Anticipating and Resisting the Temptation to Behave Unethically

Abstract

Ethical dilemmas pose a self-control conflict between pursuing immediate benefits through behaving dishonestly and pursuing long-term benefits through acts of honesty. Therefore, factors that facilitate self-control for other types of goals (e.g., health and financial) should also promote ethical behavior. Across four studies, we find support for this possibility. Specifically, we find that only under conditions that facilitate conflict identification—including the consideration of several decisions simultaneously (i.e., a broad decision frame) and perceived high connectedness to the future self—does anticipating a temptation to behave dishonestly in advance promote honesty. We demonstrate these interaction patterns between conflict identification and temptation anticipation in negotiation situations (Study 1), lab tasks (Study 2), and ethical dilemmas in the workplace (Studies 3-4). We conclude that identifying a self-control conflict and anticipating a temptation are two necessary preconditions for ethical decision making.

Keywords

ethical decision making mental bracketing psychological connectedness conflict identification counteractive control self-control

Although most people across most societies care deeply about maintaining a moral self-image and ethical reputation, one need only take note of the near daily reports of tax fraud, bribery, steroid use, and academic misconduct to see that unethical behavior is rampant. Although a majority of such behavior is relatively minor in scale (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), in aggregate, even minor everyday transgressions can cause substantial social and economic damage. Indeed, repeated ethics violations in recent decades have begun to significantly erode public trust in both sports and politics (Davis & Cappello, 2013; Jay, 2010), while a recent Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE; 2012) report indicates that most organizations lose approximately 5% of annual revenues to unethical behavior.

What explains when people succumb to versus resist ethical temptations? While prior work in behavioral ethics points to various factors that lead people to fail to behave ethically, despite their desire to be ethical (Bazerman & Gino, 2012), self-control may play a critical role in promoting ethical behavior (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Monin, Pizzaro, & Beer, 2007; Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman, 2010). Indeed, ethical dilemmas pose a self-control conflict, presenting decision makers with a choice between pursuing one course of action that offers short-term benefits and another that offers more long-term benefits. Therefore, factors that help decision makers successfully navigate such conflicts in other domains (e.g., health, finance) should likewise induce them to make more ethical decisions. In the present research, we explore this possibility empirically, testing whether conflict identification and anticipating temptation are two necessary preconditions for ethical decision making.

A Self-Control Analysis of Ethical Decision Making: Identifying a Conflict and Anticipating Unethical Temptation

People experience a self-control problem whenever they face a choice between two mutually exclusive courses of action, one of which offers immediate benefits and another of which offers long-term benefits (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Loewenstein, 1996; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Examples of such intra-psychic problems are ubiquitous and might include a student’s decision about whether to watch TV versus study for an upcoming exam, or a health conscious diner’s decision about whether to order the tasty but unhealthy entrée over the boring but healthy alternative. Because people often internalize others’ interests as their own long-term interests, they can also face such conflicts in interpersonal domains, such as when deciding whether to compete versus collaborate in bargaining encounters (Sheldon & Fishbach, 2011) or to behave pro- versus anti-socially toward others in close relationships (Buyukcan-Tetik, Finkenauer, Kuppens, & Vohs, 2013; Finkel & Campbell, 2001).

Importantly, many ethical dilemmas, particularly those involving whether to behave honestly, pose a similar problem (Monin et al., 2007). Specifically, such dilemmas typically present decision makers with a choice between either behaving unethically to get what they want in the moment (i.e., dishonesty for selfish gain) or behaving more ethically (i.e., honestly toward others) so as to maintain a moral self-image, self-integrity, and to the extent that their decisions are public, an ethical reputation and social acceptance in the long run. Consistent with this observation, past research has shown that short-term impairments in self-control, caused by the prior exertion of self-control in an unrelated domain, increase dishonesty (Barnes et al., 2011; Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 2009) and that low self-control is a critical factor in producing criminal, anti-social behavior (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).

Given that ethical dilemmas can pose a self-control conflict, we suggest that two factors may interact to determine the likelihood of ethical behavior: seeing multiple decision opportunities together, which can promote the identification of a self-control conflict, and advance warning of temptation, which can promote preemptively exercising self-control in the face of impending conflicts. To date, these two factors have largely been studied separately (for conflict identification, see Hofmann, Baumeister, Forster, & Vohs, 2012; Rachlin, 2000; Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 1999; for temptation anticipation, see Fishbach & Trope, 2005; Sheldon & Fishbach, 2011; Trope & Fishbach, 2000) and never in the context of ethical decision making. Building upon previous work, we are thus the first to test how they interact, specifically, in shaping ethical decision making. In our investigation, we are guided by Jones’s (1991) description of ethical decisions as decisions that are both legally and morally acceptable to the larger community and unethical decisions as those that are either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community. Before describing our specific studies, let us elaborate on each component of our model in turn.

Conflict Identification: Viewing Multiple Decisions as Interrelated

Self-control conflicts, including those posed by ethical dilemmas, are rarely self-evident to decision makers. In fact, self-control conflicts are more frequently obscured by how decision makers frame the temptation involved. For instance, people may not experience an unethical behavior as unethical in the first place if they are able to frame it as socially acceptable (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) or believe it is the norm (i.e., Everybody is doing it; Bandura, 1999; Reynolds, 2006). As an illustration, after admitting to doping, Lance Armstrong explained that he did not think he was cheating because he considered cycling to be a level playing field at the time, with all the top riders using drugs (Macur, 2013). For Armstrong at least, doping appears not to have posed a self-control conflict.¹ Similarly, many small “offenses,” such as taking office supplies for personal use or downloading materials without paying for copyrights, may appear normative, never actually inducing a self-control conflict.

One factor that can affect self-control conflict identification is the structure of the decision; that is, whether people make multiple decisions involving temptation together in an interrelated frame versus in isolation (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009; Read, et al., 1999). When decision makers confront a given temptation, they can view it as either a single opportunity to act or one of multiple similar temptations they will confront over time (e.g., an opportunity to eat 1 donut today or 1 of 20 donuts they may eat this month). Because the cost of a single temptation is often negligible for long-term benefits, seeing multiple opportunities together may be necessary to identify conflict. Indeed, research on mental bracketing has documented effects of deciding in broad versus narrow frames when evaluating risk (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993), of making consumption decisions simultaneously versus sequentially (Simonson, 1990), and of considering patterns of acts versus single acts in the context of addiction (Rachlin, 2000). In these studies, a broad bracket led to exercising self-control.

Which frame people adopt—interrelated versus isolated—can further be shaped by one’s level of psychological connectedness, or the extent to which the decision maker views his or her personal identity (e.g., current personality, temperament, values, beliefs, preferences, etc.) as stable over time (Bartels & Rips, 2010). In this case, the less stability one sees in one’s personal identity, the less likely one is to view things or actions one currently finds tempting as related or connected to things one will find tempting in the future (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011). For instance, if one’s future self is unlikely to feel tempted to violate copyright laws, a present decision may not be experienced as a self-control dilemma but, rather, as an isolated violation that does not reflect on the self. Indeed, prior research has documented an association between individual differences in perceived future self-continuity and ethical decision making (Hershfield, Cohen, & Thompson, 2012). Building on Hershfield et al.’s (2012) work, we test whether, more broadly, seeing multiple decisions involving temptation together, in an interrelated frame, promotes conflict identification and whether (as discussed next) a further necessary step for promoting ethicality is anticipating temptation in advance.

Anticipating Temptation

Activating a person’s thoughts about upcoming temptations (e.g., a donut) can in turn activate self-control and the tendency to act in one’s long-term self-interest (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Fishbach & Trope, 2005). Thus, much like a person who prepares to lift a piece of furniture and would apply more force if he or she expects the furniture to be heavy, expecting temptation can lead people to put more force into overcoming these obstacles in goal pursuit. As such, even a simple reminder of an upcoming temptation can lead a person to activate a self-control response that overrides the temptation. Applied to an ethical context, might activating thoughts about ethical temptations similarly lead decision makers to exercise greater self-control and behave more ethically when subsequently faced with an ethical dilemma?

At first glance, this might seem to contradict a standard economic model of rational and selfish behavior, which predicts that for decision makers’ employing a simple cost/benefit analysis, increased anticipation of ethical temptations should make behaving ethically appear more costly, thereby lowering the likelihood of acting ethically (cf. Becker, 1968). However, work in counteractive control theory (Fishbach & Trope, 2007) offers a strong counter argument to this prediction, arguing that if ethical dilemmas indeed pose a self-control conflict, then priming temptation-related thoughts should actually induce people to behave more, not less ethically. This is because pushing decision makers to reflect on temptations before encountering them can increase their preparation to counteract the anticipated influence of such temptation. For example, Fishbach and colleagues (2003) found that subtly priming participants to think about fatty foods (e.g., chocolate, cookies, chips) led them to subsequently report greater intentions to abstain from eating such foods, and to actually make a healthier food-related choice, compared with a control group (see also Zhang, Huang, & Broniarczyk, 2010). Importantly, we do not argue that people who confront temptation better adhere to their goals than those who do not. Rather, it is the anticipation of temptation (vs. no anticipation), for those who confront temptation, that improves performance via the activation of self-control.

Taken together, we thus propose that when it comes to navigating ethical dilemmas, whether people initiate self-control depends first on whether they consider ethical decisions as interrelated, which helps them identify a problem. To the extent that they do, advance warning about an upcoming temptation (i.e., accessible temptation-related thoughts) should prompt the exercise of self-control to behave more ethically. To the extent that they do not, anticipating the temptation should not induce efforts to counteract it.

We next report four studies that tested these propositions experimentally, using different types of experimental decision-making paradigms (interactive, individual, and vignette) and a range of different ethical dilemmas (e.g., whether to deceive in a negotiation or misreport work performance). To manipulate advance warning, we primed temptation-related thoughts, that is, whether participants reflected upon a personally experienced or a general (faced by others) temptation before encountering these dilemmas. To manipulate interrelated framing, we had participants view their personal identities as more or less stable (Study 2) or had them navigate multiple ethical temptations in isolation (unrelated) versus all at once (interrelated; Studies 3 and 4).

Study 1: Resisting the Temptation to Deceive in a Negotiation

In this initial study, we held participants’ awareness (and hence identification) of the self-control conflict they faced constant and high, simply varying whether they were provided with advance warning of a specific ethical temptation. Specifically, participants were students enrolled in a business negotiations course and participated as part of a class simulation. This simulation, which involved a buyer–seller real-estate transaction, posed an ethical dilemma for buyers only; to reach an agreement, buyers had to lie to the seller about their intended use of the property. Prior to negotiating, we prompted buyers (via an ostensibly unrelated pilot study) to either recall a past time when they faced a temptation or to recall a neutral past event. Our primary dependent measures focused on the honesty (or lack thereof) of buyers in the negotiation. We predicted that recalling a past time when one faced a temptation (vs. neutral event) would reduce buyers’ deception.

Participants

Our general rule for predetermining sample sizes was 20 or more per cell for lab studies (per Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn’s, 2011, recommendation) and double that number for classroom-based and online studies, due to the increased noise that frequently characterizes the latter contexts. Because in this dyad study only half of the sample was used in the analyses, a sample size of roughly 160 was predetermined. To achieve this, we invited all 226 masters-level business school students across all sections of a negotiations course to complete the study as part of their course. A total of 196 participants accepted the invitation (67 females). We randomly assigned participants to one of the two negotiation roles (buyer or seller) and then randomly paired them with another participant of the opposite role, yielding 98 negotiation dyads. Given that only one member of each negotiation dyad (buyer) actually faced an ethical dilemma, and that all analyses hence focused solely on the honesty of this member, our effective sample for all analyses was 98.

Procedure

The present study used a temptation versus neutral prime, between-subject design. Participants assigned to the buyer role first completed one of two versions of an ostensible “pilot study” on retrospective perception, supposedly to help the class teaching assistant with her dissertation, in exchange for a candy. In one version (temptation-prime condition), these participants were prompted to recall and write about a time in their lives “when bending the rules was useful, at least in the short run.” In an alternate version (neutral-prime condition), they were prompted to recall and write about a time in their lives “when having a contingency (i.e., back-up) plan was useful.” Common recollections in the temptation-prime condition included prior instances of minor bribery, taking work-related shortcuts, and exploiting loopholes in company policy. Recollections in the neutral-prime condition included having a back-up for graduate school should they not get into their top choice or applying to a suboptimal job, just in case their preferred job fell through. To assist with the cover story, participants playing sellers also completed this pilot study, albeit in the neutral-prime version only.

All participants were then given 1 hr to negotiate the “Bullard Houses” role-playing exercise (Dispute Resolution Research Center [DRRC], 2008), a buyer–seller real-estate transaction involving the sale of a historic set of houses. In this simulation, participants negotiated as either the buyer’s agent (“buyer”) or the seller’s agent (“seller”). This simulation was chosen because it provides negotiators with a range of options for responding to an ethical dilemma posed to buyers (Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014). Sellers were instructed only to sell the property to a buyer that would preserve its current form and, preferably, its residential purposes (“You must be absolutely certain the houses will not be destroyed; maximizing sale price is important only after the above interests are satisfied”). Buyers, whose preparation materials provided some clue as to the seller’s interests, were prohibited from revealing under any circumstances that their client intended to build a commercial high-rise hotel catering to tourists and convention visitors, a use inconsistent with the sellers’ interest (“Your client has instructed you not to reveal the intended use of the site under any circumstances”). However, at no point were buyers instructed to lie.

Given the constraints imposed by their own client, as well as a basic awareness of the seller’s interests (and hence of the ethical dilemma confronting them), buyers walking into this negotiation confronted a decision about whether to be truthful versus dishonest with sellers about their client’s intended use of the property. Because deception poses a considerable temptation in every negotiation (cf. Gino & Shea, 2012), and because participants knew they would be negotiating several times more in subsequent weeks as part of their course, we assume that buyers construed the decision in an interrelated frame. Buyers exhibiting total honesty could inform the seller that they were prohibited from revealing the intended use of the property, although doing so would almost certainly raise suspicion and lead to an impasse. Alternatively, varying degrees of dishonesty could be used; buyers could claim that they were unaware of their client’s intended use, focus on ambiguous terms like residential (though a hotel “houses people,” it is short-term and requires different zoning than long-term residences), or blatantly lie by claiming that their client intended to put the property to a use consistent with the seller’s interests (i.e., preserve its current form).

Immediately after their negotiation, both players completed a post-negotiation questionnaire assessing buyers’ deception in the present study. Our first and primary measure was whether participants reported reaching a deal in their negotiation. As indicated above, the only way buyers and sellers could reach a deal was if the buyer misled the seller about their intended use of the property once purchased. To supplement this outcome-based measure, we likewise queried buyers directly about how deceptive they were, asking them whether they informed the seller that the property would be developed for commercial use (4-point scale, with higher numbers indicating greater dishonesty; 0 = Yes; 1 = I did not specify; 2 = Not exactly. Part commercial, part residential; 3 = No. Non-commercial use only). To check that buyers’ accounts matched those of their seller counterparts, we asked sellers a version of this same direct question (“Did you know whether the property would be developed for commercial use?”), using the same scale, albeit adapted to fit their version of the question.

Results and Discussion

We analyzed the percentage of buyer–seller dyads that reached agreement. We treated achieving a deal in this case as evidence that the buyer involved had been dishonest with the seller. As predicted, a smaller percentage of dyads in which the buyer had been primed with temptation (45%) reached deals than did dyads with a neutrally primed buyer (67%), χ²(1, N = 98) = 5.01, p = .04.

Next, we analyzed responses to our self-report measure of buyer deception—the extent to which buyers informed sellers that the property would be developed for commercial use (i.e., their true purpose). Supplementing our first analysis, buyers primed with temptation reported less deception about the commercial usage to which they planned to put the property (M = 1.14, SD = 0.79) than did neutrally primed buyers (M = 1.51, SD = 0.98), t(96) = −2.04, p = .04, η_p² = .04, 95% CI = [−0.73, −0.10]. Incidentally, this was confirmed by their seller counterparts, who were less likely to report that they were deceived (M = 1.00, SD = 1.06) than were seller counterparts of neutrally primed buyers (M = 1.49, SD = 1.02), t(96) = −2.33, p = .02, η_p² = .05, 95% CI = [−0.91, −0.07].

These findings provide initial support for our hypothesis that reminding people of temptations prior to encountering an ethical self-control conflict leads them to counteract the anticipated influence of ethical temptation and behave more ethically. Hence, we document the first evidence for counteractive control in the ethical domain.

Study 2: Anticipated Temptation Promotes Ethical Performance for the Psychologically Connected

To test whether people only exercise self-control and behave more ethically in response to temptations when they perceive the present situation in an interrelated frame (i.e., as related to similar, future situations), in Study 2, we adapted a lab-based ethical decision-making paradigm (Touré-Tillery & Fishbach, 2012; see also Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). In this task, participants first completed the same temptation-priming manipulation as used in Study 1. In addition, we manipulated one factor likely to affect whether they would identify a subsequently encountered ethical dilemma as related to similar, future decisions they might confront (i.e., adopt an interrelated frame): their level of psychological connectedness to their future selves (Bartels & Rips, 2010).

Participants then completed several computer-based proofreading tasks. In each, participants faced an ethical dilemma: give in to the temptation to assign oneself to short versions of the task (which entailed less work) or assign oneself to whatever task versions one’s coin flips happened to indicate. We expected that only those who felt strongly psychologically connected to their future self would behave more honestly in response to primed temptation. To allow for an initial test of whether self-control operations would explain this expected interaction effect, we further had participants report whether they experienced a self-control conflict in the study.

Participants

Based on prior work (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011), we expected our psychological-connectedness manipulation would exhibit a moderate size effect. Consequently, a sample size of 80 participants was predetermined. To achieve this, we invited 100 undergraduates from an organizational behavior course to participate for extra credit, and 76 (38 female) ultimately opted to do so. One participant failed to complete one of the experimental manipulations, leaving a final sample of 75 participants.

Procedure

The present study used a 2 (prime: temptation or neutral) × 2 (psychological connectedness: high or low) between-subjects design. Participants completed the computerized proofreading task in private cubicles and unmonitored. Participants learned that the task assessed “reading comprehension, verbal skills, and attention to detail for different types of passages with various writing contexts, styles, and lengths.” In completing it, their task would be to proofread eight different passages covering various topics and containing spelling, grammatical, and other types of errors. Participants further read that for each passage, they would proofread either a short version (containing 2 errors) or a long version (containing 10 errors), and that for the purpose of the experiment, long and short passages had to be assigned randomly. Therefore, before each passage, they would be prompted to flip a coin to determine which version to read. For this purpose, we gave each participant their own coin, labeled “SHORT” on one side and “LONG” on the other. After each coin flip, they were prompted to enter the results of their flip into the computer before moving on to proofread the actual paragraph.

Using this paradigm, we created incentives for claiming that the coin landed on SHORT (i.e., the favorable outcome): reading a shorter passage, finding fewer errors, and completing the experiment faster. This feature in turn created an ethical dilemma for participants. We labeled each coin to limit ambiguity, confusion (honest mistakes), or self-deception that could occur when people first flip the coin and then try to determine the meaning of the outcome (e.g., whether “heads” means they should read the short or long passage; see also Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson et al., 1999).

Immediately after learning about the above task, but before undertaking it, participants completed two experimental manipulations, framed as unrelated pilot studies for two different researchers. First, participants completed the same temptation-priming manipulation as in Study 1, recalling and writing about either a time in their life when bending the rules was useful, at least in the short run (temptation-prime condition), or a time in their life when having a contingency (i.e., back-up) plan was useful (neutral-prime condition). Second, participants completed a manipulation of psychological connectedness adapted from Bartels and Urminsky (2011) intended to affect whether they identified the upcoming task as posing a self-control conflict. Specifically, participants assigned to the high psychological-connectedness condition read a brief description of recent research and scientific data suggesting that one’s personal identity is far more stable than most people realize (e.g., “the characteristics that make you the person you are right now—your personality, temperament, major likes and dislikes, beliefs, values, ambitions, life goals, and ideals—are established early in life and fixed by the end of adolescence . . .”). Participants assigned to the low psychological-connectedness condition, on the other hand, read about how recent research and data suggested that one’s personal identity is far less stable than most people realize (e.g., “the important characteristics that make you the person you are right now—your personality, temperament, major likes and dislikes, beliefs, values, ambitions, life goals, and ideals—are likely to change radically, even over the course of a few months . . .”). To ensure comprehension, participants wrote a one-sentence summary of the passage they read.

Finally, participants completed the main proofreading task and filled out a post-task questionnaire. The latter included a manipulation check of psychological connectedness asking participants to first think about the characteristics that make them the person they presently are—their personality, temperament, likes and dislikes, beliefs, values, ambitions, goals, and ideals—and to then rate on a 0-100 scale “the degree of connectedness between the person you expect to be in 1 year from now compared to the person you are now” (0 = I will be completely different, 100 = I will be exactly the same in the future; see Bartels & Rips, 2010). It also included a single item, adapted from prior research (Hofmann et al., 2012; Priester & Petty, 1996), which queried participants about the degree to which they experienced conflicting impulses in the study (“How conflicted do you feel about your behavior in today’s study?” 7-point scale, 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). This conflictedness measure, which we validated in a separate study (reported below), assessed to what degree participants actually experienced the self-control conflict inherent in the experimental paradigm.² We measured deception in the present study by assessing the total number of SHORT coin flips that participants reported flipping. If this number was greater than chance (50%) on the group level, we could conclude that at least some participants in that group dishonestly assigned themselves to the short passage to save time and effort.

Results and Discussion

Pilot study

To validate our measure of experienced conflict, 71 MTurk workers (27 females) read a summarized version of the same proofreading task used in our main study (albeit involving 20 rather than 8 passages), imagined themselves being asked to complete it, and then indicated on five measures how conflicted they would feel (1 = not at all, 10 = very much so). We found that participants’ responses to a version of our main study conflict measure, adapted for the hypothetical context (“To what extent you would feel conflicted about just assigning yourself to the short passage for your 10th assignment?”), were strongly, positively correlated with responses to each of the other four conflict measures, which included, “to what degree [participants] would feel indecisive” (r = .82) and “be mixed” about simply assigning themselves to a short version of a given passage (r = .87; taken from Priester & Petty, 1996), “be likely to hesitate” (r = .61), and “view this decision as a self-control problem” (r = .49; all ps < .001).

Main study

Confirming the efficacy of our psychological-connectedness manipulation, participants in the high psychological-connectedness condition anticipated greater similarity between who they would be in the future and who they were at present (M = 77.47, SD = 16.70) than did participants in the low psychological-connectedness condition (M = 61.28, SD = 27.65), t(73) = 3.04, p < .01, η_p² = .11.

In support of our main hypothesis, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the number of “short” coin flips reported revealed the expected Temptation-prime × Psychological connectedness interaction, F(1, 71) = 6.45, p = .01, η_p² = .08 (Figure 1). Analysis of the simple effects revealed that among those in the high psychological-connectedness condition, temptation-primed participants reported fewer “SHORT” coin flips (M = 4.0, SD = 0.94) than neutrally primed participants (M = 5.26, SD = 1.05), t(34) = −3.80, p < .001, η_p² = .30, 95% CI = [−1.94, −0.59]. Importantly, the number of “SHORT” coin flips among temptation-primed participants did not differ significantly from chance (i.e., 4, p = 1), whereas the mean number of “SHORT” coin flips reported by neutrally primed participants did, t(18) = 5.27, p < .001, indicating greater dishonesty on the part of the latter. However, for those low in psychological connectedness, being primed to recall either a past temptation or neutral event exerted little influence over their level of dishonesty, with both groups reporting a similar mean number of short coin flips (M = 5.65, SD = 1.53 vs. M = 5.37, SD = 1.57), t(37) = 0.57, p = .57, η_p² = .00, 95% CI = [−0.72, 1.29]. Incidentally, this number was significantly greater than chance for both groups, both ts > 3.8, ps < .01.

Figure 1.

Effects of temptation priming and psychological connectedness on Study 2 participants’ reported total number of “short” coin flips (out of 8).

Finally, we performed an initial test of our theorized process, examining whether these varying levels of honesty are predicted by self-reported conflictedness among participants. Consistent with our explanation, an ANOVA performed on our conflictedness measure revealed a Temptation-prime × Psychological connectedness interaction, F(1, 71) = 6.84, p = .01, η_p² = .09 (Figure 2). Among highly psychologically connected participants, exposure to the temptation prime increased conflictedness (M = 3.47, SD = 1.91) more than exposure to the neutral prime (M = 1.79, SD = 1.45), t(34) = 3.00, p < .01, η_p² = .21, 95% CI = [0.54, 2.82]. Participants low in psychological connectedness evidenced little difference in how conflicted they felt as a function of priming condition (temptation-prime condition: M = 2.00, SD = 1.45 vs. neutral-prime condition: M = 2.16, SD = 1.26), t(37) = −0.36, p = .72, η_p² = .00, 95% CI = [−1.04, 0.73]. Self-reported conflictedness further negatively predicted the number of short coin flips reported, r = −.24, p = .04.

Figure 2.

Effects of temptation priming and psychological connectedness on Study 2 participants’ reported feelings of conflictedness.

Thus, we document greater honesty for temptation- than neutrally primed participants but only among those high in psychological connectedness. Whereas previous research suggests that psychological connectedness is associated with ethical decisions (Hershfield et al., 2012), we suggest that it operates by helping people identify a conflict and that it changes people’s response to anticipated temptation.³

The above findings offer support for our overall model specifying that the initiation of self-control in response to anticipated temptations hinges on decision makers first identifying the self-control conflict involved. In our next study, we switched to using different types of dilemmas and a more domain-general priming procedure (i.e., one less likely to activate thoughts about ethical temptation). The latter was done in part because our advance warning manipulation employed thus far may have created a degree of ethical guilt, and this, rather than self-control operations per se, may have driven participants’ subsequent ethical decision making.

Study 3: Anticipated Temptation Promotes Workplace Ethicality in a Wide Choice Bracket

In Study 3, we made two key methodological changes. First, we employed a new manipulation of interrelated framing: choice bracketing. Choice bracketing involves the grouping together of individual choices into sets (Read et al., 1999). When sets are small, containing one or very few choices, bracketing is narrow, whereas when sets are large, it is broad. We expected that viewing ethical temptations through a broad bracket should facilitate the perception that temptations are interrelated and hence pose a self-control conflict. We conducted a pilot study, which we report below, to confirm this. Second, we employed a new temptation-priming manipulation less likely to create ethical guilt in participants (and as reported below, it did not). Specifically, participants (MTurk workers) recalled a prior situation where they acted based primarily on the hedonic pleasure they thought would ensue. In a separate, ostensibly unrelated task, participants then navigated six hypothetical yet common work-related ethical dilemmas presented to them in either a narrow or broad bracket. Although hypothetical scenarios, which we also employ in Study 4, can have disadvantages, in some cases failing to predict behavior, their use in ethical decision-making research is common (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010) and has shown similar effects. In our context, they help bolster the generalizability of our previous lab-based decisions. We predicted that those primed to think about a past instance of hedonic temptation would report being less inclined to behave unethically across the six subsequent ethical dilemmas but only when exposed to the dilemmas in a broad bracket.

Participants

We predetermined a sample size of roughly 160, given the increased noise typically associated with data collected from web-based platforms. One hundred seventy-five unique MTurk workers (90 females, M_age = 30.27) ultimately participated in the study in exchange for US$0.50. However, 14 (8%) were dropped due to protocol violations that ranged from completing the study twice to misunderstanding/failing to follow instructions for the priming task, thereby leaving a final sample of 161 participants.

Procedure

The study used a 2 (prime: temptation or neutral) × 2 (choice bracketing: broad or narrow) between-subjects design. We invited participants to complete two ostensibly unrelated online surveys: a brief pilot survey for a graduate student of the experimenters (in actuality, our temptation-priming manipulation) and the experimenters’ own survey, which was described as examining how people think about various common situations and choices they confront in their everyday lives, including their work lives. In the first of these surveys, we asked participants to recall and write about either a time in their life when they did something “based primarily on the pleasure it would bring [them], at least in the moment” (temptation-prime condition), or a time in their life when having a contingency or back-up plan was useful (neutral-prime condition). Common recollections mentioned by those in the temptation-prime condition included prior instances of unhealthy eating, unplanned drinking and smoking, indulgent purchases, and succumbing to sexual or romantic temptation.

Next, participants proceeded to a second survey, which presented them with six different work-related ethical dilemmas (adopted from Wiltermuth & Flynn, 2013), each describing an ethically questionable behavior (downloading copyrighted materials without paying on company time, intentionally pacing work slowly to avoid additional tasks, calling in sick when actually just tired, bluffing in a negotiation with a potential employer about current salary, falsely agreeing to perform work tasks without the intention of doing so, taking office supplies home for personal use). Participants rated how likely they would be to behave in the way described in each of the dilemmas (1 = not at all likely to do, 7 = very likely to do), the average of which formed our dependent measure. This measure assessed participants’ behavioral intentions rather than actual unethical behavior, which we assume corresponded to their intentions to exercise self-control (though interpretative caution is clearly warranted, given the less than perfect correlation between intentions and behavior). Half of the participants completed a version of the survey that presented and had them make decisions about the six ethical dilemmas in isolation from each other, on separate screens (narrow-bracket condition). The remainder completed a version of the survey that presented all six dilemmas at once, on a single screen, and only after they had read all six did they make decisions about each (broad-bracket condition).

Results and Discussion

Pilot study: conflict identification

To confirm that our interrelated framing (i.e., bracketing) manipulation affected identification, we carried out a separate pilot study with 146 different MTurk workers (61 females). We also used this opportunity to confirm that our anticipated-temptation manipulation (a) did not in fact facilitate self-control conflict identification (we predicted that only interrelated framing does) and (b) did not differentially elicit guilt.

Participants completed the same anticipated-temptation manipulation as participants in our main study, followed by a single item measuring how guilty they currently felt (1 = not at all or slightly, 7 = extremely; adopted from Watson & Clark, 1994). They then read about the same six dilemmas, either in a narrow bracket or in a broad bracket, and indicated the extent to which they viewed the dilemmas as containing important ethical aspects (using an item taken from Reynolds’s, 2006, measure of moral awareness). Specifically, either after each scenario (six ratings in the narrow-bracket condition, α = .84) or only after reading all six (one rating in the broad-bracket condition), they responded to the following measure of identification: “To what extent does the above situation(s) contain what you would describe as very important ethical aspects?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).

We predicted that our temptation-prime manipulation would not elicit the experience of guilt. Indeed, we found no difference in reported guilt as a function of whether participants recalled a prior hedonic temptation (M = 1.43, SD = 0.91) or not (M = 1.56, SD = 1.07), t(145) = −0.63, p = .43 η_p² = .00. Next, an ANOVA performed on our conflict-identification measure revealed a main effect of bracketing, F(1,142) = 10.06, p < .01, η_p² = .07, but no effect of anticipating temptation nor an interaction between the two, Fs < 1, ps > .40, η_p² < .01. Supporting our prediction, participants in a broad bracket identified the dilemmas as more ethically laden in nature (M = 4.93, SD = 1.45) than did participants in a narrow bracket (M = 4.23, SD = 1.30). Also importantly, these results indicate that advance warning of temptation does not itself facilitate self-control conflict identification.

Main study: Ethical decision making

To test our primary hypothesis, we ran an ANOVA of participants’ intention to behave unethically averaged across the six ethical dilemmas. Supporting our prediction, this analysis yielded a main effect of bracketing, F(1, 157) = 4.23, p = .04, η_p² = .03, along with a Temptation-prime × Choice bracketing interaction, F(1, 157) = 7.27, p < .01, η_p² = .04. The main effect of priming was not significant (F < 1; Figure 3). When exposed to ethical dilemmas in a broad bracket, temptation-primed participants reported less inclination to behave unethically (M = 3.03, SD = 0.83) than did neutrally primed participants (M = 3.57, SD = 1.19), t(75) = −2.32, p = .02, η_p² = .07, 95% CI = [−1.00, −0.08]. However, for those in a narrow bracket, inclinations were similar across the two priming conditions (temptation prime: M = 3.82, SD = 1.08 vs. neutral prime: M = 3.47, SD = 1.05), t(82) = 1.50, p = .14, η_p² = .03, 95% CI = [−0.11, 0.81].

Figure 3.

Effects of temptation priming and bracketing on Study 3 participants’ mean intention to engage in various work-related unethical behaviors.

These results extend our Study 2 findings to a different (yet conceptually related) set of manipulations. In addition, results of the pilot study suggest that our bracketing manipulation affected ethical behavior via conflict identification, whereas the temptation prime (which provided advance warning) increased actors’ preparation to counteract temptation and did not affect identification.

Study 4: Priming Temptation in Narrow and Wide Brackets

Our fourth and final study used a new and less direct manipulation of anticipated temptation. In this study, we primed temptation indirectly by having participants read about a temptation faced by others, ostensibly as part of an unrelated study on people’s attitudes toward debated social practices. In addition, we manipulated choice bracketing by having participants respond to a single dilemma (either falsely calling in sick for work or using office hardware and supplies for personal matters) faced on either one occasion or on seven different occasions across time. Finally, we also included a measure of conflictedness (adopted from Study 2) to assess whether participants’ experience of self-control conflict underlies their ethical intentions.

Study 4a: Falsely Calling in Sick for Work

Participants

Given the online sample, a sample size of 160 was once again predetermined. One hundred sixty-three MTurk workers (80 females, M_age = 33.92) ultimately participated in the study in exchange for US$0.50.

Procedure

This study used a 2 (prime: temptation or neutral) × 2 (choice bracketing: broad or narrow) between-subjects design. Similar to Study 3, we invited participants to complete two ostensibly unrelated online surveys: a brief pilot survey for a graduate student of the experimenters (in actuality, our temptation-priming manipulation) and the experimenters’ own survey, which in this case we described as examining how people make tough choices when balancing their work and personal lives. In the first survey, participants read and summarized a paragraph discussing the pros and cons of either the temptation among younger, savvier and often cash-strapped Internet users to download and share copyrighted material through unapproved channels (temptation-prime condition) or the current trend among young adults entering college to gravitate toward technical degrees rather than arts, humanities, and social sciences degrees (neutral-prime condition).

Next, participants completed the second survey, in which they read and responded to a single ethical dilemma adopted from Study 3—our dependent measure in this study. Specifically, participants read,

You wake up one morning and just can’t bear the thought of going into work. Things have been hectic, you’re behind on various personal errands, and you’re exhausted. You decide to call in sick to work around the house or just have the day off.

To manipulate bracketing, those in the broad-bracket condition further imagined that over the course of a hectic year, they in fact found themselves in this scenario on seven different occasions. Those in the narrow-bracket condition simply read that they found themselves in it presently, thus forcing them to confront the dilemma in isolation from future occasions on which they might plausibly confront it. All participants then responded to the question, “How likely are you to engage in the behavior described?” (In the broad-bracket condition, we added “on each of the seven occasions?” a single item; 1 = not at all likely to do, 7 = very likely to do).

Results and Discussion

An ANOVA of participants’ intention to behave unethically (i.e., falsely call sick to work) yielded a main effect of bracketing, F(1, 159) = 16.28, p < .001, η_p² = .09, along with the predicted Temptation-prime × Choice bracketing interaction, F(1, 159) = 4.45, p = .037, η_p² = .03. The main effect of priming was not significant (F < 2.7, p = .11; Figure 4). In a broad bracket, participants in the temptation prime reported significantly less inclination to behave unethically (M = 2.54, SD = 1.61) than did participants in the neutral-prime condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.97), t(80) = −2.76, p < .01, η_p² = .09, 95% CI = [−1.89, −0.31]. In a narrow bracket, temptation- and neutrally primed participants reported being similarly disinclined to behave unethically (M = 4.34, SD = 1.96 vs. M = 4.20, SD = 1.94), t(79) = 0.34, p = .75, η_p² = .00, 95% CI = [−0.72, 1.00].

Figure 4.

Effects of temptation priming and bracketing on Study 4a participants’ intention to engage in the work-related unethical behavior of falsely calling in sick for work (to work around the house or take the day off).

Study 4b: Using Office Hardware and Supplies for Personal Uses

Participants

A sample size of 160 was again predetermined. One hundred thirty-five MTurk workers (64 females, M_age = 31.83) ultimately participated in exchange for US$0.50. We recruited only participants who were currently employed.

Procedure

This study used the same design as Study 4a, with two exceptions. First, participants read and responded to the following, somewhat different work-related dilemma (adapted from Study 3):

You are at work one day and need to Xerox some personal documents and express mail them, along with a CD, before the end of the day. You decide to use the Xerox machine, shipping material, and postage from work to accomplish this, as there isn’t a FedEx or UPS store within walking distance or on your way home.

In doing so, they again answered the question, “How likely are you to engage in the behavior described?” (In the broad-bracket condition, we added “on each of the seven occasions?” a single item; 1 = not at all likely to do, 7 = very likely to do). Second, participants then completed a slightly adapted version of our 1-item conflict measure from Study 2, which asked them to rate “how conflicted would you feel about engaging in the behavior described?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).

Results and Discussion

An ANOVA of participants’ intention to behave unethically (i.e., misuse office hardware and supplies) again yielded a main effect of bracketing, F(1, 131) = 4.995, p = .027, η_p² = .04, along with the predicted Temptation-prime × Choice bracketing interaction, F(1, 131) = 4.66, p = .034, η_p² = .03. The main effect of priming was not significant (F < 1, Figure 5). In a broad bracket, participants in the temptation-prime condition reported less inclination to behave unethically (M = 3.38, SD = 1.84) than did those in the neutral-prime condition (M = 4.43, SD = 2.12), t(65) = −2.16, p = .034, η_p² = .07, 95% CI = [−2.03, −0.08]. In a narrow bracket, however, temptation- and neutrally primed participants reported being similarly inclined to behave unethically (M = 4.86, SD = 1.67 vs. M = 4.46, SD = 2.17), t(66) = 0.86, p = .39, η_p² = .01, 95% CI = [−0.53, 1.34].

Figure 5.

Effects of temptation priming and bracketing on Study 4b participants’ intention to engage in the work-related unethical behavior of using office Xeroxing, shipping supplies, and postage for purely personal matters.

To assess their experience of a self-control conflict, we next performed an ANOVA of participants’ self-reported level of conflictedness. Consistent with our theorizing, this ANOVA revealed a Temptation-prime × Choice bracketing interaction, F(1, 131) = 5.54, p = .02, η_p² = .04 (Figure 6). Among those in the broad-bracket condition, exposure to the temptation prime increased conflictedness (M = 4.81, SD = 1.69) more than exposure to the neutral prime (M = 3.94, SD = 1.97), t(65) = 1.92, p = .058, η_p² = .05, 95% CI = [−0.03, 1.77]. Participants in the narrow-bracket condition, however, evidenced little difference in how conflicted they felt as a function of priming condition (temptation-prime condition: M = 3.09, SD = 1.72 vs. neutral-prime condition: M = 3.76, SD = 2.18), t(66) = −1.42, p = .16, η_p² = .03, 95% CI = [−1.62, 0.28].

Figure 6.

Effects of temptation priming and bracketing on Study 4b participants’ reported level of conflictedness about engaging in the work-related unethical behavior of using office Xeroxing, shipping supplies, and postage for purely personal matters.

Finally, we explored whether these varying levels of self-reported conflictedness mediated the observed pattern of effects for unethical intentions. To do so, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). As reported above, the Temptation-prime × Choice bracketing interaction was significant for both self-reported conflictedness and unethical intentions. When we subsequently regressed unethical intentions on choice bracketing, temptation priming, and their interaction, controlling for self-reported conflictedness, the relationship between conflictedness and unethical intentions remained significant (β = −.69, SE = .07), t(130) = −10.40, p < .001, while the direct effect of the interaction was reduced (β = −.39, SE = .51), t(130) = 0.76, p = .45. More importantly, a subsequent bootstrap analysis (2,000 random samples; Preacher & Hayes, 2004) showed the mediating pathway through experienced conflict to be significant, 95% CI = [0.1699, 2.015].

Taken together, Study 4 thus provides more direct support for our model, using indirectly primed temptation and showing that the experience of conflict mediates the effects of interrelated framing and advance warning on behavioral intentions.

General Discussion

Prior research in the behavioral ethics literature has documented a variety of factors that lead people to fail to behave ethically, despite a deeply held desire to be ethical (Ariely, 2012; Bazerman & Gino, 2012). However, to date, comparatively less work has explored the question of when and how people resist ethical temptations. In the present research, we proposed that decision makers would exercise self-control and behave more ethically to the extent that they both viewed ethical temptations in an interrelated frame, helping them identify it as posing a conflict for them personally, and were primed in advance with thoughts about temptation.

Results across four studies provided compelling support for these predictions, showing that participants behaved more honestly in negotiation (Study 1) and lab tasks (Study 2), and made more ethical decisions across various workplace situations (Studies 3 and 4), when primed in advance to think about temptation. Critically, however, they did so only under conditions that promoted interrelated framing and hence identification of the self-control conflict involved, such as when they viewed their present and future selves as highly connected (Study 2) or considered several decisions simultaneously (Studies 3 and 4). Correlational (Study 2) and mediation (Study 4b) analyses provided converging support for our prediction that the experience of conflict indeed played a key role. Thus, the present work recognizes self-control conflict identification and counteractive self-control operations as two important drivers of ethical decision making.

Notably, we considered and accounted for plausible alternative explanations for the observed pattern of results. For instance, we ruled out the possibility that psychological connectedness operated via self-awareness. In addition, in providing participants with advance warning of temptation, we potentially induced in them a sense of guilt, and perhaps this, rather than counteractive self-control operations per se, is what ultimately drove them to behave more ethically. It is also possible that advance warning of temptation may itself have facilitated self-control conflict identification, rather than or in addition to an interrelated choice-frame. However, given that the expected pattern of results emerged regardless of whether temptation was primed directly or indirectly, that the former did not differentially induce feelings of guilt, and that only the act of considering decisions simultaneously facilitated conflict identification, support for our own interpretation would seem comparatively stronger.

Theoretical Implications

Our studies have important implications both for the literature on self-control and the literature on behavioral ethics. Turning first to the former, to date, both the counteractive self-control and resource depletion literatures have focused almost exclusively on identifying interventions that facilitate (or factors that influence) the exercise of self-control, either assuming that self-control conflicts are apparent to decision makers or else designing studies in such a way as to make them apparent. Hence, neither has dedicated much attention to systematically examining factors likely to influence whether decision makers identify self-control conflicts in the first place. A potential exception is prior work on psychological licensing effects, which points to feeling psychologically licensed as a factor that may well inhibit people’s identification of self-control conflicts (Miller & Effron, 2010). Prior work linking self-distancing (Kross & Ayduk, 2011) and construal level (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006) to self-control also identifies interventions that might plausibly work through influencing decision makers’ identification of self-control conflicts, though further research is needed to disentangle at which level (conflict identification or the exercise of self-control) such interventions actually operate. In demonstrating the malleability of conflict identification and its role in facilitating self-control, the present research thus suggests that it will be important for self-control research to not only begin to investigate other potential interventions likely to affect this factor but also start distinguishing between interventions that facilitate (or factors that influence) conflict identification versus those that affect the exercise of self-control.

The present work also contributes importantly to the literature on behavioral ethics. While early ethics scholars (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986) often attributed variation in people’s ethical conduct to character flaws and individual differences, recent work shows that situational and social forces often exert an equal if not stronger influence over to how people resolve ethical dilemmas (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). The present work joins this latter stream of ethics research in documenting the power of situational forces in shaping ethical decision making. Specifically, our research partially builds upon recent work by Hershfield and colleagues (2012), who document a positive link between future self-continuity and ethical decision making—a link that we presume stems from conflict identification. Here, we not only test and provide initial evidence in support of this possibility but also demonstrate the joint role that counteractive self-control operations play in guiding ethical decision making.

More broadly, this work provides a new answer to the paradoxical question of why people frequently behave unethically, despite a deeply held desire to be ethical. To date, most answers to this question have centered on cognitive forces impacting the ethical decision-making process, such as externally and internally induced constraints on decision makers’ ability to recognize ethical content in the world around them (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2012; Chugh, Banaji, & Bazerman, 2005; Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009; although see Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 2009 for exceptions). However, the present studies indicate that motivational factors also play a key role, and that people occasionally deviate from their long-term ethical goals due to diminished motivation to resist temptation, driven both by a failure to recognize that impending temptations in fact conflict with long-term goals and by a lack of advance warning that they will in fact confront such temptation.

Conclusion

Unethical behavior is rampant across various domains, ranging from business and politics to education and athletics. In the present work, we have shown that whether decision makers identify a self-control conflict and are provided with advance warning of a specific ethical temptation jointly affect whether they resist such temptations. As such, we identify two levers that those who wish to promote ethical behavior might pull to (a) help decision makers recognize the relationship between discrete ethical decisions so as to foster awareness of the accumulative impact of unethical acts for self and society and (b) provide warning cues for upcoming temptation.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We are thankful to Meng Li, now at the University of Colorado, Denver, who provided us with advice on research design and assisted us with data collection.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by funding from Rutgers Business School to Oliver Sheldon and by a grant from the Templeton Foundation to Ayelet Fishbach

Supplemental Material

The online supplemental material is available at .

Notes

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