Psychological Misconceptions and Their Relation to Students’ Lay Beliefs of Mind

Abstract

Psychological misconceptions are common among students taking psychology courses. In this study, we show an association between student endorsement of misconceptions and two prevalent and well-researched lay beliefs about the human mind, specifically the belief in free will and dualism. This study also revisits and builds upon past research investigating the relationship between believing in psychological misconceptions and other student beliefs such as opinions about psychology as science and beliefs in extrasensory perception, and student characteristics such as critical thinking ability, number of psychology courses taken, and grade point average. The findings are discussed in the context that differences among students in beliefs in free will and dualism may lead some students to endorse a greater number of common psychological misconceptions. We discuss the implications of these findings for instruction and for research on techniques to correct student misconceptions.

Keywords

psychological misconceptions lay beliefs of mind free will dualism

Psychological misconceptions are defined as “commonsense” beliefs about human behavior and mental processes not supported by scientific evidence (Gardner & Brown, 2013; Hughes et al., 2013; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004), and decades of research shows them to be common among students taking psychology courses (Furnham & Huges, 2014; Gardner & Dalsing, 1986). Common examples of misconceptions include the following: Most people use only 10% of their brain power, extrasensory perception (ESP) has been found to exist in people, and most mentally ill people are dangerous (Lilienfeld et al., 2010).

In addition to being prevalent, psychological misconceptions have been found to be resistant to correction, at least by many traditional methods of instruction (Gutman, 1979; Lamal, 1979; Vaughan, 1977). To some extent, this finding may result from the public’s reluctance to accept the scientific status and authority of psychology (Holmes, 2014; Lilienfeld, 2012; Stanovich, 2013). Of course, some researchers have found that psychological misconceptions do seem to decrease among students as they complete additional credit hours in psychology (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; Landau & Bavaria, 2003; Standing & Huber, 2003); however, even students completing graduate-level training have been found to retain some misconceptions. The overall conclusion of many researchers; psychological misconceptions possess a quality of “stickiness” (Huges et al., 2015).

Although psychological misconceptions may create challenges for instructors, they should be corrected as they are educationally significant. For example, the endorsement of psychological misconceptions has been found to be negatively correlated with student course performance (Kuhle et al., 2009), although some researchers find individual differences in critical thinking ability and thinking style (e.g., intuitive or analytical) mediate this relationship (Bensley & Lilienfeld, 2017; Kowalski & Taylor, 2004; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Nonetheless, like any false belief, psychological misconceptions can lead to poor decision making, with the potential to harm both students and society (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). To summarize, psychological misconceptions are prevalent, somewhat resistant to correction, and worthy of instructor attention. But where do psychological misconceptions originate, and are some students more prone to believing them than others?

Psychological misconceptions are somewhat nebulous, comprising incorrect bits of information, and overgeneralized half-truths, and can become associated with intuitive ontological assumptions about humans and overtime become “commonsense” beliefs. The misinformation that maintains misconceptions may derive from several sources including the media (e.g., TV, internet), cultural memes, persuasive messages from vested interest groups (e.g., advertisements, self-help books), and even one’s own social–cognitive processes (e.g., heuristics, stereotypes; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2010). If misconceptions stayed as isolated bits of incorrect information, they would probably be easily corrected in all students by providing correct information, for example, through traditional class lectures. Unfortunately, differences between students in their general knowledge and beliefs may play a role in their acceptance of misconceptions.

Dekker et al. (2012) investigated individual differences in believing misconceptions, specifically misconceptions about the human brain and learning, among a sample of primary and secondary school teachers in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Overall, teachers believed about half of the misconceptions the researchers labeled as “neuro-myths.” As is usually the case with research on misconceptions, the researchers found no significant differences in sex or age of the participant. What they did find was that individual differences in the teacher’s general knowledge of the human brain (apparently acquired from popular science magazines) was a significant predictor of misconception endorsement. Although the teachers with a basic knowledge of the brain and its workings were shown to be more enthusiastic toward using neuroscience in their teaching, they were also unfortunately more susceptible to believing brain-related misconceptions than teachers with less knowledge.

As some researchers argue, psychological misconceptions tend not to exist in isolation but are often connected with fundamental and general beliefs about human nature; in other words, one’s intuitive, “commonsense” psychology” (Amsel et al., 2011). Students, like most people, often use their commonsense psychology to aid their understanding of themselves and others (Heider, 1958), even if these beliefs conflict with psychology’s empirically supported findings (Benjamin, 1986, Friedrich, 1996; Stanovich, 2013). A good example of a “commonsense” lay belief that conflicts with most of psychological science is that of mind–body dualism.

Bloom (2004) argued the majority of people in the world are “commonsense dualists.” Many laypeople believe the human mind exists separate from the brain/body yet somehow the mind has control over the body. In contrast, most psychologists favor monism believing (to varying degrees) that mind processes (e.g., consciousness) are the product of brain processes. Stanovich (1989) investigated the belief in dualism and found a large percentage of U.S. college students endorsed a dualistic theory of mind–body, and this belief was correlated with a belief in the existence of ESP, although mainly for students reporting lower levels of religiosity. Yet perhaps the most predominant and fundamental belief about the human mind, and one receiving decades of research attention, is the belief in free will (Baumeister, 2008).

Although philosophers and scientists have long debated the existence of free will, the majority of laypeople believe in the existence of this concept (Sarkissian et al., 2010). Informal surveys of people in the United States estimate 60% believe in free will, and people believe free will to be a fundamental component of human consciousness, decision making, and moral responsibility (Baumeister, 2008; Monroe & Malle, 2010). At the core of lay beliefs of free will is the concept of personal agency and choice, choice free of any internal or external causes (Feldman, 2017). However, individual differences concerning the strength in a belief in free will do exist, with researchers finding free will to be correlated with greater levels of religiosity, political conservatism, and moral behavior (Baumeister, 2008; Carey & Paulhus, 2013). Three important points about lay beliefs in free will need to be made.

First, research indicates a belief in free will results in distinct, and unique behavioral effects in participants, different from other agentic-related constructs such as self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and the belief in mind–body dualism (Feldman, 2017; Feldman et al., 2018). Second, social psychologists conceptualize beliefs as being broader in coverage, and more abstract than attitudes, and personality traits. As Feldman (2017) explains, “Beliefs such as the belief in free-will, implicit theory, mind-body dualism are more generalized abstract beliefs about life, across domains, and in reference to human beings in general, both self and others” (p. 5). Finally, in developing an often used research measure of lay beliefs in free will (i.e., Free Will and Determinism Scale [FAD-Plus Scale]), Paulhus and Carey (2011) found evidence, for not only a lay belief in free will, but three other related but distinct subcategories of beliefs about human choice, mind agency, and life outcomes. The most prevalent belief was free will, whereas mentioned, people referenced the idea of choice and responsibility, free from external and internal influences. Yet some people favored a second belief pattern Paulhus and Carey labeled fatalistic determinism, described as the belief that choice may not matter in life as fate has a plan for everyone (e.g., what will be, will be). A third belief subcategory they labeled unpredictability. People with this belief view human decisions and life events as mostly random and therefore unpredictable. In contrast to these belief categories, some individuals favor determinism. Similar to that of psychology, these individuals believe human thought and behavior derive from the complex interplay of biological, psychological, and environmental factors (McLeod, 2013). Determinism also implies that human thought and behavior result from a chain of prior internal and external causes and, although complex, is predictable.

Recent research suggests that believing strongly in free will can have benefits for college students, for example, being a significant predictor of a student’s overall grade point average (GPA; Feldman et al., 2016). It has been proposed that believing strongly in one’s free will enhances counterfactual thinking, thereby helping one learn from academic mistakes (Alquist et al., 2015). In addition, when a student’s belief in free will is diminished, at least experimentally, their cheating and aggressive behavior increases (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Overall, it seems that believing strongly in free will provides students with benefits, yet we believe it may also carry some limitations. We speculate that students believing strongly in free will may be limited, to some extent, in their ability to appreciate the complex, interactive, and multiply determined (e.g., bio–psych–culture) nature of human behavior and mental processes. For this reason, we propose that students believing in free will may be prone to accepting a greater number of common psychological misconceptions. We expected to find a positive correlation between participant’s belief in free will and their endorsement of a greater number of psychological misconceptions. Our study also investigated the possible associations between the endorsement of psychological misconceptions and the belief constructs of both fatalistic determinism and unpredictability.

A second goal of this study is to replicate and extend previous research by Stanovich (1989) that investigated the relationship between student’s belief in mind–body dualism and opinions about the existence of both ESP, views about psychology as a science, and common psychological misconceptions. Finally, based on past research, we also examined the endorsement of psychological misconceptions and the possible influence of student’s completing additional credit hours in psychology, individual differences in critical thinking (i.e., need for cognition), and student’s overall GPA. Understanding any possible association between student lay beliefs of mind and student endorsement of psychological misconceptions could better inform both instructors and researchers on ways to correct student misconceptions.

Method

Participants

Participants consisted of 212 undergraduate students (137 women, 75 men, M_age = 19.5 years, M_GPA = 3.09) recruited from several different introductory and upper-level psychology courses at a small, private college in the Midwestern United States. One hundred and forty-nine of the participants consented to provide their GPA. Sixty-four of the participants were declared psychology majors, and 148 were other majors or undecided. Participants included 91 first-year students, 53 sophomores, 32 juniors, 34 seniors, and 2 designated as other.

Materials and Procedure

At the beginning of the semester, participants completed a packet containing the following measures presented in randomized order and comprised of response item statements measured on a 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree Likert-type scale.

Popular Psychological Misconceptions Scale (PPMS)

We constructed a 28-item index of common psychological misconceptions. PPMS items were developed, in part, from the book Fifty Great Myths of Popular Psychology (Lilienfeld et al., 2010), and examples included “Subliminal messages in advertisements can persuade people to buy products they do not want” and “People only use 10% of the brain.” We calculated reliability for the PPMS to be acceptable (α = .73).

Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD-Plus)

Developed by Paulhus and Carey (2011), this 27-item scale (α = .70) measures the belief in free will as well as three other distinct but related belief constructs. An example from the seven-item subscale of a belief in free will includes “People can overcome any obstacle if they truly want to.” The subscale of scientific determinism contains seven items (α = .69) and items such as “As with other animals, human behavior follows the laws of nature.” The five-item subscale of fatalistic determinism (α = .82) contained items such as “No matter how hard you try you can’t change your destiny.” And finally, the eight-item subscale in the belief of unpredictability (α = .72) included statements like “What happens to people is a matter of chance.”

Mind–Body Dualism Scale (MBDS)

The 27-item MBDS (Stanovich, 1989), with an α of .71, measures the belief in dualism versus materialism. An example of an item from the MBDS is “The mind and the body are two totally separate things.”

ESP

This 14-item scale (α = .91) measures the belief in the extrasensory ability and psychic powers (Stanovich, 1989). An example of an item includes “Some people have the ability to heal others’ illnesses by using their minds.”

Psychology as a Science Scale (PAS)

This 15-item scale (α = .71) is often used by researchers to measure the degree to which a person views psychology as a science (Friedrich, 1996). Examples of PAS statements include “The study of psychology should be seen primarily as a science” and “Although people are unique, it is possible for science to discover general laws explaining human behavior.”

Need for Cognition Scale (NFC)

The version of the NFC (Cacioppo et al., 1984) used in this study consisted of 18 items (α = .90) and used a 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me) range to access one’s motivation to engage in and enjoy cognitive challenges. The NFC has been shown to be associated with critical thinking and scrutinizing persuasive communications (Stedman et al., 2009). Examples of items on the NFC Scale include “I enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to a problem” and “Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.”

Finally, participants completed demographic questions that collected information about their age, academic class (e.g., freshman), number and level of psychology courses completed, and consent to obtain their overall college GPA.

Results

We compared participant scores on the FAD-Plus subscale measuring belief in free will with the PPMS scores and, as expected, found a significant and positive correlation between a belief in free will and the endorsement of psychological misconceptions, r(210) = .34, p < .001. Unlike previous research, a moderation analysis showed no significant moderation by the number of college psychology courses completed on the relation between free will beliefs and psychological misconception endorsement, b = −.07, t(208) = −.94, p = .35, ΔR² = .002. Unlike past research, correlational analyses revealed no significant relation between free will beliefs and student GPA, r(147) = −.07, p = .43. As expected from past research, we found a belief in dualism to be significantly and positively associated with participant endorsement of psychological misconceptions (PPMS), r(198) = .34, p < .001. However, we found that neither free will beliefs nor dualistic beliefs were significantly related to how participants viewed psychology as a science (p > .05).

Multiple hierarchical linear regression models using forced-entry within sets were fitted with known participant predictors including scores from the MBDS and NFC scales in the initial block (Block 1), scores from the FAD-Plus in the second block (Block 2), and PAS scores and the number of psychology courses completed in the third block (Block 3), in order to examine whether these variables could predict a significant amount of variability in the endorsement of psychological misconceptions, endorsement of ESP, and student GPA. In the model predicting endorsement of psychological myths, Block 1 (including the need for cognition scores and dualistic beliefs) collectively predicted a significant amount of variance, R² = .06, F(2, 141) = 4.27, p = .02. For the same model, Block 2 (including free-will belief, scientific-deterministic belief, fatalistic-deterministic belief, and belief in unpredictability) predicted a significant amount of variance, above and beyond that of Block 1, R² = .20, ΔR² = .14, F(6, 137) = 5.68, p < .001. Block 3 (including participant views of psychology as a science and the number of psychology courses taken) predicted a significant amount of variance, above and beyond that of Block 2, R² = .25, ΔR² = .05, F(8, 135) = 5.74, p < .001. See Table 1 for a table of coefficients for this model. Within Block 3, the model of best fit, belief in dualism, free-will belief, fatalistic-deterministic belief, and the number of psychology courses taken were all significant predictors of psychological myth endorsement (p < .05).

Table 1.

Regression Analysis for Student Characteristics Predicting Misconception Endorsement.

Block 1: R² = .06	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	0.19	.07	.25	2.83	.005
Need for cognition	0.03	.09	.03	0.30	.768
Block 2: R² = .20	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	0.15	.07	.20	2.26	.025
Need for cognition	−0.02	.09	−.02	−0.24	.812
Free will belief	0.79	.27	.23	2.92	.004
Scientific-deterministic belief	0.47	.34	.11	1.39	.166
Fatalistic-deterministic belief	1.07	.34	.27	3.15	.002
Unpredictability belief	−0.10	.29	−.03	−0.35	.725
Block 3: R² = .25	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	0.14	.06	.19	2.24	.027
Need for cognition	−0.02	.08	−.02	−0.28	.780
Free will belief	0.81	.26	.24	3.10	.002
Scientific-deterministic belief	0.50	.33	.12	1.50	.137
Fatalistic-deterministic belief	1.03	.33	.26	3.10	.002
Unpredictability belief	−0.19	.28	−.06	−0.68	.500
Psychology courses taken	−1.32	.43	−.23	−3.09	.002
Psychology as a science	0.10	.19	.04	0.53	.597

Note. Block 3; R² = .25, N = 144, p < .001.

In the model predicting endorsement of ESP abilities, Block 1 (including the need for cognition scores and dualistic beliefs) collectively predicted a marginal amount of variance, R² = .04, F(2, 141) = 2.57, p = .08. For the same model, Block 2 (including free will belief, scientific-deterministic belief, fatalistic-deterministic belief, and belief in unpredictability) predicted a significant amount of variance, above and beyond that of Block 1, R² = .20, ΔR² = .16, F(6, 137) = 5.57, p < .001. Block 3 (including participant views of psychology as a science and the number of psychology courses taken) predicted a significant amount of variance, above and beyond that of Block 2, R² = .24, ΔR² = .04, F(8, 135) = 5.39, p < .001. See Table 2 for a table of coefficients for this model. Within Block 3, the model of best fit, fatalistic-deterministic belief, and seeing psychology as a science were significant predictors of endorsement of ESP abilities (p < .01).

Table 2.

Regression Analysis for Student Characteristics Predicting Misconception Belief in ESP.

Block 1: R² = .04	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	0.11	.05	.20	2.27	.025
Need for cognition	0.06	.06	.08	0.88	.378
Block 2: R² = .20	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	0.04	.05	.07	0.75	.457
Need for cognition	0.03	.06	.04	0.45	.657
Free will belief	0.00	.19	.00	−0.01	.995
Scientific-deterministic belief	−0.10	.24	−.03	−0.42	.677
Fatalistic-deterministic belief	1.25	.24	.45	5.20	.000
Unpredictability belief	−0.32	.20	−.14	−1.58	.116
Block 3: R² = .24	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	0.04	.05	.07	0.79	.430
Need for cognition	0.03	.06	.04	0.50	.617
Free will belief	0.01	.19	.00	0.04	.971
Scientific-deterministic belief	−0.14	.24	−.05	−0.60	.547
Fatalistic-deterministic belief	1.25	.24	.45	5.34	.000
Unpredictability belief	−0.30	.20	−.13	−1.48	.142
Psychology courses taken	0.03	.30	.01	0.09	.931
Psychology as a science	0.38	.13	.22	2.87	.005

Note. Block 3 R² = .24, N = 144, p < .001.

In the model predicting academic performance, Block 1 (including the need for cognition scores and dualistic beliefs) did not collectively predict a significant amount of variance, R² = .02, F(2, 135) = 1.27, p = .29. For the same model, Block 2 (including free will belief, scientific-deterministic belief, fatalistic-deterministic belief, and belief in unpredictability) predicted a significant amount of variance, above and beyond that of Block 1, R² = .09, ΔR² = .07, F(6, 131) = 2.17, p = .05. Block 3 (including participant views of psychology as a science and the number of psychology courses taken) did not predict a significant amount of variance, above and beyond that of Block 2, R² = .11, ΔR² = .02, F(8, 129) = 1.91, p = .06. See Table 3 for a table of coefficients for this model (excluding the nonsignificant Block 3). Within Block 2, the model of best fit, unpredictability belief, and need for cognition were significant predictors of academic performance (p < .05).

Table 3.

Regression Analysis Summary for Student Characteristics Predicting Academic Performance.

Block 1: R² = .02	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	.00	000	.00	0.04	.967
Need for cognition	−.01	000	−.13	−1.49	.139
Block 2: R² = .09	B	SE B	β	t	p
Dualism	.00	.00	−.05	−0.54	.589
Need for cognition	−.01	.00	−.17	−1.91	.050
Free will belief	.00	.01	−.02	−0.21	.831
Scientific-deterministic belief	.01	.02	.05	0.54	.590
Fatalistic-deterministic belief	.01	.02	.06	0.66	.510
Unpredictability belief	−.04	.01	−.29	−3.07	.003

Note. Block 2 R² = .09, N = 138, p = .05.

Scores from the FAD-Plus for each participant were also coded into a variable which labeled the participant as primarily one of the four lay beliefs according to the FAD-Plus Scale (free will, scientific deterministic, fatalistic deterministic, or unpredictability) to examine whether the type of belief an individual was primarily associated with was related to other beliefs and characteristics of the individuals—see Table 4 for the frequencies of different types of lay beliefs. Using a multifactor univariate analysis, we examined how the types of believer participants were and their academic year in school were related to endorsement of misconceptions. Participant type of lay believer was a significant predictor of endorsement of misconceptions, F(2, 198) = 6.40, p = .002. Academic year was also a significant predictor of endorsement of misconception, F(4, 198) = 2.86, p = .03. The interaction of the type of thinker and academic year was nonsignificant (p > .05). In a similar predictor model examining how the predictors were related to endorsement of ESP, the type of thinker was also a significant predictor, F(2, 198) = 4.25, p = .02, whereas academic year and the interaction were nonsignificant (p > .05).

Table 4.

Frequencies of Belief Categories Among Participants Using Scores on FAD-Plus.

Belief Category	n	%
Free will believer	117.00	55.20
Scientific determinist	16.00	7.50
Unpredictability believer	79.00	37.30

Note. No participants were classified as primarily fatalistic determinist.

Discussion

The primary focus of the present study was investigating the association between student endorsement of popular psychological misconceptions and two prevalent lay beliefs about the human mind, specifically free will and mind–body dualism. We found significant and positive associations between the belief in both free will and mind–body dualism and the endorsement of misconceptions. In addition, we found the number of psychology courses students completed and other lay beliefs about the mind (e.g., free will, fatalistic determinism, dualism) were significant predictors of student endorsement of psychological misconceptions, although unlike some previous research we did not find the variable of need for cognition among students to play a significant mediating role. This study also sought to update a previous study by Stanovich (1989) investigating the association between the belief in mind–body dualism and the belief in the existence of ESP. Dualism was associated with greater endorsement of common psychological misconceptions; however, it was not significantly predictive of student’s belief in ESP. Although we did find some evidence that a belief in fatalistic determinism (e.g., what will be, will be) and seeing psychology as a science were predictive of believing in ESP.

Instructors of psychology should take note that the majority of our participants endorsed a belief in free will, many more than the number of students favoring scientific determinism. Our findings suggest the importance of considering individual difference in student lay beliefs of mind, when considering student’s acceptance of psychological misconceptions, and ways to correct them. Our findings also support the argument that psychological misconceptions do not exist simply as isolated bits of misinformation but are more likely to be associated with more fundamental and intuitive lay beliefs of mind. We believe our findings add validation to Amsel et al. (2011) assertion, “Misconceptions do not exist in isolation but are connected to and supported by a network of ontological assumptions, explanatory concepts, and causal mechanisms, which form an alternative intuitive or folk theory” (p. 3).

Our findings should also be of interest to researchers investigating methods to correct student misconceptions, especially instructional methods focusing on conceptual changes in student thinking (Chi, 2008; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). For example, recently, researchers found some success correcting student endorsement of psychological misconceptions by using refutation-based learning techniques (both texts and written assignments; Lassonde et al., 2016; Lassonde et al., 2017). We propose future researchers might use previously established experimental methods to temporarily weaken student’s lay beliefs in free will and/or dualism and then evaluate the effectiveness of refutation instructional techniques on the acceptance of psychological misconceptions. Finally, future research should investigate those students favoring a belief in unpredictability, in order to further explore the association with opinions about scientific psychology and ESP.

Although the present study adds to the understanding of student misconceptions of psychology, it is not without limitations. Obviously, it is correlational in nature, with the focus of the study largely limited to two (although prevalent) lay beliefs of mind. Our findings are preliminary, and future studies should explore the mechanism that leads students believing in free will or mind–body dualism to be more susceptible to psychological misconceptions.

In conclusion, our findings show the need for further research on student lay beliefs of mind and the acceptance of psychological misconceptions. Our findings also support researchers who argue psychological misconceptions should not always be viewed as simple isolated bits of misinformation but for some students are associated with their more fundamental ontological lay beliefs about the human mind.

Footnotes

Authors’ Note

Mark Sibicky and Christopher L. Klein contributed equally to this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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