Abstract
There has been wide speculation regarding the meaning of two Greek words in 2 Cor. 5.13: ἐξίστημι and σωφρονέω. Interpreters of this verse have struggled to assess these terms in their literary and historical contexts. While the majority of commentators view these terms as referring to Paul’s ecstatic experiences, others have interpreted the verse as referring to Paul’s erratic behavior. A third group of scholars have tried to demonstrate that Paul is in fact responding to accusations that he lacked rhetorical sophistication. Building on the work of scholars belonging to the third category, I propose in this article that Paul is not only being accused of poor rhetorical skills, he is also being accused of all the connotations of a weak and inarticulate leader. By examining ἐξίστημι and σωφρονέω in their rhetorical contexts I will demonstrate that these two terms are often used in descriptions of ineffectual and unqualified civic leaders. Thus, Paul has been accused of lacking all the necessary qualities of a successful leader in the ancient world.
Introduction
‘Paul must be out of his mind!’ Upon a cursory reading of 2 Cor. 5.13, one would gain the impression that this was the accusation leveled against Paul by his adversaries. There have been numerous attempts to explain Paul’s use of the verb ἐξίστημι, often translated as ‘beside oneself’ or ‘out of one’s mind’ (Bauer 2000: 350). So many proposals, in fact, that the possibilities are staggering. Over the course of this essay I will outline the three main categories for interpreting 2 Cor. 5.13. I will then propose that Paul’s use of ἐξίστημι, as well as σωφρονέω, ‘to be of sound mind/to be in one’s right mind’ (Bauer 2000: 986), can best be understood in the light of ancient rhetoricians such as Isocrates and Dio Chrysostom. Within the writings of these trained rhetors, we will find that the two verbs in question are often used in contexts that describe the rhetorical ability and character traits of an effective civic leader. Finally, applying the connotations of civic leadership qualities to 2 Cor. 5.13 will provide further insights into the accusations leveled at Paul from his opponents in Corinth.
Three Main Interpretations of 2 Corinthians 5.13
In the current state of scholarship on 2 Cor. 5.13 there are three main views as to what Paul is denoting when he uses the words ἐξίστημι and σωφρονέω: (1) ecstatic experiences, (2) social abnormalities and (3) rhetorical weakness. The majority of scholars regard this passage as referring to Paul’s experiences of ecstasy and mania represented in such manifestations as glossolalia and visions. 2 Hans Windisch proposed that the antithetical terms must refer to the ecstatic experiences of Paul, and asserted that in 1 Cor. 14.14-19 Paul suggests that the state of ecstasy represents an elimination of the mind (νοῦς) (1924: 179). Similarly, Rudolf Bultmann made the unambiguous assertion, ‘In antithesis to σωφρονεῖν, ἐξίστασθαι can only mean a “being-outside-oneself” in pneumatic ecstasy, thus can only denote the phenomena such as the [visions] and [revelations] of 12.1, or the glossolalia of 1 Corinthians 14’ (1985: 149). For Bultmann, ἐξίστασθαι in this context is exclusively reserved for genuine ecstatic experience, contra those who assert that it refers to social abnormalities. ‘It is scarcely credible that he was scolded for having “conducted himself like a ‘lunatic’ at the conflict in Corinth”. That would not be called an “ἐξίστασθαι”’ (1985: 150). 3 Most contemporary scholars follow Windisch and Bultmann in their assessment of Paul’s use of these two Greek terms.
The argument for Position 1 is typically made to rely on the supposed equation of ἐξίστημι with μαίνομαι, ‘to be mad [or insane], to be out of one’s mind’ (Bauer 2000: 610). The latter term is often found in antithesis to σωφρονέω, ‘to be of sound mind, to be able to think in a sane manner’, and is sometimes used to describe ecstatic experiences (Bauer 2000: 986). 4 In fact, Acts of the Apostles demonstrates a common use of these opposing terms during Paul’s trial before Agrippa and Festus: ‘But Paul said, “I am not out of my mind (μαίνομαι), most excellent Festus, but I am speaking the sober truth (σωφροσύνης)’” (26.25). C.K. Barrett, following Windisch, sought to confirm the equation of ἐξίστημι and μαίνομαι in 2 Cor. 5 by arguing, ‘it may be that “to be of sound mind” has been too closely connected with speech and instruction. Plato, Phaedrus 244A (ὁ μέν μαίνεται, ὁ δε σωφρονεῖ) illustrates the normal use of the word’ (1973: 167; cf. Windisch 1924: 179). Plato is referring to a situation where two kinds of people are being compared: one who is in love and another who is not in love. The one in love is insane because he has been overtaken by his desires, while the other is sane, not allowing his emotions to run wild. The ‘normal use’ of the word σωφρονέω, then, occurs in Phaedrus in the context of judging one’s capacity for rational thinking. According to Phaedrus, rational thought must be unencumbered by emotional infatuation and bodily desires. The ecstatic experiences of prophets and seers in the ancient world were often thought to be highly charged with emotion and would thus put one ‘out of one’s mind’. 5 In Barrett’s view we should not see σωφρονέω as a term related primarily to speech, but as one related to a person’s ability to engage in sober, rational thought. When Paul is engaging in ecstatic experiences he is not rational. Thus, Barrett concludes by paraphrasing Paul’s point in 5.13, ‘My Christian and apostolic experience may be divided into the ecstatic and the rational; these are directed respectively to God and to you, so neither is undertaken for my own benefit or glory’ (1973: 167). According to this view, Paul’s opponents must have derided him for lacking the public ecstatic experiences that seemed to validate their own authority as apostles. Paul responded by declaring that such experiences are beneficial only for the one speaking to God, but sober instruction is useful for the whole church. In this way, Paul legitimizes himself by claiming to have his own ecstatic experiences, while at the same time devaluing his opponents’ claim to authority by stating that ecstatic experiences are tertiary.
While Position 1 is attractive and widely held among scholars, its greatest weakness is the lack of evidence for establishing ἐξίστημι as referring to actual ecstatic experiences. As Moyer Hubbard notes, ‘In certain contexts, ἐξίστημι and μαίνομαι are roughly synonymous, though in none of these passages is the reference to religious ecstasy’ (1998: 42). The word ἐξίστημι is used 92 times (in various forms) in the Septuagint and the New Testament, but it does not occur in the context of ritual ecstasy in any of those instances. In the vast majority of occurrences, ἐξίστημι is used to denote amazement, confusion, or fear. 6 Even in Ezekiel and Daniel, where supernatural revelations abound, ἐξίστημι is never applied to such phenomena. Ezekiel uses ἐξίστημι to describe the deep fear that will come as a result of God’s judgment (2.6; 26.16; 27.35; 32.10). Daniel uses ἐξίστημι to describe the troubled soul of King Nebuchadnezzar (2.1-3). In 2 Cor. 12.2, the place to which many interpreters point in support of Position 1, Paul never uses ἐξίστημι to describe his visions and revelations. Moreover, he speaks of his ecstasy not in terms of being ‘out of my mind or in my right mind’, but in terms of being ‘in the body or out of the body’ (Baker 1999: 224). The correlation to 2 Cor. 5.13, then, does not quite work. Moreover, Paul uses μαίνομαι in 1 Cor. 14 in reference to the ecstatic experience of glossolalia, but he chooses not to use that word in 2 Cor. 5.13, when it would have paired so seamlessly with σωφρονέω, as it does in Acts 26.25. For these reasons, I hold that Paul’s use of ἐξίστημι in 2 Cor. 5.13 does not refer to ecstatic experiences.
A second group of scholars interprets the opposing terms in 5.13 as though Paul were speaking of a type of social abnormality such as megalomania, dramatic boasting or eccentric conduct. 7 For the proponents of this position, Paul’s outward behavior and outlandish propositions were being questioned by his detractors. He was acting strangely towards the congregation; he was making radical claims about his apostleship and gifts. This position construes the accusation against Paul as if his opponents were saying, ‘Paul is insane! His claims are outrageous and his behavior is erratic!’ Thus, Paul was responding by saying, ‘If I have acted like a lunatic, it was for God (or “on God’s behalf” or “before God”)’. Johannes Weiss writes, ‘He had lost control of himself, he had acted like a madman, said his opponents, without having had either the power or the intelligence to overcome his enemies’ (1959: I, 343). For Weiss, this episode occurred when Paul attempted to confront the Corinthians and especially the ‘puffed up ones’ whom Paul had mentioned in 1 Cor. 4.18. During this incident, Paul goes ‘out of his mind’ in an emotional outburst at the Corinthians. The confrontation does not, however, achieve its intended goals. With ‘feeble words and the loss of personal dignity, he abandoned the field. He had suffered a grievous humiliation, a heavy defeat’ (Weiss 1959: I, 343; cf. 2 Cor. 12.21). According to Weiss, Paul’s erratic behavior and lack of self-control were contributing factors to his public chastisement at Corinth.
Following Weiss, Frederick Danker also defended the theory that Paul was referring to his overly dramatic expressions of emotions in 2 Cor. 5.13: ‘Paul’s emotionalism appeared to tip in the direction of imbalance and fanaticism, and to some who did not share his enthusiasm he appeared to parade like a rooster in a barnyard manor’ (1989: 78). While Position 1 maintains that Paul’s opponents were accusing him of too little display of ecstasy and enthusiasm, Position 2 argues that his opponents were accusing him of too much emotional display. In his essay on ἐξίστημι, Albrecht Oepke also argues for this position. ‘So far as we can gather from 1 C. 12–14, the charge that Paul was out of his mind could hardly arise out of his ecstatic experiences—this is also refuted by v. 12. It is probably to be explained in terms of a supposedly “eccentric” assertion of apostolic authority’ (1999: 460). Unfortunately, Oepke does not provide any further details concerning what Paul’s eccentric assertion of authority might look like, although he does refer to Windisch as explaining ‘eccentricity’ in terms of ‘a self-seeking and boastful assertion of such special advantages [as tongues or visions]’ (1999: 460; cf. Windisch 1924: 179). Additionally, Alfred Plummer suggests that ἐξίστημι could refer to mental illness, erratic self-aggrandizement or the overly impassioned ‘Letter of Tears’ (1915: 171-73). 8 Position 2, then, encompasses a vast array of theories suggesting that Paul was engaged in some type of socially abnormal behavior.
In response to Position 2, it is difficult to explain what it would mean for Paul to revel in the fact that he is behaving erratically for God (θεῷ), or acting like a lunatic θεῷ, unless he were doing so in a moment of religious ecstasy. Would Paul be able to say that an (angry?) emotional outburst, or an arrogant assertion of authority, was ‘for God’? I think not. One would need to appeal to ecstasy in order to justify such an outburst. Since we have already ruled out the ecstasy option, we should do the same with Position 2. The argument that 2 Cor. 5.13 is referring to the fact that the Corinthians have forced Paul to boast of himself is a slightly better option than the ‘erratic behavior’ option, but it remains unsatisfactory. For example, Paul says in 2 Cor. 11.23, ‘Are they ministers of Christ? I am talking like a madman—I am a better one’. Here Paul suggests that boasting of his apostolic superiority is a type of insanity. However, ἐξίστημι is never used in this section. Instead, Paul uses the word παραφρονέω, ‘to be irrational, to be beside oneself’ (Bauer 2000: 772). Regarding his ‘insane’ boasting in 2 Cor. 11, Paul states: ‘What I am saying in regard to this boastful confidence, I am saying not with the Lord’s authority (or “in accordance with the Lord”, κατὰ κύριον), but as a fool’ (11.17). Paul evidently does not believe that his foolish boasting is θεῷ (‘for God’, or ‘on God’s behalf’), but is a concession for the sake of the Corinthians. Therefore, ἐξίστημι in 2 Cor. 5.13 cannot be synonymous with παραφρονέω, since the former is done θεῷ, but the latter is specifically not done θεῷ. As a further argument against Position 2, it seems that the Corinthians would have welcomed a strong and eccentric outward display from Paul, since his opponents at Corinth were boasting proudly of their own apostolic abilities (cf. 2 Cor. 5.12). 9 Instead, Paul’s opponents specifically accuse him of having a ‘weak’ bodily presence and a ‘contemptible’ manner of speech. The image of a weak, bumbling speaker does not fit the characterization of Paul as an arrogant, eccentric and boastful personality, which Position 2 attempts to convey. This position, then, does not adequately make sense of the derogatory statements about Paul’s weakness and poor rhetoric in 2 Cor. 10.10.
A third view regarding the interpretation of 2 Cor. 5.13 seeks to draw parallels with a particular set of technical terms which were used in the Greco-Roman realms of rhetoric and rhetorical training, a subject with which Paul was quite familiar.
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This view sees ἐξίστημι and σωφρονέω as referring neither to ecstatic experience (Position 1) nor erratic behavior (Position 2). Rather, proponents of this third view attempt to interpret these two terms as rhetorical terminology with specific meanings in the context of persuasive speech. Peter Marshall reasons that Paul’s opponents accused him of being uneducated or ignorant because of his lack of rhetorical ability (1987: 329). This point is strengthened by the fact that the only direct quotation we have of Paul’s adversaries is one of derision of Paul’s speaking ability: ‘For they say, “His letters are weighty and strong, but his bodily presence is weak, and his speech contemptible”’ (2 Cor. 10.10). Moreover, Paul introduces the pericope in 2 Cor. 5.11 by using the word πείθομεν, ‘we persuade’. Marshall asserts, ‘The term peithein is synonymous with rhetoric’ (1987: 331). Regarding the pair of antithetical terms in 5.13, Marshall writes, Sōphronein applied to the intellectual and ethical qualities of the speaker which enable him to avoid excess and follow the precepts relating to rhythm, choice of words, metaphor, figures, and so on. It is possible then that [with ἐξίστημι] we have further insight into Paul’s rhetorical style of speech. Passionate, excessive, impulsive, intense, unrestrained by custom and precedent, undisciplined by study and practice. By comparison, his rivals, who were most likely rhetorically trained, were characterized by praiseworthy restrain and showed due deference to rhetorical convention (1987: 332).
The opposing Greek terms, then, are not referring to ecstatic experiences or erratic behavior, but to accusations of Paul’s rhetorical deficiency. ‘Paul appears to be responding to invective … There can be no doubt that invective of this kind could follow on from a more specific charge of being unskilled in rhetoric’ (Marshall 1987: 331). While Paul is categorized as untrained and unrestrained in his style of speech, ‘his enemies are characterized by σωφροσύνη and other allied virtues’ (1987: 331).
Following Marshall and his utilization of Helen North’s study on the usages of σωφροσύνη (1948: 1-17), Moyer Hubbard notes that this term was deemed to denote an essential quality of a good orator by rhetoricians such as Dionysius, Demetrius, Maximus of Tyre, Aristides, Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus (1998: 59). ‘North’s work indicates that the σώφρων style so highly regarded in an orator refers to “moderation, good taste, and avoidance of excess”’ (1998: 59). Hubbard mostly agrees with Marshall’s assessment of North’s work and its bearing on 2 Cor. 5.13, but remains slightly hesitant to adopt Marshall’s confidence on the matter. ‘Marshall may be more precise than the evidence allows, but if the connection between σωφροσύνη, oratorical style, and 2 Cor. 5.13 is correct, he is probably heading in the right direction’ (1998: 59). Hubbard’s analysis also relies on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in which Aristotle warns his students of a style of speech in which the overuse of meter would fail to persuade (ἀπίθανον) and would be confusing (ἐξίστημι) to the audience (1998: 59; cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1408B). Aristotle, likewise, uses ἐξίστημι to describe an orator who ‘wanders from his subject’ and thus becomes distracting or bemuddled (Hubbard 1998: 60; cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1418A). ‘Taking North’s definitions of σωφρονέω as “fitness and propriety in speech and action”, [ἐξίστημι] would seem to make a suitable antithesis to this verb. The deficiency of this style is evidenced in its inability to persuade’ (Hubbard 1998: 60). For Hubbard, then, Paul, in 2 Cor. 5.13, is saying: ‘If, as some of you complain, my speech was unpolished and excessive, credit that to God’s account; if I am presently reasonable and lucid, credit that to yours’ (1998: 61). Hubbard concludes that 5.13 makes the most sense when understood as Paul’s response to accusations of poor rhetorical skills.
I find Position 3 to be the most helpful interpretation of this difficult verse. It makes the best sense of the antithetical pair ἐξίστημι and σωφρονέω within its context in 2 Cor. 5, without importing Paul’s ecstasy, which is not in view anywhere in 2 Cor. 2.4–7.4. Moreover, the evidence is lacking that Paul acted in a socially erratic manner in Corinth, or that he was involved in an arrogant bout of boasting before the Corinthians. Similarly, it is difficult to explain how Paul’s erratic behavior or megalomania would have been conducted θεῷ. Position 3, though, takes into account the rhetorical context of the antithetical terms. The impact of trained rhetoricians on the ancient city of Corinth has been well documented. 11 Paul’s interactions with the Corinthian church must have been affected by the looming cultural significance of his rhetorical ability, or lack thereof. Position 3 uniquely synthesizes the only direct quotation we have from Paul’s rivals at Corinth (2 Cor. 10.10) with Paul’s statement in 2 Cor. 5.13. It is for these reasons that I wish to pursue an exploration of Position 3 and attempt to illuminate further the rhetorical effect of the oppositional terms in 5.13.
The Rhetorical Context of ἐξίστημι and σωφρονέω/σωφροσύνη
Marshall and Hubbard both discuss many of the usages of ἐξίστημι and σωφρονέω/σωφροσύνη in rhetorical contexts from the classical period up to the second century ce. I need not repeat all of their findings here. Instead, I would like to highlight a different aspect on which neither author spends much, if any, time. In light of the way ancient rhetoricians such as Dio Chrysostom, Aristides, Isocrates, Cicero and Aristotle use these two antithetical terms, I argue that our pair of terms in 2 Cor. 5.13 invokes not only a distinction between a good speaker and a poor speaker, but also provides a commentary on the ancient understanding of a good leader (such as the leader of a city). Thus, in surveying the literature listed above, I will attempt to establish that Paul’s detractors accused him not only of deficient rhetoric, but also of faulty leadership qualities, lack of intelligence, and flawed character.
ἐξίστημι and Leadership Qualities
As far back as the fourth century bce, Isocrates connected ἐξίστημι and σωφροσύνη with ideas of leadership skills. In his Panathenaicus, Isocrates describes how his ancestors proved themselves to be a great people because of their self-control and sound judgment. He states, ‘[Our ancestors] did not betray [ἐξίστημι] themselves in the process, avoiding those … who become arrogant [and] lose their good senses … they kept to the character they always had by governing their city well … and they were admired by others for their strength of character and prudent wisdom [σωφροσύνη]’ (Isocrates, Panathenaicus 196, trans. Papillon 2004). His forefathers were adept at war, sober-minded and were not carried away by wealth, reputation or hubris. The ancestors did not ‘lose’ themselves or ‘betray’ themselves in the process of becoming powerful. Those who previously did ‘betray themselves’ also apparently lost their ability to discern properly, which ruined their adeptness for governing the city (Panathenaicus 196). The necessity of having leaders with sound, virtuous characteristics was vital for Isocrates’ vision for the greatness of Greece. In this speech, ‘Isocrates repeats his lifelong desire that the Greeks make a unified campaign against the Persians under strong leadership. Notions of who the leader should be changed over the years for Isocrates because of changing political circumstances, but the basic idea lasted throughout his life’ (Papillon 2004: 168). The leaders who were able to practice σωφροσύνη were victorious over their opponents and retained their governing positions over the state. By not succumbing to ἐξίστημι, the ancestors were able to ‘keep their character’ and model the qualities that make for a good leader.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus relates this Greek term to failed leadership in his story of the Horatii triplets, who fought against their cousins, the Curiatii. Horatius Publius, one of the triplets, slew his cousins and was the sole survivor among his brothers. When Horatius came home from battle, his sister, who had been secretly engaged to one of the Curiatii cousins, rebuked Horatius for his savagery. Dionysius relates the account: After she had bewailed the death of her betrothed she stared with fixed gaze at her brother and said … ‘You are not even touched with pity for your slain kinsmen, whom you were wont to call your brothers, but instead, as if you had performed some noble deed, you are beside yourself (ἐξίστημι) with joy and wear garlands in honor of such calamities. Of what wild beast, then, have you the heart?’ (Roman Antiquities 3.21.5).
Horatius rejects this depiction of himself and responds, ‘The heart of a citizen who loves his country and punishes those who wish her ill, whether they happen to be foreigners or his own people’ (Roman Antiquities 3.21.6). Horatius’s sister accused him of ἐξίστημι, being carried away with emotions. She accused him of being a dishonorable leader. Horatius, however, suggests that he has done exactly what a good leader should have done in his situation. He has saved his country and garnered victory for his family. Far from practicing ἐξίστημι, Horatius argues that he has acted nobly as one who loves his country. The term ἐξίστημι, here, is put in opposition to virtuous leadership.
Closer to the time of Paul, Dio Chrysostom associated ἐξίστημι with being ἀσθενής, ‘weak’, which is the same word that Paul’s opponents use when referring to his bodily presence in 2 Cor. 10.10. Dio writes, ‘To the disenfranchised, life seems with good reason not worth living … if one were so weak (ἀσθενής) that, in the case that someone should revile him, he would immediately lose his senses (ἐξίστημι), life for such a one would surely be a thing to shun’ (66.15-16). For Dio, weakness and the lack of mental fortitude go hand in hand. Weakness not only corresponds to a deficient bodily condition or persona, but to weak mental capabilities and weak mental strength. The connection with the Pauline corpus is intriguing. Paul seems to glory in the very thing that Dio says should cause a person to give up on life—weakness. ‘I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses (ἀσθενείᾳ), so that the power of Christ may dwell in me’ (2 Cor. 12.9). In Paul’s case, Dio’s hypothetical situation is becoming a reality. Paul is being reviled. He is being called ‘weak’. His rhetorical and mental capabilities are being questioned. What follows in the case of Dio is the conclusion that such a one has no reason left to live. Yet for Paul, these accusations only serve to fan the flame of his passion for living and spreading the message of the gospel.
Moreover, in Dio’s situation, ἀσθενής and ἐξίστημι are linked to the disenfranchised life, with those who have lost their citizenship in the polis. ‘Many choose death rather than life after losing their citizenship, for whoever so desires is free to strike them and there exists no private means of punishing him who treats them with contempt’ (66.15). The one who is stripped of his citizenship becomes weak and feeble-minded (ἐξίστημι) and lacks protection from anyone who wishes to assault him physically or verbally. Those who are associated with terms like ἀσθενής and ἐξίστημι are even worse than slaves: ‘The slave who is unrestrained and given to jesting, if his master catches him at it, is often made to smart for it; but the person who is subservient to public opinion is humbled by anyone at all with a single word’ (66.16). 12 Slaves, according to Dio, need only fear punishment from their master, but those who enter public office and exhibit physical and mental weakness can be derided and punished by the whole city. Dio continues his description of the ineffective leader by explaining that when you insult a man ‘who plumes himself on his temperance (σωφροσύνη) and who has enrolled under the banner of virtue, you have ruined him completely’ (66.21). Paul’s opponents have questioned his σωφροσύνη and have indeed tried to ruin him. For Dio, anyone who manifests the types of deficiencies that are suggested by the word ἐξίστημι would be disqualified from holding an authoritative position in the city. These examples in Dio Chrysostom’s writings, then, support the thesis that ἐξίστημι is used to describe a person with poor leadership qualities.
Longinus (or Pseudo-Longinus), writing sometime between the first and third centuries ce, uses ἐξίστημι to describe the poor rhetorical style of those who are associated with weakness. He writes, ‘All who aim at elevation [in speech] are so anxious to escape the reproach of being weak (ἀσθενείας) and dry that they are carried, as by some strange law of nature, into the opposite extreme’ (On the Sublime 3.3). The ‘weak’ speaker overcompensates and, in his exaggerated style, becomes distracting to the audience. Longinus castigates this type of defective rhetoric as ‘puerile’ (3.4). In his unpolished manner, the weak speaker demonstrates his lack of rhetorical training. He is as effective as a babbling child. Even worse, Longinus compares this type of speaker to someone who has ‘dropsy’ (3.4). Moreover, Longinus characterizes the weak speaker as one who demonstrates ‘unreasonable and empty passion … where moderation is needed’ (3.5). They lack the discipline and self-control to moderate the passions in their speech. ‘They are beside themselves (ἐξίστημι), while their hearers are not’ (3.5). The person who exhibits ἐξίστημι in their speech is weak, unreasonable, childish and is associated with the mentally or physically challenged. Whereas a successful leader was expected to be an effective communicator, Longinus associates the weak speaker with displaying an ‘utterly low and base and in real truth the most ignoble vice of style’ (3.4).
A further example regarding ἐξίστημι and effective leadership can be found in the writings of Plutarch. In his biography of Phocion, a successful Athenian politician and statesman in the fifth century bce, Plutarch introduces Phocion by claiming that he was a highly virtuous man, yet the misfortunes of Greece had obstructed this man’s exemplary character from shining forth. ‘But the fame of Phocion’s virtue, which may be said to have found an antagonist in a grievous and violent time, the fortunes of Greece rendered obscure and dim’ (Plutarch, Phocion 1.2). Plutarch wants to be certain that his readers understand that a person’s misfortune does not necessarily equate to any deficiency within themselves. ‘We must not follow Sophocles in making virtue weak [ἀσθενής], as when he says: “Indeed, O King, whatever reason [or ‘intellect’, νοῦς] nature has given a person, does not remain with the unfortunate, but goes astray [ἐξίστημι]”’ (Phocion, 1.3). For Plutarch, the renown of Phocion’s virtue deserves to be expressed, even though he was the victim of Fortune’s disapproval. Plutarch here quotes Sophocles’ Antigone, in which Antigone’s sister Ismene repeatedly exclaims that she cannot go on living if Antigone is put to death (Antigone 563). Ismene volunteers herself for execution alongside Antigone and places herself in the category of the ‘unfortunate’. These are the ones whose mind and intellect have ‘gone astray’ because of their dire circumstances. Plutarch balks at Sophocles’ supposition that those who are unfortunate lack mental fortitude, and proceeds to extol the virtues of Phocion in spite of his misfortune. In these texts from Plutarch and Sophocles ἐξίστημι is again intertwined with common conceptions concerning the mental state of the misfortunate and the lowly. Those who are not blessed to have Fortune smile upon them are the ones whose reasoning abilities go astray. In contrast, the fortunate ones (the high born, good-looking, virtuous people) are those whose mental abilities should be exalted and praised. This is in keeping with ancient correlations between physical beauty and virtue, on the one hand, and unattractiveness and lack of virtue, on the other. 13 These examples of the way that ἐξίστημι was used in relation to lower-status people in antiquity will aid our explanation of the accusations directed against Paul by his opponents at Corinth.
σωφρονέω/σωφροσύνη and Leadership Qualities
Unsurprisingly, ἐξίστημι is not the only word in our oppositional pair in 2 Cor. 5.13 that is used in a context of leadership ability and virtuous character. In fact, Aristotle lists σωφροσύνη as one of the cardinal virtues (Rhetoric 1.9.9; cf. Plato, Republic 427D). The word σωφροσύνη can mean many things, but normally has the connotation of ‘sound mind, moderation, self-control, sanity, and temperance’ (Bauer 2000: 987). Helen North notes that σωφροσύνη was used to describe a type of rhetorical speech that avoided excessive passion and was therefore characterized as moderate or temperate speech (1948: 10-12; cf. Marshall 1987: 131). Hubbard states, ‘What is important is that σωφροσύνη was deemed to be an essential quality of a good orator’ (1998: 59). Furthermore, the Greek concept of σωφροσύνη influenced Roman orators like Cicero, who states, [V]irtue is a habit of the mind, consistent with nature, and moderation, and reason … It has then four divisions—prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance [temperantiam, which is a Latin translation for σωφροσύνη] … Temperance is the form and well-regulated dominion of reason over lust and other improper affections of the mind (De Inventione 2.159).
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Cicero links the concept of temperatia with virtuous character and proper reasoning skills. Therefore, contra the use of ἐξίστημι that we have noted above, σωφροσύνη and its cognates are often associated with terms that convey a stable mental capacity, along with an adeptness for sound decision-making.
Several ancient Greek authors describe the pivotal role that σωφροσύνη plays in the effectiveness of civic leaders. In the passage quoted above from Isocrates’ Panathenaicus, the leaders of the city were said to have been admired for their σωφροσύνη even more than the courage they displayed in battle (Panathenaicus 197). It is interesting that Isocrates elevates σωφροσύνη above ἀνδρεῖος (courage) here. The exact opposite is true in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. After listing nine aspects of virtue, including σωφροσύνη, he remarks that justice and courage (ἀνδρεῖος) are the most esteemed since the former is useful in times of peace and the latter useful in times of war (Rhetoric 1.9.6). The passage in Isocrates, however, views σωφροσύνη as more praiseworthy, and thus of greater value for civic leaders. Furthermore, Isocrates sets up those who have σωφροσύνη against those who are of low status and inferior education when he says in the same passage, ‘base men have no share in a spirit that is adept … for this belongs only to those who are nobly born and raised and educated well, as were those who governed our city’ (Panathenaicus 198). The civic leaders are high born, educated, well-spoken and self-controlled (σωφροσύνη), whereas those who lack such traits fall into the deplorable category of ἐξίστημι (going astray).
In On Style, Demetrius (or Pseudo-Demetrius) ridicules those who confuse the rhetorical techniques of charm and humor. In charming speeches, one should evoke poetic imagery and employ beautiful and vivid language. The words of the charming speech should serve to ornament and adorn their subject (164). However, humor is more effective if one uses common and ordinary words, couched in terms of prose rather than poetry (167). As for those who would mix the two styles, Demetrius writes, ‘Graces of style must be employed with discretion (σωφροσύνη). To utter a mere jest ornately is like beautifying an ape’ (165). Those who lack σωφροσύνη in their speech are like bumbling fools who try to put dresses and makeup on wild animals. Demetrius goes on to explain that any man of ‘sound judgment’ would not make such mistakes that are ‘sadly out of place’ in the realm of proper rhetorical education (188). Even the buffoon knows how to use language properly to achieve his desired goal of laughter (168). Those who fail to practice σωφροσύνη, then, are worse than buffoons.
The writings of Dio Chrysostom also provide insights into the way σωφροσύνη was embedded into the language of leadership. In Oration 3 Dio makes this statement: [The leader] looks to his prudence alone, and that man becomes the savior and protector of men everywhere … for when a man governs and holds sway over all mankind … his temperance [σωφροσύνη] serves to restrain even the intemperate … his courage is able, not only to save the less valiant, but even to fire them with greater courage’ (3.7).
For Dio, then, the one who leads must be a person who is prudent, temperate and courageous. A good leader is someone people should want to imitate. The virtuous character of the leader should instill a desire in the followers to pursue the same virtues. On the other hand, the counterpart to the leader who practices σωφροσύνη is the man characterized as being ἀσθενής (weak). Dio writes: For he who cannot check a fit of anger, which is often caused by mere trifles; who cannot conquer a lust for the basest things; who cannot thrust pain aside, imaginary as it often is; who cannot endure toil, even to gain pleasure; who cannot drive fear from his soul, though it avails naught in the midst of alarms but works the greatest mischief—must not such a man be greatly lacking in strength, be weaker than a woman, weaker than a eunuch? Or do you call that man strong who is weaker than the softest of things? (3.34).
A man overcome with such weakness ‘cannot help himself, let alone others, nor call to his aid anyone willing to fight in his defense’ (3.35). For Dio, then, the person labeled ἀσθενής is disqualified from holding any civic leadership position. One manifests the traits of an effective leader, not by cultivating weakness, but by fostering temperance, courage, and wisdom. It is through these characteristics that such a person is qualified to lead a city; and it is these virtues that Paul’s rivals have accused him of lacking.
Moreover, in Oration 33 Dio describes what makes a city healthy and beloved by the gods. He states, ‘It is not a river or plain or harbor that makes a city prosperous, nor quantity of riches or multitude of houses or treasuries of gold … instead it is sobriety [σωφροσύνη] and common sense [νοῦς] that save. These make men blessed; these make men dear to the gods’ (33.28). The city is made beautiful by people who practice σωφροσύνη and who are able to make good use of their mind (νοῦς). Those who embody such traits are assets to their city and bring the good favor of the gods upon the polis. Dionysius makes a similar statement in his Roman Antiquities, ‘It is other things that preserve cities and make them great … [namely] unanimity among the citizens, [which] could be most effectively achieved for the commonwealth by the prudent (σώφρονα) and just (δίκαιον) life of each citizen’ (2.3.4). By denying that Paul possessed such characteristics as prudence, sober-mindedness, and bodily strength, his opponents in Corinth have insinuated that he is defective in his νοῦς and insufficient as an apostle. In short, Paul’s opponents think he is an unqualified and unappealing leader. As we examine the context of 2 Cor. 5.13, we will see how Paul uses these accusations against him as an opportunity to instruct the Corinthians.
Literary Context of 2 Cor. 5.13
The compositional structure of 2 Corinthians has received no small amount of discussion by scholars in the last two centuries. A majority of commentators view 2 Corinthians as a composite work, though there are disagreements as to where to separate the text and also regarding the chronological order of the various parts (Thrall 1994: I, 3-49). 15 The verse we have been considering in this article is located in the larger section of 2.4–6.13, 7.2-4. 16 These chapters are generally regarded as an apology for Paul’s legitimacy as an apostle. 17 In this section of the letter, ‘the self-respect of the insulted Apostle, rooted in his confidence in God, rises against suspicion and calumny; hence the constant self-defence, self-praise, self commendation’ (Weiss 1959: I, 349). Similarly Bultmann states: ‘In 5.11 to 6.10 Paul abides consistently by the theme of the apostolic office … In 5.11 the theme of apostolic trust is actually resumed, indeed without express formulation, but in such a way that verses 11f. give clear expression to this trust’ (1985: 145). Indeed, the apologetic nature of 2.14–6.13, 7.2-4 can be seen from the opening verses of this section: ‘For we are not peddlers of God’s word like so many; but in Christ we speak as persons of sincerity, as persons sent from God and standing in his presence’ (2.17).
Paul’s statement in 2.17 sets up the argument of this entire unit. In defense of his apostolic legitimacy, Paul will continue to revisit the theme of his alleged faulty character which would disqualify him from holding a leadership position. George A. Kennedy argues that this verse serves to provide three headings which Paul will further explain: ‘(A) as men of sincerity, (B) as commissioned by God, (C) in the sight of God we speak in Christ’ (2.17)’ (1984: 88). As a person of sincerity, Paul is not like other itinerant preachers of his day, who are peddling their message for profit. 18 Paul’s qualifications are not based on letters of recommendation, which his opponents proudly brandish (3.1-3). The Corinthians themselves are Paul’s letter, written by the Spirit of God. Thus his legitimacy is not linked to any human authority, but is endowed by God’s own Spirit. Paul freely admits that he is not competent in and of himself: ‘Not that we are competent of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence is from God’ (3.5). His leadership qualities may be lacking, but his authority comes from God.
Paul continues to defend his character in 4.2: ‘We refuse to practice cunning or to falsify God’s word’. Paul rejects the claim that he is involved in any kind of deceptive rhetoric. Lampe argues that the Corinthians would have known the difference between sophistic rhetoric and the rhetoric of Paul: ‘Ancient readers would have understood Paul’s attitude. They were aware of the difference between the rhetoric of the sophists, on the one hand, and the Platonic and Aristotelian rhetoric, on the other’ (2010: 18). Many sophists denied that anything resembling ‘truth’ could be discovered through debate. For them, ‘only subjective opinions standing side by side existed, and whoever was able to pump a weak position into a strong one was the better orator’ (Lampe 2010: 18). While Paul does not take such a ‘radically skeptical’ view of argumentation, he does appropriate the principle of transforming a weak argument into a sound one. He accomplishes this through appeals to the weakness of Christ (2010: 18). Paul is ‘always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be made visible in our bodies’ (2 Cor. 4.10). The crucifixion of Christ, while moronic to Greeks and a stumbling block to many Jews, is, for Paul, the power and wisdom of God. ‘God’s weakness is stronger than human strength’ (1 Cor. 1.25).
Moreover, embracing one’s weaknesses as a means of gaining ground in an argument is part of the Platonic rhetorical tradition. As in the Socratic dialogues, Paul’s apologetic discourses in the Corinthian correspondence display an inclination towards self-parody, as has been noticed by Hans Dieter Betz, Dieter Georgi and Larry L. Welborn. 19 In Gorgias, especially, ‘Socrates resorts to self-parody, seeming to revel in the foolishness and vulgarity of his language, and the discomfort it causes his aristocratic companions … the point of Socrates’ self-parody, as it is of Paul’s, is to call into question what is vulgar and what is noble, what is ridiculous and what is serious’ (Welborn 2005: 99). With Paul’s admission of having been ‘beside myself’ (ἐξίστημι), which I argue is referring to an accusation of deficiencies in the characteristics that qualify one for leadership, Paul acknowledges his own weakness and uses that to his advantage. ‘Paul follows a Socratic precedent in making himself and his manner of speaking the object of parody’ (Welborn 2005: 99). Paul’s acceptance of his own weakness allows him to destabilize the categories of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’, thus forcing his opponents and the Corinthian church to reevaluate their definitions of these terms. Betz argues that Paul’s self-parody serves not only to expose his opponents, but above all, as all rhetoric, to persuade his audience (1972: 84). This line of argumentation comes to a climax in the ‘Fool’s Speech’ of chs. 10–13 when Paul states: ‘Therefore I am well content with weaknesses, with insults, with distresses, with persecutions, with difficulties, for Christ’s sake; for when I am weak, then I am strong’ (2 Cor. 12.10). Betz notes that ‘weakness’ is suddenly no longer something that is only negative, but is transfigured into a positive and immensely powerful concept (1972: 99). What is more, Paul’s identification with the weakness of Christ also associates Paul with the victory of Christ over death (1972: 99). Like Christ, Paul is ‘afflicted, but not crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but not destroyed’ (2 Cor. 4.8-9). Even death itself is transformed into life through the power of Christ (4.10-12). Paul’s weaknesses, then, only serve as a foil for the ultimate victory he proclaims through participation in Christ.
Since Paul is confident in his position before God (‘we ourselves are well known to God’) he now openly proclaims that he is writing in order to ‘persuade’ the Corinthians (5.11). 20 Paul’s apologetic rhetoric, as well as the biting critiques of his opponents, are on full display throughout chs. 5–6. ‘Paul believes that he can stand up to scrutiny and that he should be examined closely by the consciences of his audience. A rhetor expected the audience to judge him and his art’ (Witherington 1995: 393). As Paul attempts to persuade the Corinthians, he fully expects them to recognize his virtuous character and his God-given authority as an apostle. It is not Paul who should be boasting of himself; rather the Corinthians should be boasting in Paul. Paul’s opponents are those who ‘commend themselves’ (5.12), who ‘boast in outward appearances’ (5.12), who ‘live for themselves’ (5.15), who regard people ‘from a human point of view’ (5.16). In this attempt to distance himself from his rival apostles, Paul displays an ‘overtly derogatory intent’ in the ‘context of an exercise in rhetorical comparison’ (Welborn 2011: 218). Similarly, Bultmann states that ‘the polemical orientation to the reproach that Paul is a powerless, pitiful apostle is clear’ (1985: 146). Moreover, chs. 4–6 serve to explain how ‘in the very humility of the proclaimer, the power of ζωή [‘life’] at work in the proclamation is manifest’ (1985: 146). Therefore, the context of chs. 2–7 makes it clear that in this section Paul is responding to accusations of poor rhetorical ability, flawed character, and deficiency of leadership qualities.
Proposal for 2 Corinthians 5.13
We have established that the context of 2 Cor. 5.13 supports the thesis that Paul is engaged in defensive rhetoric against accusations of faulty leadership qualifications. We have also established that ἐξίστημι and σωφροσύνη were often used by ancient rhetors such as Isocrates and Dio Chrysostom in the context of civic leadership skills and virtuous integrity. If we employ Marshall and Hubbard’s idea that the two oppositional verbs in 2 Cor. 5.13 are not pointing to Paul’s ecstatic experiences, insanity or erratic behavior, but to Paul’s weakness in rhetorical ability, then I propose that Paul’s rivals have also accused him of lacking the expected characteristics of an ancient civic leader. The traits which Paul lacks are: powerful speech, noble birth, education, intelligence, temperance, courage and strength. This hypothesis makes sense in the logical framework of chs. 2–7 and is supported by the fact that the only explicit quotation from Paul’s opponents indicates that he is ‘weak’ in bodily presence and ‘contemptible’ in speech. I have shown that, in ancient rhetorical literature, both weakness in persona and contemptibility in speech are linked to poor leadership qualifications. In the interpretation of 5.13, then, we would see Paul as saying something like, ‘If I have lacked the qualities expected of a good leader it is for God’s benefit (God gets the glory); if I am now practicing the expected traits of a good leader it is for your benefit’. Thus, Paul argues that his weakness and contemptibility only serve to further the proclamation of the foolish message of the cross. His deficiencies allow the glory of God to shine forth all the more brightly. On the other hand, if Paul utilizes the rhetorical sophistication of a proper civic leader, it is not to aggrandize himself, but is for the benefit and edification of his congregation. Instead of dwelling on the painful accusations of his rivals, Paul, through self-parody, turns the insult on its head and makes his accusation of weakness a place of glorying in the power of God.
Conclusion
In this article, I have attempted to draw conclusions about accusations against Paul that relate to his alleged lack of sophisticated rhetoric and weakness of bodily presence. I have noted that Paul was accused not only of being a poor speaker, but also of all the connotations that go along with someone who is a weak orator. Paul has been derided as lacking intelligence, nobility, education and courage, that is, the things that make for a good leader in the ancient world. However, even while being accused of such deplorable traits, Paul seizes the opportunity to turn these insults into an occasion for taking the focus away from himself and instead giving honor to God. In this way, he attempts to establish himself as having a leadership quality that comes not from men, but from God.
Footnotes
1.
This essay is a revised and expanded version of a paper I presented in the Second Corinthians section at the Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting, 2012, in Chicago, IL.
2.
4.
Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 244A; Republic 331C; Philo, Cherubim 69.
5.
6.
See, for example, Lk. 8.56; Gen. 45.26; Isa. 33.3.
7.
9.
On this point, see Käsemann 1942: 37; Georgi 1986: 280-81;
: 407.
10.
This third view is put forward by Marshall 1987 and
. While adhering to Position 1, Windisch (1924: 178) suggests that our passage may reflect the debates between philosophers and sophists (rhetoricians), as noted by Hubbard 1998: 58.
11.
13.
For example, when explaining how to defame an opponent’s character in a debate, Cicero says, ‘Caricatures also provoke loud laughter: as a rule they are leveled against ugliness or some physical defect, and involve comparison with something a little unseemly’ (De Oratore 2.226).
14.
Cf. Plato’s list of four virtues in Republic 427D.
16.
On this point, see Weiss 1959: I, 349; Bornkamm 1961: 7-36; Georgi 1986: 335;
: 95-13
17.
See, for example, Bornkamm 1961: 22; Georgi 1986: 336;
: I, 188.
18.
Cf. Plato’s statement about wandering priests who peddle their services at the homes of the rich (Republic 364B-C).
19.
On this point, see Betz 1972: 82-83; Georgi 1991: 49-54;
: 194-206.
20.
On the rhetorical usages of πείθω (‘persuade’), see Buxton 1982; Bultmann 1985: 147; Marshall 1987: 331; Kennedy 1994: 12-13;
: 6.1-11.
