Abstract
Contact with the dominant group can increase opposition, among the disadvantaged, to social policies that would benefit their group. This effect can be explained in terms of contact promoting support for an ideology of meritocracy, which privileges the distribution of societal resources based on individual merit, rather than group-level disadvantage. We tested this ideological mechanism in a large, nationally representative sample of Māori (a disadvantaged group in New Zealand; N = 1,008). Positive intergroup contact with the dominant group (New Zealand Europeans) predicted increased opposition to a topical reparative policy (Māori ownership of the foreshore), and this was fully mediated by increased support for the ideology of meritocracy. Intergroup contact may enable the ideological legitimation of inequality among members of disadvantaged groups, engendering political attitudes that are detrimental to their group’s interests. Contact with ingroup members had the opposite effect, increasing support for reparative policy by reducing subscription to meritocratic ideology.
System Justification Theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) posits that political behavior is driven, not just by self- and group-interest, but by a need to rationalize and legitimize existing socio-political systems, even in the face of inequality. The theory predicts that ironically, under certain circumstances, this motivation to justify the system is strongest among people who suffer the greatest systemic disadvantage (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). While this enhanced system-justification effect among the disadvantaged has been replicated many times and in several countries (e.g., Henry & Saul, 2006; Sengupta & Sibley, 2013), exploration of the contextual factors that might increase or attenuate this tendency has been limited (see Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012).
Recent research suggests that one such contextual variable that might lead the disadvantaged to adopt system-justifying political attitudes is the amount of positive contact they have with advantaged-group members. For example, several studies have found that increased contact with the dominant group reduces support for reparative social policies among the disadvantaged and decreases their motivation to engage in collective action to advance their interests (Dixon, Durrhiem, & Tredoux, 2007; Durrheim & Dixon, 2010; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). Although this effect is well documented, the study of the mechanisms driving it has focused on socio-cognitive processes such as reduced ingroup identification, improved outgroup evaluations, and perceptions of discrimination (see Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010, for a review).
In addition to these processes, viewing the system-bolstering effects of contact through the lens of SJT highlights the need to consider the mediating role of ideology in explaining them. Research on SJT has shown that one of the most effective ways for people to fulfill their system-justification motivation is to subscribe to ideologies that make social inequality seem legitimate (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). One such ideology is that of “equality-as-meritocracy,” which positions inequality as arising from differences in individual merit, rather than from historical, group-based disparities (McCoy & Major, 2007; Sibley & Wilson, 2007). People who subscribe to this ideology tend to prefer outcome allocations based on the deservingness of individuals, rather than those based on the disadvantage associated with one’s group-membership (Son Hing et al., 2011). Indeed, endorsement of a meritocratic ideology has been found to predict a variety of system-justifying beliefs and attitudes, especially among members of disadvantaged groups (Jost et al., 2003; McCoy & Major, 2007).
Here, drawing from the rich, but largely independent research traditions of SJT and intergroup contact, we argue that the socio-cognitive consequences of contact increase the system-justification motivation among the disadvantaged, leading them to ideologically bolster the status quo. Thus, ideology forms the “missing link” in the mechanism through which interactions between individuals shape the political attitudes that help perpetuate societal-level inequalities (see also Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008). Specifically, we predict that positive contact with the dominant group will increase support for an ideology that privileges the merit-based distribution of societal resources, which should in turn engender opposition to specific policies aimed at remediating group-based inequality. We test this in a large sample of Māori (the indigenous group), who suffer considerable socioeconomic disadvantage relative to the now dominant group—New Zealand Europeans. Māori in New Zealand have been victims of historical injustice perpetrated by European settler-colonists, and in contemporary society, fair worse than Europeans on various socioeconomic indicators, including income, employment, political representation, and incarceration rates (see Sibley & Ward, in press, for review).
System Justification Theory
Nearly two decades of research on SJT has provided support for the central premise that there exists a general ideological motive to perceive the status quo—the socio-political systems under which one lives—as fair and just (see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004, for a review). For example, it has been found that people use various ideologies and stereotypes to legitimize group-based differences in social status (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Hunyady, 2005), defend the status quo in response to threats to it (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011), and accept weak, pseudo-explanations for prevailing social inequality (Haines & Jost, 2000). This desire to justify the system is driven by people’s inherent, epistemic need for order and structure (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009), and buffers them against the negative emotional consequences of living in an unfair world (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007).
A somewhat counterintuitive prediction derived from SJT is that sometimes the victims of systemic inequality have the strongest motivation to bolster the very status quo that disadvantages them. This prediction is drawn from research on cognitive dissonance theory, which has shown that those who are most deprived have the strongest need to rationalize their own suffering, to reduce dissonance (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). In the context of intergroup relations, such dissonance arises from the competing motivations of subordinate-group members to advance their self- and group-interests, and to justify the unequal system in which their group is at a disadvantage (Jost et al., 2004). Psychologically, it is much easier for them to resolve this dissonance by making internal attributions for their disadvantage, rather than acknowledging that society is inherently unfair (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).
Consistent with this argument, several studies have shown that members of lower-status groups show more pronounced system-justifying attitudes relative to higher-status group members. For example, Jost et al. (2003) found that African Americans and people on low incomes were more likely than others to legitimize economic inequality as being necessary, and support restrictions on the rights of citizens to criticize the government. Similarly, Henry and Saul (2006) found that low-status children in Bolivia held stronger beliefs about the government’s ability to meet the needs of its citizens than higher-status children. In New Zealand, results from a large, nationally representative sample showed that members of Asian and Pacific minority groups, who experience the highest levels of interpersonal discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage, believed New Zealand society was fairer than European New Zealanders did (Sengupta & Sibley, 2013).
However, the phenomenon of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged remains contentious and is not always observed. Several influential theories of intergroup relations including social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965) propose that while members of dominant groups might be motivated to bolster systems that advantage them, subordinate-group members typically reject and resist such systems in a manner consistent with self- and group-interest. Indeed, a large body of research in support of these perspectives has suggested that subordinate-group members are more inclined to challenge status hierarchies than dominants (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005; see Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011, for a meta-analytic review).
Furthermore, research on collective action has demonstrated that the experience of systemic injustice against one’s ingroup motivates resistance to the status quo among the disadvantaged (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In fact, Jost et al. (2003) who provided some of the most compelling evidence for enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged acknowledged that the disadvantaged are not “always (even ordinarily) the most likely ones to provide ideological support for the system” (p. 17). Instead, SJT predicts that the disadvantaged are most likely to display enhanced system justification, specifically when the salience of self- and group-interest is low (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). Here, we argue that the psychological consequences of positive intergroup contact serve to reduce the salience of self- and group-interest, thus enhancing the system-justification motive.
Intergroup Contact and System Justification
The contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) starts from the premise that intergroup problems stem primarily from ignorant, negative attitudes displayed by dominant groups towards subordinate groups. The solution it proposes is for prejudiced individuals to come into contact with the targets of their prejudice under conditions of equal status, cooperative interdependence, common goals, and institutional support. This serves to dispel their ignorance and improve outgroup attitudes. Indeed, as reported in Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-analysis of 696 samples, five decades of empirical work has provided strong evidence that increased outgroup contact, under optimal conditions, is associated with more favorable evaluations of outgroups.
Pettigrew (1998) postulated that the considerable benefits of positive contact are accrued through a process of changing category salience over time, culminating in recategorization into to a superordinate category (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). This involves the interactants viewing themselves as belonging to an overarching group that consists of the ingroup and outgroup. Achieving this superordinate categorization allows processes of favoritism usually reserved for ingroup members to be extended to members of the now-included outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This mechanism has received considerable empirical support from studies showing that greater positive contact does indeed promote superordinate categorization, and thereby, more positive outgroup evaluations (e.g., Lipponen & Leskinen, 2006; see also Dovidio, Gaertner, Saguy, & Halabi, 2008, for a review). Specifically relevant to our analysis of minority-group processes, Jasinskaja-Lahti, Mönen, and Liebkind (2012) found that Russian immigrants to Finland identified more strongly with the superordinate Finnish national category as a function of the quality of contact they had with the native Finnish outgroup.
However, by reducing the salience of their stigmatized social identity, while increasing the salience of a common superordinate identity shared with the dominant group, this recategorization process can have insidious political consequences for the disadvantaged (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrhiem, 2012; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). For example, Greenaway, Quinn, and Louis (2011) showed that priming a sense of common identification with the dominant group led Aboriginal Australians to identify less strongly with their own group, and consequently reduced their intentions to engage in collective action to redress the historical injustice perpetrated by European settler-colonists. This highlights that a strong sense of identification with a stigmatized group is an essential precursor to recognizing intergroup inequality, which motivates political action for social change (van Zomeren et al., 2008).
Indeed, it has been found that positive contact prevents subordinate groups from recognizing the inequality inherent in their socio-political relationship with the dominant group, reducing their motivation to act in their group’s interests (Saguy et al., 2009; see Dixon et al., 2012, for a review). For example, Dixon, Durrheim et al. (2010) found that Black South Africans reported reduced levels of perceived discrimination as a function of their contact with Whites. Extending this model, a longitudinal analysis by Tropp, Hawi, van Laar, and Levin (2012) revealed that positive contact with White Americans decreased ethnic activism among Latinos and Blacks over time, mediated by lowered perceptions of racial discrimination. In the most comprehensive test of the process outlined here, Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, and Heath (2011) found that contact with White South Africans reduced ingroup identification among Black South Africans, thereby reducing perceptions of ingroup deprivation, leading to reduced support for political behaviors that would benefit their group. Thus, contact lowers the salience of self- and group-interest directly, through its effects on the social categorization process, and indirectly through its effects on perceptions of inequality. According to SJT, the consequence of this reduced identity salience is the enhancement of the system-justification motive (Jost et al., 2004).
The Role of Ideology
How do disadvantaged-group members go about fulfilling this enhanced motive, even in the face of the inequality they suffer? SJT suggests they do this by subscribing to ideologies that allow them to rationalize social inequality as being legitimate and necessary (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). One powerful ideology that enables them to do this is that of “equality as meritocracy,” which positions equality as being primarily a question of procedural fairness between individuals, as opposed to distributive fairness between groups (Sibley & Wilson, 2007). We argue that by reducing the issue of equality down to the level of the individual, the ideology of meritocracy allows members of subordinate groups to resolve the cognitive dissonance resulting from being a victim of systemic disadvantage and simultaneously needing to justify that unequal system. As mentioned earlier, this dissonance is most easily resolved by attributing the origins of one’s disadvantage to personal factors (e.g., lack of effort) while clinging more strongly to a belief in systemic fairness—a sentiment akin to, “If only I try hard enough, this fair and meritocratic system will reward me.”
This propensity of subordinate-group members to internalize their disadvantage is evident in the phenomenon of “depressed entitlement.” For example, it has been found that women internalize gender inequality by judging their own work as worth less than their male counterparts do (Jost, 1997). Similarly, people employed in lower-paying jobs internalize economic inequality by reporting that they deserve less for their work on difficult tasks than do people employed in higher-paying jobs (Pelham & Hetts, 2001). The core premise of the meritocratic ideology is that differences in status reflect differences in individual merit or deservingness (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Thus, subscribing to this ideology further enables the tendency of the disadvantaged to make internal attributions for the inequality they face.
Two studies by McCoy and Major (2007) provide direct evidence for this ability of the meritocratic ideology to promote internalization of inequality. In their first study, members of a lower-status group (women) primed with the idea of a meritocratic system were more likely to blame rejection by a higher-status group member (men) on themselves, rather than seeing it as gender-based discrimination. In their second study, women who were provided information on gender inequality and then primed with meritocracy were more likely to explain this inequality by self-stereotyping their own group as incompetent and minimizing the role of systemic sexism. This dovetails with recent research showing that subscription to other kinds of system-justifying ideologies and attitudes (e.g., benevolent sexism, social dominance orientation, political conservatism) can also lead members of disadvantaged groups to internalize inequality by applying the negative stereotypes associated with their group to themselves and behaving in stereotype-consistent ways (Calogero & Jost, 2011; Cheung & Hardin, 2010).
Contact and Ideology
Here, we argue that contact enhances the tendency of disadvantaged-group members to internalize inequality and subscribe to a meritocratic ideology, thus fulfilling their need to reduce ideological dissonance. It does so by drawing their attention away from group-based disparities; occluding their perception of the systemic origins of their disadvantage (Saguy et al., 2009). For example, Saguy and Chernyak-Hai (2012) found that contact reduced the propensity of subordinate-group members in laboratory and real-world settings to attribute negative treatment of ingroup members to systemic discrimination. Instead, they were more likely to attribute this treatment to internal factors (such as a lack of effort on the part of the individual being mistreated).
To the extent that the meritocratic ideology indexes a preference for internal attributions of disadvantage, intergroup contact should increase support for this ideology. By framing success within a social system as reflecting individual merit rather than group-based privilege, the meritocratic ideology also implies greater individual mobility and permeable group boundaries (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Recent research suggests that the system-justifying effects of positive contact with the dominant group are mediated by an increased perception of individual mobility among subordinate-group members (Tausch & Becker, 2012). This lends further support to our prediction that contact should increase support for meritocracy among the disadvantaged.
The Effects of Ingroup Contact
In contrast to the well-documented effects of outgroup contact on socio-political attitudes, contact with members of one’s own group is rarely measured quantitatively in the intergroup literature (see Wilder & Thompson, 1980, for a notable early exception). This reflects a general theoretical orientation that treats intragroup and intergroup processes as independent and distinct (Dovidio, Saguy, & Shnabel, 2009). However, the interactions people have with outgroup friends occur in a broader social context that includes friendships with ingroup members. Therefore, following other theorists (e.g., Dixon et al., 2012), we consider it important to examine the role of ingroup contact in shaping intergroup relations. In the absence of direct empirical evidence, we draw on the vast intergroup contact literature and recent work on the relational nature of ideology (see Hardin, Cheung, Magee, Noel, & Yoshimura, 2012) to speculatively propose that ingroup contact might have the opposite effect on system-justifying political attitudes to outgroup contact.
Since people have a limited amount of time for social interaction, it seems reasonable to assume that to some extent, ingroup contact comes at the expense of outgroup contact. As noted by Pettigrew (1998), the effects of outgroup contact can, in part, be explained in terms of reduced contact with the ingroup, as a result of increased contact with the outgroup. This reciprocal relationship between ingroup and outgroup contact is useful in understanding the potential effects of the former. To the extent that contact with the dominant group reduces the salience of self- and group-interest among the disadvantaged, by attenuating ingroup identification (Cakal et al., 2011) and reducing perceptions of ingroup disadvantage (Dixon, Durrheim, et al., 2010), thereby increasing their system-justification tendencies, ingroup contact could be expected to increase the salience of these interests, increasing ingroup identification and perceptions of disadvantage, thus reducing system justification. This is consistent with evidence that identifying strongly with a group influences one’s ideological affinities in ways that are consistent with the collective self-interest of the group (Bobo, 1999; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004) and increases the motivation for systemic change (van Zomeren et al., 2008).
This analysis also resonates with recent theoretical and empirical developments suggesting that people subscribe to political ideologies, in part, to meet their relational need to maintain a shared reality with positively evaluated individuals and groups (Hardin et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2008). To do this, they automatically shift their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors toward desired others, to maintain and regulate the mutual understandings essential for these relationships (e.g., Davis & Rusbult, 2001), and away from undesired, disliked, or socially unimportant others (Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005).
Consistent with this notion, the literature on political socialization shows that people’s “ideological opinions are tied to stable interpersonal relationships such as those involving friends and family members” (Jost et al., 2008, p. 176). There is also evidence that identification with social groups, beyond one’s friends and family, influences one’s socio-political attitudes. For example, Haslam et al. (1996) found that the intergroup attitudes of Australians were most strongly influenced by the perceived attitudes of their fellow Australians. Similarly, Cohen (2003) found that people engage in selective information processing to attain ideological alignment with their ingroup. They presented liberals and conservatives with either a stringent or generous welfare policy and found that both groups supported whichever policy they were told was endorsed by their political ingroup, regardless of the policy’s content. Together these findings indicate that ingroup bonds have a considerable impact on ideology and political attitudes.
In the case of ideologies and political attitudes that are relevant to systemic inequality, the influence of these ingroup bonds should be stronger for members of disadvantaged groups than advantaged groups. This is because the disadvantaged are often the ones who perceive inequality most acutely, and generally tend to resist existing hierarchies (Lee et al., 2011). Further, the ingroup identity of the disadvantaged is often constructed in direct contrast to the superordinate category shared by those in power and those who benefit from the hierarchy (Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Therefore, disadvantaged-group members are more likely to view themselves as belonging to a group that challenges the status quo than are advantaged-group members. Bonds with others who share this identity, then, should influence the disadvantaged to adjust their ideologies and attitudes in a way that resists rather than maintains inequality.
This is especially pertinent to the focus of the present study: the ideological legitimation of the status quo by the disadvantaged in New Zealand. Māori, the disadvantaged group in this context, have been found to display the lowest levels of system-justification beliefs of all ethnic groups (Sengupta & Sibley, 2013). It has also been shown that socio-political awareness regarding the historical injustice faced by Māori at the hands of European settler-colonists forms a core part of Māori identity (Houkamau & Sibley, 2010). Furthermore, Māori show strong opposition to the ideology of “Historical Negation,” which disregards the relevance of historical injustice to contemporary issues of resource distribution between groups (Sibley, 2010). Therefore, ingroup contact among Māori should bias their ideological orientations in a direction consistent with these preferences for the recognition and remediation of systemic inequality. Māori can thus be expected to oppose the ideology of meritocracy, which de-emphasizes group-based disadvantage, and support redistributive social policies as a function of the time they spend with Māori friends.
Present Study and Hypotheses
Based on the arguments presented, we hypothesize that outgroup contact among the disadvantaged will increase subscription to the ideology of “equality as meritocracy.” We also predict that this relationship will fully mediate the effect of outgroup contact on reparative policies benefiting the disadvantaged group. Further, we expect that ingroup contact will have the opposite effect, reducing support for meritocracy, and thus reducing opposition to reparative policy. We test these predictions using a large sample of indigenous Māori in New Zealand. When the British Crown colonized New Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century, they signed the Treaty of Waitangi with Māori, which established British sovereignty over the country and granted Māori the rights of citizenship and ownership of tribal lands. However, the Crown disregarded and violated the principles of the Treaty for decades, forcefully appropriating Māori land and resources, and usurping Māori rights (Belich, 1996). The ongoing legacy of this injustice is a defining feature of intergroup relations in New Zealand. Compared with European New Zealanders, Māori fair worse on a host of socioeconomic indicators including income, employment, literacy rate, and political representation (see Sibley & Ward, in press).
In the context of this historical disadvantage, reparations for violations of the resource provisions granted to Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi are the main redistributive social policy issues in New Zealand today. We will examine how contact and ideology correlate with one specific reparative policy, that of Māori ownership of the foreshore and seabed. More specifically, we predict that the more time Māori spend with European friends, the more strongly they will subscribe to a meritocratic ideology, which will in turn be associated with greater opposition to Māori ownership of the foreshore and seabed. This study is novel in a number of ways, chiefly that we (a) examine the association between intergroup friendship and highly contested and topical support for a specific social policy central to the group’s interests, in a large nationally representative sample of disadvantaged-group members, (b) model an ideological mechanism through which ingroup and outgroup contact predict change in the policy attitudes held by disadvantaged-group members, and (c) explore contextual variation in system-justifying political attitudes.
Method
Participants and Sampling Procedure
This study analyzed data from the 2009 New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS-2009). The NZAVS-2009 questionnaire was posted to 40,500 participants from the 2009 New Zealand electoral roll. Roughly 1.36% of all people registered to vote in New Zealand were contacted and invited to participate. The NZAVS-2009 contained responses from 6,518 participants. The overall estimated response rate (adjusting for address accuracy of the electoral roll and including anonymous responses) was 16.6%.
We limited our analyses to the 1,008 participants who identified as Māori and who provided complete responses to the items analyzed here (630 women, 378 men). Participants had a mean age of 43.88 years (SD = 13.66). Average household income was $NZ 70,667 (SD = 54,431). Roughly half (52.5%) of participants were religious, 78.0% were parents, 63.5% were in a relationship or married, and 73.5% were employed. With regard to education, 33.6% had no formal qualification, 30.7% had a secondary school qualification, 15.4% had a tertiary diploma or trade certificate, 16.4% had an undergraduate university degree, and 4.0% had a postgraduate qualification.
Questionnaire Measures
Contact was measured using the following item: “Roughly how many hours (if any) have you spent with friends from each of the following groups in the last week?” Participants entered an open-ended number in response to the question for each of five ethnic groups: Americans, NZ Europeans, Māori, Asians, and Pacific Islanders. For this analysis, outgroup contact for Māori was operationalized as hours spent with NZ European friends and ingroup contact as hours spent with Māori friends. On average, Māori spent 24.13 hr (SD = 37.85) with Māori friends and 25.38 hr (SD = 33.58) with NZ European friends.
Support for equality as meritocracy was measured using three items from a scale developed and validated by Sibley and Wilson (2007). Items were administered with the following instructions: “The statements below reflect different opinions and points of view. Please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each statement. Remember, the best answer is your own opinion” and were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items were, “We are all New Zealanders and the law should not make provision for minority groups because of their ethnicity,” “True equality can be achieved only once we recognize that some ethnic groups are currently more disadvantaged than others and require additional assistance from the government,” and “We are all one nation and we should all be treated the same. No one should be entitled to anything more than the rest of us simply because they belong to one particular ethnic group.” For Māori, the mean scale score for support for equality as meritocracy was 4.44 (SD = 1.57). The Cronbach’s alpha (α = .69) for this scale indicated that it had reasonable internal reliability.
Participants rated their level of support versus opposition for “Māori ownership of the foreshore and seabed” on a scale of 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support). Scores for this item were reverse-coded so that a higher score indexed greater opposition toward the policy. The mean score was 3.75 (SD = 2.19).
Age, gender, and objective economic deprivation were added to the model to adjust for their effects. Deprivation was assessed by matching each participant’s neighborhood (obtained via their address) with a measure of deprivation calculated by the Ministry of Health (see White, Gunston, Salmond, Atkinson, & Crampton, 2008). This measure provides a ranked decile score (1 = most affluent; 10 = least affluent) to each local neighborhood in New Zealand (each neighborhood consists of roughly 100 people). Each decile score is derived via a principal components analysis of household income and the proportion of people living within the given neighborhood who (a) receive financial assistance, (b) rent their home, (c) are single parents, (d) are unemployed, (e) lack qualifications, (f) live in crowded housing, (g) lack telephone access, and (h) lack access to a car. Higher scores on this measure reflect greater levels of objective deprivation. The mean deprivation index for Māori was 6.33 (SD = 2.88).
Results
We tested a structural equation model in which hours with European friends predicted meritocracy beliefs. Further, a latent estimate of meritocracy beliefs was modeled as predicting opposition to reparative policy. All models were estimated using 5,000 bootstrapped resamples. Owing to our large sample size, we set the alpha level at p = .01 for all analyses. Because we were interested in determining full versus partial mediation, we also included the links between hours with European friends and reparative policy. The model also included links from hours with Māori friends, gender, age, and material deprivation with meritocracy and reparative policy attitudes, and therefore adjusted for the effect of ingroup contact and these demographic factors. This model is depicted in Figure 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations between all observed variables in the model are presented in Table 1.

Structural equation model with standardized path coefficients predicting opposition to resource policy as a function of outgroup contact, mediated by support for the ideology of meritocracy.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between All Observed Variables.
p < .01.
The model provided a reasonable fit to the observed data according to a range of indices of relative model fit: χ2(12) = 39.01, p < .01; standardized Root Mean Square Residual (sRMR) = .021, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .047. The sRMR and RMSEA values indicate that the model provided a reasonably parsimonious summary of the observed covariance matrix according to the rules-of-thumb proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999) of an RMSEA <.06 and a sRMR <.08.
As predicted, hours spent with European friends positively predicted meritocracy beliefs (b = .009, SE = .002, β = .188, z = 4.16, p < .01). Conversely, hours spent with Māori negatively predicted meritocracy beliefs (b = −.010, SE = .002, β = −.239, z = −5.18, p < .01). Meritocracy beliefs in turn were positively linked with increased opposition toward reparative policy (b = .737, SE = .047, β = .556, z = 15.65, p < .01).
Tests of (bootstrapped) indirect effects indicated that, as predicted, hours with European friends predicted a significant increase in opposition to reparative policy via its positive effect on meritocratic ideology (indirect effect = .007, β = .104, SE = .002, z = 4.00, p < .01, 99% CI = [.038, .171]) and hours with Māori friends predicted a significant increase in support for reparative policy via its negative effect on reparative policy (indirect effect = −.008, SE = .002, β = −.133, z = −4.48, p < .01, 99% CI = [−.208, −.057]). The direct effect of hours with European friends on opposition to reparative policy was nonsignificant when controlling for meritocratic ideology (b = .005, SE = .002, β = .07, t = 2.22, p = .026) indicating that this ideology fully mediated the effects of contact on reparative policy.
We also tested an alternative model in which the demographics, hours with European friends, and hours with Māori friends were modeled as predicting meritocracy and opposition to resource policy as independent outcomes. A chi-square difference test indicated that the hypothesized model provided a significantly better fit than the alternative model, χ 2 (1) = 289.98, p < .001. This indicated that meritocracy is more appropriately modeled as an intermediary ideology influenced by intergroup contact, which in turn predicts policy attitudes, rather than it being a distinct outcome from policy preferences.
Discussion
This is the first study of its kind, modeling an ideological mechanism through which contact influences the social policy preferences of disadvantaged-group members, using a large, representative national sample. Consistent with our predictions, we found that the more time Māori spend with European friends, the more strongly they oppose redistribution of resources (in this case, land) in favor of their own group. This effect was fully mediated by their increased subscription to the ideology of meritocracy, which negates group-based claims to societal resources by prescribing that such allocations should reflect individual deservingness. Overall, these findings support our argument that intergroup contact enhances subordinate-group members’ already strong motivation to justify the system, a motivation which can be fulfilled by subscribing more strongly to the meritocratic ideology, which then helps justify opposition to reparative policy. Conversely, we found that the more time Māori spend with ingroup friends, the less likely they are to ideologically justify the status quo and oppose group-based reparations. These findings add new insight into the broader context in which contact and ideology operate, by acknowledging the role of intergroup and intragroup processes in shaping intergroup relations.
In integrating the perspectives of SJT and the contact hypothesis, our findings represent an important contribution to both these vast literatures. First, they serve to replicate, in the New Zealand context, the effect observed thus far in South African, Israeli, and American samples (Durrheim & Dixon, 2010; Saguy et al., 2009; Wright & Lubensky, 2009), that intergroup contact can have insidious consequences for the political attitudes of disadvantaged-group members. Positive interactions with the dominant group can cause subordinates to oppose the very measures designed to remediate the systemic injustice from which their group suffers. In explaining the psychological process underlying this tendency, our study goes beyond the socio-cognitive explanations (e.g., reduced ingroup identification, improved outgroup evaluations) explored in past work, to consider the mediating role of ideology. It thus answers the call of several theorists for a more political conception of the consequences of intergroup contact, one which takes into account not just how contact affects intergroup attitudes, but how it might shape the ideologies that drive political behavior (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005; Jackman & Crane, 1986; Pettigrew, 2010; Reicher, 2007).
This ideological extension of the contact hypothesis has important implications for a theory described as “one of psychology’s most effective strategies for improving intergroup relations” (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003, p. 5). This assertion is based on the premise that the central problem in intergroup relations is ignorant antipathy between groups, and specifically antipathy expressed by dominants towards subordinates. The fact that contact consistently increases outgroup warmth (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) speaks to the effectiveness of this strategy. However, more harmonious intergroup relations do not necessarily translate into more equal relations (Dixon et al., 2012; Dixon, Tropp, et al., 2010). As our findings suggest, the very processes that help improve intergroup attitudes can inculcate ideological orientations and policy preferences that perpetuate intergroup inequality.
Indeed, inequalities that exist in the context of relatively positive and intimate social relations between groups can be far more resistant to change than those born out of openly conflictual relations (Jackman, 1994). One reason for this, is that having positive experiences with the dominant group can prevent subordinates from perceiving them as functionaries of an unequal status quo (Reicher, 2007). For example, it has been empirically demonstrated that the warm feelings engendered by contact can increase perceptions of outgroup fairness among members of subordinate groups, perceptions that prove optimistic in light of the actual fairness demonstrated by the dominant group when allocating resources (Saguy et al., 2009).
This is especially pertinent in a country like New Zealand, where intergroup antipathy is low and interethnic friendships are relatively common (Sibley & Ward, in press). Under such circumstances, dominant-group ideologies can be easily transmitted across intergroup boundaries, since people tune their ideological orientations towards people they share positive interpersonal relationships with (see Jost et al., 2008). As Jackman (1994) noted, “bonds of mutual affection” (p. 82) between groups can lead subordinate-group members to buy in to ideologies that offer them conditional inclusion into an inherently unequal relationship with the dominant group. This is particularly true when subordinates engage in contact with dominants in which the latter actively legitimize social inequality. Becker, Wright, Lubensky, and Zhou (2013) found that contact only undermined subordinates’ collective action tendencies “when the advantaged-group partner described their group’s advantaged position as legitimate or when they did not communicate their feelings about intergroup inequality (leaving them ambiguous)” (p. 442).
In New Zealand, Europeans have been found to show much stronger support than Māori for the ideology of Historical Negation which denies the relevance of historical injustice in explaining contemporary issues of group-based inequality (Sibley, 2010). So when Māori come in contact with Europeans, they are probably, on average, exposing themselves to interaction partners who are prone to legitimize social inequality. Thus, the negative political consequences of contact for disadvantaged-group members might be especially pronounced in contexts where entrenched inequality exists in conjunction with highly prevalent hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies and relatively harmonious intergroup relations (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Further, the superordinate recategorization prompted by positive contact can lead subordinate-group members to pay less attention to the inequality inherent in their socio-political relationship with the dominant group (Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012; Saguy et al., 2009). Consider, for example, that optimal contact requires equal status between group members in the contact situation and authority support (Pettigrew, 1998). Taken together, these prescriptions imply that the individuals engaging in the contact and the institutions supporting it should ignore the power and status differences that mark the real-world relationship between the groups to which these individuals belong. The logic behind this is that attending to these differences will elicit anxiety, provoke defensive reactions, and produce the same patterns of interpersonal behavior that the contact is designed to change (Dovidio et al., 2003). However, it also means that the collective and institutional bases of inequality and can go unchallenged, allowing for the denial of group rights and group-based grievances (Jackman, 1994). This is reflected in our finding that positive contact encourages the disadvantaged to ignore group-based disparities when making judgments about resource allocations in society and focus instead on individual merit.
The failure of the contact hypothesis to fully account for such ironic effects, calls into question the theoretical model of social change that underlies it; one predicated on prejudice-reduction (see also, Dixon et al., 2005). It also highlights two major asymmetries of focus in the contact literature: a focus on attitude change at the individual level and on the attitudes of dominant groups in particular. By investigating the effects of outgroup contact on subordinate-group members’ ideologies and policy orientations, our study addresses these asymmetries and shows how positive interactions between individuals can have negative societal consequences, enabling the ideological legitimation of inequality. This suggests that for all its affective benefits contact can potentially hinder disadvantaged-group members’ pursuit of the real structural changes (e.g., land redistribution) required to improve their lot.
The inequality-bolstering effects of contact also have important implications for system-justification theory. This theory often frames the tendency to rationalize and legitimize unequal systems as an intrinsic motivation (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Positioning system justification as a fundamental human trait forecloses any consideration of situational factors that might serve to enhance or reduce this tendency (see Reicher, 2011). This has the effect of naturalizing inequality and making resistance seem futile—if we are all predisposed to justifying the system, how could we ever hope to change it? However, recent research has begun to suggest that several factors might explain contextual variation in the tendency to bolster the status quo, including the degree to which the system is perceived to be threatened, how inescapable it seems and how much people feel dependent on it (Kay & Friesen, 2011). Further, Sengupta and Sibley’s (2013) recent findings imply that feeling part of the nation and having a strong sense of injustice suffered by one’s ingroup might diminish subordinate-group members’ need to rationalize their own disadvantage. The present study adds to this literature on contextual variation in system justification, showing that disadvantaged-group members’ contact with the dominant group might enhance their support for system-justifying ideologies and policy preferences.
On a more positive note, one aspect of our model provides an indication of how the enhanced system-justification motive among the disadvantaged might be attenuated. We found that contact with ingroup friends was negatively related to opposition to reparative policy and that this effect was fully explained by a reduced subscription to the meritocratic ideology. This is consistent with research suggesting that ingroup contact reduces support, among Māori, for another system-justifying ideology (Symbolic Exclusion; Sibley, 2010), which functions to exclude representations of Māori identity from the national category (Sengupta, Barlow, & Sibley, 2012). It seems that the more time the disadvantaged spend with members of their own group, the less inclined they are to legitimize an unequal status quo.
These ameliorative effects of ingroup contact (vis-à-vis system justification), together with the potentially pernicious effects of outgroup contact highlight the need to consider an alternate model of social change; one not predicated solely on improving intergroup attitudes. In countries like New Zealand where frequent and positive intergroup contact takes place in a context of entrenched structural inequality, engendering discontent among the victims of inequality may be a more effective strategy for achieving social change than promoting greater harmony. In an independent research tradition, psychologists studying collective action have approached the problem of intergroup inequality in terms of how the disadvantaged come to organize politically to improve their plight rather than how prejudice among the dominant group can be reduced (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2005; Klandermans, 1984; Walker & Smith, 2002). This perspective is based on the premise that equality is not achieved through endowment by the advantaged, but through the political mobilization of the disadvantaged (see Dixon et al., 2012, for a detailed analysis of these competing models of social change).
Accordingly, research in this area has shown that to engage in collective action, disadvantaged-group members must first recognize that they are victims of injustice (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006), be outraged by this (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), and feel capable of changing their circumstances (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002). A key antecedent in this process is a strong sense of identification with the disadvantaged group (van Zomeren et al., 2008), something that might be promoted by ingroup contact and hindered by outgroup contact. Thus, our findings suggest that ingroup contact might help increase the motivation for collective action among the disadvantaged, while outgroup contact might diminish it.
Strengths and Limitations
The present study is cross-sectional, which precludes the inference of a causal direction from contact to ideological change. It is therefore possible, that people’s preexisting political orientations towards redistributive social policy and beliefs about meritocracy influence their choice of friends and how the amount of time spent with them. However, findings from elsewhere in the contact literature indicate that the direction of causality is indeed from contact to attitude change rather than vice-versa. For example, in their meta-analysis Pettigrew & Tropp (2006) addressed this issue by coding samples based on the extent to which participants could choose to engage in intergroup contact. They hypothesized that if positive attitudes predicted contact, the effect sizes should be larger for studies that allowed choice than for those that did not. However, they found that studies in which selection bias was allowed did not produce larger effect sizes. Longitudinal analyses of the effects of contact on intergroup attitudes (Brown, Eller, Leeds, & Stace, 2007) and ethnic activism (Tropp et al., 2012), over time, also provide support for the causal direction proposed here.
Since these data were drawn from a much larger survey, which measured a vast array of social-psychological variables, we were necessarily constrained in the length and comprehensiveness of the scales used for the specific analyses reported here. For example, we measured meritocracy using a shortened three-item version of a larger, eight-item scale developed and validated by Sibley and Wilson (2007). While this measure had good internal reliability, future research using more comprehensive measurement of ideology would serve to provide further support to the mechanism tested here. Similarly, our use of a single-item to gauge policy preferences is limited in scope and could be extended in future work to include a broader range of policy attitudes. It must be noted that our choice of redistributive policy (i.e., Māori ownership of the foreshore and seabed) reflected the highly topical and contested nature of this particular issue in contemporary New Zealand.
An important strength of our study is that it is conducted on a large, nationally representative sample of minority-group members, which is rare in the literature. Further, the particular group studied here, Māori, has been found to be unique among disadvantaged groups. For example, while other ethnic minorities in New Zealand show enhanced system justification relative to European New Zealanders, Māori show lower levels (Sengupta & Sibley, 2013). Observing the system-justifying effects of contact among a group not as predisposed as others to bolstering the status quo represents a stringent test of our hypotheses and suggests that similar processes might be operating in other disadvantaged groups.
Conclusion
Here we have presented evidence that contact with the dominant group increases the subscription to the meritocratic ideology among disadvantaged-group members and that this leads them to express opposition to reparative polices which favor their group. In doing so, we have extended research on the potentially negative political consequences of intergroup contact and on the contextual variation of system-justification tendencies among the disadvantaged. We have also shown that ingroup and outgroup contact work in opposition to each other. These findings highlight the tension between harmony and equality in intergroup relations by showing that the same processes that promote harmony might bolster inequality. Finding ways to resolve this tension and promote social relations that are simultaneously amicable and equal is a fertile site for future research on social change.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We thank John Dixon and Kate Reynolds for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.
Authors’ Note
This manuscript is based on part of Nikhil Sengupta’s PhD thesis, supervised by Chris Sibley.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Collection of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study 2009 (NZAVS-09) data analyzed in this article was funded by University of Auckland FRDF (#3624435/9853) and ECREA (#3626075) grants awarded to Chris Sibley.
