Marking Time

Abstract

Temporal landmarks such as birthdays and significant calendar dates structure our perception of time. People might highlight temporal landmarks spontaneously in an effort to regulate connections between temporal selves. Five studies demonstrated that landmarks are used spontaneously to induce psychological separation from undesirable temporal selves. Participants were more likely to think of events that fell in between the current and the future self if an imagined future self was negative than if it was positive (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2). Furthermore, when a self-enhancement mindset was activated, participants were more likely to call to mind intervening temporal landmarks to protect themselves from a negative future self than when this mindset was not activated (Study 3). Finally, when psychological separations between the current self and a negative future self were introduced through alternate means, participants no longer selectively used landmarks to separate themselves from this future self (Study 4).

Keywords

possible selves time temporal selves self-enhancement self-protection temporal landmarks

Our representation of the geographical landscape includes spatial landmarks to orient us, to mark boundaries or borders, and to highlight changes in direction (e.g., turn left when you pass the cathedral). Likewise, we might organize our temporal landscapes by highlighting temporal landmarks along the path that provide a sense of direction, mark turning points, and erect time period boundaries. As an individual contemplates an upcoming period of time—say the next month—she might review the personally important events, holidays, and even other notable but mundane events (e.g., weekends) that structure the temporal landscape of that time. Although this kind of mental schedule review might seem unremarkable, the location of the particular landmarks that come to mind may be consequential.

Research indicates that landmarks and transitions can change the perceived connection between present and temporally extended identities (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Ungemach, Stewart, & Reimers, 2011, but see Matthews, 2012, for a critique; Skowronski et al., 2007; Thomsen, 2009; Peetz & Wilson, 2013). Specifically, when people think about a temporal landmark that falls between the current self and a future self, they view that future self as more dissimilar from the present than if no intervening landmark was salient. People are also more likely to organize present and future selves into separate mental categories, and to contrast rather than assimilate their attributes, when a landmark acts as a barrier between temporal selves (Peetz & Wilson, 2013). In past research, Peetz and Wilson (2013) experimentally controlled the placement of salient landmarks and examined their implications for identity and motivation. However, it is conceivable that if intervening temporal landmarks can act as a mental barrier between the current self and a future self, people might also selectively focus on landmarks in a strategic way—for example, focusing on landmarks that disconnect the current self and undesirable future selves or events, but avoiding similar barriers between the present and desirable future selves that they would like to include in current identity.

Certainly, we know people do reflect on temporal landmarks—they think and talk about important personal and cultural events that have happened and those that are yet to come (D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011; Shum, 1998). But could there be something systematic about what event or holiday landmarks come to mind? Imagine that Julie is dreading an upcoming evaluation at work, which she expects to be painful and anxiety-provoking. As her mind wanders, is she more likely to think about an upcoming vacation (scheduled before the evaluation) or her best friend’s wedding (not long after the evaluation)? She looks forward to both events and thinks of both often. According to our theorizing, Julie would be more likely to think of the vacation in this circumstance, because erecting a barrier between today and the dreaded evaluation will help her to feel psychologically disconnected from the dreaded future event and thereby reduce current negative affect. However, if instead of a distressing performance review, Julie anticipates a promotion at work, she might be more inclined to relish this upcoming event and want to think of it as part of her current identity. In this case, the wedding instead of the vacation might spontaneously come to mind, because it does not evoke a separation between current self and the self who will experience the event. Even if Julie experiences these thoughts as randomly coming to mind, the specific landmark event she thinks of might in fact be quite systematic.

In the current research, we investigate the possibility that people spontaneously select or focus on temporal landmarks that help them to regulate their identity over time in a way that maintains a favorable present self view.

Temporal Selves

People’s sense of personal identity is not limited to the present moment in time. Instead, people’s concept of themselves extends into the past and the future (Haddock, 2004; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Robinson & Ryff, 1999; Wilson & Ross, 2001). One might imagine a future self that is accomplished, happy, and successfully employed—or a future self that is destitute, depressed, and jobless. These temporally extended selves reflect on the present self (Wilson, Buehler, Lawford, Schmidt, & Yong, 2012), even as they are being imagined—thinking about one’s upcoming surgery or a jobless future self might make one feel anxious in anticipation. However, the sense of connection between these temporal selves is not set in stone: Perceived connection or disconnection between the present and a temporally removed self is malleable, and can vary independent of the passage of time (Hershfield, 2011; Ross & Wilson, 2002; Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale, 2010). Greater perceived connection increases the degree to which temporal selves are evaluated as similar (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005), and increases the degree to which temporal selves impact current self-appraisals (Broemer, Grabowski, Gebauer, Ermel, & Diehl, 2008; Hanko, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2001). Greater disconnection between temporal selves promotes judgments of dissimilarity, change, and contrast (Hanko et al., 2010; Peetz & Wilson, 2013; Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008).

Disconnecting Temporal Selves

People tend to think of and describe their temporal selves as a series of connected but distinct selves: they organize their life narrative into chapters that emphasize meaningful distinctions between time periods rather than along a purely linear progression (Shum, 1998; Skowronski et al., 2007; Thomsen, 2009). Important personal transitions such as starting university, becoming a mother, or moving to a different community increase the sense of disconnection between temporal selves (Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987; Kling, Ryff, & Essex, 1997). Indeed, even imagining a fictitious but personally momentous event (being kidnapped, experiencing a religious conversion) can effect a change in connection to the hypothetical future self (Bartels & Rips, 2010). However, even events that are more mundane than momentous and more short-term than life-spanning may temporarily lead people to view a future self as belonging to a different temporal category than the current self (Peetz & Wilson, 2013; Ungemach et al., 2011). For example, simply thinking about holidays (Christmas, New Year’s) or personal events (one’s own or another’s birthday) that fall between the current self and a future self can make this future self seem more different and separate from the current self than if the holidays or events were not made salient or fell after the future self (Peetz & Wilson, 2013). Thus, mundane everyday landmarks can break the flow of time into temporary chapters or categories, and can lead people to view the temporal selves across these categories as more disconnected than the temporal selves within these categories.

Overview of Research

In the present research, we examine whether people actively mark time to regulate desired and undesired connections between temporal selves. People may systematically think about personal events and holidays that provide temporal boundaries between the current self and unfavorable future selves. In other words, we hypothesize that everyday landmarks are spontaneously used to ward off threats but allow positive experiences to stay connected to the present. Across five studies, we examine people’s tendency to preferentially select landmarks that regulate connection with favorable or unfavorable future selves. We reasoned that people may highlight intervening landmarks spontaneously when they wish to dissociate from an undesired temporal self, and to ignore intervening landmarks when contemplating a desirable future state. Studies 1a, 1b, and 2 test the basic phenomenon, and Studies 3 and 4 test aspects of the proposed mechanism. Specifically, we contend that people may selectively use landmarks as a tool for self-image regulation (self-enhancement and self-protection). Accordingly, selective landmark use should be stronger when participants are in a self-enhancement mindset than when they are not (Study 3). In addition, if we are correct that landmarks are selectively used to induce (or avoid) separation between temporal selves, then selective landmark use (and its self-enhancement value) should be attenuated when temporal selves have already been separated by some other means (Study 4).

Study 1: Do People Systematically Choose Holidays as Landmarks?

The initial study tested our main proposal that people selectively choose to think about events that structure time in a way that benefits the self. To increase generality, Studies 1a and 1b shared a similar design but used different landmarks and time spans.

Study 1a

In Study 1a, we varied the valence of the future self by asking participants to imagine a negative future self or a neutral future self 6 months in the future. We then examined participants’ choice to focus on one of two American holidays (Independence Day vs. Veteran’s Day). We expected that if the target future self was undesirable, participants would prefer to think about the intervening calendar landmark (Independence Day in this case) more than if the target future self was more neutral. Such a pattern of preference would suggest that people selectively use temporal landmarks to regulate the psychological connection to their temporal selves.

Participants

Seventy-nine American adults (36 women, 43 men) participated through the online site Mechanical Turk by Amazon (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).¹ Age ranged from 18 to 64 years (M = 32.49 years, SD = 12.26). This study was run in late February. Participants were compensated with 50 cents, which was consistent with the norms for this recruitment tool at the time.

Procedure

This study was conducted using the online platform Unipark (n.d.). Participants were first randomly assigned to describe a target future self. In the negative future self condition, participants were asked to think about what they did not want to be like in 6 months time, and completed up to three statements beginning with “I don’t want to be . . . ” (e.g., “out of shape,” “in debt”). Participants in the control condition were asked to think about what they would be like in 6 months time, completing up to three statements beginning with “I will be . . . ” (e.g., “thinner,” “gainfully employed”). Even though this control condition did not explicitly ask for positive information, participants listed overall relatively positive future statements, consistent with the general tendency for people to expect self-improvement over time (Robinson & Ryff, 1999; Wilson et al., 2012).

Participants then rated the future self on seven general appraisal dimensions. They rated how confident, energetic, content, happy, sad (reverse scored), unhappy (reverse scored), and lonely (reverse scored) the future self would be, from 1 (will not apply at all) to 7 (will apply very much). These ratings of positive future affect were aggregated (α = .92), and served as a manipulation check.

Then, participants were told that the study examined perceptions of holidays. They were asked to choose which holiday they wanted to talk about in the context of the study. Participants were given the choice between Independence Day (July 4) and Veteran’s Day (November 11). Independence Day (the intervening landmark) fell inside the 6 month window between now and the future self in August, and Veteran’s Day (the nonintervening landmark) fell outside that window. We recorded which of these holidays participants chose.

Results

To assess the impact of the possible selves valence manipulation, we examined participants’ future self-ratings. Participants rated the negative future self less positively (M = 3.59, SD = 1.36) than the neutral future self (M = 5.61, SD = .98), t(77) = 7.56, p < .001.

Next, we examined holiday choice. Age did not correlate with holiday choice, r(77) = −.07, p = .541, and holiday choice did not differ by gender, t(77) = −.51, p = .611. Recall that we expected that participants in the negative self condition would prefer to think about intervening holidays to separate themselves from the future self. As predicted, participants in the negative future self condition were far more likely to select Independence Day (83%) than Veteran’s Day (17%), whereas participants in the control condition selected Independence Day only somewhat more often (61%) than Veteran’s Day (39%). A logistic regression showed that the effect of the future self condition on holiday choice was significant (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Logistic Regressions: Predictors of Choosing an Intervening Landmark.

Predictor variables	Regression
Study 1a
Future condition	B = 1.08, SE = .53, exp(B) = 2.95, p = .042
Study 1b
Age	B = −0.08, SE = .03, exp(B) = 0.927, p = .006
Gender	B = −1.86, SE. = .66, exp(B) = 0.155, p = .005
Future condition	B = 1.30, SE. = .66, exp(B) = 3.68, p = .048
Study 2
Future condition	B = −0.89, SE. = .44, exp(B) = 0.412, p = .045
Study 3
Future condition	B = 0.49, SE. = .40, exp(B) = 1.64, p = .218
Enhance condition	B = 1.19, SE. = .42, exp(B) = 3.29, p = .004
Future × Enhance	B = −1.19, SE. = .57, exp(B) = 0.306, p = .038
Type of landmark	B = −0.54, SE. = .28, exp(B) = 0.581, p = .056
Study 4
Type of landmark	B = −0.23, SE. = .14, exp(B) = 0.798, p = .100
Future condition	B = 0.03, SE. = .33, exp(B) = 1.03, p = .933
Calendar condition	B = −0.41, SE. = .33, exp(B) = 0.661, p = .212
Future × Calendar	B = 0.90, SE. = .48, exp(B) = 2.74, p = .060

Discussion

This study provides initial evidence that people may selectively focus on temporal landmarks that regulate psychological separation between temporal selves. Participants preferred to think about calendar event landmarks that intervened between their current and an unwanted future self, more than when the future self was more neutral (or somewhat positive). It is notable that participants in both conditions showed some preference for Independence Day, perhaps because of the valence or meaning of this holiday, or even because it was closer in time. We selected real-world upcoming events to enhance ecological validity, but of course this makes it impossible to select perfectly equal stimuli. Independence Day and Veteran’s Day vary along several dimensions, not just their location in time. Specifically, these holidays—marking the birth of a nation versus death and sacrifice—may differ in desirability. Independence Day could be selected due to its positivity rather than its location in time. To address this possibility, we conducted Study 1b, using different landmarks that were more similar in nature and valence: Mother’s Day and Father’s Day.

Study 1b

The next study replicated Study 1a using different holidays. To increase time span generalizability, we also asked participants to consider a target future self 6 weeks rather than 6 months in the future. Again we expected that contemplating an undesirable future self would lead participants to prefer the holiday that represents a mental barrier between the present and this future self (i.e., falls in the next 6 weeks) compared with contemplating a relatively more positive future self.

Participants

Eighty-seven American adults participated through the online site Mechanical Turk and were compensated 50 cents. Two participants were excluded because of missing responses on key variables and five participants were excluded because they recorded an incorrect date for their future self. The final sample (34 women and 46 men) ranged in age from 18 to 62 years (M = 31.24 years, SD = 11.77). This study was run in mid-April.

Procedure

The procedure was identical to Study 1a, with three exceptions. First, the comparison group was explicitly positive in this study. Because participants’ statements in the neutral control condition of Study 1a were already quite positive (M = 5.61 on a 7-point scale), these instructions removed ambiguity and made a clearer comparison between differently valenced future selves. The negative future self condition was identical to Study 1a. Participants in the positive future self condition reported what they hoped to be like in 6 weeks time, completing up to three statements beginning with “I hope to be . . . ” (e.g., “happier,” “relaxed,” “finding more time for my art work”). Participants also indicated the date of their future self (i.e., the date 6 weeks away), as an attention check.

Second, the holiday choice task offered different holidays. Participants were given the choice between Mother’s Day (May 8th) and Father’s Day (June 19th). Mother’s Day (the intervening landmark) was 3 weeks in the future and therefore fell inside the window between present and future self, and Father’s Day (the nonintervening landmark) was 9 weeks in the future and therefore fell outside that window.

Finally, to assess differences in landmark perception, participants also rated the importance of the holiday (not at all important to very important), the extent to which they looked forward to the holiday (not at all to very much) and saw the holiday as positive (not at all positive to very positive) on 7-point scales.

Results

Participants rated the negative future self less positively (M = 3.32, SD = 1.49) than the positive future self (M = 6.16, SD = .83), t(78) = 10.51, p < .001. Participants rated Mother’s Day and Father’s Day as equally important, Ms = 5.08 versus 5.00, respectively, t(78) = .21, p = .832; looked forward to the holidays to the same extent, Ms = 4.43 and 4.15, respectively, t(78) = .72, p = .471; and saw the holidays as equally positive, Ms = 5.35 and 5.40, respectively, t(78) = −.15, p = .882. Although holidays were rated equally favorably, across conditions, people showed an overall tendency to select Mother’s Day more frequently (76.3%) than Father’s Day (23.8%). In addition, age and gender were both significantly associated with holiday choice; older participants, r(78) = −.25, p = .03, and women, t(78) = 2.70, p = .008, were more likely to choose Mother’s Day than younger participants and men. For this reason, we controlled for age and gender in the main analyses of holiday choice.

A logistic regression controlling for age and gender indicated that the effect of the future self condition on holiday choice was significant (Table 1). Participants in the negative future self condition were much more likely to select Mother’s Day (83%) than Father’s Day (17%), whereas participants in the positive future self condition had a less pronounced preference for Mother’s Day (70%) over Father’s Day (30%).

Discussion

Together, these two studies provided evidence that people may selectively focus on temporal landmarks that regulate psychological separation between temporal selves. Although there was an overall tendency for participants to prefer one landmark over the other, participants were especially likely to prefer intervening landmarks when confronted with a negative future self than when thinking about a neutral or a positive future self. The same pattern emerged when the target future self was in the relatively distant (6 months) or closer future (6 weeks). Conceivably, we might have expected participants to show a fully reversed preference for nonintervening landmarks when they desire connection with a favorable future self. We did not find this reversal, only a less pronounced preference for the intervening event. It may be that several factors influenced participants’ preference for the earlier event (Independence Day and Mother’s Day): They could have been more positive (though we found no evidence for that in Study 1b), their proximity might have made them more concrete or emotionally intense (Van Boven et al., 2010), or it may be that, all else being equal, people tend to select the first event they encounter in the temporal landscape—often the temporally closer event. Despite these ambiguities, in two studies using different time frames and various real-world holidays, the experimentally induced focus on a negative self elicited a significantly greater preference for intervening landmarks than either neutral or positive selves.

We suggest that people selectively attend to specific landmarks to regulate connections between temporal selves. Of course, these studies still constrained participants’ focus by asking them to select one of two predetermined landmarks. Hence, we have demonstrated that people systematically select landmarks that help connect or disconnect the present and future self, but we have not tested whether people might show the same tendency more spontaneously when contemplating their own life events.

Study 2: Do People Systematically Self-Nominate Events as Landmarks?

Study 2 extended on Study 1 by examining participants’ selection of self-generated important personal events, rather than events offered by the experimenter. Arguably, this procedure reflects spontaneous landmark use outside the lab more closely: In real-life situations, people might naturally reflect on an upcoming vacation or wedding, but are unlikely to select a holiday from a set of options. The question is, are people’s spontaneous thoughts about future landmarks actually more systematic than they appear—for example, are they more likely to bring up an intervening vacation than a nonintervening wedding after being reminded of a dreaded upcoming event?

Method

Participants

Ninety-three German students, recruited via an email list, participated for a chance to win Є50. Two participants were excluded because they failed to complete the landmark measure. The final sample consisted of 91 participants (19 men, 65 women, 7 gender-unidentified). The average age was 27.79 years (SD = 5.52). The study was run in February.

Procedure

This study was conducted in German using the online platform Unipark. Participants were randomly assigned to either imagine a negative future self or a positive future self in 6 months time (i.e., in August) as in Study 1b, and completed the same 7-item manipulation check of future positive self-appraisal (α = .95).

Next, we assessed whether participants would be more likely to nominate temporal landmarks that separated their current self from a negative future self. Participants were instructed to think about the next year and to list the first important event that came to their mind. They were further asked to mark this event on a 10 cm timeline stretching from “Today” to “Next year.” At the halfway point on this timeline, the target future self was marked with the words “6 months.” We coded whether participants nominated an event that fell between Today and the target future self (i.e., intervening landmarks, coded as 1) or whether they named an event that fell after the 6 month mark (i.e., nonintervening landmarks, coded as 0). Participants nominated landmark events such as university deadlines (n = 29), calendar events such as Easter or Christmas (n = 14), personal events like birthdays and weddings (n = 21), and plans to travel or move (n = 17). It is worth noting that people typically know more concrete detail about their upcoming activities and events in the near than distant future (e.g., Peetz, Buehler, & Wilson, 2010; Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2008), hence we might expect to see a general tendency to nominate closer rather than more distant landmarks.²

Results

Future self valence manipulation check

Again, participants rated an imagined negative future less positively (M = 3.54, SD = 1.55) than an imagined positive future self (M = 5.91, SD = .98), F(1, 87) = 62.80, p < .001.

Landmark nomination

Next, we examined whether participants used the landmark nomination task to separate themselves more often from a negative future self than from a positive future self. Landmark choice did not relate to age, r(83) = .02, p = .841, or gender, t(82) = −.81, p = .418, so these variables were not considered further. Consistent with predictions, a logistic regression revealed a significant effect of future self condition on event selection (Table 1). More participants (72%) who thought about a negative future self nominated an event that separated the current from the future self, whereas only 51% of participants who thought about a positive future self nominated an intervening event.

Discussion

This study showed that people use intervening temporal landmarks spontaneously to separate themselves from unfavorable temporal selves, whereas they show less inclination to disconnect from favorable temporal selves. Complementing Study 1, participants in this study self-nominated any upcoming event rather than choosing between two specified holiday options. After participants contemplated an undesirable future self, they were considerably more likely to insert a landmark event separating the present from that undesired future than one falling outside of that time span. By injecting a personal landmark into the temporal scenery, they may be able to keep future ills at bay and benefit from the contrast effect afforded by comparing a rosy present to a gloomier future (Peetz & Wilson, 2013). When considering instead a desirable future self, people were somewhat more apt to avoid selecting an intervening landmark, although again there was no reversal of preferences, similar to Study 1.

Study 3: Do People Use Landmarks More Selectively When in a Self-Enhancement Mindset?

The previous studies showed that people defend against a negative future self by calling to mind intervening temporal landmarks. We have argued that people may be motivated to focus on landmarks that allow them to think of the future as a “different category” to protect against an undesired future, or as part of the same temporal category as current identity to reap benefits of a desirable future. In the next study, we more directly examine the contention that a self-enhancement mindset might prompt the selective use of temporal landmarks.

If the motivation to protect and enhance the self underlies the proposed effect, then activating a self-enhancement mindset may increase the tendency to regulate negative future selves through landmarks. In Study 3, we examined whether the tendency to call to mind intervening landmarks was amplified if participants were particularly inclined to feel good about themselves relative to a control condition. Self-enhancement mindset was indirectly activated—not by instructing participants to self-enhance per se but rather by asking them to describe the possible benefits of a self-enhancement thinking style. This is comparable with a mindset activation in one task (e.g., describing the reason vs. the process of achieving a health goal) that then carries over to a different unrelated task that people could approach with a more process-oriented mindset or a more reason-oriented mindset (e.g., Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004).

This study also examined two types of landmarks to increase generalizability: Some participants were asked to list important calendar dates or holidays (similar to Study 1), others listed personal events (as in Study 2).

Method

Participants

Two-hundred and twenty-eight American adults participated through Mechanical Turk and were compensated 50 cents. Five participants were excluded because they did not complete the manipulations. The final sample (125 women, 96 men, 2 gender-unidentified) ranged from 18 to 82 years (M = 31.90 years, SD = 12.14). This study was run in May.

Procedure

This study was conducted using the online platform Unipark. After an initial demographic questionnaire, participants were randomly assigned to either imagine a positive future self or a negative future self in 6 months time (November). Instructions were changed slightly from the previous studies, asking participants to either “imagine the best [worst] possible outcome for your future self.” They then completed three statements that began “In 6 months, my most positive [negative] self would be . . . ” The future selves imagined in this study were often more extreme than in the previous studies (e.g., “in jail,” “living on the street”).

Enhancement mindset

Next, participants were assigned to a self-enhancement condition or a control condition. In the self-enhancement condition, they read

Depending on our goals and situations, we may describe ourselves in different ways. Sometimes we want to describe ourselves in a way that makes us feel particularly good about ourselves. We select the information that makes us feel best and describe ourselves in the most positive light.

They then wrote a brief paragraph on why they thought that feeling good about themselves is important and to give examples of the benefits. All participants completed this task successfully, listing plausible benefits of self-enhancement. On average, participants wrote 59.57 words (SD = 26.89) in this thought exercise. Participants in the control group did not complete this task. The instructions were designed to activate a self-enhancement mindset that would carry over to subsequent tasks without explicitly instructing them to self-enhance.

Temporal landmark

Finally, we assessed whether people would selectively gravitate toward intersecting temporal landmarks that cut off an undesirable future self from the present self, particularly after being primed with a self-enhancement mindset. To increase generalizability, we varied the type of landmark participants were asked to consider: Some were asked to consider important calendar dates or holidays and others were asked to select a personal event. In the holiday landmark condition, participants were instructed to think about the next year and to list the first important calendar date or public holiday that came to their mind. Selecting holidays parallels Study 1 but allows participants to choose their own rather than selecting from predetermined options. In the personal landmark condition, participants were asked to list the first important event that came to their mind. They marked the selected event or holiday on a 100 mm timeline stretching from “Today” to “Next year,” as in Study 2. At the halfway point on this timeline, the target future self was marked with the words “6 months.” We coded whether participants nominated an event that fell between Today and the target future self (i.e., intervening landmarks, coded as 1) or whether it fell after the 6 month mark (i.e., nonintervening landmarks, coded as 0).

Participants nominated landmark events such as the start or end of an important project at their jobs (n = 29), plans to travel or move (n = 20), anniversaries/birthdays or proposals/weddings (n = 29), or other personal events (e.g., surgery, n = 17). Participants nominated landmark holidays such as Christmas (n = 71), 4th of July (n = 15), Thanksgiving (n = 14), Halloween (n = 7), New Year’s eve (n = 7), and other holidays (Memorial Day, Valentine’s Day, etc., n = 14). Note that Christmas was by far the most salient holiday landmark, perhaps due to its cultural importance. This preference might contribute to a relatively high number of distant (nonintervening) landmarks in this study.³

Results

First, we examined whether the type of landmark participants were invited to select (personal events vs. holidays) had an effect on their temporal placement. There was a marginal difference in the landmark location choice across the two methods, B = −0.53, SE = .28, exp(B) = 0.59, p = .055, such that fewer close, intervening holidays (34%) were selected than intervening personal events (46%). This might be explained by the popularity of Christmas (which was a salient but nonintervening holiday). Subsequent analyses were identical whether controlling for type of landmark (holiday vs. event) or not. Landmark choice did not relate to age, r(221) = .01, p = .843, or gender, t(219) = −.06, p = .954.

Next, we examined whether future valence and mindset affected participants’ tendency to select landmarks that either separated current and future selves or not. We expected that participants primed with self-enhancement would be more likely to think of a landmark that separates them from a negative future self than participants in the control group. A logistic regression with the future self condition, the self-enhancement condition, and their interaction term revealed a significant effect of self-enhancement condition (more intervening landmarks when in a self-enhancing mindset), no significant main effect of future self condition, and, as predicted, a significant interaction (Table 1).

To break down the interaction effect, we conducted two separate logistic regressions (see Table 2 for percentages). When imagining the negative future self, those with an increased motivation to self-enhance selected more intervening holidays or events (55%) than those in the control group (27%), B = 1.18, SE = .41, exp(B) = 3.25, p = .004. In contrast, when imagining the positive future self, self-enhancement condition had no effect on landmark selection (38% vs. 38%), B = 0.01, SE = .38, exp(B) = 1.01, p = .979.

Table 2.

Percentages of Chosen Landmarks for Study 3.

	Negative Future Self		Positive Future Self
	Control	Self-enhancement	Control	Self-enhancement
% of people selecting the intervening event	27	55	38	38
% of people selecting the nonintervening event	73	45	62	62

Discussion

This study suggests that the tendency to defend against looming negative future selves by means of placing an intervening landmark between the current and the future self was more pronounced when participants were in a self-enhancement mindset. Relegating the negative future self to a different temporal category saves the current self from being tainted by this unfavorable future. Participants in a self-enhancement mindset appear to capitalize on the protective function of intervening landmarks because they showed more evidence of interjecting events between the present and a negative future self. When the possible future self was positive, however, self-enhancement did not affect landmark choice, perhaps because participants were not as motivated to include a positive future self in the current self as they were motivated to separate the negative self. This imbalance in self-enhancing responses (feeling more threatened by the negative self than enticed by the positive self) was also evident in Studies 1 and 2, where landmark choices were driven by the preference for intersecting landmarks in the negative self condition. This imbalance might reflect a general tendency to fear negative outcomes more than to covet positive outcomes (loss aversion; for example, Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991), or may suggest that selective landmark use is more effective for separating selves (with intervening landmarks) than for inducing a sense of continuity (with nonintervening landmarks).

Notably, the tendency to select more intervening landmarks when considering a negative than when considering a positive future self was not found in the control condition (we might have expected a weaker landmark effect in this condition rather than no significant landmark preference). The number of nominated intervening landmarks was overall much lower in this study than any other, perhaps because participants self-nominated events in this study and several especially salient holidays (e.g., Christmas, New Years) happened to occur more than 6 months in the future (hence were nonintervening). Because these nonintervening holidays are not only more salient than closer, intervening landmarks (e.g., July 4th) but are also quite positive, participants faced with a negative future self might have been able to reduce threat either by selecting an intervening landmark or gravitating toward positive (hence perhaps mood-boosting) distant landmarks. However, self-enhancement mindset significantly increased the tendency toward intervening landmarks in the negative condition compared with the control (and marginally more than the positive-enhancement condition) even in a sample with an overall preference for more distant landmarks.

Study 3 provides some evidence consistent with our suggestion that landmark use may be systematic and self-protective. However, it is important to note that although participants weren’t explicitly asked to self-enhance, the mindset manipulation was still fairly overt. The goal of Study 4 was to address a similar question from a different perspective—rather than increasing self-enhancement motivation, we reduce the functionality of temporal landmarks by introducing an additional disconnection between temporal selves.

Study 4: Do People Still Use Landmarks Selectively If Other Barriers Already Exist?

We argued that people will more often select landmarks that place a barrier between themselves and unwanted future selves, and be less inclined to select an intervening barrier between the present and a desirable future self. However, this enhancement strategy should only be effective to the extent that the temporal landscape is otherwise continuous—that, in the absence of the landmark in question, the present and future self would be seen as part of the same temporal category. If there are already other disconnections between the present and future self, then selecting a particular landmark should become pointless. If the future is already disconnected from the present, then an intervening landmark would provide no additional benefit to protect against an unwanted future self; likewise if the future is already disconnected from the present, then selecting a nonintervening landmark will not help to connect the present to a desirable future self.

We sought to manipulate the degree to which landmarks could effectively serve a self-enhancement function by introducing a very subtle variation on the calendars people viewed. Specifically, some participants saw a calendar in which the months and days were clearly separated from each other through shading, spacing, and lines. Control participants saw a calendar in which days and months were continuous (no physical space separating one month from the next) and were presented on one continuous white background. Similar calendar formatting manipulations have been shown to affect goal pursuit (e.g., Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009; Peetz & Wilson, 2013). We expected that participants would no longer show the preference for intervening landmarks after imagining a negative future self when other visual separations were already present in their temporal landscape. Likewise, there would be no reason to select nonintervening landmarks after considering a positive future self if the present and future were already separated.

We examined this question in two separate study versions to increase generalizability. In both versions, the two different calendars ranged over 3 months time and were formatted similarly. In both study versions, participants were asked to choose one of four holidays, two of which intervened before a (positive or negative) target future point in time, and two of which were after this point in time. The two versions of the study were run at different times of the year; therefore, we offered different holidays as landmark choices (because they had to either be intervening or nonintervening in a 3-month window of time). In addition, the two versions of this study increased generalizability by examining both anticipated future events (Study 4a) and anticipated future selves (Study 4b). In real life, people may not often anticipate a worse off future self (at least in the relatively near future). However, people do regularly have both parties and dentist visits in their calendars—in other words, they do anticipate both upcoming pleasures and pains. Hence, in one version of this study we asked participants to think of a positively anticipated or dreaded future event instead of a possible self. Anticipating experiencing a positive or negative future event has direct implications for self-view (Wilson et al., 2012), and thus this procedure is conceptually very similar to anticipating a valenced future self.

Method

Participants

Three-hundred and sixty-seven American adults participated through the online site Mechanical Turk and were compensated 50 cents. Ten participants were excluded because they did not complete the future self or event description, and 4 because they did not complete the dependent variable. In addition, 32 participants nominated a methodologically unusable future event.⁴ The final sample included 100 female participants and 219 male participants. Age ranged from 18 to 67 years (M = 29.16 years, SD = 10.11). Study 4a (n = 91) was run in early November, and Study 4b (n = 230) was run in early February.⁵

Procedure

This study was conducted using the online platform Qualtrics (n.d.). After an initial demographic questionnaire, participants were asked to think about a possible negative or positive time period 1 month in the future. In Study 4a, they were asked to think about a negative or positive future event. They were asked to “think of a possible negative [positive] event that you will take part in that will likely happen around 1 month from now. ( . . . )” Participants described this negative or positive event (e.g., participants mentioned an upcoming surgery or a court date as negative events, and birthday parties and Christmas potlucks as positive events). In Study 4b, they were asked to think about a negative or positive future self, identical to Studies 1 and 2 except targeting a future self 1 month in the future. On the same page, they were presented with a calendar spanning the next 3 months and asked to write the date of this future event or future self underneath the calendar.

As a manipulation check of future valence, they then rated the future self on the same 7-item index of future positive self-appraisal as previous studies (α = .95).

Calendar manipulation

The calendar presented to participants at two points in the study (when locating the point in time 1 month in the future and again later, when choosing the preferred holiday) varied by calendar condition. In the separated calendar condition, the individual months were surrounded by thick black lines, there was a physical space between each month, there was a border around each individual day, and the background around and between the months was a dark gray. All these style elements were intended to provide visual separation between the months. In contrast, in the continuous calendar condition, the background was white throughout, and the months and days did not have borders, providing less visual separation between the months.⁶

Temporal landmark

Next, participants completed the landmark choice variable. They were instructed to “think about holidays and important calendar dates. In the next 3 months, there are a number of national holidays and we’d like you to think more about one of them. Choose which of the listed holidays you’d like to think of.” Two of the listed holidays were temporally before the future event or self (Study 4a: “November 11th-Veteran’s Day,” “November 22nd-Thanksgiving Day”; Study 4b: “February 14th-Valentine’s Day,” “ February 18th-President’s Day”) and therefore intersected the time between now and the future self (coded as 1) and two of the listed holidays were temporally after the future event or self (Study 4a: “January 1st-New Year’s Day,” “January 21st-Martin Luther King’s Birthday”; Study 4b: “April 1st-April Fool’s Day,” “April 15th-Tax Day”) and therefore did not separate the present and the future self (coded as 0). Following these instructions, participants were again presented with the calendar and were asked to indicate their choice of holiday by clicking on the correct day in the calendar.

Results

Future self valence manipulation check

To assess the impact of the possible selves valence manipulation, we first examined participants’ future self-ratings. As expected, participants who imagined a negative future self or event rated themselves 1 month in the future much less positively (M = 3.23, SD = 1.50) than those who imagined a positive future self (M = 5.67, SD = .99), F(1, 315) = 220.22, p < .001. Overall, participants’ self-ratings for their future self in December (Study 4a) was more positive (M = 4.72, SD = 1.58) than for their future self in February (Study 4b, M = 4.31, SD = 1.82), F(1, 315) = 7.17, p = .008. A marginally significant interaction also suggested that the future self manipulation was more effective in changing participants’ future self-ratings (M = 5.64 vs. 3.03) than the future event manipulation (M = 5.76 vs. 3.74), F(1, 315) = 3.60, p = .059.

Landmark nomination

Holiday choice did not relate to age, r(314) = −.03, p = .661, or gender, t(317) = .79, p = .433. Next, we examined whether participants used the landmark nomination task to separate themselves more often from a negative future self or event than from a positive future self or event. Recall that we expected that participants would selectively choose landmarks only in the continuous calendar condition, but that they would not do so when barriers already exist (i.e., in the separate calendar condition) because landmarks would no longer serve a function if the future was already disconnected from the present in another way. To test this expectation, we examined the distribution of holiday choice by calendar condition. A logistic regression with calendar condition, future state condition, and their interaction term, controlling for the study version, revealed a marginally significant interaction term, and no main effect of calendar or valence condition (Table 1).

To break down the interaction, we conducted two separate logistic regressions, controlling for study version (see Table 3 for percentages). In the continuous calendar condition, the valence of the future state participants were considering had a significant effect on landmark selection, B = 0.94, SE = .35, exp(B) = 2.57, p = .006. When considering a negative future state, 75% participants selected a holiday that separated the current from the future self, compared with 56% participants who thought about a positive future state. In the separated calendar condition, however, the valence of the future state participants were considering had no effect on landmark selection, B = 0.04, SE = .34, exp(B) = 1.04, p = .915.

Table 3.

Percentages of Chosen Landmarks for Study 4.

	Negative Future State		Positive Future State
	Separated Calendar	Continuous Calendar	Separated Calendar	Continuous Calendar
% of people selecting the intervening event	65	75	64	56
% of people selecting the nonintervening event	35	25	36	44

Discussion

Study 4 showed that across two valence manipulations (possible selves vs. possible events) and across two sets of holidays, participants selected intervening landmarks more often when they thought of a negative future event or self, replicating Studies 1 and 2. However, this study highlights an important boundary condition: We demonstrate that this holiday preference disappears when there are other psychological separations already salient between the present point in time and a future point in time. In other words, when the present and future were already represented as more disconnected, then it becomes superfluous to selectively focus on intervening landmarks to keep unwanted events at bay.

General Discussion

Temporal landmarks can help to organize the temporally extended self and determine what selves are included or kept separate from current identity. Past research has shown that people feel better about their present self when they consider a desired future with no intervening landmarks, or an undesired future separated by an intervening landmark (Peetz & Wilson, 2013). The present research extends past findings by demonstrating across five studies that people may selectively use temporal landmarks to regulate the experienced inclusion or exclusion of a temporally extended self. When confronted with a negative future self, participants spontaneously preferred to think about temporal landmarks (holidays) that separated their current and the future self, but showed less interest in these intervening landmarks when focusing on a positive future self (Study 1). Subsequent studies replicated this pattern both with different holidays and by inviting people to name the first event that came to mind—Those envisioning a negative future were more likely to bring to mind an intervening personal event. In addition, the last two studies showed that the tendency to choose a landmark (either personal or public) that separates the current self from an undesired future was stronger when people were in a self-enhancement mindset (Study 3), and was eliminated when the landmark would no longer serve the function of separating temporal selves (i.e., when the future self was already separated from the present self, Study 4).

Are Landmarks Effective Barriers?

We argue that temporal landmarks can act as psychological barriers between the present and unpleasant future states. In the current studies, landmark choice was the central dependent variable, so we did not test landmarks’ effectiveness at protecting the self. However, we do know from previous research that induced landmarks provide such benefits. When participants were randomly assigned to consider intervening (vs. nonintervening) landmarks, they not only felt more separated from the future self, but this future self also reflected less on the current self (Peetz & Wilson, 2013). Thinking about a negative future has a negative effect on the present self that was attenuated by an intervening landmark. Similarly, positive future selves had less positive effect on current identity after considering intervening landmarks (Study 6; Peetz & Wilson, 2013). We argue that spontaneously selected landmarks should provide the same protective benefits as induced landmarks, and future research should investigate this contention.

There are obviously many other reasons why some landmarks make it to the forefront of people’s minds, well beyond their self-protective role as psychological barriers. In our studies, this natural variability was evident: People tended to select more proximal (than distant) events when they accessed their own future plans, which are likely to be more concrete and detailed in the near future (Peetz et al., 2010; Wakslak et al., 2008; Study 2). They were also more likely to select salient or important holidays (i.e., Christmas) even when these were further away than less culturally important holidays (Study 3), and some holidays were preferred by one gender or age group (i.e., Mother’s Day; Study 1). Thus, landmark selection in paradigms such as the ones we use depends on many factors. Despite the natural variability in landmark accessibility, across a variety of time periods (weeks vs. months), types of landmarks (events vs. holidays), and future thought (future events vs. selves), we found a consistent pattern of selective preference. Nonetheless, while consistent, the effects are also quite small. There are a number of reasons this may be. First, although people have one self-protective motivation to systematically select a particular landmark, other factors determining the importance and meaning of particular events will also determine selection, increasing error variance. Second, in our landmark choice paradigm (Study 1, Studies 3 and 4), all landmarks were primed in participants, so to some degree, the pure effect of either thinking of a landmark or not thinking of it could be weakened.

Spontaneous Use of Temporal Landmarks in Everyday Life

In real life, people may regulate the connection between temporal selves both intrapersonally (by bringing to mind an upcoming vacation, for example, to increase their separation from a dreaded subsequent surgery) and interpersonally (by discussing with others intervening events that separate the self from undesirable events). In some cases, people might even “create” these landmarks—actively planning a landmark party might put distance between now and next month’s exams; getting a makeover might create disconnection between now and next month’s surgery.

Indeed, landmarks might be applied in therapeutic interventions in which people could be encouraged to acknowledge dreaded future (or past) events while keeping sufficient disconnection of these events from present identity. However, research is needed to determine whether landmarks serve a wholly positive function (threat reduction) or whether this peace of mind comes at a cost (perhaps lack of acknowledgment, problem-focused coping, or preparation for dreaded events).

The selective use of landmarks is likely not a very conscious process. Rather, we conceptualize choosing to focus on an intervening holiday option or spontaneous recall of an intervening event as a spontaneous in-the-moment preference—people may not be aware of the intervening versus nonintervening nature of the choices or their implications. In none of our studies did participants comment on the fact that some landmarks intervened and others did not. However, we also did not ask participants explicitly to reason about why they chose one holiday over another or nominated one event over another. Doing so might actually change participants’ preferences (Wilson et al., 1993)—for instance, if asked to reason explicitly about their choice, people might focus more on salient content (“I am excited about my cousin’s wedding”) and less on the apparently peripheral detail of where it occurs in the temporal landscape.

Temporal Direction

Of course, this phenomenon is likely to occur in both temporal directions—people may be just as likely to erect a landmark as a barrier between themselves and a particularly troubling memory from their past (e.g., Li, Wei, & Soman, 2010) as they are to place a barrier before a potential negative future self.

Additional Consequences of Landmarks

In addition to affecting the connection between present identity and temporal selves, considering intervening landmarks on the temporal landscape might alter the perception of time itself. For example, a target event seems further away when people think of more related events punctuating the time between the target and the present (Zauberman, Levav, Diehl, & Bhargave, 2010). If temporal landmarks affect psychological distance, they could also affect cognitive mindsets: Salient intersecting landmarks might increase distance, thereby increasing the tendency to think objectively, abstractly, and more conceptually (rather than emotionally) about an event (Kross & Ayduk, 2011).

Landmark Effectiveness and Boundaries

Are there landmarks that are more effective in regulating the connection between temporal selves? We used a variety of culturally and personally important temporal landmarks in these studies, even if the cultural relevance was arguably slight for a relatively young sample of Americans (i.e., Memorial Day, Independence Day). However, there might be boundaries to just how mundane or meaningless the personal or cultural connection of a temporal landmark can be before it is no longer an effective boundary for psychological categories. In our lab, we have obtained preliminary evidence that landmarks which are not meaningful to participants in any way (Roman holidays they had never heard of) are not used to regulate temporal selves. Logically, the most effective barriers against negative temporal selves might be those events (personal or calendar events) that have the most personal impact. However, in the absence of a significant personal transition to act as a psychological barrier, even relatively minor events (that maintain at least a minimum of personal meaning) may serve the function.

Conclusion

A number of avenues—temporal distance, visual perspective, similarity focus, and emotional intensity—might be employed to regulate the connections between selves on the temporal landscape (Hanko et al., 2010; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby et al., 2005; Pronin et al., 2008; Wilson & Ross, 2001). Selective focus on temporal landmarks may be another, particularly subtle real-world strategy people use to erect barriers between their current identity and unflattering future selves. We did not find clear evidence that landmarks are actively used to pull favorable selves close, perhaps because simply selecting a nonintervening landmark averts the creation of a barrier, but does not as effectively create a connection between temporal selves. The present research is an initial foray into examining how people might manage their temporal selves perhaps as simply as flipping through their mental calendar, and deciding when to stop and contemplate the next event.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

Both authors received financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada) for this research.

Notes

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