Searching for equilibrium in labour relations before the EU accession: Developing grassroots trade unions in private companies in Poland

Abstract

The article focuses on an analysis of seven cases of the emergence of trade unions in private companies of the greenfield type in Poland before the EU accession in 2004, when the conditions on the labour market in Poland were at their worst. The formation of a trade union is understood as creating a workers’ instrument, designed to equalize the asymmetrical labour relations within the company. Research data are interpreted according to the perspective of Bourdieu’s forms of capital.

Keywords

Case study cultural capital Poland social capital trade unions

Introduction

As Clark (2000) pointed out, the ability to gain new members, especially in the private sector, is a matter of ‘life or death’ for any trade union in the world. It is the ability to unionize the private sector, which constitutes the main sector of the Polish economy, that determines not only the condition of trade unionism in Poland but its very existence, their ‘to be or not to be’.

There are various reasons and diverse factors in the weakening of trade unions. Some of the major ones are independent of the actions of the unions themselves and occur worldwide. Specifically, it is important to point out the transformation of the economy in the context of globalization, and the changes in the direction of the post-Fordist model of work organization (Gardawski, 2009). Additionally, the trade unions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have weakened and experienced a loss of their members from the very beginning of the period of transition. However, it has to be stressed that the process of membership loss was experienced by trade unions in many developed countries. In general, this process was related to major changes in their economies. In Poland, throughout the 1990s, trade unions were also marginalized. They became entrenched in state-owned enterprises and those temporarily owned by the state treasury during the privatization and restructuring processes (Gardawski et al., 1999). As a consequence, in 2010 the membership in trade unions in Poland stood at only 7% of the adult population, or 15% of the working population (CBOS, 2010).

Up until the late 1990s, the trade union leadership in Poland had not been particularly interested in transforming their organizations, either by organizing in private and privatized companies where there were no trade unions, or by changing the image of the stereotypical unionist as an ignorant and arrogant politicking complainant (Gardawski, 2001). Instead, the key union activists were mainly interested in getting political jobs for themselves, leaving the interests of the workers on the back burner. In 1997 the governing party, AWS,¹ was dominated by the Solidarność leaders, and the OPZZ² confederation had 42 out of 460 MPs in the Polish parliament. Basically they opted just to keep on, trying to merely survive, short-sightedly awaiting ‘better times’ and irrationally believing that ‘it will all work out somehow’ (Ost, 2005). Finally, union leaders were attempting to attract to unions any groups traditionally marginalized in labour relations such as youth, women, or workers in peripheral industries.

This article hopes to contribute and to engage in a discussion on trade union revitalization in Poland. Carola Frege and John Kelly (2004) describe the similarities and differences among various types of union strategies. Within the institutional context of industrial relations, they analyse specific state and employer strategies and the internal structures of unions as crucial for choosing the best approach to helping to strengthen the trade union as a social movement.

The social movement strategy of union organizing includes two different approaches. For Mrozowicki et al. (2010) it is focused on external structures, policies and ideologies of a macro character. The other approach assumes an independence of union activists in their role as social agents. This is similar to Voss’s (2010) explanations. Within US union revitalization strategies since the mid-1990s, two separate models have been explored: a ‘worker-centred unionism’ focused on individual empowerment and deliberative democracy, and a ‘leverage-centred unionism’ which stipulates the democracy stemming from the union’s bargaining power (Voss, 2010). To summarize, within the social movement approach, two models can be distinguished: the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’. Both are based on different visions and strategies.

Studies conducted in Poland suggest that the tendency of the trade unions to lose members can be slowed down or reversed by adopting an organizing strategy (Kozek and Ostrowski, 2003). Such revitalizing strategies in Poland were first studied by Juliusz Gardawski (2001). He pointed out that both of the largest unions (NSZZ [Solidarność] and OPZZ) realized the necessity of strengthening their representation by turning to still non-unionized sectors. David Ost (2002) also focused on revitalizing strategies in the context of CEE. He emphasized the need to reconcile unionism as a social movement with the demands of business unionism. David Ost believes that paradoxically, the latter trend, hotly contested in the contemporary realities of the Western countries, represents an opportunity for trade unions in the post-socialist countries. According to this view, a trade union would strengthen its representation in enterprises by offering and delivering important services to its potential members.

In the late 1990s, the union strategies focused on organizing were implemented by the two main Polish trade union confederations (Mrozowicki and Van Hootegem, 2008). Solidarność adopted the American organizing approach (Krzywdzinski, 2010) of active recruitment, and OPZZ established the Confederation of Labour (Konfederacja Pracy) (Gardawski, 2001). Both strategies were founded as an ‘external’ (top-down) approach to the workers in previously neglected sectors and have already been well researched. These approaches presuppose that the company-level trade union should be established according to the confederation’s organizing model, including planning, supporting, evaluating, etc., strongly connected to ‘leverage-centred unionism’. This article attempts to explain the process of trade union formation at the company level, but without any imposed strategy (bottom-up). It shows that unions can be established through a grassroots initiative, followed by democratic workers’ mobilization, to some extent, independently from the ‘top-down’ model. The article presents therefore a union democracy approach in the union renewal research in the context of CEE.

Grassroots activism has been already studied in the ‘old’ capitalist countries, e.g. research on the German Ver.di and IG Metall unions focused on mobilization-based campaigns (Turner, 2008). Similar studies on Polish workers have also been conducted by Juliusz Gardawski (2001) and Jane Hardy (2009). However, both emphasized the role of the AFL-CIO’s influence on the Solidarność programme on organizing, with the OPZZ responding to it through the actions of its Confederation of Labour. The ‘top-down’ strategy was crucial to both of them, to some extent as the basis for organizing.

Signs of revitalization were noticed at the beginning of 2000s (Gardawski, 2001; Krzywdzinski, 2010; Meardi, 2007a, Meardi, 2007b; Mrozowicki et al., 2010; Ost, 2009). All these attempts, however, were mostly focused on ‘privileged’ workplaces, especially in the automotive sector (Meardi, 2007b) and consequently on the skilled workers (Ost, 2009), that is, on groups that traditionally are the backbone of trade unions. In-depth studies of the peripheral sectors were also conducted, but these related to the public sector (Kubisa, 2011; Ostrowski, 2003) or to a specific period for CEE: after the EU accession in 2004 (Czarzasty, 2010; Krzywdzinski, 2010). In fact, the period after 2004 was characterized by a relatively good situation in the labour market. In Poland this was reflected in the increased level of foreign direct investment (FDI), institutional support from the EU structural funds and increased emigration, mainly to the UK. These three factors significantly contributed to the improvement in the labour market.

Referring to the literature published already in this field, the present article identifies the gap in the knowledge regarding trade union grassroots organizing in the FDI private sector before Poland’s accession to the EU. The article shows that the process of company-level trade union formation was also possible in peripheral sectors, and before the EU accession. This period was characterized by economic recession and the worst labour conditions, where registered unemployment in Poland exceeded 20%. It was in that context that an important thesis about the role of Poland (as an American ‘Trojan horse’) in relation to the European social model was published (Meardi, 2002). The debate on how EU enlargement brought about more ‘civilized’ labour relations and working conditions to Poland must also take into account the dynamics in the widespread European Works Councils and the new forms of consultation which were not seen before 2004 (Hardy and Kozek, 2011). The situation in the labour market, and therefore the adverse position of the workers, are important as a context also in relation to the trade unions’ limited access to the EU structural funds pre-accession. Their capacity building based on the funds, and improved international relations (by membership in the European Economic and Social Committee [EESC] in particular) are significant advantages offered by accession to the EU structures.

The study focuses not only on manufacturing, but also takes into consideration the peripheral greenfield investments in the services sector (retail, security, entertainment). It also represents therefore new sectors of the Polish economy. The core research question is what is the role of grassroots worker activism in the development of trade unions in non-unionized companies in difficult labour market conditions.

It can be seen that the mechanism of bottom-up trade union formation in the CEE context has to be adequately explored, and not only within the industrial relations literature. One of the most important examples of the research focused on bottom-up strategies can be found in Mrozowicki et al. (2010). However, it seems that broader sociological explanations are also needed. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) forms of capital approach can be helpful and will be a useful tool in understanding and explaining the grassroots activism within trade unions in post-socialist Poland. In Bourdieu’s theory, different forms of capital sustain and reproduce social inequalities, and therefore are determinants of the social structure. Asymmetrical relations between employer and workers in terms of distribution are, then, the starting point for organizing a trade union. However, the most important issue is how (under what conditions) the change or conversion can occur. The tendencies of workers to change their unfavourable situation by active grassroots mobilization in the direction of establishing a trade union will be explained by the conversion of capital. The dynamic process of codetermination of the three forms of capital (cultural, social and economic) and in particular the conversion of cultural capital into social capital is, then, a core of the explanation provided in the present article. Additionally, the process of shifting from individual to collective discontent is explained in terms of Blau’s (1964) theory of ‘just exchange’, and the role of collective dissatisfaction, as explained by Kelly (1998). Putnam’s and Fukuyama’s concept of trust is also important in explaining the process of social capital conversion.

An important question remains as to what happens within enterprises in which trade unions emerge not only despite the crisis of their structures but also – to some extent – apart from an organizing strategy. It must be taken into account that the literature on the US and the UK campaigns to organize the unorganized shows that any union’s success lies in a combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies (Voss, 2010), rather than in employing only one of these approaches. According to Voss, although member activism was crucial in the cases analysed, the role of ‘external’ paid union staff was also very important.

This article is an attempt to show why workers of private enterprises decide to create trade unions, what are their motivations and goals, and who plays a decisive role in this process. It shows how Polish unions managed to survive in adverse conditions before the EU accession and how they tended to turn to the bottom-up organizing model.

Research method

The empirical research consisted of seven case studies which examine the process of forming plant-level trade union organizations in Poland.

The choice of the case study research strategy was purposeful and allowed for placing the issues studied in a wider context, helping to understand the complexity of the situation and the process of trade union formation (Kitay and Callus, 1998). It also facilitated the objective analysis of the given social entity in order to discern its typical features, while taking into consideration the complex subject matter, its dependence on outside, wider political, economic and cultural contexts and all the specific relations within these.

Interviews were the most important research techniques. Other techniques included:

Observation: the appearance of the company, visible relations between management facilities and employees’ workplaces, information channels provided between managers and workers, non-verbal reactions during the interview.

Analysis of relevant documents: trade union documents, company documents like magazines or CSR (corporate social responsibility) guidelines.

Analysis of press (including the local press) and company web pages: to examine the company’s market position and its relations with the external environment.

All of above-mentioned help to describe the style of management within the studied company, its market position and the social structure.

In total, 14 interviews were conducted (Table 1). Seven of them were conducted with union activists. In six cases, the respondents were people who initiated the process of trade union formation. In the seventh case, the respondent was a person who had important information about the union’s formation. The other seven interviews were conducted with key persons from the companies studied who represented the employer’s point of view. The most appropriate respondents from this group proved to be heads of personnel units or a management representative for contact with trade unions.

Table 1.

Characteristics of the interviewees.

Company	Workers’ representative (position within company, age, gender)	Employer’s representative (position within company, gender)
Alpha	Rank-and-file, 22, F	CEO, M
Beta	Rank-and-file, 24, M	CEO, M
Gamma	Rank-and-file, 35, M	Head of personnel department, M
Delta	Rank-and-file, 34, F	Head of personnel department, F
Kappa	Rank-and-file, 29, M	Head of personnel department, F
Sigma	Rank-and-file, 31, M	Management representative for contact with trade unions, M
Omega	Supervisor, 38, M	Management representative for contact with trade unions, M

Conversations with top management were undertaken reluctantly, especially as regards CEOs of large companies, where the leaders, while knowledgeable about the general condition of their firms, often have little idea about matters concerning the workers. Only in two cases was a decision taken to interview the chief executive officer (CEO) – in both cases the reason being that the companies did not have any dedicated personnel department and the CEO was the decision-maker at the moment of trade union formation.

Two different interview schemas were designed for these two types of respondents (unionist and the representative of management). The management representatives were first asked about general information regarding the company (how long it has been established in Poland, its characteristics, how many people it employs, what is the chain of command, general condition of the firm), worker-related questions (average age, educational level of workers, salaries, fringe benefits, design of career paths, assessment of general morale, labour relations climate, methods of conflict resolution, level of job retention and work absenteeism). Finally, they were asked about their general opinion with regard to the activity of trade unions and their direct reaction to the formation of a union in the company.

Unionists, on the other hand, were asked first to describe in as much detail as possible the process of forming the trade union. Since they were usually leaders and initiators of creating the trade union cell, they were asked about the direct and indirect reasons for the formation of the union. Specifically, they were asked about the relations between employer and employees in the enterprise, the ways of recruiting their membership, the ways of mobilizing, the duration of this process, the attitude of the management and other workers to trade union formation after the union was established.

The research was conducted in 2003 and 2004. The interviews lasted for approximately one hour. In addition to the interviews, the case studies draw on available supporting information taken from the press, Internet and external and internal company information, as listed earlier. The interviews were recorded. In order to ensure the anonymity of the companies that took part in the research, they had Greek alphabet letters assigned as their names. All of the interviews were conducted in Polish.

The sample comprised greenfield FDI firms in which a trade union had been set up. Two of the firms employed between 80 and 100 workers, four firms employed between 600 and 2000 workers and one company employed 10,000 workers. The sample was drawn from the food processing (1), entertainment (1), retail (2), automotive (2) and security (1) sectors (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Characteristics of the studied companies.

Company	Size (number of workers)	Location	Type of industry	Profile of activity
Alpha	Medium (80)	Large city	Service	Entertainment
Beta	Medium (100)	Large city	Service	Retail
Gamma	Large (600)	Agglomeration/Special economic zone	Production	Automotive
Delta	Large (600)	Large city	Service (FMCG)	Retail
Kappa	Large (900)	Medium-sized city	Production	Food processing
Sigma	Large (1000)	Small city/Special economic zone	Production	Automotive
Omega	Very big (10,000)	Large city/nationwide network	Service	Security

Asymmetry of relations: Searching for equilibrium

Starting point: Asymmetry

The basic model of capital–labour relations assumes that the interaction takes place within the context of an asymmetry of resources (Moerel, 1994). This fits with Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of capital. He postulates that capital configurations take the form of inequality (the structure of superiority and subordination), in any given field (Bourdieu, 1986). They do not lead to cooperation but instead, they sustain and reproduce the ‘superiority’ and inequality in a hierarchical situation. In labour relations it is the employer who has the upper hand; the workers have at their disposal a set of goods of lesser force. The factors that frame the character of employment of the person hired are dependent on the decisions of the employer; thus, the employers are starting from a privileged position and set the structure of inequality.

The analysis of the reasons for bringing about the rise of trade unions shows that the worker has basically no possibility of affecting the shape of the contract and the level of material indicators offered in the contract. Or, in the best case, the worker can exercise only marginal influence. In all studied cases of the situation of inequality, the common feature is the financial asymmetry. The workers complain about the poor wages, their inadequacy in relation to their duties, tasks accomplished, their skills, dedication and work seniority. Low wages are compensated by fringe benefits, and those are coming from the firm’s social benefits fund:

All new workers are employed for a probationary period, usually with part-time (1/4) contract, which implies the salary of 184 Polish zloty monthly. It sometimes happens that the next temporary contract is a full-time one, but the salary per hour is still very low. (Workers’ representative, Alpha)

Usually, all the rank-and-file employees were working 240 hours per month, receiving ca. 1000 Polish zloty net. The workers who disagreed and complained about that, were dismissed. (Workers’ representative, Omega)

The inequalities were enhanced by bad, and sometimes hostile relations between management and workers:

The managers knew what they were doing and how it affected their relations with us. They would tell us: ‘You are to do your job, not to think.’ The workers could not see in their behaviour anything that would benefit the company, the workers, or would lead to gaining competitive advantage. We perceived this behaviour as an organized way of making our lives harder. (Workers’ representative, Beta)

One day, the manager called all the workers shouting: ‘Ants! Come to me!’ He announced that the Saturdays and Sundays were usually free of work, but not for us. And once more, when closing the meeting he offensively shouted: ‘Ants! Back to work!’ (Workers’ representative, Kappa)

The workers’ complaints focused on an authoritarian, despotic style of management, humiliating treatment of subordinates, and arrogance. Other factors were: working in an atmosphere of uncertainty, temporariness and the prevalence of stress-generating situations. A total picture of the cases studied fully supports this statement (see Table 3).

Table 3.

External effects of asymmetry in labour relations as reported by worker interviewees.

Company	External effects of asymmetry indicated by workers
Alpha	Low wages and lack of pay rises; no motivation and lack of career advancement paths (climate of temporariness); significant turnover (climate of uncertainty); new workers have fewer rights; poor interpersonal relations with one of the supervisors
Beta	Poor relations between workers and company management; career advancement only for the ‘trusted’; authoritarian style of managing; poor safety at work, low wages and impossible work goals for achieving bonuses; lack of any influence over the expenditure of the company’s social benefits funds
Gamma	Career advancement only for ‘trusted’ workers, who often are incompetent leaders of a team, regarded by other workers as instruments of control and the source of conflict (‘hunting for errors’ in quality control); low wages; management’s conviction that the workers will never organize a union
Kappa	Low wages and no pay rises; too heavy workload; stressful, arrogant middle-level management (work is a ‘horror’); uncertainty regarding future in the firm; lack of possibilities of influencing the way the firm’s social benefit funds are spent; facade-like system of circulating information
Sigma	Only foreigners are likely to advance (blocking career advancement for local workers); wages lower than offered in a nearby large enterprise
Omega	Low wages; manipulation of work time and wages for overtime and night shifts (a system of low wages for ‘gigantic’ workload); lack of any motivational system; lack of influence over the firm’s social benefit funds; lack of possibility to advance; uncertainty as to the future

On the way to change: From individual to collective

Kelly (1998: 30) points out that, ‘social identification entails the process whereby people develop a sense of themselves as a distinct group, “we”, defined in opposition to an outgroup, “them”, which has different interests and values’. Individual discontent with the work and relations between worker and employer has to become collective dissatisfaction. The injustice should be shared by the group. A certain set of norms – reciprocity and expectations – controls the exchange of goods. One of the more important norms is the one that regulates the ‘just exchange’ (Blau, 1964). If the rules are not respected by one side, we get a violation of the just exchange norm. The weaker side decides then to look for another partner who would serve its interests, and guarantee that the rules of exchange are respected. In such a situation, the workers will look for an instrument which could change the rules of the current asymmetric relation (exchange). The main goal of the workers is to reclaim the control of the resources held by the stronger side as a result of their function and position, and to establish control over the resources achieved collectively (not by the individuals but by the group).

In the cases studied, the means towards this end turned out to be the trade union. It has features of the collectively achieved good, i.e. it is supposed to realize goals impossible to achieve through individual strategies (Hechter, 1990). A trade union is formed and, in theory, is supposed to function within the framework of maximizing usefulness through giving up control over goods accessible to individuals, and creating a new cooperative situation based on entering the state of equilibrium (by Nash) towards the social optimum, according to the principle that a union common good is not an arithmetic sum of individual resources (Coleman, 1998). In other words, the employees feel entitled to their demands and feel that there is some chance that their situation can be changed by ‘collective agency’ (Kelly, 1998: 29).

In addition, these relations should be looked at in a wider social context which influences and determines the ability to fully utilize the resources of each side. Workers in certain conditions, in the context of the intervening factors, undertake the decision to form a trade union, taking into consideration a subjectively drafted analysis of costs and benefits. This is close to the concept of agency used by Mrozowicki et al. (2010) to explain the revitalization of trade unions in Poland. Their analysis shows how the interaction of stable cultural motivations, union reflectivity and the context of institutional change creates the conditions for union revitalization and improves the unfriendly institutional context of the union. It can be therefore assumed that the trade union’s formation cannot be analysed as simply reacting unilaterally to the changes of external structural processes (i.e. ‘external’ organizing model), but rather as a reciprocal interaction of the external and the internal factors. These mutual interventions are subjectively understood as continuous redefining of own orders, and as an internal game in which the external interacts with the subjective choices.

According to the empirical observations, the most important external factors intervening in the process of trade union formation are: (1) management style, (2) internal labour market dualism and (3) the enterprise’s position within the environment (see Table 4).

Table 4.

Factors influencing/intervening in the process of trade union formation.

Company	Authoritarian style of management	Division and distance between management and rank-and-file workers	Operation of the company in a competitive market
Alpha	+	+	+
Beta	+	+	+
Gamma	+	+	+
Delta	+	+	+
Kappa	+	+ (also division into ‘key’ and ‘easily replaceable’ workers)	+
Sigma	–	–	+ (internal competitiveness)
Omega	+	+	+

As far as management style is concerned, in all cases, authoritarian forms of shaping the labour relationship were universally rejected by workers, who treated them as a violation of their personal integrity, contrary to the principle of partnership cooperation. Consequently, such authoritarian forms were strongly contested.

All the companies studied operate in highly competitive markets, in a situation of high sensitivity to the fluctuations of the local, state and global economy, uncertain future and potential stormy changes. In all cases studied, the firms are facing strong competition and pressure to cut costs. This, in turn, results in the development of a specific policy of cost-cutting, focused on the conditions of recruitment. The companies offer wages lower than the local average, without fringe benefits or any bonuses, even in periods of intensified workload.

The next factor conducive to the emergence of labour unions is the internal dual labour market. In all cases in a situation of a relatively even organizational structure, the large cohorts of people of similar age, similar level of formal education, with similar world views, and remaining in almost identical socioeconomic conditions, were visibly opposed to the management:

We take responsibility for our work. We train all new employees, familiarize them with the products, train them how to respond effectively to the customer’s demands. We also support the creation of appropriate relations with the management. … After work we continue to mingle. We usually go to a nearby bus stop, drink beer purchased at a petrol station and talk about problems at work. (Workers’ representative, Beta)

It has to be emphasized that the clear-cut division separating management and rank-and-file workers was observed in almost every case explored. This division strongly connects with the recognition of the internal structure by the workers themselves. The workers recognized the distinction between ‘we’ and ‘them’ in terms of management–workers distance, at first glance. A phenomenon similar to Marxian class division in capitalist society.

When collective means ‘a trade union’: The role of Bourdieu’s cultural capital

At this moment, an important question may be posed: why did workers not leave their firm because of the unfavourable conditions? The answer could be provided by the concept of ‘voice’ developed by Hirschman (1970). On the level of the company, the answer should be sought in substantial uncertainty, connected with a difficult and potentially long period of new job search, as well as the memory of the past formal and informal cooperation between workers. That is why Hirschman’s ‘exit’ strategy could not be applied. Another question is why, in fact, did workers decide on a trade union as an answer (‘voice’, in Hirschman’s terminology)? Other strong strategic reactions available to the workers in such situations could be wildcat strikes, productivity slowdown, considerable work fluctuation and/or refusal to cooperate with an employer and/or the other workers.

Cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and its conversion into social capital seems to be the best answer as to why the workers decided to create the trade union. Cultural capital for Bourdieu can exist in three forms, of which only one – the embodied ‘form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body’ – is useful within the framework of analysis undertaken in the present article. This form of capital mainly includes education and language skills, but can also be understood in a wider sense, as an orientation towards a certain sort of values. Bourdieu (1986: 18) shows that the embodied state is nothing but ‘external wealth converted into an integral part of the person’, the cultural ‘personality’ (including values, norms and rules) indicating the nature and way of thinking of a person.

Taking on board Bourdieu’s concept of the embodied form of cultural capital, the basis for the formation of collective consciousness is individual possession of the cultural capital embodiment that pertains to trade unions. These are the defining values of justice and equality (as opposed to asymmetry) in capital–labour relations: dignity, clarity and predictability of the work situation; and honesty on the part of management towards the workers. The composition of these values is connected with a certain set of norms respected by the workers. The most important norms are those that pertain to preserving the intergroup solidarity (reciprocal support and collegial help); in sum, preserving the implementation of workers’ interests.

The unionists in the cases studies were fighting to restore the state of normalcy including the recognition of the role of workers and those who represent their collective interests. ‘Normalcy’ means for them not only accepting the conditions of work but also acknowledgement of the workers and their representatives’ interests.

The mere fact that the individual has a well-defined cultural capital focused on values of justice and equality at the workplace does not make it inevitable that the circumstances necessary for the formation of trade unions will also be present. It is only a starting point, a basis for the situation of social discontent (see Blau, 1964; Kelly, 1998). In order to develop, it would require extension of internalized resources (values and norms) into the external situation accessible only to individuals. This is the necessary condition for collective consciousness, which may only take the form of shared beliefs, values and norms and their externalization.

The key role in the process of cultural capital externalization is played by the workers’ leader. This is to stress that rank-and-file workers do not share any explicit ‘union-friendly’ behaviour. What they do have is the internalized and individualized cultural capital related to the situation of justice and equality at the workplace. Workers oppose the unfriendly relations in the company, and implicitly are ready to act to change them. The relation between internalized and unconscious potential for trade union development individualized by workers and its externalization is similar therefore to the Marxian distinction between ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’. The internalized capital (as cultural resources necessary to change in the case of problems at work) is rather a category (an instrument) which refers to workers but – what is the most important – is externalized and objectivized by the leader in the direction of the trade union. Only the leader has the potential then to use the discontent (anger, injustice of the exchange, etc.) and transform it into the trade union development process. It means that both workers and the leader have the internalized cultural capital referring to the values of justice at the workplace. But only the leader has the internalized cultural capital referring to the trade union and only the leader has the potential to externalize and objectivize it collectively into a trade union:

As a former member of a Trotskyst organization I know what the role of trade unions in the company should be. (Workers’ representative, Omega)

I was talking about the problems at work with members of my family. I received a lot of positive information about trade unions from my uncle – a rank-and file trade union member. (Workers’ representative, Alpha)

As a Pole, I know what Solidarność trade union has done for democracy. We must continue this in my company. (Workers’ representative, Delta)

Similarly to Kelly’s (1998) explanation, the leader plays the role of mobilizing workers by promoting, urging and defending the collective action. However, Kelly’s mobilization concept does not presuppose any role of internalization of pro-union potential among workers mobilized by the leader. In the cases studied in this article, the role of the leader lies in freeing the internalized values and attitudes among the reluctant workers and reworking them into shared and objectivized values (see Table 5). By referring to the leader, workers come to believe in change, and from then on they perceive the trade union as a tool to achieve their goals.

Table 5.

The attitudes of the workers’ leaders in the studied enterprises.

Company	Workers’ leader	Proof of cultural capital regarding trade unions
Alpha	Present Key role Assembly line supervisor and deputy supervisor	Knowledge about trade unions from family members; positive examples
Beta	Present Key role Rank-and-file worker	Knowledge about trade unions acquired from higher education studies, newspapers; strong conviction about the need for trade unions; leftist beliefs of the workers’ leader
Gamma	Present Key role Charismatic, long-time member of a union in a coalmine, participant in many union workshops	Region with a strong union tradition; conviction of the need of workers’ solidarity and sense of collective action; ability to take advantage of legal assistance from the other unions in the region
Delta	Present Key role in the union headquarters Charisma (issuing the call to join the union)	Traditions of union headquarters; belief in using expert advice; positive sentiment towards tradition and the history of the trade union; viewing reality with an open mind; constantly maintaining activity in the organization
Kappa	Present, but nominated by the action of the union headquarters Never thought about union organizing, but when he found a union leaflet, he decided that ‘something can be done in the firm’ (organizing resembles ‘guerrilla warfare’)	Belief in the need to fight for workers’ rights; collective action in collaboration with the union headquarters
Sigma	Initially absent, enters in later period and plays a key role in energizing the union	While working abroad, learning about the effectiveness of trade unions’ activities and benefits resulting from collective actions
Omega	Present Initiator, driving force, mobilization facilitator, office worker (extensive knowledge and information) Attentive to the needs of ‘the base’	Leftist beliefs of the workers’ leader; need for the trade unions to exist; a natural reflex of ‘going against the grain’

In other words, the leader becomes the facilitator of the collective consciousness. The role of the leader is clearly visible in the case of Sigma in which the management was the key agent of the trade union’s formation. But it was only when the workers identified a leader that the already existing but rather apathetic union finally became energized and ‘put on the right track’.

The role of the leader can be also analysed as a part of the trade union renewal and mobilization strategies in the context of ideology, the struggle ‘for the hearts and minds of people’ (Hyman, 1999). As Kelly (1998: 29) indicates, the ideologies help identify the most salient features of the relationship, supply a set of emotionally loaded categories for thinking about the exchange in terms of group interests and provide a set of categories and ideas that label the interests of one’s own group as rights.

Conversion into social capital

The category of Bourdieu’s cultural capital as defined above is a starting point and a necessary condition for working out the concept of social capital, or the network of individual workers’ relations, linked into a goal which can only be achieved through a collective action. It means that, using the terminology of Bourdieu, cultural capital becomes converted into social capital. The characteristic features of social capital are its indestructibility, a collectively owned set of goods and the ability to lower the cost of transactions.

In this way, the development of social capital rather than an external organizing model seems to be a crucial contributing factor to the emergence of a trade union organization. In this sense, social capital is a secondary construction with respect to cultural capital, but it is a necessary condition for the process of the formation of a trade union. People operating within one social network begin to notice that the practical implementation of certain goals (rules, values and norms shared by members of the group) can only be achieved with the support of a trade union.

In addition, of great importance is the category of trust (Fukuyama, 2005; Putnam, 1993), which plays a key role in the process of capital conversion. First, trust between workers is the effect of the dichotomous relationship between workers and employer; second, the result of a similar socioeconomic position among workers in the dual structure of the company. For Fukuyama (2005), social capital results from the development of trust in society, which is created and transferred through the cultural mechanisms: religion, traditions and historical habit:

I knew how to create a trade union from my classes at the university. And as the workers respected me, they believed this could be a good solution. (Workers’ representative, Beta)

The workers were looking for a ‘wise guy’, who could help them, explain what to do and how. They trusted me. (Workers’ representative, Omega)

What about the top-down involvement?

The present study shows that this is not an ‘either/or’ dilemma. Moreover, a complete independence from the top-down strategy for grassroots trade unions development is somewhat difficult. Two models can be found therefore, and can be named as a ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger combination’ of the trade union top-down strategy.

Weak combination

Trade unions were formed independently from the ‘external’ top-down strategy, but they were not in fully independent of the ‘big’ unions. The trade union development process and initiative of the leader remained internal (at the company level), but to a certain extent they were also associated with and supported by the trade union confederations. As a consequence, all the trade unions studied – at the moment of their development – joined one of the two main union confederations: Alpha – OPZZ, Beta – OPZZ, Gamma – Solidarność, Delta – Solidarność, Kappa – Solidarność, Sigma – Solidarność, Omega – OPZZ. So, the process of legitimizing the company-level trade union required the involvement of the established trade union structures. The unions studied have also received all kinds of necessary support after the formal legitimization process.

Strong combination

The trade union development was related to the ‘external’ trade union initiative (leaflets, talks with local leaders), but it was not an imposed (top-down) strategy (the relation between Sigma and Solidarność could be defined as ‘strong’ to some extent because the company’s management and the trade unions of the country of origin in particular had a strong influence in establishing the trade union in Sigma).

Neither weak nor strong involvement with the union confederations meant a rejection of bottom-up initiatives, but nor can we see a separate, external top-down strategy in the case studies. It means that the grassroots trade union formation process based on the union democracy principle was recognized: the externalization of the cultural capital and its conversion were without any external union support. Simultaneously, in all cases some relations with the ‘big’ unions were present.

Reactions of management

The representatives of management in the companies studied displayed varied reactions to the creation of the trade unions. In two cases (Alpha and Beta), management decided to destroy the union. One possible explanation may be that in the situation of limited information and limited predictability, the management concluded that the cost of the trade union’s existence in the context of the changed rules of exchange of resources with the workers would become too high, and this transformation would be unfavourable for the management. The latter feared too many losses in the context of new types of relations, so they decided to eliminate the union. Their point of view is that the costs of such a decision are much smaller than the costs of accepting the new status quo. In this case, we are dealing with an incomplete conversion of cultural into social capital.

A separate issue is the problem of explaining management’s reaction. This could be clarified also with the support of the concept of Bourdieu’s cultural capital, this time internalized by the Polish managers in relation to trade unions. Gardawski (2001) presents two possible positions taken by management. The first is ‘ambiguously positive’. The management assumes that the functions of trade unions are generally positive, but rejects the activity of the Polish trade unions, which are characterized as ‘having a genetic defect which makes it a cure worse than disease’ (Gardawski, 2001: 188). The second position is simply hostility to all trade unions, and the emergence of any workers’ organization is viewed by management as a doomsday event.

In the remaining five cases, management allowed the existence of a trade union. Probably, not knowing the precise consequences of the emergence of a trade union, management decided at first that to eliminate the trade unions would cost a lot. In these cases, we are dealing with full conversion of cultural into social capital within the trade unions. As a result, the management was not able to eliminate the unions. Under these conditions, the management was forced to implement a policy of either making the union’s activities difficult (the path of ‘making it difficult’) or entering into a more or less institutionalized cooperation with the unions, in which case the rules of exchange would have to change. In the latter instance, it seems that any conflict with the workers’ trade unions would appear to management to be too costly (hence the ‘path of cooperation’). The role of the union leader is clearly visible in the case of Sigma, where the management had been the key facilitator of the trade union’s formation. But it was only when the workers identified a leader that the existing but rather apathetic union finally became energized.

Conclusions

The Polish workers, not just the ‘privileged ones’, have more resources at their disposal than is usually acknowledged. These can be used even in bad labour market conditions, as was observed just before the EU accession. Moreover, under certain conditions, the workers can organize on their own initiative, as they do not necessarily need support from outside the factory gate and/or to refer the ‘external’ organizing model applied in different industrial relation systems.

Consequently, three preconditions that lead workers to create trade unions have been observed. The first is an authoritarian management style – management’s belief in its superiority and the right to act arbitrarily. Workers found this type of labour relations unacceptable and therefore they strongly contested it.

The second factor conducive to creating trade unions results from the internal dual labour market structure, which is the basis for forming the ‘soul of the group’ and leads to the ability to contest the existing conditions of labour relations rather than quitting the firm or accepting the status quo. By exploiting the formal regulations characteristic for the trade unions, as well as manifesting a symbolic strength (in the form of ‘we, too, can do it’), workers consolidated through group solidarity and pressure to change the rules. The workers characterize the present situation as a violation of the principle of ‘justice’.

The third factor conducive to the change of rules is the role of the workers’ leaders. In the cases studied, the company-level trade union leaders did not use (or did so only to a small extent) the ‘external’ organizing trade union strategy. The development of social capital rather than an external organizing model seems to be a crucial contributory factor to the emergence of a trade union organization in these case studies. It was shown that the influence of the leader’s cultural capital in relation to trade unionism, in line with Pierre Bourdieu’s concept, played the crucial role. It should be stressed once again that only the leader has the potential to utilize the workers’ discontent and transform it into the trade union development process. Richard Hyman (2001) argues that the dual challenge including not only the ‘over-company’ trade union strategy but the genuine mechanisms for more vigorous grassroots participation can provide a useful model of trade union revitalization. But does it mean that no kind of organizing strategy is necessary in the context of revitalization?

The cases studied prove that the confederated trade union structures are very much needed in the process of trade union development. The trade union confederations support, provide experts and training facilities. They have also relevant experience. The evidence presented in this article seems to confirm the results of the research conducted in the US and UK, which showed the importance of the combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies in organizing strategies (Voss, 2010).

However, it seems that at the very beginning of the process of trade union development, the trade union confederations do not play such an important role, in particular through their ‘top-down’ organizing model. To be more specific, it seems that the lack of influence on the development of cultural capital among the workers might be a crucial problem in this respect. Therefore, it must be emphasized that the trade union confederations should be more focused on raising awareness of the importance of trade unions in the workplace as an effective tool to reduce the asymmetry between employers and employees by enhancing the cultural capital of present workers (and leaders) or those in the future. This can be done also through education in schools, for example, and/or engaging in social movements.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biographies

Piotr Ostrowski is a lecturer at the Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Poland. His main research interests include trade unions, social dialogue and conflict in industrial relations analysis.

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