Generational Changes in Materialism and Work Centrality,1976-2007

Abstract

We examined whether culture-level indices of threat, instability, and materialistic modeling were linked to the materialistic values of American 12th graders between 1976 and 2007 (N = 355,296). Youth materialism (such as the importance of money and of owning expensive material items) increased over the generations, peaking in the late 1980s to early 1990s with Generation X and then staying at historically high levels for Millennials (GenMe). Societal instability and disconnection (e.g., unemployment, divorce) and social modeling (e.g., advertising spending) had both contemporaneous and lagged associations with higher levels of materialism, with advertising most influential during adolescence and instability during childhood. Societal-level living standards during childhood predicted materialism 10 years later. When materialistic values increased, work centrality steadily declined, suggesting a growing discrepancy between the desire for material rewards and the willingness to do the work usually required to earn them.

Keywords

materialism generations societal instability birth cohort work centrality

Materialism is typically understood as

the belief that it is important to pursue the culturally sanctioned goals of attaining financial success, having nice possessions, having the right image (produced, in large part, through consumer goods), and having a high status (defined mostly by the size of one’s pocketbook and the scope of one’s possessions). (Kasser, Ryan, Couchman, & Sheldon, 2004, p. 13)

More than 70% of adults in the United States and United Kingdom believe that today’s children and adolescents grow up in a culture that is too materialistic, that youth are too materialistic (Center for a New American Dream, 2004), and that youth are more materialistic than they used to be (BBC News, 2008). Has the desire for money, possessions, and status actually increased among youth, or do these perceptions reflect the tendency of adults to perceive moral weaknesses in the next generation? And if materialism has increased, why has it? Unfortunately, the literature on these topics is sparse, conflicting, and methodologically limited. In addition, no research to our knowledge has addressed whether generational changes in youths’ desire for more possessions are associated with changes in how much they value work, the usual method of earning the money needed to obtain such possessions. To address these questions, we draw from a nationally representative time-lag study of high school students, the Monitoring the Future (MtF) survey (conducted since 1976; N = 355,296), to examine materialistic values at age 17 to 18 among three generations: Boomers (born roughly 1946-1964, in the sample 1976-1982), Generation X (born 1965-1981, in the sample 1983-1999), and Millennials/GenY/Generation Me (born 1982-1999, in the sample 2000-2007).

Understanding generational trends in materialism among youth is important, as research shows that placing a strong priority on money and possessions is associated with a variety of problems. For example, people who rate materialistic goals as relatively important also report lower levels of personal life satisfaction, happiness, and vitality, as well as higher levels of depression and anxiety (for summaries, see, for example, Dittmar, Bond, Hurst, & Kasser, 2012; Kasser, 2002). The negative associations between materialistic values and personal well-being also appear at the level of generational cohorts, with increases in materialism predicting increases in psychopathology (Twenge, Gentile, et al., 2010). People who prioritize materialistic values are also relatively unlikely to engage in prosocial, cooperative behaviors; more likely to espouse prejudicial attitudes and a social dominance orientation; and more likely to behave in antisocial, competitive ways (e.g., Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & De Witte, 2007; McHoskey, 1999; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995; Sheldon, Sheldon, & Osbaldiston, 2000; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). In addition, those who strongly endorse the acquisition of money and possessions are more likely to engage in behaviors and have lifestyles that undermine ecological sustainability (e.g., Brown & Kasser, 2005; Sheldon & McGregor, 2000).

Culture-Level Variables Potentially Related to Changes in Materialism Over Time

The current study is premised on the assumption that the social environment created by a temporal era shapes individuals similarly to the way geographical areas do (e.g., Twenge, 2006; Twenge, Abebe, & Campbell, 2010; for a model from cultural psychology, see the Mutual Constitution Model: Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Just as people are influenced by the region of the world in which they happen to live, temporal era can also influence people through the dominant social ideologies, family structures, economic situations, media, and political and business messages and institutions during the time period in which they live (Twenge & Campbell, 2009). Although cultural products are especially likely to reflect temporal cultural shifts (Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008; Twenge, Abebe, et al., 2010), attitudes, personality traits, and values of individual people are also quite responsive to cultural changes over time (e.g., Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012; Wells & Twenge, 2005).

Because no study, to our knowledge, has examined how features of temporal eras are associated with cohorts’ materialistic values, we drew on research conducted at the level of the individual person to identify potential culture-level indices that might change over time and thereby affect the materialistic values of different cohorts. That individual-level research has identified two primary pathways by which people come to prioritize materialism (Kasser et al., 2004).

First, when people have experiences that undermine the satisfaction of their psychological needs and make them feel insecure, they often compensate by orienting toward materialistic values. For example, materialistic values and/or behaviors tend to be higher when people have experienced nonoptimal parenting styles (Cohen & Cohen, 1996; Kasser, Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995; Williams, Cox, Hedberg, & Deci, 2000), when their parents divorce (Rindfleisch, Burroughs, & Denton, 1997), and when they experience rejection and social exclusion from peers (Banerjee & Dittmar, 2008; Sheldon & Kasser, 2008; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007). Insecurity caused by family poverty (Cohen & Cohen, 1996; Kasser et al., 1995), growing up in economically difficult times (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995), and thinking about living in a recession (Sheldon & Kasser, 2008) also increases people’s focus on money and possessions. Other experimental manipulations of insecurity, via death (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000; Sheldon & Kasser, 2008), hunger (Briers, Pandelaere, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2006), and uncertainty (Chang & Arkin, 2002), also increase materialistic values and behaviors.

Second, social modeling may increase materialistic values (Kasser et al., 2004). When people are exposed to social messages suggesting that wealth, profit, and possessions are important in life, they tend to “buy into” such ideas and increase the importance they place on such goals. So, for example, people’s materialistic values are higher when their parents (Goldberg, Gorn, Peracchio, & Bamossy, 2003; Kasser et al., 1995) and peers (Sheldon et al., 2000) strongly endorse such aims in life, as well as when they perceive pressure from their peers to be materialistic (Banerjee & Dittmar, 2008). An academic environment focused on financial profit and the accumulation of wealth also increases materialistic values among students (Sheldon & Krieger, 2004; Vansteenkiste, Duriez, Simons, & Soenens, 2006). And watching a good deal of television, with its many commercial messages promising that the “good life” is “the goods life,” is associated with higher levels of materialistic values (Brand & Greenberg, 1994; Cheung & Chan, 1996; Good, 2007; Kasser & Ryan, 2001; Nairn, Ormrod, & Bottomley, 2007; Rahtz, Sirgy, & Meadow, 1989; Schor, 2004).

Studies comparing individuals living in different geographic areas support the idea that these two pathways identified at the level of the individual might generalize to the level of the culture. For example, Kasser, Cohn, Kanner, and Ryan (2007) suggested that living in a highly competitive capitalist economy can increase feelings of insecurity, due to worries about job stability and the relative lack of government-sponsored safety nets (for health care, education, etc.). Furthermore, such economies are highly focused on promoting economic growth and encouraging consumption, so citizens in such nations are exposed to messages promoting the worth of materialistic aims. Thus, as would be expected, citizens in economically developed nations prioritize money, status, and wealth more highly when their nation organizes its economy in a very competitive, free-market fashion (Schwartz, 2007) and is more “economically free” (i.e., de-regulated; Kasser, 2011) than when their nation is more cooperative and regulated by the government.

For the present study, we therefore sought out indices that might reflect temporal changes in a culture’s modeling of materialistic values and in its stability and security. As described more fully in the “Method” section, we obtained two such indices for materialistic modeling (exposure to advertising and to adults’ materialism) and six such indices for insecurity/instability (divorce rate, percentage of births to unmarried mothers, percentage of people living alone, unemployment rate, violent crime rate, and youth suicide rate). We predicted that youth growing up in time periods with relatively high insecurity and materialistic modeling would more highly prioritize the desire for money and possessions than would youth growing up in time periods characterized by greater security and less exposure to materialistic modeling. We also examine the effects of actual living standards on adolescents’ desires, to discover if the attainment of material goods by adults influences youth materialism. As youths see people around them having a certain standard of living, they may come to prioritize materialistic aims at higher levels. Because past research has shown that temporal effects can be delayed (e.g., Twenge, 2000), we examine both contemporaneous and lagged effects of exposure to insecurity, materialistic modeling, and living standards on adolescents’ materialistic values.

Materialism and Work Centrality

An additional goal of this research was to discover if changes in materialism were associated with changes in youths’ focus on work. If young people increasingly desire money and material goods, especially expensive goods such as houses and cars, they might see work—the usual method of earning money—as increasingly important in life. Such a pattern would suggest that increases in youth materialism reflect a stronger general focus on money-related values as a whole, with more recent generations adopting a mind-set focused not only on having and spending money but also on earning it. Alternatively, increasing material desires might be accompanied by waning work centrality, as several recent studies suggest that Americans now place less importance on work than in the past (e.g., Highhouse, Ziclar, & Yankelevich, 2010; Smola & Sutton, 2002; Twenge, Campbell, Hoffman, & Lance, 2010).

How could American youth be more materialistic and less focused on work? One possibility is that entitlement—the idea that one deserves things without working for them—may have increased. This is plausible, given that the related trait of narcissism has increased over the generations (Stinson et al., 2008; Twenge & Foster, 2010). Those high in narcissism have an inflated sense of self and value image and perception more than objective reality; they often believe that normal rules (such as becoming wealthy through hard work) do not apply to them (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). In addition, recent high school students’ expectations have outpaced actual attainment—for example, twice as many expected to earn a graduate degree even though the number who actually earned these degrees had not changed (Reynolds, Stewart, MacDonald, & Sischo, 2006). Larger cultural forces may also be at work. The increased penetration of advertising into nearly every sphere of life (Kasser et al., 2004), the emphasis on easily attained celebrity (via, for example, reality shows), the expansion of the finance industry, and the reduced regulation of the banking industry (Twenge & Campbell, 2009) may all have created the impression that material goods are deserved rather than earned and that it is possible to “get rich quick.” Overall, recent cultural and generational trends point to an increasing gap between expectations and reality, and an increasing discrepancy between money and work. Thus, rather than finding that materialism and work ethic parallel each other, the two sets of aims may have diverged in importance over time.

Previous Research

Although previous studies, to our knowledge, have not examined the temporal cultural determinants of changes in materialism or the extent to which materialism and work ethic may have diverged over the years, a few previously published articles have examined changes in youth materialism over time. For example, data from the American Freshman study, a nationally representative sample of entering college students, revealed a strong increase in the percentage of first-year undergraduates who valued “becoming very well-off financially” between the 1960s and the 2000s (Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012). These data, however, have some weaknesses. Materialism was assessed with only a single item, and this item may be influenced by growing economic pressures such as greater college loan debt (Kamenetz, 2006) and the increasing cost of raising a family (Pryor, Hurtado, Saenz, Santos, & Korn, 2007). Furthermore, the sample only includes adolescents who attend college, thereby underrepresenting large swaths of American adolescents.

Changes in materialism over time have also been investigated via a small number of items in MtF, the database on which we rely. In particular, Trzesniewski and Donnellan (2010) analyzed four MtF items they identified as measuring materialism. The importance placed on “having lots of money” (d = .28) increased over time, as did agreement with “There is nothing wrong with advertising that gets people to buy things they don’t really need” (d = .48), whereas two other items decreased over time in endorsement: “How much do you care about having the latest fashion in your clothes, records, leisure activities, and so on?’’ and “How much do you care about whether your family has most of the things your friends and neighbors have?” (d = −.38 for an index of the two items). Unfortunately, the latter three items do not seem to measure materialism directly, as the second assesses attitudes toward the advertising industry and the third and fourth tap into the related but distinct value domain of conformity and fitting in (Grouzet et al., 2005). Given recent increases in the penetration of advertising into daily life (Kasser et al., 2004) and the decreasing emphasis on conformity (e.g., Fukuyama, 1999; Myers, 2000; Twenge, 2006), it is probably not surprising that Trzesniewski and Donnellan (2010) found this pattern of results (Twenge & Campbell, 2010).

Overall, then, previous studies provide an unclear picture of whether materialism has increased over the generations, although they suggest that increases are notable for items that more precisely assess the desire for having money and being financially well-off. Fortunately, the MtF data set includes several other items that more directly measure materialistic desires and have not been examined in previous studies. Specifically, in addition to the previously examined question regarding the importance of “having lots of money,” we used the MtF data set (N = 355,296) to assess the importance adolescents placed on owning four expensive material items (a new car every 2 to 3 years, a vacation home, a single-family home, and a recreational vehicle) and on getting a job “with the possibility of earning a great deal of money.” Such items closely match standard definitions and operationalizations of materialism (e.g., Kasser et al., 2004; Richins & Dawson, 1992). For exploratory purposes, we also examined materialistic expectations and satisfaction, measured by questions about how much adolescents expected to own, and the least they would be content to own, compared with their parents.

Overview and Hypotheses

The current study aims to examine three questions. First, have the materialistic values of youth changed over time? We examine multiple materialism items from the MtF 12th-grade survey over three generations (Boomers, GenX, and Millennials/GenMe). We expect general increases in materialism, but given historical cycles, we will not be surprised to find that materialism might wax and wane over time.

Second, do materialistic values increase when cohorts of adolescents have experienced cultural-level insecurity (e.g., high unemployment rates, high divorce rates) and materialistic modeling (e.g., advertising)? We hypothesize that they will, and examine associations between materialistic desires and social indicators at the year of data collection, 5 years prior (when the respondents were 12 to 13 years old), and 10 years prior (when the respondents were 7 to 8 years old). We also examine whether actual changes in the standards of living (e.g., home-ownership rates over time) explain why youth may come to prioritize materialistic achievements. For exploratory purposes, we also test if these same social indicators relate to materialistic expectations and satisfaction.

Third, are changes in materialistic values associated with parallel changes in the importance of work? Given past research suggesting increases in feelings of entitlement, and given that advertising messages typically promote the value of consumption but not of work, we expect that potential increases in materialism may not be accompanied by parallel rises in work centrality, suggesting a discrepancy between these two priorities among U.S. adolescents over time.

Method

Sample

The MtF study (Johnston, Bachman, O’Malley, & Schulenberg, 2008) has surveyed a nationally representative sample of 12th graders every year since 1976. MtF samples high schools across the United States chosen to represent a cross-section of the U.S. population on variables such as region, race, gender, and socioeconomic status (SES; see http://www.monitoringthefuture.org). The survey uses a multistage random sampling procedure to select high schools and then students to complete the survey. The participation rate of schools is between 66% and 80%, and the student participation rate is between 79% and 83% (Johnston et al., 2008). About 15,000 high school seniors are sampled each year in the spring. The sample is divided into subsamples of about 2,500 people, and each subsample is asked a different set of questions, called a “Form.” The current project used items from Forms 1, 3, 4, and 5. We analyzed all the data available from MtF at the time we began our analyses; this included data files for all years from 1976 to 2007. Sample sizes depend upon the item and are reported below.

Materialism Items

We attempted to locate all items in MtF consistent with past definitions of materialism (Kasser et al., 2004; Richins & Dawson, 1992), specifically the priority placed on money, wealth, and possessions. First, we used an item on Form 1 that asked youth to rate on a 1 to 4 scale (1 = not important to 4 = extremely important) how important it is to “have lots of money” (n = 94,651). Second, we used an item on Form 4 that asked youth to rate on a 1 to 4 scale (1 = not important to 4 = very important) the importance of having “a job which provides you with a chance to earn a good deal of money” (n = 94,111). Third, we used four items on Form 3 that asked youth to rate on a 1 to 4 scale (1 = not important to 4 = extremely important) the importance of owning various items; we focused on youths’ desire for four expensive items, namely, “a new car every 2 or 3 years,” “a house of my own (instead of an apartment or condominium),” “a vacation house,” and “a motor-powered, recreational vehicle (powerboat, snowmobile, etc.).” Data on these items were asked each year between 1976 and 2007 (except 1977); alpha = .73 (see Table 1; total N for those responding to all four items = 72,656). We excluded two items from this section: One on having “lots of space around my house, a big yard” (which is more indicative of the region in which one lives than the cost of one’s house) and one on having “clothes in the latest style” (which is more a measure of fashion and conformity and not necessarily an assessment of expensive purchases).

Table 1.

Percentages, Means, t Tests, and Effect Sizes Comparing Changes in Materialistic Values, Materialistic Expectations, and Work Centrality Among U.S. 12th Graders.

				1976-1978	1988-1990	2005-2007	1976-1978 vs. 1988-1990	1988-1990 vs. 2005-2007	1976-1978 vs. 2005-2007
	1976-1978 (% imp.)	1988-1990 (% imp.)	2005-2007 (% imp.)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	t (d)	t (d)	t (d)	r with year	Beta with year squared
Importance of money
Importance of having a lot of money	47.8%	69.2%	62.3%	2.54 (0.88)	2.96 (0.87)	2.81 (0.89)	33.40***(0.48)	−10.84***(−0.17)	20.29***(0.30)	0.08***	−0.12***
Importance of job earning a great deal of money	48.7%	62.1%	54.6%	3.34 (0.75)	3.50 (0.73)	3.39 (0.78)	15.38***(0.22)	−9.65***(−0.15)	4.28*** (0.07)	0.03***	−0.22***
Importance of having certain material goods
Own house (not apartment or condo)	54.9%	64.7%	68.5%	2.63 (1.09)	2.87 (1.03)	2.92 (1.02)	13.28***(0.23)	3.05** (0.05)	15.64***(0.28)	0.08***	−0.02***
Vacation house	13.0%	24.1%	18.6%	1.53 (0.86)	1.87 (1.03)	1.72 (0.95)	20.27***(0.35)	−9.15***(−0.15)	11.28***(0.21)	0.05**	−0.12***
Recreational vehicle (e.g., boat)	16.9%	26.6%	20.4%	1.63 (0.92)	1.91 (1.05)	1.73 (0.98)	16.24***(0.28)	−10.70***(−0.18)	5.62*** (0.11)	0.01**	−0.11***
A new car every 2 or 3 years	11.3%	18.0%	14.3%	1.46 (0.81)	1.69 (0.93)	1.63 (0.85)	14.71***(0.23)	−3.67***(−0.07)	11.37***(0.20)	0.08***	−0.07***
Index (alpha = 0.73)	—	—	—	7.23 (2.66)	8.34 (3.03)	8.00 (2.80)	21.76***(0.39)	−6.76***(−0.12)	15.33***(0.28)	0.08***	−0.11***
Materialistic expectations
Expect to own more than parents	48.5%	62.1%	59.4%	3.48 (0.91)	3.76 (0.92)	3.72 (0.95)	21.65***(0.31)	−2.95**(−0.05)	17.26***(0.26)	0.09***	−0.07***
Least amount more than parents acceptable	15.4%	21.3%	22.0%	2.62 (0.97)	2.83 (0.98)	2.80 (1.04)	15.31***(0.22)	−2.16*(−0.04)	11.98***(0.18)	0.06***	−0.06***
Work centrality
Don’t want to work hard	25.3%	29.9%	38.8%	1.61 (0.86)	1.71 (0.90)	1.90 (0.93)	7.42***(0.11)	12.84***(0.22)	20.63***(0.33)	0.06***	0.09
Work is just making a living	22.7%	25.7%	33.6%	2.20 (1.40)	2.37 (1.39)	2.73 (1.39)	7.90***(0.12)	16.30***(0.26)	22.89***(0.38)	0.14***	0.03***
Would not work if had enough money	21.5%	26.2%	29.4%	0.22 (0.41)	0.26 (0.46)	0.29 (0.44)	6.68***(0.09)	4.56***(0.07)	10.74***(0.16)	0.07***	0.00
Willing to work overtime to do the best job	90.9%	89.1%	83.6%	4.43 (0.85)	4.38 (0.87)	4.20 (0.94)	−4.15***(−0.06)	−12.20***(−0.20)	−15.50***(−0.26)	−0.10***	−0.02***
Work a central part of life	74.7%	70.8%	62.2%	3.95 (1.15)	3.84 (1.11)	3.63 (1.10)	−5.74***(−0.10)	−12.10***(−0.19)	−16.83***(−0.29)	−0.11***	−0.03***
Discrepancy between expensive material items and work centrality
Work is just making a living (reverse)	—	—	—	0.46 (1.42)	−.05 (1.48)	−0.20 (1.46)	−19.78***(−0.35)	−6.18***(−0.10)	−25.21***(−0.45)	−0.15***	0.05***
Would not work if had enough money (reverse)	—	—	—	0.38 (1.37)	−.12 (1.52)	−0.09 (1.48)	−18.84***(−0.35)	−.98 (−0.02)	−17.56***(−0.37)	−0.10***	0.08***
Willing to work overtime to do the best job	—	—	—	0.33 (1.34)	−.11 (1.45)	−0.19 (1.44)	−17.95***(−0.32)	−3.05**(−0.06)	−20.41***(−0.38)	−0.12***	0.07***
Work a central part of life	—	—	—	0.37 (1.34)	−.11 (1.41)	−0.16 (1.31)	−19.46***(−0.35)	−2.22*(−0.04)	−21.75***(−0.39)	−0.13***	0.06***

Note: The questions about the importance of owning certain material goods were not asked in 1977. Thus, for these items, the 1976-1978 time period includes data of the years 1976 and 1978 only. For all other items, this time period includes data of all 3 years. Positive values for “r with year” indicate increasing levels over time, whereas negative values indicate decreasing levels over time. Positive values for “beta with year squared” indicate a U-shaped function of year with the indicator, whereas negative values indicate an inverted U-shaped function.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

For exploratory purposes, we also examined two questions on Form 5 relevant to youths’ materialistic expectations and satisfaction. Specifically, respondents were asked to rate on a 1 to 5 scale (with 1 = much less than my parents to 5 = much more than my parents) “When you are older, do you expect to own more possessions than your parents do now, or about the same, or less? I expect to own . . . ” and on the same 1 to 5 scale, “Compared with your parents, what is the smallest amount that you could be content or satisfied to own? The least I could be content to own is . . . ” (n = 93,878; alpha = .64).

Work Centrality Items

We used a number of items to assess how the value placed on working hard may have changed among youth over the decades. First, we assessed three items on Form 3 rated on a 1 to 5 scale (with 1 = disagree to 5 = agree): “To me, work is nothing more than making a living,” “I expect my work to be a very central part of my life,” and “I want to do my best in my job, even if this sometimes means working overtime.” A fourth item, “If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you’d like for the rest of your life, would you want to work?” was on a dichotomous scale (1 = I would want to work and 2 = I would not want to work). Because these items did not produce an alpha high enough to be combined, we examined them as individual items; ns ranged between 86,185 and 88,355. A fifth item came from Form 4, which lists a number of obstacles to “getting the kind of work you would like to have,” including “not wanting to work hard” (n = 88,819), rated on a 1 to 3 scale (with 1 = not at all to 3 = a lot).

Because we were also interested in how work centrality compared with materialism by year, we calculated the difference between the z-score of the three work centrality items from Form 3 and the z-score of the desire for expensive material items, also on Form 3. A difference score above 0 means that work centrality is higher than materialistic values, a score of 0 means that the two are equivalent, and a score below 0 means that materialism is higher than work centrality. We were not able to perform this calculation for the item about not wanting to work hard, as it was on Form 4 and thus given to different participants.

Demographics

MtF asks for demographic information, including gender, race, and the education of respondents’ parents. We used these categories to determine whether they moderated any generational changes that might be observed in materialistic values. That is, we asked whether generational change occurred relatively equally across various groups. We used father’s education as an indicator of SES, splitting the sample into low SES (father completed high school or less) and high SES (father completed at least some college or more). MtF coded race as only White, Black, or other until 2000; thus, for race/ethnicity, we were only able to examine Black–White differences.

Actual Attainment and Standard of Living Statistics

We obtained statistics on actual material possessions and standards of living by year from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and other government sources (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011) that correspond to the four expensive material items from MtF: home ownership, boat ownership (mentioned in the recreational vehicles item), and vacation home ownership (all as a percentage of the U.S. population), and the average age of cars (reverse scored). Not all of these statistics were available for all years, so in some cases, we substituted statistics from the closest year. Thus, these results should be interpreted with caution. We z-scored these four items and summed them to calculate an index of the actual standard of living.

Societal Insecurity and Materialistic Modeling

To assess societal insecurity, we obtained statistics from the Statistical Abstract (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). For each year, we recorded the divorce rate (per 1,000 population), percentage of births to unmarried mothers, percentage of people living alone, unemployment rate, violent crime rate (rate per 100,000 population), and the suicide rate for young people (ages 15-24; rate per 100,000 population).

To measure societal materialistic modeling, we used two sources. First, we obtained data on adult materialism from the General Social Survey (Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 2011), which has surveyed a nationally representative sample of Americans 18 and above every few years since 1972. Respondents were asked to rate on a 1 to 5 scale (with 1 = not important at all and 5 = very important), “How important do you personally consider these job characteristics?”; we focused on the response to the characteristic of “high income.” Second, we calculated the percentage of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for by advertising expenditures in newspapers, magazines, and TV, as reported in the Statistical Abstract.

In addition to looking at contemporary effects, all social indicators were lagged to reflect the social environment 5 and 10 years before data collection. We attempted to create a single index for societal insecurity, but the pattern of intercorrelations and factor analytic solutions for the six variables was not stable across the three different lag times. Ultimately, the pattern that produced the most satisfactory internal reliability during each of the three periods suggested the creation of two scales: Unstable Environment (divorce, unemployment, and suicide rates; alpha = .75 for current, .69 for 5 years before, and .80 for 10 years before) and Disconnection (living alone and unmarried mothers; alpha = .58 for current, .70 for 5 years before, and .79 for 10 years before); rate of violent crime remained alone as a single variable. Because the two modeling variables (adult materialism and advertising spending) were not highly correlated with each other during any of the lag years, we also analyzed them individually.

Results

Have Materialistic Values and Expectations Changed?

U.S. 12th graders of the mid-2000s (Millennials) expressed significantly greater material desires than those of the mid-1970s (Boomers; see Figure 1). The data showed evidence of a curvilinear trend, with materialistic values increasing from the 1970s to the late 1980s/early 1990s (GenX) and decreasing somewhat into the 2000s, although they still stayed above 1970s levels (see Table 1 for linear and curvilinear models with year for all variables). To help make these trends more concretely understandable, we also present analyses comparing subsets of the three generations sampled in MtF: 12th graders between 1976 and 1978 (Boomers), 1988 and 1990 (Generation Xers), and 2005 and 2007 (Millennials; Table 1 reports these descriptive statistics, t tests, and ds).

Figure 1.

Generational change in the desire for expensive material items (single-family house, vacation house, recreational vehicle, a new car every 2 or 3 years) among high school seniors, 1976-2007.

Forty-eight percent of 1976-1978 students agreed that “having lots of money” was important, compared with 62% of 2005-2007 students. The desire for expensive material goods also grew. Fifty-five percent rated owning a single-family home as important in 1976-1978, compared with 65% in 1988-1990 and 69% in 2005-2007. There was a 46% increase in those believing a vacation house was important (from 13% to 19%), a 27% increase in the importance of having a new car every 2 or 3 years, and an 18% increase in the importance of having a recreational vehicle.

As seen in Table 1, materialistic expectations and satisfaction showed linear and curvilinear trends, with the primary trend a rise from the 1970s to the early 1990s followed by steadily high expectations into the 2000s. For example, almost twice as many 2005-2007 high school students (23%) as mid-1970s students (13%) expected to own “much more” than their parents. Thus, youths’ materialistic expectations continued to rise rather steadily even as the importance placed on money and expensive material items declined slightly from the early 1990s to the 2000s.

We next examined whether the trends in materialism were similar across various demographic factors. As seen in Figure 2, the generational increase in materialism (focusing here on the desire for the four expensive items) occurred across males and females, Blacks and Whites, and low-SES and high-SES youth. The pattern of fairly consistent change across demographic groups held for the other materialism items as well (e.g., the importance of having a job where one can earn a good deal of money).

Figure 2.

Trends in the desire for expensive material items within SES, gender, and race.

Do Societal Insecurity, Materialistic Role Modeling, and Standards of Living Predict Youth Materialistic Values?

We next turned to our primary hypothesis that temporal changes in societal-level insecurity and materialistic role modeling would be associated with generational changes in materialistic values. The dependent variables were the three materialistic value measures, and the independent variables were six societal-level predictors: unstable social environment (index of unemployment, divorce, and suicide rates), disconnection (index of percentage of people living alone and of unmarried mothers), the violent crime rate, adult materialism, advertising spending, and the index of the actual attainment of the four expensive material items (i.e., the actual standard of living). In addition to looking at contemporaneous effects of these indicators during the respondents’ late adolescence, we also lagged the societal indicators to examine the influence of the social environment 10 years prior, when the respondents were in middle childhood, and 5 years prior, when the respondents were in early adolescence.

Our predictions were largely supported across the three materialistic values measures (see Table 2). High levels of instability during middle childhood (10 years earlier) and early adolescence (5 years earlier) were consistently associated with more materialistic values during late adolescence. High levels of disconnection during early adolescence (5 years earlier) and late adolescence (contemporary effect) were associated with two of the three indicators of materialistic values during late adolescence. High levels of advertising during early adolescence (5 years earlier) were positively associated with two of the indices of materialistic values during late adolescence, and high levels of advertising during late adolescence (contemporary effect) were associated with all three indices of materialistic values. Rating money as important was positively related to violent crime rates during late adolescence. Materialism during 12th grade was not related to the standard of living at the time or during early adolescence, but was related to the standard of living from childhood (10 years before) for two materialism measures. Adult materialism was the only predictor variable that was consistently nonsignificantly related to late adolescents’ materialism levels. These results suggest that different societal forces at different developmental stages may shape late adolescents’ materialism. Specifically, 12th graders’ materialism is associated with societal instability and actual standards of living during their middle childhood and early adolescence, and with levels of disconnection and advertising during early and late adolescence.¹

Table 2.

Betas in Regressions of Social Indicators on Measures of Materialistic Values, Materialistic Expectations, and Work/Materialism Discrepancies.

	10 years prior	5 years prior	Year of data collection
Importance of expensive items
Instability	0.51***	0.44**	0.10
Disconnection	−0.19	0.57*	0.78***
Crime	0.53	−0.06	0.19
Advertising	0.06	0.37**	0.58***
Adult materialism	0.11	−0.11	0.06
Actual attainment (standard of living)	0.31*	−0.01	0.09
Importance of having a lot of money
Instability	0.52***	0.68***	0.20
Disconnection	−0.38	0.72**	0.76**
Crime	0.54	−0.21	0.32*
Advertising	0.13	0.43**	0.57***
Adult materialism	0.08	0.08	0.09
Actual attainment (standard of living)	0.43**	−0.02	0.18
Importance of job that earns a great deal of money
Instability	0.51*	0.95***	0.54
Disconnection	−1.07	0.41	0.38
Crime	0.81	−0.20	0.04
Advertising	−0.18	0.05	0.73***
Adult materialism	0.13	0.21	−0.10
Actual attainment (standard of living)	0.30	0.25	0.18
Expectation to own more than parents
Instability	0.39***	0.34**	−0.14
Disconnection	−0.39*	0.70***	0.76***
Crime	0.79***	−0.05	0.28*
Advertising	0.25**	0.35***	0.34***
Adult materialism	0.04	−0.09	0.07
Actual attainment (standard of living)	0.33***	−0.12	−0.06
Least amount of ownership more than parents that is acceptable
Instability	0.62***	0.28*	0.18
Disconnection	−0.18	0.38*	0.95***
Crime	0.35	0.07	0.34*
Advertising	0.19	0.56***	0.20*
Adult materialism	−0.05	−0.08	0.08
Actual attainment (standard of living)	0.21*	−0.07	−0.05
Discrepancy with work centrality (reverse)
Instability	0.20**	0.03	−0.19
Disconnection	0.52**	0.79***	0.82***
Crime	0.29	0.04	0.05
Advertising	0.08	0.20*	0.25***
Adult materialism	0.06	−0.05	0.05
Actual attainment (standard of living)	0.10	−0.02	−0.04

Note: Weighted by MtF sample size; df = 31 years. Betas are computed at the level of the group and thus should not be used to calculate individual-level effect sizes. Adult materialism before 1971 is estimated based on 1972 data; thus, the correlations for 10 years prior are not definitive. MtF = Monitoring the Future.

Although past theorizing regarding the roles of insecurity and social modeling on materialism has focused on the value placed on materialism (i.e., the importance of these goals), we explored whether these predictor variables might also explain variations over time in youths’ expectations and satisfaction about materialistic goals. As can be seen in Table 2, the regression results for materialistic expectations were quite similar to those for materialistic values. Cohorts with higher materialistic expectations experienced more societal insecurity and role modeling of materialism. Generally speaking, materialistic expectations had their most consistent relationship with societal instability during middle childhood (10-year lag), disconnection across all three time lags, and modeling via advertising during early and late adolescence (5-year lag and contemporary). Materialistic expectations were also linked to actual standards of living during middle childhood (10-year lag) but not during early adolescence or contemporaneously.

Has Work Centrality Increased Alongside Materialistic Values and Expectations?

We explored generational shifts in the importance of work to examine whether increases in materialistic desires and expectations were part of a general increase in money-relevant values or, alternatively, were discrepant from attitudes toward work. The data revealed that the centrality of work decreased while the desire for money and material goods increased (see Table 1 and Figure 3). The percentage of respondents who agreed that “work is just making a living” went from under 1 in 4 to more than 1 in 3, and the percentage who saw “work as a central part of life” slid from 3 in 4 to less than 2 in 3. Fifty-six percent more high school seniors acknowledged that “not wanting to work hard” may prevent them from getting a desired job (25% agreed in the mid-1970s, compared with 39% in the mid-2000s). As with materialistic desires, the decreases in work centrality were similar across demographic factors such as SES, race, or gender.

Figure 3.

Effect sizes for generational changes in work centrality and desire for material items among U.S. 12th graders, 1976-1978 versus 2005-2007.

We were also interested in the discrepancy between low work centrality and desiring expensive material items. As Table 1 shows, the match between work centrality and the desire for expensive material items declined significantly over time (see also Figures 4 and 5). While students in the mid-1970s expressed a work ethic that, based on historical averages, exceeded their material desires, by the mid-2000s, youths’ material desires were higher than their work ethic. Material desires began to exceed work ethic in the late 1980s, when material desires were very high and work centrality was moderate, with the discrepancy continuing through the mid-2000s, when material desires were still relatively high but work centrality reached all-time lows. Thus, recent 12th graders’ material desires have outpaced their willingness to work for these rewards.²

Figure 4.

Z-scored discrepancy between disagreeing “work is just making a living” minus the desire for expensive material items among U.S. 12th graders, 1976-2007.

Figure 5.

Z-scored discrepancy between willingness to work overtime minus the desire for expensive material items among U.S. 12th graders, 1976-2007.

Finally, we explored whether societal modeling, insecurity, and actual living standards predicted variations in the discrepancy between youths’ materialistic desires (measured with the four-item expensive possessions index) and the centrality they placed on work (measured by the item “Work is just making a living”). The bottom portion of Table 2 reports these results. The discrepancy between materialism and work centrality was associated with societal instability in middle childhood (10-year lag), with disconnection in middle childhood and early and later adolescence (i.e., all three time lags), and with modeling via advertising during early and late adolescence (5-year lag and contemporaneously). The violent crime rate, adult materialism, and actual living standards were not correlated with the discrepancy between work centrality and materialism. Thus, it appears that eras with greater societal insecurity, disconnection, and materialistic modeling are associated not only with youth placing a strong value on money, wealth, and possessions but also with a dampening of the willingness to work that is necessary to attain these goals.

Discussion

In a large, nationally representative sample of American 12th graders, materialism rose substantially from the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, peaking among members of Generation X. Although materialism then declined slightly, youth in the late 2000s (Millennials/GenMe) were still significantly more oriented toward materialistic values than were youth in the 1970s (Boomers). These trends were notable across multiple measures of materialistic values (including the desires for expensive possessions, money, and a high-paying job). Materialistic expectations (i.e., how much youth expected to own relative to their parents) increased steadily. The trends in materialism were not accompanied by a greater desire to work hard and earn money; in fact, work centrality declined steadily between the mid-1970s and mid-2000s.

Although some may suggest that weaknesses within younger individuals are responsible for increasing levels of youth materialism, these data instead show that certain features of the society created by adults may result in a more materialistic value orientation. As expected on the basis of past research and theorizing (Kasser et al., 2004, 2007), societal-level instability and materialistic role models were consistently associated with youths’ level of materialism. Specifically, youth raised during times of societal instability (e.g., unemployment) and disconnection (e.g., more unmarried parents) were especially likely to endorse materialistic values. Furthermore, when a larger percentage of the nation’s economy was oriented toward advertising messages, youth were also likely to prioritize materialistic aims. The strength of these societal-level factors’ relationships with materialism varied somewhat depending on developmental stages. Materialism during 12th grade was most associated with societal instability during middle childhood and early adolescence and with social disconnection and advertising levels in early and late adolescence. Actual standards of living were not correlated with contemporaneous material desires, but childhood standards—those 10 years out of date—were linked to higher materialism. Put in terms of historical context, materialism peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s (with GenX), about 10 years after the height of American instability in the late 1970s and early 1980s (as measured by social indicators such as unemployment and divorce) and about 5 years after a peak in advertising spending (as a percentage of the overall economy) in the mid-1980s. Materialism then declined somewhat after the early 1990s, but remained relatively high in the mid-2000s (Millennials/GenMe), perhaps as a result of somewhat mitigated, though continuing, social instability from 1990 to 1995 and a second peak in advertising spending during the late 1990s.

Such results not only support past theoretical suggestions about how culture and era may affect youth’s values and personality (Kasser et al., 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Twenge et al., 2012) but also provide interesting avenues for future research on how the timing of societal events may be associated with youths’ development. For instance, the findings consistently point to early adolescence as a crucial time for the development of materialistic values. Youth begin to seriously consider aspects of their identity around age 13 (Erikson, 1959) and are increasingly aware of the events in their social surround at this time. Furthermore, societal levels of instability in middle childhood, when the youth were 8 years old, were consistently related to youths’ materialism when they were seniors in high school. Children at this age are probably not directly aware of societal levels of divorce, unemployment, and suicide rates; instead, the effects of such distal variables are likely mediated through more proximal effects (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), such as the child’s parents’ likelihood of being divorced, unemployed, or depressed. These experiences may, in turn, lead to feelings of insecurity on the part of the child that may linger in the child’s life and lead him/her to attempt to cope by following the culturally sanctioned path of pursuing wealth and possessions (Kasser et al., 2004). A third noteworthy finding concerns advertising expenditures: The more that the nation’s economy was oriented toward advertising during youths’ early and late adolescence, the more that youth prioritized materialism as high school seniors. This finding is consistent with past studies showing that when youth are forming their identities and exposed to many commercial messages in their social surround, they place more priority on money and consumption (Nairn et al., 2007; Schor, 2004).

We also explored the potential discrepancy between material desires and youths’ beliefs about working hard. GenXers and Millennials/GenMe deemed owning expensive material goods more important than Boomers did at the same age, yet also placed less importance on hard work, the usual means of earning money and paying for material items. The decline in work centrality might be viewed as psychologically healthy if more recent generations were focused on having more time outside of work for their family or personal lives; such a focus on “work-life balance” and “time affluence” is known to benefit well-being (e.g., Kasser & Sheldon, 2009). The increase in the number of young people who believe that work is just making a living and who say they do not want to work hard is, however, at odds with the traditional idea of work/life balance, which instead emphasizes being able to succeed at work and in one’s personal life (e.g., Neal, Chapman, Ingersoll-Dayton, & Emlen, 1993; Schroeder, 1999). It is possible that more recent respondents may anticipate obtaining wealth through means they perceive as low-effort and high-payoff. These generational trends could also indicate an increase in entitlement—the idea that one deserves things without working for them (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). Entitlement is also frequently implied in advertisements, which often suggest that people should be able to get what they want (the product) but rarely mention that they most likely must work hard and long hours to afford it.

Limitations

Three limitations of the present project warrant discussion. First, the students who compose the MtF sample were surveyed in the spring of their senior year of high school, after some former students had dropped out. As a result, the sample is not representative of the entire population of 17- to 18-year-olds, and most likely oversamples those who are somewhat higher in SES and academic engagement. Nevertheless, the sample is more socioeconomically diverse than college student samples (i.e., the American Freshman study) and is designed to be nationally representative.

Second, the failure to find any significant effects of adult materialism on youth was curious and unexpected, particularly considering that the item we used is quite parallel to at least one of the items assessed in youth (i.e., a concern for a high-paying job). It may be that the values espoused by adults in general are relatively less obvious to youth or less influential than other assessments of instability, disconnection, and advertising. Future studies might explore whether similar findings occur when parents’ own values are assessed relative to other indicators of media use and insecurity.

Finally, as with any cultural or temporal era study, our analyses were correlational, and thus, conclusions about causation must be made cautiously. Given that we examined the effects of societal factors on youth, it seems relatively unlikely that youth attitudes caused societal conditions, particularly for the lagged associations we observed. However, any number of other unmeasured societal-level variables could be responsible for the associations observed here. We did include one other societal-level variable, actual attainment of expensive material goods, so the associations between societal conditions and materialism are independent of actual living standards.

Conclusions

Soon after the onset of the economic recession that began in late 2007 and deepened throughout 2008, numerous social observers suggested that the children of the time period, who would be the future high school seniors of 2017-2020, might reject materialistic values and return to frugality and thrift (e.g., Stengel, 2009). The current data argue against such predictions, given that the dislocation and insecurity wrought by high levels of unemployment and other economic woes are associated with higher levels of youth materialism later in life. At the same time, these results also suggest that numerous other societal-level factors will influence how youth respond to the late 2000s recession. For example, if the economic downturn led to lowered divorce rates or less advertising, youth might show lower levels of materialism in late adolescence. Although testing such predictions will have to await the passage of time, the current project clearly demonstrates that such societal-level factors are linked to desires for expensive material goods and wealth, as well as to a growing discrepancy between these aspirations and the willingness to work for them.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We thank W. Keith Campbell for his help with the graphs.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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