“More Than Words”

Abstract

Conversations are susceptible to many disturbances: A speaker’s hesitations, distractions, or, when communicating online, technical hiccups that may cause brief delays. Research among previously unacquainted individuals revealed that brief disruptions in conversational flow can have profound social consequences: Silences or delays in mediated communication threaten the need to belong and validate one’s ideas. The present research, however, shows that when occurring in close relationships, flow disruptions may be ironically beneficial. We hypothesized that when flow disruptions occur, partners fall back on their relationship beliefs to infer mutual agreement and the existence of a shared reality. When a relationship is perceived as secure, partners may believe that “no words are needed” to understand each other. Flow disruptions can thus paradoxically make shared cognitions accessible and foster feelings of social validation. Data from two experiments, using partners in different types of relationships, supported this hypothesis.

Keywords

close relationships social validation shared cognition conversational flow perceived relationship security

Communication is often said to lie at the heart of every solid social relationship. However, not all communication is equally smooth: People may be distracted during a conversation, they may hesitate while talking, or they may not be clear in what they mean. Moreover, different forms of mediated communication such as telephone or video-conferencing can introduce brief delays on the line. Previous research indicates that disruptions of conversational flow raise questions about the quality of relationships and the consensus between people (Koudenburg, Postmes, & Gordijn, 2011a, 2013a). However, this prior research only studied conversations between people with no a priori acquaintance. Flow disruptions may be less disturbing in close relationships. Once solid bonds have been established, people may feel that no words are needed to understand each other. Indeed, research shows that romantic partners believe to be able to capture each other’s thoughts and expect to hold similar views (Sillars, 1985; Swann & Gill, 1997; Vorauer & Cameron, 2002). Thus, when people experience a sense of shared reality with close friends or loved ones, this may mean that smooth communication becomes less important. It could even be that disrupted conversations provide close partners with the possibility to increase their sense of social validation, as people fall back on their secure relationship to infer a sense of shared cognition when their partners’ viewpoints are difficult to access. This is what we examined in the current research.

Disruptions of Conversational Flow

People possess a complex set of conversational skills that allow them to take turns with excellent precision (Clark, 1996; Schegloff, 2007; Wilson & Wilson, 2005). For instance, communicators take into account the actions of their communication partners when planning and performing their own actions (Clark, 1996). In addition, they adjust their vocal intensity, pause length, and language use to their partner, to develop a common framework for communication (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Through such close coordination of speech acts, people are often able to minimize the duration of between-turn gaps to less than two tenths of a second (Jefferson, 1986). When turn-taking occurs in a smooth, efficient, and effortless manner, a conversation is said to have flow (Cappella, 1981; Chapple, 1971; Koudenburg et al., 2013a, 2014). Besides facilitating the exchange of information, attaining conversational flow signals relationship quality in and of itself: Research has shown that when conversation between previously unacquainted people smoothly flows, this brings about a feeling of social unity (Koudenburg et al., 2013a). Disruptions of this flow, for instance by a brief conversational silence, can negatively affect this sense of unity and threaten fundamental social needs, such as the need to belong (Koudenburg et al., 2011a, 2013a, 2013b, 2014).

In addition to fostering a sense of belonging, research suggests that a smooth alternation of speaking turns between strangers increases the feeling of being on the same wavelength with one another, and therefore encourages feelings of social validation (Koudenburg et al., 2011a, 2013a). In other words, among strangers, conversational flow can foster the development of subjectively shared cognitions, which can be the starting point for developing a meaningful relationship (P. Berger & Kellner, 1964; Clark, 1996; Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009; Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2007). However, once meaningful relationships and shared cognitions have been established, it is unclear what the impact of flow disruptions would be. We believe that for people in close relationships, disruptions in conversational flow could lead to a process whereby they fall back on heuristic indicators or proxies for the level of shared cognition, in particular their appreciation of the relationship itself.

Shared Cognition in Close Relationships

With increasing time spent together, individuals gain more insight into each other and establish a sense of shared cognition: They believe to be on the same wavelength with one another (C. R. Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). The experience of such common understanding serves two important social goals: First, it allows people to establish, maintain, and regulate interpersonal relationships (see also Swaab, Postmes, Van Beest, & Spears, 2007). Second, it enables people to perceive the environment as stable, predictable, and, to some extent, controllable, thereby satisfying the need for validation (Echterhoff et al., 2009; Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996).

Whereas a sense of shared cognition in close relationships may partly result from a process of actual consensualization of beliefs (Davis & Rusbult, 2001) and the development of shared memory schemes (Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985), part of this shared cognition appears to exist mainly in the eye of the beholder. Research shows that people in general, but romantic partners in particular, have a tendency to project their own views onto their partners, thereby overestimating the degree of similarity between oneself and one’s partner (Murray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, 2002; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Sillars, 1985).

The experience that beliefs are mutually shared provides intimates with a sense of security and social validation (Ickes & Simpson, 1997, 2001; Murray et al., 2002). In fact, research suggests that rather than actual understanding between intimates, it is especially the perception of being understood that serves positive outcomes for both personal and relational well-being (Acitelli, Douvan, & Veroff, 1993; Finkenauer & Righetti, 2011; Pollmann & Finkenauer, 2009; Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004; Reis & Shaver, 1988). A consequence of overestimating mutual agreement within a relationship, however, is that the need for communication between partners reduces, as they believe that they already understand each other (C. R. Berger, 1979; C. R. Berger & Calabrese, 1975).

These studies suggest that a paradoxical effect may exist: In intimate relations, a lack of communication may serve to maintain a high level of social validation. Because disrupted communication can impede participants’ ability to assess actual agreement with their partners, participants are likely to fall back on their relationship as a source of information. Their beliefs about the level of shared understanding in their relationship become especially important when the situation requires partners to interpret disruptions of flow, or silences, within the communication. As a result, rather than implying disagreement, it is possible that for people in close relationships, a lack of conversational flow bolsters feelings of social validation. However, we expect that this only works when the relationship is experienced as highly secure.

The Role of Relationship Security

Research suggests that especially in secure relationships, people are likely to experience a sense of shared reality and overestimate the similarity of others’ ideas to their own ideas (cf. C. R. Berger, 1979; Murray et al., 2002). In such relationships, disruptions of conversational flow could provide partners with the opportunity to interpret their partners’ viewpoints in terms of this shared reality, and feel socially validated as a result. However, when relationship security is low, for instance because one believes his or her partner is not committed, or because there is a lack of closeness between partners, a brief disruption of conversational flow may be experienced as threatening. In this case, the increased scope for interpretation is likely to be filled with questions or doubts about the relationship and the extent to which ideas are shared (Koudenburg et al., 2011a, 2013a, 2013b). Importantly, perceptions of relationship security only come into play when the conversation leaves room for interpretation, for instance because flow is disrupted. When a conversation is smoothly flowing, people are not expected to revert to external sources of information. The flow of the conversation, in itself, can provide a sense of social validation (Koudenburg et al., 2011a, 2013a). In such a situation therefore, perceptions of relationship security are unlikely to play a role in the level of social validation that is experienced within the conversation.

The Present Research

The present research tests the influence of conversational flow disruptions on the process of social validation within close relationships. We predict that perceived relationship security (PRS) moderates the effects of conversational flow on social validation. When a conversation has good flow, perceptions of relationship security are unlikely to play a role in the social validation process, and people can simply tune into the conversation. However, when conversational flow is disrupted, this raises questions about the consensus. As a consequence, existing knowledge may be relied on to answer these questions, such as their perceptions of relationship security.

For individuals who perceive their relationship as insecure, disruptions of conversational flow raise questions such as the following: “Are we still on the same wavelength?” Because the relationship provides no solid basis to infer this from, such flow disruptions eventually lower feelings of social validation. By comparison, when individuals in secure relationships experience disruptions of conversational flow, they are likely to fall back on their secure relationship to infer a sense of shared cognition. Paradoxically, disrupted flow may thereby end up increasing feelings of social validation.

It is important to note that the present article focuses on partners’ experience of shared cognition rather than on their actual shared cognition (i.e., the actual sharedness of knowledge structures, Swaab et al., 2007). Indeed, prior research has shown that perceptions are likely to be more impactful than actual shared knowledge. We therefore expect that the predicted effects on social validation are mediated by the experience of shared cognition within the conversation.

The hypotheses are tested in different samples, with different disruptions of conversational flow. In Study 1, romantic couples participated in a laboratory experiment, in which they were asked to have a conversation via headsets. Relationship security was operationalized as the perceived satisfaction of the romantic partner. Such perceptions of the partner as being responsive and committed to the relationship play a key role in the experience of relationships as strong and secure (Reis et al., 2004). Indeed, perceiving a partner as dissatisfied would be highly threatening for the security one feels in a relationship. We manipulated the extent to which the conversation had flow by delaying auditory feedback throughout the second half of the conversation, that is, participants either heard each other with 1-s delay (disrupted-flow condition), or they conversed in real time (flow condition). Feelings of social validation and shared cognition were measured after the conversation.

Study 2 was designed to examine the generalizability of the findings. To this end, we conducted a second experiment, which used a method similar to Study 1 but now including a different population (couples visiting a shopping center). In this study, we not only included romantic couples but employed dyads in any kind of close relationships (i.e., parent–child relationships, friendships). In addition, in Study 2, we used both visual and audio channels for the communication. Because Study 2 included dyads in relationships other than romantic relationships, we used a more general measure of relationship security to test whether this would moderate the effect of flow disruptions. Relationship security was again measured before the conversation; the experience of shared cognition within the conversation and feelings of social validation were assessed afterward.

Study 1

Method

Participants

Participants were 74 romantic partners (37 couples, 36 mixed-sex, 1 same-sex) with an age range of 19 to 35 (M = 22.31, SD = 3.08). Couples were recruited through the network of five research assistants, who were blind to the hypotheses of this study. The mean relationship duration was 34.40 months (SD = 23.51 months). Seven couples were married, 7 couples were cohabiting, and 23 couples were neither cohabiting nor married.

Procedure

Romantic partners were placed into separate cubicles where they filled out the informed consent form and the first questionnaire. To manipulate conversational flow, we randomly assigned dyads to either a flow or a disrupted-flow condition. In the flow condition, dyads had a 5-min conversation about arranged marriages via headsets. This topic was chosen to be relevant to relationships. The disrupted-flow condition was similar, except that auditory feedback was delayed by 1 s throughout the second half of the conversation. Previous research indicated that a 1-s delay was long enough to hamper the coordination of communicative behaviors and reduce the flow of the conversation without making participants consciously aware of the delay (Koudenburg et al., 2013a; Pearson et al., 2008). After the conversation, we measured participants’ feelings of social validation and their experience of shared cognition within the conversation with a questionnaire.

Measures

Before starting the conversation, we assessed participants’ perceptions of their partner’s commitment to the relationship, as an indicator of PRS (four items, e.g., “My current partner feels strongly connected to me,” “It is likely that my partner will terminate our relationship within the next 6 months”—reverse coded, α = .68). To test whether effects on social validation could be explained by individual differences, participants completed the Dutch 24-item attachment style questionnaire, which includes a subscale for each of the four attachment styles (i.e., secure, fearful, preoccupied, and dismissive; Van Oudenhoven, Hofstra, & Bakker, 2003).

After the conversation, participants indicated their feelings of social validation, by rating their agreement with three items: “I had the feeling that my ideas were grounded,” “I felt validated in my opinions,” “I had the feeling that my partner shared my opinions” (α = .80; Koudenburg et al., 2011a; see also Smith & Postmes, 2011). The experience of shared cognition within the conversation was measured by assessing participants’ agreement with three items: “My partner and I are on the same wavelength,” “My partner and I understand each other,” “My partner and I have the feeling that we agree with each other” (α = .82; Koudenburg et al., 2013a).¹

Results

One participant was removed from the analysis because of missing data. The intraclass correlations (ICC1) for social validation (.42) and shared cognition (.61) indicated that multilevel modeling was required. To correct for the interdependence of the data within couples, we tested our predictions with hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analyses. We examined whether social validation was predicted by flow at the group level, PRS at the individual level, and the flow by PRS cross-level interaction.² All continuous variables were standardized prior to analysis. PRS scores were high on average, with a mean of 6.39 and a standard deviation of 0.51. We therefore distinguish between moderate PRS (1 SD below the mean) and high PRS (1 SD above the mean). Note that both moderate and high PRS reflect scores above the midpoint of the scale.

HLM analysis revealed a main effect of PRS, γ = .62, standard error (SE) = 0.15, t(69) = 4.14, p < .001. As predicted, no main effect of flow was found (t < 1), but the interaction of flow and PRS was reliable, γ = −.49, SE = 0.19, t(69) = −2.49, p = .015 (see Figure 1). The total variance explained by the model was R² = .22, which is considered a medium to large effect, according to guidelines by Cohen (1992). Simple slope analysis revealed a significant positive effect of PRS in the disrupted-flow condition, γ = .62, SE = 0.15, t(69) = 4.14, p < .001, but no effect in the flow condition (t < 1, ns).

Figure 1.

Relation between perceived relationship security and social validation for the different conditions of flow in Study 1.

Further analyses revealed that partners high in PRS felt more socially validated when conversational flow was disrupted, rather than when the conversation had flow, γ = .65, SE = 0.30, t(69) = 2.18, p = .036. No difference was found for participants with moderate PRS, γ = −.34, SE = .30, t(69) = −1.14, p = .26.

We performed a similar HLM analysis on shared cognition. A main effect of PRS indicated that participants experienced higher levels of shared cognition within the conversation with increasing PRS, γ = .49, SE = 0.12, t(69) = 3.95, p < .001. We found no main effect of flow (t < 1). Furthermore, the PRS by flow interaction effect on experienced shared cognition was not significant, γ = −.19, SE = 0.16, t(69) = −1.23, p = .224, although the means revealed a pattern similar to the findings on social validation. The total variance explained by the model was R² = .22 (medium to large effect; Cohen, 1992).

Mediation analysis

We expected the interactive effect of security and flow disruptions on social validation to emerge through the experience of shared cognition within the conversation. Finding such a mediating effect in the present study should however be interpreted with the necessary caution, because both variables (shared cognition and social validation) were measured simultaneously and items on both scales shared some conceptual similarities. We did however decide to explore this mediation, as it provides insights into the possibility that the experience of shared cognition plays a role in the validating effects of flow disruptions, as our model suggests (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

The mediation model in which experience of shared cognition within the conversation mediates the interactive effect of flow disruption and perceived relationship security (as an indicator for the existing socially shared reality) on social validation.

We used a Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Sobel, 1982) on the multilevel effects to assess whether the flow by PRS interaction on social validation was mediated by the experience of shared cognition within the conversation.³ For mediation to occur, the cross-level flow by PRS interaction on experienced shared cognition should be significant. However, as suggested before, we only found a small trend here: γ = −.19, SE = 0.16, t(69) = −1.23, p = .22. A second requirement for mediation was that social validation should be predicted by experienced shared cognition, when flow, PRS, and the flow by PRS interaction were included as predictors in the model. Indeed, experienced shared cognition predicted feelings of social validation: γ = .76, SE = 0.10, t(68) = 7.76, p < .001, whereas the flow by PRS interaction on social validation reduced to marginal significance, γ = −.27, SE = 0.15, t(69) = −1.84, p = .07. Because the flow by PRS interaction on experienced shared cognition was not significant, the Sobel test did neither reveal a significant mediation, Z = 1.21, SE = 0.12, p = .225. It seems however too early to conclude that there is no indirect effect of experienced shared cognition. Because of the small sample in the current study, the power to obtain a significant mediated moderation effect was small (especially because of the multilevel structure of the data). For exploratory reasons, we investigated the simple effects with a bootstrapping procedure on the unilevel effects (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). These simple indirect effects suggested that when the conversation had flow, the effect of PRS on feelings of social validation was not mediated by experienced shared cognition, b = .19, bootstrapped SE = 0.12, 95% bootstrapped confidence interval (CI) = [−0.02, 0.48]. However, when conversational flow was disrupted, the path from PRS to social validation was mediated by the level of shared cognition experienced within the conversation, b = .45, bootstrapped SE = 0.10, 95% bootstrapped CI = [0.28, 0.67].

Finally, we tested the alternative explanation that instead of PRS, individual attachment styles could be responsible for the effects. In four additional HLM analyses, social validation was regressed on each of the attachment styles, the flow manipulation, and the attachment style by flow interaction. Results showed no significant main effects of any of the attachment styles on social validation (all ts < 1.58, all ps > .1), nor any effects of the attachment styles by flow interactions (all ts < 1.13, ps > .1). Similarly, for shared cognition, no main effects of any of the attachment styles (all ts < 1.20, ps > .1), nor any interaction effects were found (all ts < 1, ns). Moreover, including the four attachment styles as covariates in the original analyses did not significantly change the flow by PRS interaction effect on social validation nor on shared cognition. The data thus provided no support for this alternative explanation.

Discussion

Study 1 showed that when a conversation has flow, PRS had no influence on one’s feelings of social validation. However, when conversational flow is lacking, people who perceive their relationship to be secure feel more validated than those who doubt the commitment of their partners. Moreover, participants with high PRS feel more validated when conversational flow is disrupted than when the conversation is smoothly flowing. These results thus paradoxically indicate that among those who experience their relationship as secure, a delay in communication can strengthen a sense of validation. Moreover, we found a small trend suggesting that when conversational flow is disrupted, partners rely more on their perceptions of relationship security to establish a sense of shared cognition, compared with when conversation is smoothly flowing.

These results indicate that disruptions of conversational flow leave more scope for interpreting the other partner’s viewpoints. To fill the communicational gaps, partners consult their prior beliefs about relationship security to infer a sense of shared cognition and social validation. The data are somewhat in line with the idea that the experience of shared cognition within the conversation in turn encourages their feelings of social validation. However, it lacks the power to test this mediating process appropriately. In Study 2, we increased the sample size to 130 participants to allow for such a test.

Study 2

In Study 2, we aimed to (a) replicate the effect on social validation, (b) test whether this effect was mediated by the experience of shared cognition within the conversation, and (c) examine the generalizability of the findings. First, in addition to romantic couples, Study 2 also included partners in other relationships (i.e., friendships, family ties). For this reason, this study used a different indicator for relationship security. Whereas beliefs about a partner’s commitment were an appropriate indication for experienced security in romantic relationships, we expected it to be less relevant for people in, for instance, family relationships. We therefore used questions tapping into the closeness experienced within the relationship, as these questions would indicate the level of security in a wide range of relationships. Furthermore, to examine whether the effects would hold beyond telephone conversations, we used video-mediated communication between partners. Finally, rather than asking couples to come to the laboratory, in Study 2, we set up an experiment in a more naturalistic setting, as we approached and tested participants in a shopping center.

Participants

Dyads of participants were recruited in a shopping center in the Netherlands. In general, all people who were in a couple and seemed older than 18 years were likely to be approached. The sample consisted of 130 participants (M_age = 35.95, SD = 17.68, 39% male, 61% female). Members of each dyad were previously acquainted to each other. On average, partners had been acquainted for 17 years (SD = 14.65 years). In return for their participation, participants were either given a coupon of €6 to spend in the shop, or a cup of coffee and cake.

Procedure and Materials

After agreeing to participate, members of the dyad were placed behind two tables where they filled out their consent forms. To measure PRS, participants answered three questions on 7-point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 = not at all, to 7 = completely: “How well do you know the participant with whom you will be talking?”, “Do you and the other participant interact frequently?”, “Is the participant whom you will be talking to important in your life?” (α = .88).

The conversations took place in a quiet place in the shopping center. Here, two laptops were connected via a network cable, and located in such a way that during the conversation, participants could only see or hear each other through their headsets and their laptop screens. We developed a program for the interaction that allowed dyads to interact via both visual and auditory channels, and allowed us to introduce a delay in audiovisual feedback at some point in the conversation. Participants were instructed to talk about their holidays for 5 min. Previous research had shown this topic allowed participants to have a smoothly flowing conversation (Koudenburg et al., 2013a). After 2.5 min of conversation, we introduced the flow manipulation by delaying audiovisual feedback. There were five conditions: no delay versus 0.5-s delay versus 1-s delay versus 1.5-s delay versus 2-s delay. These different durations of the delay were intended to measure whether the effects would increase with longer delays. However, because the effects on social validation were similar across the different durations of the delay, we combined the results for the different delay conditions (coded 0) and compared these with the flow condition (coded 1). After the conversation, we measured social validation (α = .82) and shared cognition as in Study 1 (α = .85).⁴

As in Study 1, we expected that perceptions of relationship security would not influence the extent to which dyads would experience a sense of shared cognition and social validation in the flow condition. However, when auditory feedback was delayed, we expected the experience of social validation and shared cognition to be predicted by PRS.

Results

The ICC1 for social validation (.42) and experienced shared cognition (.54) indicated that multilevel modeling was required. The scores on PRS were standardized prior to analysis (M = 6.31, SD = 1.20, with no differences between flow conditions, t < 1.33, ns). We defined moderate PRS at 1 SD below the mean, and high PRS at the maximum end of the scale. Both moderate and high PRS reflect scores above the midpoint of the scale. We examined whether social validation was predicted by the flow (vs. disrupted flow) at the group level, PRS measured at the individual level, and the flow by PRS cross-level interaction.⁵

HLM analysis revealed a main effect of PRS, indicating higher levels of social validation with increasing PRS, γ = .32, SE = 0.11, t(126) = 2.87, p = .005. A flow main effect revealed higher levels of social validation in the disrupted-flow condition than in the flow condition, γ = −.35, SE = 0.13, t(63) = −2.61, p = .012. This main effect was qualified by the predicted flow by PRS interaction, γ = −.24, SE = 0.11, t(126) = −2.15, p = .034 (see Figure 3A). The total variance explained by the model was R² = .18, which is considered a medium to large effect (Cohen, 1992). Simple slope analysis revealed that in the disrupted-flow condition, PRS significantly predicted feelings of social validation, γ = .56, SE = 0.13, t(63) = 4.50, p < .001. No such effect was found in the flow condition, γ = .08, t < 1, ns. Moreover, partners with high PRS (i.e., maximum score, 0.69 SD above mean) felt more socially validated when conversational flow was disrupted, rather than when conversation was flowing, γ = .52, SE = 0.16, t(126) = 3.33, p = .002. No difference was found for partners with moderate PRS (−1 SD), t < 1, ns.

Figure 3.

Relation between perceived relationship security and social validation (A) and shared cognition (B) for the different conditions of flow in Study 2.

A similar analysis on the experience of shared cognition within the conversation revealed a positive main effect of PRS, γ = .26, SE = 0.09, t(126) = 2.86, p = .005. A marginal main effect of flow, γ = −.23, SE = 0.12, t(63) = −1.95, p = .055, suggested that experienced shared cognition was somewhat higher in the disrupted-flow condition than in the flow condition. The predicted flow by PRS interaction was found, γ = −.18, SE = 0.09, t(126) = −2.00, p = .047 (see Figure 3B). The total variance explained by the model was R² = .15 (medium to large effect; Cohen, 1992). Simple slope analysis showed a significant positive effect of PRS on experienced shared cognition in the disrupted-flow condition, γ = .44, SE = 0.11, t(63) = 4.18, p < .001, but not in the flow condition (γ = .08, t < 1, ns). Further analyses revealed that partners with a high PRS (+ 0.69 SD, i.e., maximum end of the scale) experienced higher levels of shared cognition in the disrupted-flow condition than in the flow condition, γ = .41, SE = 0.15, t(129) = 2.78, p = .007. No difference was found for partners with moderate PRS (−1 SD), t < 1, ns.

Mediation analysis

A similar procedure as in Study 1 was used to test whether the flow by PRS interaction effect was mediated by the experience of shared cognition within the conversation (see Figure 2). First, the cross-level flow by PRS interaction on experienced shared cognition was significant: γ = −.18, SE = 0.09, t(126) = −2.00, p = .047. Second, social validation was predicted by experienced shared cognition, when flow, PRS, and the flow by PRS interaction were included as predictors in the model: γ = .74, SE = 0.09, t(125) = 8.64, p < .001. Third, when including experienced shared cognition in the model, the flow by PRS interaction reduced to non-significance, γ = −.13, SE = 0.09, t(125) = −1.41, p = .16. The Sobel test showed that this mediation was significant, Z = 1.95, SE = 0.07, p = .05. Further investigation of the simple effects was conducted with a bootstrapping procedure on the unilevel effects (Preacher et al., 2007). The simple indirect effects suggested that when the conversation had flow, the effect of PRS on feelings of social validation was not mediated by experienced shared cognition, b = .07, bootstrapped SE = 0.28, 95% bootstrapped CI = [−0.17, 0.79]. However, when conversational flow was disrupted, the path from PRS on social validation was mediated by the experience of shared cognition within the conversation, b = .34, bootstrapped SE = 0.07, 95% bootstrapped CI = [0.22, 0.48].

General Discussion

Previous research has repeatedly found negative effects for disruptions of conversational flow in conversations between people who were a priori unacquainted to each other (Koudenburg et al., 2013a, 2013b, 2014). However, the present research suggests that people in close relationships experience disruptions of conversational flow (e.g., brief silences, interruptions) not always in a similarly negative way. More specifically, in two experiments, one with romantic partners in the laboratory and one with couples with diverse relationships in a shopping center, we found that when conversational flow between partners is disrupted, the perceived security of the relationship influences the extent to which such disruptions are interpreted as socially validating. When the relationship is perceived to be secure, a disruption of conversational flow results in higher levels of social validation than a smoothly flowing conversation does. When a conversation has flow, no influence of PRS is found.

Results thus reveal a paradoxical effect showing that disruptions of flow can be experienced as validating to the extent that the relationship is perceived to be secure. Although this finding may be counterintuitive, a potential explanation may be given by the literature on shared reality or shared cognition (Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Our findings suggest that in a situation of conversational flow, the partners’ viewpoints are easily accessible. On the one hand, this enables partners to identify commonalities in their ideas, but on the other hand, potential differences in opinion are also less likely to remain concealed. When conversational flow is disrupted however, the partners’ viewpoints are less easy to access. As a result, partners consult their prior beliefs about the relationship to infer a sense of shared cognition. One could say that the flow disruptions lead partners to fall back on sources external to the conversation to establish a level of shared cognition within the conversation and that previous conceptions of the security within their relationship serve as such a source. In highly secure relationships, partners are likely to feel that they know one another very well and to have developed a strong sense of shared reality. When communication fails, partners are more likely to call on these prior beliefs to interpret their partner’s view, increasing their experience of shared cognition within the conversation and are likely to feel reaffirmed as a result. When conversation is, however, smoothly flowing, there is no need to revert to PRS as an external source, as levels of shared cognition can be assessed within the conversation. Indeed, mediational analyses in our studies suggest that when conversational flow is disrupted, the positive effect of relationship security on feelings of social validation can be explained by the higher levels of shared cognition that are experienced within the conversation (see Figure 2).

The mediation effect should, however, be interpreted with some caution: In both studies, the experience of shared cognition and social validation were assessed simultaneously, and the items by which we measured the variables share some conceptual similarities. These shortcomings in the measurement retain us from drawing any definite conclusions about the process underlying the model.

It is important to note that the present studies focus on the experience of shared cognition and social validation during a specific conversation. In general, we expect people who perceive their relationships as secure to experience higher levels of shared cognition. Indeed, in an online pilot study among 252 participants from different backgrounds (M_age = 24.91, SD = 6.86, 80% female, mean relationship duration = 4.94 years, SD = 3.25), we established a clear positive link between perceptions of relationship security and levels of shared cognition: r = .57, p < .001. The question addressed in the current research, however, is not whether such a link exists, but when people use their prior beliefs about the relationship as a source of information to interpret the current situation. We predicted, and found, that perceptions of relationship security were especially likely to be used to infer levels of shared cognition when the course of the conversation raised questions: that is, when conversational flow was disrupted.

These findings share some conceptual similarities with the Social Identity Model of Deindividuating Effects (SIDE). Research on the SIDE model has shown that when social identities are salient, group members express strong commitment to group norms especially when they are anonymous and when visual communication between participants is absent (e.g., Postmes & Spears, 1998; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). The reason for this is that anonymity means that individual group members are not distracted by individuating information about others in the group: The ingroup self-stereotypes are not challenged by any concrete new information about individuals. Thus, an absence of communicative cues keeps ideas that already exist about “us” intact. Conversely, a presence of communicative cues means that new information needs to be verified as consistent with pre-existing ideas of “us.”

In the present research, our reasoning is similar in some sense: In personal relationships, too, an absence of interpersonal communication may keep pre-existing ideas about “us” intact. Here too, the gaps left by deficiencies in communication are filled by prior beliefs that people have about the level of understanding and consensus within their relationship. However, our findings extend the research on the SIDE model by focusing on inductively formed couples, rather than on abstract social categories (cf. Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). Specifically, the present research shows that the process of induction, in which the interpersonal relation between partners gives rise to the sense of social unity, can ultimately generate a social unity that influences members of the dyad above and beyond the interindividual level. The shared cognitions that emerge at the dyad level provided a strong basis for feelings of validation in conversations in which flow was disruptive. It appears that the dyad (or group)—and the shared cognitions that exist within that dyad—informs people about the validity of their ideas, when actual information about the personal standpoints of others is more difficult to access. In fact, the distorted conversation provides individuals with a scope for interpreting the ideas of the other, which, as research suggests, often leads to estimates that are more similar to one’s own ideas than actual ideas of others (Koudenburg, Postmes, & Gordijn, 2011b; Sillars, 1985). In a way, flow disruptions leave more room for interpretation, and if the context in which this disruption occurs is one of shared cognition and common understanding, this will provide a sense of validation.

An alternative explanation for the effects could be that partners are initially threatened by a flow disruption, but engage in compensatory thoughts through which they may end up reporting higher levels of validation than they would have had when the conversation was smoothly flowing. Such a mechanism would be difficult to uncover, because at the point of measurement the threat may have already been reduced by these compensatory thoughts. In our data, we did not find higher levels of anxiety and distress in the disrupted-flow condition than in the flow condition.⁶ On a theoretical basis, we would expect compensatory thoughts to be especially prevalent among those who perceive their relationship to be weak and unstable. However, the data revealed higher levels of validation by partners who perceive their relationship as secure. Therefore, we believe that our initial explanation fits the data better than this alternative explanation.

Whereas previous research indicated that among people who have no a priori acquaintance, flow disruptions are often experienced as socially invalidating; we found no such effect for participants who scored lower than average on the measures of PRS. This can be due to the fact that participants in our sample scored on average very high on these measures. A participant who is located 1 SD below the mean still scored well above the midpoint of the scale, and is therefore unlikely to respond in the way that a complete stranger would. It is therefore still possible that in less secure relationships (e.g., below the midpoint of 4), one may obtain negative effects of flow disruptions. One could test this idea by manipulating relationship security. Such a manipulation would provide the experimental control to examine the effects among partners who perceive little relationship security (instead of only focusing on partners with medium to high relationship security). Moreover, with such a manipulation, one could rule out the possibility that the partners in secure relationships would have differed from those in less secure relationships in ways other than our focal variable. Due to ethical concerns however, we decided not to manipulate relationship security.

In the present studies, we have focused on brief conversations between partners and we should therefore be careful in generalizing these findings to long-term effects of disrupted conversational flow. When communication channels between close partners are for a longer period of time disrupted (e.g., when an expat frequently calls a partner in their home country on a poor line), it is possible that these positive effects disappear. However, it could also be that the shared reality provides a framework that becomes in a way resistant to actual opinion changes on the other side of the line. The result may be that partners idealize their relationship, and hold on to shared cognitions that conceal actual discrepancies in viewpoints (see also the literature on positive illusions, e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). On the one hand, one would expect differences between actual and perceived agreement between partners to be problematic in the long run. However, research shows that perceived agreement is often a stronger predictor of positive relationship outcomes than actual agreement is (Acitelli et al., 1993; Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008; Pollmann & Finkenauer, 2009; Swann & Gill, 1997). Indeed, it may be that the ability to overcome or even positively interpret brief deficiencies in communication contributes to the stability of close relationships. These long-term effects provide an interesting route for further empirical investigation.

Another interesting question would be to examine whether there are differences in the effects of flow disruptions for people in various relationships. From previous research, we learned that strangers tend to perceive disruptions of conversational flow negatively (e.g., Koudenburg et al., 2011a, 2013a), and the present research extends this by showing that partners in secure relationships tend to experience flow disruptions in the opposite way: as an implicit validation of their viewpoints. Research also showed that people in high status positions may experience silences as less threatening to the unity within the group than do people in low status positions (Koudenburg et al., 2014). Although we did have a varying set of relationships (parent–child, friendships, coworkers) in Study 2 of this article, power constraints prevented us from examining differences in interpretation between the different kinds of relationships. This is a potential direction for future research.

In conclusion, the results of these studies suggest that very subtle and presumably unconscious aspects of communication can influence social processes such as social validation. A minor disruption of conversational flow, such as a brief silence or a 1-s delay on the line can either obstruct or foster relationship formation, depending on the context of the conversation. Previous research showed that in the (insecure) situation of meeting strangers, flow disruptions elicit doubts about the consensus and decrease feelings of validation (Koudenburg et al., 2011a, 2013a). The present studies however show that when flow is disrupted in the context of a relationship, partners are likely to use their perceptions about the security within their relationship to infer their partner’s agreement. In this way, a disruption of conversational flow can paradoxically foster feelings of social validation.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Catrin Finkenauer for her helpful insights and Ben van Dijk, Anna-Carolin Haye, Jannemien Wisselink, Renske Steenhuis, Liesbeth de Vlugt, Inge de Jong, and Anna van den Brand for their assistance with data collection.

Supplementary Material

The online supplemental material is available at .

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Study 2 was supported by a Google Research Award granted to the three authors. The project was titled “Social Consequences of Short Delays in Mediated Communication: Towards a Social Psychological Solution” and had no grant number. The support was strictly financial; the grant provider did not contribute to the design or execution of the research.

Notes

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