Abstract
During the last sixty or more years, analysis of the New Testament which draws on the social sciences of cultural anthropology and sociology has made great strides in elucidating the cultural assumptions behind many scriptural texts. Prominent among its themes has been the idea that the biblical world can be understood as reflecting a Mediterranean culture with the core values of honor and shame. This, it has been argued, stands in sharp contrast to modern western societies. However, more recent work on the New Testament which exploits research in cognitive science/psychology suggests that it can provide a helpful corrective and complement to anthropological and sociological approaches. In line with this work, the present essay will apply the psychological analysis of social dominance hierarchies to the theme of honor-shame in order to fill out the picture painted by the social-scientific approach and, in doing so, seek to highlight continuities between New Testament and modern cultures. It will conclude by suggesting a reason why it has been the case that scholars employing social-scientific criticism have shown less awareness of these continuities.
There is, however, another domain of knowledge, that of the field of psychological research, which scholars have only in more recent times begun to exploit, but which has already achieved some valuable contributions to the analysis of biblical texts. Carried out chiefly by researchers from Nordic nations, it has applied findings from what they call “cognitive science” in studying such matters as magic, ritual and the transmission of thought in the New Testament (Moxnes). In some of their work, this group of scholars has sought to re-balance the emphasis on cultural contrast as found in social-scientific criticism with work that highlights important similarities (e.g. Roitto; Czachesz & Uro; Uro; Czachesz). As Moxnes explains:
When the latter [those applying social-scientific criticism] use the paradigm of difference between the ancient world and our modern world, that may be balanced by cognitive sciences that study early Christian texts, beliefs and rituals as results of human behavior that is recognizable across time spans [Moxnes: 80].
To date the Nordic scholars have not specifically dealt with the topic of honor-shame in the New Testament within the framework of cognitive science or psychology. So, as a contribution to the task of complementing the “paradigm of difference”, in this essay I will seek to demonstrate that, on the basis of psychological research, we can usefully and, in a fuller sense, understand seeking after honor in terms of a more fundamental, cross-cultural drive for social dominance.
Social dominance refers to that universally observed phenomenon among humans, as well as in many other species in the animal kingdom, in which rankings are established and more dominant members gain preferential access to socially valued rewards. By drawing attention to social dominance as an important deeper source of honor-shame codes in Mediterranean societies, the way is opened to discovering similarities with contemporary Western cultures, and therefore to addressing the hermeneutical question of how we might appropriate the New Testament text for ourselves.
In making this argument, I will discuss three elements which will aim to fill it out:
using the social-scientific analysis of the honor-shame code in the New Testament, scholars have both drawn a strong contrast, and also neglected the similarities, between first-century Mediterranean codes of honor-shame, and contemporary Western modes of social interaction;
however, evidence from psychological research points to an underlying and universal motivational system, social dominance, and supports the idea that such a system serves as the foundation for social interaction in both honor-based New Testament cultural settings and that of the achievement, status-based modern Western societies.
a key factor in the apparent “blind spot” for this common dynamic is the present-day devaluing within North American and European (especially Northern European) societies of public and overt expression of status claims even in the face of the virtually ubiquitous individual (and largely individualistic) pursuit of such status. Following a discussion of each of these points in turn, I will conclude with a brief consideration of some possible implications especially for contemporary appropriations of the biblical text.
Honor and Shame—a Cross-cultural Study in Contrasts
In their writings, members of the Context Group have given prominence to the role played by honor and shame in the world of the New Testament. The key claim is that, within that world, these values were at the heart of social interactions outside of family and close friendship circles, and indeed held a central place within the self-identity and thought processes of individuals of that era (Malina; Esler: 19–36; Rohrbaugh). They generally base their claim in this respect on the work of cultural anthropologists, which has been able to identify a common honor-shame social dynamic within a large number of contemporary cultures located around the Mediterranean region (Neyrey: 6). It is held—I believe compellingly— that there are substantial continuities between these cultures and the ones that existed approximately two millennia ago in the same regions (Horden & Purcell: 463–523).
While I cannot here review in detail the operation of the honor-shame code as it is described by Malina and others, some of its keys dimensions are worth setting forth for the sake of my later discussion.
Honor is typically defined—and here Malina's definition is often cited— with reference to its two core components: “it is the value of the person in his or her own eyes (that is, one's claim to worth) plus that person's value in the eyes of his or her own social group” (Malina: 31). In a society with honor as a central value, without the social acknowledgement of one's claim to honor, there would be no honor. Thus, for the individual in such a society, thoughts relating to honor dominate: what are the expectations of my social group? How can I act in accordance with them so as to preserve my honor? How should I evaluate the actions of others in terms of their honor?
Cultural anthropologists also commonly distinguish between two forms of honor: ascribed and acquired. The former refers to that honor which accrues to one by virtue of birth into a particular family, by membership of a people, in short, apart from anything one has done. Acquired honor, by contrast, is that which is granted to a person in view of what they have achieved or accomplished, as long as the field of accomplishment is valued by one's society (Malina: 33–37).
Closely linked to honor-shame codes of social interaction is a collectivist mentality whereby members of a society define themselves chiefly in terms of their identification with the key social groups to which they belong—“I am a member of the (such-and-such) family” or “I belong to (such-and-such) tribe, ethnic group”—rather than, as is the case in individualistic societies, on the basis of qualities or accomplishments specific to the individual. In collectivist cultures, the person's actions are evaluated in terms of the norms of the groups to which he or she belongs, rather than on his or her own distinctive values (Triandis et al.; Triandis 1989).
The account of honor and shame as expressed within the first-century Mediterranean world and recounted by scholars of the Context Group is complex and nuanced, and, as applied to New Testament writings, it has been able to shine a particularly helpful light on many of its texts. In order to highlight the importance of a social-scientific approach to the Scriptures, scholars have drawn attention from time to time in their writings to the stark divide that separates a contemporary western mindset from that of a first-century Mediterranean culture. Their approach has not been systematically articulated in the sense of providing a scheme of the various elements of modern liberal societies as they relate to those whose pivotal value is honor, but the overall point has been frequently expressed. Some examples of this “paradigm of difference” will illustrate what is meant.
Of the New Testament concern for honor, Rohrbaugh (123) notes that
while it is a cultural idiom with which persons in the contemporary western world are not much familiar, it remains the single most prominent characteristic of the New Testament attempt to communicate with its first-century Mediterranean audience.
Malina spells out the cultural contrasts further:
[T]he organizing principle of life [in the US] is instrumental mastery—the individual's ability to control his or her environment, personal and impersonal, to attain quantity-oriented success: wealth, ownership, “good looks,” proper grades, and all other countable indications of success.
The divergence from the NT world is clear: “Now in the Mediterranean, present and especially past, the focal institution … has been and is kinship. The family is truly everything.” The effect of this in such societies is that “the organizing principle of life is belongingness” (Malina: 30).
In relation to shame, Rohrbaugh contrasts its value in an honor-shame society with that of “guilt—a dominant concern in contemporary western societies” (Rohrbaugh: 113). He goes on to explain the difference thus:
Guilt is triggered in an individual who is confronted with wrong-doing by the internal voice of conscience. But in the collectivist societies of the Mediterranean world, conscience existed in the community rather than the individual. Thus it is the community that accuses, not an internal voice. And what community accusation produces is public shame.
Another feature of persons belonging to honor-shame societies that strongly contrasts with those of the modern West is what Malina calls the dyadic personality. “Dyadic personality is characteristic of individuals who perceive themselves and form their self-image in terms of what others perceive and feed back to them. They feel the need of others for their very psychological existence” (Malina: 67–68). This characteristic, of course, relates to the second of the two core components of honor defined above, i.e. honor as reflecting “that person's value in the eyes of his or her own social group.” The disparity here with Malina's description of the modern mind is stark. “In our culture we are brought up to stand on our own two feet, as distinctive wholes, distinctive individuals. … We are motivated to behave in the “right” way, alone, if necessary, regardless of what others might think or say” (Malina: 67). Esler echoes these sentiments:
The emphasis on honor in [New Testament] culture is related to the manner in which personality is perceived. Since honor, the pivotal social good, depends upon a grant of public approval, the extent to which a person's sense of self is dependent upon the perception of others is far greater than in the case of Northern European and North American contexts [Esler 1994: 29].
Indeed, Malina goes so far as to write that the greater the differences one recognizes between the analysis of the New Testament's social background and one's own (contemporary) culture, the more likely one's interpretation is to be correct: “if the difference between [the NT] world and ours proves too great, the variance between their moral judgments and ours too disturbing, the focus between their religious concerns and ours too distant, the chances are good that our interpretation has a higher probability of being more accurate” (Malina: 25).
The net effect of drawing such strong contrasts between the cultures of the New Testament and those of modern-day northern Europe and America is that readers from these latter cultural environments are hard pressed to be able to extract much in the way of meaningful appropriations from the New Testament. As Carolyn Osiek notes:
For the western student this is the deconstructive phase of the process, in which previous suppositions and certainties are torn down. Biblical texts are then approached with more suspicion, and the student is provided with some tools for ascertaining what they might have meant in the original context. But then what? The western student can be left in a theological vacuum, knowing that the old interpretive framework no longer holds, but unable to construct a new one that will provide workable interpretations for today's world. The gap between then and now has widened, and the bridge is not long enough [Osiek: 113].
It is possible, however, that, in placing such an accent on the gulf between ancient Mediterranean and modern western cultures—a much needed emphasis aimed at reducing the modern reader's misleading sense of “familiarity” with the New Testament—concomitant continuities operating at a level distinct from and deeper than that of socio-cultural analysis will be lost. It is these continuities that I will now consider.
Bridging the Cultural Gap: The Psychology of Social Dominance
Contemporary work in psychology has prompted a significant nuancing and development of traditional accounts of the way humans operate in, and experience, the social world, chiefly in the direction of giving more weight to the “animal” side of human nature. In this regard, evolutionary studies have under-lined the observed continuities between the behavior of non-human creatures and human social interaction. Social dominance has been well studied and manifests one of these continuities.
The Social Dominance Motivation: A Summary Description
Theorists and researchers in this area have focused on various aspects of this motivational system: the politico-social (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle; Sidanius & Pratto; McFarland); individual differences (Sibley & Liu); cross-cultural comparisons (Fischer, Hanke & Sibley; Fischer); social psychological (Fiske); developmental (Hawley 2002) and evolutionary psychological (Cummins; Buss). The following material draws upon ideas from a number of these perspectives.
The motive of dominance is observed in a wide range of species (Dewsbury 1982). The males of many species engage in conflicts with each other so as to be able to mate with more and higher-valued females of reproductive age (Owens & Owens; for humans, see Betzig; Slatcher, Mehta, & Josephs). Non-agonistic interactions which establish dominance without recourse to open conflict also figure prominently in male-to-male interactions. Among the females of such species much behavior is directed towards the enhancement of reproductive value and the assessment of which males could best serve as sexual partners (Gutierres, Kenrick & Partch). The evolutionary value of this system is clear: the greater survival of offspring is tied to the mating of high-status males and females. The likelihood of the continuation of the species is thus increased.
That which signals status is particular to any given species, e.g. antler size among male deer, body size and fighting prowess among gorillas, quality of plumage in some birds. Among human societies, and especially in industrialized nations, status has ramified into an extraordinarily diverse range of dimensions. On virtually any kind of hierarchy, high-status individuals will be prized as potential partners, but more than that, such status often brings with it other benefits such as the respect, envy and attention of others, greater financial rewards, the right to claim the lion's share of talking time in a conversation or meeting, and superior health outcomes (Adler et al.; Jackson et al.). Among humans, it is the case, more so than in non-human species, that both males and females pursue social dominance strategies (Fink et al.).
Given the close similarities between the expression of the dominance motive in human and non-human animals, one might reasonably call it part of human biology. Certainly its complexity is distinctively human, but the essential mechanics are common to much of the animal kingdom (Kenrick et al.; Hawley 1999). In order to see its connections with honor-shame dynamics, we need to consider in more detail the way dominance manifests itself in the day-to-day life of contemporary Western people, but before doing so, I will briefly note the way it grows to its mature form within that same context, since this will figure in my later discussion.
The Development of Dominance in the Individual: Its Western Form
The foundation for the latter emergence of social dominance can be observed in the pleasure which an infant gains from seeing the effect on a toy that his/her own actions can produce. This phenomenon, called “effectance” by some (White; Harter), grows as the boy or girl moves out of infancy, into a more general sense of satisfaction in socially-valued accomplishment, e.g. academic achievement, morally good behavior, sporting prowess, or in control or influence over others (Deci & Moller). With further maturity, the achievement aspect of dominance is typically linked to comparison with peers so that winning at sport or excelling at school over one's classmates can become a key goal. Influence and leadership are, of course, also socially prized and expressed, particularly among peers.
In adulthood, the range of social hierarchies is enormous, as varied as there are socially-valued qualities such as physical appearance, wealth, work status, domains of knowledge and varieties of skill. Those higher on some pecking order typically gain most of the relevant rewards, and their self-perceptions reflect their higher status (Adler et al.). At the heart of this higher status lies the awareness of superiority and of the possession of greater influence.
Both achievement and influence over others define hierarchical structures but each in varying degrees (Cheng et al.). Some hierarchies are organized primarily around the exercise of control, so that higher individuals gain a sense of reward by exerting power over those of lower status. However, in most such cases, an individual's high level of influence over others depends on their perceived achievement/status as well (Cheney & Seyfarth 1992a, 1992b). In developed Western societies it is achievement, more commonly than asserted power, that establishes position on a dominance hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto; Van Berkel et al.).
Dominance, while largely a matter of individual status in contemporary western societies, also manifests itself in the ordering of social groups. We observe this in family status, what suburb one lives in, the school or university one attended, one's employment or professional status, football team affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, and many other groups with which people identify. Among these, of course, there is great variation in the strength of identification and in the cohesiveness and control operative within a group. Nevertheless, essentially the same dominance mechanisms operating between individuals also apply to groups. The individual's experience of exhilaration at winning a prestigious academic scholarship is similar to that of the passionate football fan, that is, a group member, whose national team wins a World Cup final.
The Importance of Dominance Motivation in Day-to-day Behavior and Thought
Perhaps the most unsettling finding from research into human dominance is that which points to its pervasiveness within human interactions, and also within the individual's inner world (Hawley 1999; Anderson et al.). It would seem that dominance is the primary energizer and driver of social consciousness (Baumeister & Masicampo: 945).
Imagine, for example, two contemporary Western men meeting one another for the first time. Within a few seconds, both have performed a complex multidimensional assessment of indicators of dominance status: height, body size, facial appearance (e.g. jaw shape), subtle pointers to level of intelligence, signs of wealth, any signs of defects, etc. All of this will be rapidly and intuitively processed in order to arrive at a way of relating based upon a provisional assessment of dominance on some key status hierarchies. “Surface” thoughts will, naturally, focus on what to say, and where the interaction is heading, but all this will be powerfully and tacitly shaped at an unconscious level by dominance considerations. Is this person worth getting to know? What status are their affiliations? Do we share important commonalities? Perceiving low status in the other will likely prompt an earlier closure of the contact; high status might lead one to display more “pleasing” behavior towards the other in the hope of cultivating the relationship.
Furthermore, a moment's reflection will show that dominance concerns are not limited to circumstances involving direct social contact; Much of our inner life is taken up with pondering matters to do with work (a major source of status), recent social contacts, anxieties (usually about matters which impact on our social standing), personal improvement, e.g. ensuring that we are up-to-date about important matters of conversation, educating ourselves, etc. (Anderson et al.). The point is that, however sophisticated our thoughts might be and however carefully guided by reasonable and considered attitudes, the likelihood is that most of the time they will be powered and given direction by the dominance motivation (Thrash & Hurst).
In the light of what has been described of social dominance as it expresses itself in Western societies, I will now identify some of the ways in which that motivational system works within honor-shame societies.
Social Dominance as the Connection between the New Testament and Modern Worlds
On the surface, at least, the accounts of honor-shame societies paint a vastly different picture of social life than that we westerners have of our own societies. And yet, the description of social dominance I have just offered clearly contains a number of significant points of contact between the two worlds. Let us consider some of them.
Individuals in both the New Testament honor-shame culture and the contemporary West are driven by social comparison and depend intimately upon the evaluations of others.
In Malina's account of social interactions within an honor-shame society, he writes: “In the first-century Mediterranean world, every social interaction that takes place outside one's family or outside one's circle of friends is perceived as a challenge to honor, a mutual attempt to acquire honor from one's social equal” (Malina: 37). Here, rather than individual status, the currency is one of collective—but also, to some extent, individual—honor. And yet the so-called agonistic or hierarchy-establishing aspect is common to both. In the Western example described above, there must be one of the two interactors who is dominant; both cannot “win.” So, too, in the ancient interactions depicted in the New Testament, the constant attempt is to gain honor over one's social “equal.” (Interactions between those who are not social equals generally do not call for pursuit of honor because the dominance relationship is already established prior to interaction.)
This is not so obvious in modern culture; however, the available evidence supports the idea that while it might seem that individuals evaluate themselves in terms of their own set of values, independently of how others see them, the reality is quite otherwise (Cheng et al.; Anderson et al.). Social dominance in the West is necessarily hierarchical and comparative, and the dimensions along which individuals evaluate themselves are socially determined according to the cultural context in which they find themselves (Torelli et al.).
Thus, comparative evaluation is the primary dynamic of social dominance which expresses itself in markedly different ways in the two cultural types, but always according the same rules which require social comparison in order to effectively clarify and demarcate one's identity. In short, both modern and New Testament worlds are populated by people who possess “dyadic personalities.”
Seen within the context of social dominance, the values of honor and status display significant overlap.
Not only are honor- and status-driven societies both, at their core, strongly socially comparative, hierarchical and inhabited, in Malina's terms, by dyadic personalities, but values by which comparison occurs are essentially the same in both. Ascribed honor is commonly linked to group identification, i.e. honor based on social class or family standing, more so than is status among modern westerners, but acquired honor in Mediterranean societies is represented in a number of passages of the New Testament and closely parallels the individualistic self-identity of modern Western societies. Consider, for example, the argument that arose among Jesus’ disciples as to which of them was the greatest (Luke 9: 46–48). Surely, the self-identification of the disciples with Jesus as their master would have been prepotent over any other group identities they might have still retained, and yet, within that group of followers, as the passage makes clear, individual honor or status was at issue.
It must be noted that between societies there are various ways of manifesting honor/status. Some cultures are direct and up-front about signalling position within social hierarchies, while others are reticent about making overt status claims (Hofstede). Also, many contemporary societies are extraordinarily complex, not least because they bring together populations of vastly greater size. This complexity, of course, multiplies the possibilities for pursuing acquired honor/status since in certain social contexts, for example, chess prowess, victory at a Paralympics event, large numbers of followers on social media or success in any of myriad other hierarchies can lead to exalted honor/status. Likewise, the range of situations in which influence or control over others is possible, vastly extends the rather limited possibilities offered by the small-scale Mediterranean societies of the New Testament. Nevertheless, the same dynamics of social dominance apply in all cases, so that members of a society are rank ordered, and, typically, rewards are disproportionately granted to those who possess higher honor or status.
The similarities between the biblical and modern worlds can be masked by the former's strongly collectivist aspect.
The cultures of the Mediterranean possess group dynamics which are both more nuanced and dominating of the social lives of their members than is commonly the case in contemporary western cultures with their “thinner” social bonds, and their greater options for group belonging. It is, therefore, not to wondered that considerations of group (rather than individual) identity and honor should figure more strongly in the analysis of interactions as they are described in the New Testament. Social-scientific criticism of the New Testament has been helpful in allowing us moderns to recognize the group directedness of many biblical texts which hitherto have been interpreted as addressed to individuals qua individuals. Much of the groundwork for this development was set down by the work of Triandis and co-workers, who researched the differences between collectivist and individualist societies. (Hui & Triandis; Triandis et al.; Triandis 1989, 2001)
Yet, as noted above, even for us moderns, self-identities defined by group membership are not insignificant. Indeed, within contemporary Western societies, large population groups, especially where lower educational levels and/or unskilled employment predominate, display rather robust and enduring group identifications so that they are significantly less individualist than educated, professional social populations (Sidanius et al.). To the extent that this is the case, we might see mirrored in those low-skilled/limited education modern groups many of the same honor-shame social and psychological dynamics as are found in the ancient Mediterranean cultures of the New Testament (Marshall; Wink; Vandello & Cohen). Certainly, the contemporary American values Malina describes in his work, The New Testament World as part of two tables comparing Mediterranean and U.S. preferences in child-rearing and in more general value preferences are heavily weighted toward the ideals held by educated professionals and are not likely to represent US society as a whole (Malina: 56–58, 82–86).
In three important ways, then, it would appear that modern Western and honor-shame societies share fundamental social dynamics that belong to the motivational system of social dominance. And yet, this has not at all been apparent to those who have pursued the social-scientific analysis of New Testament texts. In what follows, I would like to proffer a possible explanation for why such a “blind spot” has operated.
Cultural Blind Spots: A factor in Obscuring the Continuities
It is clear from the writings of Malina, Rohrbaugh, Neyrey, and others on the themes we have been considering that they have made refined and well-evidenced analyses of the complexities of honor-shame societies. When it comes to comparisons with modern societal processes, the accounts of the latter are more assumed than rigorously supported by sociological or psychological evidence since the supposition is presumably that those writing from within modern Western societies would be familiar with their own social dynamics. And yet, such is not necessarily the case. Indeed, considering the matter more generally, there is a significant literature supporting the idea that much of what occurs in both social interaction and in cognitive processes among humans is not readily available to consciousness.
For this reason, we are likely to construct reasons for why we do and say things, rather than drawing them from careful introspection of their supporting processes. My suggestion is that, operating from inside a Western culture in which there exist strong social expectations to suppress the expression of motives of social dominance with its essential comparative aspect, students of the New Testament honor-shame social context will see only those features which strongly contrast with those of their own culture. But, as I will argue, it is the fact that many of the processes underlying our thoughts and actions are not available to our consciousness that allows for this “failure to see” to be put into effect. Let us consider a very small sample of the available evidence:
The notion of an unconscious mental process has been greatly clarified in recent decades. In the seventies, Nisbett and Wilson in their review of the relevant literature to that time, reached the conclusion that much higher-order mental processing was going on outside of conscious awareness and that our ability to access it through introspection was, in large part, quite limited. They argued that most of the time, the reasons we do things are not directly accessible to our consciousness. This limitation leads us to resort to inferring reasons by observing our actions rather than directly reading them from our thoughts. We do so, for example, by drawing upon common-sense or folk theories, and these can easily be inaccurate. For example, in a landmark study (Nisbett & Wilson), the researchers had women evaluate the quality of nightwear on display in a shop. They found that, regardless of in which spatial order the different items were placed, there was a clearly discernible bias in favor of whichever one was on the right side of the display. Subjects were unaware of such a bias, and, when questioned, gave reasons for their choice which were guided by observable qualities of the nightwear rather than their display arrangement. It would seem that some kind of unconscious process was operating to bring about such preference judgments unbeknown to the women.
More generally, it is claimed that people are likely to construct rationales for their behavior in conditions where causal factors are not readily available to them and this is more often the case than is commonly realized (Wilson & Nisbett; Guerin & Innes; Wilson).
Other researchers have furthered our understanding. Another body of research has shown, for example, that, at least for Western subjects, there is a significant gap between our self-at-tributions (what we say) about our motives (e.g. our professed desire for achievement), on the one hand, and our implicit or unconscious (achievement) motivation, as revealed by an analysis of our actions (what we do) (Rawolle, Schultheiss & Schultheiss; Thrash & Elliot). That is, when it comes to our efforts to achieve, there is much that is happening “beneath the surface,” of which we are unaware, and so we are likely to offer reasons for our actions which are more socially acceptable because they are less revealing of a desire to achieve.
All this, of course, is not to deny the critical role played by conscious reasoning processes in guiding human behavior. Clearly both conscious and unconscious aspects are important, and yet, as it would appear, we are also prone to mis-reading our actions and thoughts such that we do, at times, deceive ourselves. In relation to the motives of achievement and status, this would appear to be more clearly the case in Western societies, in particular those of North America and Northern Europe, where there are strong social norms against the overt expression of such motives.
Now bringing this material to bear on the comparison between New Testament and contemporary Western expressions of social dominance, we can observe a key difference between the two cultures, at the level of conscious awareness, in how the pursuit of honor or status plays out.
In Mediterranean societies both ancient and current, honor is acknowledged both as a socially affirmed reality and as an ever-present mindset within the individual. Honor/status, whether group or individual, is socially valued and its concealment or even its restricted presentation within social interactions would be viewed as incomprehensible. If not for oneself, then at least for the sake of one's family, honor must be communicated, upheld and defended in any social context. Consciousness of the needs of honor/status goes hand in hand with a sense of its naturalness: that is just the way the world is.
Standing in some contrast to this, in many Western societies, to proclaim openly one's superiority over others in some respect is viewed as crass and anti-social. Rather, status is signalled by subtly ensuring that others know of one's achievements, or by crafting one's social manner so as to convey one's status, e.g. taking the initiative in interacting with another or dominating talking time. That is, status is communicated but not publicly affirmed or broadcast. Moreover, actions or purposes which might be understood as efforts to achieve status are commonly re-interpreted by the agent as simply a striving for non-comparative competence, or as actions performed out of concern for others (“I want to be the best that I can be,” or “I want to leave the world a better place.”). At the same time, of course, in such societies, the pursuit of status in a number of key areas of life is powerfully incentivized by means of financial reward, media attention, public signs of honor and respect shown in interactions with others. In short, Western societies, and especially those of North America and northern Europe, have evolved a process of strongly encouraging the social dominance motive, but simultaneously disvaluing an open recognition of its pervasive influence in the lives of their citizens.
Yet this can happen only, as I have argued above, because humans are somewhat limited in their access via introspection to important processes or dynamics that shape their actions and thoughts. Unlike in Mediterranean societies, where there is a coherence between the existence of the pursuit of honor and its public expression (although in other areas there are likely to be “blind spots”), modern Western societies have developed a mechanism for obscuring the latter from conscious awareness. Thus one can make sense of the strong contrasts drawn between honor-shame societies and modern achievement-based ones which have characterized the writings of those conducting social-scientific criticism of the New Testament.
Conclusion
In this essay I have sought to demonstrate that, in respect to its core values of honor and shame, the world of the New Testament is not quite as alien to the dominant mindset of us moderns as might appear to be the case. The sharp contrast which members of the Context Group have drawn between these two worlds, I suggest, must be complemented and corrected by the acknowledgement that the pursuit of both group-based honor, on the one hand, and status through individual achievement, on the other, can be subsumed under the broader category of social dominance, a biological/psychological motivational system which underlies each of them.
Yet, seeing the pursuit of honor and achievement as belonging to the same fundamental human drive lurking beneath the collectivist/individualist contrast, opens up possibilities for contemporary appropriation of the biblical text that might otherwise be closed off. When Jesus responds to the disciples’ squabbling over who should be first in the Kingdom by presenting to them the example of the young child (Matt 18:1–5), Malina and Rohrbaugh write that “Jesus’ reversal of the expected order challenges the assumptions of an honor-shame society in a very fundamental way.” (Malina & Rohrbaugh: 92) However, one must not draw the conclusion here that Jesus would have commended the modern achievement-focused approach. Indeed, I would suggest that his challenge would apply to both honor-based and individual status-based societies. As expressions of social dominance, they both have the effect of separating and evaluatively distinguishing humans from each other, and thus of undermining human solidarity.
Just as social-scientific analysis has been able to uncover just how fundamental is the operation of an honor-shame code to the self-identity of players within the New Testament, so, too, we are able to affirm that the seeking after status through achievement or power works in the same—but perhaps more unconscious—way in the minds of members of modern societies. Certainly it is not at all obvious how the contemporary believer is to deal with this rather disturbing dynamic influencing his/her thought and behavior. And yet, if he or she cannot see the similarities I have described, then any scriptural solutions directed at the moral problems raised by the honor-shame code will fall on deaf ears, since the believer will see neither the problem nor any proposed solution.
This essay follows the example of other scholars who have aimed to apply insights achieved by psychological research to the text of the Scriptures. These scholars, as noted above, see their work as complementing that of social-scientific criticism with its use of cultural anthropology and sociology, and this accords with my own purposes. My particular interest has been to show that this latter form of analysis, specifically as it addresses the honor-shame social codes found in the New Testament, is able to open up more fully the biblical text to the experience of its contemporary Western reader.