The Policy of the Military “Supporting the Left” and the Spread of Factional Warfare in China’s Countryside: Shaanxi,1967–1968

Mid- and Low-level Regional Commanders in a Shattered Bureaucracy

Before considering the actual processes of policy implementation, we provide a brief sketch of the PLA’s bureaucratic structure within which mid- and low-level regional commanders made decisions. In deciding their stance on factions, mid- and low-level regional commanders—those of military subdistricts and county people’s armed departments—were not acting on their own. Military bureaucracy generally inhibits them from making such political decisions without the consent of superior officers. Moreover, under the uncertainty of the Cultural Revolution, those commanders would avoid making consequential decisions without clear guidance from higher authorities.

The PLA was divided organizationally into two general categories: the main forces and the regional forces (Nelsen, 1972, 1977). Often called “armies” 军, “corps,” or more recently “group armies” 集团军, the main forces were elite army units whose main responsibility was national defense. While assigned nominally to “military regions” 大军区 (hereafter MR), main force units were in fact under the direct command of the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

On the other hand, the “regional forces,” consisting of the remaining regular ground forces, all the army reserve units, and the militia, were placed under the control of provincial “military districts” 省军区 (MD). The MD was further subdivided into “military subdistricts” 军分区 (MSD) at the prefectural level, and then into “people’s armed departments” 人民武装部 (PAD) at the county level. The main duties of the PAD were to supervise reserve forces, military service and recruitment, and command militia operations. As the bu 部, or “department,” indicates, the PAD served as departments of the county party committee and the government for military work, while at the same time they were under the command of the upper-level military unit, that is, the MSD. The Shaanxi MD had 9 MSDs, one for each of Shaanxi’s 8 prefectures and 1 prefectural-level city, and 95 PADs, one for each of the province’s 93 counties and 2 province-controlled cities, in 1966 (see Table 1).

The two types of military forces had different command structures. Regional forces were under the dual leadership of higher-level military commands and local party committees. Before the Cultural Revolution, the regional forces and local party committees were knitted together in order to synchronize the militia’s dual tasks of national security and economic development (Nelsen, 1972: 448). More importantly, leading positions of regional forces and local party committees were interlocked with each other. At the provincial level, the first party secretary was usually appointed as the MD’s first political commissar, while the MD commander also often held a position in the provincial party committee. At the county level, the PAD’s political commissar was usually the county party secretary, while the PAD chief often served on the county party committee.

Commanders of main force units, on the other hand, did not usually hold important political positions in local party committees or governments before the Cultural Revolution. As mentioned above, they were also under the direct command of the General Staff Department and only nominally under the MR. Main forces were therefore more independent from local influence. This was why, as we will see later, main force units were transferred into troubled provinces to take over the commanding role of the MDs in supporting the left (Nelsen, 1972: 448).

The duty of supporting the left was first assigned to the regional forces, while the main forces were reserved for defense purposes (Nelsen, 1977: 29). But, as the brief sketch above suggests, regional forces were not very suited to this misconceived task. The policy of supporting the left posed an obvious conflict of interest for regional force commanders under the “dual leadership system.” They were in effect ordered to help “leftist” rebels seize power from the power structure of which they were a part. Their “symbiotic relationship” (Shambaugh, 2002) with local party leadership may have led regional commanders to protect local party leaders, suppress recalcitrant rebels, or in some cases even support moderate, or “conservative,” factions. There were in fact well-publicized cases in which high-level commanders and central leaders disagreed over which factions to support or suppress in such places as Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Wuhan.

Whether regional force units in fact supported a faction or not, however, their close ties to local political leadership undermined their credibility and made them vulnerable to rebel attacks. The lack of confidence in those units was generally more evident at the lower levels of the military bureaucracy. In some counties, the PADs were viewed as quasi-military organizations—as rebels of Sanyuan county put it, “local officials wearing military uniforms” (Sanyuan xian zhi, 2000: 727). In others, the murky line between local military and political leaders led rebels to suspect, whether justified or not, the former of being a “black backstage supporter” 黑后台 of the latter (Guo, 2005: 2294). The lack of credibility and attacks on military leaders paralyzed most mid- and low-level commands into indecision.

The Center’s response to this impasse was to override the regional military bureaucracy, which it did by stripping regional commanders of decision-making power and reorganizing regional commands. From late March to early May 1967, the Center issued a series of documents overruling decisions made by military region and provincial commanders, negating the legitimacy of power seizures, rehabilitating factions labeled “counterrevolutionary organizations,” and in effect overturning the direction of support (Zhonggong zhongyang et al., 1967b; Zhonggong zhongyang, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c). In case the point was missed, the CMC’s “ten-point order,” in early April 1967, mandated that military commanders “report to and ask for instructions” 请示报告 from the CCRG and the CMC’s Cultural Revolution Group before deciding their position on mass organizations (Zhongyang junwei, 1967c). It also prohibited regional commanders from declaring mass organizations “reactionary” or “counterrevolutionary” without ratification from the Center. The ten-point order virtually took decision-making power away from regional commanders.

The reorganization of provincial commands was even more dramatic. More than a dozen army corps were relocated to distant provinces to take over command there (Nelsen, 1977: 126–37). Army corps were sent not only to provinces where regional commanders confronted the Center by siding with “wrong” factions, but, as we see later in the example of Shaanxi, to those where they had trouble handling the situation.

But these heavy-handed measures affected only the higher reaches of the regional military bureaucracy and did not ensure compliance at the lower levels. In “asking for instructions” from the central authorities, mid- and low-level commanders had to go through intermediate regional commands, which, given the policy’s vague and divisive nature, involved a complicated and protracted process. Moreover, the reshuffling of provincial commands inevitably caused disruption and confusion among lower-level commands. The Center’s attempt to impose its will on the regional military bureaucracy left mid- and low-level commanders without guidance and leadership. As a result, the vast majority of mid- and low-level commands did not, or more precisely could not, support any faction, but rather fell into indecision.

Reorganization of the Provincial Command

Hu Bingyun 胡炳云, Shaanxi Military District commander, was a typical regional commander who also served as secretary of the secretariat of the provincial party committee. He ordered the MD to protect leading provincial officials to ensure the continuation of work, and, as a result, was criticized by the rebels (Hu, 1998: 312–15). When Xi’an’s rebels brought a complaint against him to Vice Premier Chen Yi 陈毅, Chen was aware of the problem faced by regional commanders. Referring to the provincial first party secretary, Huo Shilian 霍士廉, who also served as the MD’s first political commissar, Chen Yi pointed out, “From their [the MD’s] standpoint, they had to protect the Northwest Bureau and the provincial party committee, [because] the provincial party secretary is, after all, the first political commissar of the military district!” (“Chen Yi jiejian,” 1967: 51).

By the time the policy was introduced in late January 1967, Xi’an’s “conservative” organizations had disintegrated in the midst of the campaign against the “bourgeois reactionary line” in late 1966. Some of those organizations—the Red Guard Headquarters 红卫兵司令部, the Red Terror Squad 红色恐怖队, ³ and the Workers and Peasants General Headquarters 工农总部—allegedly defended provincial authorities, while another—the Cultural Revolution Liaison Station 文革联络站—daringly criticized the CCRG. The victorious rebel coalition, the Unified Headquarters 统指, then split into two camps as the Xi’an Jiaotong University Cultural Revolution Congress 交大文革总会 (hereafter Jiaoda) headed by controversial leader Li Shiying 李世英 opted out of the coalition (“Jiaoda wen’ge,” 1967; “Chen Yi jiejian,” 1967). Other core member organizations of the Unified Headquarters—Xibei Industrial University (Xigongda 西工大) and Xi’an Telegraph Construction Academy (Xijundian 西军电)—went ahead with the “January 25 power seizure” with little consultation with Jiaoda rebels (“Zhou zongli, Kang lao deng,” 1967: 2). The remaining coalition then joined forces with the Workers Alliance 工联, while Jiaoda rebels helped to form a coalition of opposing workers, the Workers General Headquarters 工总司.

The rebel split threatened the unity of the Shaanxi Military District. When asked about the MD’s stance on the split within the rebel camp by Chen Yi on February 5, a representative of Jiaoda replied, “Some support them, and some support us. We are worried that the division within the left is drawing the military into it” (“Chen Yi jiejian,” 1967: 50–51). Chen Yi went on to ask, “You split into two factions, and there are two leftist factions; what should they [the provincial MD] do?” Chen then answered his own question, “They should not express their stance 表态 . . . [and] should never intervene.”

The MD also antagonized rebels over its handling of factional brawls at large military-related factories. The CMC’s “eight-point order” of January 28, 1967, prohibited attacks on military facilities, while endorsing the suppression of “counterrevolutionary organizations and elements.” Under the circumstances, Xi’an’s large concentration of arms factories inevitably drew the military authorities into factional brawls in such strategic sites. One such incident took place at Xibei Optical Instrument Factory 西北光学仪器厂, in which a large-scale fight, involving thousands of workers from neighboring factories, resulted in hundreds of injuries and serious damage to the facilities. After an investigation, the MD one-sidedly blamed the Workers Alliance, judging it to be responsible for a “serious counterrevolutionary incident” and arresting six “flagrant counterrevolutionary elements.” The Workers Alliance protested and demanded a reinvestigation and rehabilitation. The Center was prompted to step in and decided that the Shaanxi MD had committed an error in handling the incident; it was not a “counterrevolutionary incident” but a “subversive incident”; and the six workers who had been arrested were to be rehabilitated (Zhonggong zhongyang et al., 1967c).

Finding the MD unreliable, the Center decided to bring in a main force army to take over the task of “supporting the left” in Shaanxi. On February 15, it ordered the transfer of the 21st Army from Taiyuan, Shanxi (Beijing MR), to Xi’an, Shaanxi (Lanzhou MR), to take charge (Geng, 2005; Nelsen, 1977: table 5 at 136). Army commander Hu Wei 胡炜 assumed a leading role, while the MD commander, Hu Bingyun, who had been under criticism, was replaced by Huang Jingyao 黄经耀. On February 23, Zhou Enlai summoned Hu Wei and told him, “Xi’an is now in disorder. . . . Both factions of Xi’an are revolutionary mass organizations. After your troops arrive in Xi’an, work hard to stabilize the situation. You must urge both mass organizations to achieve an alliance.” A few days later, Zhou instructed Hu again, “You should not fall for either faction. If you do, it will be difficult to carry out your duty” (Geng, 2005: 25).

On March 2, the Support the Left Committee (SLC), comprising the 21st Army, the Shaanxi Provincial MD, and the Lanzhou Military Region Air Force, was established. On the same day, Zhou Enlai met representatives of Jiaoda and the Workers General Headquarters in Beijing and instructed: “Xijundian, Xigongda, Jiaoda, and Yeyuan 冶院 [Xi’an Metallurgy Construction Institute] must undertake extended military training”; “Students . . . should listen to what the PLA says”; “Whether or not one respects the PLA is evidence of whether one is a true or false revolutionary” (Shaanxi sheng zhi: zhengwu zhi, 1997: 674; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1997: 133). From March 15 to 18, the SLC dispatched 2,059 military officials and soldiers to Xijundian, Xigonda, Jiaoda, and Yeyuan to conduct military training (Shaanxi sheng zhi: dashiji, 1996: 464; Shaanxi sheng zhi: zhengwu zhi, 1997: 674–75; Shaanxi sheng zhi: Zhongguo gongchandang zhi, 2002: 928).

By bringing in a main force army from another MR, and by instructing rebels himself, Zhou Enlai intended to enhance the credibility of the military and restore the unity of rebel organizations. He, as well as Chen Yi, tried to avoid military involvement in the factional conflict by emphasizing that “both factions are revolutionary mass organizations.” The 21st Army’s relations with local rebels—not only with the military-related Xijundian and Xigongda but also with Jiaoda—went well for a while (“Zhou zongli, Kang lao deng,” 1967). Leaders of the 21st Army and the Shaanxi MD were even praised by Mao Zedong for “listening open-heartedly to the masses’ opinions” by holding a series of conversations with Xigongda, Xijundian, and Jiaoda (Mao, 1967). Even so, the task of mediating between rebels became increasingly difficult toward the summer as various issues fed factional disputes.

Indecision and Confusion among Mid- and Low-level Commands

Much like the provincial command, mid- and low-level commands were made the focus of local factional conflict by the policy of supporting the left. Local factions competed for recognition to fill the political vacuum left by power seizures. Mid- and low-level commands were also tied closely to local party leadership, making them equally, if not more, unsuitable for the task. But unlike the provincial command, lower-level commands had little guidance or leadership from higher authorities. The extensive involvement of central leaders that characterized developments in Xi’an did not extend to prefectures and counties. Moreover, the reorganization of the provincial command caused disruptions in the regional command structure. The sudden replacement of the MD commander and the imposition of a main force army “with little comprehension of the local situation,” as the Xi’an Municipal Annals observed, “created misunderstandings 隔阂 and disputes 纠纷 between the military and the locals, and within the military” (Xi’an shi zhi: zhengzhi junshi, 2000: 70, 864). Disputes within the provincial command would inevitably undermine its leadership of subordinate commands.

Moreover, Zhou Enlai’s instructions on Xi’an’s factional rivalry—“both factions are revolutionary mass organizations”—were of little relevance to most prefectures and counties. Local situations varied from one prefecture to another and from one county to another. The provincial command’s “neutrality” provided little guidance to mid- and low-level commanders. Thus, in the first several months after the policy was introduced in late January 1967, the lack of clear guidance and leadership from higher authorities led most of those commands to indecision. “Indecision” included three subtypes: waiting and seeing, being split within themselves, and offering tacit support to a faction without “expressing support.”

The Pingli county 平利县 PAD provides a typical example. On receiving the order to “support the left” in March 1967, the PAD began to survey the membership of rebel organizations (Pingli xian zhi: junshi zhi, 1988: 120–21). Based on the proportions of party members, cadres, and poor and lower-middle peasants, it classified the organizations into three groups—“revolutionary mass organizations,” “general mass organizations,” and “mass organizations with serious errors.” After the survey, the PAD first became inclined toward the Fifteen General 十五总, whose members included many party members, cadres, and those with “pure” class origins. The PAD, however, refrained from declaring the faction “leftist,” while supporting it secretly. In late May, the superior Ankang 安康 MSD indicated that “supporting the left” should not be based solely on “class origins” but “rebel sprit” should be the general guideline. But no county PAD under the MSD had yet to declare its position. Meanwhile, a split emerged within the Pingli PAD when vice-chief Shi Yangcheng 史羊城 sided with the Six Allied General 六联总, whose membership included many people with “complex backgrounds” and few party members. But the PAD chief, Zhao Guangqi 赵光歧, continued to refuse to express a position despite the Six Allied General’s demand for support.

The example of the Pingli PAD shows all three elements of “indecision”: offering tacit support, a split within, and waiting for further clarification. It also reveals that the county PAD received an order to support the left in March 1967, more than a month after the policy was introduced. The delay was probably caused by the reorganization of the provincial command, which was finally put together as the Support the Left Committee on March 2. The Pingli case also shows that the MSD conveyed vague instructions in late May, which, however, did not convince the Pingli PAD, or any other PAD, to take sides. The chief commander continued to avoid committing himself.

Some mid- and low-level commanders attempted a more aggressive approach by mediating a “great alliance” 大联合 among “revolutionary rebel factions” and supporting their “power seizures.” This strategy was consistent not only with the official policy that ambiguously called for “supporting the left” and achieving a “great alliance” at the same time ⁴ but also with the stance of the provincial command, which promoted an alliance of both Xi’an factions. It may have also been a convenient way of avoiding committing to a faction or forming a “moderate” coalition. But most military-sponsored “great alliances” at this stage collapsed shortly after “power seizures,” undermined by such issues as who among leading officials should be targeted or protected, which mass organizations were “revolutionary factions” and thus should be included in the alliance, and so on. ⁵ In fact, these were issues that could not be decided solely by mid- and low-level commanders. Without the approval of higher authorities, fragile alliances were doomed to split.

Even before the sudden change in the provincial command in early March 1967, a few subordinate units had unilaterally taken a position on local factional rivalries. The mid- and low-level commands that did so made decisions apparently without consultation with, or in some cases in open defiance of, the upper levels. The case of the Yulin 榆林 MSD and the Mizhi County 米脂县 PAD is an example of unilateral actions. On January 25, two days after the policy of supporting the left was issued, despite internal disagreements, the Yulin MSD “hastily” 匆匆 declared its support for the Red Flag Rebel Headquarters 红旗造反司令部, a faction dominated by party and government officials (Yulin shi zhi, 1996: 479). Five days later, defying the Yulin MSD, the subordinate Mizhi County PAD expressed its support for the “101,” a local faction opposed to the Red Flag Rebel Headquarters (Mizhi xian zhi, 1993: 391). The political commissar of the Mizhi PAD, Cui Xiaotang 崔孝堂, did not change his position, despite criticism and warnings from the Yulin MSD, the county party committee, and the government. As we will see later, this defiance by the Mizhi PAD caught the eye of the CCRG, which decided to use it for its own purposes.

As we have seen, the vast majority of mid- and low-level regional commands in Shaanxi initially did not take sides. Of the 9 MSDs and 95 PADs in Shaanxi, only 1 MSD and 6 PADs expressed their position by the end of May 1967, while the vast majority either remained indecisive or were struggling to mediate between rival factions. The lack of clear guidance and leadership from higher authorities led to indecision among mid- and low-level commanders.

Attack on the Military and the Outbreak of Major Armed Battles in Xi’an

In Xi’an, the relationship of the Jiaoda rebels with the 21st Army began to deteriorate in May 1967, when Jiaoda stepped up its attack on Huo Shilian, provincial first party secretary, as “a big traitor of the Liu Shaoqi type.” Having expressed his support for the Unified Headquarters and the Workers Alliance—together called the West Faction 西派—Huo became the primary target of Jiaoda and the Workers General Headquarters, the “East Faction” 东派. Zhou Enlai’s decision to entrust Huo’s custody to the provincial military authorities set them on a collision course with the Jiaoda rebels (“Zhou zongli zuixin zhishi,” 1967: 1). Officers and soldiers are also said to have become inclined toward military-related Xigongda and Xijundian—core member organizations of the United Headquarters—through on-campus military training.

But the Jiaoda rebels likely would not have dared to confront the 21st Army without devastating attacks on the military initiated by radicals at the Center. Reversing the previous CMC “eight-point order,” the ten-point order of early April prohibited the military from firing on mass organizations, arresting their members, and declaring them “reactionary” or “counterrevolutionary” without the ratification of the Center (Zhongyang junwei, 1967c). Similarly, a so-called policy of “four noes” 四不—no hitting back, no swearing back, no punching, and no firing guns—put the military in a vulnerable position. These measures emboldened rebels to attack the military without fear of retaliation (Chen, 2008: 141). Wuhan’s “July 20 Incident” and the subsequent campaign to “drag out a handful in the military” dealt an even more devastating blow to the credibility of the military. ⁶ While cut short by Mao, who considered the slogan “tactically inappropriate” (Wang, 2008: 685; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006: 231), the campaign badly tarnished the military’s reputation by signaling that even military officers could be targeted as “capitalist roaders.”

In early August, the nationwide wave of attacks on the military engulfed Shaanxi. Jiaoda students staged an extended mass sit-in against the provincial military authorities from August 5 to September 17, mobilizing 799 work units and 98,000 people, including more than 90 work units and 1,900 people from other prefectures and counties (Shaanxi sheng zhi: zhengwu zhi, 1997: 678; Shaanxi sheng zhi: Zhongguo gongchandang zhi, 2002: 929). They broke in and occupied the offices of the 21st Army and the Support the Left Committee. Students posted the slogan “Down with the handful of capitalist roaders within the party and the military” (Shaanxi sheng zhi: dashiji, 1996: 464) and accused “some decision-makers of the SLC” of aggravating differences within the revolutionary faction by “supporting one side and attacking the other” 支持一方, 打击一方 (Shaanxi sheng Senlin gongye guanli ju, 1967: 3).

While the Jiaoda-led August 5 Headquarters was staging the marathon sit-in, both Xi’an factions stepped up preparations for looming armed battles. Both factions set up commands and squads specialized in combat, and repeatedly broke into military and public security facilities to snatch guns and ammunition. From mid-August to September, both factions mobilized thousands of street fighters to fight for the possession of factories, institutions, warehouses, and so on. Factional street battles culminated in large clashes in the city’s industrial areas in early September. Both sides mobilized thousands of workers, and used rifles and machine guns as well as many vehicles including stolen tanks (Xi’an shi zhi: zhengzhi junshi, 2000: 70). The death toll in these armed battles, widely known as the “September 2 armed battle,” reached nearly a hundred, and 290 were injured (Shaanxi sheng zhi: Zhongguo gongchandang zhi, 2002: 929).

These armed battles were stopped only by the Center’s intervention. Zhou Enlai gave instructions to the Workers Alliance and the Workers General Headquarters in the evening of September 2. The next day, both sides replied by pledging to carry out Zhou’s instructions. On September 8, Zhou summoned representatives of Jiaoda and the Workers General Headquarters to Beijing, where they were to engage in study sessions for the next two months (“Zhou zongli, Kang lao deng,” 1967: 1). This finally brought the August 5 sit-in to an end.

Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai feared that rebel attacks on the military would cause a nationwide domino effect, and sought Mao’s approval to curtail these subversive acts (Chen, 2008: 140–41). On September 5, the Center issued a much-needed order authorizing the PLA to use force if necessary to stop rebels from seizing arms, virtually reversing the CMC ten-point order (Zhonggong zhongyang et al., 1967d). It also stepped up its call for a “great alliance” to lay the ground for “three-in-one” revolutionary committees.

After the “September 2 armed battle,” street battles died down and were replaced by political struggles as negotiations for a revolutionary committee increasingly loomed large. There were still occasional skirmishes, but military control effectively prevented them from getting out of control. Remarkably, municipal and provincial annals report no deaths from armed battles after the September 2 incident in Xi’an until July 19, 1968, when after a hiatus of more than ten months a last-ditch battle resulted in 21 deaths (Shaanxi sheng zhi: Zhongguo gongchandang zhi, 2002: 929–31; Xi’an shi zhi: zhengzhi junshi, 2000: 70). This uneasy interim was, however, limited to the provincial capital, where the Center closely monitored developments and the PLA’s main forces exercised effective military control.

The Extension of Central Control in Rural Areas

As factional street battles in Xi’an peaked late in the summer of 1967, tensions were also building in the countryside. Attacks on military authorities and facilities that preceded major battles in Xi’an also occurred in many prefectures and counties. The Shaanxi Provincial Annals observes that after the slogan “drag out a handful in the military” was introduced, “‘rebel factions’ all over the province dragged out and struggled against ‘armed Lius and Dengs.’” “The provincial military district, military subdistricts, and almost all county and municipal people’s armed departments were attacked, occupied, and even taken over by civilians 民管, while many leaders were dragged out and struggled against, paraded in streets, and had signboards hung around their necks; three corps commanders and four division commanders were struggled to death” (Shaanxi sheng zhi: junshi zhi, 2000: 32). The “drag out a handful in the military” drove regional military commanders into a corner.

Figure 1 shows the patterns of “first arms seizures” and deaths from armed battles in rural counties between June 1967 and September 1968. Both arms seizures and deadly armed battles increased in the summer of 1967 and then almost disappeared in October, in the wake of the “September 5 order” to stop arms seizures. But in the countryside the halt was only temporary. Both arms seizures and armed battle deaths increased sharply between November 1967 and January 1968 and again between April and July. Factional violence spread to the countryside just as it was subsiding in the provincial capital.

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Figure 1.

Timing of first arms seizures and deaths in armed battles in the Shaanxi countryside.

As Figure 1 indicates, deaths from armed battles in the countryside increased hand in hand with “arms seizures” 抢枪. The seizure of arms in fact consisted not only of outright robbery but also of covert issuance or some form in between. In some counties, where the PADs supported local factions, they often distributed weapons under the disguise of “arms seizures” 明抢暗送武器 (Luochuan xian zhi, 1994: 202–3; Mizhi xian zhi, 1993: 392). Some of them also mobilized armed commune militia to staff the armed squads of factional organizations they supported (Zichang xian zhi, 1993: 833). In others, where local units remained indecisive, rebels made light of their ability to deal with the situation. Dismissively claiming that “the PLA would never dare fire at workers, peasants, and students” (Fu xian zhi, 1994: 556), rebels broke into armories and seized hundreds of rifles and machine guns, as well as artillery, at a time. The first incident usually set in motion competition for arms between rival factions. One way or another, arms seizures took place in almost all the counties (97 percent) of Shaanxi. Seizing weapons, rebels then set out to organize “specialized squads for armed battles.” Regional military paralysis caused rampant “arms seizures,” which in turn led to the militarization of rural factional conflict.

Thus, in stark contrast to Xi’an, where the Center’s vigorous intervention and the main force army’s military control curtailed factional violence, confusion and indecision among mid- and low-level commands led to the spread of arms and the militarization of factional conflict in the countryside. But a closer look reveals important variations in the course of these rural conflicts. The differences are attributable to the Center’s will and resources to control the behavior of regional commanders. As the examples below show, central authorities attempted to impose their choice of faction in some parts of the countryside by extending their control into mid- and low-level commands. They did this through two means: the mobilization of main force units and the launching of a media campaign.

Control through Main Force Units

When the 21st Army entered Shaanxi in February 1967, one of the divisions, the 63rd Division (the 8145th Unit), was stationed to garrison Baoji 宝鸡, the second largest industrial center of the province. ⁷ In stark contrast to the 21st Army’s “neutral” approach to the factional conflict in Xi’an, the division took a clear and decisive stand in Baoji. In Baoji prefecture, the Workers-Miners General Headquarters 工矿总部 (WMGH) and the Allied General Headquarters 联总司 (AGH) were fiercely contending with each other for military recognition and a favorable position in a “great alliance.” On June 17, the 63rd Division, along with the Baoji MSD, declared support for the WMGH (Baoji xian zhi, 1996: 714). The units stationed in Baoji county followed suit by declaring their support for a local faction allied with the WMGH. In late July, as the CCRG stepped up the campaign to “drag out a handful in the military,” the 63rd Division initiated concerted interventions in other counties in Baoji prefecture. The division dispatched troops to some of those counties to express support for local factions associated with the WMGH, while PADs in other counties acted in accordance with the division’s decision. By the end of August, these military units declared support for allies of the WMGH in at least six of the eleven counties of Baoji prefecture, with no unit siding with the opposition.

The concerted declaration of support by the military units led to the disintegration of the opposition in some counties (Feng xian zhi, 1994: 607; Qianyang xian zhi, 1991: 280). In others, where opposition persisted, main force troops were called in to suppress it. In Mei county 眉县, “at the request of a local rebel faction and under the direction of a higher authority,” a unit of the 63rd Division was dispatched to subdue the opposing faction (Mei xian zhi, 2000: 585–89). In Baoji county on August 16 and 17, division troops, escorted by members of the supported faction, marched on vehicles with loudspeakers to put pressure on the opposition, shouting, “Oppose ‘dragging out a handful in the military!’” (Baoji xian zhi, 1996: 714).

Stubborn opposition was met by overwhelming numbers. In Long county 陇县, the 63rd Division declared its support for the County General Headquarters 县总部 in late July (Long xian zhi, 1993: 690–92). In the morning of August 27, the opposing County Red Alliance 县红联 mobilized more than a thousand peasants and attacked the County General Headquarters at four locations. Using bricks, clubs, pitchforks, and rifles, they beat to death one person and injured many others. The County General Headquarters called the Baoji WMGH and other allies many times, exaggeratingly claiming that “counterrevolutionary riots have broken out in Long county. The rebel faction is shorthanded. Send support immediately!” In response, Shan Yingjie 单英杰, leader of the WMGH, called together more than 8,000 combatants from various counties. Armed with clubs, spears, and guns, they advanced into Long county in 180 motor vehicles on August 28. Six hundred combatants from neighboring Qianyang county 千阳县 were organized and armed by the PAD’s political commissar (Qianyang xian zhi, 1991: 280). More than 15,000 people were involved in three days of armed battles, resulting in sixteen deaths and hundreds of injuries (Zhongguo gongchandang Baoji shi weiyuanhui, 1990: 147; Baoji shi zhi, 1998: 2409).

While suppressing opposition, the 63rd Division pushed aggressively for “great alliances” and revolutionary committees. In Baoji county, the main force unit and the PAD sponsored separate study sessions for “masses of both factions, revolutionary leading officials, and leaders of the rebel faction” in early September. The Baoji County Revolutionary Committee was established on December 15, 1967, the second earliest of all the Shaanxi counties (Baoji xian zhi, 1996: 27). ⁸ The prefectural revolutionary committee was inaugurated on February 28, 1968, the earliest of all the prefectures (Baoji shi zhi, 1998: 2408). By mid-April, revolutionary committees were established in eight out of eleven counties in Baoji, about half a year earlier than most of the other counties in Shaanxi (Figure 2).

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Figure 2.

Timing of the establishment of county revolutionary committees in Shaanxi.

Aside from the “August 28 armed battle” in Long county, there were two large battles in Baoji prefecture. One took place in November 1967 in the county seat of Baoji, killing 7 and injuring 220, while the other broke out in Qishan county 岐山县 on June 6, 1968, killing 20 and disabling 32 (Zhongguo gongchandang Baoji shi weiyuanhui, 1990: 147–48; Baoji shi zhi, 1998: 2409–10). Despite these incidents, the average number of deaths from armed battles per county in Baoji prefecture was ten (in 100,000), the lowest in all of Shaanxi’s prefectures (Table 2). In most counties, intervention orchestrated by the main force unit suppressed local opposition and prevented the escalation of factional violence. ⁹

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Table 2.

Average Number of County Deaths per 100,000 Population from Armed Battles in Shaanxi, 1967–1968, by Prefecture (N = 75). ^a

Yulin	Yan’an	Weinan	Baoji	Xianyang	Shangluo	Hanzhong	Ankang
14.7 (28.4)	45.6 (41.7)	15.1 (38.5)	10.3 (17.7)	17.3 (33.6)	12.5 (24.7)	54.0 (126.4)	73.2 (186.1)

Note. The numbers in the parentheses are the average (raw) numbers of deaths from armed battles.

a

Of the annals for Shaanxi’s 93 counties, 18 do not include an independent section on the Cultural Revolution, and thus are excluded from the statistical analysis.

The Spread of Factional Warfare at the Margins

Central control over regional force units did not extend to the mountainous southern prefectures of Ankang and Hanzhong. In those prefectures, neither the main forces nor the CCRG intervened to impose their choices of factions, leaving local military authorities without direction, credibility, or the forces needed to deal with contending factions. As a result, none of those MSDs and PADs took a stand or played an effective mediating role. Without clear guidance and leadership from higher authorities, they became overwhelmed by raging factional conflict and fell into passivity. Regional military paralysis led to rampant “arms seizures” and then to widespread factional warfare.

In Hanzhong prefecture in May 1967, the Unified Faction 统派 began to attack the MSD commander, Wang Mingchun 王明春, as a “black backstage supporter” and took “extreme actions” against other MSD officials such as beating, cursing, and kidnapping (Hanzhong shi junshi zhi, 2002: 160–62; Guo, 2005: 2294). On July 13, thousands of supporters of the Hanzhong Unified Faction paraded with the body of a worker killed during an armed battle, and then flooded into the MSD building, forcibly placing the corpse and wreaths in a large conference room. By turning the conference room into a mortuary, they intended to pressure the MSD into recognizing them as a “leftist faction.” The incident lasted a month, during which hundreds of wreaths were placed and hundreds of people staged a sit-in hunger strike. In August and September, the Unified Faction raided the MSD repeatedly and captured a total of 24 military officials. The rebels confined the “hostages” in separate facilities, and inquired about their view on the faction’s “nature” 定性 and the whereabouts of weapons.

The MSD’s inability to take the initiative inevitably resulted in confusion among constituent PADs. Most of them fell into passivity and some became internally divided. In Zhenba county 镇巴县, for example, a vice-political commissar rebelled against his superiors by siding with a local faction (Zhenba xian zhi, 1996: 39). With the military entangled in factional conflict, this “expression of support” added to the tension rather than reducing it.

Armed battles in Hanzhong intensified after the “August 19 bombing incident” of 1967, in which the Unified Faction blasted a building occupied by the opposing Allied Faction 联派 with dynamite, killing 32 people and injuring more than 30. After the incident, both the Unified Faction and Allied Faction, in coordination with their county-level allies, repeatedly ransacked the armories of county PADs, the militia, locally stationed troops, and public security bureaus. In the prefecture, arms seizures took place 224 times, and 95,000 firearms and 78,000 boxes of ammunition, as well as artillery and large quantities of dynamite and detonators, were stolen (Guo, 2005: 2296).

The Center did not ignore the incessant fighting in Hanzhong. In mid-November 1967, representatives of the warring factions as well as military officials were summoned to Beijing to negotiate an alliance, and, under the sponsorship of the provincial MD, achieved a “January 13 agreement.” But the alliance did not last. Factional battles flared up again in early April 1968, which prompted Zhou Enlai to summon leaders of both of Hanzhong’s factions and MSD officials to Beijing on April 10. Zhou met them personally and urged an alliance and immediate cease-fire. But these meetings and negotiations failed to produce any concrete results. Claiming themselves to be “revolutionary leftists,” representatives of both factions refused to make a self-criticism and blamed each other. They returned to Hanzhong, intent on preparing for even larger armed battles.

On June 13, 1968, the largest battle in Hanzhong broke out in its urban district (Hanzhong shi junshi zhi, 2002: 160–61; Hanzhong shi zhi, 1994: 943–44). With the Unified Faction controlling the eastern half of the town and the Allied Faction the western half, a battle raged for 48 days, killing or injuring more than a thousand people and burning down tens of thousands of houses and buildings including the old bell tower.

The factional warfare took place against the backdrop of regional military breakdown. On June 2, attempting to seize weapons from stationed troops guarding classified materials, an ally of the Hanzhong Allied Faction in Mian county killed thirteen PLA officers and soldiers. On June 11 and 12, days before the outbreak of Hanzhong’s “June 13 armed battle,” the MSD commander, Wang Mingchun, and the vice-commander, Wang Ronghua 王荣华, tried to dissuade leaders of the Unified Faction from launching an offensive (Guo, 2005: 2298). The rebels responded by forcibly occupying the MSD’s facilities and turning them into a “stronghold.”

Curiously, the Hanzhong Municipal Military Annals boasts of the MSD holding out in the face of rebel attacks and upholding its “duty” (Hanzhong shi junshi zhi, 2002: 161). When the rebels invaded, “commanders and soldiers of the Military Subdistrict promptly repaired 13 tunnels (every section had a tunnel), stationed themselves underground, held fast to their position, and upheld their duty.” There were shell craters and bullet-marked walls everywhere in the compound. On June 14, in the face of a bombardment by the Allied Faction that injured 14 soldiers, “not only did the commanders, political commissars, and cadre soldiers not desert their position, but also their families shared their joys and sorrows and lived in the tunnels for 50 days.” This episode epitomizes the helpless situation in which mid- and low-level regional commands were placed. Left without guidance and leadership, and deprived of the means to cope with the situation, they could do nothing but stick to their “duty” by passively enduring rebel attacks.

Like its counterpart in Hanzhong, the Ankang MSD also failed to take the initiative, leaving the subordinate PADs on their own to deal with local factions. Events in Pingli county are a telling example of the breakdown in the command structure. In the early morning of September 3, 1967, two “staff officers” 参谋 of the Zhuxi county 竹溪县 PAD in neighboring Hubei province, along with five other officers and soldiers, led more than 170 rebels across the provincial border and surrounded the Pingli county PAD. Aiming rifles and machine guns at the PAD building, the officers from the neighboring county attempted to coerce the Pingli PAD into recognizing a local faction, the Six Allied General, as “revolutionary left.” The Pingli PAD chief, Zhao Guangqi, continued to refuse this misplaced demand from officers outside the chain of command (Pingli xian zhi: junshi zhi, 1988: 121). But the incident cast the breakdown of the regional command structure in a stark light.

In the spring of 1968, armed battles in Ankang prefecture were increasingly getting beyond the Center’s control. ¹³ In Ankang county, the Six General Headquarters 六总司 controlled the county seat, while the opposing Red Third Headquarters 红三司 retreated to the mountains and “surrounded the city from the countryside” 农村包围城市. In March, both of Ankang’s factions set up “weapon factories” and produced guns, cannons, rockets, hand grenades, and so on, while all the armories of the county PADs in the prefecture were looted. On April 5, the Ankang MSD and stationed troops placed the county seat under martial law. The Center had already thrown a main forces unit, the Zongzi 总字 282nd Unit, ¹⁴ into Ankang in late December 1967. But probably because of its insufficient size and lack of credibility, the main force unit failed to play any significant role in reducing the tension between the contending factions.

In both military and political terms, the Center’s intervention in the factional fighting in Ankang proved “too little too late.” On April 9, the Six General Headquarters, confined within the county seat, launched a surprise attack on the besieging Red Third Headquarters, killing 35 of its members. The next day, the Red Third Headquarters retrieved 24 corpses and put them on display, inciting revenge among its members. On April 12 and 13, shaken by these developments, Zhou Enlai gave two successive orders, calling for an immediate cease-fire and asking leaders of both factions to come to Beijing immediately. The Ankang MSD and stationed troops repeatedly issued “urgent appeals” to implement Zhou’s orders, but to no avail. On April 17 and 18, the Center also twice demanded through the provincial MD that both factions carry out Zhou’s orders immediately and without conditions. It was, however, not until April 23 that representatives of both factions and the military were helicoptered to Beijing. The next day, the representatives in Beijing agreed to a cease-fire and to provide food to the besieged county seat.

Nevertheless, the armed battles in Ankang continued. From April 16 to May 4, in open defiance to Zhou’s call for a cease-fire, the Red Third Headquarters fired hundreds of shells and so-called “flying explosives” 飞行炸药包 into the old county seat, burning down 878 houses. The Six General Headquarters also destroyed 654 houses under the pretext of defending the town. Half of the buildings in the old county seat were destroyed and most residents fled. The agreement in Beijing was a “mere scrap of paper” 一纸空文.

On May 9, Zhou Enlai issued still another order to stop the fighting in Ankang. But large-scale armed battles went on, and ominous slogans such as “the fourth revolutionary civil war” and “Fight a people’s war” emerged. As the county annals laments, “from the Center to the provincial military district, and even to the stationed [main force] unit, all failed to restrain the armed battles” in Ankang (Ankang xian zhi, 1989: 904).

On June 2, the Center finally decided to stop the fighting in Ankang by force, throwing in a larger, probably a regiment-sized, contingent of main force troops (the 8163rd Unit of the Lanzhou MR). On arrival, the troops separated the warring factions by armored cars, set up posts, and then destroyed defensive barriers and obstacles (Ankang diqu zhi [xia], 2004: 1652). But armed battles persisted well into August in such places as the new county seat of Ankang, Hanyin county 汉阴县, and Zhenping county 镇坪县.

The average number of deaths from armed battles per county in Ankang reached 73 (in 100,000), by far the highest of all the prefectures of Shaanxi, while that in Hanzhong was 54, the second highest (see Table 2). The breakdown of the regional military structure, caused by the lack of determined and timely intervention by the Center and the insufficient presence of main forces, threw the southern prefectures into civil war–like factional warfare. Even Zhou Enlai’s repeated appeals went unheeded since they lacked sufficient force to back them up. As late as mid-July 1968, provincial authorities were still pleading with central leaders to reinforce “supporting the left troops” in rural prefectures wracked by armed battles (“Zhongyang, Zhongyang wen’ge shouzhang,” 1968). The Center’s inability to implement its misguided policy caused the spread of internecine factional warfare in the countryside.

Conclusion

In late July 1968, the Center finally decided to put down the persistent armed conflicts in Shaanxi by force. It issued the “July 24 decree” to stop armed battles in Shaanxi, ¹⁵ and sent in a large number of main force units to major conflict areas such as Ankang and Hanzhong. The decree demanded that all fighting factions in Shaanxi “stop armed battles immediately and disband all specialized armed battle squads.” The main force units separated warring factions, demolished strongholds, and demobilized and disarmed combatants. They also arbitrated between factions and sponsored the formation of revolutionary committees. Armed battles dragged on well into August in some parts of the province. It was only in August and September 1968 that the bulk of the county revolutionary committees were finally established (see Figure 2). Civil war–like armed battles caused by the breakdown of the regional military structure were only subdued by a massive deployment of main forces.

This study has compared prefectures that suffered from extensive violence with those that experienced much less violence by focusing on the policy implementation processes of “supporting the left.” Our findings show that rural factional violence spread not because of the clash of interests between the CCRG and regional military commanders, but because of the paralysis of the regional military structure. The Center’s divisive, and yet elusive, policy called for a high level of unity and coordination among the levels of the regional military bureaucracy. Only clear guidance and consistent leadership could have ensured coordinated decisions among regional force units. This was especially true for mid- and low-level regional commanders, whose ties to the local party leadership made them inherently vulnerable to rebel attacks, regardless of their stance on factions.

The Center, not only the CCRG but also Zhou Enlai and others, attempted to impose their will on the regional military bureaucracy by overriding decisions made by regional commanders and by sending in main force units to take over command. But such political and military resources were inevitably in short supply. As we have seen, these extraordinary measures were extended only to the provincial level and to limited parts of the countryside. This was as far as the Center’s divisive and yet ill-conceived policy could get. Factional warfare spread where the policy failed to be implemented, while it was checked where the policy was, in one way or another, enforced.

What implications can we draw from the case of Shaanxi? First of all, events in Shaanxi’s countryside clearly show the limits of the Center’s control over the implementation of one of the most consequential policies of the period. Only an omnipotent authority could have enforced such an ill-defined, and yet divisive, policy in the vast countryside. Aside from factional armed fighting, there may have been other forms of violence and persecution that were caused by the Center’s inability to enforce its own policies. ¹⁶

Shaanxi may also represent an instance in which the equivocal position of the provincial command, and thus the Center, led to the paralysis of lower-level commands and then to the spread of factional warfare in the countryside. Zhou Enlai’s approach to “supporting the left” was in effect not to support any faction: he favored mediating an alliance over siding with a faction. But with a divisive policy already in place, his formula that “both factions are revolutionary mass organizations” did not convince contending rebels to form an alliance. Recent studies have shown that the Center’s failure to reach a consensus on who should lead a new government after a power seizure prolonged and intensified factional conflicts in provincial capitals (Dong and Walder, 2011; Yan 2015). Our findings revealed an even more sobering picture in the countryside. Although military control kept urban factional struggles from getting out of control, lack of political will and military resources allowed factional warfare to spread in the countryside.

The CCRG’s one-sided intervention also had its limitations in the countryside. Despite a national media campaign, its influence failed to extend across prefectural boundaries. Furthermore, while imposing factional domination in a part of the countryside, and thus checking the spread of factional violence there, the CCRG’s intervention produced a localized and more repressive form of violence. Further research, we expect, will turn up more instances of repressive violence under CCRG-imposed one-faction rule.

In the final analysis, the Center’s ill-conceived policy and its inability to implement it, rather than the clash of interests between the CCRG and regional military commanders, caused the spread of factional warfare in the countryside. Left without guidance and leadership, the vast majority of mid- and low-level commands in fact could not support any faction, but fell into indecision and confusion.