Abstract
This article reviews the 510-day strike by women irregular workers in the South Korean retail industry, and analyses factors which made a group of women irregular workers, whose employment conditions render them the most marginal employees, to sustain a lengthy struggle despite financial and family pressures. This article argues there are three factors behind the struggle: first their desire to address the employment discrimination and inhumane treatment they faced at work; second their belief that the struggle was larger than just their immediate demands; and third the solidarity and support they received from both the union and full-time colleagues and from the broader community.
Keywords
One day last winter I got a text from my oldest son which read: ‘They finally cut off the electricity.’ I couldn’t reply … I came home after a long day of action and late-night meetings. I cried all night as I thought about what to do. Am I making the right choice, considering what my family and I are going through? There is nothing to eat in the house, our life is a mess, but I am still out on the street waging this fight, turning my back on my family’s pain. Am I doing the right thing as the mother to my children? (Part-time worker, Company H, cultural festivities to commemorate the 300th day of the strike, 17 April 2008)
Introduction
On 30 June 2007, about 600 mostly women workers employed by a supermarket chain (Company H in Group EL) in the Republic of Korea took control of the company’s largest store, the W store, and launched their fight for job security and equality for irregular workers and against outsourcing. On 8 July, workers of another supermarket chain (Company N), but part of the same corporate group, took control of the group’s biggest store, the G store, and started their fight for the same demands. The E-N struggle, named after the two unions 1 involved, continued for 510 days.
Also on 8 July, workers took over and occupied 22 stores nationally, of which 16 stores suffered interruption to business. In response to the strike, and for the first time in the history of the union movement in the Republic of Korea, the more militant peak union organization, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), convened a nationwide delegates’ meeting around the case of one single workplace to discuss support action. In addition, declarations of support and solidarity rallies by non-government organizations (NGOs), political parties and individuals also occurred regularly. Public support was also strong and included a nationwide boycott of the company.
Historically, in the Republic of Korea women workers have been at the forefront of union activism and industrial action. However, this activism has largely been associated with single women in full-time, secure jobs (Chun S, 2003; see Kim S-K, 1997; Koo, 2001; Park M-N, 2005; Park N, 2009). Irregular women workers, many of whom are married, are recognized as the most marginalized in the labour market and are the least likely to be unionized (Kim Y, 2004a). In 2010, women represented 53.8% of irregular workers 2 and 63.4% of women were employed as irregular workers, yet it was estimated that only 1.9% were unionized (Kim Y-S, 2010). There are few examples and very little literature that details industrial action taken by workers in irregular employment, particularly women (Chun JJ, 2005, 2009; Moon and Broadbent, 2008). In the past 40 years, women’s workforce participation has increased from 39.3% (1970) to 49.9% (2014), with a declining birth rate and less time spent in child raising. By irregular workers, we mean those who are employed in temporary or part-time employment, and it is work characterized by long working hours, low wages, job insecurity, limited social protection and low rates of unionization. The majority of irregular workers are employed in small to medium enterprises or micro businesses, which are not particularly welcoming to unionization (Eun, 2009). Many irregular workers average 45 hours per week, equivalent to the hours of regular workers (Korean National Statistics Office, 2008).
In 2010, irregular employees represented 61.5% of the retail workforce, a slight decline from 2008 when it was 64.4% (Kim Y-S, 2010). This figure represents only those employed directly. The government has no reliable figures on the numbers of dispatch workers or those employed to promote products in store, 3 and large employers will not reveal their figures. A survey of three stores within a top supermarket company revealed that women comprised about 20% of regular staff, 100% of directly employed irregular staff and about 70% of dispatch workers or promoters (Kim Y, 2006: 102).
Contributing to the limited number of studies on marginally employed women workers in the Republic of Korea, this article looks at one group of irregular women workers in retail and their struggle for better treatment and employment conditions, and an end to the outsourcing of their jobs. The article discusses factors that contributed to the E-N struggle and addresses the following question: Why were a group of women irregular workers, whose employment conditions render them the most marginal employees, able to sustain a struggle for 510 days despite financial and family pressures? This article argues there are three factors that contributed to their ability to continue their struggle: (1) their desire to address employment discrimination; (2) their belief that the struggle was larger than just their immediate demands; and (3) the solidarity and support they received from the union, full-time colleagues and the broader community. In looking at irregular workers in the E-N struggle, this study contributes to the literature that explores the treatment of marginalized workers, the role of women workers and irregular workers in taking industrial action, and the impact of community-based coalitions. The study is significant as it highlights how irregular women workers, despite the precariousness of their employment and their social marginalization, are able to conduct and sustain industrial action when supported by their unions. This article is structured as follows: we start with a discussion of women and irregular workers in the labour market; this is followed by an overview of the E-N strike and an analysis of the factors that sparked and sustained the struggle. We conclude with some reflections on the struggle.
Literature
Women have long played a central role in industrializing economies but they have nevertheless typically occupied a marginal place in the labour market. Since Kessler-Harris (1975) asked ‘Where are the organized women workers?’, a significant and growing literature in the English language has begun to reclaim the roles women have played in industrial action. To cite some examples, non-unionized Japanese silk workers in 1886 launched the first recorded strike against increased working hours, lower wages and harsh treatment. Their four-day strike succeeded in minimizing some of the increases to working hours (Sievers, 1983: 81). The matchgirls’ strike at Bryant and May in East London, where work in the factories was often casual, is quoted as being the ‘small spark that ignited the blaze of revolt and the wildfire spread of trade unionism among the unskilled’ (Kapp, 1979: 270). The Lawrence (US) textile strike is hailed as the greatest women’s strike (Cliff, 1984: 58), where ‘more women than men appear to have been arrested for intimidating scabs while picketing … they refused to pay the fine, choosing rather to go to jail’ (Foner, 1965: 323). Women textile workers in Russia, by ‘demanding bread and herrings’ (Stites, 1978: 290), sparked events leading to the February revolution in 1917 and continued to fight for the overthrow of the autocracy. The 1981 strike at Kortex Australia showed how women workers can overcome barriers such as disinterested male union officialdom, a linguistically diverse workplace, limited English language skills and inexperience in industrial action to wage a 10-day strike and successfully achieve their demands and stand up to baton-wielding, gun-toting police and bullying and intimidation from the company (Bloodworth, 1998: 124). In many of the countries where they took industrial action, women workers were not unionized or they were ignored by their workplace union, and their actions, while often spontaneous, occurred within a context of industrial or civil militancy. Other studies, although not specifically focusing on women irregular workers and industrial action (see Eun, 2009; Peetz and Ollett, 2004), highlight the action women irregular workers have taken.
The marginal employment of female workers in the Republic of Korea, as elsewhere, presents a number of industrial and social problems: a permanent pool of poorly paid workers whose existence undermines wider employment standards and a population that is unable to enjoy the normal living standards associated with advanced economies. Significantly, the redress of such issues has long been a concern of unions. Studies of casual dockside workers in the United Kingdom and Australia detail their battles to retain job autonomy (see Sheridan, 1994; Turnbull and Sapsford, 1992) and show how these workers, after bitter battles, became highly unionized. In Korea, the lengthy struggles waged by fixed-term workers at Korean Telecom, ready mix concrete truck-drivers and sub-contracted manufacturing workers succeeded in bringing the employment discrimination faced by irregular workers to the attention of union activists (Chun JJ, 2009: 544). Recently, Simms and Dean’s article on unionized fixed-term workers in universities and the performing arts shows that non full-time workers usually excluded from unions can be mobilized when ‘salient collective interests are identified’ (2015: 188). This is reinforced by a survey of women irregular workers in the Republic of Korea, where 61.8% responded that they would ‘participate in a work related struggle that concerned them if it occurred’ (Kim Y, 2004a: 236).
Where irregular workers have been excluded from the mainstream unions, in some cases they have looked to alternative forms of organization. In Japan and the Republic of Korea, women-only unions have formed to provide organizational strength for women, both irregular and permanent workers, in negotiating employment conditions (Broadbent, 2007). When a survey asked women workers in the Republic of Korea why they were not union members, 54.6% stated that ‘they weren’t eligible’. Two-thirds stated they would be members if they could and married women had a stronger union consciousness compared to single women, 80% compared to 63.2% (Kim Y, 2004a: 222–232). Temporary workers’ unions and community-based unions have also formed in the Republic of Korea and Japan to assist workers employed in industries where union organization is weak or who are excluded from the mainstream enterprise union.
The material conditions of employment, power and control (see Hyman, 1984: 92–98) which encompass the treatment of irregular workers in the workplace explain why workers take industrial action. In analysing the E-N struggle we understand the employment relationship is by its nature conflictual and workers take collective action when crises in the employment relationship emerge. Analysis of the E-N struggle indicates it to be an example of class struggle in the Marxist sense, with the working class – including from within the broader community – fighting against the injustice and repression meted out by the state and the ruling class, and challenging capital’s power (Barker et al., 2013).
Research indicates that in waging struggles workers and unions are incorporating new and innovative strategies (see Adler and Webster, 1995; Fine, 2005; Moody, 1997; Waterman, 1993) including grassroots activities and forming alliances with groups outside the workplace (Waterman, 1993: 266–267). The E-N struggle occurs within the context of the newly introduced labour legislation and defeats of earlier struggles of irregular workers. The retail workers and their union reached out to and drew on the resources of the wider community, a strategy used elsewhere (see, for example, Hose, 2012; Wiseman, 1998). According to Frege et al., unions enter coalitions for several reasons but the one most relevant to this study is the necessity to build strength in order to challenge the state and powerful employers in the broader political arena as a result of their exclusion from the political process where they are denied access to the governing party (Frege et al., 2003: 127). In drawing on community networks, the E-N struggle allowed for broader discussion on questions of social justice and equity and against discrimination in the Republic of Korea. The focus on improving employment conditions for irregular women workers employed in these supermarkets gave the community an opportunity to voice concerns about the treatment of workers more generally and specifically of older, women workers. The struggle gave the community the chance to express discontent with capitalism in the Republic of Korea where ‘struggles against oppression … are mutually interdependent parts of the struggle against capitalism as a totality’ (Barker, 2013: 53).
The Republic of Korea is a relevant case for analysis due to the size and extent of the irregular workforce, of whom despite their employment status as ‘irregular’ many, especially those defined as part-time, are working full-time hours. As Doogan suggests, the majority of part-time workers in this study were employed ‘on a regular ongoing basis’ (2009: 155). Despite the existence of legislation prohibiting discrimination, women in the labour market continue to face discrimination both as women and as part-time workers when employed part-time (Park M-N, 2005). The place of women in the labour market has attracted considerable attention (Park M-N, 2005); however, this research has been largely restricted to those in the most secure areas of employment. While there is a growing literature analysing the unionization of irregular workers in the Republic of Korea (Chun JJ, 2005, 2009; Kim Y, 2004a, 2004b), research in English is limited (Chun JJ, 2005, 2009; Moon and Broadbent, 2008). Analysing the E-N strike provides an insight into the discrimination in employment and the impact of legislation in exacerbating the discrimination faced by women irregular workers and outlines the extent capital and the state work in tandem to smash workers asserting their rights. The E-N strike challenged the legitimacy of the employers’ actions and those of the state in creating the legislation that left irregular employees vulnerable to dismissal within the two-year period before which they would qualify for a regular employment contract.
Methodology
To address the research questions posed, 19 participants involved in the strike (December 2007–April 2008) were interviewed. Follow-up interviews were conducted in 2009 and 2010. The respondents included married women irregular workers, managers, union officials and activists (see Table 1) who took part in solidarity actions and were all central figures in the strike. The interviews provide a first-hand account of the strike, providing a rich source of qualitative data.
Description of interviewees.
The data gathering was shaped by the concept of institutional ethnography (Smith, 1987, 2002), which was developed to give voice to women and make ‘women’s situation and experience the basis for social inquiry’ (Smith, 1987: 152). This methodology places women at the centre and provides a mechanism for analysing work practices ‘as articulated to and determined by the generalized and generalizing relations of the economy and ruling apparatus’ (Smith, 1987: 167). Using this methodology allows the focus to shift to those who are ‘at the margins’ of the South Korean labour force, but yet are essential to economic productivity. In this way we can also investigate how the actions of the state play out in the workplace and the impact these actions have on irregular women workers.
Interviews with irregular workers of each company were first conducted in groups, taking five to six hours each, and were followed up by individual interviews taking between one and four hours. The union provided introductions to the irregular workers and managers. None of the married women interviewees had ever participated in collective action, union activities or a workplace occupation prior to the E-N struggle, and so the data give voice to a group of workers who were new to union militancy but were marginalized socially and politically.
The interviews allowed for an examination of the social relations (Smith, 2002: 18) that exist in the work of irregular women workers and how they are shaped by the wider context. Given their significance to the national workforce and these organizations, the interviews with these 19 participants (see Table 1) provide a useful insight into the problems faced by women in marginal employment. Until the strike only the irregular workers employed by E-N companies were unionized in Korean supermarkets. The interviewees are representative of women workers employed in the irregular workforce – in age and marital status – and their experiences of irregular employment symbolize those of other women in the irregular workforce, such as the Hyundai cafeteria workers (Moon and Broadbent, 2008), train attendants and country club golf caddies (Chun JJ, 2009). The nature of the strike and the sharply drawn lines between capital and labour limited the ability to interview employers; however, secondary sources such as newspapers provided a useful avenue for understanding the employer position and commentary on the strike, and the wider public perception. The small sample size is a limitation but emphasizes the limited amount of research that has been conducted in this field and provides what is hopefully a starting point for a far better appreciation.
Marginal employment in the Republic of Korea
The economy in the Republic of Korea is dominated by the service sector in terms of percentage GDP and number of employees (see Tables 2 and 3). Fifteen per cent of the workforce is employed in retail, which is higher than the OECD reported average (Doogan, 2009: 150). Since 1970, the number of women employees has increased significantly. The percentage of wage workers among women was 28.6% in 1970 (men 44.8%) and increased to 72.9% in 2010 (men 70.0%) (Korean National Statistics Office, 2012). Women’s workforce participation increased from 39.3% in 1970 to 49.9% in 2014, but the quality of their employment remains low. The gender wage gap has remained at 63.7%, and women irregular workers’ earnings (the hourly wage ratio) represent only 40.6% of a male regular worker’s wage (Kim Y, 2010: 178). Since the beginning of industrialization to the present day, irregular work has been the major form of women’s work.
Industrial sector as a percentage of GDP, 1970 and 2012.
Source: KB Research Institute (2014).
Employees by industrial sector, 1980 and 2010 (%).
Source: Korea National Statistics Office (2012).
Women are represented across all ages in the irregular workforce but their number increases for those aged from their late twenties. 4 The number of women irregular workers has declined from 74.3% in 2000 to 56.1% in 2014 but for women workers, the ‘typical’ worker is an irregular worker (Kim Y, 2004a). In supermarkets, irregular workers employed directly by the company are women, and women represent 70% of those employed through labour hire agencies (Kim Y, 2006).
Irregular work is characterized by long working hours, low wages, job insecurity, limited social protection and low rates of unionization. Irregular workers are paid only half the wages of regular workers (Korea National Statistics Office, 2012), a gap in earnings which is at the higher end of the OECD average (Doogan, 2009: 156). Discrimination against irregular workers, especially married women employed as irregular workers, also occurs in national pension and health insurance coverage, which is compulsory and paid by employers. This reflects Doogan’s assertion that the difference in benefits is greater between part-time and full-time workers (2009: 156) and highlights the disadvantage irregular workers will suffer in their later years. Employment insurance, which is supposed to extend to all workers, only covers 30% of women irregular workers, and only 20% of women irregular workers receive benefits such as retirement pay and paid leave, a much lower percentage than male irregular employees (Kim Y, 2010: 180).
Legal changes: The Act to Protect Fixed-term and Part-time Workers
The start of the E-N struggle was precipitated by management’s response in the lead-up to the Act to Protect Fixed-term and Part-time Workers (hereafter the Act), effective from 1 July 2007. Following the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, irregular employment increased sharply and the government introduced this Act to manage the growing irregular workforce. Clearly, the government recognized there was an issue in employers’ treatment of irregular workers. On the surface, the Act appears to address the unfair treatment faced by irregular workers, such as including a conversion to regular employment after a qualifying period and abolishing discrimination on the basis of employment contract if performing the same job; but, as can be seen by the E-N situation, the Act exposes irregular workers to massive dismissals, in effect creating legal pathways for illegal employer practices. The Act contains two key points: first, workers employed for two or more years would automatically be considered to have an open-ended employment contract (or equivalent to a regular worker) with exceptions; and second, that there be no discrimination on the basis of type of employment contract between workers performing identical or similar jobs (National Legal Information Service, n.d.).
Opposition to the Act came from both business and unions. The focus of opposition was on the period for conversion to an open-ended contract, with business arguing two years was too short while the KCTU claimed workers could be sacked prior to the expiry of the two-year period without employers having to justify the dismissals. The KCTU and the conservative Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) waged hunger strikes and led public protests in the national Parliament (JJ Chun, 2009). The business case triumphed. In response, the KCTU walked out of negotiations, leaving workers represented by only the FKTU.
Overview of the E-N struggle
The E-N strike is not just about a legal problem. Other industries such as banks are also actively converting irregular workers into regular employees, so the actions of the supermarket workers have broader implications in society. The strike at E-N, which began on 23 June 2007, was to prove one of the longest in the Republic of Korea’s recent industrial history, lasting 510 days. The strike represented a struggle of retail checkout operators, who are one of the lowest paid occupations in the labour market, against major multi-billion dollar conglomerates. Occurring in the context of the recently introduced labour legislation, the strike was the expression of the anger and frustration felt by irregular workers at their continued employment discrimination and abuse in the workplace.
Wins for irregular workers had occurred prior to the introduction of the Act but a win since the introduction of the Act would have given workers and unions the confidence to attack the legislation in a range of industries. The dispute was ostensibly triggered by the decision of the H and N companies to outsource, relocate or terminate approximately 800 of their irregular checkout operator positions, following the passage of the Act, but the underlying grievances had been building up at the workplaces for some time. The study is important as it documents the struggle beyond a workplace of a group of workers who are generally thought to be the least willing to take strike action – women employed insecurely. The E-N struggle can be seen as a model for the other major strikes, such as the Hyundai Auto struggle of irregular workers. For this reason it is necessary to examine the discrimination experienced by irregular women workers at these companies, which included long working hours, harassment and extreme managerial control.
Irregular workers, even part-time workers, in both companies worked 40 or more hours per week – the same as regular workers. Part-time workers were part-time in name only, because the content of their jobs was almost identical to those of regular workers, yet irregular workers earned half the wage. In effect, they were regular workers earning a portion of the income, with few or no benefits such as bonuses, and with little or no opportunity for promotion. In Company H, the programme of converting irregular workers to regular employment status was suspended in 2003, closing off opportunities to earn higher wages. Increasing work intensity was another major concern as management did not replace staff when they left, which, for example, involved other part-time staff having to do the store cleaning when the cleaners were dismissed. Work intensity increased for all workers in all the stores, but the biggest burden fell on the cashiers, who were often forced to work five to six hours without a break, even unable to go to the bathroom.
‘Undignified treatment’ was the most common response from interviewees when questioned about the difficulties at the workplace. Company H emphasized friendliness to customers while subjecting the married women part-timers to an extreme form of emotional labour. The coercion of emotional labour and undercover monitoring takes place in all supermarket companies in the Republic of Korea, including of the workers employed by suppliers. As most store workers are employed on an irregular basis, many supermarket companies do not believe skill development is necessary. The only training offered is ‘friendliness education’, as management believes customers only need a woman’s smiling face to encourage them to buy. Irregular workers cited for ‘behaviour’ violations, such as not smiling or greeting a customer appropriately, must undergo two hours of unpaid ‘friendly service’ training outside of work hours. Three behaviour violations immediately lead to dismissal.
The EL Group not only defined the expression of friendliness, but they also proscribed an employee’s appearance, the colour of their makeup and their hairstyle. Company H redesigned the uniform to look ‘prettier’, but it was so tight it was difficult to move freely. In this way the company hired women and forced them into emotional labour. Comments from the interviews revealed how many of the married women part-timers felt about working for Company H: ‘My every movement is being watched from the moment I come to work … I am not treated as a human being’ (Ms PCH, part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008).
The introduction of the Act led to a dramatic increase in unfair labour practices. Company H contravened the collective bargaining agreement (which had priority over the Act) by dismissing workers with over 18 months of service despite the agreement stating that part-timers with over 18 months’ service should be converted to open-ended contracts. The company refused to abide by the Labour Commission ruling to reinstate the workers. At training sessions for regular workers, Company H reportedly tried to convince full-time workers that irregular workers were not company employees. Company N also forced workers to sign blank contracts, or forged workers’ contracts (see also Chun JJ, 2009: 545); and when accidents occurred, the company refused to recognize them as industrial accidents (Ms HER, part-timer, Company N, interviewed January 2008). The owner of the EL Group regularly stated that the ‘bible didn’t have unions and so they were unnecessary, and he wouldn’t recognize them’ (YTN news channel report, 23 July 2007). This example is not an exception in companies with confrontational industrial relations practices; rather, this is the norm.
Company H was undeterred by the workers’ protest and so the action was escalated on 30 June when approximately 600 members of Union E occupied the W store. These 600 members were joined the next day by about 1000 union members from Company N. On 8 July, Company N’s union members occupied the G store. The owner of the EL Group stated that ‘unions are the devil’s power and he would continue to smash them even if it wrought economic damage’ (Ohmynews, 8 December 2007). The workers continued their occupation, demanding job security and equal treatment for irregular workers and the removal of the outsourcing policy. Management responded to the industrial action with lawsuits and demands for compensation that they promised to drop for those workers who returned to work. 5 Both companies claimed that the occupation of the store, the rallies in front of the stores and public support for the workers had caused significant financial loss. The Chief of the Labour Ministry criticized the outsourcing of labour by the EL Group, saying it was ‘unsuitable’ and ‘lengthy employee–employer conflict is harmful’ (Hankook Ilbo, 9 July 2007). Several media outlets reported that the CEO of the EL Group in an email to all regular staff wrote ‘the occupation of the store is an action akin to Satan’s work’ (see, for example, YTN news channel, 23 July 2007). Despite the strike and financial loss, the two companies still refused to participate in ‘good faith’ bargaining. The political situation added to management’s problems. In late November, Company H expressed its willingness to accept workers’ demands, but a remark from a then presidential candidate that E-N workers were demanding too much boosted management’s confidence and they retracted their offer. In May 2008, Company H was sold to Company T, a UK multinational. In contrast to the EL Group, Company T expressed their willingness to consider improving the job security of irregular workers.
On 10 July 2007, police began to control access to the store, allowing only departures, and at Company N’s G store, the company welded shut all the exits except for those guarded by the police. A soccer match near W store on the morning of 20 July 2007 was used by police as the pretext to storm the two stores and arrest all the strikers, including 13 of the leaders. This action reveals the sharply divided class lines and exposed the state’s continued use of repressive labour practices. Initially expected to end before the northern autumn of 2007, the strike reached the one-year mark in July 2008, but financial pressures and conflict with husbands were taking a toll. The number of workers participating had declined and some of the stores were operating again. Union membership had also declined. At the beginning of the strike there were 1500 union members in Company N and 1200 in Company H. By the autumn of 2008, this had dwindled to 400 and 600 members respectively. The workers who refused to return to work took temporary jobs elsewhere to support themselves and their families. Rumours of divorce and family difficulties began to spread. Union N ended their strike on 29 August 2008 (434 days) while Union E continued until 13 November 2008 (510 days).
Company T indicated willingness to cooperate with workers’ demands and so the leadership of both unions decided to end the strike. Company T promised job security, depending on length of service, and to cease the outsourcing of jobs. It also reinstated 16 of the 28 workers and withdrew the civil and criminal suits against the union, its leadership and members. In return, Union E promised to delegate wage bargaining to management and signed a ‘no strike’ clause effective until 2010, and accepted the dismissal of the remaining 12 union leaders. Union N was promised the withdrawal of civil and criminal suits against its leadership and members and the re-employment of irregular workers, with a verbal commitment that after two years irregular workers would be converted to open-ended contracts. Union N accepted the dismissal of its leadership, the delegation of wage bargaining to the management and no strikes for two years (until 2010). Union N also promised to change from a union shop to an open shop. While irregular workers received job security guarantees, management had exacted a high price for the lengthy strike.
Why did the struggle continue?
My son will also get a job one day, and this will affect him too. (Ms PCH, part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008)
As workers who had never taken strike action, when they first took over store G, they described their feelings as like ‘a warm spring day’ or ‘a big field trip’ and they were ‘just so happy and having so much fun’ (Ms EIS, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). The struggle gave the women a voice: women who previously, even when being verbally abused by customers or managers, or when their names were written on the cafeteria wall for a behaviour citation, or when they collapsed during friendliness training, ‘could not even squeal, we just had to do as we were told’ (Ms EKO, union leader, Company H, interviewed March 2008). Watching the regular workers strike, many of them had felt like outsiders and powerless, feeling that all they could do was to think ‘They are fighting for their rights. What am I doing?’ (Ms EIS, part-timer, Company N, interviewed January 2008). After taking their own industrial action, they felt proud of themselves when the news of the struggle was reported in the media, including in Japan. Many had the support of their husbands, who encouraged them with: ‘Your company is out of line. Go for it’ (Ms YMR, part-timer, Company H, interviewed January 2008), but ‘Just don’t stand at the front’ (Ms CHS, part-timer, Company H, interviewed January 2008). Some had the support of their parents-in-law, who encouraged them to ‘Eat well. You need to eat a lot to have a good fight’ (Ms YMR, part-timer, Company H, interviewed January 2008).
The protracted nature of the strike began to take a serious toll on the strikers and their families. The struggle that ‘nobody thought would continue for so long’ (Mr ENS, union leader, Union E, interviewed January 2008) showed no signs of ending and the women workers who took home KW800,000–900,000 a month were now suddenly the target of the company’s damages and temporary asset seizure claims for KW100 million. Naturally, many worried that their husbands would realize that their savings to buy a house could be lost. As the strike dragged on, the number of participants dwindled from hundreds to dozens, and the media began to lose interest. Ms EIS, who was at the site for eight days, went home for a short visit, ‘because I thought I should see my children before I got taken into custody, just to let them know that my heart is always with my family’. Her husband, even as he was fighting cancer, would clean the house to show his support (Ms EIS, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). But many husbands were now silently but clearly hinting that their wives should quit the strike (Ms HER, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). The women were pressured by husbands asking: ‘How much longer are you going to run around like that, don’t you think it’s enough?’ or complaining that ‘The house is a mess’ (Ms EYK, part-timer, Company H, interviewed February 2008).
Many women delayed returning to work because they could not abandon their colleagues in the struggle, but the debts continued to mount and their children were in despair because they could not pay for their after-school studies. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that some ran up huge credit debts or had their electricity cut off, and others could not afford to pay for their children’s school lunch. No longer when a husband rang to ask ‘Where are you?’ could they confidently reply that ‘I’m at the rally and will be home late tonight’. Instead, it became a timid ‘I’m just outside, I will be home soon’ (Ms PCH, part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008).
As autumn passed and winter came, more and more people returned to work, and those remaining were left with a heavy heart: ‘In the car on the way home after the rally, I just kept crying’ (Ms EIS, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). For some, there were many days now when they could not get to sleep without a drink (Ms PCH, part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008), and there were rumours that the union leader of store W, an irregular worker, could not come because her husband had locked her up. One husband even threatened: ‘You did all you could, so stop. If you keep striking, I’m leaving’ (Ms HER, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). They could not face their children either, and their wounded hearts hurt more than the physical bruises they suffered at the hands of the police.
Despite these setbacks there were many who could not quit. They believed they could not just try to save themselves when ‘the union leaders are in jail’ (Ms PCH, part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008) and when ‘so many regular workers were fired because of our problems, and they’re still fighting’ (Ms ESG, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). ‘How do I leave, how do I leave them? They went through so much.’ They considered that those who did quit had courage: ‘Those who left seem so brave … I think they are the brave ones’ (Ms PCH, part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008). Moreover, many would not quit because they were still angry: ‘The company was so unfair to us’ (Ms HJR, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). ‘I worked here for nine years, and I thought I deserved at least an open-ended contract’ (Ms KOJ, part-timer, Company N, interviewed January 2008). ‘If I quit, that means one year out of my life meant nothing’ (Ms Suh Eun-joo, store W union member, cited in Kwon S-H et al., 2008: 72).
Those whose families were suffering, such as the husband fighting cancer (Ms EIS) or tuberculosis (Ms HJR), were caught in a dilemma, but they felt that they would not be able to live with themselves if they did not see the struggle through to the end. The overwhelming sense was that this struggle was not just their problem but would affect future generations: ‘My son will also get a job one day, and this will affect him too’ (Ms PCH, part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008). If they surrendered this would show the employers that irregular workers can be fired at will, and this would affect the working lives of their children. They did not want a world where ‘my children will study so hard then become irregular workers’ (Ms YMR, part-timer, Company H, interviewed January 2008). No matter how hard it was, they wanted to keep fighting to ensure better employment opportunities for their children. The striking workers wanted to be unapologetic, proud mothers: ‘My children know what I’m doing, and if I quit … that’s not what I want to show my children’ (Hwang Seon-young, store W union member, cited in Kwon S-H et al., 2008: 72). One interviewee commented that ‘I brought my child [who’s in elementary school] to the union, showing him how I attend meetings, and showed him pictures of me doing my one-person protest’ (Ms EIS, part-timer, Company N, interviewed March 2008). Ms YMR (part-timer, Company H, interviewed March 2008) explained to her son when he complained about a railroad strike that occurred at the same time:
That’s something you ought to do. If you’re a worker, something you have to do is to fight for your rights. Why is your mother doing it? It is so that I can have my rights. This whole business about irregular workers, it’s not something that will end at my generation, you’re at risk too. When you’re grown, there will be no full-time jobs for you. You’ll just be disposables.
Some of the children came to the picket lines and protests, which clearly had an impact on them. Children would send text messages to their mothers warning them that ‘The place is swarming with police. Be careful’ (Ms EYK, part-timer, Company H, interviewed February 2008) or encouraging their mothers: ‘you have to win so that I don’t have to live as an irregular worker’ (Chang Eun-mi, store W union member, cited in Kwon S-H et al., 2008: 75). The children expressed their understanding of the reasons for the strike and their moral support: ‘I’ll take care of home and my little brother … you just hang in there and finish it’ (Lee Geon-joong, Hwang Seon-young’s son, cited in Kwon S-H et al., 2008: 228–229). At first, the union had planned to occupy the store for one or two days, but after seizing the store, the irregular workers, all married women, declared: ‘We can’t just go out like this, we must carry on indefinitely until the company gives job guarantees to irregular workers.’ They decided to continue the store occupation with two shifts a day to accommodate the family responsibilities of the majority of the union members.
Significance of the E-N struggle
The E-N strike was significant for two main reasons: it was conducted and sustained by a group of women who are the most marginal in society; and the strike involved a broad community coalition, a new form of conducting industrial action in the Republic of Korea, which incorporated new forms of action including a widely supported boycott and which inflicted substantial economic damage on Company H. The E-N strike and actions of the union, including forming alliances with non-workplace forces, incorporate elements of Waterman’s definition of social movement unionism such as struggling against authoritarian work regimes and ‘articulation with non-unionized and non-unionizable working classes or categories’ (1993: 266–267). According to Professor Kim Won, the E-N struggle is about the rights of irregular workers: ‘Regular workers, irregular workers and the local community have become one. It’s the spark for a new organising model. It is the struggle that has opened a new chapter in the history of the Korean workers’ movement’ (The Hangyoreh, 28 June 2008). The striking workers understood that the struggle was also about future workforce rights. The implications were significant because the strike took place at the same time as the Act to Protect Fixed-term and Part-time Workers was implemented. The strike received such widespread national support that it made it very difficult for any other company that was considering sacking their irregular workforce and outsourcing their employment. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour of 766 large companies in July 2007 reported that while 30% of companies had planned to outsource, there were no other examples of mass layoffs such as that pursued by the EL Group. The struggle had a significant impact on the actions of large corporations in dealing with their irregular employees (The Hangyoreh, 6 August 2007).
Union support of irregular workers
Unions were beginning to recognize the need to organize irregular workers. Worker solidarity that is based on ideology and that transcends interests was once again confirmed by the struggle of the E-N unions. Both unions had been committed to organizing irregular workers, with Union E being one of the first unions within the KCTU to organize irregular workers, in the face of the limitations presented by the marginalization suffered by irregular workers, as discussed earlier. A key factor in the union’s ability to organize irregular workers was its willingness to support irregular workers’ claims for improved job security. Both unions had a history of striking over issues affecting irregular workers. Lengthy strikes by Union E in 1997 (57 days), in 2000 (256 days) and in 2006 (30 days) led to wins on conversion of cashiers to regular employment, improved job security and the union’s right to organize irregular and agency workers. The sense of solidarity among workers, which union leaders had deliberately fostered, was instrumental in the success of the union and which Kelly (1998: 35) acknowledges is key for mobilizing workers.
Union N was very militant among retail unions, but its membership was limited to full-time workers despite the leadership understanding the need to organize irregular workers and regularly educating members about the issues facing irregular workers. In 2001, when updating the collective agreement, the union included a clause to offer part-time workers with more than 10 months’ service the option of conversion to regular employment, and as a result some part-timers became full-time. In 2004, after the company was acquired by the EL Group, the union continued to champion the rights of all workers and to support irregular workers, and the solidarity between irregular and regular workers was illustrated by support in workplace issues and the number of irregular workers in the union. In 2005, the union established a Special Committee on Irregular Workers and began a serious effort to organize irregular workers. In the E-N struggle, if the company succeeded in dismissing irregular workers, regular workers would be affected, but the core issue of the strike was to protest against the outsourcing and to protect irregular workers’ jobs. Around 1000 full-time workers took part in the strike, 350 of whom continued to strike for over one year.
Support from the community
Another factor contributing to the longevity of the E-N struggle was the creation of the Support Committee, formed by local unions, NGOs and political parties at the unions’ initiation. It was active in five regions of South Korea, and this section focuses on the most active branch, which was formed in store W. In October 2006, Unions E and N paid a visit to a regional office of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), asking for their support in organizing store W of Company H. Union E was keen to develop a support committee because of their experience in 2003 when local NGOs and social organizations had been seen to provide more assistance than the union’s umbrella organization. The E-N struggle elicited support from over 140 different civic groups and individuals, including 635 academics and lawyers. A gathering in support of the striking workers included academics, lawyers, clergy and the community, and attracted over 1200 participants (Ohmynews, 8 August 2007). International organizations such as UNI Global Union and the ILO also criticized the brutality of the police.
The regional office of the DLP formed a labour committee and together with NGOs conducted actions, including information campaigns and candlelight vigils in front of store W every weekend, in this way providing resources for the networks and activists. It also visited lunch rooms and held training sessions for union members. As a result, the committee organized 80 out of 100 irregular workers directly employed in store W and formed a branch of the union in May 2007 (YSI, Chair of Support Committee of store W, interviewed December 2010). This supports the argument of Frege et al. (2003: 124) with respect to the role of coalition partners in providing resources and supplementing union activities.
As the strike continued, other NGOs and social organizations in the region also participated. The Support Committee continued with the information campaign and vigils at store W and also assisted in the organization of rallies, cultural activities or attending member meetings when the union leadership was unavailable (Kim G-W and Goh, 2008: 235). The then opposition parliamentarians from the left of the DLP and other party powerbrokers visited the strike to give support, at a time when they were riding high in the polls. On 20 July 2007, committee members, members of the local community and three DLP parliamentarians stayed with those occupying store W and protected the Union E chairperson when the police burst in. In referring to the influence of the Support Committee, the union chairperson joked, ‘I think at store W, the Support Committee is more influential than the union’ (Mr KKW, union chair, Union E, interviewed October 2009), which illustrates the committee’s key role and also demonstrates that its orientation remained in concert with the union (Frege et al., 2003).
The active role of the Support Committee also owed a great deal to the open operational method of Union E. Their meetings were open to the public as they believed that solidarity was possible only through openness. This conferred a stronger sense of responsibility to the Support Committee leaders, who saw themselves as actors in the struggle. Even when the DLP broke up in early 2008 because of ideological differences, the Support Committee was not affected. The committee’s activities strengthened organizational solidarity, and the branch of Union E at store W was the one that retained the most irregular workers until the end of the strike. Although the Support Committee for store W dissolved in May 2009, at the time of interview in December 2010 it continued to participate in union gatherings and activities, holding meetings with the members every weekend even after the strike ended (YSI, Chair of Support Committee of store W, interviewed December 2010). The existence and activities of the Support Committee also showed possibilities for the union movement to be elevated to a local-based civic movement, instead of being confined to the workplace. As was seen by the endless stream of local members of the public visiting the store in support of the strike, a retail store provided an ideal venue for a movement to develop into a local campaign because it is part of local residents’ everyday life.
The striking workers received support from all over the Republic of Korea – the Seoul branch of the DLP and more than 140 citizens groups and NGOs coordinated with workers to form a joint response committee. University students and the general public supported and joined the fight, as well as initiating their own fundraising drives and participating in the boycott of the EL Group (see Ohmynews, 30 July 2007, 22 March 2008; Shimin Sahoe Sinmoon, 20 July 2007). Public opinion polls revealed there had never been a labour struggle in South Korea that had received so much enthusiastic support – 50% blamed the government for the strike, 27% blamed the company, 60% opposed the police brutality and 56% believed the company should heed the workers’ demands (The Hangyoreh, 24 August 2007). For people living in a society where many workers – especially women workers – are irregular workers, the fight being waged by the ajumma (literally translated as aunties) of the supermarket where they frequently shopped brought the issue into ‘their own backyard’. Even the conservative media expressed sympathy for the women and criticized the company for forcing married women workers, who should be ‘caring for their homes’, to participate in strikes.
On 28 July, a nationwide ‘zero sales boycott’ of the two companies was launched by the union members of Company N’s G store and Company H’s M store, together with the KCTU and several NGOs (see also Ohmynews, 30 July 2007, 22 March 2008; Shimin Sahoe Sinmoon, 20 July 2007). The KCTU immediately convened a delegates’ convention that established a team dedicated to supporting the E-N struggle and initiated a fundraising drive to support the striking workers. In all the supporting activities provided by the community, the union was at the forefront and the community groups provided support. The workers and their union constituted the vanguard and the community groups provided the solidarity (Frege et al., 2003).
Conclusion
The E-N struggle on one level was about the outsourcing of jobs and the working conditions and treatment of irregular workers. On another level, it was a strike about the extent to which employees would tolerate a worsening of their employment conditions. The irregular women workers desperately needed jobs to support their family and educate their children, which explains why they had tolerated and accepted the oppressive working conditions. Initially, they thought they could not expect improved conditions and were reluctant to take any action because they did not believe they had the power. The union leadership, together with the NGOs, eased the mistrust between irregular and regular employees generated by the company and gave the women the courage to take action.
What kept the struggle going was their own belief and solidarity from the community. Their experiences of struggle meant they simply could not abandon their co-workers despite oppression by their employer and declining support from their families. Despite this, they were motivated by the desire to improve working conditions for future generations; and because their children were watching, they believed they needed to continue. There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from the E-N struggle.
What this action shows is that married women workers are just as willing to participate in industrial action when they receive solidarity. The support from their co-workers, the union, their families and the broader community enabled them to cause a multi-billion conglomerate to suffer extensive financial loss and to protect some jobs. The mass media and public opinion had a significant impact. The E-N strike, coinciding with the implementation of the Act to Protect Fixed-term and Part-time Workers, became a symbolic fight that went beyond the company or region and received nationwide attention. People identified with irregular workers and extensive media coverage rallied a sympathetic public.
The union worked to overcome the divisions based on employment status between the workers – divisions that were not so great, particularly between regular and irregular women workers. In the retail industry, women regular workers may enjoy job security and relatively higher wages, but they are restricted by the ‘sticky floor’ because of gender biases in job assignment and are at high risk of being replaced by irregular workers. The union emphasized the solidarity between regular and irregular workers, which involved opening union membership to irregular workers.
The E-N strike shows that irregular workers in the service sector can be organized and boosted by a community-wide movement beyond corporate boundaries. Where the regional support committee was the most active, literally everything was shared between the union members and committee members. The significance of the support from the community was that it provided solidarity and boosted the confidence of the striking workers. The collective action galvanized by the union and the determination of the workers and their families to continue the struggle, however, was the foundation. The E-N struggle, which took place in part in response to the management’s reaction to the Act to Protect Fixed-term and Part-time Workers, became much more than just a workplace conflict – it became the symbol of irregular workers’ fight for their rights and showed how such effort can be sustained with the backing of the overall labour movement and social movements.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We want to express deep gratitude to all the interviewees. Also thanks to Professor Brad Bowden for his advice and the anonymous referees.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by a two-year research grant from Pusan National University.