advertisements for donations that ultimately amounted to over 50,000 yuan (Shengjing shibao, August 27, 1932: 4). In Harbin, the Emergency Commission accumulated over 200,000 yuan, of which over 75,000 came from the public, as well as 5,000 from the Banks of China and Communications. Prominent donors included Zhang Jinghui (10,000 Harbin dollars) and the recent head of the Guandong 關東 Army, General Honjō Shigeru 本庄繁 (10,000 yen) (Harubin, 1934: 143–46).

For the Japanese, in both Japan and Manchuria, the floods offered a possible opportunity to win some acceptance of their presence by showing fellow-feeling with the victims. To this end, a high-profile fund-raising exercise was mounted within Japan. The emperor himself donated 40,000 yen, and on August 26 the premier established a North Manchuria Central Flood Relief Committee 北滿水災救援中央委員會, appointing Prince Tokugawa Iesato 徳川家達 as chair (JACAR, n.d.: 69; Hoku Man, 1932: 1–3; Asahi shimbun, September 3, 1932: 2). The committee launched newspaper campaigns and distributed 50,000 fund-raising pamphlets to veterans’ associations, the Japan Chamber of Commerce, and local officials (Hoku Man, 1932: 5–8; Yomiuri shimbun, September 16, 1932: 7). Large donations were made by the private sector, with 50,000 yen each from Mitsui and Mitsubishi, and by organizations such as the patriotic youth and student leagues. The final total reached 490,106.97 yen (Asahi shimbun, November 2, 1932: 2; Hoku Man, 1932: 9–10, 20).

Other organizations participated in Japan’s show of concern. Within Manchuria, the Guandong Army donated money for relief in Harbin, Qiqihar 齊齊哈爾, and Jilin, as well as supplying food where that was scarce (Hoku Man, 1932: 15; Asahi shimbun, August 13, 1932: 4). The South Manchurian Railway Company 南滿州鉄道株式会社 (SMR) assessed a levy on staff salaries, and donated 50,000 yen to Harbin as the worst-hit area (Hoku Man, 1932: 17; JACAR, n.d.: 76; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 32). Nongovernmental organizations, such as the Japanese Red Cross and its Manchurian branch, the Dōjinkai 同仁會, the various YMCAs, and the Patriotic Women’s Association, also raised funds or donated supplies (JACAR, n.d.: 76; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 31–33; Hoku Man, 1932: 16; Asahi shimbun, August 17, 1932: 3).

This exercise was closely linked to Japan’s broader political ambitions. In the Japan Times a Japanese MP, stressing the enormity of the floods, concluded: “Therefore it is a matter to be grateful that the people of Japan are exerting their efforts to aid the people of Manchuria through the raising of flood relief funds” (UKNA, 1932b: 113). Significantly, the first tranche of 150,000 yen from the Flood Relief Committee was handed over by the Japanese ambassador plenipotentiary at the ceremony for the signing of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, by which Japan formally recognized the new state of Manchukuo, on September 15, 1932 (Hoku Man, 1932: 10–11). Later the Manchukuo government formally expressed its gratitude, describing the funds raised as a memorial to the sympathy of the Japanese people (Hoku Man, 1932: 11).

Humanitarian Relief

The attempt to build performance legitimacy required the state to meet popular expectations generated both by China’s history and by the modernization narrative. It needed to provide the soup kitchens, shelter, and access to affordable food that were at the core of the high Qing relief system (Li, 2007: 221–36). In addition, modernization in general and the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service 北滿防疫處, which had been established at the end of the Qing and had succeeded in greatly reducing the region’s death rates from infectious disease, in particular had created expectations of state intervention to control the spread of disease (Nathan, 1967).

Despite the government’s stress on collaboration and racial harmony, the relief effort made clear the quasi-colonial reality of Manchukuo. Key aspects of the effort, such as the maintenance of order, the prevention of disease, and the control of the flood waters, depended on the Japanese contribution. British journalist Woodhead (1932: 41–42) argued that flooding and disease would have been far worse without the energy displayed by the Japanese. American Lilian Coville (1933: 250) also contrasted the efficiency of Japanese efforts at disease control with the ineffectiveness of the Chinese and Soviet authorities in flood prevention. Moreover, although overall flood damage only slightly affected Japanese residents (JACAR, 1932a: 25), the protection of the lives and property of imperial subjects was given priority and, not surprisingly or uniquely, Japanese press coverage concentrated on the experiences of Japanese nationals (Yomiuri shimbun, August 9, 1932: 2). The consulate in Harbin called for action to prevent any intrusion on the camps holding Japanese refugees (JACAR, 1932a: 40, 41, 48), while the Relief Commission allocated more funds (admittedly not a large amount) to support the small number of Japanese residents in north Manchuria than it did to Yilan, the second largest refugee center (Harubin, 1934: 153).

An important, though ambiguous, part of the colonial reality in Manchuria was the Korean community, which constituted the majority of the region’s imperial subjects. Many Koreans were more severely affected than the Japanese, suffering serious losses to their crops. Over 4,000 Korean flood refugees congregated in Harbin (JACAR, 1933–1934: 32). Although regarding its responsibility as “troublesome,” the Japanese consulate demanded protection for the camps holding Korean refugees, and tried to persuade the Korean authorities to provide financial support (JACAR, 1932a: 25, 41, 49; UKNA, 1932c: 138). The Relief Commission provided equivalent support for Korean as for Chinese refugees (JACAR, 1933–1934: 33, 1932–1933: 14).

Shelter

Large numbers of homeless refugees pose a very visible threat to any state’s claims of benevolent governance as well as to the maintenance of order. Traditionally, Chinese states have been expected to provide shelter in disasters and in modern times warlord and Nationalist authorities provided shelters for large numbers of refugees during the 1930 floods in Liaoning, the 1931 Yangzi floods, and the 1935 Shandong floods (Jiao and Zhang, 2011: 190; NFRC, 1933: 69–75; Li, 1991: 470). Emergency accommodation was therefore among the most urgent requirements in 1932. The focus was on Harbin, because the urban population’s higher visibility most directly affected perceptions of the regime’s performance, though also because the city acted as a magnet for refugees from the surrounding region. After the dikes broke on August 7, chaotic scenes followed, as the floods drove many inhabitants from their homes, forcing people—poor Russians as well as Chinese—to take shelter in the upper floors of houses or to erect temporary shelters anywhere they could (Coville, 1933: 247, 251; Binjiang shibao, September 20, 1932: 6; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 43; JACAR, 1932a: 36–37).

In response, the Harbin authorities and other organizations set up camps to house at least some of the refugees. The municipal government opened 21 camps in temples, two middle schools, and an old railway printing works (Binjiang shibao, August 12, 1932: 6, September 20, 1932: 6; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 43; JACAR, 1932a: 36–37). The Red and White Swastika Societies also established 23 camps (Shengjing shibao, August 15, 1932: 2), and both the SMR and the Chinese Eastern Railway 中東鐵路 (CER) provided reception centers in the form of barracks (JACAR, n.d.: 58; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 32). Some of this accommodation, however, was of questionable quality. In many cases, as shown in Figure 3, the shelters were merely makeshift affairs, while the Relief Commission doubted whether even the sturdier CER barracks could house the refugees over winter (Binjiang shibao, September 10, 1932: 6). Outside Harbin, county governments and local elites also set up camps: in Hulan, 15 kilometers to the north, camps housed some of the 30,000 refugees in the area, although many found accommodation with relatives, while others fled to Harbin or Suihua 綏化 (Teraoka, 1936a: 19).

Figure 3.

Shelters in a refugee camp. Courtesy of the family of Cabot Coville.

The authorities were keen to publicize that they were meeting popular expectations and showing concern for homeless refugees. So, in September propaganda officers from the police toured the camps declaring that the authorities were developing plans to deal with the threat of the coming cold weather (Binjiang shibao, September 10, 1932: 6).

The authorities did provide shelter for large numbers of people. In Harbin, the various camps housed 63,000 refugees—about three-quarters Chinese, but also substantial numbers of Koreans and Russians (Harubin, 1934: 73–74; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 44–45, 48–49; JACAR, 1932a: 67–69; North China Herald, May 31, 1933: 330). The Confucius Temple 文廟 camp and the SMR and CER barracks accommodated the largest numbers (around 10,000 in each case), while 23,000 were housed in the Red and White Swastika camps (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 44; Shengjing shibao, August 15, 1932: 2). At first the camps catered mainly for displaced residents of Harbin, but later many refugees arrived from the surrounding countryside, putting considerable strain on facilities (JACAR, 1932a: 37). Although numbers dwindled as the waters receded, 5,000 to 10,000 were still expected to need warm housing to survive the winter (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 43; JACAR, n.d.: 58, 1932e: 7). The CER strengthened the defenses of its barracks against the cold, while the authorities lent materials to 650 households to build temporary huts on areas of empty ground. At the beginning of February, over 4,000 people—90% Chinese and 10% Russian—were still being housed and fed (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 48–49).

Food and Clothing

The disruption of supplies and the refugees’ loss of their normal livelihood meant that the provision of food was central to the state’s response. Again, the people expected the state to provide food or cash to buy food in emergencies: after the 1917 north China floods, over 10,000 tons of grain was distributed across more than 60 counties (Xiong, 1918: 72–77). In 1932 Harbin again had the highest profile. As the floods hit, the authorities mobilized a wide coalition of organizations to distribute food, involving governmental institutions, including the Binjiang 濱江 city authorities, the Emergency Commission, and the central government Relief Commission; Japanese organizations such as the Guandong army and police organs; elite groups collaborating with the regime including the Chamber of Commerce, the Red and White Swastika Societies, and the Manchukuo Concordia Association 滿洲國協和會; and others such as the Overseas Russian Refugee Relief Association 俄僑難民救濟會 (JACAR, 1932a: 36–37; Manshū nippō, August 10, 1932: 7; Harubin, 1934: 74–83). The police established soup kitchens supplying initially bread buns, but later millet or sorghum congee mixed with pickles or cabbage (Binjiang shibao, September 10, 1932: 6; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 45). While the Manchukuo authorities distributed most of the food, the Japanese provided water sterilized in boilers, as shown in Figure 4 (Harubin, 1934: 75–76).

Figure 4.

Japanese helpers distribute water.

In all, the authorities managed to distribute substantial amounts of food. In late September, 23,000 refugees in the camps and 15,000 outside were receiving food—a similar proportion of the total refugee population as the 200,000–250,000 fed daily during the Yangzi floods (JACAR, 1932e: 3; NFRC, 1933: 77). In all, 4 million meals were distributed in Harbin. That only 55% went to Chinese people, over 40% to Russians, probably reflects the extra options the former had, for example relying on relatives in the countryside (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 45). By late spring 1933, numbers were down to 2,000 a day, partly because employment, for example in dike-building work, was provided to many able-bodied refugees (North China Herald, May 31, 1933: 330; Shengjing shibao, December 6, 1932: 5; Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, 1933: 131).

Rural areas were more difficult to reach. In Jilin, Governor Xi Xia sent a senior official to investigate the flood situation and required local magistrates to report on the numbers in need. Both Jilin and Heilongjiang distributed emergency relief in the form of cash, millet, salt, and clothing (Shengjing shibao, October 3, 1932: 2, October 4, 1932: 5; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 53–54, 56–57; Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, 1933: 120). The Japanese also made some air drops of biscuits to rural areas in Heilongjiang, though later sources decried these as pitifully inadequate (Heilongjiang sheng, 1985: 102).

The provision of warm clothing was of particular importance in the extreme cold of Manchuria, though it was also necessary further south as in the 1935 Shandong floods (Li, 1991: 473). The state again led the way by spending 140,000 yen on padded clothes for 50,000 refugees in Heilongjiang (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 54). Nongovernment organizations, such as the Red Swastikas, the Binjiang Club 濱江俱樂部, the Japanese Women’s Federation 日本婦人連合會, and a Manchurian Women’s Charitable Association 婦女慈善會 led by Zhang Jinghui’s wife, also contributed sets of padded clothes (JACAR, 1932b: 2). The White Swastikas recognized the importance of winter clothing, but believed that, because there had been warning of the floods, most refugees had been able to escape with their clothes. Individual investigations were therefore necessary before issuing free clothing (Cheng, 1990: 167–68).

Entitlements and Price Controls

Direct provision of food could only be a short-term measure, and recovery crucially depended on the revival of market supplies. Concern over the ability of the poor to access food and other necessities at reasonable prices has a long history in China, while in the late nineteenth century the Japanese authorities in Taiwan also attempted to control rice prices in order to ward off social unrest (Li, 2007: 229–30; Gao, 2010: 9). By 1932, however, despite the establishment of some charitable storehouses (Jiao and Zhang, 2011: 191), the granary system developed in imperial times was largely defunct in Manchuria. Nevertheless, in the new year the government aimed to reduce prices by buying food cheaply in south Manchuria, transporting it (the SMR was offering discounted freight rates) to counties in difficulties, and selling it at cost (JACAR, n.d.: 64; Hoku Man, 1932: 18). Governments at various levels, including both Harbin and Heilongjiang, also prohibited food exports, a traditional measure to conserve supplies (Harubin, 1934: 133; Shengjing shibao, October 18, 1932: 4).

Administrative price controls had also long been used in situations of shortage. In response to popular unrest when prices of basic necessities rose by up to 150%, the Harbin authorities fixed food prices—and later rents, wages, and transport costs—at the levels of August 5, threatening any who disobeyed the order with severe punishment and confiscation of assets (Harubin, 1934: 133–35; JACAR, 1932c: 11–12; Manshū nippō, August 11, 1932: 4; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 41–42). Elsewhere, county magistrates, for instance in Raohe 饒河 close to the Russian border, followed suit (Binjiang shibao, September 20, 1932: 2). Despite the controls, however, as the waters retreated, landlords in Harbin and Yilan tried to take advantage of the pressing need for housing by expelling their previous tenants and raising rents (Harubin, 1934: 135; Atsumi, 1934: 286).

Overall, the evidence suggests that prices were kept within bounds. Whether because of the controls or (more likely) because of market forces, prices soon fell back: after an abnormal 30% to 40% rise in food prices in August, by November they were little higher than previous levels (Shangye bu, 2012: 25–26, 34, 65–66; see also Binjiang shibao, September 2, 1932: 6; Shengjing shibao, October 5, 1932: 5).

Disease Control

As Mitter (2000: 122) has shown, the Japanese used health policy and disease control to consolidate their influence in Manchuria. In this field, more than most, the new regime’s predecessors had achieved considerable success: the North Manchuria Plague Prevention Service was described by the American minister as “one of the most excellently organized parts of the Chinese government” (Nathan, 1967: 42). In 1932 the state put heavy emphasis on disease control. In response to the serious outbreaks of typhoid and cholera caused by flood-related insanitary conditions, the Harbin authorities established a Disease Prevention Association 哈爾濱聯合防疫委員會, headed by Zhang Jinghui, with the mayor and the head of the Japanese army medical team as deputies (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 42; JACAR, 1932a: 61; JACAR, n.d.: 75). Japanese support in the form of SMR and Japanese Red Cross personnel was crucial, though their role was made so necessary only because they had expelled the senior Chinese personnel of the Plague Prevention Service (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 32; Manshū nippō, August 18, 1932: 7; Binjiang shibao, September 11, 1932: 6; Hoku Man, 1932: 16; Nathan, 1967: 73).

The main threat was from cholera, which required both an inoculation program and treatment facilities. In all, medical teams in Harbin and elsewhere inoculated over 250,000 people, a number roughly proportional to the over 2 million who were vaccinated against infectious diseases in the course of the 1931 Yangzi floods (JACAR, 1932–1933: 15; Hoku Man, 1932: 16; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 37, 42; Teraoka, 1936a: 17; NFRC, 1933: 151, 298). As rumors circulated about possible harmful effects, however, the program often had to be enforced at gunpoint or by requiring refugees looking to escape by train first to show an inoculation certificate (Coville, 1933: 255–56; Harubin, 1934: 128: Woodhead, 1932: 42; Shenbao, September 6, 1932: 10). Later, the incidence of the disease declined, though the British consul credited this mainly to the cooler weather (UKNA, 1932a: 105). Government and other clinics also treated the sick (see Figure 5), and the Harbin authorities flew in 200 bags of salt for saline drips (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 37). The Harbin Central Hospital 哈爾濱中央病院 cholera clinic treated 354 patients, including 31 Koreans and two Japanese, up to August 19. In all, up to spring 1933 15,000 were treated in clinics and 18,000 elsewhere (Asahi shimbun, August 18, 1932: 3; JACAR, n.d.: 75, 1932c: 13–14; North China Herald, May 31, 1933: 330); by comparison, 157,000 patients were treated by the medical authorities in the Yangzi floods (NFRC, 1933: 295).

Figure 5.

An ambulance waits to pick up a cholera victim.

Overall, the authorities were relatively successful in controlling the spread of disease. Between August 1 and October 2, 248 people died from cholera in Harbin (149 corpses were also abandoned on the roadside), with a death rate of 40% among those who contracted the disease—a little higher than the 31% registered in the 1932 cholera outbreak in central China, but that outbreak was not contemporaneous with the floods. Up to November 30, 1933, 2,098 died from infectious diseases (Hoku Man, 1932: 16; Zheng, 1994: 103; NFRC, 1933: 299). This compares with a death toll of 4,500 in Harbin, and between 10,000 (according to Carl Nathan) and 25,000 (according to the Manchukuo authorities, who might have had an interest in exaggeration) across north Manchuria in 1919, and 1,500 region-wide in 1926 (Nathan, 1967: 64–65, 70; Harubin, 1934: 121).

Reconstruction

Building up any legitimacy also required the state to ensure the continued functioning of society. In the aftermath of natural disasters, the immediate priority of any regime, and perhaps especially of colonial or quasi-colonial states, is to reverse the sudden decline in state capacity resulting from the breakdown of communications and the destruction of public goods and infrastructure (Roy, 2012: 8). In some localities in 1932, even the Japanese army was short of food; in others, government and order had broken down, partly because the authorities lacked the funds to pay the police (Teraoka, 1936a: 17; LSD, 1932b: 2). Because only a short period had elapsed since the Japanese occupation and resistance was still active, the Manchukuo authorities needed quickly to rebuild state capacity. In the short term the most urgent tasks were the maintenance of order, the restoration of transport links, especially railways, and the clearing of the flood waters from the streets of Harbin. Once the immediate crisis had passed, the new Reconstruction Commission began to turn its attention to addressing the longer-term issues of flood prevention, rebuilding destroyed streets, and promoting broader economic recovery (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 48). The state’s narrative again emphasized the role of collaboration among the Japanese and Manchurian people and governments (Harubin, 1934: 66).

Social Order

The maintenance of social order was a key part of the Manchukuo regime’s appeal to local elites and was essential for the restoration of state capacity (Duara, 2003: 71; Woodhead, 1932: 90). Japanese participation in this was probably necessary: when the Japanese army withdrew from Yilan for fear of cholera, the local elite protested that this would expose them to bandits (JACAR, n.d.: 3; Atsumi, 1934: 275; Hoku Man, 1932: 15). However, their involvement highlighted the regime’s quasi-colonial nature and had contradictory impacts on legitimacy.

The state had to move quickly to counteract the chaos and disorder that followed the breaking of the dikes on August 7. A joint police command, involving the Japanese military together with the Manchukuo army and police, set up posts (see Figure 6) with powers of random search and stipulated severe penalties for rumor-mongering. Troublemakers taking advantage of the floods would suffer the death penalty, while merchants seeking to profiteer would have their property confiscated (JACAR, 1932a: 40, 56–58; Harubin, 1934: 126–29; Shengjing shibao, September 7, 1932: 5; Dagongbao, September 9, 1932: 3). Summary justice was exercised against troublemakers and those—including two patrolmen—who robbed refugees (Coville, 1933: 250; Dagongbao, September 9, 1932: 3; Harubin, 1934: 130; JACAR, 1932c: 9–10). The authorities’ nervousness led to repeated injunctions to refugees not to listen to rumors or allow themselves to be used by troublemakers; proclamations were even dropped by plane to ensure that the populace received them (Harubin, 1934: 126).

Figure 6.

A military police station during the floods.

The role of Japan was central. The Japanese consul highlighted the need to guard against bandits and Communists and stressed his consulate’s vigilance against unexpected threats (JACAR, 1932a: 40). Japanese soldiers cordoned off some of the higher ground with electric wires, forcing refugees to more distant areas in order, according to the Communists, to disperse potentially troublesome large congregations of people (Shenbao, September 1, 1932: 12; Zhongyang dang’anguan, 1988: 11: 15–18, 28). They were also active in guarding the stocks of soybeans rescued from the floods (Coville, 1933: 249).

Intercommunal clashes would obviously undermine any legitimacy the state had. So, Japanese military police were quickly deployed to prevent clashes between Japanese and Chinese populations (Harubin, 1934: 70). The sensitivity of communal issues underlay the swift response to criticisms that relief efforts had focused on the (partly foreign) Pristan or wharf district (now Daoli 道里), leaving the (Chinese) Fujiadian 傅家甸 area (Daowai 道外) to its own devices. The authorities argued this had been for economic and technical reasons, stressing they were committing resources to the Chinese city (Binjiang shibao, August 23, 1932: 6). Nevertheless, commercial leaders petitioned for more rapid action in Fujiadian as the waters subsided in Pristan (Shenbao, September 17, 1932: 10).

Communications

In order to reestablish state capacity as well as facilitate relief operations, the authorities needed to restore communications. The floods had deprived Harbin of all its railway links (Asahi shimbun, August 9, 1932: 7). Most urgent was the CER’s southern link to Changchun 長春, which had been cut in five places. Under pressure from the municipal authorities, the railway resumed operations partially from August 20 and fully from August 30, having expended 10,000 man-days and over 10,000 cubic meters of rock and gravel. The company also sent 200 laborers to strengthen the foundations of the Songhuajiang bridge at Harbin, successfully averting immediate danger, though the bridge’s future was still in doubt in early 1933 (Yomiuri shimbun, August 12, 1932: 7; Harubin, 1934: 62–65; North China Herald, February 22, 1933: 281). Reopening the CER’s eastern and western branches took longer, partly because of bandit disruption, with operations not fully restored even by the end of the year (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 63–64).

Japan’s contribution was again important. Its army, which was the main user of the reopened lines, provided protection from bandits, while the SMR took responsibility for reopening the Hulan 呼蘭–Hailun 海倫 line to the north of Harbin (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 64; Harubin, 1934: 65–66; LSD, 1932a: 23). The Japanese military was also interested in non-rail communications, providing the small sum of 100 yen for road repairs in Hulan, and allocating gunboats to protect a growing amount of river transport on the Songhuajiang (Teraoka, 1936a: 17; LSD, 1932a: 41).

Fighting the Floods and Flood Prevention

Flooded cities rarely enhance a government’s reputation. So, after the failure of attempts to protect endangered areas, the authorities needed to clear the water as quickly as possible. Once the crisis was past, efforts shifted to preventing a recurrence of the problem.

Across the broad rural plain, there was little to do but wait until the waters subsided, but in Harbin active intervention was more possible, and the most important flood prevention and clearance efforts took place there. Initial attempts to strengthen dikes failed, and Fujiadian was flooded on August 7, eventually to a depth of five meters. Five hundred Chinese workers and 400 members of a Japanese army work unit made further attempts to protect Pristan and particularly Kitayskaya Street 中央大街, but by August 9 the area was flooded to a depth of two meters (Harubin, 1934: 25–27, 32–33, 41). After the waters peaked on August 12 the priority switched to flood clearance. The first task was to insulate the urban areas from the river by repairing damaged dikes or building new ones. In Pristan, a thousand meters of dikes cut off the river, while in Fujiadian breaches were repaired with over 37,000 sandbags. Then mechanical pumps were used to remove the water from the now insulated urban areas. This took from August 25 to September 27 in Pristan; in Fujiadian the work started in mid-September and, despite fears the water would remain until the year’s end, by October 15 it was gone (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 46–48; Harubin, 1934: 34, 38, 42–43, 48–50).

The official narrative highlighted the role of the Japanese, who claimed their expertise in water control was world famous. On August 21 the Manchukuo government sent two Japanese experts to Harbin to direct the drainage work, and the official retrospect recognized the “indispensable contribution” of 50 technicians from the SMR, who worked solidly for 40 days from September 4 to October 15 (Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 32; Harubin, 1934: 41, 44, 58).

As Tirthankar Roy (2008: 262) emphasizes, long-term disaster control measures are at least as important as immediate relief. Control of rivers has long featured among the people’s expectations of the Chinese state: the Yellow River Conservancy was among the most important institutions in imperial China. The Manchukuo state assigned water control equal priority with social control, and in November 1932 the SMR and the Special Services Unit of the Guandong Army proposed a study into control of the Songhuajiang (Jiao and Zhang, 2011: 37; SMR, Keizai chōsakai, 1935: 441). In Harbin, the Reconstruction Commission, with the help of subsidized steel from Japan’s Yawata 八幡 steelworks, repaired the old dikes and built new flood walls, while pumping equipment was installed to prevent flooding when the ice melted the following spring (SMR, Keizai chōsakai, 1935: 442–43; Manshūkoku kokumuin, 1933: 49; North China Herald May 31, 1933: 330). Up to 1937, 2.35 million yuan was spent to build over five kilometers of dikes (Harbin shi, 1998: 492).

The state’s efforts met with at least limited success. Although water levels in 1934 almost matched those of 1932, much less of Harbin was flooded and the main populated areas escaped lightly (JACAR, 1934: 82–91; Zheng, 1994: 106). Of course, dike building could not prevent floods entirely, but rather just diverted the waters away from the urban centers, and the rural areas north of Harbin suffered as much as in 1932 (UKNA, 1934a: 9).

Economic Recovery

Economic recovery was crucial to the state’s efforts to build legitimacy. Support—for example, through tax relief—particularly for the rural economy in the aftermath of disasters was among the popular expectations of the imperial state (Li, 2007: 230–32). In 1932, recovery required substantial resources and the Manchukuo government allocated part of the proceeds of a 30 million yen bond issue to restore the flood-stricken areas (North China Herald, November 16, 1932: 248; UKNA, 1934b: 48).

The state faced a rural sector in crisis, partly (though not entirely) because of the floods. In some areas fields remained flooded for over four months, capital stock was destroyed, and labor driven away, leading to a sharp reduction in crop acreage in 1933 (Teraoka, 1936a: 22, 1936b: 60). Near Qiqihar, the floods led to a sharp decline in purchasing power as well as in the availability of draft animals; the SMR concluded that progress in agriculture would be difficult until the flood problem was resolved (Fukui and Kobayashi, 1934: 56–57). In 1934, observers reported reduced acreage and productive capacity across north Manchuria as a result of both floods and bandits (Manshū hyōron, 1934: 5).

In response the state provided both financial aid and tax relief. The Central Bank lent 20 million yuan to aid the 1933 and 1934 spring harvests (total supply of Manchurian yuan was about 120 million) (Manshū chūō ginkō, 1988: 70). In Heilongjiang, the provincial government proclaimed it was practicing the Kingly Way when it lent eight million yuan to 61,000 households farming one million hectares, to be repaid in installments in late spring 1934 (Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, 1933: 129–30). Jilin announced a reduction in miscellaneous taxes for flood-hit areas and Heilongjiang offered a range of tax exemptions (Shengjing shibao, September 3, 1932: 5; Manshū shoin, 1932: 60). In Hulan, a tax holiday was declared up to autumn 1933, though this left the county government in financial difficulties (Teraoka, 1936a: 17). As a “compassionate” measure the central government also suspended the implementation of the law against cultivating opium (UKNA, 1933: 27).

The recovery of the highly visible urban areas was also crucial for the state’s reputation. Despite ambitious early plans to rebuild Fujiadian on higher ground, in fact Harbin’s physical reconstruction took place very much along earlier lines (Manshū nippō, August 27, 1932: 5; North China Herald, March 15, 1933: 410). In response to Fujiadian’s economic problems, caused by the floods, the Japanese occupation, and the Great Depression, the authorities ordered pawnshops to halve their normal 40% interest rates. A senior official also called for aid to the private sector and a moratorium on interest payments for flood-affected businesses, but the banks balked at the idea of interest-free loans lasting three or five years. Merchants based in the north and south markets also called for a moratorium on rents, though the authorities only granted one or two months rather than the one or two years requested (Harubin, 1934: 85–86).

The promotion of longer-term economic recovery was probably the least successful, as well as the most complex, aspect of the state’s response. When a renewed episode of flooding occurred in 1934, its impact was magnified by the fact that the rural population had not yet recovered from the 1932 disaster (SMR, Chōsabu, 1935: 332). The decline of the soybean trade and the impact of the World Depression were, however, probably as important long-term factors as were the floods.

Conclusion

The relief effort, in both actuality and propaganda, manifested the quasi-colonial nature of the Manchukuo state, with its dependence on the Japanese for funding, medical support, and the maintenance of order. The prioritizing of relief for Japanese nationals, and to a lesser extent for other imperial subjects, reflected that reality. Propaganda featuring the prominent role played by the Japanese police, army, and officials in the relief effort was also clearly linked to the attempts to legitimize the new state, as shown when the relief funds raised in Japan were handed over at the ceremony for the signing of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol.

At the same time, this story provides some support for Duara’s (2003: 1) contention that there is more to Manchukuo’s history than brutality and victimization, even though those facets capture essential parts of the reality. The ideological focus on the Kingly Way had little impact and the slogan was used less from the mid-1930s (Han, 2004: 472). However, the new state was able to collaborate with local Chinese elites to mount a partially successful relief effort in a way it might reasonably hope would build some performance legitimacy. Judgments in hindsight need to take account of the limits of state capacity (Roy, 2012: 28–29). Given that, this article has shown that, although according to some reports the initial flooding in 1932 cost up to 30,000 lives (Shengjing shibao, August 11, 1932: 4), the response of the fledgling Manchukuo government registered some real achievements. Tens of thousands of refugees were housed and fed. Deaths from disease were kept to a couple of hundred, at least at the height of the crisis in Harbin. Communications were restored relatively promptly and longer-term flood prevention work protected the major urban areas from rivers in 1934 that were almost as high as in 1932. Not even hostile Chinese sources were able to argue that a major human catastrophe, whether in terms of famine or of epidemic, followed the floods.

How far the regime actually succeeded in translating this “good roads as propaganda” into increased legitimacy or even acquiescence is more difficult to say. The Japanese asserted that the relief efforts “had been fully appreciated by the local population” (North China Herald, May 31, 1933: 330), and their Manchukuo supporters made similar claims to refute the statements of the League of Nations report on Manchuria (UKNA, 1932c: 73). Jilin gentry representatives explicitly thanked Governor Xi Xia and the provincial government for saving 300,000 refugees who would otherwise have had no hope (Shengjing shibao, November 13, 1932: 5). And the Manchuria Daily News (June 1, 1933: 9–10) reported that the Chinese population of Harbin “seemed to think quite a lot” of Japanese efforts, inspired by the Kingly Way, to drain and rebuild Fujiadian. Some skepticism is warranted in all these cases, but the overall successful management of the floods probably did the regime’s performance legitimacy some good or at least no harm.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for comments from Edward McCord and two anonymous referees, which helped me greatly to improve the article. Richard Gunde has done his usual excellent editorial job in sharpening my prose and argument. The photographs used in the article were taken by the U.S. Consul Cabot Coville, and his family have been very helpful in locating and giving me permission to use them; thanks especially to Liz, Brooks, and Gilbert Coville. Mimi Dornack at National Geographic also gave helpful advice on the images, while John Butler of Photovalet improved their technical quality. Thanks also to Sunyoung Park of Pohang University of Science and Technology for bringing important source materials to my attention.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: I would like to acknowledge the support of the British Academy’s excellent scheme for individual visits to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for funding a visit in 2009 to Beijing, Shenyang, and Harbin, and that of the GB Sasakawa Foundation for enabling me to collect materials in Japan.

Author Biography

Tim Wright is Emeritus Professor in Chinese Studies at the University of Sheffield. He is author of Coal Mining in China’s Economy and Society, 1895-1937 (Cambridge University Press, 1984) and The Political Economy of the Chinese Coal Industry: Black Gold and Blood-stained Coal (Routledge, 2011). He is also editor-in-chief of the Oxford Bibliographies in Chinese Studies.

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