The Evil Animal: A Terror Management Theory Perspective on the Human Tendency to Kill Animals

Abstract

This research tested whether support for the killing of animals serves a terror management function. In five studies, death primes caused participants to support the killing of animals more than control primes, unless the participants’ self-esteem had been elevated (Study 4). This effect was not moderated by gender, preexisting attitudes toward killing animals or animal rights, perceived human–animal similarity, religiosity, political orientation, or by the degree to which the killing was justified. Support for killing animals after subliminal death primes was also associated with an increased sense of power and invulnerability (Study 5). Implications and future directions are discussed.

Keywords

human–animal relations terror management violence genocide

As soon as man reached new historical forms of power, he turned against the animals with whom he previously identified- with a vengeance, we now see, because the animals embodied what man feared most, a nameless and faceless death.

—Ernest Becker (1975, p. 92)

Inconceivable numbers of animals are being killed by humans, for different reasons. Each year more than 3 million cats and dogs are euthanized in animal shelters in the United States (e.g., American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [ASPCA], n.d.), over 100 million animals in the United States die in animal-research (some of which experience pain without anesthesia; U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 2010), and billions of male chicks are killed in the egg industry (e.g., The Humane Society of the United States [HSUS], 2008).¹ Although some of the killing of animals is aimed at fulfilling society’s basic physical needs, psychological forces may also play a role in this phenomenon.

One possibility is that the killing of animals gives humans a sense of power and superiority over nature that protects them from the threatening awareness of mortality. This possibility is suggested by Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Marino & Mountain, 2015). According to TMT, humans unconsciously manage the potentially terrorizing awareness of mortality by denying their animal-like nature. To do so, they view themselves from within cultural worldviews that provide them with the sense that they are more than material creatures and so in some way they can transcend their own death. Our aim in this set of studies was to test the possibility that killing animals contributes to terror management. If we find that the killing of animals does partly serve this psychological purpose, we can better understand what could be done to reduce some of the unnecessary killing and abuse of animals.

The Killing of Animals

The killing of animals is an integral part of human life. Evolutionary anthropologists suggest that hunting animals for food was probably a key factor in human evolution and our differentiation from other prehistoric primates (e.g., Becker, 1973; Hill, 1982; Stanford, 1999). Over human history, people started to use, grow, and kill animals for farming, clothing, and later on for medicine and other purposes.

Although killing animals might often be necessary for the functioning of human societies, some animal rights advocates argue that in many cases animals are killed when the resources for avoiding the killing are available (e.g., Craven & Wallis, 2012; Mountain, 2011; Winograd, 2007). For instance, even some animal rights organizations, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) maintain their euthanasia programs despite the existence of potentially more economically viable alternatives to killing (such as “Trap-Neuter/Spay-Vaccinate-Return”; for example, Greenwood, 2015; PETA, n.d.; Winograd, 2007). Could such decisions to end the lives of animals be influenced by psychological factors that are often not taken into consideration?

The few studies that explored the psychology of killing animals have mainly found gender differences in support for animal experimentation, with men being more supportive of killing animals (e.g., Eldridge & Gluck, 1996; Swami, Furnham, & Christopher, 2008). Other research focused on various personality traits such as the “dark triad” (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy; Kavanagh, Signal, & Taylor, 2013), and sadism (Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013), which are positively correlated with support for killing and abusing animals; or empathy (e.g., McPhedran, 2009), which is negatively correlated with violence toward animals. These studies generally focus on abnormal dispositions and psychopathologies that are correlated with the killing of animals. Thus, these findings cannot account for the broad tolerance and support of animal killing in many cultures and for the socially supported institutions that kill hundreds of millions of animals each year.

TMT

TMT starts with the proposition that like all other animals, humans are biologically predisposed to try to stay alive. However, humans also have the cognitive capacity to acknowledge that they will eventually die. The clash between the desire for continued survival and the awareness of mortality can potentially cause anxiety. To avoid this anxiety, humans immerse themselves in cultural worldviews that provide them with meaning, value, order, and with a sense that they are more than just mortal animals that live in a body that is destined to die and decay—that they can continue to exist after death, either literally or symbolically.

The hypotheses derived from TMT have been supported through hundreds of studies in more than 25 different countries (for a review see Greenberg, Vail, & Pyszczynski, 2014). Basic research in TMT has shown that (a) death primes cause people to validate their cultural worldviews (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990), behave in ways that enhance their self-esteem (e.g., Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002), and deny the similarity between humans and animals (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2001); (b) enhancing people’s sense of self-esteem, affirming their cultural worldviews, or highlighting human–animal differences reduces anxiety, the accessibility of death-related thoughts in consciousness, and the need to validate worldviews when death thought is high in accessibility (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2001; Greenberg et al., 1992; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997); and (c) threatening people’s sense of self-esteem, undermining the validity of their cultural worldviews, or reminding them of human creatureliness—our similarity to other animals—causes an increase in the accessibility of death-related thoughts in consciousness (e.g., Goldenberg, Cox, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2002; J. Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & Williams, 2008; Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007).

According to TMT, because people’s animalistic bodily existence reminds them of their own mortality, thoughts about death drive them to disassociate from their body and from animals and nature (e.g., Becker, 1973, 1975; Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000; Marino & Mountain, 2015). This hypothesis was supported by studies showing that death reminders (compared with control inductions) elicit psychological distancing from bodily products and animals, as well as greater preference for essays that describe people as different from animals (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2001); avoidance of stimulating physical sensations (Goldenberg et al., 2006); definitions of the ingroup as more human (e.g., Vaes, Heflick, & Goldenberg, 2010); and dislike of wilderness (e.g., Koole & Van den Berg, 2005). Death and creatureliness primes increase negative attitudes toward animals (Beatson & Halloran, 2007), including negative attitudes towards pets among pet owners (Beatson, Loughnan, & Halloran, 2009). Furthermore, thinking about how animals (dolphins) are more intelligent than humans increased levels of death thought accessibility (Soenke, Greenberg, & Lifshin, in press).

The Current Research

Considering that death thoughts motivate people to deny their animalistic nature (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2001, 2006; Vaes et al., 2010) and express negative attitudes toward animals (e.g., Beatson & Halloran, 2007; Beatson et al., 2009), we propose that the killing of animals might also serve a terror management function. The killing of animals might implicitly make people feel superior to animals and therefore more than just mortal creatures. We found initial support for this idea in a pilot study (N = 72) containing various questionnaire items. Students who were more supportive of killing animals reported lower fear of death (r = −.28, p = .017) and death-related anxiety (r = −.33, p = .005; but not anxiety over major life events or social situations, rs < .19, ps > .11), as well as higher feelings of superiority over animals (r = .26, p = .027), which was also negatively related to death anxiety (r = −.25, p = .039).

Building off these initial correlations, we designed a series of five experiments to assess whether death primes would increase support for killing animals. Study 1 provided an initial test of this hypothesis. Studies 2 and 3 tested this hypothesis while demonstrating that this effect does not extend to support for policies that would increase the killing of humans. Because self-esteem boosts reduce the need for further defense after death reminders, Study 4 assessed the hypothesis that such a boost would eliminate the increase in support for killing animals. Finally, Study 5 assessed whether support for killing animals after death primes would be associated with an increased sense of personal invulnerability. Across the studies, we also explored whether variables such as preexisting attitudes toward animal rights (ATAR) would moderate the hypothesized effects.

Study 1

We tested whether death primes would lead to more support for killing animals. Because we did not want participants to explicitly connect thoughts of mortality to support for killing animals, we decided to use a subliminal death prime (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997).² Our primary prediction was that subliminal death primes would cause participants to support the killing of animals more than control primes.

However, because mortality salience (MS) effects are often moderated by aspects of the individual’s worldview (e.g., Castano et al., 2011; Greenberg et al., 1990), we also we wanted to assess whether participants’ ATAR would moderate the effect of subliminal death primes on support for killing animals. In fact, research showing that MS can increase positive attitudes toward the environment among pro-environmentalists is consistent with this possibility (Vess & Arndt, 2008). Indeed, “no kill” and other social movements (e.g., ASPCA) that oppose any killing of animals are growing in support throughout the world (Winograd, 2007). Nevertheless, there is also reason to believe that the death prime effect will not vary with ATAR. The idea that humans are different from and superior to other animals is a fundamental part of most worldviews, and this is certainly true of the mainstream American worldview. Indeed, peoples’ sense that they are special and can in some ways transcend their mortality is predicated on the notion that they are more than merely transient material animals. The finding that MS reduces positive attitudes toward pets among pet owners (Beatson et al., 2009) is consistent with this possibility. Thus, we saw no a priori basis for assuming that ATAR would moderate the effect of the death primes.

Finally, in light of previous studies (e.g., Eldridge & Gluck, 1996), we expected that men would support killing animals more than women.

Method

Participants

One hundred forty-one introductory psychology students at the University of Arizona took part in the experiment. After excluding the responses of 12 participants who were either suspicious or did not follow study instructions, data from 90 females and 39 males (M_age = 19.28, SD = 2.91) were analyzed.³

Procedure and materials

The experiment was introduced as two studies, one about perceptual information processing and one about attitudes and personality. Participants were first randomly assigned to the subliminal death or control prime condition, and then completed the rest of the measures using the online interface Qualtrics.com. Below are the materials in the order they were presented to the participants.

Premeasures

Participants’ ATAR (“how important to you personally is the cause of supporting animal rights?”; 1 = not at all, 9 = extremely) and perceived human–animal similarity (“Please rate how similar you think you are to other animals”; 1 = not at all similar, 9 = very similar) were assessed in a mass screening survey at the beginning of the semester, several weeks before the study.

Subliminal priming

The subliminal priming task was presented on a 64-bit Pentium 4 computer with a 1,024 × 768 screen resolution, using the software DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). As in prior research, we used a “word relationship task” as our cover story. Participants were presented with pairs of words and were asked to indicate, as fast as they could, if these words are related to each other or not. All stimuli were presented in Times New Roman 14-point font. The first and the third stimuli were the words for which participants were to judge the presence or absence of a relationship. These words also served as a fixation point and provided a forward and backward mask. The subliminal primes (DEAD or PAIN) were presented between the two mask words for 30 ms. We used PAIN as the control condition because pain is also aversive but distinct from death. This procedure was effective in previous terror management research (e.g., Arndt, Cook, Goldenberg, & Cox, 2007; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997).

Filler questionnaires

To aid the cover story, we added a short version of the morningness scale (Smith, Reilly, & Midkiff, 1989).

Support for killing animals

To measure support for killing animals (see Online Appendix 1), we constructed a questionnaire in which participants rated how much they agree with 16 statements addressing different domains of animal killing (e.g., “It is often necessary to control for animal overpopulation through different means, such as hunting, or euthanasia”; “An experiment should never cause the killing of animals”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). Factor analyses did not yield any distinct factors so we used an overall mean composite score as our measure of support for killing animals (one item was dropped because it had low interitem correlations; α = .81).

Results

To test our hypothesis, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis. In the first step, we entered prime (1 = DEAD, 0 = PAIN), gender (male = 1, female = 0) and ATAR (mean-centered). In the second and third steps, we entered all the two-way interaction terms, and the three-way interaction term. The outcome variable was support for killing animals.⁴

The first step was statistically significant, F(3, 120) = 14.38, p < .001, $R_{adj}^{2}$ = .25. The subliminal prime, t(125) = 2.11, p = .037, β = .17; gender, t(125) = 2.57, p = .011, β = .21; and ATAR, t(120) = 4.88, p < .001, β = −.39, all significantly predicted support for killing animals. The DEAD prime, being male, and less positive ATAR all predicted more support for killing. The second and third steps of the regression model were not significant, ΔF = 0.35, p = .788, and ΔF = 1.55, p = .216, respectively, as the Prime × ATAR interaction did not predict support for killing, t(117) = 0.44, p = .664.

To further examine the differences between the priming conditions in support for killing animals, we performed a t test using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples with gender as a stratified sampling variable. Participants in the subliminal DEAD condition supported killing animals (M = 5.03, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [4.75, 5.31]) more than participants in the subliminal PAIN condition (M = 4.52 [4.26, 4.76]), t(127) = 2.61, p = .01, Cohen’s d = .46.

Discussion

Participants exposed to subliminal death (compared with control) primes supported the killing of animals more. This effect was not moderated by gender, prior-existing ATAR, or perceived similarity to animals. This finding supports our hypothesis that concerns with mortality play a role in the human motivation to kill animals. Particularly interesting is the finding that ATAR did not moderate the effect, despite the fact that people who were more invested in animal rights were generally less supportive of killing animals.

Study 2

In Study 2, we sought to replicate the results from Study 1, while testing several alternative explanations. First, we wanted to ensure that the subliminal death priming effect is in fact due to terror management, rather than simply increasing the accessibility of the concept of killing (e.g., Higgins, 2012). If the effect is simply an automatic response, then such death primes should increase support for any type of killing. However, from a TMT perspective, death primes should only increase support for the type of killing that would defend or bolster people’s bases of terror management (e.g., of killing of animals or human enemies) and should not increase support for killing in general. Although many studies already demonstrate that the effects of death primes are specific to terror management, even in the context of aggression and violence (e.g., Motyl, Hart, & Pyszczynski, 2010; Pyszczynski et al., 2006), we wanted to directly test the alternative cognitive accessibility explanation. So, in addition to measuring support for killing animals we also measured support for killing humans in various domains.

Furthermore, to ensure that the effect observed in Study 1 is not related to the specific control condition used (subliminal PAIN primes), we used a different control word: “FAIL” (e.g., Arndt et al., 2007). We predicted that participants subliminally primed with “DEAD” would support killing animals more than participants subliminally primed with “FAIL.” However, we expected that there would be no difference between participants in the DEAD and FAIL conditions in support for killing humans.

Method

Participants

Eighty-seven students at the University of Arizona participated in the experiment. After excluding the responses of one participant who was suspicious about the prime, and four who had procedural errors, data from 49 females and 33 males (M_age = 18.68, SD = 1.38) were analyzed.

Procedure and materials

The procedure and cover story were the same as in Study 1. Participants were first randomly assigned to the different priming conditions. They then responded to either the measure of support for killing animals from Study 1, or to questions about support for killing humans. We chose this between-subject design to avoid contaminating any condition with additional death-related thoughts and to reduce demand characteristics.

Premeasures

As in Study 1, ATAR and perceived similarity to animals were assessed in a prescreening survey. We also included a single-item premeasure of support for killing animals (“Psychology experiments should never cause the killing of animals”; 1 = completely disagree, 9 = completely agree).

Subliminal priming

The subliminal death primes were administered using the same procedure as in Study 1. However, we replaced the control condition word “PAIN” with “FAIL.”

Filler questionnaires

The short morningness scale (Smith et al., 1989) was added as a filler.

Support for killing animals

Support for killing animals was measured using the same scale as in Study 1 (α = .92).

Support for killing humans

Participants rated their agreement with eight items regarding the killing of humans (e.g., “Police officers should NOT be allowed to shoot at unarmed suspects”; “Abortion is a good way of solving unwanted pregnancy”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). A factor analysis yielded four distinct factors, explaining 70.77% of the variance. One factor (three items) related to shooting, one related to abortion and human experimentation (two items), one related to hospital procedures (two items), and the last factor was an item about the death penalty for juveniles (see Online Appendix 2).

Results

To test our hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (subliminal prime: DEAD or FAIL) × 2 (target: animals or humans) between-subject ANCOVA, with the premeasure of support for killing animals as a covariate and general support for killing as the dependent variable (ATAR was not a significant covariate when the killing-animals premeasure was used).⁵

The analysis yielded a significant effect for target, as participants overall supported killing animals more than humans, (M = 4.51 vs. M = 3.50), F(1, 77) = 22.51, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .23. The main effect of the death prime was not significant, F(1, 77) = 2.95, p = .09, and the Prime × Target interaction was also not significant F(1, 77) = 2.63, p = .11, perhaps due to the strong target main effect, and the lack of a crossover pattern. However, having a priori prediction regarding the pairwise differences, we proceeded to investigate them nonetheless. The pairwise comparison did in fact fully support our prediction (see Figure 1): In the subliminal death prime condition, participants supported the killing of animals (M = 5.06, 95% CI = [4.57, 5.57]) more than participants in the control condition (M = 4.23 [3.60, 4.85]), F(1, 77) = 5.06, p = .024, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .06, but there was no difference between the death (M = 3.46 [3.08, 3.84]) and control prime (M = 3.44 [2.97, 3.91]) in support for killing humans, F(1, 77) = 0.01, p = .95. Looked at differently, the difference between support for killing animals and support for killing humans was larger after the subliminal death prime (M = 5.06 vs. M = 3.46), F(1, 77) = 19.87, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .21, than after the control prime (M = 4.23 vs. M = 3.44), F(1, 77) = 5.01, p = .028, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .06.

Figure 1.

Mean support for killing, according to the type of subliminal prime (“DEAD” or “FAIL”) and the target (animals vs. humans) in Study 2 (N = 82).

Because the measure of support for killing humans produced four factors, our ability to use a single measure of support for killing in a factorial design and capture an interaction effect was limited. We therefore also conducted a MANOVA for differences in the four factors of support for killing humans between the priming conditions, using bootstrapping with 10,000 resample. The analysis yielded no differences in support for killing humans on both the multivariate level, F(4, 38) = 0.04, p = .998, and the univariate level, all Fs < 0.11, ps > .74. Similar results were obtained by looking at all the items individually, all ts < 1.10, ps > .28.

Discussion

This experiment replicated the effect from Study 1 using a different control condition, supporting the idea that killing animals serves a terror management function. Furthermore, by showing that this effect does not occur in regard to support for various policies regarding the killing of humans, the findings cast doubt on the possibility that the latter effect is merely a result of increased accessibility of the general concept of killing. However, the lack of internal consistency reduces confidence in the killing-humans measure.

Study 3

Study 3 was therefore conducted to replicate Study 2 using a more reliable scale of support for killing humans, one that is more comparable to our support for killing animals scale. To do this, we created a questionnaire that measures participants support for killing animals or humans in experiments. Again, we hypothesized that death primes (compared with control) would increase support for killing animals, but would not affect support for killing humans.

Method

Participants

Three hundred and six students at the University of Arizona completed the experiment either online using Qualtrics.com (n = 217) or in a laboratory setting (n = 89).⁶ After excluding the responses of 78 participant (69 from the online sample) who either had missing data, were engaging in other activities during the study, or who were suspicious about the cover story, and two extreme outliers on the support for killing humans measure (Zs > 2.50), data from 156 females and 72 males (M_age = 18.89, SD = 2.80) were analyzed.

Procedure and materials

Participants were told that the study was about the relationship between aesthetic evaluation and social attitudes. Participants first rated five designs of T-shirt on a 5-point scale. The death prime was included in the fourth T-shirt: Participants were randomly assigned to see either a T-shirt with an image of a skull consisting of the word “death” printed on it multiple times or a similar colored T-shirt without the skull image (see Online Appendix 3). This procedure was based on previous research using a skull-image prime in both online and real-world settings (e.g., Chopik & Edelstein, 2014; Zestcott, Lifshin, Helm, & Greenberg, 2016).

Support for killing animals or humans

Participants were then (after filling out the filler morningness scale) randomly assigned to answer six questions regarding their support for killing either animals or humans in experiments (e.g., “Some animal [human] research should be conducted even if it puts the animals [participants] at risk of death,” “Animals [humans] should never be at risk of death in an experiment”; 1 = completely disagree, 9 = completely agree). A mean score was computed for support for killing animals (α = .94) or humans (α = .90), with higher scores indicating more support for killing in experiments (see Online Appendix 4).

Results

To test our hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (T-shirt prime: death or control) × 2 (target: animals or humans) × 2 (gender: male or female) between-subject ANOVA with support for killing in experiments as the dependent variable.⁷

The analysis showed a significant main effect for the type of target and for gender, as participants overall supported killing animals more than humans (M = 3.96 vs. M = 2.61), F(1, 220) = 21.91, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .09, and men overall supported killing more than women (M = 3.59 vs. M = 2.99), F(1, 220) = 4.39, p = .039, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02. The main effect for the death prime was not significant, F = 0.15, p = .697. Most importantly, the hypothesized Prime × Target interaction was significant, F(1, 220) = 5.09, p = .025, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02 (see Figure 2). All other interaction effects were not significant, Fs < 2.62, ps > .105. Pairwise comparisons indicated that, although death-primed participants supported the killing of animals (M = 4.34, 95% CI = [3.86, 4.83]) more than participants in the control condition (M = 3.58 [3.04, 4.11]), F(1, 220) = 4.36, p = .038, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02, there was no difference between the death prime (M = 2.34 [1.59, 3.01]) and the control prime (M = 2.88 [2.43, 3.33]) in support for killing humans, F(1, 220) = 1.45, p = .229. Looked at differently, the difference between support for killing animals and support for killing humans was larger after the death prime (M = 4.34 vs. M = 2.34), F(1, 220) = 19.23, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .08, than this difference after the control prime (M = 3.58 vs. M = 2.88), F(1, 220) = 3.93, p = .049, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .02.

Figure 2.

Mean support for killing in experiments, according to the type of T-shirt prime (death or control) and the target (animals vs. humans) in Study 3 (N = 228).

Discussion

These results replicated the findings from our previous study using parallel and internally consistent measures of support for animal and human killing. Death primes increased support for killing animals, but not for killing humans. This lends clear support for the notion that our effects are indeed related to terror management processes rather than to a purely cognitive effect of death-related cognition.

Study 4

In Study 4, we sought to replicate the results from the previous experiments, while further testing the role of terror management in this effect. If the effect of subliminal death primes on support for killing animals is driven by terror management needs, then satisfying those needs prior to the measurement of support for killing animals should moderate the effect. This could be achieved by increasing the participants’ self-esteem, for example, by giving them positive feedback (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Because self-esteem acts as a death anxiety buffer, temporarily elevating it should wipe away the need to support the killing of animals after the subliminal death prime. If we find that the increase in support for killing animals after the subliminal death prime occurs only when terror management needs are high (i.e., when participants have not received positive feedback), we can be even more certain that the effect is not due to mere automatic priming processes. To enhance the participants’ self-esteem in a way that would fit our prior studies, we decided to give the participants positive (vs. neutral) feedback regarding their performance on the word relationship task used for the subliminal priming induction (supposedly measuring perceptual information processing abilities).

We hypothesized that although under neutral conditions a subliminal death prime would increase support for killing animals, a self-esteem boost would eliminate this effect. Thus, we predicted that after neutral feedback regarding performance on a cognitive task, participants in the subliminal DEAD condition would support killing animals more than participants in the subliminal FAIL control condition. However, we expected no such difference among participants who received positive feedback about their performance in the cognitive task.

Method

Participants

Eighty-six students at the University of Arizona participated in the experiment. After excluding the responses of six participants who were suspicious, data from 70 females and 10 males (M_age = 18.56, SD = 0.87) were analyzed.

Procedure and materials

The experiment was introduced as two short studies, one about perceptual information processing abilities and one about the correlations between different measures of attitudes and personality. Participants were randomly assigned to subliminal priming condition, then given either positive or neutral feedback about their performance, and then completed the rest of the measures on Qualtrics.com.

Premeasures

ATAR and perceived similarity to animals were assessed in a prescreening survey. Support for killing animals was measured with the same premeasure from Study 2.

Subliminal priming

The subliminal “DEAD” or “FAIL” prime were presented using the same procedure as in Studies 1 and 2.

Self-esteem boost

Participants’ self-esteem was momentarily enhanced using false positive feedback about their performance in the “perceptual information processing” task. Positive feedback was used in prior TMT research to enhance self-esteem and moderate terror management responses (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). The experimenter randomly assigned the five cubicles to the different feedback conditions, while remaining blind to the priming condition. After the task, the experimenter entered the cubicle and casually gave the participants feedback, while looking at an ambiguous output file. In the positive feedback condition, the experimenter commented, “Oh wow, I’m not sure I’ve seen a score this high on this task, this is really good.” In the control condition, the experimenter commented, “Ok you did good, just as well as most people do on this task.”

Because the self-esteem manipulation was designed to appear spontaneous, and we did not want to arouse suspicion, we did not include a manipulation check for this manipulation in the study. Rather, we conducted a pilot study (N = 24) testing the effectiveness of this manipulation in which participants were either given the positive or neutral feedback and then responded to the questions, “How well do you think you performed on the perceptual information processing task?” (1 = not at all good, 5 = average, 9 = very good) and “How good did your performance on the perceptual information processing task make you feel about yourself?” (1 = not at all good, 5 = average, 9 = very good). Participants who received positive (vs. neutral) feedback through this method thought they performed better (M = 7.82 vs. M = 6.54), t(22) = 2.40, p = .025, Cohen’s d = .99, and felt better about themselves based on their performance (M = 7.82 vs. M = 6.00), t(22) = 5.64, p < . 001, Cohen’s d = 2.31. Participants also reported feeling very good about themselves in the debriefing sessions of both the pilot study and the actual experiment when they got the positive feedback. Thus, our feedback manipulation had the intended effect.

Filler questionnaires

The morningness scale (Smith et al., 1989) was again used as a filler.

Support for killing animals

Support for killing animals was measured using the same scale as in Studies 1 and 2. (α = .89; one item was dropped because it had low inter-item correlations).

Results

To test our hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (subliminal prime: DEAD or FAIL) × 2 (feedback condition: positive or neutral) between-subject ANCOVA on support for killing animals, controlling for the participants’ gender and ATAR, using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples.⁸

This analysis indicated that gender and ATAR were significant covariates, F(1, 74) = 12.80, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .15, and F(1, 74) = 11.31, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .15. Importantly, the hypothesized Prime × Feedback interaction was significant, F(1, 74) = 9.40, p = .003, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .11 (see Figure 3). As expected, when the feedback was neutral, participants in the subliminal DEAD condition supported killing animals (M = 5.25, 95% CI = [4.68, 5.82]) more than participants in the subliminal FAIL condition (M = 4.18 [3.79, 4.58]), F(1, 74) = 7.83, p = .003, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .10. Also supporting our hypothesis, this difference was eliminated in the positive feedback condition. Here participants in the subliminal DEAD (M = 4.00 [3.37, 4.70]) and FAIL (M = 4.60 [4.06, 5.10]) conditions did not differ significantly, F(1, 74) = 2.45, p = .156. All other effects were not significant, Fs < 2.39, p > .13. Looked at differently, death-primed participants who did not receive positive feedback supported the killing of animals more than those who did, F(1, 74) = 10.34, p = .005, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .12, but there was no difference between the feedback conditions among FAIL-primed participants, F(1, 74) = 1.26, p = .200. As in the previous studies, there were no significant interaction effects with ATAR, all Fs < 1.15, ps > .29.

Figure 3.

Mean support for killing animals, according to the type of subliminal prime (“DEAD” or “FAIL”) and the feedback condition (positive/self-esteem boost vs. neutral/no boost) in Study 4 (N = 80).

Discussion

Study 4 replicated the death prime effect. Furthermore, consistent with TMT, this effect was eliminated by a self-esteem boost. This further supports the idea that elevated support for animal killing in these studies is motivated by a desire to quell mortality concerns activated by the death primes. It is conceivable that the positive feedback simply distracted participants more than the neutral feedback, thereby reducing death thought accessibility after the subliminal death prime. However, given the prior studies’ findings linking death primes specifically to support for killing animals, it seems more likely that self-esteem eliminated the need for additional terror management in the form of supporting killing animals. The distraction possibility also seems unlikely in light of earlier studies showing that death reminders prompt increased death thought accessibility that is sustained through numerous distraction tasks (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997).

Study 5

Study 5 was conducted to replicate and further explore the findings from Studies 1 to 4. First, given that killing may be perceived as immoral, we assessed the possible moderating effect of level of external justification for killing animals. High external justification should make it such that support for killing cannot clearly be attributed to the participants’ dispositional characteristics (e.g., to their lack of morality or empathy), and thus should lead to greater support for killing animals in response to the subliminal death prime compared with when no salient external justification is present (e.g., Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979). This might lead to an interaction, such that the death prime has an especially strong effect when external justification is high. It is also possible, however, that high external justification would just increase tolerance of killing animals in general and the prime would have similar effects regardless of justification.

Second, we wanted to further examine the psychological function of supporting the killing of animals. We hypothesized that support for killing animals would be correlated with feelings of power and invulnerability when death-related thoughts are primed. This effect might result from a causal sequence, whereby (a) the threat of death implicitly makes people feel more vulnerable, (b) prompting them to show heightened support for killing animals, (c) which in turn results in a heightened sense of invulnerability and power. We predicted that there would be a positive indirect effect of subliminal death prime on feelings of power, control, and invulnerability through support for killing animals. We did not expect that there would be a direct effect of prime on measures of invulnerability and powerfulness, as it is not likely that death primes would generally increase these perceptions.

Finally, to increase the ecological validity of our findings, we measured support for killing animals in a more concrete scenario: the annual killing of 200 million male chicks in the egg industry. We also went beyond the earlier studies by measuring a behavioral intention, namely, the participants’ willingness to pay more money to prevent the killing of male chicks.

We predicted that the subliminal DEAD (compared with FAIL) primes would increase support for killing animals, especially when it is justified and there is ambiguity regarding the participants’ motives for supporting the killing. We also expected that for participants in the subliminal DEAD prime condition, support for killing animals would be associated with greater feelings of power, control, and invulnerability.

Method

Participants

One hundred fifteen introductory psychology students participated in this study for course credits. After excluding the responses of nine participants who were suspicious,⁹ the results of 70 females and 36 males were analyzed (M_age = 18.75, SD = 0.80).

Procedure and materials

The experiment was introduced as three short studies, which were run together. The participants were told that the “first study” (our subliminal priming induction) examines perceptual information processing. The “second study” (that included the support for killing-animals measure in the different justification conditions) was supposedly about attitudes toward various social issues in the news. This part of the study was completed using Qualtrics.com. The “third study” (our measures of power, control, and invulnerability) was portrayed as a pilot for new measures. This was done in a pencil-and-paper format.

Premeasures

As in the previous studies, ATAR and perceived similarity to animals were assessed in a screening survey. To better control for within-subject variability, we included in our prescreening survey a measure of support for killing animals, consisting of three items (e.g., “People should never kill animals because of overpopulation”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree; α = .83). We also included measures of importance of religious beliefs (1 = not at all important, 9 = extremely important) and political attitudes (1 = very conservative, 9 = very liberal).

Subliminal priming

The subliminal death priming was done using the same procedure as in the previous studies, using the word “FAIL” as the comparison condition.

Attributional ambiguity: Justification for killing

To create attributional ambiguity regarding the participants’ motives to support killing animals, we varied the degree to which the killing was justified (see Online Appendix 5). We fabricated an article about the killing of male chicks in the egg industry, using facts from various resources such as news articles and websites of farming companies. Then we created two versions of this article. One version implied a high level of justification, in that the killing of male chicks was presented as vital for the survival of the egg industry. The other version implied a low level of justification: The article noted that the killing of male chicks could be avoided if consumers paid about 10% more for eggs.

Support for killing male chicks

As our primary outcome measure, we included five items (α = .91) in which participants rated the degree to which they agree with statements about killing of male chicks (e.g., “It is legitimate for farmers to kill male chicks if they do not have the means to provide for them”; 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). In addition, we asked participants how much more money (by percentage) should consumers pay for eggs if it would help stop the killing of male chicks (see Online Appendix 6).

Power, control, and invulnerability

Participants were asked to rate their agreement with five statements about their feelings of power (e.g., “I feel powerful”), invulnerability (e.g., “I can escape dangerous situations”), and sense of control (e.g., “I have a great deal of control over my life”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

Principal components analysis (with a varimax rotation) of these items resulted in two factors, which together explained 60.16% of the total variance. Factor 1 (Eigenvalue = 2.0) consisted of the control item and the third invulnerability item: “I feel vulnerable” (reversed). Factor 2 (Eigenvalue = .99) consisted of the power item and the first and second invulnerability items: “I can take risks and get away with it” and “I can escape dangerous situations.” These two factors were conceptualized as Control-Based Invulnerability (CBI) and Power-Based Invulnerability (PBI).¹⁰

Results

Support for killing male chicks

To test our hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (subliminal prime: DEAD or FAIL) × 2 (justification condition: high or low) between-subject ANCOVA, controlling for the participants’ preexisting attitudes toward killing animals.¹¹

The analysis indicated that preexisting attitudes toward killing animals was a significant covariate, F(1, 99) = 28.51, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .22. There was a significant main effect for the type of prime, F(1, 99) = 7.73, p = .006, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .07, as participants in the subliminal DEAD priming condition supported the killing of male chicks significantly more (M = 3.49, 95% CI = [3.16, 3.82]) than those in the control condition, (M = 2.95 [2.7, 3.21]). There was also a significant main effect of the justification condition F(1, 99) = 7.38, p = .008, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .07, as people in the high justification condition supported the killing of male chicks significantly more (M = 3.16 [3.16, 3.80]) than those in the low justification condition (M = 2.97 [2.69, 3.24]). The interaction effect was not significant F < 1, p = .532 (see Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Mean support for killing male chicks, according to the type of subliminal prime (“DEAD” or “FAIL”) and attributional ambiguity (high or low justification for killing) in Study 5 (N = 104).

Willingness to raise egg prices

Preliminary tests indicated that the increased percentage that participants agreed that consumer should pay to stop the killing was not normally distributed (skewness = 9.58, kurtosis = 12.45), and that there was heterogeneity of variance between the different conditions, Levene’s test, F(3, 100) = 5.37, p < .005. This was probably because the low justification condition provided an anchor for participant responses (the alleged 10% increase in egg prices that could stop the killing), whereas the high justification condition did not.¹²

We therefore used bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples to estimate the means and CIs of the dependent variable in the subliminal DEAD and FAIL priming conditions separately for each justification condition. There was a significant difference in the low justification condition, t(31.28) = 2.26, p = .031, such that participants in the DEAD prime condition advocated a lower raise in egg prices, M = 7.97, 95% CI = [6.29, 9.64] compared with participants in the FAIL condition (M = 13.79 [9.52, 18.82]). There was no such difference in the high justification condition, t(48) = .34, p = .737 (see Figure 5).

Figure 5.

Differences in the suggested raise in the price of eggs (in percentages) that consumers should pay to stop the killing of male chicks, by the type of prime (“DEAD” or “FAIL”) and attributional ambiguity (high or low justification for killing) in Study 5 (N = 104).

An additional nonparametric test indicated that participants were generally willing to pay less money to stop the killing in the subliminal DEAD prime condition compared with the control condition, Mann–Whitney U = 1,084, z(105) = 1.94, p = .05.

Power, control, and invulnerability

We tested our hypothesis that the effect of the subliminal prime on support for killing animals would indirectly increase power, control, and invulnerability. The independent variable was the subliminal prime (DEAD = 1, FAIL = 0), the mediator was support for killing animals, and the dependent variables in the analyses were the PBI and CBI factors (a separate test was conducted for each factor). We also included the justification condition and preexisting attitudes toward killing animals as covariates. The 95% CIs obtained for the indirect effect were estimated via bootstrapping from 10,000 subsamples using the SPSS macro PROCESS (A. F. Hayes, 2012). Path coefficients were computed using hierarchical regression analyses.

As predicted, the indirect effect of the subliminal prime on PBI through support for killing was positive and significantly different from zero, M_effect = .11, 95% CI = [.02, .30]. Examining the specific paths (see Figure 6), the DEAD prime increased support for killing animals (A path), t(100) = 2.80, p = .006, β = .23, and support for killing significantly increased PBI (B path) t(99) = 2.35, p = .021, β = .27. The subliminal prime was not related to PBI (C path), t(100) = 0.78, p = .437, β = .08, also when we controlled for support for killing (C′ path), t(99) = 0.13, p = .893, β = .01.¹³ The indirect effects of the subliminal prime on CBI through support for killing were not different from zero, 95% CI = [−.18, .06].

Figure 6.

A model depicting the indirect effect of the subliminal prime (DEAD = 1, FAIL= 0), on feelings of invulnerability and power (PBI factor) through support for killing (N = 104).

Discussion

This study provided further evidence supporting our central hypothesis regarding the effect of death-related thoughts on support for killing animals, as the subliminal death prime (compared with the failure prime) elicited more participant support for the annual killing of 200 million male chicks in the egg industry even in the no-justification condition. The finding that, in the low justification condition, death-primed participants were not willing to pay the 10% that was needed to help stop the killing of male chicks is remarkable.

This study also provided initial support for our hypothesis regarding the role of support for killing animals in providing a sense of power and invulnerability. The indirect effect analysis showed that the subliminal DEAD prime led participants to support killing animals more, and that this increased support for killing was asociated with higher levels of power and invulnerability.

General Discussion

The results from this set of studies provide the first direct empirical evidence that support for killing animals is in part caused by the psychological need to manage the awareness of mortality. In Studies 1 to 5, death primes caused participants to support the killing of nonhuman animals more than the control primes. This effect was not moderated by participants’ gender, ATAR, perceived similarity to animals, preexisting attitudes toward killing animals, religiosity, political attitudes, or by the justification of the killing.

In addition, we found support for the idea that this effect is indeed related to terror management needs rather than to an automatic cognitive priming process, by showing that it is specific to animals rather than fellow humans (Studies 2-3) and that it is reduced when terror management needs are met via a self-esteem boost (Study 4). Furthermore, in Study 5, death primes indirectly increased feelings of power and invulnerability via increased support for killing animals. This indirect effect provides some insight into the specific psychological effects of killing animals. These findings, using multiple methods and measures, converge in supporting the view that the increased favorability toward killing animals after death primes served a psychological function, rather than being a mere product of cognitive activation.

This research has some limitations. One limitation of these studies is the fact that they were conducted among a specific population: American college students. It is possible that other age groups or people from other countries would respond differently. Nevertheless, we have several reasons to suspect that these findings do apply to the general human population and might be even stronger in situations outside the college laboratory. First, we did find in Study 1 and in our mass survey data that, within our limited subject pool, older students supported killing animals more (r = .15, p < .001). This may be a consequence of increased cognitive dissonance due to a “richer” history of killing. Second, despite the fact that unimaginable numbers of animals are killed in America, Americans are relatively advanced in promoting the cause of animal rights. Indeed, when we compared the mass survey responses of domestic and foreign students, we noticed that Americans are generally less supportive of killing animals, F(1, 1132) = 10.60, p = .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .01. Nonetheless, perhaps people who view animals as holy, such as Buddhists in Tibet or India, would not choose killing animals in general as a terror management strategy. Further research should investigate such possible cultural differences.

Another limitation is that we did not provide conclusive evidence for the causal effect that support for killing animals might have on feelings of invulnerability and powerfulness. Although we did find support for the hypothesized causal direction in the form of a null reverse-mediational model, we cannot be completely confident that support for killing causes an increase in power and invulnerability.

This study has several important implications. First, the findings that support for killing animals serves a psychological function, rather than a merely practical one, should prompt people to question policies that might unjustly promote the killing of animals. In our investigation, we deliberately did not focus on attitudes toward instances of killing animals that may be necessary for human survival. Instead, we focused on instances of killing that may be avoided, such as when humans are trying to control for animal overpopulation, using animals in psychological experiments, or killing male chicks to save an extra 10% on costs. Indeed, the finding that death-related thoughts increased acceptance for the annual killing of 200 million male chicks in the egg industry, even when there was no real justification provided for doing so, suggests that this is not merely a matter of practicalities. We hope that these findings may alarm policy makers into considering how psychological drives might bias decisions regarding the lives of hundreds of millions of innocent animals.

Second, this research may provide additional insight into occurrences of mass killing among humans. Social psychologists have established empirical links between violent attitudes toward animals and prejudice, aggression, and genocide via the process of dehumanization and infrahumanization (e.g., Arluke, Levin, Luke, & Ascione, 1999; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Costello & Hodson, 2010; Harris, & Fiske, 2011; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Because humans are animals, they can always be stripped of their human characteristics. Dehumanization provides the justification to kill humans, especially when the killing is not necessary for immediate survival, as in the case of genocide (e.g., Bandura et al., 1975; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). By understanding the psychological function of the killing of animals, we could perhaps realize how to make the tendency to dehumanize out-groups less dangerous. Future studies should investigate the relationship between support for killing animals and support for killing out-group members. For example, it may be useful to test whether delegitimizing the killing of animals could decrease support for killing dehumanized out-groups.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the research assistants Audrey Cortesi, Maigan Davey, Joshua Hoeft, and Marissa Giunta for their help on this project. They also thank Dr. Jeff Stone for his helpful comments on the article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

The supplemental material is available at online.

Notes

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