Dispositional Envy Revisited

Social Comparison and Envy

Envy is defined as a negative emotional response to another person’s superior quality, achievement, or possession, in which the envier either desires the advantage or wishes that the envied person lacks it (Parrott & Smith, 1993; Smith & Kim, 2007). In its essence, envy is always based on an upward social comparison. Such a comparison is particularly likely to result in envy if it is directed toward similar others and if it concerns domains of high relevance to the self (Salovey & Rodin, 1984).

Social comparisons are a fundamental element of human cognition. People engage in social comparisons habitually (e.g., Corcoran, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2011; Mussweiler, 2003) and automatically (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004), explaining why envy is such a common and culturally universal experience (Foster, 1972). Nevertheless, people also vary systematically in their propensity to compare themselves with others (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Therefore, it is safe to predict that they will also exhibit stable inter-individual differences in their propensity to experience envy. In fact, much evidence has firmly established that dispositional envy exists and that it determines important psychological and behavioral outcomes (Gold, 1996; Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999; Veselka, Giammarco, & Vernon, 2014). Importantly, however, these efforts to measure envy as a trait have not taken into account that, at the state level, two qualitatively different forms of envy exist: benign and malicious envy.

Benign and Malicious Envy

Envy has consistently been referred to as a deadly sin, implying that malicious tendencies are an essential element of envy. However, prominent scholars and intellectuals such as Aristotle (1929), Dorothy L. Sayers (1969), and John Rawls (1999) have observed that another kind of envy exists. This benign, emulative form of envy can increase the desire to get what the envied person has, but lacks the hostility characterizing its malicious counterpart. In many languages, there are two different words for envy, substantiating such a distinction. For instance, in Dutch, there are the words benijden and afgunst, and in German this is paralleled by the words beneiden and missgönnen (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009). The first word implies a more upward motivating form of envy, whereas the second word designates envy’s hostile form. Perhaps the clearest occurrence of this etymological difference is present in Russian, in which there is white and black envy. Still, even in languages that allow a semantic distinction of the two forms of envy, there may also exist an inclusive term. For example, in German, the words Neid (envy) and neidisch (envious) capture both envy forms simultaneously. At the same time, languages such as English or Spanish have only one word for envy. Nevertheless, when speakers of these languages are asked to report such an instance, they report one of two qualitatively distinct emotional episodes matching the distinction between benign and malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Thus, there is evidence that the two forms of envy exist independently of language differences.

From a functionalist perspective, the two forms of envy may reflect two different routes through which people can achieve the goal to level the difference between the self and a superior comparison standard (Van de Ven et al., 2009). On the one hand, in benign envy, enviers may try to level themselves up to become as successful as the other person. This notion is supported by findings showing that envy can increase personal effort (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011c), propel behavior aimed at obtaining a desired object (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012), and shift attention toward means to attain it (Crusius & Lange, 2014). Recent research suggests that envy-eliciting situations result in benign envy if the envied person’s advantage is evaluated as subjectively deserved and if the envier perceives high control over personal outcomes (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011a).

On the other hand, in malicious envy, enviers may try to level the envied person down, decreasing or denigrating the advantage of the other. This notion is supported by findings showing that envy can increase schadenfreude (Smith et al., 1996; Van de Ven et al., 2014; Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006), lead to hostile and resentful behaviors (Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012; Salovey & Rodin, 1984), and shift attention toward the envied person (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Hill, DelPriore, & Vaughan, 2011). Envy-eliciting situations result in malicious envy if the envied person’s advantage is evaluated as subjectively undeserved and the envier experiences less control over personal outcomes (Van de Ven et al., 2011a). Nevertheless, both forms of envy involve equivalent degrees of highly negative affect and frustration (e.g., Crusius & Lange, 2014).

In spite of substantial evidence in favor of the two forms of envy at the state level (Belk, 2011; Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009; Van de Ven et al., 2011a; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011b; Van de Ven et al., 2011c), this distinction has not been taken into account in the investigation of dispositional envy.

Existing Trait Measures of Envy

Three scales have been introduced to measure trait envy, all of them conceptualizing it as a single dimension. However, what form of envy was focal in these scales, benign or malicious envy?

First, Gold (1996) developed the York Enviousness Scale. Although he cites work connecting envy to improvement motivation, Gold explicitly differentiates covetousness from it. Instead, the scale is focused on resentment and ill will. These emotional facets should be indicators of malicious but not of benign envy. In addition, the scale correlates positively with anger and hostility, which, according to our reasoning, reflect only malicious envy.

Second, Smith et al. (1999) developed the Dispositional Envy Scale (DES), which is the most widely used measure of envy as a personality trait. The scale is composed of items measuring inferiority, ill will, frustration, and perceptions of injustice. It correlates with negative self-esteem, depression, neuroticism, hostility, and resentment. With the exception of frustration and a sense of inferiority, which should characterize both benign and malicious envy, most of the emotional facets and correlates of the DES should again be indicative of malicious but not of benign envy.

Finally, Veselka et al. (2014) recently developed the Vices and Virtues Scale to measure dispositional tendencies to commit deadly sins, including a subscale to measure envy. Their items also focus on resentment and anger, and should thus be concerned only with malicious envy.

Dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy and Their Motivational Dynamics

In summary, dispositional envy is a comparison-based emotional trait that leads to frustration when people are confronted with an upward standard. However, parallel to state envy, we predict that there are two forms of dispositional envy, namely dispositional benign and malicious envy. Apart from the aforementioned commonalities, they should be uniquely connected to distinct motivational dynamics and, ultimately, to distinct envious behavior. In that sense, differentiating between two forms of envious responding at the trait level should allow to elucidate how dispositional envy predicts these outcomes and which form explains the specific relationships. What are the important constructs related to envy and how are dispositional benign and malicious envy uniquely connected to them?

Most importantly, as described above, envy is related to a multitude of motivational goals that may result from upward comparisons. In general, envy’s functional goal is to level the difference between the self and the envied person (Van de Ven et al., 2009). In the case of benign envy, the envier tries to level up whereas in the case of malicious envy, the envier tries to level the envied person down. Thus, in both envy forms, the envier is concerned with a standard of excellence—the level of the envied person—in a domain of high relevance to the self (Salovey & Rodin, 1984). Situations in which individuals are concerned with a personally important standard of excellence trigger the achievement motive (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). The achievement motive also has two components that differ in how individuals respond to this standard of excellence: hope for success and fear of failure (Atkinson, 1957). Hope for success leads to an approach toward the standard, whereas fear of failure leads to avoidance of failing to reach it. We contend that these motivational tendencies fuel dispositional benign and malicious envy and explain their distinct behavioral patterns.

The optimistic disposition of hope for success should lead to appraisals of perceived control over future outcomes. In other words, it should be connected to perceiving oneself as capable of achieving success. In an upward comparison situation, the standard of excellence is represented by the level of the envied person. Given that enviers perceive personal control over the ability to reach this standard, benign envy should be spurred (Van de Ven et al., 2011a). Therefore, hope for success should predict dispositional benign envy and lead to motivated behavior directed at achieving this standard. This is in line with previous findings that have linked state envy to upward-directed motivational tendencies (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2011c). As previous research on dispositional envy did not investigate benign envy, this relationship awaits empirical scrutiny.

In contrast, we predict that dispositional malicious envy is fueled by a general motivation to avoid falling short of a standard of excellence. Such a pessimistic disposition should lead to an appraisal of low perceived control over future outcomes. Low control, in turn, is linked to malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2011a). In this case, enviers perceive an inability to ever reach the standard. From a functional perspective, in such a situation, it makes more sense to alter the standard to decrease the threat resulting from it. In an upward comparison, this implies that the envier tries to harm the envied person’s success. Therefore, fear of failure should be related to dispositional malicious envy and ultimately avoidant behavior toward this standard. This is in line with previous findings linking state envy to hostile motivational tendencies (Smith & Kim, 2007). As previous scales measuring dispositional envy were—presumably—mostly concerned with dispositional malicious envy, this reasoning might also explain why the DES has been linked to antisocial behavior such as diminished cooperation in social dilemmas (Parks, Rumble, & Posey, 2002) and chronic schadenfreude about others’ misfortune (Krizan & Johar, 2012).

In summary, recent research on episodic envy suggests that a one-dimensional conceptualization of envy does not capture the full spectrum of the motivational dynamics related to experiences of envy and envious responding. We contend that, similar to the state level, there are two distinct forms of envy at the trait level: dispositional benign and malicious envy. In what follows, we report four studies investigating this possibility. In Study 1, we develop the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS). In Study 2, we demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity of the BeMaS. We show that dispositional benign and malicious envy dissociate motivational intentions to improve personal performance from motivational intentions to harm when people are confronted with an upward comparison standard. In Study 3, we demonstrate that hope for success is linked to the motivational tendencies of dispositional benign envy. However, fear of failure and less hope for success are linked to the motivational tendencies of dispositional malicious envy. Study 4 shows that the motivational dynamics of dispositional benign and malicious envy translate into the race performance of long-distance runners.

Study 1

The goal of Study 1 was to develop a measure for dispositional benign and malicious envy.

Results and Discussion

Exploratory factor analyses with oblimin rotation clearly revealed two factors in the scree plot. Items measuring likability of the envied person typically loaded highly on both factors and were therefore excluded. Based on our results, we chose six items for each subscale. These items had good psychometric properties, loaded highly on their intended factor and not on the other, fitted our understanding of benign and malicious envy, and several contained the word envy.

The Dispositional Benign Envy subscale (α = .85) and the Dispositional Malicious Envy subscale (α = .89) were both internally consistent. The scales were not correlated, r(365) = .01, p = .89. The DES showed no significant relation with the Dispositional Benign Envy subscale, r(365) = .04, p = .46, but was significantly correlated with the Dispositional Malicious Envy subscale, r(365) = .65, p < .001.

After this initial study, feedback from colleagues and further results led us to refine the scale in some details. An English native speaker pointed out that the formulation of one item used a somewhat uncommon word, which we then exchanged with a more frequent synonym. In addition, in later studies with the BeMaS, one benign envy item repeatedly loaded highly on both the Dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy subscales. We therefore decided to delete this item from the scale. To even out the number of items, we also excluded another malicious item whose content was covered by others. This led to the final version of the BeMaS (see Table 1). We tested the internal structure of the BeMaS with an independent sample (N = 933). A structural equation model with two correlated factors—dispositional benign and malicious envy—showed good fit to the data, χ²(34) = 189.89, p < .001, goodness of fit index (GFI) = .96, comparative fit index (CFI) = .97, adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) = .93, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .07, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [.06, .08] (for details and further results, see the Supplementary Data). ² We then also translated the English scale into German. ³

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Table 1.

The Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS) and Factor Loadings of Each Item.

	Item	Benign envy	Malicious envy
(1)	When I envy others, I focus on how I can become equally successful in the future.	.84	−.09
(3)	If I notice that another person is better than me, I try to improve myself.	.84	−.11
(4)	Envying others motivates me to accomplish my goals.	.76	.11
(7)	I strive to reach other people’s superior achievements.	.84	.02
(9)	If someone has superior qualities, achievements, or possessions, I try to attain them for myself.	.81	.09
(2)	I wish that superior people lose their advantage.	.03	.72
(5)	If other people have something that I want for myself, I wish to take it away from them.	.05	.81
(6)	I feel ill will toward people I envy.	−.04	.89
(8)	Envious feelings cause me to dislike the other person.	−.03	.84
(10)	Seeing other people’s achievements makes me resent them.	−.01	.88

Note. Factor loadings were taken from a factor analysis with oblimin rotation with the collapsed samples from Study 2, Study 3, and the Supplementary Data (N = 933). Numbers in parentheses refer to the item’s position in the full scale. Factor loadings > .30 are written in bold.

Study 2

The goal of Study 2 was to establish convergent and discriminant validity of the BeMaS. More precisely, we wanted to test whether it can predict the diverse motivational consequences of envy. On the one hand, benign envy spurs upward-directed behavior aimed at leveling oneself up. On the other hand, malicious envy spurs socially harmful behavior aimed at leveling the other person down. In Study 2, we confronted participants with an upward social comparison standard. If the BeMaS (assessed in a previous session) measures stable differences in envious responding, it should predict the specific emotional reactions toward this comparison standard. More specifically, we hypothesized that dispositional benign envy would predict benign envy at the state level and that dispositional malicious envy would predict malicious envy at the state level. However, dispositional benign envy should neither correlate with state malicious envy nor should dispositional malicious envy correlate with state benign envy. This would constitute evidence for the full pattern of a double dissociation (Teuber, 1955).

Also of interest were correlations of dispositional benign and malicious envy with perceived deservingness and the intensity of participants’ negative affect. Being an important appraisal dimension distinguishing the two forms of envy, we expected dispositional benign envy to correlate positively, but dispositional malicious envy to correlate negatively with deservingness. Furthermore, we expected both dispositional benign and malicious envy to predict the intensity of negative affect experienced in the situation. The latter prediction is important because it establishes that the BeMaS does not capture admiration instead of benign envy. Benign envy entails a certain amount of admiration for the more advantaged other. However, the two emotions are also associated with distinct thoughts, action tendencies, motivational goals, and appraisal patterns. Most importantly, whereas benign envy is a negative emotion, admiration is a positive emotion (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009; Van de Ven et al., 2011a, 2011c). Just as dispositional malicious envy, dispositional benign envy should thus predict negative affect.

Study 3

In Study 2, we collected first evidence for the distinct motivational dynamics of envy that can be unraveled by the BeMaS. State benign and malicious envy as measured in Study 2 implied concrete motivational tendencies, for instance the inspiration to invest more effort or the wish that the envied person would fail. In Study 3, we wanted to go one step further by linking dispositional benign and malicious envy to broad underlying motivational tendencies: hope for success and fear of failure.

We reasoned that dispositional benign envy is fueled by a general motivation to reach a standard of excellence and thereby achieve success. Therefore, hope for success should be related to dispositional benign envy. In contrast, we reasoned that dispositional malicious envy is fueled by a general motivation to avoid falling short of a standard of excellence. Therefore, fear of failure should be related to dispositional malicious envy.

The core underlying process of this conceptualization is a social comparison. Thus, although dispositional benign envy should be related to hope for success and dispositional malicious envy to fear of failure, both should be positively correlated with a general tendency to compare, establishing convergent validity. These predictions were of focal interest in Study 3.

Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations of the scales can be found in Table 2. As predicted, dispositional benign envy was positively related to hope for success but unrelated to fear of failure. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy was positively related to fear of failure and even negatively related to hope for success. Both forms of dispositional envy, however, were positively correlated with comparison propensity, especially with the comparison propensity regarding abilities.

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Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of the Scales Used in Study 3.

	M (SD)	Benign envy	Malicious envy	Hope for success	Fear of failure	INCOM	INCOM Ability	INCOM Opinion
Benign envy a	4.12 (0.92)	—
Malicious envy a	2.54 (1.13)	−.07	—
Hope for success b	3.12 (0.50)	.37*	−.26*	—
Fear of failure b	2.78 (0.73)	.05	.26*	−.19*	—
INCOM c	3.39 (0.68)	.26*	.21*	.10	.39*	—
INCOM ability c	3.09 (0.88)	.27*	.26*	.00	.41*	.92*	—
INCOM opinion c	3.76 (0.66)	.16*	.07	.23*	.23*	.79*	.49*	—

Note. Participants responded on a scale from 1 (I disagree strongly) to 5 (I agree strongly). INCOM = Iowa–Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure.

a

Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

b

Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

c

Iowa–Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure.

*

p < .05.

To verify our predictions and to control for the correlation of hope for success and fear of failure, we also ran two regression analyses. Specifically, we regressed dispositional benign envy simultaneously on hope for success and fear of failure. Confirming the hypothesized pattern, hope for success predicted dispositional benign envy, B = 0.71, SE = 0.13, p < .001, whereas for fear of failure, the association was marginal, B = 0.15, SE = 0.09, p = .08. Repeating the same analysis with dispositional malicious envy as criterion revealed a significant positive relationship for fear of failure, B = 0.33, SE = 0.11, p = .002, but also a significant negative relationship for hope for success, B = −0.48, SE = 0.16, p = .002.

In summary, a motivation to reach a standard of excellence is linked to dispositional benign envy, whereas a motivation to avoid falling short of such a standard is linked to dispositional malicious envy. In addition, dispositional malicious envy was negatively correlated with hope for success. Thus, not only do maliciously envious people fear to not live up to a standard of excellence, they even actively refrain from pursuing it.

Study 4

The goal of Study 4 was to extend the findings regarding the motivational dynamics of envy by investigating the behavioral effects of dispositional benign envy in a field setting. The current perspective and evidence strongly suggest that past research on dispositional envy was exclusively focused on malicious envy. Being the form of envy with a longer research history, malicious envy has been linked to many important real-world outcomes such as social undermining in working groups (Duffy et al., 2012) or deception in negotiations (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). There is less evidence for behavioral effects of state benign envy, and it remains to be investigated how dispositional benign envy is related to real-world behavior and outcomes.

One highly self-relevant domain, in which the success of others is often interpreted as justified and personal control over one’s accomplishments appraised as high, is athletic achievement. In sports, superior comparison standards typically invest much effort into training to reach their goals. Therefore, benign envy should occur frequently among competitive individuals and may have beneficial effects with regard to their performance.

Study 3 has shown that dispositional benign envy is associated with a general motivational tendency to optimistically pursue standards of excellence. We wondered whether this corresponds to the actual performance of long-distance runners in an important race. Usually, runners practice multiple times per week and are likely exposed to several upward comparison standards during training as well as during their races. These upward comparisons could elicit envy. The connection of dispositional benign envy to hope for success should lead to an adoption of this high standard of excellence. To put it differently, dispositional benign envy should increase goal setting during training. Given that goal setting predicts performance, this goal, in turn, should spur the motivation to excel during training and, ultimately, the race.

Dispositional malicious envy, on the other hand, should be unrelated to performance in long-distance running. Study 3 has shown that malicious envy is linked to a fear of not living up to a certain standard and decreases motivation to reach such a goal. Therefore, being exposed to upward comparison standards during training should not lead to the adoption of a higher goal and therefore not to increased performance during the race.

To investigate these hypotheses, in Study 4, we measured participants’ dispositional benign and malicious envy shortly before they took part in a marathon or a half marathon. They also indicated the goal they had set themselves for their race. We hypothesized that dispositional benign envy would predict race performance mediated via higher goal setting. Dispositional malicious envy should not show this pattern.

Results and Discussion

We present descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations in Table 3. We used the average running speed in kilometers per hour as dependent variable. Runners’ time goal was also transformed into a speed goal. As predicted, dispositional benign envy was positively related to higher goal setting and performance during the race. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy was unrelated to these variables.

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Table 3.

Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of the Variables in Study 4.

	M (SD)	Benign envy	Malicious envy	Age	Gender	Race type	Race goal	Race speed
Benign envy a	3.41 (1.03)	—
Malicious envy a	1.58 (0.77)	.32*	—
Age	39.60 (10.67)	−.23*	−.18*	—
Gender b	0.32 (0.47)	.10 †	.03	−.23*	—
Race type c	0.44 (0.50)	−.02	−.05	.11*	−.24*	—
Race goal d	10.77 (1.50)	.12*	−.03	.05	−.31*	.05	—
Race speed d	10.67 (1.48)	.11*	−.01	.02	−.32*	.02	.86*	—

Note. Spearman correlations.

a

Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

b

0 = male, 1 = female.

c

0 = half marathon, 1 = full marathon.

d

Kilometers per hour.

†

p < .10. *p < .05.

We then tested the hypothesis that the goal runners had set for themselves before the race mediated the relationship between dispositional benign envy and race performance. We present the results of the mediation analysis controlling for age, gender, type of race, and dispositional malicious envy in Figure 1. The indirect effect in a bootstrap mediation analysis with 5,000 bootstrap re-samples and bias-corrected CI (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) was significant, ab = .15, 95% CI = [.03, .28], Sobel Z = 2.56, p = .01. Repeating the same analysis with dispositional malicious envy as predictor yielded no significant indirect effect, ab = −.09, 95% CI = [−.27, .09], Sobel Z = −1.14, p = .26. ⁶

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Figure 1.

Mediation effect of dispositional benign envy on race speed via race goal controlling for age, gender, race type, and dispositional malicious envy.

Although not anticipated, we noted during data collection that not every runner had set a specific time goal for the race. This enabled us to test another hypothesis in Study 4. According to our reasoning, dispositional malicious envy is fueled by a fear of not living up to a standard of excellence and also less motivation to reach this goal. In other words, dispositional malicious envy should lead to an active avoidance of a specific goal. This would be in line with the dynamics of enviers’ underlying motives. In the current study, a number of participants did not indicate a concrete race goal although we explicitly asked for it. We tested whether dispositional benign and malicious envy predicted the tendency to indicate no goal. To this end, we ran a logistic regression in which we regressed goal (0 = goal indicated, 1 = no goal indicated) on dispositional benign and malicious envy, controlling for age, sex, and type of race. In line with our reasoning, dispositional benign envy marginally predicted the adoption of a concrete race goal, B = −0.42, SE = 0.23, χ²(1) = 3.34, p = .07, odds ratio (OR) = 0.66, 95% CI = [0.42, 1.03]. However, also as hypothesized, dispositional malicious envy significantly predicted the avoidance of a concrete race goal, B = 0.49, SE = 0.18, χ²(1) = 7.30, p = .01, OR = 1.64, 95% CI = [1.14, 2.34].

In summary, our hypotheses were supported. Higher goal setting mediated the association of dispositional benign envy on race performance. This constitutes the first evidence for behavioral correlates of dispositional benign envy with a real-world behavioral outcome. In addition, we also found that dispositional malicious envy predicted the active avoidance of a concrete race goal. Together, these findings strongly support the contention that dispositional benign and malicious envy are connected to distinct motivational dynamics.

General Discussion

Previous research has treated dispositional envy as a unitary construct. In contrast, recent research on state envy has shown that people may react to threatening upward comparisons with two qualitatively distinct forms of envy: benign envy, which involves the motivational tendency to improve oneself, and malicious envy, which is aimed at pulling the superior other down. We predicted that people also differ in their propensity to experience benign and malicious envy. To capture the two envy forms on the trait level, we developed the BeMaS, which uniquely predicts benign and malicious reactions in comparison situations. We further reasoned that dispositional benign envy is fueled by an optimistic achievement motive and is associated with the adoption of a standard of excellence provided by the envied person and, ultimately, increased performance. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy should be fueled by a pessimistic fear of not living up to the standard of excellence provided by the envied person and the active disengagement of such a goal.

The data confirm our predictions. They reveal that dispositional benign and malicious envy can be measured as distinct forms of envious responding (Study 1). Furthermore, the data show that the DES (Smith et al., 1999)—the most widely used scale to measure dispositional envy so far—exclusively taps into dispositional malicious envy. In addition, the BeMaS predicts benignly and maliciously envious responses toward an upward social comparison standard that people are confronted with (Study 2). In line with these behavioral inclinations, dispositional benign envy is linked to hope for success, whereas dispositional malicious envy is linked to fear of failure and decreased hope for success (Study 3). Moreover, these motivational dynamics translate into performance patterns of long-distance runners mediated via increased goal setting for dispositional benign envy. The propensity to experience malicious envy can even be associated with the active disengagement of concrete goals (Study 4).

The current data highlight that the BeMaS allows to uncover previously unknown motivational dynamics of envy. In Study 4, dispositional malicious envy predicted the active disengagement of a concrete race goal of long-distance runners. This fits the results of Study 3, which showed that dispositional malicious envy is linked to a fear of not living up to a certain standard of excellence and decreased hope to reach it. It follows that dispositional malicious envy may also be an important predictor of motivational behavior in other settings and be related to other specific forms of coping strategies that fit this motivational dynamic. For instance, people prone to malicious envy may often actively deny the goal to get good grades in an educational situation, or disidentify with the goal to pursue a better position in the company. They may also be more likely to switch to other comparison domains to bolster their self-esteem, or they may engage in self-handicapping. This reflects a pattern of a self-protection strategy (rather than a self-enhancement strategy) in responding to self-esteem threat evoked by upward social comparisons (cf. Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010).

Furthermore, translated versions of the BeMaS may be an interesting means to test cultural differences of dispositional benign and malicious envy and how they relate to other psychological constructs. There is not yet much research on cultural variations in envious responding (but see Foster, 1972) and we are not aware of such research under the umbrella of benign and malicious envy. In Eastern cultures, people tend to construe the self as interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Given that such a self-construal leads under some circumstances to stronger assimilation effects (Kühnen & Hannover, 2000), we would predict more benign envy. Nevertheless, Eastern cultures often instill stable social hierarchies and demand to respect these fixed status differences (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). This could decrease felt personal control over one’s outcomes, which would then increase malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2011a). Such hypotheses could easily be tested with the BeMaS.

The studies presented above are strongly focused on the motivational dynamics of dispositional envy. We see this as a central dimension of envious responding. Nevertheless, we are optimistic that the BeMaS can also help to predict distinct relationships of the different envy forms with other important personality characteristics and important psychological outcomes. For instance, it has been shown that dispositional envy is related to all three elements of the Dark Triad (Veselka et al., 2014). As Veselka et al.’s scale presumably taps into dispositional malicious envy, it remains to be investigated how dispositional benign envy is related to Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. We predict benign envy to be positively related to Machiavellianism and narcissism but not to psychopathy (Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2014). Benign envy results from an appraisal of control over personal outcomes (Van de Ven et al., 2011a) which might, in excess, lead to a grandiose view on the self and therefore to narcissism (Lange, Hagemeyer, & Crusius, 2014). Furthermore, benign envy is characterized by strong frustration and negative affect (e.g., Crusius & Lange, 2014). Its central goal is to overcome this frustration by leveling up. Possibly, in the extreme, the benignly envious are inclined to use every means to attain this superior level of achievement, even if they have to resort to trickery and manipulation characterizing Machiavellianism. In summary, confidence in the self and a willingness to stop at nothing to level up in concert with hope for success should protect the benignly envious individual from negative affect in the long run and thus, from psychopathy. In contrast, we would predict dispositional malicious envy to be related to Machiavellianism and psychopathy as measured within the Dark Triad. Malicious envy entails hostile behaviors directed at the envied person (e.g., Duffy et al., 2012; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008), which could underlie a manipulative mind. These hostile behaviors in concert with resentful thoughts might eventually lead into subclinical psychopathic thoughts (see, for instance, Gold, 1996).

Conclusion

For a long time, there has been agreement about the hostile nature of envy. Recent findings, however, cast doubt on this one-dimensional picture of envious responding. Next to the socially destructive behaviors that characterize malicious envy, the benign form of envy can also lead to upward-directed behavior. In the present article, we conceptualized and measured envy as a two-dimensional personality trait. This enabled us to link dispositional malicious and benign envy to distinct pessimistic and optimistic motivational tendencies and, ultimately, to behavior. We are confident that taking the dual nature of envy into account will uncover the wide variety of motivational dynamics and behavioral consequences of the most joyless of all sins.