Reinterpreting the Chinese Revolution: The Balance between Radical and Moderate Approaches,1937–1945

Radicalized Southwest Shanxi

On January 4, 1940, within days of the Jin-Xi Incident, all of Xiaoyi except for areas controlled by the Japanese was occupied by Yan Xishan’s forces while the CCP’s forces retreated to northwest Shanxi, north of the Fenyang-Lishi highway (Wang, 1940: 1; Gan, 1984: 180). Later, on March 16, 1940, Wang Dacheng 王大成, a senior leader of the CCP’s forces in southwest Shanxi, wrote an internal party report detailing the situation in the Fenxiao (Fenyang-Xiaoyi) subregion after the Jin-Xi Incident. ³ According to this report, during the occupation, the local regimes at every level from county to village were speedily transformed with former Communist or pro-Communist officers being replaced by either officers from the Yan Xishan forces or local elites (landlords and rich peasants) who chose to collaborate with Yan (Wang, 1940: 1; Gan, 1984: 178). Unsurprisingly, both local CCP organizations and all anti-Japanese mass organizations under the control of the CCP were unable to function because all their cadres had to go underground due to lack of military and political security. The only activities the CCP undertook were to protect non-native cadres from being arrested or executed by Yan’s forces (Wang, 1940: 1).

On January 10, 1940, in order to pursue the CCP forces and the New Army, which had escaped to northwest Shanxi, Yan Xishan’s main forces withdrew from Xiaoyi, leaving behind a small number of troops (Wang, 1940: 2). Some of the CCP’s units immediately returned to Xiaoyi, instructing underground cadres to restore local regimes and mass organizations and establish guerrilla teams (Wang, 1940: 2; Gan, 1984: 180–81). By early March 1940, there were seven guerrilla teams consisting of 350 soldiers equipped with 150 rifles in the Fenxiao subregion. All were mobilized to struggle against both the Yan Xishan and Japanese forces, which became the central task of the CCP in the Fenxiao subregion at this stage (Wang, 1940: 2; Gan, 1983; Gan, 1984: 181–82). In order to survive in this area, the CCP not only prepared its forces to deal with any possible attack from outside but also attempted to eliminate potential threats within the territory it controlled as well as mobilize popular support. According to incomplete statistics, over 230 individuals who had sided with Yan Xishan and therefore were considered politically unreliable were executed by the CCP. Only a fraction of these individuals were sentenced to death by local regimes under the control of the CCP following a public trial—the majority were assassinated by guerrilla teams (Wang, 1940: 2; Gan, 1984: 180). This caused panic among former officers and their dependents. For instance, one former officer’s father went into hiding at night for fear of being assassinated (Wang, 1940: 2). As noted earlier, these former officers, in addition to some from Yan’s camp, were usually local elites (landlords and rich peasants) who sided with Yan after the outbreak of the Jin-Xi Incident (Wang, 1940: 1; Gan, 1984: 178).

In the eyes of the local CCP leaders, who at the time believed that all but two of the executions were justified, the executions were a reasonable move (Wang, 1940: 3; Gan, 1984: 181). This judgment was based mainly on the short-term positive impact of the executions on the CCP’s survival in this area. Many local elites, who originally had supported Yan Xishan, hesitated to do so after witnessing the violence. Feng, a local resident who was offered the post of county magistrate by Yan Xishan, refused it (Wang, 1940: 3). Few local elites dared to report to Yan’s forces on the situation of the CCP in this area. Some former local officers who had earlier sided with Yan decided to shift to the Communist side and asked other people to intercede with the CCP for them (although the limited archival materials do not indicate exactly who did so) (Wang, 1940: 3). Some individuals who had been indifferent to or had even been opposed to the CCP’s policies also began to support the CCP, if not genuinely, at least superficially. One local intellectual who had long been against the Communists’ mass campaigns now attempted to persuade his son to take part in their activities. In areas close to the Japanese-occupied territory, it became easier for the CCP to implement its policies and attract recruits (Wang, 1940: 3; Gan, 1984: 182).

The CCP switched to relying more heavily, if not completely, on poor peasants and workers, since most landlords and rich peasants were politically unreliable, as was shown in their collaboration with Yan Xishan after the Jin-Xi Incident. As the CCP transformed local regimes at every level from county to village, local elites were dismissed from their leadership positions—and many of them were executed. Their positions were then filled by poor peasants and workers (Wang, 1940: 3). A former county treasurer, probably afraid of being executed by the CCP, absconded with a large amount of money (1940: 3). However, it is still unclear how many of the former establishment local elites in Xiaoyi and Fenyang escaped to the safety of the Yan Xishan–controlled area in southwest Shanxi or the Japanese-occupied area, or what the consequences were. Certainly, in 1939 and 1940 this kind of phenomenon could be more clearly observed in some counties in other North China base areas, such as the Northwest Shanxi Base Area and the Taihang Base Area in southeast Shanxi, which will be discussed below (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941; Goodman, 2013).

In order both to collect provisions for the CCP forces and to mobilize the local people, the CCP’s “reasonable burden” taxation system, which had been abolished by the Yan Xishan forces, was reinstated and implemented in a radical way (Wang, 1940: 3). This meant that the tax burden was heaviest on landlords and rich peasants who now could not find a way to circumvent it, although other people might still have had to pay some taxes (CCP West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941: 4). With the support of the CCP, a workers’ union with more than thirty members was founded in a village in Fenyang. As a result of pressure from the union, the wages of these workers immediately jumped by 20 percent. In the meantime, the land and other property of the landlords and rich peasants who had largely sided with Yan Xishan and who were subsequently labeled by the CCP as traitors and capitulators were confiscated and redistributed (Wang, 1940: 3).

Along with transforming local regimes at every level and radically redistributing wealth, the CCP also conducted a purge of its members. Some rich peasant and landlord members were not only dismissed from leadership positions in local party organizations but also expelled from the party. Some were even executed. A rich peasant party member who was also a senior CCP cadre in the Fenxiao subregion was not only driven out of the party but also had his family’s property confiscated. Two landlord party members, whom the CCP in the Fenxiao subregion believed were preparing to mutiny although they had not actually done so, were put to death (Wang, 1940: 4).

Such events in Fenyang and Xiaoyi were dramatic and some contemporary sources claim that many peasants underwent fanshen 翻身—that is, they had stood up and liberated themselves by seizing local political power (Wang, 1940: 3, 6; Hinton, 1966). The confiscation and redistribution of the land and other property of landlords and the rich also seemed to indicate the coming of a social revolution. More significantly, during almost the same period, similar events also occurred in some counties of other major Communist North China base areas including the Taihang Base Area, which later became a part of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Border Region 晋冀鲁豫边区; the Northwest Shanxi Base Area, which became a part of the Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suiyuan) Border Region 晋绥边区; and the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chaha’er-Hebei) Border Region 晋察冀边区. All of these were on Shanxi’s borders. ⁴

Beyond Southwest Shanxi

Although the Communist movement in the three counties at the heart of the Taihang Base Area—Wuxiang, Licheng, and Liaoxian—was no less radical than in Fenyang and Xiaoyi, it differed in important respects (Goodman, 2013). The CCP in Wuxiang, Licheng, and Liaoxian carried out a relatively systematic land reform program by encouraging class warfare, such as struggle meetings in Wuxiang, where over eighty landlords were physically attacked and killed (Goodman, 2013: 180–81). Yet, as noted earlier, the CCP in Fenyang and Xiaoyi did not carry out a systematic land reform but only confiscated and redistributed the land and other property of landlords and wealthy people who, largely because they chose to side with Yan Xishan, were condemned as traitors and capitulators (Wang, 1940: 3). In addition, during this process the majority of those who were executed were simply assassinated by guerrilla teams (2). A potential explanation for these outcomes was that the political and military environments differed. Wuxiang, Licheng, and Liaoxian were basically under the CCP’s control both militarily and politically (Goodman, 2013). In contrast, the CCP in Fenyang and Xiaoyi confronted a relatively unstable political and militarily situation. In this context, the aim of radical policies in Fenyang and Xiaoyi was survival, rather than full-scale revolution.

As the civil war of 1939–1940 expanded to northwest Shanxi, the CCP withdrew its main forces in southwest Shanxi and, together with the Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee 中共晋西南区党委, moved them to northwest Shanxi. ⁵ This meant that the Northwest Shanxi Base Area faced the dual challenges of a sharp increase in military and administrative expenditures, as well as the security threat posed by Japanese encirclement and the disintegration of the anti-Japanese coalition. Soon after the Jin-Xi Incident, the Northwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee 中共晋西北区党委 issued an oral order to local party branches that, in order to ease the financial burden and mobilize local people, landlords and rich peasants could be regarded as “die-hards” whose land and other property should be confiscated and redistributed (He Long, 1945: 1–6). In most of the northwest Shanxi counties that were to a considerable extent under Communist control, such as Linxian 临县, Lanxian 临县, Kelan 岢岚, Jingle 静乐, Hequ 河曲, Baode 保德, Lishi 离石, and Xingxian 兴县, the CCP adopted an explicitly revolutionary agenda. As in southwest Shanxi and southeast Shanxi, the CCP in northwest Shanxi seized power at every level from its erstwhile allies, often through violence, calling for and implementing a radical redistribution of wealth that led to the deaths of many landlords (CCP West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1940: 3–15; West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941; Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 1–138; Jin-Sui Border Region, 1986: 116–76). According to incomplete statistics, 24,671 mu were confiscated in Linxian, 20,000 in Kelan, 5,625 in Lishi, and 8,759 in Xingxian (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941). In the radical mobilization and its associated violence, at least six hundred landlords and rich peasants fled northwest Shanxi, most of them escaping to Japanese-occupied territory (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941; Party History Research Office, 1989: 123).

The civil war of 1939–1940 did not have a direct impact on the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region in northeast Shanxi, not least because the CCP forces had long been militarily dominant in the area and the Border Region government under the control of the CCP had been in power since January 1938 (Wei, 2000; Dorris, 1975: 55–56). The scholarship on peasant mobilization during the years of 1939–1940 in this area does acknowledge that the CCP carried out radical measures on a wide scale. However, because the CCP maintained a moderate approach in most places, for the most part radical events have been dismissed as a kind of aberration (Dorris, 1976: 705). In the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, as in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area, local elites resisted the CCP’s socioeconomic and political reforms (Hartford, 1980: 174, 177–78; 1989: 103–4). In July 1939, in order to mobilize popular support against the Japanese, the CCP launched a wave of campaigns for rent and interest reduction, progressive taxation, and popular elections—all of which made local elites the target of struggle (Dorris, 1975: 54; 1976: 703–4; Hartford, 1980: 174). Although few details are available, it is nonetheless clear that the struggle went to extremes in some places, reaching a high point from late 1939 to early 1940 (Dorris, 1975: 54–55; 1976: 705; Hartford, 1989: 105). Peasants were encouraged not to pay rent or pay back loans, while landowners were pushed to “return [. . .] the land to the tillers” (Dorris, 1976: 705; Hartford, 1980: 174). Some local elites who were recalcitrant or escaped to the Japanese-occupied territories were branded “traitors” and all of their land was confiscated and redistributed (Hartford, 1980: 174, 177). Even the temples in some areas, mostly owned by Buddhist monasteries, were attacked by peasants mobilized by peasant unions under the control of the CCP (Dorris, 1976: 705).

It is clear that the timing of radical actions in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region was different from that in other North China base areas. Radical events in southwest, northwest, and southeast Shanxi occurred around late 1939 and early 1940, while similar events in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region in northeast Shanxi took place earlier, in mid-1939. There are clear reasons for this. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, apart from the Japanese-occupied territories, was dominated by the CCP’s forces. This meant that the CCP, which enjoyed military superiority in this area, was not concerned about provoking Yan Xishan, Chiang Kai-shek, or local elites, and was thus prepared to put into practice radical policies aimed at mobilizing popular support against the Japanese. In other North China base areas, particularly in southwest Shanxi, the Yan Xishan forces or the GMD forces under Chiang Kai-shek had a stronger presence. Thus in these areas, before the civil war of 1939–1940, the CCP had to bide its time and, to maintain a broad united front, avoid policies that would challenge Yan Xishan or Chiang Kai-shek.

Yet, the tension between the CCP, Yan Xishan, and Chiang Kai-shek during the civil war of late 1939 and early 1940 found an echo in the disintegration of the united front as well as peasant mobilization in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. The Yan Xishan and GMD forces under Chiang Kai-shek were completely driven out of this area (Dorris, 1975: 55–56). At the same time, radical activities in this area reached a climax during late 1939 and early 1940 when the CCP demanded all-out land revolution (Dorris, 1975: 54; Hartford, 1980: 177–78).

Behind Radical Mobilization

The relatively secure military and political environment in the counties, as mentioned above, of the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas was an external factor that made possible the CCP’s radical mobilization. As the local CCP in the Fenxiao subregion of southwest Shanxi pointed out, military occupation came first, not least because the transformation of local regimes and mass mobilization required a relatively secure political and military environment (Wang, 1940: 6). However, this external factor does not fully explain why the CCP in some relatively secure counties of the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas almost simultaneously adopted a radical approach, nor its motivation and intent in doing so. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the processes behind the CCP’s decision to pursue radical mobilization.

In August 1939, the CCP Central Committee issued an instruction on the consolidation of party organizations. The party center decided to terminate rapid organizational expansion and set about purging a number of landlord, rich peasant, and merchant members who had been recruited earlier in the war (Politburo, 1939). The instruction stressed that the indoctrination of party cadres in the theory and practice of class struggle was central to the consolidation of the party (Politburo, 1939). From the CCP’s perspective, in the context of its increasing friction with the GMD, party cadres had to understand that the united front between the CCP and its allies, which represented the landlord and bourgeois classes, was liable to collapse at any time (Politburo, 1939; Yang, 1940). In November of the same year, the Central Committee issued a second instruction, addressing mass mobilization. In the areas controlled by the CCP, the instruction called for economic reforms aimed at improving the living standards of peasants and workers, such as rent and interest reductions. The CCP reckoned that landlords were likely to hinder the implementation of reform and should therefore be excluded not only from local party organizations but also from local governments (CCP Central Committee, 1939). This instruction demonstrates that, at this stage, the party center considered mass mobilization to be the central task of local party organizations (CCP Central Committee, 1939; Dorris, 1976: 703).

Following these two mandatory instructions, local party organizations in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas drove landlords and rich peasants out of the party as well as local governments and launched radical reform policies that benefited poor peasants and workers at the expense of local elites. Therefore, to a large extent the nearly simultaneous radical events of 1939–1940 in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas were a result of the implementation of these two instructions from the party center.

Remarkably, the actions in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas in 1939–1940 were actually more radical than what was called for in the two party center instructions. In the process of radical mobilization, a number of landlords and rich peasants were executed and their wealth confiscated and redistributed, which went far beyond the instructions. This would suggest that it was local cadres who decided to use execution as a means of implementing policy, not the party center. At least officially, the party center required a program of rent and interest reduction only and never called for the radical redistribution of wealth. Nor did the party center call for land reform, which included public struggle against landlords and rich peasants and resulted in many deaths. Why, then, did local party organizations implement the two party center’s instructions in this more radical way?

The Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee was aware that local party organizations, especially at the sub-county level, lacked experience in membership “rectification.” The Organization Department had already highlighted three points: regional and subregional party committees should strengthen their guidance of the rectification of local party organizations under their leadership; membership rectification of party organizations below the county level should generally be approved by county party committees; and young party members who were born into families of landlords, rich peasants, and merchants but had proven themselves loyal should not be driven out of the party (Politburo, 1939: 6). After the Jin-Xi Incident, the CCP organizations in Fenyang and Xiaoyi lost contact with both the regional and subregional party committee, obliging them to act independently (Jia, 1984). Later, in July 1945, at a Yan’an forum on the history of the Jin-Sui Border Region, Lin Feng 林枫, ⁶ vice secretary of the Jin-Sui Bureau, pointed out that local cadres, including Wang Dacheng, should be held responsible for the death of numerous local elites (Lin, 1945: 8).

However, the lack of guidance from higher-level party organizations does not fully explain what drove lower-level party organizations toward radical reform programs. After the Jin-Xi Incident in the Northwest Shanxi Base Area, the county- and sub-county-level party organizations in the Taihang Base Area and the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region were still under the guidance of the regional and subregional party committees, but more radical activities also took place in these areas. Even in northwest Shanxi, as mentioned earlier, the Northwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee issued an oral order that the wealth of landlords and rich peasants be confiscated and redistributed (He Long, 1940: 1–6). What these examples show, as Joseph W. Esherick has pointed out, is that local party organizations did not always mechanistically pay obedience to the party center (Esherick, 1994: 1078). The actions of local party organizations were to a large extent shaped by both their social composition and the specific political, socioeconomic, and military context.

In August 1938, the CCP started the rectification of party members in Fenyang and Xiaoyi. Many individuals who were labeled opportunists 政治投机分子—in the eyes of the CCP, obstacles to the anti-corruption campaign and the “reasonable burden” movement—were expelled from the party (Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee, 1939a: 68, 81). In the six months following August 1938, in Xiaoyi alone sixty-five people, the majority of whom were landowners and merchants, were expelled from the party (Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee, 1939a: 68). Even so, until March 1939 the CCP still believed that there were numerous opportunists in Xiaoyi’s local party organizations (Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee, 1939a: 68). By November 1939, after the CCP Central Committee had issued the instruction on party consolidation, according to the figures from one Communist source, the proportions of worker, farmhand, poor peasant, and middle peasant party members in the Fenxiao subregion were 5.3 percent, 2.4 percent, 64.3 percent, and 20.2 percent respectively, while rich peasants and merchants accounted for only 0.6 and 1.8 percent respectively of party members (Party History Research Office, 1987: 33). Although there are no precise statistics on the number of landlord party members, it is clear that the composition of the CCP membership changed with the recruitment of more poor peasants and the purge of rich peasants, landlords, and merchants. In other words, local CCP organizations in Fenyang and Xiaoyi were increasingly dominated by poor peasant members who were rarely challenged in terms of decision making by rich peasant and landlord members. Naturally, these local party organizations were more willing to implement the party center’s reform policies since they would benefit poor peasants. Additionally, in terms of the socioeconomic environment in Fenyang and Xiaoyi, the conflicts between the landed and the landless, and the rich and poor, were relatively acute (Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee, 1939b: 227–38). When the party center called for a mass mobilization for rent and interest reduction in November 1939, it is easy to see why the local party organizations in Fenyang and Xiaoyi were responsive.

More significantly, the party center provided no detailed guidelines on how to guarantee the implementation of rent and interest reduction, which left some freedom for local party organizations to decide how they would operate. The party center also criticized the previous overemphasis on accommodating local elites and neglecting peasant mobilization (Dorris, 1976: 103). In addition, the previous experience in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area before 1939 indicated that the appeals to both nationalism and social justice were not enough to persuade landlords and rich peasants to reduce rent and interest. Before 1939, local party organizations had to constrain their own activities due to their military inferiority and the need to maintain a broad united front with Yan Xishan, Chiang Kai-shek, and local elites. Given the changed political and military environment, it is understandable that local party organizations would turn toward a more radical path during 1939–1940, especially after the outbreak of the Jin-Xi Incident.

As discussed earlier, from late 1939 to early 1940, local party organizations in Fenyang and Xiaoyi had to act decisively and rapidly to establish a secure environment and mobilize popular support against Yan Xishan. This meant that local party organizations no longer had the time nor patience to appeal to nationalism and social justice when seeking to collaborate with local elites. Furthermore, the fact that many local elites had chosen to side with Yan Xishan after the Jin-Xi Incident strengthened the CCP’s belief that local elites were not politically reliable and that in fact they posed a major threat to the base area’s security. In this context, it was perhaps not surprising that the CCP in Fenyang and Xiaoyi executed a number of local elites and relied more heavily on workers and poor peasants. At this time, local party organizations dominated by poor peasants did not even attempt to implement a compromise program of rent and interest reduction, which not only required local elites to reduce rent and interest but also required the poor to pay rent and interest. Thus, in Fenyang and Xiaoyi a number of local elites were branded as traitors and capitulators and their land and other wealth were confiscated and redistributed. On the surface, local party organizations justified these actions on the grounds of nationalism, and condemned local elites as traitors and capitulators. But behind this nationalist discourse was violent class struggle. Unsurprisingly, local people in Fenyang and Xiaoyi at that time felt that revolution was coming (Wang, 1940: 3, 6).

Similarly, the motivation for local party organizations in other North China base areas to encourage radicalism was also to a large extent shaped by their particular circumstances. In the Northwest Shanxi Base Area, radical actions were related more to the financial challenges brought by the sudden increase of military and administrative expenditures after the Jin-Xi Incident. Local party organizations had to fulfill or overfulfill grain collection quotas and quickly raise money. When local elites could not be persuaded to donate or lend a great amount of grain and money, the local party organizations, under tremendous political pressure, immediately turned to a radical approach (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 1–138; CCP West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941: 3–15). Consequently, most counties in this area witnessed radical activities that appeared to be much more violent than those in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941; Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 1–138; Jin-Sui Border Region, 1986: 116–76).

In July 1939, the CCP launched a wave of rent and interest reduction campaigns in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, made possible by the CCP’s more secure political and military situation in the area (Dorris, 1976: 704; Hartford, 1980: 174). Following the two instructions from the party center, the party encouraged rent and interest reductions. But there were also a number of local elites who resisted the program of rent and interest reduction in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, even though the area was almost fully dominated by the CCP forces except for the Japanese-occupied territories (Dorris, 1976: 704–5). For this reason, the CCP mobilized peasants to struggle against these local elites. Some local party organizations dominated by poor peasants were probably unable or unwilling to constrain peasant activism. As a result, in some places peasants asked for more than rent and interest reduction, calling for an all-out land revolution, and the struggle against local elites became extremely violent, reaching a peak in late 1939 and early 1940 (Dorris, 1975: 54; 1976: 705; Hartford, 1980: 174, 177–78).

In Wuxiang, Liaoxian, and Licheng in the Taihang Base Area, local party organizations’ experiment with full-scale revolution during 1939–1940 correlated highly with a tenser atmosphere. After the civil war of 1939–1940 spread into southeast Shanxi, there were pitched battles between the CCP forces and the GMD forces under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, ending with around ten thousand people killed on each side (Goodman, 2000: 52). At that time, there were still some local elites who resisted the rent and interest reduction program (Goodman, 2013: 180). Local elites were dissatisfied with, or even resisted, the CCP forces’ call for donations of grain and money through appeals to anti-Japanese nationalism and social justice (Goodman, 2013: 181). These factors might have pushed local party organizations in Wuxiang, Liaoxian, and Licheng, and even the CCP at the base-area level, to rely totally on poor peasants and workers and therefore adopt a more revolutionary program in order to compete with the GMD.

In sum, the party center emphasized that party rectification should be conducted along class lines and that any obstacles to mass mobilization should be removed, although it probably never, officially and explicitly, called for land reform with violent class struggle in 1939–1940. Inasmuch as the party center did not provide any specific guidelines, local party organizations had a degree of freedom to operate in their own way. The simultaneous and similar radical events of 1939–1940 in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas were not simply a result of local CCP organizations obeying the two instructions from the party center—they were also the product of the social composition of local party organizations as well as the particular environment surrounding them.

More importantly, according to current available archival materials, very few local party cadres were severely punished later for acting more radically than was required by the party center, although there were criticisms within the CCP of the radical activities of 1939–1940 in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas (Wang, 1942: 5; Lin, 1945: 8; Goodman, 2013: 181, 183). This suggests that the party center did have full knowledge of the actions of local CCP branches. It is also possible that the party center actually expected local party organizations to conduct a more radical form of mobilization. However, because the CCP had publicly renounced land reform in order to form a united front with the GMD, it could not sanction radical policies other than the program of rent and interest reduction, especially land reform with class struggle, in official directives. If radical polices in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area and other North China base areas proved successful, the party center would probably not ask local party organizations to reverse them.

Crisis

The radical events of 1939–1940 gave rise to tension between the CCP and local elites (landlords and rich peasants). On the surface, some local elites chose to cooperate temporarily by, for example, donating land. They did so possibly out of the fear of being killed, although there may have also been some who genuinely supported the CCP (Wang, 1940: 4–6). Some former establishment officers and local elites fled the area, although their numbers as well as the places to which they escaped is still unclear (3). This phenomenon can be more clearly observed in some other North China base areas where similar radical activities took place at the same time. As mentioned earlier, in the Northwest Shanxi Base Area, at least six hundred landlords and rich peasants fled, the majority to the Japanese-occupied territories (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941; Party History Research Office, 1989: 123).

This later led to a great deal of criticism within the party. This is clearly reflected in a report Lin Feng, secretary of the West Shanxi Regional Party Committee 中共晋西区党委, gave to the North Bureau and the CCP Central Committee in August 1941 (Main Points, 1945: 3, 8). In August 1945, at a symposium on the history of the CCP in northwest Shanxi and southwest Shanxi, held in Yan’an, Lin once again criticized the radicalism in Fenyang and Xiaoyi in 1939–1940 (Lin, 1945: 8). In his view, the killing of so many landlords and rich peasants labeled traitors and capitulators undermined the attempt to win the long-term support of local elites, and as a result, the CCP’s underground activities in the Fenxiao subregion were more trouble-plagued than in other counties in southwest Shanxi (Lin, 1945: 8; Main Points, 1945: 3, 8).

Lin Feng’s criticisms tallied with the historical facts. Once the CCP forces withdrew from the Fenxiao subregion in October 1940, local CCP organizations suffered at the hands of Yan Xishan (Gan, 1984: 184–85, 189). A number of CCP members and supporters were arrested and executed, not least because their identities had been revealed during the radical events of 1939–1940 (Gan, 1984: 184–85, 189; Tong, 1984: 210–11). In other words, Yan’s forces must have obtained intelligence from local people who identified the Communists and their supporters based on their radical actions after the Jin-Xi Incident. The details of who exactly reported the identities of the Communists and their followers in this area to Yan’s forces still remain unknown due to a lack of archival materials. From the evidence presented earlier it can be inferred that local elites who fled the area or stayed, but resented the CCP because of its radical polices and the associated violence during 1939–1940, had a motive to assist Yan’s forces. In other North China base areas that experienced radical events during 1939–1940, local elites cooperated with the CCP’s opponents.

According to Kathleen Hartford’s research on the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, Japanese forces carried out a fortification policy and intensified their attacks on the Border Region throughout 1939 and 1940 (Hartford, 1980: 179; 1989: 98–99). The growing radicalism in late 1939 and early 1940 in some locations indeed resulted in local elites assisting the Japanese, such as providing useful local information. Some even organized anti–Border Region groups to attack the Communists and their followers when Japanese forces launched an extermination campaign (Hartford, 1980: 180; Hartford, 1989: 105). Consequently, the combination of intensified Japanese attacks and the local elites’ reaction posed a huge threat to the security of the Border Region and discouraged the activism of local CCP cadres and supporters (Hartford, 1989: 106–7).

Archival materials also reveal that in the Northwest Shanxi Base Area many local elites who had fled to the Japanese-occupied areas because of radical activities in 1939–1940 returned during the Japanese encirclement campaign in the summer of 1940—a vulnerable moment for the CCP—and collaborated with the Japanese (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 14–15, 19–20, 40–42; He Long, 1945: 5). In order to understand the consequences of the radical activities of 1939–1940, the CCP itself later conducted a detailed investigation in Lanxian—a county at the heart of the Northwest Shanxi Base Area—in the winter of 1941 (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 1). In the month-and-a-half investigation several local CCP cadres were interviewed. A report on the investigation explained what took place in Lanxian following the Jin-Xi Incident up to the end of 1941 (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942). Because the Japanese encirclement was assisted by local elites, CCP cadres and their followers were endangered. Some people did not dare provide the Communists with food during the encirclement campaign, purely out of fear that they would be regarded as supporters of the CCP (14–15). In this situation, many CCP cadres even defected to the Japanese side (19). The report therefore concluded that it was the radical events of 1939–1940 that pushed local elites to become traitors, threatening the resistance against the Japanese invasion as well as the very survival of the CCP (40, 42).

Additionally, the radical events of 1939–1940 also undermined production. According to Hartford’s research, in the process of struggle against landlords and rich peasants, poor peasants improved their standard of living to a certain extent. But this also led to an expectation among many peasants that they could profit by taking from the rich instead of independently improving their circumstances (Hartford, 1980: 178). Similarly, relatively better-off people became less inclined to produce more and increase their wealth since the rich were vulnerable to becoming victims of radical class struggle (Hartford, 1980: 178). Landlords and rich peasants were good at managing the agricultural economy, and from this perspective, radical activities meant an economic loss. At that time especially, the increased Japanese attacks necessitated production based on the support of all classes in the resistance (Dorris, 1975: 56–57).

Above all, the radical events of 1939–1940 proved destructive to security and production as well as efforts to resist the Japanese. In the second half of 1940, the CCP decided to change its tactics in the Northwest Shanxi Base Area and the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. However, it is worth noting that without these radical activities, the CCP might not have been able to later successfully implement its well-known moderate polices that had previously been resisted by local elites, and would not have established the mobilization model that will be discussed in detail below. Admittedly, some previous studies of the North China base areas do mention the radical events of 1939–1940 (Hartford, 1980; Dorris, 1975; 1976). However, their significance for the whole process of the Sino-Japanese War has to a large extent been dismissed. This is not only because they were confined in a few places but also because, as emphasized here, the central role of these radical events in the formation of the mobilization model has not yet been fully recognized.

Mobilization Model

In late December 1939, under assault by Yan Xishan’s forces, the Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee as well as the main body of the CCP forces withdrew from southwest Shanxi to northwest Shanxi (Shanxi Provincial Institute of Historical Research, 1999: 228–34; Gong, 1983: 56). On February 7, 1940, the Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee and the Northwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee merged into the West Shanxi Regional Party Committee (Party History Research Office, 1987: 64), and Lin Feng, the former secretary of the Southwest Shanxi Regional Party Committee, became secretary of the West Shanxi Regional Party Committee (65). After the CCP reached a compromise with Yan Xishan in April 1940 (see Liu, 2020), CCP senior cadres, including Wang Dacheng and Gong Zirong 龚子荣, who had been left in Fenyang and Xiaoyi in order to conduct guerrilla warfare as well as the rectification of local party organizations after the Jin-Xi Incident, were also transferred to northwest Shanxi and became senior cadres of the West Shanxi Regional Party Committee (Party History Research Office, 1987: 65–72; Gong, 1999: 391).

These senior cadres, who had personally experienced the radical events of 1939–1940 in southwest Shanxi and seen their consequences, must have reported to Lin Feng who, as mentioned earlier, harshly criticized radicalism on several occasions (Main Points, 1945: 3, 8; Lin, 1945: 8). This meant that the events in southwest Shanxi provided lessons for these senior cadres and Lin Feng, likely prompting them to adjust their tactics in northwest Shanxi. However, this is not to say that the CCP’s later decision to adjust its tactics in northwest Shanxi was entirely due to the lessons gained in southwest Shanxi. As noted earlier, at almost the same time similar radical events also took place in northwest Shanxi, and archival materials indicate that this also had negative consequences. Undoubtedly, the experience in northwest Shanxi itself served as an impetus for the CCP in this area to put a stop to radical actions and turn to moderate polices in the second half of 1940. All this contributed to the formation of the CCP’s mobilization model.

According to the archival materials from the Northwest Shanxi Base Area, in June 1940, after the West Shanxi Regional Party Committee held a senior cadre meeting the CCP leadership started to draw lessons from the radical events of late 1939 and early 1940 in southwest Shanxi and northwest Shanxi, adjusting its united front policies in order to win back the support of local elites (He Long, 1940: 5; West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941; Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942; Lin, 1945: 8, 9). This was in line with changes in the party center’s united front policies, although detailed information about the connection is not clear. As Lyman Van Slyke notes, “the years 1939 and 1940 saw the mature development of the wartime united front” (Van Slyke, 1967: 108). In March 1940, Mao Zedong gave a report at a Yan’an meeting of senior cadres, “Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front,” which highlighted the significance of winning over the “middle forces” (Li, 1988: 255; Van Slyke, 1967: 108–10). In the opinion of Mao, the “middle forces” consisted of the “middle bourgeoisie,” the “enlightened gentry,” and “regional power groups” (Mao, 1965 [1940]: 422). Here most local elites fell into the category of “enlightened gentry.” Further, Mao expressly noted that winning over the “middle forces” could only be achieved under three conditions “(1) that we [the CCP] have ample strength; (2) that we respect their interests; and (3) that we are resolute in our struggle against the die-hards and steadily win victories” (424–25). This point was to a certain extent followed or reflected in the subsequent policies of the CCP.

Under intensified attack, some parts of the Northwest Shanxi Base Areas fell into Japanese hands. Yet, there were too few Japanese troops to station these areas for long. After they were transferred elsewhere, CCP forces returned to re-occupy these areas (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 38). At this time, the CCP decided to reintroduce a moderate approach to deal with local elites who had collaborated with the Japanese when they occupied these areas. These local elites were not to be branded as “traitors” and their land and other wealth were not to be confiscated and redistributed (He Long, 1940: 5). For local elites who had fled to Japanese-occupied areas during the radical events of 1939–1940 and remained there, the CCP also took advantage of this opportunity to send various signals, through public announcements, private letters, and personal networks, that promised that their land and other wealth would be given back if they returned (He Long, 1999: 2, 5). At the same time, the CCP was prepared to implement a so-called three-thirds system, based on a directive from the party center, in which local elites could participate in the popular assemblies in the Northwest Shanxi Base Area, and were guaranteed a third of the seats (He Long, 1940: 2; Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 33). As Gerry Groot notes, this was undertaken because “the CCP believed that encouraging political participation by almost all groups, from landlords to poor peasants, would avoid the alienation and passivity common to dictatorship” (Groot, 2004: 24).

In addition, the CCP in northwest Shanxi retreated from the radical policy of land reform and instead once again implemented a program of rent and interest reduction, which had also been resisted by local elites before the civil war of 1939–1940 (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 34). Although local elites were still required to reduce rent and interest, this time the CCP emphasized that peasants could no longer refuse to pay rent and interest (34, 43). In addition, the CCP started to exercise careful control over the execution of local elites. According to Hartford’s research on the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, by 1942 approval from the higher party level was required before a village party’s “traitor-elimination” squads could conduct an execution (Hartford, 1989: 114). In short, the CCP introduced a series of moderate policies with the aim of protecting local elites’ lives and property (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 42–44).

There is evidence that a number of local elites did return. By mid-November 1940, 364 members of the local elite had returned to the Northwest Shanxi Base Area where, as mentioned earlier, over six hundred had earlier fled to Japanese-occupied areas or somewhere east of the Yellow River during the civil war of late 1939 and early 1940 (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941; Party History Research Office, 1989: 123). According to the investigative report on Lanxian, the majority of seized land and other wealth was returned to local elites (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 43). Some local elites even participated in the resistance government and helped develop the economy and resolve financial difficulties (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941). This is not to say that local elites had forgotten their experience of the radical events of 1939–1940 and were thus inclined to support the CCP unstintingly; indeed, some local elites remained skeptical of the CCP’s new policies (West Shanxi Regional Committee, 1941). Clearly though, they did comply with a series of the CCP’s policies, particularly the program of rent and interest reduction, which they had long resisted prior to the civil war of 1939–1940 (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 9).

Why did many local elites return to the CCP-controlled area from the Japanese-occupied territories? This can be answered by examining the relationship between these local elites and the Japanese. Some Communist archival materials reveal that the Japanese actually did not treat their collaborators very well. The Japanese sometimes heavily fined local elites on pretexts such as fraud and corruption and then expelled them from Japanese-sponsored organizations, or even worse, beat or killed them (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 7, 19). In addition, some local elites found that life was even harsher in the Japanese-occupied areas (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942: 9). The Communist investigative report on Lanxian provides some examples, although perhaps not enough to represent the whole picture. One example is provided by Cheng Manquan, a local elite who escaped to the Japanese-occupied territories during the radical events of 1939–1940. Cheng later returned to Lanxian during the Japanese encirclement in the summer of 1940 and became the magistrate of the Japanese-sponsored county government. The Japanese beat him on several occasions and even put him in jail on the pretext that some people had accused him of corruption. Cheng later said that it was actually difficult to work for the Japanese and if it had not been for the radical events of 1939–1940 he would not have become a so-called traitor (19). Another case was landlord Liu Zhirong and his son who worked in a Japanese-sponsored organization. On the pretext that Liu cheated people, the Japanese arrested him and were prepared to bury him alive. He paid 800 fabi 法币 and was released. Using adultery as an excuse, the Japanese again arrested his son and finally he had to pay a fine of another several hundred fabi. In addition, the investigative report claimed that the Japanese also had raped their wives (19). Cases like these illustrate that cooperation between local elites and the Japanese was not always smooth, and often endangered local elites. As Lyman Van Slyke pointed out, the Japanese “never trusted their Chinese collaborators” (Van Slyke, 1986: 629). Therefore, it is understandable that many local elites decided to once again side with the CCP after it adjusted its policies and promised to protect their lives and property.

Another question is why local elites came to accept the CCP’s so-called moderate policies, such as the program of rent and interest reductions, which they had once resisted. Clearly, this is related to their experience with the radicalism of 1939–1940. For these local elites, knowledge of the previous period of revolutionary violence significantly modified their behavior. According to the investigative report on Lanxian, during the high tide of radicalism in 1939–1940, local elites who chose to stay put had expressed their willingness to donate money and land or anything else so long as their safety could be guaranteed, and they were also willing to support the CCP, again so long as their safety was assured (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942). For local elites who chose to flee, when they came back and had their land returned, they did not dare request more or challenge the CCP by resisting its policies. In order to survive they had to collaborate with, or at least not publicly challenge, the CCP. For example, Niu Jindou and Niu Huandou, brothers and landlords, fled Lanxian in April 1940 but returned in August after the CCP wrote a letter to them. When they returned, the CCP restored their land to them. Whether by choice or not, the brothers began to do what the CCP required them to do without resistance, and from then on, they no longer expressed any opinions about politics or policies (Investigation of the Work in Lanxian, 1942). Evidently, the most violent aspects of the radical actions of 1939–1940 were reined in by the base area leadership in the second half of 1940. However, the experience left an indelible impression on local elites. For them, it was a learning experience in how to interact with the CCP, understanding that resisting the demands of the CCP posed a significant threat to their lives.

The psychological impact of the radical events of 1939–1940 on local elites played a key role in the successful implementation of the CCP’s moderate policies of rent and interest reduction. The claim of Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden that there was a “silent revolution” in which landowners might still have surrendered their land when the CCP came knocking was to a large extent due less to patriotic fervor and more from fear of violent class struggle or even death if they resisted (Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden, 1991: 80, 82, 84–85). In other words, on the surface, the CCP’s success lay in its moderate approach of appealing to nationalism and social justice, but below the surface, violent class struggle also contributed to its success. Although Hartford (1980; 1989) and Dorris (1975; 1976) recognized the existence of radical activities during 1939–1940, neither acknowledged the psychological impact of these activities on local elites, nor their connection to the later successful implementation of moderate policies.

On December 10, 1940, the West Shanxi Regional Party Committee held a twenty-five-day meeting to summarize the experience of the preceding year (Party History Research Office, 1989: 151–52). After the meeting, the West Shanxi Regional Party Committee wrote a detailed report and on January 27, 1941, sent it to the CCP Central Committee and the CCP’s North Bureau (152–53). Although the original of this report has not been declassified, it is summarized in an official publication. According to the summary, the report discusses the adjustment of radical policies, the implementation of the three-thirds system, and the financial and economic situation in northwest Shanxi (Party History Research Office, 1989: 153–54). On February 12, 1941, the party center forwarded this report to all the other base areas for reference, and emphasized that the CCP leadership in other base areas should learn from the mobilization experience in northwest Shanxi (Party History Research Office, 1989: 154).

On January 28, 1942, the party center published a directive on land policy in the base areas, which was based on the summary of the experience of the base areas in southwest Shanxi, northwest Shanxi, and elsewhere in North China where similar radical events had occurred during 1939–1940 (CCP Central Committee, 1942b). On February 4, 1942, the party center issued another directive on the procedures for implementing the land policy directive, which was only available to CCP cadres and was not published publicly (CCP Central Committee, 1942a). In the second directive, the party center acknowledged and repeatedly emphasized the necessity of violent class struggle against local elites in the process of mobilization (295). To convince local elites that they could protect their interests only by complying with the CCP’s policies, the party center required local CCP organizations to use violent class struggle against them, instead of constraining peasant radicalism (296). Informed by the previous experience of radical mobilization during 1939–1940 in the Southwest Shanxi Base Area, the Northwest Shanxi Base Area, and other North China bases areas, the party center was acutely aware of the negative impact of violent struggle against local elites. Apart from being destructive to production, radical actions could push local elites to flee to the side of the Japanese or the GMD and perhaps even return with them to help attack the Communist base areas. Therefore, the party center instructed local CCP organizations to be prepared to adjust their policies to win back local elites while at the time mobilizing peasants and implementing the three-thirds system and rent and interest reductions. The party center believed this would lead local elites to feel grateful to the CCP, to cooperate with it, and to comply with its polices (296–97). The party center’s interpretation was at least partially correct, since many local elites in fact returned and submitted to the CCP’s rule. However, the party center was also to some extent incorrect, because these local elites did so, as mentioned earlier, not because they were grateful to the CCP, but rather mainly because they feared being killed if they resisted.

These two directives marked the start of a new mobilization model based on the experience of the radical events of 1939–1940. This model incorporated two contrasting approaches—moderate and radical—both of which played a central role. In the past scholars have overemphasized the moderate aspect and concluded that the CCP’s success lay in a nonrevolutionary strategy based on nationalism and social justice. However, as noted earlier, scholars have downplayed the significance of the CCP’s radical tactics, even when they acknowledge the struggles against local elites (Dorris, 1976: 705). According to the evidence presented in this article, the radical activities were the first step toward mass mobilization. More moderate strategies were only successful because of this prior radical mobilization. In other words, the CCP’s success relied not merely on the moderate approach based on anti-Japanese nationalism and social justice, but also, if not more, on a radical approach based on violent class struggle.

In the later years of the Sino-Japanese War this mobilization model was gradually applied to all Communist base areas across all of China. For example, according to David Paulson, after fall 1943 the mobilization in the Shandong Base Area went through almost the exact same procedures as the requirements of the mobilization model. Radical activities similar to those that took place in Shanxi during 1939–1940 also occurred in the Shandong Base Area, where landlords and rich peasants were purged from local administration and all tenancy relationships came under attack (Paulson, 1982: 329, 333, 353). Landlords and rich peasants experienced various forms of violence, such as being beaten and paraded through the streets, or even struggled to death (333, 353). As a result, a number of landlords, rich peasants, and even middle peasants fled the area (335). Some of these exiles participated in militia revolts against the CCP or cooperated with the Japanese and puppet forces in attacking the base area (337). In response to deteriorating military security caused by the reactions of local elites, the CCP again introduced moderate policies after the movement of struggle against local elites had developed broadly and peasants were fully mobilized (336). At this moment, local elites who had experienced violent class struggle came to realize that they had to yield to the CCP in order to protect their interests, and therefore were willing to accept the “moderate” policies, such as the rent and interest reduction, that they had resisted earlier (328, 340). As a result, through the calculated management of radical events, in most places the CCP “made more progress in expanding its popular base than it had in the preceding six years of war” (353–54).