Fatigued for safety? Supply chain occupational health and safety initiatives in shipping

Introduction

The relation between product and service suppliers and their powerful clients in the supply chain has been increasingly recognized to be an important factor that affects employment practices. On the one hand, it is widely noted that because clients tend to transfer cost pressures and risks down the supply chain, suppliers are forced to use contingent and temporary workers. On the other, the potential is also acknowledged that the power of clients can be used positively to enforce good working conditions and employment practices in supplier organizations. How clients exercise their power also has implications for occupational health and safety (OHS) in supplier organizations (James et al., 2007; Lloyd and James, 2008). There are reports that supply chain initiatives have improved OHS management. The impact of such initiatives, however, largely remains to be critically and rigorously examined (Walters, 2009).

The shipping industry carries more than 90% of world trade and is an indispensable part of global supply chains (IMO, 2011). It employs around 1.2 million seafarers worldwide. Shipping is also a relatively risky industry and its safety record has been a concern of the stakeholders (Bloor et al., 2000). These features of this industry make it potentially an illuminating case for the study of OHS implications associated with supply chain pressure. Yet, maybe because it is not located ashore but remains ‘invisible’ at sea it has not received relevant research attention. In this context, this article focuses on the oil tanker sector of the industry and examines the safety initiatives of the major clients.

Supply chain and occupational health and safety

The unequal power relation between large buyers and small suppliers has been the focal point in exploring the implications of supply chain management for work and employment relations. The power disparity is seen as enabling buyers to transfer costs and risk down to small supplier firms (Turnbull et al., 1993). Grimshaw et al. (2005) further note that when suppliers in weak positions were squeezed, they naturally passed the pressure on to workers. This often led to work intensification and precarious employment. With their margins being constantly tightened, small suppliers were found to complain about the difficulties in recruiting and keeping quality workers (Carroll et al., 2005). In a similar vein, Lloyd and James (2008) and Wright and Lund (2003) found in their research that food processing industries in both the UK and Australia dealt with the pressure from dominant supermarket chains through increased labour flexibility, such as by using casual and/or agency workers and flexible working hours.

However, in cases where buyers have the intention of developing long-term stable and cooperative relationships with suppliers, the former may use their power to encourage and help the latter in improving working conditions and employment relations. This is evident in a number of studies (Beaumont et al., 1996; Marchington and Vincent, 2004; Scarbrough, 2000). Beaumont et al.’s (1996) research in the UK automotive industry, for example, showed that customers used their market position to facilitate positive employee relations changes in small supplier firms either directly or indirectly. The direct route to change was by conducting customer audits which examined the implementation of good employee relations practices such as training and employee–management communication. The indirect route to change was driven by increased customer demand for improved performance, which required suppliers to rethink their working practices. Taking into consideration the arguments from both sides, Scarbrough (2000: 16) points out that the impact of supply chain management on work and employment relations in supplier organizations is not one-sided but ‘double-edged’ (see also Lloyd and James, 2008).

The ‘double-edged’ impact in turn may have different OHS consequences. Aronsson (1999) studied the relationship between temporary employment and workers’ opportunities to take part in work environment dialogue in Sweden. He found that contingent workers are likely to find it difficult to voice criticism and have their voice heard over health and safety issues because of their employment conditions. Furthermore, contingent worker respondents in the research also reported a lack of sufficient training and knowledge which is necessary for taking part in health and safety management. Two systematic reviews (each included around 100 empirical studies) conducted by Quinlan and his colleagues (Quinlan, 1999; Quinlan and Bohle, 2009; Quinlan et al., 2001) suggested that precarious employment often results in a deterioration of OHS standards. Three risk factors associated with precarious employment were identified in the reviews: (1) economic pressure, such as work intensification, competition and lack of resources in small business; (2) disorganization, including lack of training, experience, OHS knowledge and a collective voice; (3) increased likelihood of regulatory failure.

More recently, researchers have attempted to explore the direct link between supply chain and OHS. Mayhew and Quinlan (2006) studied multi-tiered subcontracting and OHS in Australian long-haul trucking and found that drivers in the lower tier of the subcontracting chain tended to work longer hours and take shorter medical leaves and were more likely to suffer fatigue and psychological distress. Walters (2009) too identified a number of reasons why supply chain pressure can negatively affect OHS. He noted that organizations at the bottom end of the chain are likely to be small ones whose OHS management systems are less adequate than their larger counterpart. Furthermore narrow profit margins in these organizations make it difficult to invest in OHS. The lack of voice which results in inadequate representation of worker interest hinders effective management of workplace health and safety.

Of particular relevance to this article are initiatives designed to improve OHS in supplier organizations utilizing supply chain pressure. While comparatively such evidence is far less notable, there are nevertheless incentives, or rather pressures, such as concerns of good reputation and company images, ethical trade and corporate social responsibility agendas and civil society/consumer group pressures for firms at the top of the supply chain to exert influence on those at the bottom to improve OHS arrangements and performance (Walters, 2009; Walters and James, 2011). In a study in the chemical industry, Marchington and Vincent (2004) found that the chemical company enforced a code of conduct including OHS requirements on their suppliers. In the construction industry, similar OHS initiatives were also enforced through the supply chain which was found to have improved OHS outcomes (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2000). Barrientos and Smith (2007) assessed the impact of the Ethical Trading Initiative on workers at the bottom of global supply chains, especially those in the third world countries. They found that the main improvements were related to health and safety including ‘clearer procedures, information and training, fire safety, personal protective equipment, safer use of chemicals, lighting and ventilation, toilets and drinking water’ (Barrientos and Smith, 2007: 722).

However, James et al. (2007) point out that such initiatives and codes of conduct are voluntary and have inconsistent results. Those who signed up to such initiatives often downplay or even disregard them when the economic pressure gets tight (Walters and James, 2011). In a study of the effectiveness of voluntary labour initiatives in the global supply chains associated with the banana trade, Robinson (2010) noted that due to the pressure to meet the punishing schedule of producing just-in-time bananas for giant supermarket chains, OHS issues in banana farms were largely ignored.

Thus, whether or not OHS initiative relying on supply chain pressure work is far from conclusive and competing findings present a complex picture. In this respect, Walters and James (2011) suggest that ‘visibility’ matters and clarify that if OHS performance can attract attention from both the public and regulatory inspectors and thus entail substantial reputational and legal risks to top firms, then such initiatives are more likely to produce positive outcomes. They point out that the concern of client organizations is not directly about the OHS of vulnerable workers at the end of supply chains but about their public images.

This complex issue with varied perspectives raises interesting questions. If supply chain OHS initiatives are in fact only indirectly related to workers, is worker voice listened to and employee participation encouraged? What are the associated implications? These questions are important because employee participation is widely acknowledged to be central to effective OHS management (Gunningham, 2008) and features even in some of the major OHS legislation (see European Council Directive 89/391/EEC [EEC, 1989]). In this context, an examination of the question can offer a new perspective to make sense of the OHS impacts of supply chain initiatives.

Research literature suggests that for workers to communicate their OHS concerns and contribute in its management effectively they need to be part of an organized workforce (Bohle and Quinlan, 2000). Walters (2006), drawing upon several empirical examples from UK, further revealed that certain infrastructural prerequisites facilitate workers’ collective representation. He found that a strong presence of trade unions, which is most effective if supported by statute, plays a crucial role in facilitating such participation. Walters argued that trade unions help present workers’ views to the management on labour conditions including minimum wages, maximum working hours, staffing level and job security. Furthermore, the presence of trade unions supports workers in learning about hazards, communicating risk and contributing to the management of OHS more generally (Walters, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that organizations in which trade unions play an important role in providing support to workers are found to perform better on OHS than those where there is limited or symbolic union presence (Lewchuk et al., 1996; Nichols et al., 2007).

However, as discussed earlier, supply chain pressures often lead to work flexibility and thus weaken worker voice and representation (Marchington et al., 2005; Quinlan and Bohle, 2009; Quinlan et al., 2001). In this context, it becomes more interesting to ask what role workers play at the bottom of the supply chain, who are said to hold a crucial role in safeguarding workplace health and safety. To examine this question, the shipping industry, especially its tanker sector, provides an ideal research setting due to its particular characteristics. These characteristics are explained next.

The shipping industry and the Oil Majors

One of the salient features of the shipping industry is the remote nature of its workplace, which among other consequences impedes the scope for regulating shipboard OHS and thus maintaining labour standards in the industry. While the industry continues to suffer from this limitation, more recently, the impacts of economic globalization in the industry have exacerbated the concern. Since the 1970s, increased power of capital and deregulation have given unprecedented freedom to the ship-owners to relocate their assets in terms of choosing their regulatory affiliation and sourcing labour from around the world as they consider suitable. In the past it was a common practice for ship-owners to register their ships in their country of domicile and to employ local seafarers. Such practice was common in countries such as the UK and Norway which were identified as the Traditional Maritime Nations (TMNs). The new regime permitted ship-owners, most of who continued to hail from the TMNs, to move the registry of their ships to a particular group of countries identified as the Open Registries (ORs). These countries, such as Panama and Liberia, offered an attractive ‘business model of ship registration’ by allowing comparatively lower standards of ship operation and maintaining lenient regulatory inspection and control systems which were particularly attractive to the relatively less scrupulous ship-owners. (Alderton et al., 2004; DeSombre, 2006; Lillie, 2006). The popularity of registering ships with ORs continued to grow as by the turn of the century over half of the world tonnage was already registered with them. (ITF, 1998).

One of the most damaging consequences of this new development was the deterioration of seafarers’ labour conditions. Without an effective regulatory oversight more and more ship-owners increasingly employed seafarers from new labour supply nations, such as from countries in East Europe and the Far East, and offered relatively lower salaries and short-term contracts lasting for between six and 12 months. In so doing ship-owners were able to shed their responsibilities towards the workers beyond the contractual obligation. Ship operating costs were further reduced as they also took the advantage of downsizing resulting in seafarers having to accept increased workload and longer working hours. The change in the labour market is evident from the reduction in seafarers from TMNs and the increase from new labour supply nations (Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Bloor et al., 2000). Between 1965 and 1992 the seafarers from the UK, for instance, dropped by over three-quarters despite an increase in maritime activities globally. The latest maritime manpower survey (BIMCO, 2010) shows that over 75% of global seafarers come from labour supply nations, whereas around 64% of the ship-owners are domiciled in the OECD nations.

Such fragmentation of the industry made the relationships between seafarers and ship-owners and between them and state regulators relatively more transient. Among other impacts it hindered the function of maritime trade unions. In addition to the limitation posed by the ‘distant workplace’, the new geographic dispersion made it considerably more complex for trade unions to help improve general labour conditions or address issues specific to seafarers’ OHS. The scope for nationally based seafarers’ unions became considerably limited in, for instance, engaging with ship-owners in collective bargaining. The nature of the seafarer labour market and the lack of support from trade unions thus turned them into a relatively unorganized labour force. It weakened their ability to present their views to managers in a representative manner on employment standards and working practices more generally and in matters pertaining to OHS more specifically (Kahveci and Nichols, 2006; Lillie, 2006).

In the shipping industry the regulatory involvement varies not only with regard to a ship’s registry but also, among other factors, according to the type of trade that a ship is engaged in. Compared to most other sectors, such as dry cargo, ships in the crude oil and petroleum product trade experience lower rates of shipboard incidents. It is the case despite tankers transporting relatively more hazardous cargoes. The views from the industry suggest that the crucial factor that makes tankers safer than their counterparts is the involvement of the major oil companies (Matthews, 2011; Sagen, 2005).

These companies, such as Shell, Texaco and Exxon, identified as the Oil Majors, dominate the entire supply chain from exploration and production of crude oil to refining, as well as to distribution of the refined petroleum products. Although it is a heavily vertically integrated supply chain some of its elements are largely outsourced, which includes maritime transportation. However, in order to ensure that the supply chain works efficiently the Oil Majors take an active interest that the ships and the shipping companies involved in their business maintain high operating and safety standards. As the Oil Majors are relatively few in number, they enjoy a dominant position in this trade. They lay down their own operating standard and before employing a ship they conduct rigorous vetting to determine the physical state of the vessel as well as its operating practice against such standard. They do so at regular intervals by conducting inspections on both the ship in question and its parent management unit (Walters et al., 2011). Such an inspection scheme can be seen as an initiative aiming to improve safety.

However, as suggested by Walters and James (2009: 60), the underlying reason for the Oil Majors’ vested interest in ship safety could be located in maintaining their public image. Shipboard incidents – such as fire and oil pollution – which are visible to the media have the potential to bring Oil Major companies (associated with the ship) into disrepute and cause heavy economic loss. Thus, in the tanker sector of the shipping industry the Oil Majors play an important role in filling the regulatory void but it remains to be investigated how their initiative affects shipboard OHS.

Research method

This study investigates the nature of the Oil Majors’ involvement in inspecting and regulating the standard of shipboard health and safety as an example of supply chain initiative in OHS. In particular it aims to examine how such initiative considers employee participation. A number of earlier studies investigating issues affecting the workplace followed the qualitative case study approach (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998; Van Maanen, 1988). They pointed out that work practices are highly context specific, which makes it essential to investigate the underlying influences as well as the wider environment.

This research uses two case studies involving tanker operating shipping companies with Oil Majors as their regular clients. They are both located in Europe and each operates between 10 and 15 tankers, but while one runs relatively larger tankers in the worldwide oil trade the other specializes in transporting petroleum products within Europe. The ships of both companies were registered in several different countries, some of which were TMNs while others were ORs. Both companies were reputable and had conducted oil transportation business for several years. Their shore-based management office employed around 30 personnel, of whom around 10 were involved with ship operation and in liaising with Oil Majors. Around five days were spent in each office collecting data from these managers using semi-structured interviews.

Subsequent to the onshore fieldwork, data were also collected from two tankers of each organization. The first two voyages were undertaken on ships of the first company sailing in the Persian Gulf and North America while the two remaining voyages on the ships of the second company were undertaken in European waters. Nearly 50 days were spent on these four ships during which period a total of 67 seafarers were interviewed and non-participant observation was conducted. On each ship the majority of the data pertinent to this research came from the four senior officers. They were the captain, the chief officer, who was the captain’s deputy and in charge of the cargo and the ship’s stability, the chief engineer, who was in charge of the ship’s machinery, and the second engineer, who was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the machinery. The junior officers, who were largely in charge of keeping watch, and the ratings, who worked in supporting roles, also offered some useful views.

Most of the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. These along with the observations which were noted in a diary were all systematically coded using the N-Vivo program. By grouping the codes as per their common attributes, regularities and patterns, a few themes emerged. They included the high standard of Oil Major inspections, the significance of inspections, employment standards and seafarers’ participation.

In the next sections these themes are discussed with a view to reveal the practice of the Oil Majors in the inspections and control of OHS and whether or not they take into consideration the relevance of seafarers’ participation in the management of shipboard health and safety.

Improved tanker safety

Oil Major inspections are a means to assess the level of risk in hiring a ship and in conducting business with its parent company. It includes inspecting the ship’s machinery and safety equipment, the qualifications and experience of the seafarers sailing on it as well as the operation and management standards involving both the ship and its onshore managing office. Such inspection is not only designed to take a wide perspective but also made comprehensive by its systematic nature and the scrupulousness of the inspectors. The seafarers as well as the managers from both organizations felt that it was more stringent than any other form of inspection in the industry and was the main reason for the relatively high safety standard in the tanker sector. One of the managers in the onshore office, for instance, in his interview mentioned:

Oil Majors have shown us the highest level of professional standard. They are the best. Nothing escapes their [the inspectors’] eyes. . . . Although it is my job [safety management], but I must say that that the meticulousness of Oil Major Inspections is very hard to match.

Likewise, one of the chief officers pointed out:

The Oil Major Inspectors are thorough. No matter how much you prepare they can always find some mistakes. They have a much better standard than any other type of inspection.

Even the ratings, who had limited involvement with Oil Majors, were also convinced of the benefits of sailing on tankers inspected by them. One engine room rating, for instance, in his interview said:

Every two months we get an Oil Major vetting. This is good because everything on this ship has to work . . . we get stores and spares. My last ship did not have vetting – it was not like this. This ship is safe.

Such expressions of admiration for the Oil Majors were evident throughout the study, which clearly indicates how they were perceived as a major contributor to shipboard safety. This, however, is only part of the story, as the research further revealed that seafarers also had serious concerns about Oil Major inspections.

The power of the Oil Majors

Mixed with the expressions of admiration for the Oil Majors, however, was a sense of anxiety, as managers and seafarers from both companies felt uncertain about maintaining continued business from these companies. They were particularly worried that the Oil Majors could terminate the business relationship in the event of a single unfavourable inspection. One of the managers, for example, said:

We aim to get long term charter like contract of affreightment or time charter with the Oil Majors. But that does not always happen. On most times they hire us on spot charter . . . [passing] the inspections therefore is crucial to our business . . . the outcomes of these inspections hold good for one year but that is not always the case. . . . Say, if they find problems on another ship [in the company] then the entire fleet might get inspected out of turn. So nothing is certain.

Such uncertainty was rife in both companies, which did not let either of them take their relationship with the Oil Majors for granted. The Oil Majors applied strong economic leverage on the shipping companies to make them comply with the operating standards set by them. From the shipping companies’ point of view it was a question of their economic survival, which is why they felt obliged to play by the rules set by the Oil Majors. This argument was well articulated by one of the managers, who said:

I tell my colleagues that Oil Majors are our boss – they are our source of income. We just have to pass their inspections – failing is not an option. We go to any extent to ensure things are right; if we don’t get it the first time we put all our resources to save the situation . . . if we pass this we pass everything [all other including statutory inspections].

The Oil Majors’ control over the entire supply chain, as mentioned earlier, was also revealed in this study. From the managers’ interviews it was apparent that they were unable to circumvent the Oil Majors in this business. They had to pass these inspections even when they conducted business with other oil companies and had no direct dealing with the Oil Majors. One of the managers explained the extent to which the Oil Majors controlled the trade:

They [Oil Majors] are omnipresent. Even when we are not chartered by them we may go to their terminals or get sub-chartered to them or they could be the sellers or the receivers of the cargo. Everyone asks for [the Oil Majors’] vetting report. They have their tentacles everywhere which makes it impossible to avoid them.

The offshore staff were equally mindful of the economic benefit of conducting business with the Oil Majors and the importance of working hard to pass their inspection but they were also more fearful of a negative outcome. The senior officers in particular appeared more wary of the results as they felt that they would be apportioned blame in the event of a poor outcome. One of the captains, for example, said:

You have no idea what happens when Oil Majors report too many observations. Up to five is okay but any more or even a single major observation then they [managers] will send e-mails like ‘despite our repeated instruction you are still not doing these, can you please explain why you are not doing things properly?’ We are genuinely scared how they [managers] might react to a failed inspection. They could even sack me.

The power of the Oil Majors was thus evident and engendered anxiety and fear among the employees. While the managers appeared anxious and regarded such inspections as an entry point to good economic potential, the senior officers viewed it as a necessary evil but also one that could adversely affect their career. Such fear is not surprising (Aronsson, 1999; Lewchuk et al., 1996) in the employment conditions that prevail for the seafarers. The temporary nature of their contractual employment and the lack of regulatory control over their employment standards were the underlying reasons for the seafarers’ fear of losing their job. Arguably such fear was pronounced due to the lack of support from trade unions, which could otherwise help them negotiate collectively.

Not participating – only complying

Being in a weak position the companies could barely relax their compliance with the Oil Majors’ rules. While managers’ efforts to comply helped improve safety, as mentioned earlier, they also served to pass the pressure down to the seafarers. This downwards pressure did not aim at eliciting opinions from the seafarers themselves or encouraging them to participate in OHS management in order to better satisfy the Oil Majors’ requirements. Rather, it merely demanded seafarers to follow orders given by mangers out of pressure. Prior to each inspection the managers felt it was crucial to remind the ship’s crew of defects and offer tips to pass the inspection. One manager, for instance, mentioned:

As soon as we fix an inspection we inform the ship. Then we remind them of all the defects and hot spots. We have to guide them and tell them exactly what to do. Sometimes we also need to visit the ship to convey the seriousness. In fact I’ve just returned from a ship in the States.

The seafarers construed these ‘reminders’ as pressure applied by the managers to pass the inspections. A chief officer called these inspections as ‘pressures from the managers on top of the everyday pressures’ that they were subjected to, while a captain summed it up as ‘an additional pressure which only the seafarers were required to endure for the benefit of the whole company’.

The offshore staff considered this as pressure as they felt that their contribution did not receive adequate support or recognition from the managers although they carried out the actual preparation and had the ultimate responsibility to negotiate the inspection. In their view, they were instead ‘ordered around’ by the managers, which undermined their professional ability. One of the senior engineers, who articulated this concern in his interview, said:

The managers are never in the habit of listening to us, they only order us around. They only ask us to ensure that there are no defects and pass these inspections. Their attitude at the time of vetting shows this. The company [managers] keeps sending us threatening emails – they just get very active all on a sudden and send us lot of reminders – our own defect lists are sent back to us, typical concerns identified in the Oil Major inspections generally and also a long list of defects that were reported by inspectors in other ships of our company. . . . The bottom line is to convey ‘do what you have to to pass the inspection’.

Such ‘ordering around’ to pass the Oil Major inspections was made possible as the two companies already practised a top-down management style. As captured in the interviews with both the managers and offshore staff as well as in the documentary evidence from across the two organizations, seafarers did not have opportunities to participate in safety management and were not encouraged to make any contribution to risk identification and assessment (for more detail, see Bhattacharya, 2012). The managers felt that the management of safety required their direct intervention, which involved instructing the seafarers what to do and how to do it. One of the superintendents, for instance, said:

The sea-staff don’t understand much, they are naive and as a result they should be told what to do – every step of it. . . . [The] More they follow the SMS [Safety Management System] the safer they are – the happier we all are. My job is to ensure that the crew follow the procedures [written in the SMS] word for word.

Likewise, the ship’s officers also revealed their minimal contribution to the formal management of shipboard health and safety. Their input barely went further than mechanically complying with the policies and procedures set out by the managers. The second engineer from one of the ships, for instance, sarcastically said:

Every day we have to fill these, these and these forms and checklists. That’s what the SMS requires us to do. . . . It’s all about yes sir, yes sir, three bags full.

Within such a top-down structure, where the shipboard staff were expected merely to register their compliance, there was limited opportunity for their voices to be heard. Nearly all the senior officers shared their unhappiness on this matter. One example from a captain is particularly telling. He said:

I have been Master on this ship from the time she was delivered and I know her inside out. We need the echo sounder display here [next to the steering wheel on the bridge] and not there [in the chart room]. For sure someone would be here at the wheel at all times but it would take someone to leave navigation to get to the chart room during which time we may either hit a jetty or, if not, run aground . . . it is a doable job. But it has been nine months since [I raised the issue] and no response yet.

Thus, although seafarers worked and lived on board and had a good knowledge and sensible opinions on the management of their ships and the inspections, their role was reduced to following orders and complying with procedures. The fieldwork suggested that the Oil Major inspection only required seafarers to demonstrate to the inspector on the day of inspection that a set of prescriptive rules had been adhered to ‘consistently’. It did not aim to change the non-participation situation, and the Oil Major inspectors were not concerned about company management styles nor did they enquire about seafarers’ concerns and opinions. A captain said in the interview:

We never talk to the Oil Majors [inspectors] – the office [managers] doesn’t want to hear us out – we have no say in anything. We only need to prepare for the inspection and hide the defects.

The findings suggest that supply chain pressure generated in organizations operating a top-down management style inevitably serves to generate more ‘orders’ for the managers to pass down. As a consequence of merely following orders, workers’ valuable knowledge and experience could not be capitalized on in managing OHS. Perhaps more crucially, however, the negative effects of the initiative on the workers were not dealt with as nobody cared about their concerns.

Before moving to a discussion of the negative effects, it may be worth noting that seafarers occasionally exploited the Oil Major inspections as opportunities to participate in a covert and novel way. In their interviews four of the total 16 senior officers disclosed how they divulged shipboard safety related concerns to the inspectors. They volunteered to do so as they felt that by so doing their safety concerns – which were ignored by managers – would be attended to. These were relatively rare occasions but those which made a significant impact on the shipboard OHS management. This strategy clearly exploited the relatively weak position of the ship managers in relation to the Oil Majors. For seafarers, who were the weakest party in the power dynamics, this strategy was risky. If they overdid it and thus failed the inspection, or if it raised suspicion among the managers, arguably, there would be ‘retribution’. This explains why it was used only rarely. The main point here, however, is that the reason to take such bold and calculated yet risky initiatives was only because these senior officers were denied participation in the management of shipboard OHS in a legitimate way. The following interview of a captain exemplified this point. He said:

I have leaked information to them [Oil Major inspectors] many times. Look, I’m not a traitor and did that only when the office [managers] did not care about what I said to them. They rarely listen to us and do not see our problems. So unless someone else tells them they don’t do [anything]. It puts us [the ship] in trouble. But if it is noted in the Oil Major’s report, spares and technicians [to repair the defect] await us in the next port.

Fatigued by pressure?

Being forced into compliance and denied a direct channel to voice their opinions and concerns not only frustrated seafarers but also had negative OHS effects on them. Maintaining the ship to an ‘Oil Major standard’ demanded considerable effort, which was apparent from all four ships, and seafarers worked long and hard to help their ships pass the Oil Major inspections. One chief officer, for instance, said:

It is a lot of hard work. We have to maintain the ship at the Oil Major standard throughout the year and the inspections are like exams – you always need to carry out last minute checks such as filling [in] paperwork, checking safety cut-outs, cleaning and stencilling. Mind you, all these are done in addition to our regular watch keeping and cargo work.

Similarly, on another ship a junior officer mentioned:

Last port we had [a] Shell inspection. For a week previous to that I had to check the logbooks, passage plan and chart correction and had work for over 18–20 hours a day. Even before we reached [the port] we were all very tired.

A serious consequence of working hard and long hours to comply lies in the neglect of seafarers’ occupational health. Throughout the study the seafarers complained that going through the inspections was a tiring experience, as it demanded a considerable amount of extra work but without extra hands being provided. While it is perhaps the case that the seafarers sailed on a safer ship in terms of its physical condition as a result, the question that arises nevertheless is whether it made them feel fatigued and thus affected their health. It has been pointed out that in the present day reduced manning levels and a faster turnaround of ships in ports have made seafaring a highly stressful profession (Kahveci, 1999; Smith, 2007; Wadsworth et al., 2008). Seafarers are compelled to work long hours and in conjunction with a poor shipboard environment this results in a lack of good sleep and thus leads to progressive chronic fatigue. The expectation of maintaining the ship to the Oil Major standard is clearly an additional concern which aggravates the situation in the days leading up to such inspections, as the two quotations above show.

Fatigued for reasons of safety, ironically, did not necessarily bring about safety improvement. Falsifying logbook entries was a common practice found on all the ships. The study showed that officers routinely filled in forms and checklists, such as work permits and risk assessments, days after the job was completed. Worse still, in some cases they did so when such tasks were not even carried out. The objective was to make sure that the records were updated the way they were meant to be presented to the inspector. This practice was captured in one of the diary entries:

[Two days backdated] the Chief Officer was filling forms and checklists, such as the tank atmosphere checklists. When on the job, he explained that these made no sense, yet the procedures required it so he was fabricating the entries. . . . The tank atmosphere logbook, he said, was one that was always checked by the Oil Major inspectors.

This entry illustrates the frustration and powerlessness felt by seafarers – they had to do things that made no sense to them without questioning. In this context, falsifying perhaps can be seen as an ‘art of resistance’ (Scott, 1990), or a form of sabotage, sabotaging whatever was the intention of designing the paperwork. The important point here is that it diverted seafarers’ energy and resources from doing things that could improve safety. Every officer in all four research voyages complained that they spent far too long filling in paperwork. They pointed out that such paperwork compelled them to divert their attention during watch-keeping and also took some of their leisure time away. They also complained that on many occasions they had to repeat the same entries in different logbooks, checklists and work permits to facilitate inspectors’ cross-checks.

Furthermore, fatigue itself has safety implications as it may make seafarers less alert in their work which is inherently risky. It is believed to be a major contributory factor in maritime accidents (MAIB, 2004; Parker et al., 1997; Smith, 2007). Perhaps for this reason, the Oil Majors seem to appreciate seafarers’ long working hours as a problem, though they do not take responsibility for how the pressures they apply may in fact exacerbate the problem. They therefore, among other logbooks, inspect the account of the seafarers’ daily working hours. However, as the findings suggest, ironically – like the tank atmosphere log – it was also routinely falsified for the purpose of passing the inspection. Thus the current mechanism to check seafarers’ working hours and hence their fatigue level is inadequate and the weakness in terms of checking their occupational health remains insurmountable.

Actually, all the issues discussed above – fatigue, paperwork pressure and falsification – are not secret but have been widely reported and openly discussed in industry publications and conferences for a long time (Smith, 2007). Yet, it seems that neither the Oil Majors nor ship managers were inclined to address them properly. Otherwise, they would not rely on untrustworthy paperwork to prevent fatigue. This further revealed that seafarers’ voice carried no weight at all. Instead the Oil Majors exploited the top-down controlling infrastructure prevalent in the industry and applied their economic leverage to meet their immediate concern of enhancing the standard of ship safety. Its explanation is located in the ‘visibility’ of shipboard safety and thus the business sensitivity associated with it. Such practice, however, neither took into account seafarers’ health nor did it allow for seafarers’ concerns to be taken seriously.

Conclusion

This article has presented a nuanced picture of the effects of supply chain health and safety initiatives in the case of the tanker sector of the shipping industry. It suggests that supply chain OHS initiatives, though designed to improve OHS standards, can be ‘double-edged’ if employee participation is not considered. While pressures from the Oil Majors have made a noticeable impact on the management of safety of ships, the Oil Majors together with managers ignored seafarers’ concerns and demanded their compliance, which led to negative OHS consequences.

While not denying the Oil Majors’ and tanker companies’ genuine concerns about safety, this article also shows that looming large behind the scene of their achievements are the Oil Majors’ concern about their public image, the tanker companies’ concern for their economic survival and the seafarers’ concern for their career and employability. Safety improvement does not seem so much a direct outcome of safety considerations as an indirect consequence of these concerns. If safety considerations were taken more seriously, arguably, seafarers’ opinions and concerns would be attended to. After all, it is the seafarers who have the most intimate knowledge of their ships and have more reasons to safeguard themselves and their workplaces. The reality, however, is that seafarers are denied active participation in safety and health management and their concerns are not listened to. Instead, the Oil Majors effectively pass their pressure down through the ship managers to the seafarers and force them to passively and silently comply. Among the consequences are work intensification and the falsification of paperwork. The latter does nothing other than to divert seafarers’ time and energy from safety issues and add to their workload. Work intensification in turn can result in fatigue. Although seafarers keep complaining about it, it seems nobody cares to listen.

The supply chain pressure is deeply embedded in this sector and clearly acts as the main source of influence, especially as the industry lacks statutory control. However largely because the Oil Majors’ agenda is not strictly to safeguard seafarers’ OHS but to make economic gains it produces a skewed outcome. While acknowledging the positive contribution made by the Oil Majors’ initiatives, this article suggests that supply chain pressure cannot be an adequate substitute for regulatory power which in particular encourages union involvement or helps in organizing the workforce in terms of health and safety management. It has been repeatedly stressed by researchers (see Walters and Frick, 2000) that top-down pressures alone are more likely to force compliance than to encourage active employee participation – without which management of OHS is inevitably ineffective. Thus, in the tanker sector of shipping, fatigue and its safety consequences remain unaddressed, which in fact, ironically, is exacerbated by the supply chain pressure.

The implications discussed above are not limited to shipping, but can also be applicable to other industries. To implement their initiatives more effectively, perhaps organizations at the top of the supply chain need to set up channels for upward communication. This kind of communication demands representative employee participation, because at a collective level workers are more able to raise their critical voices and make managers attend to them. If left individualized, workers may fear negative consequences and are thus reluctant to say anything, or even if they are willing to say something, managers may feel no pressure to listen.