Trade unions and corporate campaigning in a global economy: The case of James Hardie

Abstract

This article analyses a campaign led by the Australian Council of Trade Unions, against James Hardie Industries Limited, concerning their responsibility and liability to fully fund asbestos compensation claims. Across the Anglo-American world, trade unions are faced with increasingly hostile legislative and political environments and a declining membership base. In addition, the globalization of capital increasingly allows for organizational mobility and reduced commitment to specific communities or workers. These factors can have a significant impact on union effectiveness, particularly due to their national focus. In response, the concepts of corporate campaigning and social movement unionism have increasingly been used by unions as a strategy to influence and contest corporate policy decisions. This high profile case illustrates the critical role that corporate campaigning can play in ensuring that the mobility of capital does not override justice in a global economy.

Keywords

globalization industrial conflict industrial relations organizational justice trade unions

Introduction

Social movement unionism research emerged in mainstream academic discourse in the 1960s, as a way of explaining the mobilization of individuals into movements as diverse as environmentalism, women’s rights and anti-war rallies (Doyle, 2001). The focus of social movement unionism is individuals with a sense of injustice, coalescing into social groups with a collective identity and leadership (Kelly, 1997). The emergence of social movement research in the context of unionism has developed as a response to the globalization of capital (Martin and Schumann, 1996). As several academics have argued (Benyon, 2003; Evans, 2000; Kelly, 1997), this refocusing of organized labour provides opportunities for traditional trade union activities to become broader in terms of their political perspective, while allowing for a greater understanding of the determinants and processes for collective action that the traditional literature does not address.

The fundamental element of social movement unionism for trade unions is a broad conceptualization of the corporation as an entity and social institution, integrated with society through its diverse and multiple stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Sadler, 2004a; Thompson et al., 1991). It is the ability of trade unions therefore to mobilize these interests against the corporation that provides the power base for effective corporate campaigning. The catalysts for union adoption of social activism strategies, particularly in Anglo-American countries, have included the ascendancy of neoliberal governments, a declining union base, broader social and environmental concerns and the globalization of capital, which have facilitated capital mobility and reduced commitment to specific communities or workers (Brown and Chang, 2004; Craypo, 1997; Greven and Russo, 2003). Thus, the refocusing and reconstitution of labour relations issues in terms of the broader perspective of corporate citizenship (Sadler, 2004b) have provided a new strategic approach to union-based campaigns against corporations, underpinned by social movement unionism, and particularly mobilization theory (Kelly, 1998). In a global economy, this can be seen as a way of negating the increasing power imbalance between labour and multinational/transnational corporations, and as a means to develop powerful coalitions.

Corporate campaigning, social movement unionism and mobilization theory

Corporate campaigning has developed as a popular activist strategy among unions as a means of anti-corporate protest, pursuing corporate accountability and challenging neoliberal hegemony, in the face of global capital mobility (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999; Frundt, 1996; Manheim, 1998, 2001, 2003; Sadler, 2004b; Sites, 2007; Yeates, 2002). In fact, the rise of resistance and opposition to and contestation with global corporations in a variety of social and political forms has rapidly become one of the most significant geopolitical forces of the early 21st century (Sadler, 2004a, 2004b; Wills, 2002; Yeates, 2002). As Wills (2002: 676) further notes, questions of economic inequality, corporate power and class have taken centre stage in political protests worldwide. Broader political and economic changes, including the development of the UN Global Compact, which includes principles that support human rights, trade unionism, anti-discriminatory practices and environmental protection, and the development of international framework agreements, have also been influential in heightening political protest (Wills, 2002). As a result, many transnational corporations are signatories to corporate codes of conduct, committing themselves to responsible management practice with regard to employment and labour standards, local communities and the environment in globalized industries (Sadler, 2004a; Wills, 2002: 677).

Due to political and consumer pressure, social and environmental responsibility have become ‘bottom line issues’, critical to the reputation of a company, the value of its brands, the attraction and retention of staff and its success in the marketplace (Wills, 2002: 676–7). New social movements are coalescing around questions of workers’ rights and employment conditions and environmental accountability in the global economy, prompting defensiveness from many employers (Sadler, 2004a, 2004b; Wills, 2002). Trade unions, as a result, can play a critical role in the emerging networks of global protest in the defence of working conditions (Wills, 2002). New models, including community unionism and social movement unionism, have evolved, alongside heightened relations between production and consumption (Sadler, 2004a).

One means by which unions and the international labour movement more broadly can participate in global protests that seek to secure and advance workers’ rights in the global economy (Wills, 2002) is through corporate campaigns. Corporate campaigns have emerged as one way to augment workplace strategies, by targeting the wide array of relationships on which capital depends, through engaging collaboratively with other interest groups to pressure management and undermine a company’s reputation (Anderson, 2009; Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009; Sadler, 2004a). Corporate campaigning may involve the deliberate targeting of one firm, or a number of firms, and seek to persuade the firm(s) to reconsider their position(s) over a range of issues, such as labour rights, working conditions and environmental issues (Sadler, 2004a). Corporate campaigns are an attempt by unions to influence the strategic business decisions of a firm by placing pressure on the firm’s top policy-makers (Kochan et al., 1986). More broadly, corporate campaigns can involve opposition to the dominance and power of multinational/ transnational corporations over national states and citizens (Sadler, 2004b: 853). Therefore, the nature and extent of corporate campaigning and activism can vary significantly (Juska, 2010). However, Wills (2002) argues that social actors have to develop a multi-scalar approach in order to tackle the challenges of globalization, since a distinctive feature of contemporary capitalism is its ability to operate on multiple scales.

From an industrial relations perspective, the term ‘corporate campaigning’ originates from the United States of America (USA) and can be traced to a dispute in 1976 between the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Union (ACTWU) and JP Stevens (Jarley and Maranto, 1990; Perry, 1996). However, traditions of union organizing around the activities of individual multinational corporations date back even earlier, to company councils established in the motor vehicle industry in the late 1960s, by the International Metalworkers Federation at Chrysler, Ford and General Motors (Sadler, 2004a: 38). Despite these traditions, corporate campaigning has received limited attention in the academic literature (Jarley and Maranto, 1990), particularly in Australia (see Rawling [2006] and Sadler [2004a] as exceptions). One reason for the dearth of academic literature on corporate campaigning may be attributable to the lack of consensus on the character of corporate campaigns (Jarley and Maranto, 1990). Academics define the term differently, identify a range of tactics that can be used and identify different determinants of success. Many of these definitions and tactics are specific to the legislative and institutional environment of a particular country; Jarley and Maranto (1990) for example distinguish three types of campaigns in the US: complements to traditional organizing drives; complements to strikes; and substitutes for strikes. In contrast, Rawling (2006) studied the case of unions as shareholder activists in Australia, as a means of extending labour political activism into corporate governance and strategy, in order to align employee and shareholder interests and pursue managerial and shareholder accountability. Shareholder activism in Australia is enabled through the use of a legal mechanism in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.), which allows unions to participate as shareholders in the general meetings of publicly listed companies.

Broad and Cavanagh (1999) however propose a more generic five-sided matrix that can be used to analyse the nature of corporate campaigns. The five dimensions include: strategic goals, target of the activity, method, the initiating actors and the geographical scope of the campaign. Strategic goals comprise three dimensions and relate to the motivation for the campaign (Manheim, 2003): campaigns that seek to fundamentally change the corporation or eradicate the corporation completely; campaigns that seek to change the rules that govern corporate behaviour; or campaigns that seek to reform abusive practices of individual corporations (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999). Campaigns focused on individual corporations may target one of a multitude of areas, including: the company’s business, structure, finances and resources, labour relations, environmental record, consumer protection record and/or human rights record (Manheim, 1998). The area(s) targeted will depend on an evaluation of the target corporation’s vulnerability/vulnerabilities, potential leverage, the opportunities available and the desired outcomes (Anderson, 2009; Manheim, 1998, 2003).

Perry (1987) and Greven and Russo (2003) also analyse the strategic goals of corporate campaigns, suggesting they have vertical and/or horizontal strategies. Vertical strategies focus on stakeholders, including shareholders, customers and corporate alliances; the organization’s public image; and any particular weakness in the organizational power structure; for example, government contracts or alliances. Horizontal strategies include coalition building with international unions or local community groups such as churches; and political activists (Greven and Russo, 2003; Perry, 1987). Manheim (1998) suggests that the strategic objectives of corporate campaigns can be classified on two dimensions: high vs low visibility and favourable vs unfavourable.

The target of the activity in corporate campaigns is the behaviour of the corporation(s), or the government, whereby the aim of the latter approach is to target and influence government policy as a means to subsequently influence corporations, particularly where a loophole in the law is perceived to exist (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999). Potential stakeholder targets in the firm include: employees, shareholders, the financial community, consumers, vendors, franchisees and the general public (Manheim, 1998). The method of the campaign refers to the instruments used to pursue corporate accountability, such as corporate codes of conduct or trade agreements. Additional methods include: direct workplace actions (e.g. picketing), legislative instruments and initiatives, publicizing ethical competitors (e.g. marketing ethical products), shareholder resolutions and actions, dialogue and actions intended to influence consumers (e.g. boycotts), building coalitions with other labour and non-labour groups, public relations strategies and appeals to regulatory agencies (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999; Jarley and Maranto, 1990; Kipling, 1998). Corporate campaigns often make aggressive use of the media as part of a public relations strategy (Jarley and Maranto, 1990; Kipling, 1998). The initiating actors are the groups involved in the campaign that join forces to oppose corporations, and may include non-governmental actors, trade unions, religious groups, investors and environmental groups (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999). The geographical scope of the campaign refers to the level at which it takes place: local, national, regional and/or international (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999).

Broad and Cavanagh (1999) suggest that corporate campaigns can be analysed using the above five dimensions to assess their effectiveness. The criteria that determine the effectiveness of corporate campaigns include: the degree of change in corporate behaviour; policy outcomes; the degree of change in public awareness and/or consumption patterns; the building of new coalitions; and the introduction of new actors into the corporate accountability movement (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999). Additional determinants of success identified in the literature include: a multifaceted approach (Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009); a strategic and effective communication strategy underpinned by a clear and simple narrative with the intent of publicly shaming a corporation (Manheim, 1998; Perry, 1987; Röttger, 2006, as cited in Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009); an employer’s sensitivity to adverse publicity (Perry, 1987); a union’s ability to escalate conflict beyond a simple labour dispute and elicit public support for union goals (Perry, 1987); an emphasis on financial ties and secondary pressures (Jarley and Maranto, 1990); and researching the company’s image (Jarley and Maranto, 1990).

Community unionism, social movement unionism and mobilization theory have increasingly become useful analytical frameworks for understanding the action-oriented set of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate labour and coalition building strategies, such as corporate campaigning (Gajewksa and Niesyto, 2009; Juska, 2010; Sadler, 2004a). Mobilization theory provides a framework or schemata of interpretation (Goffman, 1974) to analyse the inherent conflict between the interests of labour and capital from a macro perspective (Tilley, 1978). Kelly (1998), drawing on the work of Gamson (1992), Klandermans (1989), McAdam (1988) and Tilley (1978), takes this further, arguing that mobilization theory is a useful framework to analyse industrial conflict as it focuses on social processes and thus transcends the debate around union membership decline, bargaining structures and militancy; the traditional benchmarks for determining collective action. The focus for determining the basis of collective action is generally injustice, based upon the breach of widely shared social values (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005). When this sense of grievance is shared, Badigannavar and Kelly (2005) argue that the disadvantaged group (or coalition) is likely to feel their grievance is legitimate and are more likely to develop a group identity and cohesiveness, with a greater capacity to withstand counter-mobilization such as management indifference or pressure.

Tilley (1978) argues that there are five key components to collective action: interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity and action. Interest is the extent to which the group(s) (for example, employees) differ from the opposed group (management). Organization refers to the capacity of the group(s) (employees) to organize (for example, through unions) around an issue. Mobilization is the process by which the group/groups acquire collective control of the resources needed for action and the way in which the (coalition) participants transform into a collective voice. This is central to explaining the ability of groups to build an alliance of the aggrieved (Gall, 2003), and critical to the success of the campaign as groups such as employees need to perceive that there is a vehicle for redressing injustices through collective agency (McAdam, 1988). Opportunity focuses on the cost-benefits or opportunity for achieving a successful outcome (against management), or what Gall (2003) describes as ‘constructive attribution’, and the ability to maintain a unified position or ‘collective action frames’ (Klandermans, 1997) in the face of repression from the controlling group (management). Action is the outcome of the above factors and is determined by the balance between interest, organization, mobilization and opportunity, underpinned by a focus on agency from who the aggrieved group believe they can achieve restitution (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005; Tilley, 1978).

Mobilization theory provides a framework of interconnecting concepts that focus attention on a particular social issue, to interpret and analyse the processes underpinned by a sense of injustice (Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009; Kelly, 1998). This focus on injustice, as Edwards (2003) argues, is an important advancement in the theoretical development of industrial relations theory, as it addresses workers’ interpretations and perspectives. Research (Buttigeig et al., 2007; Cregan, 2005; Johnson and Jarley, 2004) has shown that social movement theory provides a platform for union revitalization as unions have the organizational capacity to lead social movements by mobilizing and organizing employees in campaigns for workplace justice, focused on workers with attributions (blame) directed to the employer, while also developing and maintaining group cohesion and identity (Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009; Heery et al., 2003; Hyman, 2001; Kelly, 1998). Folger and Cropanzano (1998) also argue that the issue must be manifestly indefensible, within the control of the employer to have taken alternate action and be liable for restitution, and of a magnitude to pursue collective action. Research reinforces the key role of union leadership (particularly transformational leadership) in the promotion of a sense of group injustice and in maintaining group solidarity through persuasion, influence and defending against counter-mobilization by employers (Darlington, 2001, 2002).

Gall (2003: 17) notes that while various aspects of mobilization theory have been debated, criticisms of ‘mobilization theory’ tend to focus on particular components without undermining the validity of the overall thesis (see Gall, 2000; Martin, 1999). Increasingly, theoretical and empirical research supports mobilization theory (Kelly, 1998), and it is noted that perceptions of injustice provide powerful predictors of workers’ behaviours (Bryne and Cropanzano, 2001; Buttigeig et al., 2007; Folger and Cropanzano, 1998).

Corporate campaigning in Australia

The Australian trade union movement has a long history of involvement in social issues dating back to the first decade of federation with legislation of a minimum ‘living wage’ in 1907 (which is still part of the system today). Corporate campaigning in Australia has its origins in what became known as the ‘Green Bans’ of the early 1970s. In response to often speculative commercial developments in the central business district of Sydney, the development of housing and the protection of culturally and architecturally significant buildings were largely overridden. In response, the New South Wales (NSW) Builders’ Labourers Union (BLF) initiated and led a campaign to stop further speculation on significant sites (Burgmann and Burgmann, 1998).

The BLF claimed the right to intervene in the decision-making process, to insist that ‘all work performed should be socially useful and of an ecologically benign nature’ (Munday, 1988, as cited in Burgmann, 2003). This altruism was despite the fact that this stance could potentially adversely affect BLF members’ employment. The first ban was on the last open bushland within Sydney. With no support from the local state political representatives, or the premier of NSW, the BLF, in coalition with local residents, proceeded to black ban the site and picket work. The builders, AV Jennings, initially attempted to continue with non-union labour. However, as Burgmann (2003: 170) notes:

. . . building workers on a Jennings office project in North Sydney sent a message to the company which said if you attempt to build on Kelly’s Bush, even if there is the loss of one tree, this half completed building will remain so forever, as a monument to Kelly’s Bush.

This had a sobering influence on Jennings, and alarmed property developers generally.

In line with the theme of ‘the common good’ which often underpins corporate campaigning Thomas (1973) reported on the NSW BLF leadership’s arguments for undertaking the campaign as follows:

In a modern society, the workers’ movements, in order to play a really meaningful role, must engage in all industrial, political, social and moral struggles affecting the working people as a whole. (cited in Burgmann, 2003: 169)

By 1974, 42 green bans had been initiated. However, with the political downfall of the NSW BLF leadership later that year, the green ban campaign collapsed. The campaign is credited with saving over 100 buildings considered worthy of preservation by the national trust, and being the catalyst for more stringent state and federal laws on protecting sites of special value (Burgmann, 2003). The ‘green’ political debates around the world have their origins in this campaign (Allaby, 1983; Burgmann, 2003).

Corporate campaigning as a strategy lay dormant in Australia over the next 20 years as the Labor Party gained power federally and forged a close alliance with the trade unions through the Prices and Incomes Accord. The ‘Accord’, as it became known, was a mechanism to negotiate terms and conditions in return for relative industrial harmony. During this period, union density declined by approximately 1 percent per annum from 50 percent in 1976, to less than 33 percent in 1994 (currently 18 percent; ABS, 2010). In 1996, the Howard conservative coalition government was elected with a more hostile agenda towards unions. During this period (1996–2007), unions rediscovered the corporate campaign and used the strategy across a variety of sectors and issues. One of the main issues to attract the focus of unions was the liability of organizations in respect of occupational health and safety (OHS) issues.

Mobilization around OHS issues is not however ‘new’ in Australia. In the period 1880–1920, union and community-based alliances on OHS-related matters were relatively common and influential. One example is the National Anti-Sweating League established in Melbourne in July 1895 which had several branches in regional Victoria (Lack, 2008). The league, concerned with the process of sweating, in which workers were exploited in manufacturing industries, aimed to ameliorate the worst features of the competitive system and had the support of trade unions (Lack, 2008). The league’s activism led to legislation which provided for the creation of a system of Wages Boards, constituted by equal numbers of employees and employers, with an independent chairman, to regulate hours of work and minimum wages for all workers (Lack, 2008). Success in regulating factory and workroom conditions eventually reduced the league to watchdog status, and it ceased active work in 1912. The league re-emerged in the midst of the depression in 1931, and expired totally in 1953 (Lack, 2008). In more recent times, there are notable cases of activism by parents and families who have lost children in industrial accidents, such as Fran Kavanagh who formed an advocates association in NSW in the 1990s. There are a myriad of OHS support and advocacy groups in the Australian states, including: the Workplace Tragedy Support Group, a support group and a campaign organization, which explicitly campaigns for improved OHS and workplace laws (www.workplacetragedy.com); and Industrial Deaths Support and Advocacy Inc., which assists people whose loved ones have died at work (www.idsa.com.au). Similar bodies exist in other Anglo-American economies, such as Threads of Life in Canada, which is designed to assist families affected by workplace fatalities, life-altering injuries and occupational disease (www.threadsoflife.ca) and United Support and Memorial Support for Workplace Fatalities in the USA.

It is the issue of OHS that prompted mobilization and the campaign against James Hardie Industries Limited (JHIL) in Australia, as a result of the company’s involvement in the manufacture of asbestos fibre board, which was subsequently linked to fatal forms of lung cancer. A significant manufacturer, JHIL relocated its head office internationally, and by default attempted to rid itself of its financial obligations and liabilities to victims of the disease.

The aim of this article is to utilize the concepts of corporate campaigning and mobilization theory to explore the high profile corporate campaign in Australia against JHIL, and in particular, the company’s attempts to evade responsibility for compensation payments to workers affected by asbestos-related diseases. The success of this campaign is also evaluated. Before outlining the methodology and analysing the corporate campaign against JHIL, a brief summary of the global asbestos industry is undertaken.

The asbestos industry – a dark history

The asbestos industry began in Italy in the mid-19th century. The combination of new discoveries in Canada, South Africa and the former Soviet Union and new markets and uses for asbestos saw the industry grow on a global scale. The advent of the Second World War initiated a boom period for the industry which continued after 1945. As McCulloch and Tweedale (2008: 19) comment: the industry’s peak coincided with the Golden Age of Capital (1945–72), and in that sense, asbestos was symbolic of modern industrialization and globalization.

From the 1930s, research evidence increasingly identified the link between asbestos and a variety of diseases including mesothelioma. Indeed, in 1943, the German government made asbestos-related lung cancer a compensatible disease. However, this evidence emerged in a period of unprecedented demand for asbestos. During this period, little improvement was made to the working conditions of those involved in its mining or manufacture, in the US, Canada, South Africa and Australia (Haigh, 2006; McCulloch and Tweedale, 2008; Peacock, 2009). This was largely due to the ability of the main players in the industry to negate litigation, regulation and public concern through a combination of strategies identified by McCulloch and Tweedale (2008) as:

Suppressing evidence of risk;

Intimidating medical researchers;

Interfering with research;

Generating favourable publicity; and

Concealment.

This approach proved highly effective until the 1970s, when overwhelming evidence, research and the uncovering of internal documents clearly linked the asbestos industry with a variety of cancers. Despite this, the industry has remained defiant in its avoidance of culpability, as the following case highlights. Indeed, the figurehead of the campaign in Australia, Mr Bernie Banton, had his medical records concealed from him during the time he worked for JHIL. The records clearly showed the damage that working with asbestos was doing to him (Peacock, 2009).

Methodology

The research was based on a qualitative case study approach. Such an approach is considered the most effective and comprehensive approach to analysing data from multiple sources, within the context of a diverse and complex natural setting (see Yin, 1994). In the context of industrial relations, the case study approach provides a framework with a set of internal dynamics to elicit an understanding of the anatomy of a campaign (Gall, 2003). Therefore, a case study methodology provided the platform to analyse the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) led corporate campaign against JHIL, through the lens of mobilization theory (Kelly, 1998). The case study is based on a thematic analysis (Creswell, 1994) of key documentary sources and takes the ACTU-led campaign as the unit of analysis. In doing so, we utilize the concept of framing analysis (Goffman, 1974) from social movement unionism and mobilization theory to investigate, in-depth, the nature, effects and the degree of success of the corporate campaign. Diverse secondary data sources were analysed and encompassed the period from 2004 to 2006. Sources included: ACTU and individual union publications, JHIL annual reports, newspaper articles, ACTU, union, government and JHIL press releases and documents, press conferences, internet postings, weblogs and websites.

The anatomy of the ACTU-led corporate campaign

Background

James Hardie was established in 1888 in Melbourne, Australia. A publicly owned company today, JHIL is a fibre-cement business operating in markets around the world, employing over 2500 people worldwide. Manufacturing operations are located in the USA, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Chile. In December 2001, shareholders voted to accept a unanimous recommendation by the board of JHIL to restructure the company and establish a new parent company in the Netherlands (James Hardie, 2005).

JHIL was Australia’s largest manufacturer of products containing asbestos until the mid-1980s. Evidence indicates that the company knew of the dangers of asbestos for 40 years before warnings were placed on products in 1978 (Peacock, 2009). A major driver of the introduction of warnings on products was community mobilization against the industry and James Hardie itself, in the mid to late 1970s (e.g. a radio series in 1977, an ABC documentary and the film Dust to Dust publicized the dangers of James Hardie’s asbestos empire) (Peacock, 2009). Australia had the highest per capita use of asbestos in the world from the 1950s to 1970s and has the world’s highest level of per capita deaths from exposure to asbestos (Planet Ark, 2004). Asbestosis and mesothelioma are forms of terminal cancer caused by exposure to asbestos fibres. It is estimated that 54,000 Australians will be affected by an asbestos-related illness by 2020, of which, 30,000 will die from asbestos-related cancer. Approximately 500 Australians contract the incurable disease each year. While JHIL is not alone in facing asbestos claims (e.g. BHP Billiton), it is estimated that JHIL is liable for compensation in as many as 76 percent of cases (ACTU, 2005g, 2005m; Prince et al., 2004). Compensation owing to asbestos victims of JHIL have been estimated to reach almost AUD$2 billion, yet the incidence of asbestosis is not expected to peak until after 2010 (ACTU, 2005e). Despite the dangers of asbestos, Australian trade unions and the ACTU were not successful in achieving a government ban on asbestos in all workplaces until 2005 (ACTU, 2005q).

This case study focuses on an international corporate campaign led by the ACTU to ensure that victims and their families received due compensation, following a corporate restructuring off-shore that resulted in the transfer of the company headquarters and assets worth more than AUD$1.9 billion from Australia to the Netherlands in October 2001 (James Hardie, 2005). This restructure subsequently highlighted a shortfall in compensation payouts for victims with limited pecuniary obligation or penalty. As such, the corporate restructure undertaken by JHIL was largely seen by trade unions and asbestos victims groups as a means to hide behind the ‘corporate veil’. In contrast, JHIL cited a better tax regime in the Netherlands as the rationale for the restructure. It is also important to note that the Netherlands is a country that Australia does not have a legal treaty with; meaning victims are unable to enforce compensation claims in a Netherlands court.

In February 2001, JHIL established the Medical Research Compensation Fund (MRCF) worth AUD$293 million in assets to fund compensation payouts to asbestos victims and their families (Prince et al., 2004). Shortly afterwards, an approval for a ‘Scheme of Arrangement’ by the NSW Supreme Court led to the establishment of JHIL’s new Netherlands-based parent company (James Hardie Industries NV). Despite assurances from solicitors representing JHIL that the arrangement would not prejudice Australian asbestos victims seeking compensation, in March 2003 the Netherlands-based JHIL company unilaterally cancelled the partly paid shares worth AUD$1.9 billion (set aside for compensation), without informing the court or the stock exchange; placing the assets and compensation payments out of victims’ reach (Prince et al., 2004). The Australian-based entities with liability for asbestos claims also indemnified the Netherlands parent company against any claims arising from, or connected with, past asbestos liabilities. As a result of these actions, the funds available to the MRCF to compensate victims were inadequate and expected to last only until 2008, with the shortfall to be exacerbated by the fact that claims were yet to peak and expected, at minimum, for a further 15 years beyond this date.

Building coalitions

As noted by Greven and Russo (2003), a critical issue in developing a corporate campaign is to build strong coalitions and alliances. Significantly, for the ACTU, the NSW state (Labor) government at the time initiated a public inquiry into the shortfall and relocation of JHIL. This alliance provided legal and political influence and a platform upon which to highlight the issue. The NSW government was also a significant customer of JHIL and therefore could exert financial pressure. A second partner in the coalition was the Asbestos Disease Foundation of Australia (ADFA). The foundation was established to provide support for victims of asbestos-related diseases. The foundation became the focal point of the media and public relations campaign, following the 2004 inquiry into the transfer of JHIL assets to the Netherlands. ADFA members attended all inquiries with their distinctive oxygen bottles and masks. Mr Bernie Banton, Acting President of the ADFA, was the face of the campaign. Mr Banton, who worked for JHIL, had asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease (ARPD) which required him to take oxygen wherever he went. This image became a distinctive visual feature and symbol framing the campaign. As Peacock (2009: 8) notes in his authoritative book on JHIL:

Banton took to television like duck to water. . . . By the end of our interview for the 7:30 Report, it was clear I didn’t need to include anyone else from the group. To use an industry phrase, he was ideal ‘talent’.

Banton soon became a media personality, appearing on talk-shows and current affair programmes pushing the case against JHIL. As Peacock (2009: 8) comments:

Hardie had spent millions on public relations over the years, smoothing away the country’s largest industrial disaster. Now Banton was out-spinning the spinners.

In the final weeks of his life in 2007, Banton campaigned for the availability of a new drug for victims and was attacked by the then Federal Health Minister Tony Abbott. The public reaction was so strong that Abbott was subsequently forced to apologize (Peacock, 2009). On his death bed, Bernie Banton was still giving media conferences. He passed away in November 2007 and was accorded a state funeral by the NSW government.

The Jackson Inquiry

With the public declaration in December 2003 by the MRCF that it faced a serious funding shortfall and would be unable to fund compensation payments for victims (Prince et al., 2004), the NSW Special Commission of Inquiry was established in February 2004 to investigate the under-funding by JHIL of its asbestos liabilities. David Jackson QC was appointed to investigate relationships between the funding shortfall and the international restructure (Prince et al., 2004).

The ACTU played a central role throughout the Jackson Inquiry. The ACTU and the MRCF, together with unions and asbestos support groups, put forward a joint submission to the Jackson Inquiry. The key points of this submission were: a refusal to support tort law proposals that reduced asbestos victims’ rights to compensation; a call for JHIL to provide unconditional funding to the MRCF to ensure the foundation remained solvent and continued to pay asbestos victims’ claims; support for the establishment of a JHIL Special Prosecutor to pursue JHIL for compensation; and agreement on a process for streamlining and reducing legal costs associated with claiming compensation payouts.

Focusing on a conciliatory approach, the then ACTU Secretary, Greg Combet, who led the campaign, continually called for negotiations between the coalition interest groups (unions, asbestos support groups, MRCF) and JHIL throughout the inquiry. The continued response of JHIL throughout the inquiry was a proposal that would allow the company to cap asbestos liabilities and limit payouts to victims and their families, through a statutory scheme limiting the rights of victims (ACTU, 2005i, 2005j). In an interesting show of support, the MRCF agreed to support the ACTU, unions and asbestos victims’ groups in their fight to oppose JHIL’s response. The ACTU’s next strategy was to focus on several profit announcements during the hearing which revealed that JHIL were more than capable of providing full compensation (ACTU, 2005j, 2005n). Attempts to evade asbestos liabilities by placing a cap on compensation payments were also portrayed by the alliance and the media negatively, often being described as ‘immoral’, ‘inequitable’, ‘unjust’ and ‘unethical’ (ACTU, 2005k). The use of human rights discourse (Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009) to suggest that the company’s actions represented a violation of human rights, was key to the motivational framing of the campaign and allowed the ACTU to gain the moral high ground in the media campaign (Brown and Chang, 2004). This communication strategy made it clear in the public domain that JHIL was capable in financial terms of paying compensation claims; and this message was subsequently supported by Commissioner Jackson’s findings.

The Jackson report, released in September 2004, concluded that JHIL had an obligation to meet asbestos liabilities which it had attempted to evade, and that the company and its senior executives had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct for which criminal charges could be laid (ACTU, 2005o; Carr et al., 2004). Charges were subsequently laid. The Jackson report identified a AUD$2 billion shortfall in the MRCF set up by JHIL to compensate victims: ‘[JHIL] still has in its pockets the profits made by dealing in asbestos, and those profits are large enough to satisfy most, perhaps all of the claims of victims of [JHIL] asbestos’ (cited in Carr et al., 2004).

In September 2004, unions and asbestos disease support groups welcomed the release of the final report. ACTU secretary Greg Combet commented:

Mr Jackson has clearly found that the purpose of the corporate restructuring undertaken by [JHIL] in 2001 was to remove the company from the ‘stigma’ of its asbestos liabilities. In doing so, he has made serious findings against company executives, particularly the Chief Executive Officer Peter MacDonald, who may face charges under the Corporations Act for misleading and deceptive conduct. (ACTU, 2005f)

Further public and legislative pressure from the ACTU on JHIL in September 2004 came after JHIL released a controversial letter to customers and suppliers, following the release of Jackson’s final report. In this letter, the company downplayed their role in the manufacture of asbestos-related products and their subsequent liability for victims’ compensation claims. The letter, which sought to defend the company, was a counter-attack against negative public opinion, community pressure and the consumer boycotts placed on JHIL. However, following threats of legal action by the ACTU, JHIL was forced to stop distributing the letter (ACTU, 2005h).

One of the key outcomes of the inquiry was the immediate establishment of a separate investigation by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), Australia’s corporate regulator, to investigate the corporate governance issues associated with the restructure and the conduct of certain directors and officers of JHIL (ASIC, 2004). Upon the launch of an ASIC investigation, and in light of serious and damning allegations against them in the NSW Inquiry, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) resigned in September 2004 in the interests of the shareholders and the Board of Directors. The public campaign escalated shortly afterwards, when it was revealed in October 2004 that the two executives, largely pinpointed as responsible for the shortfall in funding to victims, received AUD$10 million payouts between them.

The corporate campaign in action

The key elements of the ACTU campaign were numerous and varied. They included: a public boycott of JHIL products; the building of coalitions and networks with other unions, both nationally and internationally; mobilization of community and interest group support; shareholder pressure; a targeted media campaign; and state government pressure. Each of these aspects of the campaign is explored.

Public boycott

To ensure pressure was maintained on JHIL after the Jackson Inquiry, several strategies were adopted by the ACTU and their alliances. The first of these was a boycott on JHIL products by Australian building workers, municipal councils, consumers and state governments. The commitment of the NSW government to the boycott, particularly as the biggest state government in Australia, and as a purchaser of approximately 8 percent of JHIL products, served as a strong financial as well as a media pressure point on the company (Carr et al., 2004). The NSW state government also extended the ban to state government contracts when it instructed Multiplex to ban JHIL products from the refurbishment of the NSW Trades Hall Council. This ban was taken up by the NSW Labor Council, in addition to receiving endorsement from 20 local government authorities. In November 2004, the National General Assembly of Local Government publicly condemned the actions of JHIL, and encouraged councils and contractors to review product availability from JHIL’s competitors, with a particular focus on the corporate reputation of suppliers as a criterion of choice (ALGA, 2004).

The then federal Labor opposition also supported the public boycott, pledging public commitment for a further boycott of JHIL products in all commonwealth construction and public works post an election win, should JHIL continue to refuse to negotiate and pay victims due compensation. Construction unions in the state of Victoria also supported the ban on JHIL materials (Prince et al., 2004).

Trade union and government alliances

The ACTU built support for the campaign with affiliate unions, state governments and the Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC). Alliances with unions in the ‘trades’ industry were important. The Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU), for example, publicly endorsed the push for an investigation by ASIC into the unethical and illegal corporate behaviour of JHIL (CFMEU, 2004a). The significant level of state government support for the ACTU campaign was also critical in terms of raising the media profile of the campaign and the financial impact on JHIL.

Mobilization of community support: Public rallies

A key action in the campaign against JHIL was a national day of action on the 15 September 2004, to coincide with the JHIL shareholders’ information meeting, initiated by the ACTU and asbestos groups. Approximately 5000 people, including victims and their families, attended a rally in Sydney. The rally received extensive coverage in the media. In solidarity, all building sites across the central business district of Sydney were closed down, with CFMEU workers joining the rally to demand fair compensation for all victims. Mobilization of community support for the campaign was sustained with more traditional campaign tactics, including the production and distribution of campaign stickers, leaflets and posters. Again, the focus of this campaign was pictures of victims with oxygen masks.

International support from unions in the USA was also a defining feature of the campaign, given that more than 80 percent of JHIL’s earnings are generated from the sale of building products to the US market. US unions and community groups held a protest rally in September 2004 in support of Australian asbestos victims, outside JHIL’s American headquarters in California. This event strategically targeted the company’s identifiable product within its major market, and publicized the issue and campaign internationally, making the public and consumers in the USA aware of JHIL’s treatment of Australian asbestos victims (ACTU, 2005g).

Shareholder pressure

As part of the national day of action, the ACTU led a delegation of unions, asbestos victims and support groups at the JHIL Australian shareholders’ information meeting in Sydney, on 15 September 2004, calling on the Board of Directors to meet all compensation payouts to victims (ACTU, 2005g; CFMEU, 2004b). Australian unionists and asbestos groups also attended the Annual General Meeting in the Netherlands on 17 September 2004 (ACTU, 2005g). At this meeting, the JHIL board declined to present its annual accounts. This decision followed a campaign by unions and asbestos groups who wrote to fund managers and shareholders asking them to vote against the adoption of the accounts because they made no provision for future asbestos liabilities (ACTU, 2005g).

Heading for a resolution?

At the height of the union campaign in September 2004, JHIL publicly made a commitment to negotiate with the ACTU regarding their moral obligation to provide ongoing financial compensation to asbestos victims and their families. In December 2004, a landmark AUD$1.5 million ‘Heads of Agreement’ was concluded between the ACTU, Unions NSW, asbestos groups and JHIL, identifying how the compensation arrangements would operate (ACTU, 2005b). This agreement was believed to be the largest personal injury settlement in Australian history worth over AUD$4 billion over a 40-year period (SBS, 2004; The Australian, 2005). Despite the fact that the Heads of Agreement was not legally binding, the then ACTU Secretary, Greg Combet, argued that it represented: ‘a highly significant step in the campaign to ensure that [JHIL] funds current and future compensation liabilities to Australian victims of its asbestos products’ (ACTU, 2005b).

The Heads of Agreement was designed to provide the basis for a legally binding ‘Principal Agreement’ which was to be concluded by June 2005, but would have to be voted on and accepted by JHIL shareholders. The Heads of Agreement provided for: an open funding commitment with no caps on overall funding or on payments to victims; the creation of a special purpose fund to receive funding from JHIL and make payments to claimants; the payment of an up-front cash ‘buffer’ equivalent to two years of claims plus the payment of a further year of claims in advance (approx. AUD$250 million); additional annual payments from JHIL based on an annual actuarial assessment of the liability for asbestos claims; a cap on annual payments, set at 35 percent of JHIL’s free cash flow; a minimum term funding arrangement of 40 years, with an agreement to extend this indefinitely if required; and funding from JHIL for asbestos education and medical research (ACTU, 2005b; SBS, 2004). Following the agreement, the NSW government called for all boycotts on JHIL products to be lifted, and shares in the company rose more than 7 percent upon the deal being made public (SBS, 2004); a reflection of the financial impact of the campaign (Financial Times, 2004).

To expedite negotiations for a legally enforceable agreement, the ACTU called on the NSW government to conduct an independent review of the legal and administrative costs associated with asbestos claims in NSW (ACTU, 2005d). The NSW government agreed. This was seen as a significant and public victory for the ACTU, unions and asbestos groups. As Combet noted:

This has been a major stumbling block in the negotiations with [JHIL] which has been seeking to dictate the terms of any changes to the compensation system. . . . I have asked the government to become directly involved because it is the role of the government to determine the appropriate compensation arrangements, not James Hardie. (ACTU, 2005d)

The outcome of this independent state government review resulted in a series of recommendations by the NSW government to introduce new procedures that reduced waiting times and administrative costs associated with asbestos compensation claims. This outcome was welcomed by the ACTU, with Greg Combet stating that the review achieved the ACTU’s goals by protecting the rights and compensation of asbestos victims, and by achieving significant legal and administrative cost savings. As Combet stated: ‘The way is now clear for JHIL to quickly conclude a final and legally binding agreement with the NSW government which reflects the commitments it made to asbestos victims, the ACTU and the Australian public’ (ACTU, 2005d).

Key recommendations of the NSW government’s review included: protection of existing compensation benefits and the rights of asbestos victims, with no caps on compensation claims; early claims settlement through the use of compulsory pre-trial mediation; reduced legal costs through early settlement and the avoidance of unnecessary litigation; retaining the right to an early trial for asbestos victims in urgent cases or where their health deteriorates; and streamlined processes for achieving contribution agreements between defendants in multi-defendant cases (ACTU, 2005a).

Despite the conclusion of the Heads of Agreement in December 2004 and a commitment to finalize the legally binding arrangements by June 2005, negotiations over the legal details took more than 12 months to complete, prompting threats of a second campaign. In November 2005, Greg Combet called on JHIL to finalize the multi-billion dollar agreement, saying: ‘Almost 12 months later, the legal documentation has not been finalised. Our patience is running out and time is up’ (ACTU, 2005d).

Combet threatened renewed union, community and government action, making a public commitment to urge the NSW government to introduce legislation compelling JHIL to pay, should the company not finalize the deal. A resolution came shortly afterwards, with JHIL agreeing to fund all compensation payouts for victims, at that time and in the future.

Discussion

In studying the corporate campaign against JHIL, the organization and management of the campaign reflects the structure put forward by Tilley (1978), in terms of the process of building oppositional mobilization. In terms of interest, it was clear that a broad alliance utilizing a multi-scalar approach was built between local and international trade unions, asbestos support organizations and state governments, with a common view that the employer – JHIL – had acted in a way that was unjust, immoral and represented a violation of human rights. This provided the platform for organizing a coordinated campaign under the leadership of the peak union body, the ACTU. Because of the nature of the coalitions, mobilization was able to occur across a variety of frames: trade unions used the threat of black banning industrial sites using JHIL materials; the NSW government provided legal expertise as well as financial strength, as a major purchaser of JHIL products; the ADFA provided the human face to victims’ suffering caused by asbestos-related diseases; and the ACTU coordinated and led the campaign. All these were significant factors in providing momentum for the campaign and a variety of ‘fronts’ upon which JHIL had to combat negative publicity and damage to their reputation and financial position. The addition of the MRCF to the campaign was also influential. In terms of opportunity, or the cost-benefits of the campaign, the major theme was an unfailing public commitment by the coalition to pursue JHIL and the moral rights of victims at all costs. That is, to ensure that JHIL unconditionally committed to compensating all victims of their asbestos products (Carr et al., 2004). Public comments made by Combet in the media both throughout the inquiry and after its conclusion maintained this theme: ‘A full-scale industrial, legal and legislative assault can be expected if no settlement is reached. . . . Investors and their analysts would do well to understand that morality will ultimately have a large bearing on the value of [JHIL]’ (ACTU, 2005o: 1); and:

I see this as a defining issue. We will fight as hard and long as it takes to ensure justice is done and asbestos victims get proper compensation from the company that is responsible for their injuries. Every Australian Government, regardless of its political persuasion should do what is necessary to right this outrage and ensure it can’t happen again. (ACTU, 2005: 1)

Analysing the action taken by the coalition, in addition to the building of alliances with union and lobby groups in the USA and with state and territory governments, the ACTU, unions and asbestos support groups continually presented facts in the media about the number of asbestos victims in Australia, the number expected in the next 20 years, the per capita incidence in Australia, as well as a detailed submission to the Jackson Inquiry outlining the liabilities of JHIL to asbestos victims and their families. This diagnostic framing (Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009) of the problems that were drivers of the campaign served to reinforce the facts of the case in the media, influencing and resonating with public opinion.

The targeted media campaign led by the alliance had a major impact in achieving its central objective: to attack the reputation of JHIL and to cause utmost disruption and damage. Allegations of immoral and unjust behaviour by JHIL were constantly reinforced in the media and in news and commentary regarding the dispute. Campaigning on platforms of health and safety and human rights to build national public awareness of the effects and dangers of asbestos was a key element of the public relations communication strategy. The image of victims with their tell-tale oxygen masks not only gave names and faces to the campaign, but legitimacy and credibility to the messages presented in the media (Manheim, 1998). These visual images provided a vivid and graphic statement of the effects of asbestos, appealing to public emotion and evoking sympathy. Using Manheim’s (1998) concept, it was clear that the construction of a simple morality play that pitted the evil company (JHIL) against a good-hearted, weaker adversary (asbestos victims) was crucial to publicly shaming the company. The success of the ACTU in influencing public opinion can also be seen in individual weblogs at the time of the campaign calling for community mobilization and action to support victims’ legal rights to compensation payouts. For example, one weblog stated:

Here in Australia hundreds, and potentially thousands of former [JHIL] workers are dying from cancer caused by working with asbestos. . . . [JHIL] set up a token, massively under-funded compensation fund. . . . Australian state governments are now threatening to boycott JHIL products until they make a commitment to meet their obligations to former workers… . . . If you cannot help to force a boycott, lodge a protest to [JHIL] at one of the below addresses. (Scottie’s Blog, 2004)

The use of public pressure to attack JHIL’s image, to question their morality and ethics was core to the public relations communication and media campaign. Combet’s public comments throughout the campaign highlighted the powerful use of emotive language to attack the company’s morality and ethics: ‘[This is] Australia’s greatest corporate scandal . . . with JHIL employing legal chicanery to avoid its moral and ethical responsibilities . . . [it is] one of the most repugnant acts in Australia’s corporate history’; ‘[It is] a truly sickening corporate act’ (as cited in ACTU, 2005p); ‘[It is] one of the most disgusting corporate acts I have seen’ (as cited in Carr et al., 2004); and ‘The moral and ethical responsibility of the company is to pay people’s compensation. . . .We shouldn’t be having to contemplate litigating in the Netherlands or the USA’ (as cited in Carr et al., 2004).

Targeting of the legal and actuarial advisers and their role and conduct in the under-funding of the MRCF was an extension of the public media campaign and attack on the company’s reputation, but never a major focus, so as not to detract from the main focal point of the campaign against JHIL. The reputations of the CEO and CFO were publicly attacked as they were largely seen as bearing principal responsibility for JHIL’s actions. In fact, the ACTU publicly refused to negotiate with these two individuals. When the CEO and CFO of JHIL resigned, and received significant payouts, the unions again focused on the morality of this situation, emphasizing injustice and managerial accountability. The effects of this message could again be seen in weblogs at the time:

The bastards! I worked for JHIL Mass Murderers Inc between 1976–77, making asbestos sheeting. . . . At the end of a shift, we’d dig clumps of white stuff out of our noses. . . . I’d take the dust home on my clothes to my partner and my new-born daughter. . . . If, god forbid, I should join the victims, will there be money to pay for my medical costs? But there’s always money for a fat golden handshake for a couple of bosses. It’s a rich man’s country still. (Anon in Life of Riley Blog, 2004)

Political pressure on JHIL was also particularly strong from the NSW state government. The steadfast position of the NSW government that JHIL had to negotiate with the ACTU, and receive their approval, in addition to the approval of the Labor Council and victims, added to the pressure on JHIL, particularly following the conclusion of the Jackson Inquiry. Without these requirements being met, the NSW government publicly refused to accept a settlement from JHIL or revoke its product ban.

Political pressure on JHIL was also exerted by the federal Labor opposition. The JHIL case featured as a key issue in the election campaign of 2004 and 2007, with the federal Labor opposition pledging public support for victims, asbestos groups and the ACTU, through reforming corporate law, supporting the boycott of JHIL products and the ASIC investigations and any prosecutions flowing from the Jackson Inquiry, particularly against the CEO and the CFO (Latham, 2004). Further political pressure was placed on the federal coalition government by the ACTU, who called on the Liberal and National parties to return AUD$78,000 in donations from JHIL to asbestos victims throughout the campaign.

A defining element of corporate campaigns identified by Greven and Russo (2003) is escalation, and this was a tactic that underpinned the campaign against JHIL. Escalation of the campaign took part in two stages: after the release of the Jackson report and after the attempts by JHIL to cap compensation payouts. The first stage of the campaign was a protest rally by US unions and community groups in September 2004 outside JHIL’s American headquarters in California. This was followed by the national day of action on the 15 September 2004 (to coincide with the JHIL shareholders’ information meeting), with the rally receiving extensive media coverage that night. As part of the national day of action, the ACTU led attendance at the JHIL Australian shareholders’ information meeting in Sydney on 15 September, calling on the Board of Directors to meet all compensation payouts to victims. On 17 September 2004, Australian unionists and asbestos groups also attended the Annual General Meeting in the Netherlands (ACTU, 2005g).

The second stage of the campaign took place in late 2005, more than 12 months after JHIL had agreed to provide enough funding to compensate victims. The reason for the escalation was the long drawn out process of establishing the legal arrangements that would govern compensation payouts to victims. Delays by JHIL in establishing this detail and achieving shareholder approval, despite a commitment to specific timelines, prompted the ACTU to publicly threaten a second campaign phase, in the absence of immediate completion of the legal detail. This threat proved enough of a stimulus for the legal details to be finalized quickly, thus preventing a second round of action.

It is also clear from the case analysis that the campaign developed vertical and horizontal strategies (Greven and Russo, 2003; Perry, 1987), or spatial and temporal dimensions (Anderson, 2009), exerting pressure on the company from a variety of angles. Vertical strategies focused on stakeholders including shareholders and customers as particular vulnerabilities of JHIL; the organization’s public image was also continually attacked by portraying its behaviour as immoral, unjust and unethical in the media, so as to engender an understanding of the issues in the dispute among the public, from the perspective of victims. Horizontal strategies included coalition building with national and international unions, governments and the local community, in which the ADFA provided the ‘human face’ of the campaign.

Conclusion

This case study provides an in-depth analysis of one of the most high profile corporate campaigns and disputes in Australia using the concepts of corporate campaigning and mobilization theory. Using the Broad and Cavanagh (1999) frame of reference, the degree of change in corporate behaviour and policy outcomes was the ultimate success of the ACTU-led corporate campaign, in that it delivered substantive compensation gains for asbestos victims. This success can be attributed to many factors, including the peak body’s effective strategizing, organization and leadership of the campaign; combining public relations campaigning with traditional organizing; and the use of mobilization tactics among communities. While the campaign was centrally coordinated by the ACTU and many high profile actions were national and international in character, there was also significant activity at the state, individual union and local community level, creating a campaign that had wide geographical scope (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999).

Another defining determinant of success was the horizontal strategy of working closely with asbestos support groups, governments and other unions in a cooperative manner; what Broad and Cavanagh (1999) describe as building coalitions. In addition, Broad and Cavanagh’s (1999) key feature of building public awareness and support was ever present through the focus on victims and the distinctive image of their oxygen masks, and the pivotal role and charisma of ADFA spokesperson Mr Bernie Banton. This ‘human face’ of the campaign symbolized victims and was designed to add emotional content to the core narrative (Manheim, 2003) against JHIL, by appealing to ideas of Australian identity and the values of a ‘fair go’, mateship and democracy. The building of public awareness and support allowed the ACTU to orchestrate and frame a range of ‘oppositional voices’ (Sadler, 2004b) to JHIL’s actions with a single unified message: to pursue victims’ rights at all costs.

The ACTU also formed broad-ranging political and pragmatic alliances to advance a common agenda against JHIL. The overarching theme underpinning this common agenda was the moral responsibility and accountability of JHIL, with regard to ethics, human rights and the dignity of asbestos victims, past, present and future. The second determinant of success was the combination of a horizontal and vertical strategy, building ‘oppositional politics’ (Sadler, 2004b) in the form of public, moral and government pressure, particularly in the media and among the public. This unyielding, negative, public confrontation placed maximum demands on the company from several different directions, resulting in tangible and sustained damage to their reputation and corporate image. In addition, consumption patterns (Broad and Cavanagh, 1999) were affected through product boycotts and a campaign in the key market of the USA, thus impinging on the financial bottom line. Effective communication strategies resulted in a common feeling amongst the general public that JHIL must be brought to social, economic and political justice, by creating an association in the general public between JHIL, the death of asbestos victims and immoral and unjust behaviour (Manheim, 1998). Garnering wider community and public support was essential in placing continuous and escalating pressure on JHIL and in legitimizing the ACTU campaign (Perry, 1987); reinforcing that the ACTU could and should play a key role in remedying the social, economic and political injustice of JHIL’s actions.

The discursive construction of a corporate campaign by the ACTU around issues of corporate governance, shareholder value, managerial accountability, social, ethical and moral responsibility and justice (Sadler, 2004a) enabled and encouraged the engagement of a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental groups, all with different objectives and interests, and was crucial to the success of this campaign targeting JHIL’s business practices. While building coalitions and union–community collaboration are in some ways a ‘new’ strategy for trade unions to enhance their political and economic power and campaign success (Tattersall, 2005, 2008; Tattersall and Reynolds, 2007), there is a precedence in Australia and other Anglo-American countries of campaigning and mobilization around OHS and community protests (e.g. the 1998 waterfront dispute in Australia).

The unique insights provided by the JHIL case analysis however suggest that corporate campaigns, in a new form, are one core strategy for Australian trade unions and other unions in advanced market economies, in attempts to counter global capital mobility. This new form of campaigning and mobilization activity can focus on shareholder value and managerial accountability internationally, using a multi-scalar approach, where company actions have had an adverse effect on workers’ rights. Indeed, corporate campaigning strategies can be used to attack tangible pressure points, including finances, governance, public image and a corporation’s reputation, and to build a powerful collective that protests over external injustices but also has the potential to be mobilized to build internal solidarity (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004). As Sadler (2004a: 45) notes with respect to the Rio Tinto dispute, and as is also the case in the campaign against JHIL, the ACTU effectively constructed a morality play around a clearly articulated agenda that redefined community and coalitions around JHIL and its shareholders, stressing the firm’s moral responsibilities to victims and current and future employees across the globe. This tactic was integral to the campaign’s success, to building awareness, identity and solidarity, by framing the issue in ways that linked to mainstream discourses of fairness, rights, justice and democracy; that is, widely accepted community and social values that hold great relevance for Australian people (Muir, 2010).

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the reviewers for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Peter Holland is an Associate Professor in Human Resource Management and Employee Relations, Director of the Human Resource Management Programme and Deputy Head of the Human Resource and Employee Relations Discipline in the Department of Management at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. He was formerly Deputy Director of the Australian Centre for Research in Employment and Work. Peter has worked in the Australian finance industry and consulted to the private and public sector in a variety areas related to human resource management and employee relations. His current research interests include talent management, employee voice and monitoring and surveillance in the workplace. He has co-authored nine books and over 60 journal articles, monographs and book chapters on a variety of human resource management and employee relations issues.

Amanda Pyman is a Senior Lecturer in Employee Relations and Human Resource Management and Deputy Director of the MBA programme in the Department of Management at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. Amanda’s current research interests include employee voice, trade union strategies from a comparative perspective and privacy in the workplace. Amanda has published extensively in national and international journals on a range of employee relations and human resource management issues. Recent papers appear in the British Journal of Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management.

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