Hierarchy,Dominance,and Deliberation

Abstract

Hierarchy and dominance are ubiquitous. Because social hierarchy is early learned and highly rehearsed, the value of hierarchy enjoys relative ease over competing egalitarian values. In six studies, we interfere with deliberate thinking and measure endorsement of hierarchy and egalitarianism. In Study 1, bar patrons’ blood alcohol content was correlated with hierarchy preference. In Study 2, cognitive load increased the authority/hierarchy moral foundation. In Study 3, low-effort thought instructions increased hierarchy endorsement and reduced equality endorsement. In Study 4, ego depletion increased hierarchy endorsement and caused a trend toward reduced equality endorsement. In Study 5, low-effort thought instructions increased endorsement of hierarchical attitudes among those with a sense of low personal power. In Study 6, participants’ thinking quickly allocated more resources to high-status groups. Across five operationalizations of impaired deliberative thought, hierarchy endorsement increased and egalitarianism receded. These data suggest hierarchy may persist in part because it has a psychological advantage.

Keywords

values hierarchy equality cognitive load low-effort thought

Hierarchy is pervasive in social life, but it exists in tension with the strong social value attached to egalitarianism. We suggest there is an initial tendency to endorse hierarchy—it is easier, quicker, and more deeply ingrained. Egalitariansim is learned at an older age and is socially valued, but egalitarian values exist in the context of these older hierarchy values. We hypothesize that when deliberate thought is disrupted, hiearchy endorsement increases. We support this claim in six studies using diverse manipulations of deliberative thought and measures of hierarchy and equality endorsement.

The Developmental Primacy of Hierarchy

Status and hierarchy are central organizing features of social life in nearly every society of humans (Ridgeway, 2001) and other primates (Mazur, 2005). Egalitarian societies are rare and require constant effort to suppress inclination toward hierarchy (Boehm, 1999). People are well tuned to dominance and deference; they are central to social life.

There is reason to believe people are born with the biological equipment to perceive hierarchy and to behave accordingly (e.g., Chiao, 2010; Wang et al., 2011). Perhaps because of this biological preparedness, hierarchy is among the earliest understood facts of social life (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011). Social dominance relations between individuals are detected (and expected) by infants; hierarchies emerge in humans along with social play (Omark, Omark, & Edelman, 1975). Dominance hierarchies develop in groups of 2-year olds, and these hierarchies contribute to group stability (Frankel & Arbel, 1980). Implicit intergroup attitudes develop by early childhood and remain stable into adulthood (e.g., Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008).

The understanding of hierarchy—and its implicit endorsement through behavior—makes social life work smoothly. Humans, like other primates, organize a substantial amount of their lives around perceiving status (Ridgeway, 2006), acquiring (or attempting to acquire) dominance, and offering submission when necessary (Mazur, 2005; Smuts, Cheney, Seyfarth, Wrangham, & Struhsaker, 1987). People like interaction partners more (Dryer & Horowitz, 1997; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003) and work more effectively on interdependent tasks when placed in complementary, hierarchical roles (Halevy, Chou, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2012; Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, & Galinsky, 2012). Hierarchy is generally perceived as more structured, and it can promote self-efficacy and feelings of personal control (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, & Galinsky, 2014).

The importance of hierarchy to social life produces people who seek unequal social groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and groups that create hierarchy (Blau, 1977; Ridgeway, 1991). Inequality develops spontaneously, even when people begin equally and are not motivated to compete (Pratto, Pearson, Lee, & Saguy, 2008). Dominance plays a powerful role in a wide variety of social and cognitive processes across life domains. People detect status information quickly, with modest amounts of information (e.g., Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000; Chiao et al., 2008). Hierarchical relationships are processed more fluently than egalitarian relationships, and this processing fluency leads to a preference for hierarchy (Zitek & Tiedens, 2012). Even low-status group members can show an implicit preference for dominant group members and perpetuate these systems of dominance (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002).

Egalitarianism—the notion that people deserve equal treatment—does not develop until later in childhood, in conjunction with development of theory of mind (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). Once children understand another’s mental state, they propose fairer resource distribution compared with those with an undeveloped theory of mind (Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2009). Egalitarian beliefs appear to form around ages 6 to 8 (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Fehr et al., 2008; C. E. Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). Egalitarianism is also learned and socially valued (Norton & Ariely, 2011; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000), but it is contingent on the development of complex cognitive and social processes.

Early Exposure, Longevity, and Dual Values

To the extent that people are repeatedly exposed to hierarchical systems, they should value them more (Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968; Zitek & Tiedens, 2012); and to the extent that people understand hierarchical systems as common and long-standing, they should intuitively assign them more value and worth (Eidelman & Crandall, 2014). Other value systems, like egalitarianism, may come later, but the older, hierarchy values are not replaced. When attitudes change, both new and old versions of the attitude persist in memory (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). The new attitude does not replace the initial attitude; people have two different evaluations of the same attitude object simultaneously. This dual representation of inconsistent attitudes captures the relation between hierarchy and egalitarianism (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988); both value representations exist, compete, and can be expressed.

When an older, more implicit attitude is considered undesirable, people can suppress it; this is “motivated overriding” (Wilson et al., 2000). Preference for egalitarianism may be a case of motivated overriding; people learn hierarchy early and well, but work to suppress this attitude in favor of the socially preferred egalitarianism (Sears et al., 2000). Wilson and colleagues (2000) argued that when cognitive capacity is high, people will be more likely to retrieve and express the newer, more explicit attitude. When cognitive resources are limited, people will be more likely to retrieve their initial, implicit attitude. With limited cognitive capacity, people may be unable to fully suppress their hierarchical values and unable to override them with egalitarianism.

Using a similar logic, dual processes models of judgment also suggest that early and firmly learned attitudes operate on two systems of reasoning. The automatic system uses shortcuts and associative links to process information quickly, and the controlled system uses slow, deliberate processing (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Automatic attitudes are well learned and expressed with low effort, whereas explicit, controlled attitudes require greater motivation and cognitive capacity to express (Evans, 2008).

Hierarchy, Egalitarianism, and Values

We focus on hierarchy generally and do not differentiate between interpersonal and group-based hierarchies. We recognize the distinction but do not expect the effect of low-effort thought to depend on interpersonal or group-based hierarchy. Both are learned earlier than egalitarianism and should take effort to override (e.g., Dunham et al., 2008; Strayer & Trudel, 1984).

There are many ways of assessing what people value and support. We gauge hierarchy endorsement at the level of values, attitudes, and behavior. Values are beliefs operating in an interdependent system that guide behaviors across situations to reach an overall goal or way of conduct (e.g., Schwartz, 1994). Schwartz’s dimension of self-enhancement (achievement, power) versus self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence; Schwartz, 1994) represents the tension between hierarchy and egalitarianism. Support for equality is positively associated with self-transcendent values and negatively associated with self-enhancing values (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). Self-enhancing values are relatively positively correlated with trust in hierarchy-enhancing social institutions whereas self-transcendent values show weaker or negative correlations with trust in hierarchy-enhancing institutions (Devos, Spini, & Schwartz, 2002). Values can also be assessed as a sense of morality. Moral foundations theory (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004) includes a dimension of “authority/respect,” navigating hierarchy by respecting authority and acting in/expecting subordination. The value of hierarchy should persist as a well-learned value, especially when value conflicts must be quickly resolved.

Values underlie and guide attitudes and behaviors (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1994). Attitudes have a value-expressive function (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1995) and are a clear way to express positive or negative evaluations of a target—in this case, hierarchy. Social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) is an established measure that assesses preference for group-based hierarchy and relates negatively to equality values (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Behaviors tend to be more in line with attitudes when attitudes are value-expressive (Maio & Olson, 1995). Resource distribution tasks are a common assessment of preference for hierarchy in children (e.g., Fehr et al., 2008). If hierarchical attitudes and behaviors are expressive of valuing hierarchy, then they should shift in favor of hierarchy when cognitive resources are taxed.

The Current Studies

Hierarchy-consistent values are earlier learned, more highly practiced, and more central to everyday interaction (Mazur, 2005). When deliberate reasoning is interrupted, people should rely on more initial, well-practiced and easy-to-use cognitive structures and the endorsement of hierarchy-related values should increase. Because the social-normative value of egalitarian self-transcendence is high (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Sears et al., 2000), hierarchical values should not easily exceed egalitarianism, but we expect relative movement.

Hierarchy values and political conservatism are often closely related (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Because hierarchy values are learned early, universally, and prior to development of coherent political ideology, we predict that endorsement of hierarchy under low-effort thought should increase for people across the ideological spectrum.

We disrupted effortful thought processes and examined endorsement of hierarchy and equality values in six studies. Effortful thought was disrupted via alcohol intoxication (Study 1), cognitive load (Study 2), explicit instructions (Studies 3 and 5), ego depletion (Study 4), and time pressure (Study 6). Across these studies, we predicted low-effort thought would increase endorsement of hierarchy values. Because egalitarian values are complementary to hierarchy values, the disruption of effortful thought should reduce egalitarian values.

Study 1: Alcohol and the Social Order

Alcohol intoxication inhibits deliberative processing while leaving automatic thought processing largely unaffected (Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006). For behaviors under inhibitory conflict, with pressures for both expression and suppression, alcohol is disinhibitory (Steele & Southwick, 1985). If the preference for hierarchy is under inhibitory conflict (it is pervasive, fluently processed, and socially counternormative; Zitek & Tiedens, 2012), then alcohol should increase endorsement of hierarchy values. To test this idea, bar patrons rated hierarchy-relevant values before blowing into a breathalyzer to determine blood alcohol content (BAC).

Method

Participants

Based on a priori 80% power analyses, at least 77 participants were needed for a detectable f² = .15 with p = .05. We collected data from 114 bar patrons in Lawrence, KS. Participants completed a survey in exchange for US$1 and the opportunity to learn their BAC. Six people did not complete the entire survey, and 1 participant’s BAC was not recorded; 107 participants remained (60.7% men, 6 undisclosed; M_age = 25.43).

Procedure

Experimenters stood outside downtown bar exits in pairs between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m., Monday to Saturday, for 4 weeks from June to July. They approached every third patron as they exited the bar. Patrons completed the survey individually and blew into the breathalyzer. Participants were told their BAC, paid, and debriefed.

Measures

Values

Participants rated three values from Schwartz (1994) as guiding principles in their lives on a 9-point Likert-type scale (−1 = opposed to my values, 7 = very important). Only three values were used to keep the survey short, as alcohol impairs task focus (Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009). Each value term was followed by its brief description:

Benevolence: Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the “in-group”); Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature; and Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.

The 10 Schwartz values were pilot-tested using 102 University of Kansas students for their relation to hierarchy using a 1 (hierarchy) to 5 (equality) semantic differential scale. Based on pilot testing, power (M = 1.26, SD = 0.65) was rated as significantly more hierarchical than benevolence (M = 3.49, SD = 1.26), t(99) = 14.79, p < .001, and universalism (M = 4.61, SD = 0.72), t(101) = 28.13, p < .001 (see Schwartz et al., 2010).

Values were centered separately based on individual value means prior to data analysis to correct for individual differences. All values tend to receive positive ratings; values are ipsative, and one studies the comparative importance within people (see Schwartz, 2006).

BAC

We assessed BAC using an AlcoMate Premium breathalyzer (AK GlobalTech Corporation, Palisades Park, NJ, USA). Participants blew a steady stream of air into the breathalyzer until a reading was displayed. The breathalyzer was calibrated prior to data collection, and a fresh mouthpiece was used for each participant. Participants’ BAC ranged from .000 to .171 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.05).

Political ideology was self-reported using a 0 (liberal) to 9 (conservative) scale (M = 3.63, SD = 2.58).

Results

We created a preference for hierarchy scale by combining the power item with the benevolence and universalism items (reversed; M = 1.18, SD = 1.25, α = .73). We used hierarchical regression to examine the effect of BAC, political ideology (centered), and their interaction on preference for hierarchy; the results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

Summary of Regression Analyses for the Effects of BAC and Political Conservatism on Preference for Hierarchy.

Preference for hierarchy
	β	(β) 95% CI	sr ²
BAC	.22*	[0.03, 0.40]	.05
Political conservatism	.20*	[0.02, 0.39]	.04
BAC × Conservatism	.10	[−0.09, 0.29]	.01

Note. BAC = blood alcohol content; CI = confidence interval; sr² = squared semi-partial correlation.

p < .05.

Participants with higher BAC expressed greater preference for hierarchy values. Higher levels of political conservatism predicted greater hierarchy values; there was no interaction. The effects of BAC and political conservatism were roughly equivalent for predicting hierarchy values, and BAC’s influence does not rely on individual differences in political ideology. BAC was uncorrelated with political identification (r = −.01, p = .91). The effects of BAC on values were due more to reductions in equality than increases in power (rs = −.24 and +.11, respectively).

Equality (mean of benevolence and universalism; M = 0.88, SD = 0.94) was preferred more than hierarchy overall (power; M = −1.77, SD = 1.87), t(106) = 9.77, p < .001, d = .94, but higher BAC predicted an erosion of this preference.

Discussion

Bar patrons with high BACs showed significantly higher preference for hierarchy, a result consistent with the idea that hierarchy follows from less deliberate thought processes. Equality may involve greater cognitive effort to endorse, lowering inhibition may facilitate power values, or both processes may occur.

Because participants self-administered the alcohol “manipulation,” we do not know whether differences in value endorsement were due to preexisting attitudes that were correlated with alcohol consumption. BAC was uncorrelated with self-reported political ideology and there was no interaction between BAC and ideology, consistent with previous research (e.g., Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Margulies, Kessler, & Kandel, 1977). This suggests that changes in values are not due to individual differences in political ideology, but it is still possible that people who view equality as relatively unimportant are more likely to drink. In Studies 2 to 6, we directly manipulate whether people think deeply and carefully.

Study 2: Overload and Overlords

We turn to experimental methods and extend the domain of values to the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). When reporting their moral values, half of the participants worked on a distracting second task that increases cognitive load and decreases cognitive resources (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). If the value of hierarchy is consistent with low-effort thought, then participants under cognitive load should favor the hierarchy values more than those in the control group.

Method

Participants and procedure

Based on research credit availability, 100 timeslots were posted for a study about social perception, and 93 undergraduates at the University of Arkansas (66% female; M_age = 18.6) signed up and participated for a course requirement. Participants were run in groups of four to six but worked independently. They were randomly assigned to work under high or low cognitive load. Participants under high load concurrently listened to an auditory tape playing varying tones and were instructed to count and record the number of tones preceding a change in pitch (see Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Participants under low load answered questions without this task.

Moral foundations

Participants completed the MFQ that measures five values (authority/hierarchy, care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, purity/sanctity) each with their own six-item subscale. Respondents indicated how relevant (0 = not at all relevant; 5 = extremely relevant) they think 15 factors are when considering if something is wrong or right (e.g., “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority”) and indicated their agreement (0 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with 15 statements (e.g., “If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty”).

Political ideology

Participants indicated their political orientation using a 1 (very liberal) to 9 (very conservative) scale (M = 5.68, SD = 1.69).

Distraction

Participants answered, “I was distracted while completing this questionnaire packet” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.

Results

Manipulation check

Participants in the high-load condition (M = 6.30, SD = 1.39) were more distracted than participants in the low-load condition (M = 3.52, SD = 2.29), t(85) = 6.54, p < .001, f = .72.

MFQ

MFQ subscales were analyzed in separate multiple regressions. Load condition (0 = low load, 1 = high load), political ideology (centered), and their interaction were entered as predictors in each regression model. Results are displayed in Table 2.

Table 2.

Summary of Regression Analyses for the Effects of Cognitive Load and Political Conservatism on the Endorsement of MFQ Values.

	Authority/hierarchy		Care/harm		Fairness/cheating		Loyalty/betrayal		Purity/sanctity
	β	(β) 95% CI	β	(β) 95% CI	β	(β) 95% CI	β	(β) 95% CI	β	(β) 95% CI
Load (0 = low, 1 = high)	.21*	[0.01, 0.41]	.25*	[0.05, 0.45]	.04	[−0.17, 0.25]	.11	[−0.10, 0.32]	.11	[−0.07, 0.50]
Political conservatism	.32**	[0.13, 0.52]	−.17^†	[−0.37, 0.03]	−.17	[−0.38, 0.04]	.18^†	[−0.03, 0.39]	.45***	[0.30, 0.64]
Load × Conservatism	.00	[−0.24, 0.25]	−.04	[−0.29, 0.21]	.13	[−0.13, 0.39]	.01	[−0.25, 0.27]	−.10	[−0.33, 0.14]

Note. MFQ = Moral Foundations Questionnaire; CI = confidence interval.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Participants in the high-load condition endorsed authority/hierarchy significantly more than in the low-load condition, t(89) = 2.11, p < .04, d = .44. Political conservatism positively predicted endorsement of authority/hierarchy, t(89) = 2.58, p < .02. There was no interaction between condition and political attitudes, p > .10. A reduction in deliberative thinking was associated with an increased endorsement of hierarchy irrespective of preexisting political orientation.

The four other MFQ subscales do not speak directly to our hypotheses, and we had no a priori predictions. These subscales were included in the current study to demonstrate that effects of load are specific to certain moral values, and not simply a function of general acquiescence under load. Of these four, three showed no response to the manipulation: Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, and Purity/Sanctity.

Participants under high load endorsed care/harm more than those under low load. Care/harm was not significantly correlated with political ideology.

Discussion

Study 2 provides experimental evidence for the notion that reducing one’s ability to engage in deliberate thinking enhances endorsement of hierarchical values. When a distracting task depleted available cognitive resources, participants favored moral values emphasizing authority/hierarchy.

We extended measurement of hierarchy endorsement from Schwartz values to the moral foundations (Graham et al., 2009). The care/harm foundation (e.g., killing someone, hurting a defenseless animal) also responded to the load manipulation. Because care/harm is an affectively driven automatic response (e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008), it should respond differently than foundations with a more cognitive basis.

As in Study 1, the interaction between cognitive load and political ideology was nonsignificant; cognitive load caused shifts in moral values regardless of individual differences in political ideology. We now have direct support for the notion that restricting effortful thinking has a causal effect on increasing endorsement of hierarchy-promoting values.

Wright and Baril (2011) found that cognitive load decreased endorsement of authority/hierarchy, loyalty/betrayal, and purity/sanctity (i.e., “binding” moral foundations), but only for conservatives. Some methodological and analytic differences are apparent and may contribute to these divergent findings. For instance, Wright and Baril assessed political ideology by combining “general” and “economic” (but excluded “social”) left–right ideology and collapsed across two qualitatively different experimental conditions (cognitive load and ego depletion). Past theorizing on moral foundations theory (Joseph, Graham, & Haidt, 2009) and recent data (Graham et al., 2013) challenge Wright and Baril. We interpret our findings in the context of both our methods and the other studies reported in this article.

Study 3: Cognitive Hiatus and Hierarchical Consequences

In Study 3, we manipulated thought processing simply by instructing participants to rate values while thinking either deliberately or superficially. Instructions to think superficially gave permission to participants to use whichever thought comes first and fastest, and encouraged them to weigh subsequent concerns and ideas less heavily. This surprisingly simple manipulation has been shown to work, for example, Eidelman and colleagues (2012) found conservatism increased under explicit instructions to use low-effort thought. If endorsement of hierarchy is more fluent or fundamental, then reducing effortful thought should reduce endorsement of equality values but raise importance of hierarchy values.

Method

Participants

A priori 80% power analyses for a mixed-model ANCOVA indicated that 111 participants would be needed to detect f = .30 with p = .05. We posted 154 timeslots based on room availability during a semester; 106 University of Kansas (KU) undergraduates participated for course credit. Four participants did not complete all questionnaires and were excluded from analysis, leaving 102 participants (49% men, 3 undisclosed; M_age = 19.88).

Procedure

Participants completed the survey individually in the laboratory. They were randomly assigned to use either careful, deliberative thought, or quick, superficial thought. Participants were debriefed when finished.

In the high-effort thought condition, the experimenter instructed participants to “complete the questionnaires at your own pace. Take your time and think carefully about your responses.” In the low-effort thought condition, the experimenter instructed participants to “complete the questionnaires as quickly as you can. It is very important to respond with your first, gut-level answer.”

Measures

Values

Participants rated values types from Schwartz’s Value Survey, including achievement, benevolence, power, and universalism, with a brief value description. Participants rated how important each value is as a guiding principle in their life using the response scale from Study 1. Benevolence and universalism (r = .28) were averaged to create an equality values score. Power and achievement (r = .22) were averaged to create a hierarchy values score.

Participants self-reported political ideology using a 0 (liberal) to 9 (conservative) scale (M = 4.39, SD = 2.07).

Results

Values were again centered based on individual value means prior to data analysis. Prior to standardization, hierarchy and equality values were negatively correlated (r = −.26). After individually mean-centering values, the correlation increased appropriately (r = −.48). The correlation between the two values was negative and roughly equal between low-effort (r = −.39) and high-effort (r = −.49) conditions.

To assess the influence of effortful thought processing on hierarchy and equality values, we conducted an ANCOVA with effortful thought (high effort/low effort) as a between-subjects factor, value ratings as a within-subjects factor, and political ideology (centered) as a continuous predictor. The interaction between values and condition was significant, F(1, 98) = 9.11, p = .003, f = .30 (see Figure 1). Participants in the low-effort thought condition rated hierarchy values as significantly more important (M = 0.01, SD = 0.83) compared with the high-effort thought condition (M = −0.43, SD = 0.94), F(1, 98) = 6.03, p = .02, d = .50, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.17, 0.83]. Participants in the low-effort thought condition rated equality values as significantly less important (M = −0.23, SD = 0.95) compared with the high-effort thought condition (M = 0.33, SD = 1.16), F(1, 98) = 7.62, p = .01, d = .53, 95% CI = [0.19, 0.89].

Figure 1.

Low effort enhances hierarchy values and diminishes equality values, Study 3.

We examined a significant interaction between values and political ideology, F(1, 98) = 4.40, p = .04, f = .20 with simple slopes using regression analysis, controlling for condition. Political ideology did not significantly predict hierarchy values, p = .60, but people high in conservative politics valued equality less, β = −.35, t(101) = −3.86, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.53, −0.17].

Participants rated equality values as slightly more important (M = 0.05, SD = 1.10) than hierarchy values (M = −0.21, SD = 0.91); this difference was not significant, F(1, 100) = 2.51, p = .12. The interaction between values, condition, and political ideology was not significant, F < 1, f = .06.

There was no effect of condition on the values of conformity, hedonism, security, stimulation, or tradition (ps > .30). There was a marginal effect for self-direction, p = .08; it was rated higher in the high-effort thought condition (M = 1.02) than the low-effort thought condition (M = 0.67). On Schwartz’s (1994) circumplex, self-direction is closely related to universalism and the dimension of self-transcendence.

Discussion

The simple instruction to give the first unvarnished response elevated hierarchical thinking (and reduced egalitarian values) compared with participants instructed to think carefully. These instructions were entirely innocent of value content; the instructions described how to think, but nothing about what to think.

There was no interaction between political ideology and thinking instructions; participants shifted toward hierarchy and away from equality with low-effort thought across the ideological spectrum.

Studies 1 to 3 provide evidence that hierarchy values are promoted and equality values are reduced with low-effort, compared with high-effort thought. In Study 1, participants could not intuit the hypothesis (although they could reasonably conclude we were interested in the correlation between intoxication and the questionnaire’s contents). In Studies 2 and 3, the manipulation of cognitive effort was obvious. In Study 4, we chose a manipulation of depth of thought processing that is subtle and new to the domain of values: ego depletion.

Study 4: Equality, Dominance, and Ego Depletion

Ego depletion allows for a subtle manipulation of mental effort. Participants completed either a difficult task requiring executive control or an easy task. Tasks that require high concentration tend to be fatiguing (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) and disrupt controlled processing (Govorun & Payne, 2006). When resources are depleted, people are less likely to perform well on reasoning problems (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003). Ego depletion may occur primarily through decreasing the ability to inhibit motivational impulses (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012); it is an ideal method for testing our basic hypothesis.

If hierarchy is a well-learned, easy to express value that competes with the normative value of equality, and ego depletion reduces the ability to enhance the more normatively acceptable value of equality, then ego depletion should lead to an increase in hierarchy values and a decrease in equality values.

Method

Participants

A priori 80% power analyses for a mixed-model ANCOVA indicated 158 participants would be needed to detect f = .25 with p = .05; 176 KU undergraduates participated for course credit. Twenty-one participants were excluded because they were noncompliant with directions on the ego depletion task (n = 11), study time was scheduled too short (n = 6), they knew the purpose of the ego depletion task (n = 3), or they were a statistical outlier (n = 1). All exclusions were made without knowledge of participants’ scores on the dependent variable relative to condition, leaving 155 participants (58% women, 4 undisclosed; M_age = 18.94).

Procedure

Participants completed the task in the laboratory individually. They were randomly assigned to an ego depletion or control task using the White Bear paradigm (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987), followed by a questionnaire about values and mood. Participants were debriefed.

Ego depletion manipulation

In the White Bear task, participants list their thoughts for 6 min. In the control condition, participants were told they could think about anything they wanted, including a white bear. In the ego depletion condition, participants were told they could think of anything they wanted except a white bear. All participants wrote a check mark on the page margin every time they thought of a white bear. The experimenter left the room while participants completed the exercise and returned to administer questionnaires.

Measures

Values

Participants completed the measure of values from Study 3. Benevolence and universalism were averaged to create an equality values score (r = .39), and power and achievement were averaged to create a hierarchy values score (r = .35).

Other measures

To assess participants’ mood, they completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Political ideology was assessed using a single-item scale (0 = liberal, 9 = conservative; M = 4.55, SD = 2.18). Participants rated the difficulty of the White Bear task from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very difficult).

Results

Values were again centered based on individual value means prior to data analysis. Prior to standardization, hierarchy and equality values had a small positive correlation (r = .06). After individually mean-centering values, the correlation was negative and increased in magnitude (r = −.45). The correlation was roughly equal in the ego depletion and control conditions (rs = −.46 and −.43, respectively).

Manipulation check

Participants in the ego depletion condition rated the white bear task as more difficult (M = 3.03, SD = 1.62) than the control condition (M = 2.41, SD = 1.50), t(152) = 2.44, p = .02, d = .40. The difference in number of white bear thoughts between ego depletion (M = 5.85, SD = 6.78) and control conditions (M = 5.02, SD = 5.43) was not significant, t(153) = 0.83, p = .41, d = .13.

Ego depletion effects

We conducted an ANCOVA with ego depletion condition as a between-subjects variable, value ratings as a within-subjects factor, and political ideology (centered) as a continuous predictor. There was a significant interaction between values and condition, F(1, 151) = 7.10, p = .01, f = .22 (see Figure 2). Participants in the ego depletion condition rated hierarchy values as significantly more important (M = −0.11, SD = 1.04) than in the control condition (M = −0.57, SD = 1.08), simple effects F(1, 151) = 7.27, p = .01, d = .43, 95% CI = [0.15, 0.70]. Participants in the ego depletion condition rated equality values as less important (M = 0.30, SD = 1.14) than in the control condition (M = 0.62, SD = 1.04), F(1, 151) = 3.36, p = .07, d = .29, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.30].

Figure 2.

Ego depletion enhances hierarchy values and diminishes equality values, Study 4.

There was some evidence of an interaction between values and political ideology, F(1, 151) = 3.06, p = .08, f = .14. Using simple slopes regression analysis, controlling for depletion condition, ideology did not predict hierarchy values, β = .07, t(152) = 0.93, p = .35, but high conservatism predicted valuing equality less, β = −.18, t(152) = −2.23, p = .03, 95% CI = [−0.33, −0.02].

Participants rated equality values (M = 0.46, SD = 1.09) significantly higher than hierarchy values overall (M = −.34, SD = 1.08), F(1, 151) = 29.76, p < .001, f = .32. The interaction between values, condition, and political ideology was not significant, F < 1.

There was no significant effect of ego depletion on the values of conformity, hedonism, security, stimulation, self-direction, or tradition (ps > .40), nor on either positive or negative affect (ts < 1).

Discussion

When self-regulatory resources were depleted, participants valued hierarchy more and equality less. Ego depletion led participants to endorse hierarchy more and egalitarianism less across the liberal-conservative ideological spectrum. No other values shifted under ego depletion compared with a control; the effects of the ego depletion task did not operate through mood shifts. Only values related to hierarchy were influenced by depleted self-regulation. When participants were unable to use their full resources, they shifted away from equality and toward hierarchy.

Study 5: Hierarchical Affiliations and Hierarchical Attitudes

We have tested the hypothesis that hierarchy values are comparatively suppressed by conscious and deliberate thought with four unique manipulations: alcohol intoxication, cognitive load, instructions to think lightly, and mental fatigue. The measures of hierarchy endorsement have focused on values and morality. Because values underlie attitudes and behavior (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Maio & Olson, 1995), we expect attitudes may shift as a result of diminished cognitive capacity. We adapted the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) scale; if attitudes reflect underlying values, we expect SDO to increase under low-effort thought.

We predicted this effect would be moderated by a sense of personal power. People tend to justify existing social systems that oppress them, especially when this justification is measured implicitly (Jost et al., 2004). People who are low in social power may endorse hierarchy more in general (i.e., not a specific social system) when their cognitive resources are limited.

Method

Participants

A priori 80% power analyses for a between-subjects ANCOVA indicated 158 participants were needed for an interaction f = .25 at p < .05. We were able to recruit 196 University of Arkansas undergraduates (67.3% women; M_age = 21.3), who participated for course credit.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: low- versus high-effort thinking. About half of the participants completed a paper copy of this questionnaire in small groups working independently; the other half completed a version administered online. Results did not differ by method.

In the low-effort thinking condition, participants were told, “first, gut responses are the most accurate” and instructed to not think hard about their responses and to “instead, go quickly and give the first, gut response that comes to mind. For our purposes, it is important that you give your first response.” In the high-effort thinking condition, participants were told, “thoughtful, reasoned responses are the more accurate,” and instructed to not give their first response that comes to mind, but “instead, go slow and think hard about the questions and then respond carefully and thoughtfully. For our purposes, it is important that you give a considered, deliberate response.”

Materials

Participants completed the Personal Sense of Power Scale (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012), which measures feelings of power in relationships. Eight statements (e.g., “In my relationships with others, I think I have a great deal of power”) were endorsed on 7-point Likert-type scales (α = .84).

Participants completed a 10-item vocabulary filler task (Huang & Hauser, 1998) before answering a modified version of the 16-item (α = .90) SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994), worded to reflect interpersonal dominance (e.g., “Some groups are simply inferior to others” became “Some people are simply inferior to others”) on a 7-point Likert-type scale.

Participants indicated demographic information, including political ideology (1 = very liberal, 9 = very conservative; M = 4.71, SD = 2.31). A manipulation check asked participants whether they “gave [their] ‘gut’ response when answering the question on the preceding page” (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree).

Results

Manipulation check

Participants in the low-effort thinking condition (M = 7.31, SD = 1.81) relied on their gut response more than in the high-effort thinking condition (M = 6.45, SD = 2.22), t(187) = 3.01, p = .003, d = .42, 95% CI for difference = [0.31, 1.48].

Hierarchy endorsement

To assess the effect of cognitive effort on endorsements of interpersonal hierarchy, we submitted SDO scores to a between-subjects ANCOVA with political ideology (centered) as a covariate. This revealed significant effects of condition, F(1, 192) = 4.72, p = .03, f = .16, and political ideology, F(1, 192) = 34.16, p < .001, f = .42. When instructed to rely on low-effort thinking, participants more strongly endorsed hierarchy attitudes (M = 2.92, SD = 1.08) compared with high-effort thinking (M = 2.63, SD = 0.92), 95% CI for difference = [0.03, 0.55], d = .29. Hierarchy endorsement increased as political conservatism increased, b = 0.17, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.23], but there was no interaction between ideology and condition,F(1, 191) = 1.18, p = .280, f = .08.

We analyzed hierarchy endorsement as a function of condition (0 = low effort, 1 = high effort; centered) and individual differences in a sense of power (continuous; mean-centered) using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro for SPSS. Political ideology was a covariate in the regression model. This analysis replicated the main effect of condition, b = −0.28, SE = .13, t(189) = 2.14, p = .033, 95% CI = [−0.55, −0.02], qualified by a Condition × Personal power interaction, b = 0.35, SE = .14, t(189) = 2.53, p = .012, 95% CI = [0.8, 0.63] (see Figure 3). Among those reporting a low (−1 SD) or moderate (mean) sense of power, reliance on low-effort (vs. high-effort) thinking caused greater endorsement of SDO, b = −0.62, SE = .19, t(189) = 3.31, p = .001, 95% CI = [−0.99, −0.25] andb = −0.28, SE = .13, t(189) = 2.15, p = .033, 95% CI = [−0.55, −0.02], respectively. However, participants reporting a high sense of power (+1 SD) were unaffected by condition, b = 0.05, SE = .19, t(189) = 0.27, p = .786, 95% CI = [−0.32, 0.42].

Figure 3.

Low-effort thought enhances social dominance orientation when personal sense of power is low, Study 5.

Discussion

Directing people away from deliberative thinking increases endorsement of hierarchy attitudes in addition to values and moral foundations. The shift in SDO endorsement extends our findings to attitudes and implicates people’s response to one of the most widely studied measures of hierarchy.

People with a high sense of personal power endorse hierarchical attitudes whether thinking fast or slow; people with a low sense of personal power endorsed hierarchy significantly more when thinking fast. Personal sense of power was an important moderator of the effect of low-effort thought on hierarchical attitudes—Only those low in power endorsed hierarchy more when asked to think quickly. By contrast, fast thinking lead to shifts toward hierarchy across political ideologies. Hierarchical attitudes and values both can be promoted by limiting use of cognitive resources, particularly for people feeling low in the social hierarchy.

Study 6: Cognitive Difficulty and Distribution of Capital

The five studies reported so far establish that low-effort thought promotes hierarchical values, morals, and attitudes; we now turn to behavioral choice. We asked participants to distribute resources between high- and low-status groups while directed to either think carefully or quickly. We expected participants to distribute more resources favoring high-status groups when thinking quickly.

Method

Participants

A priori 80% power analyses for between-subjects ANCOVA indicated 245 participants were needed forf = .18 at p < .05; we recruited 251 M-Turk workers to participate in exchange for US$1. Participants were excluded if they reported being distracted during the study (n = 8) or because they took longer than +3 SDs to complete the tasks (n = 7). All exclusions were made without knowledge of participants’ condition, leaving 236 participants (54.23% men; M_age = 32.97).

Procedure and measures

Participants were told they would determine how “starting resources” would be distributed in a game for a future study on employee relations in a large corporation. Participants made six resource allocation decisions between relatively high- and low-status groups (groups were pretested for high or low status; all groups selected differed with d > 1.60, p < .001, with N = 61). For example, participants were given the resource “145 points” and asked to divide it between CEOs (high status) and secretaries (low status). Other status comparisons were accountants/interns, senior analysts/junior analysts, CEOs/executive assistants, lawyers/customer service representatives, and senior software engineers/junior software engineers. Resources distributed were 35 tokens, 600 points, 15 min, US$90, and 25 min, respectively. The online software was set up with sliding indicators that showed the distribution results for both groups, and made it so all resources were distributed (i.e., the distribution was zero-sum).

Participants were randomly assigned to use either careful, deliberative thought or quick, superficial thought. In the time pressure condition, participants were told, “Because we want you to just go with your first, initial response you should complete your decisions as quickly as possible. Your response will be timed.” In the control condition, participants were told, “Because we want you to carefully think about each answer, you will have as much time as you want for each decision so be sure to take your time.” In this condition, each allocation task remained on the screen for 15 s before participants had the option to advance.

Political ideology was assessed using a single-item scale (0 = liberal, 9 = conservative; M = 4.60, SD = 2.69).

Because the assets distribution was zero-sum, the scores were ipsative. Because the scales of the six items differed (e.g., time, points, dollars), items were first standardized and high-status group scores were combined to create an “allocation to high-status groups” variable (α = .82).

Manipulation checks

Participants rated the extent to which they felt rushed during the resource distribution task using a 7-point semantic differential scale (1 = I felt very rushed, 7 = I felt like I had too much time). To test for demand characteristics, participants used a 7-point semantic differential scale to indicate if they felt the researchers wanted unequal (7) or equal (1) distributions.

Results

Manipulation checks

Participants in the time pressure condition felt significantly more rushed (M = 2.99, SD = 1.39) than participants in the control condition (M = 5.28, SD = 1.17), t(233) = 13.49, p < .001. There were no significant differences between the time pressure (M = 3.76, SD = 1.26) and control conditions (M = 3.93, SD = 1.19) in perceptions of the researchers’ desire for equal or unequal distributions, t(234) = 1.02, p = .311.

Effects of time pressure

To assess the influence of effortful thought processing on hierarchical behavior, we conducted an ANCOVA with time pressure condition as a between-subjects factor, political ideology (centered) as a continuous predictor, and resource allocation to high-status groups as the dependent variable. The effect of condition on resource allocation was significant, F(1, 232) = 4.98, p = .027, f = .15 (see Figure 4). Participants under time pressure allocated significantly more resources to high-status groups (M = 0.09, SD = 0.73) compared with the control condition (M = −0.11, SD = 0.71), d = .28.

Figure 4.

Time pressure enhances resource allocation to high-status over low-status groups, Study 6.

There was a significant effect of political ideology, F(1, 232) = 6.67, p = .010, f = .17. We examined simple slopes using regression analysis, controlling for condition. Political ideology significantly predicted resource allocation, β = .17, t(235) = 2.71, p = .007, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.08]. People high in conservative politics were more likely to allocate resources to high-status over low-status groups. The interaction between condition and political ideology was not significant, F(1, 232) = 1.63, p = .203, f = .08.

Discussion

Participants instructed to move quickly and without deliberation tended to favor high-status groups when allocating resources. This shift in resource allocation occurred regardless of participant ideology—Liberals and conservatives both allocated more resources to high-status groups under low-effort thought. These behavioral results came with no self-interest involvement; participants had no investment in the groups and would not benefit or suffer as a result of their allocations.

Participants did not reliably or systematically intuit the hypotheses; allocations were not merely reflecting perceived experimenter demands. When encouraged to proceed quickly and without reflection, people gave more time and money to high-status groups, thus reinforcing the status quo hierarchy.

General Discussion

We hypothesized that hierarchy values require less deliberative thought than egalitarian values to endorse. The results of six studies are consistent with this hypothesis. In Study 1, higher BAC predicted greater preference for hierarchy. In Study 2, participants under cognitive load favored the authority/hierarchy moral values compared with those under no load. In Study 3, participants instructed to use low-effort thought valued equality less and hierarchy more. In Study 4, the subtle manipulation of low-effort thought via ego depletion caused participants to value hierarchy more and equality less. In Study 5, participants who were instructed to proceed quickly and who felt low in personal power, endorsed hierarchical attitudes more. In Study 6, participants under time pressure allocated more resources to high-status than low-status groups.

Effect sizes were relatively consistent across studies and values, ranging from r = .13 to r = .26, M = 0.20, SD = 0.05. When meta-analyzed, the weighted effect of low-effort thought on increase in hierarchy (Studies 1-6) was r = .18, p < .001, and on decrease in equality (Studies 1, 3, and 4) was r = .20, p < .001 (ds range = .28-.53, M = 0.41, SD = 0.10).

The manipulations of effort in thinking reveal a robust effect, which appears using a distinct variety of conceptual manipulations (BAC, cognitive load, overt instructions, ego depletion, and time pressure). Across this diverse set of studies, participants devalued equality and valued hierarchy when unable to use their full mental resources. Whether they were aware they were using resources or not, the value expression shifted in favor of hierarchy.

Our manipulations also produced specific effects. Values unrelated to hierarchy and equality remained mostly unmoved by the manipulation of thought processing (with the exception in Study 2). Although shifts in other values would not necessarily challenge the notion that hierarchy is more accessible, results suggest that when deliberative reasoning was impaired, values related to social status and equality were reliably affected, but little else changed.

Hierarchy may have a psychological advantage over equality in that it is familiar, rehearsed, socially efficient (e.g., Dunham et al., 2008; Ridgeway, 2001; Ronay et al., 2012), and early learned (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012; Russon & Waite, 1991). Equality beliefs appear to override this initial tendency when resources are available, but (even though they are more socially desirable) they do not replace hierarchy values (Wilson et al., 2000). Equality may be valued explicitly (Boehm, 1993), but when cognitive resources are limited, the initial tendency toward hierarchy is more likely to be accessed and expressed.

Social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) predicts such a shift toward hierarchy; it posits humans are disposed to form hierarchy, and this disposition is reinforced through cultural ideology and attitudes. Hierarchy-attenuating social beliefs may balance the amount of hierarchy in society, but they merely curb the amount of hierarchy; they do not eliminate it. Hierarchy is easily formed, detected, maintained, and processed (e.g., Moors & De Houwer, 2005; Zitek & Tiedens, 2012); our studies suggest it is also easily valued, endorsed, and acted upon.

Culturally Learned Dominance Is Cognitively Accessible

We argue hierarchy is an easily accessible way of thinking—Evaluating dominance is easy, low effort, and perhaps unavoidable (Ambady et al., 2000; Chiao et al., 2008). This ease of accessibility from early learning implicates the role of culture and repetition in creating and perpetuating the cognitive advantage of hierarchy over equality (Chang et al., 2011). When cultures teach beliefs, values, or other systematic views of the world, repetition across modalities and situations enhance and empower the acquisition of cultural knowledge (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Frequency and consistency leads to automaticity (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). The ubiquity of hierarchy, its constant enactment in everyday life, and its unquestioned adherence in social relations (Ridgeway, 2001, 2006) lead to smooth development of prohierarchy values and attitudes, which deploy relatively automatically.

The manipulations of deliberate thought reduce access to impression management resources. Because egalitarian, self-transcendent values are associated with socially desirable responding (Schwartz, 1997), expression of more automatic values should emerge. Tension between competing internalized attitudes is typical of prejudice; people often struggle between culturally learned attitudes and changing cultural environments or personal change in values (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Devine, 1989). People develop their prejudice early, and their egalitarianism later, and prejudice reliably emerges when conscious monitoring is hindered (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). As in the case of prejudice, despite the fact that people tend to become more egalitarian over time, the value of hierarchy persists as a well-learned pattern of ideas and values.

Values in Context

Our samples mostly represent younger adults and bar patrons in the United States. How representative is our selection of participants? Values tend to be universal (e.g., Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012), and there is surprising similarity across cultures in the ranked importance of values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Self-transcendent values are ranked among the most important, and the self-enhancing value of power is among the least important across many cultures. Because hierarchy is central to human cultures, and is taught explicitly and implicitly from the earliest age (Flanagan, 1989; Mazur, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), it is socially and psychologically fundamental and easily accessible compared with complementary equality values. Because equality values are developed later and conflict with hierarchy values, we predict manipulations that decrease cognitive resources will increase hierarchy endorsement in any culture that also endorses equality values.

These studies were conducted at a time (March 2012-March 2015) when public discussion of inequality was unusually high (e.g., “Occupy Wall Street,” Gitlin, 2012; Reich’s Inequality for All, Silberstein & Kornbluth, 2013). This coverage may have temporarily increased endorsement of equality and thus our effect size, by causing people to report more egalitarianism under low-load conditions. Egalitarian movements may exaggerate the shift toward hierarchy under high load, but likely do not cause the shift. Even politically conservative participants, who are unlikely to join egalitarian movements, valued hierarchy more under cognitive load.

Our data suggest shifts in attitudes toward hierarchy may depend, in part, on one’s position in the social hierarchy. Although participants across the ideological spectrum endorsed hierarchy, this does not indicate whether participants felt high or low status—whether hierarchy would promote their self-interest. In Study 5, only participants low in personal power shifted toward hierarchy endorsement; participants were not promoting hierarchy in their self-interest. The pattern is consistent with system justification theory, which predicts people will maintain the status quo even when disadvantaged by it (e.g., Jost et al., 2004). But bolstering hierarchy only occurred when low-power participants were under low-effort thought. Participants tended to endorse hierarchy in general, not specific hierarchies as a way of maintaining the status quo. Because personal power was only assessed in one study, our findings are preliminary, but promising as a beginning to study the limits of the low-effort shift to hierarchy endorsement.

The Development of Equality

If hierarchy is cognitively accessible relative to equality due to precedence, rehearsal, and centrality to human interaction (Flanagan, 1989; Mazur, 2005; Ridgeway, 2001), how and when do people develop egalitarian ideology? Children seem to develop an egalitarian ethos in conjunction with theory of mind and sociomoral perspective (e.g., Colby & Kohlberg, 1984; Takagishi et al., 2009). Prosocial and egalitarian behavior requires sophisticated cognitive processes—Before one can help others, one must perceive and interpret others’ needs (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).

Some anthropologists have argued egalitarianism is the “natural state” of society, and social and economic inequality emerged quite recently (e.g., Fried, 1967). But Flanagan (1989) pointed out that truly egalitarian societies do not exist, nor have they ever. As Sahlins (1958) stated, “an egalitarian society would be one in which every individual is of equal status, a society in which no one outranks anyone. But even the most primitive societies could not be described as egalitarian in this sense” (p. 1). Across the range of hierarchical/egalitarian societies, daily life is characterized by interpersonal power struggles and microeconomic inequalities that shape identity and constrain action (Flanagan & Rayner, 1988). Even within comparatively egalitarian societies, suppression of hierarchy requires constant effort and traditional hierarchies remain in some forms (e.g., gender inequality; Boehm, 1999). Hierarchy permeates even egalitarian cultures; age, gender, and family relations all provide opportunity to learn the importance of hierarchy in social life.

Implications for Politics

Shifts in the value of hierarchy have important practical implications for understanding cognitive processes underlying political ideology. Across all six studies, self-reported political ideology predicted support for hierarchical values, but did not interact with the manipulation or measurement of low-effort thought. Participants across the ideological spectrum valued hierarchy more—and equality less—when deliberate reasoning was interrupted.

These data are consistent with—and provide a potential explanation for—data that show low-effort thought promotes political conservatism (Eidelman et al., 2012). They found that distraction, time pressure, and instructions to think lightly caused a shift toward endorsement of politically conservative attitudes and beliefs. Because a critical component of conservative ideology is the preference for inequality (Bobbio, 1996; Jost et al., 2003), the shift toward prohierarchy values can help explain Eidelman and colleagues’ (2012) results.

Conclusion

The recognition and use of hierarchy begins early, occurs frequently, and never disappears from social life. Hierarchy is fundamental—Cultural norms and social structures that counter it can attenuate but not eliminate it. Hierarchy has a particular advantage over equality—It is valued quickly and easily, and when one cannot carefully deliberate, the endorsement of hierarchy increases while the endorsement of egalitarianism recedes. The implementation of egalitarian social or political systems faces a substantial psychological disadvantage; egalitarianism requires greater cognitive effort.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship (2011118823) awarded to John Blanchar.

Supplemental Material

The online supplemental material is available at .

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