The public manager,the structure of public institution,and implementation: the 2002–2012 Finnish senior bureaucratic manager reform

Abstract

Public management and administration today is about crafting, structuring and instituting. Structuration is a very integral part of all organisations. Unlike the gradualist approach, structural reform transforms the dominant system touching on main elements. Structural reform had largely come and gone without necessarily touching on some public administrations and their core elements. Interviews were conducted for 37 interviewees believed to belong to the policy and implementation network. Characteristically, the structures stand very tall and hierarchically, instituting traditional top-down directives bereft of crafting. Management and managing failed to be understood and actively played. Consequently, structure and capacity remain non-aligned; and implementation is negatively affected as the reform context and management are poorly defined. With managerial leadership responsibilities shirked, silo-slabs systems have become the modern features of organisational gridlocks; thus, increasing manager incompetence.

Keywords

authority communication implementation public manager responsibility structuration

In order that the public sector and its public manager turned pragmatic following the oil crises of the early 1970s, the industrialised Western countries had sought to institute public management reforms so as to adjust to the fast changing socioeconomic politico environment by eliciting and introducing some processes of the private sector and governance practices (Kickert, 1997; Rhodes, 1997). Structuration and decentralisation were some of the early innovations. Privatisation, marketization, modernisation and capacity development reforms were also introduced. Largely, however, structuration and correlated capacity reforms had since been abandoned (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2009, 2010; Tiihonen, 2001); notwithstanding their being critical determinants for institutional communication and development successes (Drucker, 2008; Peters, 2006; Mohr, 1982).

Finland, one of such industrialised countries, has a modern (Haapala, 2009) and strong public administration system (OECD, 2009), despite its incomplete and abandoned structuration processes (OECD, 2009, 2010; Tiihonen, 2001). Tiihonen (2001) indicates that the Finnish government structuration reform was aimed at a single tier. This leaves it with structural defects that are exacerbated by the New Public Management (NPM) reform practices for the last 20 or more years (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Peters (2006) calls this side effect horizontality, a disease suffered by all governments. While Brunssen and Olsen (1993) blame the same lack of attention and coordination by the managers as the main causes, the OECD’s two consecutive reviews of Finnish government machinery (2009, 2010) found reform and communication difficulty, individual against centralisation, giant “silo” structures, among others. The chief recommendation of the OECD (2010) was a call for collective commitment of the leadership.

Considering this Finnish government machinery brief mentioned above, seeking for agility and collective commitment, on the one hand; on the other, which is even more compelling for this article, was the Ministry of Finance (2011; Government as Employer or Personnel department being the reform agency; see also www.vm.fi) evaluation of their decade-long senior management reform, that claims it to be on course but lacking robustness. Coincidentally, this study shared the same timing (2009 and 2012) and some of the same respondents to the OECD and the evaluation studies. The findings and conclusions of the earlier works have been considered critical to this article; more so, as they stand contradictory to each other. Although the OECD reviewed the entire Finnish public administration machinery, the evaluation exercise looked specifically to the senior manager development reform (whose repercussions are supposed to have positively affected all parts of the system); therefore, they might not have had too much variation in outcomes. The latter is the reform policy under investigation by this article and it had 27 recommendations to boost its robustness. Therefore, it stands well for rejection as it could be misleading to decision-makers. The reform was hardly communicated, let alone implemented, as found from the government machinery’s “stonewalled” structuration processes.

“Towards Professional Management”, or the Finnish government’s senior civil servants management development programme that began a decade ago – 2002 to 2012 – desires to be understood and lessons learned if the ongoing local government and any future reform programmes are to be successful at leadership and implementation. This article, therefore, asks – how has (the incomplete and abandoned) structuration grown to affect communicating reform for implementation in the Finnish public administration in the last decade (2002–2012)?

Following the above introduction is the section of the method of the study. It describes how the interview strategy was used to collect data and content analyses employed for meaning (Patton, 2002). The next section of the article is outlined as key terminologies are stated and explained under the heading Basic Managerial Concepts and Theories of Structure. Following that is implementation literature blended to match structuration and managerial capacity developments. The Finnish public administration structure is discussed from its history to current overviews as another section. It covers the presidency, parliament and government. Some critical issues are raised of structuration. Then Finnish government reform is introduced, to be followed by the study findings and analysis section. The final section is the discussion and conclusion, where it is found that structuration matters in successful reform implementation.

Method

This study was conducted between 2008 and 2012, while thinking longitudinally (Pettigrew et al., 1992). Such problematic deviant studies are understood better via the Institutional Approach (Brunssen and Olsen, 1993; Rhodes, 1997): history, the law and practices alongside relevant theories are considered. Additionally, qualitative methods suit implementation studies better, as actors’ perceptions, actions and interactions are the very source data with in-depth knowledge (Patton, 2002). A total of 37 out of 60 interviewees contacted were dealt with. The mix comprised 9 out of 12 ministries’ top management; parliament and the presidency among other institutions; and network of service providers to make it a fair representation of the Finnish public administration.

In seeking to understand the participative roles of this network of policy makers and implementers, the first clue came from the policy booklet Towards Professional Management, reform mandarins and some of their contacts made to that effect (Ministry of Finance, 2003). Through emails and telephone contacts from their institutional websites arrangements were made and interviews of not more than an hour were held in their offices. The preliminary contacts requested for these interviews having introduced the subject of the senior civil servants management reform.

Some initial excuses such as ‘It was a long time ago’, ‘lack of’ or ‘poor knowledge of the reform’ responses; and, rooting entry into the institutions through the permanent secretaries almost stalled the study. The successful strategy adopted was to request the targeted individual officers directly and whether one knew much or not of the government senior manager development reform policy for his/her uplift. This turned out very well. Whilst a few officers, the policy owners and formulators, were articulate with the original reform ideas most interviewees were very abreast with its antecedent failed Bill (Finland, HE 245/2006 vp) from Parliament in 2007. That was to coerce implementation as explained by the Interviewee 3. Of course, others too, especially those out of the capital city of Helsinki did not have the slightest idea about the 10-year-old reform. From Helsinki (3) and outside (2), 5 professors of Finnish public administration and Presidential history were contacted, for example, and only 2 granted interviews due to lack of knowledge of the reform. From the onset, the 2 that granted interviews are found within the city and have had brushes with the reform although at the fringes.

Besides the traditional one-on-one interviews with 31 participants, the study had 2 focus group interviews, from parliament’s Public Administrative Committee (4 participants) and the oldest private establishment that trains managers called Johtamistaidon Opisto or JTO Management Institute of Finland (2 lecturer participants; and, only the professor had been interviewed by the reformers at the formulation stage but none knew of the final reform document and/or its activities). The longest interview time was recorded as 1 hour 40 minutes, whilst the shortest was 16 minutes. The average was 40 minutes. These were transcribed and read thoroughly for meaning and interpretations as follows below. For example, a commonly found statement at nearly all the interviews’ introductory phases at the ministries was, ‘We are an independent organisation’. Indeed, it demonstrates relevance and several repercussions in the communication and structuration processes. It is, therefore, not surprising that the OECD (2010) prescribes collective commitment of the leadership. The public manager and the structural dynamics are the units of analyses.

Basic managerial concepts and theory

In this article, the public/government manager is conceived as both the political (elected official) and technical (appointed civil/public servant) heads of government institutions. The Essential of Public Manager (Pollitt, 2003: 18) outlines some fundamental elements of the public manager:

managing in a socio-political system

working with public pressure and protest

having a sense of accountability

understanding public behaviour

involved with management of ration

concerned with management of influence

assessing the multi-dimensional performance

understanding a wider responsibility to a changing society.

Pollitt (2003: 86–87) identifies and labels further some criticisms as well as theorises alongside as follows:

Civil servants do obstruct the wishes of their political leaders, because they have agendas of their own (the “conspiracy theory”).

Civil servants do block the wishes of their political leaders, not because they want to, but because they are trapped in bureaucratic routines which make them slow and unresponsive (the “bureaucratic theory”).

Civil servants appear to block the wishes of the political leaders but, that is, because what they are actually doing is pointing out real and substantial obstacles to or flaws in the politicians’ plans, problems which the politicians had been too ignorant or ideologically committed to see for themselves (the wise “counselors theory”). When politicians blame their civil servants they are really (and unfairly) shooting the messenger because they don’t like the message.

Civil servants do not block the wishes of political leaders. The latter make up negative stories about bureaucracy to excuse their own failings, because civil servants are in no position to answer back (the “scapegoat theory”).

In building a base for these manager fundamental essentials, Lynn’s (2003) perception of Mark Moore’s value addition roles of the public manager become more critical to warrant effective structuration, institutionalism and crafting processes. Lynn further found the roles to depend upon two long standing traditional values of self-control of the public manager and the self-regulated institution; thus, be it public or private administration, responsibility is the core word of all its vocabulary. Lynn (2003) cites Mosher (1968) further to differentiate the structural and craft responsibility perspectives: that objective responsibility or answerability for one’s actions is the structural perspective, whereas the subjective craft responsibility is synonymous to identification, loyalty and conscience.

In this reform dispensation the pragmatic public manager’s dual responsibility is also found in policy making and implementation (Rhodes, 1997). From constitutional governance and politico-administrative-societal relations perspective, Hill and Hupe (2002) consider implementation to be that part of governance that involves activities in relation to public tasks that follow the legitimate, directive decisions on those tasks, with its scope falling between what happens between policy expectations and perceived policy results. Its processes include 1) assembling the elements required to produce a particular programmatic outcome, and 2) the playing out of a number of loosely interrelated games whereby these elements are withheld from or delivered to the programme assembly process on particular terms (Bardach, 1982: 57–58). It is against the background that reform in itself is an active, participative and deliberative change process (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004); that the public manager’s pragmatism ought to align Lynn’s (2003) active public management’s managerial political roles or crafting to enhance better reform decision, action and institutionalisation.

Structuration process

Perhaps Hill and Hupe (2002) found it appropriate that it is from nowhere that ready-made answers are readily available to public managers and practitioners. Studies (Bozeman, 2007; Vedung, 2002) demonstrate, for example, that the means-end-thinking remains problematic at pre-, during and post-NPM development of fragmentary systems (silos) from the Weberian centralised hierarchical structure (Meier and Hall, 2005). Consequently, the capture processes engrained in the institutional settings, socioeconomic and political contexts found businesses and social communities actively demonstrating their political capacities as competing actors to influence occurrences in their broad environment. It is established (Fuchs, 2007; Galbraith, 2009) that business acting ranged from traditional passive to modern active roles in the restructuring of settings, be it locally, internationally and even globally for their self-interests’ sustenance.

Scholte (2000: 91–92) tags this process as methodological structuration, wherein

the course of social history results from mutually constituting agent choices and structural dispositions…. Structural forces largely establish the range of options that are available to actors in a given historical context. Structures also generally encourage agents to take certain steps rather than others. At the same time, however, structures depend on an accumulation of actor decision for their creation and subsequent perpetuation. Indeed, at moments of structural instability and flux, agents can have considerable influence in reshaping the social order.

The Scholte structuration process notes that the agent–structure debate involves three general contending positions: 1) the methodological individualism that supposes that social relations are wholly propelled by the aims and decisions of actors; 2) government and its institutions; and 3) non-governmental firms, civic organizations, small groups and individuals. From an individualist position, globalisation has resulted from an accumulation of initiatives taken by persons and associations of their free-will and from primary forces and their interconnections between rationalism, capitalism, technological innovation and regulation in the causation of globalisation.

All problems are organizational

From the structuration, implementation and management conundrums discussed, it is right that Golembiewski (1983: 193) prescribes that ‘all problems are organizational’, stemming from the free will of the actors and primary forces identified above. Also, from Pollitt’s (2003) public manager analysis, it was inferable that the manager operated within set limits of formal structure. Lynn (2003) explains that to be the means for constraining and overseeing how public managers deploy state authority. In this wise, the dual elements are the lawful delegation of authority, and the external control over the deployment of delegated authority. Again, Golembiewski contends that it is the result of the interpretations in the management unit (or structure) that leads to the production of goods and services. Dunsire (1990) from another perspective terms that as operationalization process to determine the policy outcomes. Additionally, Golembiewski noted that the principles of bureaucracy had gone beyond being mere structural material and had turned philosophical and powerfully reflected the mind, its thinking and talking of actors and people generally. Caiden (1994) sums that up as bureaucratic pathological excesses.

Within the management unit, Fukuyama (2005: 59) found delegated discretion is the singular core problem of organizational theory: delegation comes with cloudy goals along linear communication from top-down and decentralisation. He argues that it is for the purposes of performance and efficiency that delegation discretion in decision making and authority occur. Unfortunately, the very act of delegation creates problems of control and supervision. The delegating recipient officers’ relationship defines authority (management/structural unit). Simon and Dunsire perceived that as a two-way process, whereby one has the power to make decisions that guide the actions of the other. The superior frames and communicates decisions with the expectation that they will be accepted by the subordinate; and the subordinate expects such decisions with his/her conduct determined by them not withstanding his/her own judgment of the merit of the decisions (Simon, 1997; Dunsire, 1990).

Mohr (1982) found that organizational structure from the 1900s was viewed as artefact and a matter of choice; later he observed it to be amendable by forces such as technology, environment, size and uncertainty (see Scholte above). Expressing this in the dimension of bureaucracy and the fundamental theoretical idea of structure to concern a particular occurrence of bureaucratization or decentralization that offers precise response to an uncertainty, Mohr (1982: 104) contends that structure (or management unit) ‘is a single manager at any hierarchical level and the subordinates to whom the manager might delegate authority and responsibility’. In Weber’s bureaucratic structure there exists an in-built right of decision for a subordinate (Dunsire, 1990).

In response to heterogeneity and aggregation problems, Mohr’s structure of an organization’s high-level manager who is concerned with several types of technology, uncertainty, size and all that is to structure the flow differently for the different tasks. Importantly, Mohr (1982) argues that even in an uncertain situation the manager is expected to follow the basis of centralised authority structure for the most part or in principle; and, to defer systematically but temporarily to specialists with more expertise in those specific areas which are deemed necessary. To this, Taylor (2001) found the NPM implementation problem stemming right from the non-centralisation at the beginning.

Mohr (1982) outlines further the pivotal concept problem in the definition of bureaucratic structure as centralisation: perceiving decentralization as part of the bureaucratic structure and where authority is ceded as structural result of the need to cope with an uncertainty with appeal. Instead, the misinterpretations depart from bureaucratic structure. Unfortunately, Mohr’s empirical evidence shows negative correlation connects decentralisation and bureaucratic structures including specialisation and formalisation. Mohr concludes on two kinds of decentralised authority as operational and true authority. The explanation was put as while the former is delegated to carry out assignments with necessary guidelines and without close supervision but effective oversight supervision from the manager and effective appeal from below; the latter, true authority is with de facto or ultimate authority (example, local government).

In the ultimate authority type, decentralisation means where the hierarchical official cedes or loses the capacity to exercise effective oversight. Even in the absence of politics, Mohr (1982) notes it is a normal occurrence in any organizational life whereby subordinates at any level possessing critical skills and/or information that the executive does not effectively control resist control while seeking autonomy, either consciously or not. This resistance is typical of professional/experts/technocrats (Sennett, 2008; Fukuyama, 2005; Riggs, 1994).

The structural connection of authority between superior and subordinate only exists when the objective and behaviourism occur in tandem. Thus the behaviour pattern is demonstrated by the superior’s command and the subordinate’s expected acceptance as a criterion of choice (Simon, 1997). Mohr (1982) remarks that governance will proceed in part by joint decision by supervisor and subordinate, teamwork, consensus, democratic process and so forth to establish formal structure.

In defence of a centralised authority source, Mohr (1982: 107) referred to Weber that bureaucracy is ‘organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices’; to emphasise and explain, ‘the term hierarchy means the structure in which operational authority is successfully delegated, while ultimate, or true, authority is always retained by the delegating official’. It is from authority that an organisation derives its formal structure and influence of member behaviour (Simon, 1997). Amazingly, Mohr concludes from where he had started that there is no escaping the fact that organizational structure truly is a human artifact, remarking further that it is the result of motivated behaviours (self-interests against organisational). Mohr’s (1982: 111) proffered solution is to strengthen regularity connection with the uncertainty and strategy of control in a manner that avoids giving away all structure to technology, size, and/or environment, as well as not ‘to motivational roots which are powerful and ubiquitous’ enough to define and create certain organisational cultures and managing styles.

Culture, structure and reforms

In the above, mention has been made of the Finnish public administration diagnosed by the OECD as silo-structured; preferring specialists over generalists (OECD, 2010). Specialism managing styles create insular cultures (Riggs, 1994) that can be found in Mintzberg’s (2009: 169) managerial quandary of connecting ‘slabs across silos’ (or silo-slabs) in organisations; respectively, these are horizontal and vertical cleavages running up, down, and across the hierarchy, segregating functions and people. Silo-slab structures separate managerial activities and can move the organisation into strategic gridlock of layers of managers without necessary information and or power to adequately link up to others to enhance performance.

Structures, in Mohr’s diagnoses, are found embedded in culture. Fortunately, assessing culture for a change is possible (Schein, 2004; Dingwall and Strangleman, 2005). Additionally, traditional hierarchy (and its traditional values) will always be around (Fukuyama, 2005; Meier and Hill, 2005; Caiden, 1994) to provide the basic requirements of governance accountability, especially to novice politicians at the top of government institutions (Meier and Hill, 2005). However, this simple feature of accountability that even the political novice can take advantage of is problematic in a silo-slab system that is predominated by self-accounting (OECD, 2010). This finding demonstrates the depth of the structural problem that could inhibit performance due to poor communication, implementation and collective commitment.

Meyer and Allen (1997) found that variables of organisation structures affect commitment: affective commitment is sighted with decentralization; perception of the fairness of policy and affective commitment; ways and means of policy communication also affect commitment; it further impacts on demographics (age, gender, tenure) and dispositional variables (personality, values). Meyer and Allen also found from work experience that strong levels of correlation between superior and subordinate affects commitment and work implementation processes. For instance, as hinted elsewhere above, the experts/professionals are found obsessed with their expertise/profession, making delegation and control problematic to the managers (Sennett, 2008; Fukuyama, 2005; Lynn, 2003; Riggs, 1994). That may suggest Finnish public administration’s specialist preference (OECD, 2010) poses a managerial and commitment challenge. Also, in insular cultures professions slight one another and it is worse for generalists and non-professionals. Unfortunately too, specialisation disconnects the manager from what is to be managed (Mintzberg, 2009).

Managerial capacity

The theoretical and conceptual explanations depict that the complexities of the global environment are too glaringly overwhelming for any actor to remain in Mintzberg’s (2009) modern organisations of silo-slabs devoid of authority, information and communication for any relevant performance. More so, inferring from the structuration processes above, Pollitt’s (2003) public manager’s responsibility is to understand a wider and a changing society.

Whereas Hall and O’Toole (2000) establish that the public sector is a multi-level and multi-actor organisation and as such would require a skilful leader for implementation, Pettigrew et al. (1992) call for skill to manage dualities, dilemmas, connecting the top and bottom, while maintaining stability during the change process. These are done with the consent of the governed (OECD, 2010; Dingwall and Strangleman, 2005). Bardach (1982) would require the role of the fixer to be incorporated right at the basic policy design and formulation stage. These are built based on the national framework for discursive quality, coordination, networking and regulation in the governance process (Habermas, 2008).

But these tasks and needs have failed to align for generations. Dingwall and Strangleman (2005) found the undefined rational ethical manager’s woes and the failure to align his/her tools in the 1980s business sector reforms that merely changed vocabulary. Mintzberg (2009) also invoked the Peter Principle of Management (1966) to conclude that every incompetent manager buries his/her head in frustration as a result of how they ascend the hierarchy to its apex without rigour. The Peter Principle (Peter and Hull, 1966) itself notes as people rise from the action based of the specialist to the abstract planes of the generalist, they become disconnected from what they are supposed to manage. Some instances are found in the next section describing Finnish public administration structure.

The structure of Finnish public administration

A historical brief of the structure

Between Finland and Sweden once existed a formal hierarchical relationship; then came the erstwhile Soviet Union, now Russia, from the 13th century and 1809, respectively. The Government Council was the highest governing body of the Finnish Grand Duchy under which the Tsar Alexander I ruled Finland based on the Porvoo Diet of 1809. In 1816 the Finnish Council was renamed the Senate; and in 1918, following the unilateral independence declaration became the Council of State. Its Finance and Justice sections later became the Cabinet and Supreme Courts, respectively; while government departments became ministries (Ministry of Finance, 2009; Koivurinta, 2006).

The overview of present day state and government structures

Finland is a constitutional republic. The highest state organs are the presidency, parliament, the government and the judiciary. The powers of state in Finland are vested in the people who nationally elect the President, and are represented by their parliamentarians in parliament; an appointed Prime Minister then forms a government. The judicial system ensures all are equal before the law.

The two diagrams in Figure 1 show the position of state administration in pictographic form, revealing critical phenomena – that are perhaps due to the Nordic culture of nobody to be seen higher and outstanding (OECD, 2010), and equality value (Finnish Literature Society, 1997), while the Finnish (Suomi.fi/Treasury) invention puts nobody in charge but all the four institutions at par horizontally; that of the non-Finnish (OECD, 2009) places the presidency in charge. This seems far from the reality and the Finnish constitutional provisions and practices. Also, no ministry website showed how it connects structurally or hierarchically to the Prime Minister and/or the President’s office.

Figure 1.

Organisational charts of Finnish public administration.

Having abandoned the reform for a single tier, Finland now runs a three-tier structure – shown in Figure 1 – namely, central, regional and local government administrations. Central government agencies and bodies also have regional and local offices. Regional and local state administration refers to authorities that operate solely on a regional or local basis. For smooth governance, government must enjoy the trust of parliament as well as the President of the republic and other institutions as well as the people.

The constitutional reforms of 2000 and later 2007 amendments had the role of the parliamentary government grow stronger in both national administration and EU (European Union) matters, at the expense of today’s marginalised presidency. Soon after independence the winter tragic war of 1918 saw Monarchists and Republicans go to war over the country’s form of government. Eventually, republicanism prevailed with extensive powers reserved for the President on behalf of the people.

The presidency

The President of the republic is elected for a period of 6 years for maximum of 2 consecutive terms of office by direct universal adult suffrage. The vote is in two stages, so that should a clear cut winner fail to emerge after the first round, a second round of election is held for only the first and runner-up. The President exercises supreme executive power in conjunction with the government. The President had traditionally enjoyed extensive powers but these have either been eroded or revoked with successive constitutional amendments. The President, however still enjoys some extensive powers of appointments such as ceremonially appointing the Prime Minister elected by parliament and the ministers proposed by the Prime Minister. Other higher state officials such as the state/permanent secretaries and director-generals are appointed by him/her.

The President also conducts Finnish foreign policy together with the government. Despite all these Presidential roles, the government is largely observed to be a parliamentary government with barely any minister coming from outside of parliament. The highest civil servant supporting the presidency is the major-domo, who reports not directly to the President but to the secretary-general of the presidency, a political non-elected officer. Thus at the presidency, the highest career appointed manager has no direct structural relation with the highest elected political manager.

The parliament

Finland practices a unicameral parliament with a 200-member legislative body. It was established by 1908’s autonomous Grand Duchy and led by a speaker supported by two deputies for an annual tenure. The parliament is elected for a term of office lasting 4 years by direct, proportional and secret ballot. Its legislative work takes place in committees, comprising of the grand committee and 14 other committees covering various fields. In Finland, the grand committee functions as the committee responsible for EU matters. Based on section 2 of the constitution, parliament exercises supreme decision-making authority. Parliament passes legislation, decides on the state budget and supervises the activities of the government and the agencies, which operate under it.

The government

The current power-imbued government exercises supreme executive power with the constitutionally weakened President. The government also drafts bills and manages the state budget. The role of the government has expanded dramatically since 1919. From the 1980s, the exercise of supreme executive authority has in practice shifted more towards the Council of State. The government comprises the Prime Minister and the ministers as political heads of the ministries. The Prime Minister is the leader of the government and is responsible for reconciling the differing views on government policy held by the various groups represented in the government – a coalition government. The Prime Minister is also responsible for coordinating the work of the government with that of parliament. The Prime Minister directs the activities of the government and oversees the preparation and consideration of matters that come within the mandate of the government. He/she chairs the plenary sessions of the government and statutory cabinet committees. Finland is an appointed parliamentary government system, appropriating all powers to itself at the expense of an elected President.

Typical of the system is that a single ministry may, however, have more than one minister, in which case the administrative sectors of the ministry are shared or fragmented between the ministers of different political parties of the coalition government. The individual minister’s power has also increased following the abolition of the traditional ministerial boards (Finish Literature Society, 1997). Currently, the government consists of 12 ministries including the Prime Minister’s Office. Each ministry is responsible for the preparation of matters within its field of competence and for the proper functioning of administration. However, backed by the law or hard tools, turfs are found to be well protected and managed vertically (OECD, 2009, 2010).

The hierarchies have the permanent secretaries being responsible to the ministers. Next in line are the permanent under-secretaries, then director-generals followed by their deputy ranks. There are 20 ministers (and their political secretaries or assistants), 11 permanent secretaries, 10 under-secretaries, director-generals and deputies (contacts failed to supply statistics). From the director-general ranks upwards to the ministers constitutes the strategic apex or top management of a ministry targeted for this study. The policy processes are dealt with and managed in conjunction with other relevant institutions and stakeholders at this level.

The OECD (2009) recalls that the number of ministries since the 1950s had been 11 and increased to 13 by 1987. Currently, the merger of former Labour, Trade and Industry into Employment and Economy Ministry has reduced the total to 12. Although these ministerial combinations and compressions, labelled the “Finnish Phenomenon” by the OECD, had held the numbers almost constant and small, importantly, they fail to generate that compact effect. The OECD (2009) reveals cracks along political crevices contrary to the synergies of better coordination, and good governance generation. The OECD further found a weak Prime Minister and government at the centre, strong individual ministers, separation of powers inter and intra politics and bureaucracy. The situation is aggravated by the introduction of political secretaries whose roles remain undefined (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Amongst the civil servants the issue was due to the culture of experts not seen to be led (OECD, 2010).

This quest for a central administration with common culture reform (Ministry of Finance, 2003) is not new after all but a constitutional requirement. The reform Towards Professional Management failed to be informed to invoke Section 119 of the Finnish Constitution (1999/2007), as the reform need (Kickert, 1997). A decade (2002–2012) of implementing the reforms has yielded Riggs’ (1994) insular culture described as consisting of the ministries and relatively independent agencies called silos or stovepipes with the managers refusing to cooperate (OECD, 2009, 2010).

Key outstanding issues arising from this structural analysis on nomenclature and placements are as follows:

In the President’s office, what is meant by the Major Domo and how does it relate and compare to the other civil service rankings such as permanent secretary, for example?

Both the President and Prime Minister’s offices lacked permanent secretary rank civil servants.

These senior-most civil servants in the President and Prime Minister’s offices report not directly to the President and the Prime Minister, respectively, but to non-elected political appointees different from their counterparts in the remaining ministries.

Additionally, and in a concluding statement to the section, it is outstandingly clear that no one institution and its leadership structurally have a total view and management influence of the country, creating the need for broad-view manager development.

Finnish manager reforms

The Nordic countries failed to build any ambitious aim of a comprehensive administrative policy and implementation in their reform processes (Brunssen and Olsen, 1993). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) attest to this and found that media apathy as well as political party ideology fails to blend and influence public management reforms in Finland. They found that few civil servant mandarins are in charge; rather than the political deterministic approach to reforms that works better elsewhere (Temmes and Sootla, 2004).

The study document Towards Professional Management in Central Government: A Strategy for Management Development (Ministry of Finance, 2003: 14; English version published) is a Finnish government senior civil servants reform instituted from 2002 to 2012 for management development. The model of the reform was to develop broad view, versatile and responsive managers with the ‘will to lead and develop’ (themselves and Finland) backed by relevant values and competencies. It seeks for centralisation with common culture sharing and mobility. The reform also introduces tenure system with fixed and renewable contracting. A new unit was to be established in the Ministry of Finance to establish and coordinate a government managerial pool that is readily accessible to stakeholders. The Finnish mandarin reform was expected to lead to the development of the competent and pragmatic manager whose uplift will in turn manage for efficiency that will raise the welfare of the people and Finland as a whole to a more advanced level.

Findings and analysis

Two items are counted as the achievements of the senior manager reforms so far: in 2009, an unprecedented national meeting of government bureaucratic managers was held in Helsinki; and tensed piloting of fixed term contracting of top managers (5 as of early 2012). Much as the former is an unintended output, the rest remain on the drawing board including the centralisation with common culture, establishment of the controversial managerial pool and its coordination unit at the Ministry of Finance.

The findings are presented and analysed from the processes affecting communicating implementation of the reform on two folds: 1) advantages and disadvantages of the Finnish phenomenon; and 2) the managerial leadership relationships and actions. The analyses are laced with literature and interviewee comments and suggestions in quotations (Cresswell, 2009). That props up the qualitative inquiry attribute where social constructivists seek to understand the world in which they live and work (Cresswell, 2009; Patton, 2002). By this process, interviewees are numbered arbitrarily in the article.

Advantages and disadvantages of the Finnish phenomenon

It has been demonstrated in the literature that the ministries are polarised institutions and fail to gather synergies (OECD, 2010) for leadership and governance processes. Neither the reformers nor the managers (political and bureaucratic) were found motivated and collaborative enough for the senior management reform as ‘when they do these discussions [reforms] they don’t do it with each other’. The interviewee reveals further that ‘our State Secretary I think he is good but he is not a manager; and he has very important ideas but when we have someone who thinks about how to organize us on this kind of group or departments and so on’.

The State Secretary (Permanent Secretary) who should lead and coordinate the reform had emailed: ‘Due to the Ministry's internal division of duties, administrative management development matters are strictly the responsibility of Permanent Under-Secretary. In my view I would not be able to contribute to the subject matter, as I do not possess detailed knowledge in this field. Regrettably, I must therefore refuse the request for an interview’. This is a clear instance of specialism taking its share of fragmenting bureaucracy into Mintzberg’s (2009) silo-slabs, segregating functions and poor manager activities at the hierarchical top.

More importantly, responsibility is shirked:

Traditionally, departments have been very strong and very autonomous too; and, I think, to be frank it also comes to the kinds of leaders attitudes of highest level of the leadership at the Ministry of Finance; they do give this autonomy to departments; so that it then depends on our own, particularly, on the capacity as a head of department really to get the kind or credited, trusted and tranquil relations with other heads of other departments. department, (Interviewee 17).

It also appears that “autonomy” has been stretched into “independence”, a common street word in Finland.

I still add one problem: new prison problem in the organization of the Ministry of Finance which is a recent problem as a result of reorganization of public administration; now, we are actually composed of two ministries: Ministry of Administration and Governance and Ministry of Finance; and, this relation is not put forward clearly; there is some obscurity in the relationship; of course, there is a kind of natural conflict between Ministry of Finance and other Ministries; and, here, how to live with the conflict in an organised way is not clearly reflected in the organization of the Ministry; and, that is a problem. (Interviewee 17)

These are the cons of the Finnish phenomenon (OECD, 2009), which the OECD failed to prove in its reports but for the pros of synergism. While Interviewee 17 calls the phenomenon ‘a mistake’, Interviewee 16 rather referred that to the Towards Professional Management reform. And, of course, as found, no one including the reformers themselves had adopted and adapted their day-to-day management to the reform.

The question, ‘How do you manage your bosses?’ elicited the following responses:

With my level as a Director-General, it is easy to get to the board room. I am a substance person myself.… But I have, I must say, that I am a little bit critical of the top management of the ministries [being the political and civil servants] so that they perhaps have too much of their hands off it; as I said, they should be more interested in organisation on how it is run; I am not criticizing…if you know him; but his problem is that he is not from the point of view of the Ministry of Finance [that is, the Economic and Finance side]; he is not in the substance; that is the problem; that is the part of management I mean; the State Secretary, he is only interested and, also the under-secretary they are only interested in the substance which is of course, is a very good point but that is not enough. (Interviewee 17)

Substance is priced higher than management by top managers. As a result,

There is nobody gathering people together in the ministry. I mean it’s a ministry consisting of departments. It doesn’t exist in itself in a way. That’s chaos or dangerous I don’t know. It is something I never expected when I came here. I thought the Ministry was rather clearer. That isn’t. (Interviewee 16)

For example, according to Interviewee 6, an attempt at aligning budget and human resource issues failed woefully due to the former department’s lack of cooperation. Elsewhere, the OECD (2010) has cited the budget department as uncooperative and the hindrance to government business. No one was found leading and coordinating the reform even at its home in the Ministry of Finance, let alone beyond.

The managerial leadership relationship and actions on the reform

Government

At a certain stage the political top managers were aware of the senior manager reforms and their implementation, at least when it got to Cabinet. The excuses of lack of time and inadequate knowledge of policy as it was a long time ago (2002–2012) were offered. For example, in the interview process the most common member of parliament and ex-minister emailed response read: ‘I also doubt that I could contribute anything really relevant to your mentioned thesis as my involvement with the project was limited to critical remarks in the socdem [Social Democrats] group of ministers’. These critical comments rejecting the reforms, other criticisms, especially, for the pooling of government managers (Interviewees 1, 8, 15, 24, Parliamentary Committee on Public Administration Focus Group interviewed) in addition to the disadvantages of the Finnish phenomena findings above might have culminated in the reformers seeking for hard tools to coerce implementation of the senior managers’ reforms. But that attempt failed in 2007 as Parliament did not formally sit on the Bill (Finland, HE 245/2006 vp). Interviewee 3, while describing the failed bill as prosaic upon reflecting on the differences between law and management, remains in a quandary as to the way forward. Evidence of other implementation tools such as negotiations and bargaining (Torenvlied and Thomson, 2003; Bardach, 1982); or even open and free communication locally and systemwide were also trailed for evidences.

Obviously, political apathy had thwarted the implementation processes. For instance, no interview request was granted by any of the ministers contacted, including the “second” minister of finance responsible for public administration and local government. An important vertical finding from permanent secretaries and director-generals interviewed besides the 2 chief implementers neither received nor passed on instructions about this reform from their ministers to their subordinates. Similarly, a search through the political (Presidential, Prime Ministerial and parliamentary) speeches data base revealed no comments on the leadership developments and practices to either this reform or any other. While both the President and Prime Minister will not grant interviews to this study, it was found that the media too kept their reform passivity intact (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Horizontal communications had equally been problematic.

Presidency

Interviewee Professor Teemes, an observer, confirms and explains this top political inaction in a response to the question ‘Have you ever heard of the President and the Prime Minister give any speech on this leadership development?’ No was the typical response from all interviewees. In addition, Temmes has a long answer:

I have only once seen President speak of these issues. In fact, the first department chief but it’s already history in the Ministry of Finance; they call it department of public management today. The first department chief was Kekkonen, in 1944. He was one year.

But the only occasion I have seen President speak was year [19]82; perhaps it’s President Koivisto who came after Kekkonen. I know the reason. He has a Permanent Secretary in the office of President who had this kind of background; and, he organized that. Maybe, it was so that after this very long period of Kekkonen there was really need to reorganize and re-evaluate our civil service or at least some reforms. And, President Koivisto had this speech in Parliament. They always have this beginning, opening speech in Parliament and he included quite long text on administrative reforms in that. I know that quite many of our Prime Ministers have these kinds of knowledge and skills but it’s not normal everyday politics at all. They are very careful speaking of this because it is a very sensitive thing many many times.

In fact in every government we have one Minister who is specialised in that government second minister in the Ministry of Finance.… In fact we have in government some persons who are specialized or had responsibility for this; and, not so that persons had also according to skills and expertise in this area. But what are their real impacts and positions could be?

Teemes concluded that ‘they didn’t want to have strong civil service. It is very understandable’. Efforts to speak with three other specialists did not work out due to lack of knowledge of the senior management reform. Poor reform communication is to blame. Similarly, the service providers or (5) consultants indicated they have neither been briefed on the policy nor have they worked with it. Yet the reformers mentioned them as some of their key trainers.

The senior most civil servant of the presidency, the Major Domo, heard of the reforms only 2 years ago and the source information is not from the presidency. It came from an informal source, a colleague in another ministry. The officer was 3 years in the current post and over 12 years in the system as a senior administrator well placed to have been informed. The Major Domo neither takes part in permanent secretaries nor directors-generals’ meetings. It was found to be the only of its kind without equivalent in the service. This creates an institutional memory gap and loss of vital information between the presidency and rest of the fragmented central bureaucracy.

Parliament

Although seniority was found to matter in the Finnish system, the parliamentary bureaucracy is found headed by a Permanent Under-Secretary reporting also to an appointed political actor who chairs the monthly permanent secretaries’ meetings. This means there is no common bureaucratic head with repository knowledge for the entire bureaucratic system. The Parliamentary Committee on Public Administration is aware of the senior management reform but informally; and has interacted with the Permanent Under-Secretary for Public Administration on it in 2003. Its principles are consistent with their thinking they claimed in the Parliamentary Focus Group Interviewed (PFGI). However, no official handling or comment whatsoever has been made on it from the floor of parliament and its leadership. Again, parliament had not at any point in time issued any specific financial resource to that reform. The Secretariat to the Committee on Public Administration confirms: ‘I think that they don’t have spoken about that specific report. Certainly they must have spoken of those ideas, but we don’t know about their speeches. There is nowhere that kind of information’.

To the PFGI, the management reform issues were familiar: ‘the ideas are not new; they have them in Finnish society already, a long time ago and the Committee has emphasised them before; so the report itself didn’t change anything. But it just put the things in a frame and into the words; and, of course, it has been a decision for them to be implemented’. The PFGI argues further that traditionally, the Finnish civil/public service chiefs have been ‘more experts than managers or leaders’:

Expertise has been more important. But nowadays management and leadership are becoming more and more important…. We have had in a way experts in leadership of departments. But, so that you have been chosen to be leaders when you have known very well the expertise of the department; and, then perhaps, you didn’t have the leadership to lead the other people. And that has been, I think, under discussion in the Finnish Governing System about 10 to 15 years.

The group distinguishes experts from managerial leaders (the administrative class) as well as the public/civil service’s long overdue need but stopped short of action. This need is observed to be supressed under expert and political leadership.

What have you done since the launch of the reform in 2002? PFGI responses follow:

Here in Parliament? No; not in the Committee. As they [reform owners and formulators] told you the Committee has no roles; and, has not taken any roles. No roles for that. [But could have taken?] Yes, we could have. The position in Finland about this leading is not that kind of; we don’t do that leading that way that the Committee is going to take leadership role in the Finnish system; but if there would be some problems we could take it up from the table. It is not so that all time that the Parliament by itself will take something on the table. So this has not been. We don’t take part at all about leading. And usually Parliament doesn’t mix into the work of government to tell its opinions.”

The PFGI argues parliament considers bills and government statements while conceding power to the government – the executive, ministers and top civil servants – whose responsibility it is to lead and govern. By this analysis parliament and its Committee on Public Administration are (self)-excluded from the national leadership and the reform while remaining in their silo-slabs. The reformers also from their side failed toattract them with or apportion any role in both the formulation and implementation process; thus supporting their aloofness.

Discussion and conclusion

To capture the alleged causes, while remembering Golembiewski’s (1983) ‘all problems are organisational’ attribute finds leadership attitudes, behaviours, professionalism and poor communication skills. For example, Interviewee 14 opined that some of the managers do not even know communication is part of their job. Political apathy and specialism are found to distort the organisational structures and reforms. Politically, no reform work appears to be done as the structural connection of authority between superior and subordinate fails to exist as the objective and behaviourism fail in agreement. The behaviour patterns elicited are not demonstrative of the superior’s command (Simon, 1997). Although reform is politically inclined, the politicians are rather apathetic about it. This problem may come from the fact that it is civil servant mandarins who craft reforms in Finland and the Nordic region generally (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Brunssen and Olsen, 1993) that fail to link up to the politics. In the past it was bureaucratic dominance over the politics but that seems to be changing now. The politicians in this case have rejected the reform and will not communicate it down to bureaucrats or horizontally to their colleagues. Could it be, as Teemes opined, due to the sensitive nature of the leadership subject too? Further investigations are required in that direction then.

The reform is also rejected by not only the politicians but the expert bureaucrats too. The issue of substance, generalist and management are in contention. One interviewee observes that the Government Management Development Institute, HAUS, had failed to balance the substance and management. The passivity of the politician and the expert both turned manager without the requisite training and development was raised by most interviewees as found in the Peter Principle of Management (1966). Coupled with the obsessional actions of the experts (Sennett, 2008; Fukuyama, 2005) exacerbates Riggs’ (1994) insular culture creation due to the Finnish Public Administration’s preference for expertise rather than the generalist OECD (2010). The experts and generalists slight each other; but together they accuse the politician of having little or no managerial experience. Is this the wise counselor’s theory? The reform for centralisation and shared common culture has fizzled into the modern organisational structures of silo-slabs (Mintzberg, 2009; Hansen, 2009) and poor communication networks (OECD, 2010) due to turf wars and protectionism (Hansen, 2009; OECD, 2009). Fragmentary processes abound and go against the Constitutional demands of a well-knit central government (Finnish Constitution, 1999/2007) and the senior manager reform need, a well-known phenomenon as identified by the Parliamentary Focus Group Interviewed.

From the foregoing, governance of the reform implementation process was challenged as the proceedings fell short of joint decision (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Mohr, 1982) of the entire leadership seems to be a rare commodity. Somehow, it is the fix tenure and renewable contract that was on piloting. Even the 2009 all-government civil servant managers meeting in Helsinki counted as an achievement, when it was found that the reformers failed to bring to the fore clearly that their meeting was as a result of the decade-old senior manager reform.

An opportunity platform for a re-launch of the reforms had been lost. Direct verbal communication of the reform across the country is rare and dwarfed by documentations. Truly, managers hide their incompetence in frustration (Mintzberg, 2009); so had these reformers too. Concedingly, while the Director-General observes that ‘we have spent too much time in the boardroom’, his/her superior the Permanent Under Secretary ‘lack[s] the ideas on how to do it’ as they fail to understand Mohr’s (1982: 111) ‘motivational roots which are powerful and ubiquitous’ to undermine structuration processes. Therefore, Pollitt’s (2003) conspiracy and bureaucratic theories may not hold as the trapped civil servants themselves are split up along substance lines; and, with the stronger side rejecting the reform alongside the political bosses, together shirking managerial responsibility (Lynn 2003).

Top management is tensed and in transition. Thus politicians are taking over from bureaucratic mandarins while the expert managers are losing out to generalists, a trend not yet acknowledged. The reform is poorly communicated. In this wise, questioning the reformer’s capacity built for communication and implementation leaves much to be desired. The context and management of the reform fail to understand the problem structurally, especially with the Finnish phenomenal disadvantages. The cultural sensitivity, structuration and alignment should be taken into account in the future leadership reform needs of Finland.

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