Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the value of applying the lessons of successful historical battlefield commanders to teach leadership concepts and theories. This article uses the experience of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Grande Armee at the Battle of Austerlitz to illustrate these concepts. Utilizing Napoleon’s success in this battle as a framework, this essay employs a causal model of leadership to analyze and expound on leadership concepts that can benefit graduate students in Masters of Public Administration (MPA) programs. The leadership causal model emphasizes both descriptive and prescriptive aspects of leadership theory. The implications of this essay are that it provides a theoretical framework in public and non-profit sectors and therefore is an appropriate pedagogical strategy for teaching these concepts in undergraduate and graduate public administration courses. Moreover, the framework allows students to identify the best leadership and management practices in public and non-profit organizations.
Keywords
Introduction
The formal study of leadership in public administration programs is constantly t evolving. While our understanding of public and non-profit organizations as actors within the broader political system has been enhanced by research into organization theory and behavior, we still have a ways to go toward understanding leadership within the organizational context. This is particularly noteworthy, given the emphasis on management by pioneers of public administration theory (Wilson, 1887). Until recently, the number of MPA programs offering formal courses on leadership was relatively low (Beaty and Davis, 2012). This matters because understanding leadership processes and practices such as how to inspire subordinates and staff in public and non-profit organizations is just as important as mastering the technical skills of empirical analyses and program evaluation (Hines, 2010). From a broader perspective, it matters because now, perhaps more than ever, the menu of social problems confronting public administrators and policy makers requires a more comprehensive approach to studying leadership—which ideally leads to an enhanced leadership praxis in public and non-profit organizations (Gardner, 1995). At the graduate level, the MPA programs that do offer formal courses on leadership studies strive to balance descriptive and prescriptive aspects of the topic so that students can ascertain the theoretical parameters of leadership and also glean best practices and processes that can be applied within organizational contexts.
One way of doing this is to use as case study, the experience of successful military leaders throughout history who led soldiers and armies into battle, like Napoleon did at Austerlitz in 1805. This approach can yield fruitful results in teaching leadership concepts in an academic setting. Using the experiences of military commanders to teach leadership lessons is not a novel concept (Woodmansee, 2001). Several books have been written for executives and managers in the private sector that use military leaders as the backdrop for illustrating leadership principles. Some of these works place too much emphasis on individual personality traits, but they illustrate the trend toward using the experiences of army commanders to reinforce the lessons of leadership (Phillips, 1992; Wess, 1990). Moreover, the Gettysburg Leadership Institute uses one of the most important military campaigns of the Civil War—the battle of Gettysburg—to teach practical leadership lessons to corporate and public sector leaders from all over the country. Kolenda (2001) agrees with the potential of such an approach, proclaiming that “the battlefields of history provide a unique opportunity to examine key aspects of the leadership phenomenon.” Since public administration has adapted some of the hallmarks of military science to some of its concepts—like the ideal bureaucratic structure and strategic management in public and non-profit organizations—it stands to reason that this academic field can glean additional lessons, like leadership from the military profession.
A causal model that combines descriptive and prescriptive leadership approaches could provide a template from which to examine the experiences of army generals and use them to teach leadership concepts and principles to students in public administration classrooms. The schools of thought and theories that comprise the systematic study of leadership are numerous and wide ranging. Some theories emphasize leadership processes that value organizational productivity and group-member well-being, for example, while others emphasize leader skills and personality traits. Organizational change and organizational alignment with an external system is an example of yet another trend in leadership studies (Van Wart, 2012). Employing a causal model is a useful pedagogical tool to achieve a degree of consistency in comparing leaders and organizational outcomes across a wide range of time and circumstances (Van Wart, 2012). As a template for emphasizing key leadership theories, instructors can use the model to illustrate the various facets of a leader’s personality traits, skills, and processes, and once students have begun to comprehend the concepts, instructors can challenge students to identify them on their own.
In the next section, the causal model of leadership is presented, based on theories, concepts, and themes from the major schools of leadership thought. The model provides a framework for explaining Napoleon’s success at Austerlitz. Then, a brief sketch of Napoleon’s leadership in the months leading up to and during the battle is presented. In a classroom setting, discussions of Napoleon’s action at Austerlitz would constitute a full case study, rather than a brief sketch that is given here. After discussing the theories and concepts that make up the chains in the causal model, an analysis is presented of Napoleon’s leadership process. The application for leaders and managers within public and non-profit organizations are interspersed throughout the analysis.
A causal-chain model of leadership
The causal model presented in this work is based on Van Wart’s (2012) simple model of leadership (Figure 1). The first chain of his model begins with leadership style—the people-oriented and task-oriented behaviors—which are mediated by factors in the second chain of the model—a potential range of contingency factors—both of which together explain organizational outcomes (Schutt, 2009: 366; Van Wart, 2012: 33). The strength of Van Wart’s model is that it recognizes the theoretical links in the task-relationship, people relationship dyad that are inherent in several leadership theories (Ayman and Adams, 2012). The factors in the first chain of the model used in our analysis of Napoleon’s actions at Austerlitz—like Van Wart’s—comprise task- and people-oriented behaviors. The factors in the second chain of our model diverge from Van Wart’s in that the factors in the second chain of the model consist of the personality traits of the leader, leadership skills, and the skills and abilities of a public and non-profit organization’s rank and file members.
Causal-chain model of leadership.
The trait theory approach to studying leadership was pioneered by Stogdill (1948), who sought to extend Carlyle’s (1841) great man theory of leadership. Trait theories built on the great man theories by identifying and examining the personality traits that organizational leaders had in common. However, trait theory approaches later came into disrepute because of the inability of personality traits to withstand empirical scrutiny—in part, because of the manner in which the list of traits that psychologists referred to in explaining organizational leadership success continually expanded (Northouse, 2011).
In recent years, however, trait theory approaches has witnessed a resurgence (Rubin et al., 2002; Zaccaro, 2007). More than its resurgence, however, trait theory constitutes the first contextual factor in the second chain because the personality traits of leaders have been viewed as intervening factors in organizational outcomes, rather than simply as independent variables (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972; Perrow, 1970; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977; Vroom and Jago, 2007). In the model used in this analysis, the inclusion of the skills approach in the second link of the chain further adds theoretical robustness in that, whereas trait theory is mute on the potential of leader development, the skills approach assumes that one’s leadership potential can be enhanced and improved upon over time through experience and education (Day, 2012; Northouse, 2011).
Overall, the fusion of leadership style with other components of leadership theories, such as trait theory, the leader’s skills developed over time, and situational variables such as the abilities of organizational personnel—in this case, the ability of Napoleon’s soldiers—is aimed at rectifying one the most pertinent criticisms of the task–people-oriented approach to studying leadership. The main criticism of task–people leadership styles, which the factors in the second chain of the model addresses, is its difficulty in explaining why people with certain leadership styles are more effective in some situations than others (Kerr et al., 1974). The factors in the second chain of the model provide a theoretical link to the task- and people-oriented behaviors utilized by the leader in the first chain of the model. In so doing, the model we use reconciles two schools of thought: one emphasizes the attributes of the leader—who the leader is—and the other emphasizes what the leader does and the context in which s/he does it. Moreover, by making the leader’s personality traits and skills, as well as situational factors, the basis of the second chain of the model, the causal model’s ability to explain why the leader’s behavioral emphasis—from either a task- or people-oriented perspective—leads to a successful leadership endeavor, as suggested by Kerr et al. (1974), is enhanced.
Case study sketch—Napoleon and the Battle of Austerlitz
After Britain nullified the Treaty of Amiens in 1803, Napoleon Bonaparte spent the next two years building an army along the northern French town of Boulogne. He intended to use this army to invade Britain. Just before it was unleashed on the European Continent in the fall of 1805, it was one of the largest land forces ever assembled up to that time—some sources have the number of troops between 150,000 and 200,000 (Blond, 1979: 42; Elting, 1988: 60)—and he called this massive force La Grande Armee—French for the Grand Army. Lacking a naval force sufficient enough to challenge the British at sea and because he learned of an approaching army of combined Russian and Austrian forces, he abandoned his plans of invading England. Instead, Napoleon ordered his Grand Army to march eastward to confront this new threat.
Napoleon divided his army into four corps and moved eastward toward the Danube River from three different directions under the command of four marshals—Louis-Nicholas Davout, Jean-de-Dieu Soult, Joachim Murat, and Michel Ney. Rather than attempting to confront the Russo-Austrian coalition all at once, Napoleon’s overall strategic objective was to destroy them in piecemeal fashion, crushing one part, then the other. Departing Boulogne at the end of August 1805, Napoleon arrived with his army at Ulm, located in Germany along the Danube River, by mid-October, where the Austrian forces under the command of General Karl Mack von Leiberich were encamped.
Napoleon caught General Mack off guard, effectively surrounding him on three sides with the Danube at his rear. Seeing no way of escape, Mack surrendered his entire army of 30,000 men on October 19, 1805. Mack’s capitulation forced the Russian commander, Mikhail Kutuzov, who, at the time, was advancing with his army toward Ulm in order to reinforce Mack, to conduct an about face and retreat toward the Austrian city of Vienna, with Napoleon soon in pursuit. Napoleon entered Vienna in mid-November, while Kutuzov retreated further north and east toward Austerlitz and dug in there with his troops where he was later joined by the Russian czar, Alexander I, and the Austrian emperor, Franz II.
When Napoleon arrived at Austerlitz, he had approximately 55,000 troops under his command, and after three months of continuous marching, they were exhausted. To further complicate the situation, the combined Austro-Russian armies outnumbered the troops Napoleon had under his command by nearly two to one. After several days of carefully studying the landscape surrounding Austerlitz, Napoleon devised a battle plan that relied on surprise, and tactical maneuver. Napoleon was confident his plan would offset the numerical advantage enjoyed by his adversaries. In order for the plan to succeed, Napoleon had to achieve several objectives. First, he needed to give his exhausted troops, who had been marching virtually non-stop since they departed the army camp at Boulogne back in August, a brief respite (Esdaile, 2007: 225). Second, he needed to convey the impression to his enemies that he was vulnerable and therefore unwilling to engage in battle.
Napoleon achieved both objectives by requesting a meeting with the Russian czar, Alexander I, ostensibly for the purpose to proposing a peace treaty (Esdaile, 2007). Alexander sent his envoy to meet with Napoleon, who, in turn, reported to the czar that Napoleon was weakened and ripe for the taking. Lulled into a false sense of security by Napoleon’s subterfuge, Alexander’s hubris led him to rebuff Napoleon’s overtures—which the French emperor had hoped and expected he would do—and unwittingly walk into the trap set for him. Having achieved both objectives that were central to his battle plan—his soldiers got the rest they needed and his adversaries mistakenly believed that he was weak and vulnerable—the stage for the climactic battle was set.
On the morning of the battle, Napoleon ordered the wing of his army on his right flank to withdraw from a sloping hill known as the Pratzen Heights. Professional soldiers know that obtaining and holding high ground is one of the most important tactical objectives in military maneuver because it allows the occupants of the terrain a view of the surrounding landscape and for this reason, it would be unthinkable for a seasoned commander like Napoleon to yield high ground to opposing commanders—unless he was retreating. When Napoleon withdrew his forces from the hill, it reinforced the idea that he was weak and vulnerable. Although the Russian general Kutuzov sensed that Napoleon was setting a trap, Czar Alexander was anxious to achieve military glory and ignored Kutuzov’s warning. As Napoleon expected, the Russian troops occupied the Pratzen Heights, opposite his right flank, which Napoleon purposely left exposed, choosing instead, to concentrate his forces on his left flank and center.
In taking the Pratzen Heights and concentrating their forces to attack Napoleon’s weakened right flank, the Russian and Austrian forces left their center precariously weakened—thereby fighting the battle according to Napoleon’s intentions. Napoleon hurled his corps into the enemy’s center, effectively splitting the Russian and Austrian forces in two. After destroying the Allies’ center, Napoleon easily bottled up the Russian’s left flank. By late afternoon, the battle had turned into a rout, with Russian and Austrian forces fleeing the French and leaving behind 40,000 soldiers who had been killed, captured, or too wounded to flee, along with over one hundred Russian and Austrian canon (Blond, 1979; Schom, 1997).
For the Russians and Austrians, Austerlitz was a disaster—the Russians limped back to Russia and the Austrian emperor was forced to submit to Napoleon. For the French, it was a spectacular victory. Coming on the anniversary of Napoleon’s coronation as emperor of the French, Austerlitz was Napoleon’s finest moment as a military commander and forever cemented his legacy as one of the outstanding battlefield commanders of all time.
Leadership lessons from the Battle of Austerlitz
The causal model used to diagram and conceptualize Napoleon’s leadership strategy delineates leadership style into task-oriented and people-oriented behaviors, which we posit are mediated by the leader’s personality traits and skills, and a number of situational factors. The task- and people-oriented behaviors used to conceptualize Napoleon’s leadership processes, which constitute the first chain of the causal model, are operations planning and problem solving, motivating personnel, and managing conflict. The factors in the second chain of the model that are viewed here as moderating or impacting the performance of the leadership processes in the first part of the model are Napoleon’s personality traits (energy, confidence, and decisiveness), his skill (as a military technician), and situational factors (the ability of soldiers in the Grand Army).
Operations planning and problem solving
The planning and coordination of an organization’s strategic and tactical plans into an implementable template is one of the primary responsibilities of an organization’s leadership team (Van Wart, 2012). In public and non-profit administration and management—as well as in the business of war—the success of a venture relies on thorough and solid operations planning. Napoleon was a meticulous planner and gave careful thought to his military campaigns, envisioning the process from beginning to end. A remark Napoleon made to one of his subordinates attests to how central strategic planning was to the success of his military endeavors: If I always seem to be ready for everything, to face up to anything, it is because I never undertake anything at all without having first meditated for a long time and foreseen what might happen. It is not a genie, but meditation, that suddenly reveals to me, in secret, what I must say and do under circumstances not anticipated by others. (Castelot, 1967: 231)
Napoleon’s strategic plan included a large expeditionary force—the force that later became Napoleon’s Grand Army, as well as an armada of several thousand ships. The level of planning was so meticulous that the precise location for where Napoleon’s soldiers would disembark, along with the route they would take to London, was decided upon years before the operation was to be implemented (Schom, 1997: 309–332).
As already mentioned, these plans had to be abandoned when he learned of the Russian and Austrian forces’ advance toward France from the east. Yet it is referred to again here because it conveys not only the importance of operations planning, but also the importance of being able to apply problem-solving skills to adjust grand strategic plans when circumstances require it. Napoleon’s ability to quickly pivot from his plan of invading Britain to confront the Austrian and Russian armies suggests he was able to adjust his long-term plans in order to deal with short-term problems. A well-thought-out plan of action is paramount for any organization. In public and non-profit organizations, however, uncertainty and system-wide influences can potentially disrupt an organization’s long-term objectives and throw the organization off course. Public administration scholars know well that the “fog of war,” is an apt metaphor to describe the organizational disruptions that are part and parcel of the modern-day organizational setting. Information systems, electronic communications, and social media—all of which were originally thought to strengthen and enhance organizational effectiveness—often create more problems and disruptions than they solve (Shafritz et al., 2013). Furthermore the political environment that serves as the context for public administration (Shafritz et al., 2013)—along with all of its implications, that is, the shortened time horizons for developing and implementing plans and projects, civil service protections for employees in public sector organizations, the myriad, and ambiguous standards of success—tend to make the fog of war a more formidable metaphor in public and non-profit organizations.
Whereas operations planning suggest a broader, wider scope that have long-term strategic goals in mind, problem solving suggests a leadership process that addresses short-term problems that arise unexpectedly and occur in the course of an organization’s pursuit of its strategic goals. Problem solving is aimed at navigating and mitigating the effects of these unexpected disruptions—the fog of war—that are more likely to plague public and non-profit organizations. Napoleon’s ability to adjust his plans for invading England and to redirect his attention to dealing with the immediate threat posed by the combined forces of Russian and Austrian soldiers illustrate how leaders in public and non-profit organizations must develop strategic plans, which while broad and far reaching, are yet flexible enough to adjust to unforeseen and unplanned for contingencies.
Motivating and empowering personnel
Motivating organizational personnel to work collaboratively toward a collective goal may very well be one of the most important processes on which the premise of leadership is defined (Vroom and Jago, 2007). This is because leaders must have followers who are willing to make sacrifices for the mission of the units they are assigned to as well the overall goals and objectives of the organization. Motivation plays a key role in keeping the organization focused and collectively working toward this end. One of the keys to keeping the personnel within an organization motivated is to recognize meritorious performance (Van Wart, 2012). Whenever circumstances compel sanctioning or correcting undesirable behavior of individuals within the organization, such actions should be fair and commiserate with the offense (Van Wart, 2012).
Napoleon was a superb motivator; he was a “people person,” whose warmth and engaging personality was compelling enough to motivate individually as well as collectively. He was as willing to use the stick, as well as the carrot, if it served his purpose of getting the most out of his subordinates and his army. As stated by Elting (1988: 596) there existed a “mighty link of affection between the Grande Armee and the emperor.” One of the ways that Napoleon cultivated this mighty link of affection was to make advancement through the ranks available to anyone who distinguished himself on the battlefield. By the time the army arrived at Austerlitz, it was known that anyone could advance through the ranks by hard work and enterprising industriousness. There was a well-known saying in the army that took on proverbial proportions by 1805 and captured the essence of the idea of merit being the basis of advancement through the ranks of the army. This well-known proverb—one that would persist to the end of Napoleon’s reign—stated that within the knapsack of every private was a marshal’s baton (Elting, 1988: 597).
Napoleon seemed to have had a genuine interest in the care and welfare of his soldiers and it showed in his personal dealings with them on an individual basis. He routinely engaged them about their welfare, especially as it pertained to their equipment and whether or not they were adequately fed and supplied. While part of his own motivation behind these actions was his understanding that being well-fed and well-supplied would encourage soldiers to work harder, he also understood that displaying interest in their welfare and in their personal cares and concerns would solidify their loyalty to him, thereby binding their interests to his.
When on campaign, Napoleon made it a habit of getting out among the soldiers and engaging them in small talk. He asked to sample their food and inquired about their family, and cautioned them to make sure that their rifles were cleaned, oiled, and ready for action. When they performed well, Napoleon gave his soldiers cash bonuses and on the spot promotions for bravery in the face of enemy fire. After the Battle of Austerlitz, he gave every soldier who was wounded in action three months extra pay, a tangible display of gratitude. Moreover, he adopted the children of every soldier killed in the battle and raised them at this imperial palace; the boys were educated and he arranged marriages for the girls when they became adults (Elting, 1988: 596). In addition to this, he distributed two million francs among his high-ranking officers as a reward for their performance (Duffy, 1977: 161)
Napoleon’s actions before and after the battle suggest a motivational approach that is consistent with the literature on organization theory and motivation (Hertzberg, 1968; Maslow, 2007; McGregor, 1960). The way he engaged his soldiers in conversation, asking them about their families, and imploring them to look after their equipment exemplifies a relationship centered approach to motivation that is consistent with Mayo’s finding in his research at the Western Electric Company’s Hawthorne Plant in the 1920s, about the importance of managers paying attention to rank and file members within an organization (Roethlisberger, 2005). The increase in productivity by the Grand Army when Napoleon commanded the army in person attests to the validity of the Hawthorne Effect, as evidenced by the British Army commander Arthur, the Duke of Wellington, who said that Napoleon’s presence on the battlefield alone was worth 40,000 men. The well-known proverb among Napoleon’s soldiers that a “marshal’s baton was in the knapsack of even the lowliest soldier,” speaks to Hertzberg’s (1968) theory that opportunities for promotion, achievement, and recognition are motivational factors that are as important as extrinsic factors such as financial remuneration. Everyone knew that one of the Grand Army’s most illustrious marshals—Andre Massena—had advanced through the ranks of the army, enlisting as private, and through dent of his war-time accomplishments, received promotion after promotion until he finally reached the rank of marshal, the highest accolade that could be bestowed on a soldier. Although Napoleon was willing to use the stick, corporal punishment—which was common in other European armies—was not allowed in the Grand Army. This is wholly consistent with McGregor’s (1960) theory that it is not necessary, nor productive, to employ intimidation, threats, fear, and coercion as negative forms of motivation. Napoleon’s soldiers were better than opposing armies, and like at Austerlitz, they often won even when opposed by armies with numerical advantages because their level of motivation exceeded by far the level of motivation of opposing armies.
Just as in Napoleon’s army where pay and other extrinsic rewards such as pay raises were minimal, modern-day public and non-profit sector leaders’ limited ability to use extrinsic rewards as motivational factors means that they will need to find other incentives to motivate those who serve in their agencies and organizations. The particular challenges that distinguishes public and non-profit management and leadership from leadership in private sector organizations necessitate continuous innovative approaches to motivating subordinates and staff. Civil service values of due process, rules that govern promotion and discipline, and the limited ability of public sector managers to control the pay and promotion of their subordinates are just a few of the limitations that affect public and non-profit sector managers’ ability to lead and manage their subordinates (Rainey, 1991). Because of the lack of carrot and stick inducement available to public and non-profit organizational leaders and managers, they need to take every opportunity, like Napoleon did, to interact with subordinates and rank and file members within their department, directory, or agency and use interpersonal relationships as a foundation on which to provide inspiration and motivation to the people within their sphere of influence.
Team building
Leaders cannot possibly be everywhere at once nor do everything necessary to ensure organizational success. Therefore it is vital that they build effective teams to whom they can delegate tasks and responsibilities. Team building does not simply entail matching people with similar talents and common interests—although this is an important aspect of team building. High-performing teams have shared values and a sense of group identity. They are adequately trained and prepared to perform their assigned tasks and responsibilities; there is a distinctive culture that stresses success and individual contribution, and they recognize and value diversity of backgrounds and talent (Bolman and Deal, 2008: 286-288; Van Wart, 2012: 275–277) They also use ritual—in some cases esoteric, but no less relevant for team members—in a way that serves to strengthen the bonds of membership, which further reinforces the sense of shared identity and collective obligation toward making sure that the team is successful in contributing to the organization’s bottom line (Bolman and Deal, 2008: 286–288).
The leadership team that Napoleon assembled to lead his massive army displayed the hallmarks of successful team building. In May 1804, soon after becoming emperor, Napoleon created the marshallate, his primary lieutenants who constituted the highest level of leadership of his army. The names and exploits of these “Marshals of the Empire”—Augerau, Bernadotte, Berthier, Bessieres, Brune, Davout, Jourdan, Lannes, Massena, Moncey, Mortier, Murat, Ney, and Soult—are legendary and forever linked to Napoleon’s in the annals of French military history. These men were entrusted by Napoleon to direct his corps and divisions and they validated this trust by running roughshod over the armies of the great European powers during the Napoleonic Period. When viewed as the leadership team of the Grand Army, Napoleon’s marshals illustrate nearly all of the hallmarks of effective team building. They were a diverse group, coming from different backgrounds and stations in life; for example, some were highly educated and came from prominent families who constituted the titled nobility under the Ancien Regime while others were barely literate and came from peasant stock. In Napoleon’s army, however, these social divisions did not prevent them from becoming a unified team, working together toward a common goal. In the two years they spent at Boulogne, training together and perfecting the method of war that Napoleon unleashed upon the continent in the fall and winter of 1805, they developed the sense of common interest and shared values stressed by Van Wart as essential to the foundation of highly productive organizations (2012). The importance of diversity, especially in how it enhances unit productivity, improves delivery of services in multicultural communities, and enhances client satisfaction (in public sector organizations) and consumer loyalty (in private sector organizations) has been well documented and does not require further elaboration here (Matthews, 2010; Rice, 2010: 1; Rice and Matthews, 2012). Napoleon’s marshals were able to instill into their units what Bolman and Deal (2008) refer to as “soul,” that esprit de corps which refers to the collective spirit of devotion, enthusiasm, and regard for the team’s reputation. Esprit de corps—or soul—is the one special ingredient that give high-performing teams purpose and drive (Bolman and Deal, 2008: 289–290). Once an assortment of individuals has welded their identities and aspirations to that of the team and the greater organization, there is no limit to what the team can accomplish.
Managing conflict
The way that Napoleon managed conflict among his lieutenants is consistent with what contemporary leadership studies caution about the need to use conflict in a way that builds, rather than erodes, camaraderie and members’ commitment to the organization’s values and mission (Van Wart, 2012). Napoleon harnessed the competitive nature and ego-driven personalities of his corps commanders toward a high performing and formidable military organization. An example of this occurred several days before the commencement of hostilities at Austerlitz, when a disagreement erupted between Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat over tactical maneuver and whether the army should press forward or pull back. One of the marshals—Lannes—was of the opinion that they should withdraw and by the time Napoleon arrived on the scene, the argument had escalated to the point that they were questioning each other’s integrity and only the emperor’s presence and interference was able to diffuse the situation. In the end, Napoleon sided with Marshal Lannes, who felt most aggrieved by the episode, and ordered an immediate pull back from the town of Austerlitz and the Pratzen Heights. This episode tells us that it is unlikely that conflict can ever be totally eradicated among talented subordinates, but leaders can nevertheless manage conflict in ways that yields positive results.
The political setting and context of public and non-profit organizations make conflict inevitable—probably sooner, rather than later. The manner in which public and non-profit organizations compete for resources, the overlapping jurisdictions they share on an range of policies and government programs, and the symbiotic relationships that these organizations have with interests groups, the media, and citizen watchdog groups is indicative of a politically charged environment where conflict is rampant and ubiquitous (Rainey, 1991: 195, 196). This reality necessitates the presence of organizational leaders who are adept at conflict management. The nature of organizational conflict may be inter-organizational—occurring across levels of organizations—or intra-organizational; occurring between people within organizational units (Rainey, 1991). Whether the source of conflict is inter-organizational or intra-organizational, if managed correctly, it can be harnessed in ways that lead to productive outcomes.
Personality traits and skill sets
Any assessment of Napoleon’s leadership success must start with his energy and powers of concentration. To say that Napoleon was a tireless worker is an understatement. His energy and ability to focus on a task at hand was legendary. His contemporaries marveled at his indefatigable capacity for work and powers of concentration. His ability to compartmentalize projects in his mind and to use detail and minutia to his advantage and yet not be overwhelmed by them suggest a fecundity of mind and a relentless drive and tirelessness in the pursuit of his objectives. For managers and leaders in modern public and non-profit organizations, physical vitality is just as an important a prerequisite for organizational success as it was for Napoleon. It is unlikely that leaders who are lethargic and listless will set lofty goals for themselves, let alone for the organizations they lead. Positive energy is generally associated with the personality trait of extraversion (Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1995: 135).
Self-confidence and decisiveness are two personality traits often associated with successful public and non-profit organizational leaders. Few generals in history possessed these personality traits in more abundance than Napoleon. These two traits seem to be complementary in nature and the possession of one generally disposes to the possession of the other. Self-confidence in a leader is important—critical even—for leaders because the decisions they make must have credibility with subordinates and others within the organization if they are to have the force of moral authority (Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1995: 139). Credibility among subordinates and other organizational members become possible only when the leader exudes self-confidence and decisiveness. In addition to being self-confident, leaders need to be able to inspire in subordinates confidence in their own abilities. In fact, this is, perhaps, the truest mettle of a leader: whether or not he or she can inspire confidence in others (Northouse, 2011; Van Wart, 2012: 178). Napoleon’s self-confidence seemed to have had an infectious quality, infusing his field marshals and generals with a sense of confidence and belief in their abilities that was also imbibed by the enlisted personnel, a sentiment shared by even the lowest-ranking private in the army. Napoleon’s self-confidence and the belief among his subordinate generals and soldiers within the ranks of his faith in them made the difference at Austerlitz, even in the face of overwhelming odds. As remarked by a soldier just before the battle, regarding the confidence he exuded and inspired in others: The presence of the emperor…produced a powerful effect on the army. Everyone had the most implicit confidence in him; everyone knew from experience that his plans led to victory, and therefore…our moral force was redoubled. (Esdaile, 2007: 221)
Decisiveness is a trait that naturally flows in the wake of self-confidence. Leaders who have a belief in their abilities will display decisiveness at critical junctures during their tenure at the helm of an organization. It should be emphasized, however, that decisiveness for decisiveness sake is empty and hollow. Rather, the kind of decisiveness that matters in leaders is that which emphasizes the leader’s ability to act quickly but in a manner that does not negatively affect the integrity and quality of a decision (Van Wart, 2012). At Austerlitz, Napoleon’s decisiveness and self-confidence tipped the scales in his favor. It was because of his self-confidence and decisiveness that Napoleon was able to overcome the reservations of his field marshals, of his plan to yield the coveted high ground of the Pratzen Heights. As we have seen already, the emperor’s self-confidence and decisiveness was the reason why the men within the ranks believed so fervently that regardless of the odds against them—the numerical superiority of the coalition forces, four months of incessant marching, and having to endure the privations of inclement weather—that in the end, they would prevail and have the victory. As with Napoleon and the Grand Army, self-confidence and decisiveness of leaders can be the difference between success and failure in public and non-profit organization’s attainment of their objectives.
A person may have all of the personality traits associated with leadership success, but without the technical and conceptual skills upon which the focus of personality traits can be brought to bear, no leader can realistically expect to be successful. Whereas personality traits are innate assets unique to individual leaders, the skills they acquire over time are assets acquired only through dedicated and sustained effort. Skills can be seen as assets that can facilitate one’s ascension to positions of responsibility and leadership; indeed, a person’s skills sets can facilitate the path to leadership (Day, 2012: 118–121). As it was for Napoleon, technical proficiency in industry-related functions are especially critical for front line and mid-level managers and supervisors. As a second lieutenant and captain in the artillery who supervised and directed artillery batteries, Napoleon had to have mastered the particulars of his profession before he could have aspired to greater leadership responsibilities. Success in the army’s field artillery branch required mathematical precision, as well as familiarity with topography and map reading. Few people realize that long before he became an emperor, Napoleon spent years studying to hone his craft, becoming proficient in mathematics, history, philosophy, and geography (Parker, 1971). By the time he assumed his first command as a junior officer leading a company of artillery gunners in Toulon, Napoleon had seven years of formal preparation and apprenticeship in the art of war and military science (Wilkinson, 1952). After obtaining an officer’s commission as a second lieutenant as an artillery officer, he continued to build on the foundation of his formal education and apprenticeship by undertaking a rigorous program of self-directed study and reading on a wide range of subjects in his apartment after his work shift was completed while his colleagues used their after-work hours for gambling, carousing, and drinking.
When he descended on Austerlitz in 1805, Napoleon had become the consummate professional soldier for which history, above all other reasons, remembers him. He had spent 20 years preparing for this moment—he had spent countless hours in personal study, poring over the battles of Julius Caesar’s and Alexander the Great’s wars, as well as other historical commanders. He had fought 50 battles and was supremely prepared for the upcoming battle (Blond, 1979). He was thoroughly versed in the management of armies and men, as well as the technical functions of making war—not only of the artillery, but also in his knowledge of how the branches of his army such as the cavalry and infantry could be reformed into a better fighting unit. The army corps system is perhaps Napoleon’s most enduring legacy to military science. Contemporary armies still use the corps formation as a tactical unit of military operations. It also, however, illustrates how his mastery of the skills unique to his profession—the profession of arms—facilitate an understanding of why his army outperformed a numerically superior force.
The lesson from Napoleon’s commitment to professional competence and proficiency in the particulars of his profession, for aspiring leaders today in public and non-profit organizations is clear. Mastery of technical, operational, and interpersonal skills are important factors in leadership attainment. In order to be effective, public and non-profit organizational leaders need to possess the technical and professional skills relative to their industry and/or profession. Law enforcement professionals, for example, should be highly accomplished and proficient in the technical aspects of public safety and law and order; the same can be said of educational professionals—it goes without saying that they will master the science of teaching and learning. The point to be conveyed here is that leaders have to be specialists before they can become generalists. Furthermore, those who aspire to leadership responsibility should commit themselves to a program of continual self-development. Whether this is achieved through further study in formal academic settings, attending professional conferences, or embarking on a program of reading several books per year that is related to one’s profession, it is vital that organizational leaders maintain the mindset of continual self-development; improving the technical, conceptual, professional, and analytical skills necessary to maintain a maximum level of proficiency and preparedness commiserate with the demands of leadership.
Troop ability
From 1803 to 1805, when the Grand Army was being built, the soldiers ensconced in Boulogne underwent a continual regimen of intense training in areas such as individual marksmanship, corporate body maneuver drills, and amphibious operations (Blond, 1979). For two days on a weekly basis, the Grand Army’s battalions trained separately, for three days the army divisions drilled together, and for one day on a weekly basis, the army’s corps units engaged in large-scale maneuvers. All of this occurred under the emperor’s watchful eye. Napoleon constantly staged reviews and inspected his battalions, and offered corrections when necessary. These reviews were exhaustive and stressful, designed to ensure the readiness of the army and, in many cases, soldiers would observe that the training and reviews were more stressful than the actual battles they would later encounter. When they were finally unleashed on the European continent in the first years of the nineteenth century, the Grand Army was by far the best on the continent and was virtually invincible for the better part of a decade, defeating foe after foe, until by 1806, Napoleon was master of most of western Europe.
The superior ability of Napoleon’s soldiers, relative to the armies they faced on the battlefield, and its impact on their ability to dominate opposing armies cannot be overstated. This illustrates the importance of training on an organization’s effectiveness and productivity. Highly productive organizations do not become that way by happenstance but rather through a program of recurring training. It falls on leaders to ensure that the personnel within their organizations receive training on a recurring basis; whether it occurs on a yearly, semi-annual, or bi-annual basis. The key point stressed here is that training plays a role in the collective ability of an organization and its overall capacity for productivity.
Concluding observations
The goal of this effort is to present an innovative and interesting way to display leadership theories and concepts in undergraduate and graduate courses in public administration programs, by taking the lessons of leadership exhibited by generals such as Napoleon and using them to expound on leadership concepts and principles. In another setting, another general—at a different battle—could have been used just as effectively to emphasize task and leader-member functions, leader traits and skills, and leadership processes. There are a number of generals—past and present—that have waged successful, and unsuccessful, campaigns from which we can draw lessons. General Douglass MacArthur’s blunder on the Korean Peninsula or Robert E. Lee’s failure at Gettysburg could have just as much value in teaching leadership theories as generals who experience success on the battlefield.
A potential liability of using larger than life historical figures such as Napoleon as case study material in public administration classrooms is the potential for analyses by students to degenerate into hero worship. Napoleon has been held up by 19th-century advocates of the great man approach to leadership as the prototypical great man whose charisma and force of personality shaped the trajectory of history (Carlyle, 1841). Ideally, the instructor who moderates the discussion would ensure that this does not happen and using the causal model should provide a useful tool in steering the discussion away from this tendency. Furthermore, instructors would ideally point out, where appropriate, the importance of responsible leadership to groom capable lieutenants as potential successors to their mantle. They would also point out the caveat inherent in charismatic figures such as Napoleon—or an Alexander the Great—of their tendency to leave their organizations unprepared for their demise and the resulting collapse of the organizational structures they created, because of their failure to cultivate the long-term capabilities of their organizations to be sustained after their departure.
Another potential shortcoming of this work revolves around using soldiers and an activity that has as its end organized violence on a grand scale to teach leadership theories. That the military’s main objective is organized violence, however, should not dissuade instructors from mining the experiences of some of history’s climatic battles for their pedagogical value. The inclusion of General David Petraeus’s experience in Mosul, Iraq as commander of the US Central Command in the John F. Kennedy School of Government’s case study series verifies the accuracy of this claim. Furthermore, as already mentioned, several subfields in the academic field of public administration have used the military as a model for teaching and emphasizing concepts and themes, particularly as it relates to organization theory, strategic planning/thinking, and organizational behavior (Shafritz et al., 2013; Van Wart, 2012). The educational and pedagogical value of using the experiences of historical generals such as Napoleon to highlight and teach leadership lies in the manner in which their endeavors and organizational outcomes easily lend themselves to the practical and theoretical application of leadership theories. It seems almost gratuitous to stress that public administration scholars and instructors will readily recognize—and communicate to students—that glorifying violence and war is not the intent of the exercise but to recognize that military institutions have much to tell us about leadership.
A potential observation by instructors and students might acknowledge that modern-day public and non-profit executives grapple with different contingencies that involve stakeholders, competing coalitions, political supporters, political superiors, etc. that did not confound or challenge Napoleon’s capacity to be successful as a leader. The response to this recognizes the myriad ways in which the specific obstacles to organizational effectiveness and competent leadership—of an army in the 19th century—differ from that of competent leadership of public and non-profit organizations in a modern-day democracy. It is also equally true, however, that the challenges of organizational leadership, broadly speaking, transcend time and era. Conflict management, assembling a productive executive team, effective communication strategies that gain buy-in and support from subordinates, and strategic planning are examples of timeless leadership processes that apply as readily to organizational frameworks today as they did 200 years ago.
Time and space do not allow for coverage of the full range of potential situational factors that could facilitate an understanding of why Napoleon succeeded at Austerlitz. While only a few potential factors were presented here, there are more situational factors that could have been included in the second chain of the model that might have further enhanced our understanding of Napoleon’s success at the Battle of Austerlitz. For the purpose of this essay, the overarching goal is to illustrate how a causal model can be used to teach leadership, with some of history’s better-known generals—such as Napoleon Bonaparte—as a template, more so than the exactness of the causal model of leadership itself. In a classroom setting or as a separate case study assignment, the full range of possible situational factors that may have affected the battle’s outcome can be more fully explored. A few additional situational factors that come to mind are the technological limitations of the weapons used during the battle, the international factors affecting the other members of the coalition—that is, Britain, the primary instigator of the Third Coalition, and Prussia were members of the coalition but they did not commit forces to this battle—and the role Napoleon’s position as head of France might have played in his ability to command the nation’s resources and commitment to his ambitions. These considerations are important because they underscore a central premise of situational theory; which is that factors outside of the leader’s control are just as important in explaining organizational outcomes as anything the leader does or does not do. The addition of these situational factors in the second chain of the causal model, as previously mentioned, may further explain Napoleon’s success—given the leadership style he adopted in the days leading up to and during the battle. It is important to recognize how situational factors mediate leader behavioral styles in a way that explain why a leadership endeavor was successful—or unsuccessful—as an analysis of Robert E. Lee’s generalship at the battle of Gettysburg might conclude.
The case study approach as a pedagogical tool for teaching leadership theories can be more effective when students are encouraged to compare aspects of a case being considered and studied with that of other cases similarly situated. In all, utilizing the experience of military commanders to teach leadership concepts holds tremendous promise. As already mentioned, the Gettysburg Foundation’s In the Footsteps of Leaders program has realized tremendous success by using a similar approach to teach leadership to private and public sector executives from all over the country. Undoubtedly, the reason behind their success is that the personalities of the generals and their interactions with subordinates and troops, along with the size and scope of the armies arrayed against each other, provide an adequate framework to draw practical leadership lessons that can be applied by managers and executives on a day-to-day basis in public and non-profit organizational settings. There is every reason to believe that in teaching leadership concepts and theories, MPA programs especially can have the same level of success in presenting leadership theories to students in their programs.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.