Abstract
In this revision of his doctoral dissertation (Emory University, 2008), Rindge take as his point of departure that Luke's parable of the Rich Fool is situated within a largely sapiential Second Temple conversation on death and possessions (e.g., Qoh 8:15, Sir 11:14–19, 1 En 97:8–10 and T. Ab.), and cannot be read properly apart from these texts. Also, when the parable is situated within its broader cultural mix, texts of Greco-Roman authors like Lucian and Seneca on death and possessions allow for a more fully textured reading of the parable.
In Chapter 1, Rindge offers a comprehensive history of the interpretation of Luke's parable of the Rich Fool. In the early to medieval periods the parable was mostly interpreted as a simple and straightforward critique of avarice. Linked to this topic, some saw in the parable a warning against luxury and greed, or the potential peril of wealth. When read in its Lukan context, the emphasis was on care for the poor, and when it was cited in conjunction with wisdom texts (Athanasius and Augustine), the theme of death, for example, received no attention. In the period of the Reformation, Erasmus, Luther and Calvin continued the practice of reading the parable as a warning against the dangers of greed and luxury, and also displayed an interest in themes such as death and anxiety. Interpretations since the nineteenth century followed the same route by emphasizing wealth and avarice, showing considerably less interest in death and the parable's allusions to wisdom texts.
In Chapters 2–3, Rindge explicates four Hellenistic Jewish texts in which there is, as in the parable of the Rich Fool, an explicit interplay between death and possessions. These four texts comprise a spectrum of different views on these twin motives. According to Qoheleth, death is inevitable and the end of one's being. Possessions (that are gifts from God) should be enjoyed as some mode of control in the face of the loss of control represented by death. Inheritance is not something to consider. Ben Sira also understands death as something uncontrollable, but not the end of one's being. Death intimates some type of judgment, and one should therefore, before it is too late, enjoy one's possessions and be generous in giving to God and to the poor. Almsgiving is important, as well as the issue of inheritance. 1 Enoch insists that death is followed by a post-mortem divine judgment; death is the beginning of an eternal distinction between the just and the wicked. The wealthy—who enjoyed their possessions—are the unjust and wicked in principle. They will not escape judgment and will receive no reward after death. Reward will go to the righteous, and to those who had no possessions. In the Testament of Abraham, death is also seen as unavoidable. Meaning in life, with regards to one's possessions, is to practice hospitality and to determine who will receive one's goods as an inheritance. In each of these texts, specific recommendations for the use of possessions correspond to a specific understanding of death, an interplay that consists of diverse and conflicting perspectives.
Chapter 4 focuses on the interplay between death and possessions in the texts of two Greco-Roman authors, namely Lucian (Dialogues of the Dead) and Seneca (Epistulae moralis). In Lucian and Seneca death is seen as unavoidable and irreversible, a moment to fear because it lays bare one's life and deeds for others to see. Possessions cannot be brought across death's divide; death eliminates virtually every distinction among people in their postmortem existence (especially economic differences), contributing to a state of equality among inhabitants of the afterlife.
Luke's parable, Rindge argues, should be situated within this Second Temple sapiential conversation on the intersection of death and possessions (Chapters 5–7). In the Jewish and Greco-Roman sapiential texts discussed above, six specific proposals are offered for how a person might use possessions meaningfully in view of death's inevitability (enjoyment, inheritance, giving to God, generosity, hospitality, alms). Luke's rich man, however, enacts none of these suggestions. In terms of the sapiential context of the parable, the rich man's folly also lies in his plans to save for the future (greed) and in the neglect of his own mortality. This twin failure, namely not to utilize possessions properly and not to acknowledge and accept his own mortality, makes the rich man a fool. The parable, finally, makes two important contributions to the sapiential conversation of which it is a part. The parable identifies the fragility and uncertainties of life as a potential threat to one's sense of control, and suggests that almost any effort to secure control through the use of possessions is a futile enterprise.
Rindge's reading of the parable, situating it in Second Temple discussions of the interplay between death and possessions, is interesting. His reading also makes good use of the literary context of the parable in Luke. If one decides to share his presuppositions, his reading should be taken seriously, especially in terms the understanding of the relationship between death and possessions in early Christianities (like those addressed by Luke's Gospel). Luke's application (and meaning) of the parable, however, most probably does not concur with the parable's “more original” intention or meaning when told 60–70 years earlier. When one, for example, analyses this parable taking in consideration first-century Mediterranean cultural scripts like dyadism, limited good and the ancient Mediterranean understanding of time, a different reading will come to the fore. All readings are perspectival.