Half a Gift Is Not Half-Hearted: A Giver–Receiver Asymmetry in the Thoughtfulness of Partial Gifts

Abstract

Four studies document an asymmetry in givers’ and receivers’ evaluations of gifts: Givers underestimate the extent to which receivers perceive partial (but more desirable) gifts to be thoughtful, valuable, and worthy of appreciation. Study 1 documents this asymmetry and suggests that givers underestimate the extent to which partial gifts signal thoughtfulness to receivers. Study 2 replicates this asymmetry in the context of a real gift exchange among friends. Study 3 shows that this asymmetry arises because givers believe that purchasing partial gifts is a greater violation of gift-giving norms than do receivers, leading givers to expect that partial gifts will damage receivers’ perceptions of a gift’s value. Study 4 offers an intervention that induces givers to select the (partial) gifts that receivers prefer more than givers expect: framing a gift’s separate components as complete units.

Keywords

gift giving social exchange thoughtfulness decision making completeness

Introduction

Imagine you are deciding between two gifts for a friend. You think your friend would prefer one gift more, but this gift exceeds your budget. The second option, which you think your friend would also like—just not as much—is within your price range. You want to be a good friend, but you are reluctant to overspend. What would you do: Pay for part of a gift that your friend likes best, or all of a gift your friend will not like as much? Recognizing this gift-giving dilemma, several websites now offer givers the opportunity to purchase part of a recipient’s most desired present—from cars to honeymoons (e.g., dodgedartregistry.com, ourwishingwell.com, freegiftregistry.com). But are givers willing to give someone they care about a partial gift?

We predict that givers’ and receivers’ preferences conflict: Givers incorrectly believe that receivers prefer a complete gift (i.e., a gift that receivers can use without further financial investment) rather than part of a more desired gift (i.e., a gift that requires further financial investment, but a gift the receiver considers more desirable); in contrast to givers’ beliefs, receivers appreciate and want partial (but more desirable) gifts more than givers expect. For example, imagine a giver has US$40 to spend on a friend’s gift, and is deciding whether to give a US$40 gift certificate to the friend’s second favorite restaurant where the friend always orders a US$40 entrée, or a US$40 gift certificate to their friend’s favorite restaurant where the friend always orders a US$50 entrée. We predict that givers prefer to give the former gift (i.e., the complete gift), whereas receivers do not prefer to receive it. These conflicting preferences lead givers to choose gifts that receivers would not choose for themselves.

Gift-giving failures like this are surprisingly common: 40% to 50% of Americans return at least one gift every year (National Retail Federation). Such miscues occur despite the fact that gift givers spend more time and consider more alternatives when they search for a gift for someone else than when they shop for themselves (Clarke & Belk, 1979; Grønhaug, 1972). Gift givers have good intentions, and they try to adhere to the social mores of gift giving to ensure receivers’ appreciation of their gifts (Camerer, 1988; Mauss, 1925). However, givers and receivers may be sensitive to different social norms that govern gift exchange (e.g., Flynn & Adams, 2009). Drawing on the focus theory of normative conduct (Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993), we identify an important asymmetry in gift exchange: Givers adhere more to a “completeness norm” in gift giving (avoiding partial gifts), whereas gift recipients adhere more to a “desirability” norm (focusing relatively more on the most preferred gift).

Givers’ Bias for Complete Gifts

A preference for completeness influences what people choose for themselves (Evers, Inbar, & Zeelenberg, 2014). For example, individuals are less willing to give up a whole (e.g., a larger denomination of money) rather than the collective parts of the whole (e.g., smaller denominations that add to the same total; Mishra, Mishra, & Nayakankuppam, 2006). Individuals may even choose for themselves inferior product sets that are complete over superior product sets that are incomplete (Evers et al., 2014). In the context of gift exchange, we theorize that the preference for completeness also plays a pivotal role, leading givers to choose an inferior gift over a superior one. To date, no research has considered the influence of a “completeness norm” in gift exchange. This is surprising given the frequency with which givers face budgetary constraints in gift selection and retailers’ resulting attempts to offer givers the opportunity to purchase part of a present.

Multiple social norms influence individual judgment in gift exchange. Indeed, a pretest conducted among 75 Mechanical Turk participants revealed that after participants read a definition of social norms (i.e., “socially accepted rules that people strive to abide by”; Online Appendix A), the majority perceived that giving both complete gifts, 88.0%; χ²(1, N = 75) = 43.32, p < .001, and desirable gifts, 90.7%; χ²(1, N = 75) = 49.61, p < .001, were social norms. This suggests that both norms may be important in gift exchange. But do givers and receivers consider these norms to be equally important? We propose that they do not; rather, givers perceive the completeness norm to be relatively more important than the desirability norm. We further propose that receivers, in contrast to givers, focus relatively more on the gift’s desirability (i.e., whether the gift matches their tastes and preferences).

In general, people adhere to the norms that they deem relevant and important (Goldstein, 2008; Reno et al., 1993). In a similar vein, we suggest that givers’ and receivers’ adherence to specific norms of gift exchange is shaped by the extent to which they deem such norms to be relevant and worthy of their attention. Prior research suggests that the most relevant aspect of gift exchange for givers is selecting a gift they believe will signal their liking of the receiver and their investment in the joint relationship (Gino & Flynn, 2011; Ward & Broniarczyk, 2016). Givers, therefore, aim to make a good choice—one that will leave receivers with no question of the givers’ liking of, and commitment to their relationship with, the receiver. For example, givers prefer to give expensive gifts because they believe that recipients perceive higher priced gifts to be a particularly strong signal that the giver cares for them and is committed to their well-being (Flynn & Adams, 2009).

Drawing on this literature, we theorize that givers may be particularly sensitive to norms that could influence receivers’ perceptions of how much money they have invested in a gift. The norm of “completeness” may be salient for givers because they may assume that receivers interpret a partial gift as an indicator that insufficient resources were devoted to the gift, thereby sending the receiver a “weak signal.” Going one step further, givers may fear that receivers will interpret the ungifted portion of a partial gift as a conspicuous sign that the giver deems the joint relationship as unworthy of complete investment. In fact, givers may expect recipients to perceive an incomplete gift as less valuable than a complete gift, even when their actual monetary value is identical. People’s perceptions of nonpecuniary elements of an item can shape their evaluation of that item’s actual worth—for example, people perceive less value in physically damaged money than in undamaged money (Di Muro & Noseworthy, 2013). In a similar vein, if givers assume that violating the completeness norm signals an insufficient investment in the joint relationship, and communicates a limit to the givers’ concern for the receiver, givers may believe that this violation damages receivers’ perceptions of a gift’s value; as a result, givers may be averse to giving a partial gift.

Givers expect receivers to judge less valuable gifts as less thoughtful and less worthy of appreciation (Flynn & Adams, 2009). Thus, if givers expect that receivers will perceive a partial gift as less valuable, they may also expect that a partial gift will be perceived as less thoughtful and less worthy of appreciation. Givers’ overarching goal is to send a positive message of concern to the gift recipient (Gino & Flynn, 2011; Ward & Broniarczyk, 2016); the threat of coming across as thoughtless looms large. Givers may attend relatively more to the norm of completeness in choosing a gift because they are fearful of undermining the receiver’s perceptions of the gift’s thoughtfulness. In colloquial terms, givers may fear that giving half a gift comes across as half-hearted.

In contrast, we predict that receivers do not care as much about the norm of completeness in gift giving, provided that the giver honors the desirability norm (i.e., giving a gift that matches the receiver’s preferences). For receivers, the most relevant aspect of gift exchange is consumption of a gift rather than its selection. The receiver hopes to maximize his or her personal enjoyment when making use of the gift. Thus, norms that implicate the gift’s personal utility will be most salient to the receiver. Consistent with this reasoning, research suggests that receivers focus primarily on whether gifts match their personal tastes and preferences (e.g., Gino & Flynn, 2011). Building on this literature, we hypothesize that receivers focus relatively more on whether a gift reflects their own preferences rather than on whether a gift is complete. If receivers focus relatively more on the desirability norm, as we predict, then givers’ fear of signaling an insufficient investment in the joint relationship by purchasing a partial gift (e.g., and thus potentially signaling an unsatisfactory monetary expenditure) may be unfounded.

Drawing on the focus theory of normative conduct, we theorize that this asymmetry persists despite the fact that people frequently occupy the roles of both givers and receivers. According to previous research, when numerous and conflicting norms exist, one norm will primarily influence behavior when the situation activates that norm most strongly (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno et al., 1993). For the reasons stated above, we theorize that the role of gift giver heightens the perceived importance of the norm of completeness more than the norm of desirability, whereas the role of gift receiver heightens the perceived importance of the norm of desirability. Thus, despite people’s frequent experience with both roles, we theorize that the proposed giver–receiver asymmetry persists.

This giver–receiver asymmetry has clear consequences. If givers wrongly assume that receivers focus more on gifts’ partiality than desirability, they will choose to give suboptimal gifts—items that receivers neither appreciate as much nor choose for themselves as often as other gifts. To help address this problem, we offer an intervention that aids givers in choosing better gifts: convincing them that a partial gift is, in fact, complete. After all, completeness can be subjective: A dozen eggs can be framed as a single unit of 12 eggs or 12 units of a single egg. In the context of gift giving, givers may be more comfortable purchasing a partial gift if it can stand alone as a single entity. With this approach, a partial gift may satisfy a receiver’s preference to obtain a more desirable gift and a giver’s preference to provide a complete gift.

Overview

We predict that givers underestimate the extent to which receivers value and desire an incomplete but more desirable gift to a complete but less desirable gift. That is, givers systematically misjudge receivers’ preference for partial gifts. We further predict that this asymmetry leads gift givers to select suboptimal gifts—complete but less preferred gifts that receivers desire much less than givers believe. We test our account in four studies.

Study 1 provides an initial test of these predictions, showing that givers expect that receivers perceive partial gifts as less thoughtful than they actually do, an error that leads givers to purchase suboptimal gifts. Study 2 replicates this finding in a gift-giving context with real consequences. Study 3 reveals that this asymmetry emerges because givers (vs. receivers) believe that giving partial gifts represents a greater norm violation, which leads givers to underestimate the extent to which receivers value partial gifts. As a result, givers underestimate the thoughtfulness that partial (vs. desirable) gifts signal, and the appreciation that they elicit as a result. Study 4 identifies a remedy: Framing the price of a (less affordable) preferred gift in terms of the prices of the gift’s (more affordable) complete subcomponents decreases giver–receiver asymmetries in gift choices.

Study 1

Study 1 provides an initial test of our hypotheses across several product categories: restaurant meals, spa treatments, and concert tickets.

Method

Three hundred Mechanical Turk participants completed the study for payment. Participants were randomly assigned to one cell of a 2 (role: giver vs. recipient) × 3 (context: restaurant vs. spa vs. concert) design. We selected a target sample size of 50 to 60 participants per cell in keeping with previous research investigating gift giving (e.g., Flynn & Adams, 2009; Rudd, Aaker, & Norton, 2014). No participant’s data were excluded in this study or in any of the subsequent studies except when specified in the analyses.

Participants assigned to be givers in the restaurant condition were asked to imagine that their friend always orders a US$50 entrée at his favorite restaurant, and always orders a US$40 entrée at his second favorite restaurant. Participants read that they had US$40 to spend on this friend’s birthday present, and were deciding between giving their friend either a US$40 gift certificate to their friend’s second favorite restaurant (where he always orders a US$40 entrée), or a US$40 gift certificate to their friend’s favorite restaurant (where he always orders a US$50 entrée). Participants assigned to be receivers in the restaurant condition read this scenario from the perspective of the receiver. The scenarios read by participants assigned to be givers and receivers in the spa and concert conditions were similar in structure to these scenarios (Online Appendix B).

Dependent variables

Gift choices

Givers (receivers) indicated which gift they wanted to give (receive from) their friend by selecting a radio button labeled with their chosen gift.

Appreciation

Three items assessed the appreciation that givers expected receivers to experience: Which gift do you think your friend would appreciate more? Which gift do you think your friend would be more grateful for? and Which gift do you think that your friend would be more thankful for? Recipients’ appreciation was assessed with the same items written from the recipient’s perspective (Online Appendix B). Participants responded on seven-point scales (1 = Gift A, 7 = Gift B). We averaged the items to create an index of appreciation (α = .92).

Thoughtfulness

Three items assessed thoughtfulness: Which gift is more thoughtful? Which gift is more considerate? and Which gift is more caring? Participants responded on seven-point scales (1 = Definitely Gift A, 7 = Definitely Gift B). We averaged the items to create a composite index of thoughtfulness (α = .90).

Results and Discussion

One participant did not choose a gift and was thus excluded from the analyses.

Gift choice

A binary 2 (role: giver vs. receiver) × 3 (context: restaurant vs. spa vs. concert) logistic regression revealed a main effect of role (b = 0.99, p = .009), but no main effect of scenario or interactions (bs < 0.15, ps > .462); we, therefore, collapsed across context. As predicted, receivers (64.2%) more often chose the partial—but more desirable—gift than did givers (40.4%), χ²(1, N = 299) = 16.96, p < .001 (odds ratio [OR] = 2.64; 95% confidence interval [CI] = [1.657, 4.221]).

Appreciation

The same 2 × 3 analysis on the appreciation composite revealed a main effect of role (b = 0.63, p = .044), but no main effect of context or interactions (bs < 0.158, ps > .356); thus, we collapsed across context. Receivers (M = 4.38, SE = .12) appreciated the partial gift more than givers predicted (M = 3.92, SE = .15), t(297) = 2.32, p = .021 (Cohen’s d = .200; 95% CI = [0.018, 0.381]).

Thoughtfulness

The same 2 × 3 analysis on the thoughtfulness composite revealed a main effect of role (b = 0.81, p = .007), but no effect of context or interactions (bs < 0.20, ps > .219), so we collapsed across context. Receivers (M = 4.24, SE = .11) perceived the partial gift as more thoughtful than did givers (M = 3.66, SE = .15), t(297) = 3.05, p = .003 (Cohen’s d = .352; 95% CI = [0.174, 0.537]).

Mediation

We expected that the asymmetry in perceived thoughtfulness would drive the asymmetry in predicted appreciation, which would in turn drive the giver–receiver asymmetry in gift choices. As predicted, a serial mediation model with 3,000 bootstraps (Hayes, 2013) revealed that the giver–receiver asymmetry in gift choice was mediated by thoughtfulness leading to appreciation (95% CI = [0.0253, 0.1160]; Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Multistep mediation model in Study 1.

Together, Study 1 provides initial evidence that givers underestimate the extent to which receivers prefer a partial but more desirable gift to a complete but less desirable gift. However, one potential limitation of Study 1 is its use of hypothetical scenarios. In Study 2, we examine whether these results emerge when real friends exchange real gifts.

Study 2

Study 1 revealed that givers incorrectly appraise the amount of thoughtfulness that receivers infer—and the amount of appreciation that receivers then experience—from receiving a more desirable but partial gift. Study 2 examines whether these results extend to gift giving among real friends.

Study 2 also tests the generalizability of the current phenomenon. In Study 1, givers were explicitly informed that the receiver preferred a relatively expensive option. In contrast, Study 2 examines whether the asymmetry persists when givers are not explicitly informed about receivers’ preferences, but rather when they are presented with product choices (that exceed their budget) whose attributes objectively dominate the attributes of other options whose cost is within their budget.

Method

Sixty-two pairs of undergraduate friends (i.e., 124 individuals) at a west coast university participated in dyads for payment. Participants were randomly assigned to the roles of giver or receiver and seated in separate rooms. Givers learned they would choose an early birthday gift for their friend. Givers were allotted US$5 to spend on their gift, and learned they should choose a gift from a list of eight products (two headphones, flash drives, flashlights, and lamps), which were presented with a price and average customer rating (Online Appendix C). In each product pair, one product cost US$5 and had an average rating of three out of five stars, whereas the other cost US$8 with an average rating of five out of five stars. Givers learned that their friend would receive their chosen gift if they chose a US$5 gift; if they chose an US$8 gift, their friend would decide if she or he wanted to pay the difference (US$3) to receive the gift. Thus, givers chose between giving a portion of a more desirable gift versus a complete but less desirable gift. Participants assigned to be receivers read similar instructions from the receiver’s perspective (Online Appendix C).

Givers (receivers) indicated which gift they wanted to give (receive from) their friend by selecting a radio button labeled with their chosen gift. We measured appreciation (α = .90) and thoughtfulness (α = .82) as in Study 1. Additional items measured are documented in Online Appendix C.

Results and Discussion

A generalized linear mixed-model analysis treating friend pair as a random factor to control for nested dependencies among friends (and which employed unstructured covariance, and included random intercepts for participant pair) revealed that receivers (50.0%) more often chose a partial gift than did givers (29.0%), b = 0.19, t = 2.40, p = .020 (OR = 2.44; 95% CI = 1.166, 5.127).

Next, we conducted linear mixed-model analyses treating friend pair as a random factor on each of the continuous dependent variables. Each of these analyses employed unstructured covariance and included random intercepts for participant pair. These analyses revealed that givers (M = 2.99, SE = .21) underestimated the extent to which receivers (M = 3.83, SE = .21) perceived a partial gift to be thoughtful (b = 0.78, t = 2.75, p = .008. Givers (M = 3.18, SE = .23) also underestimated the extent to which receivers (M = 4.09, SE = .22) appreciated the partial gift (b = 0.87, t = 2.85, p = .006). Replicating Study 1, a serial mediation model with 3,000 bootstraps revealed that the giver–receiver asymmetry in gift choice was mediated by thoughtfulness leading to appreciation (95% CI = 0.0425, 0.2096; Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Multistep mediation model in Study 2.

Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 revealed that givers incorrectly appraise the amount of thoughtfulness that receivers infer—and the amount of appreciation that receivers then experience—from receiving a more desirable but partial gift. Study 3 examines whether these incorrect appraisals emanate from the fact that givers perceive that giving a partial gift is a greater social norm violation than do receivers. We further examine whether this asymmetry in perceived norm violation leads givers to fear that an incomplete gift will damage receivers’ perceptions of an incomplete gift’s value, which in turn generates the documented asymmetry in thoughtfulness and appreciation. In other words, in Study 3, we test the full proposed mediational path—givers choose gifts that receivers would not choose for themselves because givers (vs. receivers) perceive giving a partial gift to be a greater norm violation, which in turn leads givers to underestimate the extent to which receivers value incomplete gifts and thus perceive incomplete gifts as thoughtful and subsequently appreciate them.

Study 3 also examines an alternative explanation for the results documented thus far. In particular, perhaps the predicted asymmetry emerged in the previous studies because givers were not certain whether recipients had the means or interest to purchase the remainder of the incomplete gift; this uncertainty may have increased givers’ likelihood of purchasing the complete gift. In Study 3, we examine this alternative explanation by highlighting (for both givers and recipients) that the recipient would choose to purchase the remainder of the incomplete gift if it was given. According to this potential alternative explanation, the asymmetry should not persist in this context, whereas our theorizing predicts that it will.

Method

Two hundred three Mechanical Turk participants were randomly assigned to either a giver or receiver condition. Participants assigned to be givers were asked to imagine that their friend always orders a US$50 entrée at his favorite restaurant, and always orders a US$40 entrée at his second favorite restaurant. Participants read that they had US$40 to spend on this friend’s birthday present, and were deciding between giving their friend either a US$40 gift certificate to their friend’s second favorite restaurant (where he always orders a US$40 entrée), or a US$40 gift certificate to their friend’s favorite restaurant (where he always orders a US$50 entrée). The former gift was labeled “Gift A” and the latter gift was labeled “Gift B.” Participants assigned to be receivers read this scenario from the perspective of the receiver. All participants read that the receiver would choose to use the US$40 gift certificate at their favorite restaurant if it was given (Online Appendix D).

Next, participants indicated their gift choice as in the previous studies. Then, we measured perceived appreciation, thoughtfulness, norm violation, and value in a randomized order. Appreciation (α = .93) and thoughtfulness (α = .91) were measured as in Study 2. Givers also indicated the extent to which the partial gift violated the completeness norm by answering the following question: If you give your friend Gift B, to what extent would your friend think that you are violating the social norms (e.g., socially accepted rules) of gift giving? Participants indicated their responses on a seven-point scale (1: Not At All; 7: Very Much). Receivers answered this question from the perspective of the receivers (Online Appendix D). In addition, we assessed perceived value with two questions. Specifically, participants in the giver condition answered the following questions: If you gave your friend Gift A, how much money would your friend feel that you spent on the gift? and If you gave your friend Gift B, how much money would your friend feel that you spent on the gift? Participants indicated their responses on separate seven-point scales (1 = Not Much At All, 7 = A Lot). Receivers answered these questions from the perspective of the receivers (Online Appendix D). We computed the effect of completeness on participants’ expectations of a gift’s value by subtracting their valuation of Gift B (i.e., the incomplete gift) from their valuation of Gift A (i.e., the complete gift).

Results and Discussion

Replicating the previous studies, receivers (50.0%) more often chose the partial—but more desirable—gift than did givers (28.2%), χ²(1, N = 203) = 10.19, p = .001 (OR = 2.55; 95% CI = 1.4267, 4.5639).

To examine the valuation data, we conducted a 2 (role: giver vs. receiver) × 2 (gift valuation: Gift A vs. Gift B) repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 200) = 7.79, p = .006. Post hocs revealed that givers predicted that receivers would perceive the partial gift (M = 4.75, SD = 1.47) as less valuable than the complete gift (M = 5.28, SD = 1.29), t(101) = 3.75, p < .001. In contrast, the gift’s completeness did not affect receivers’ perceptions of its monetary value: Receivers perceived the partial gift (M = 5.66, SD = 1.29) and the complete gift (M = 5.71, SD = 1.17) to be equally valuable, t(99) = 0.51, p = .614.

Also as predicted, receivers (vs. givers) perceived the partial gift as less of a norm violation (M_Receivers = 2.23, SD_Receivers = 1.65; M_Givers = 3.52, SD_Givers = 1.84; t(199) = 5.22, p < .001), as more thoughtful (M_Givers = 3.34, SD_Givers = 1.67; M_Receivers = 4.22, SD_Receivers = 1.19; t(200) = 4.31, p < .001), and as more worthy of appreciation (M_Givers = 3.56, SD_Givers = 1.80; M_Receivers = 4.12, SD_Receivers = 1.25; t(201) = 2.57, p = .011). Further consistent with our theorizing, a serial mediation model with 3,000 bootstraps (Hayes, 2013) revealed that the giver–receiver asymmetry in gift choice was mediated by differences in norm perception leading to differences in valuation of the incomplete gift, which in turn led to the asymmetry in expected thoughtfulness and thus appreciation (95% CI = 0.0016, 0.0842; Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Multistep mediation model in Study 3.

Study 4

Study 4 identifies an intervention to decrease the giver–receiver asymmetry in gift choices. Specifically, we examined whether manipulating gifts’ perceived completeness tempers givers’ preference for complete gifts. We hypothesized that framing the total price of a (less affordable) preferred gift in terms of the individual prices of (more affordable) complete subcomponents reduces the giver–receiver asymmetry in gift choices.

Method

Two hundred six Mechanical Turk participants participated in exchange for payment. Participants were randomly assigned to one cell in a 2 (role: giver vs. receiver) × 2 (framing of preferred gift: component cost vs. full cost) design. Participants assigned to the full cost/giver condition were asked to imagine that they had US$100 to spend on their friend’s wedding gift. Participants further read that they were deciding between getting their friend a US$100 gift certificate to a store that sells a set of 10 fancy place settings (which cost US$1,000 and is the gift that their friend wants the most), or a US$100 gift certificate to a store that sells a set of candlesticks (which cost US$100 and which the friend wants a little less than the place settings). As expected, a pretest conducted among 102 participants from the same participant pool confirmed that participants perceived the gift of US$100 toward the US$1,000 place settings as a partial gift: After participants read the scenario, they were asked whether they thought that it was possible to purchase the place settings individually (1 = it is definitely not possible to purchase them individually, 7 = it definitely is possible to purchase them individually). A single-sample t-test revealed that participants’ responses were significantly below the scale midpoint of four (M = 3.53, SD = 1.98; t(101) = 2.40, p = .018), which suggests that, overall, participants perceived that it was unlikely that the plates could be purchased separately.

The scenario read by those assigned to the component cost/giver condition was similar except participants read that the place settings could be purchased separately: They read that the place settings cost US$100 each and US$1,000 total. Thus, these participants viewed the preferred gift’s price framed in terms of the price of the gift’s complete subcomponents in addition to the price of the full gift.

The information read by those in the receiver conditions was similar but written from the receiver’s perspective (Online Appendix E). Participants then indicated their gift choice as in Study 1.

Results and Discussion

A binary logistic regression revealed a 2 (role: giver vs. receiver) × 2 (framing of preferred gift: component cost vs. full cost) interaction on gift choices (b = 1.24, p = .022; Figure 4). As in Studies 1-3, receivers (42.0%) more often chose the desirable gift than did givers (24.5%) in the full cost conditions (b = 1.24, p = .003; OR = 2.23; 95% CI = 0.961, 5.165). However, receivers’ (52.9%) and givers’ (44.2%) choices in the component cost conditions did not differ (b = 0.09, p = .820). In other words, whereas framing did not affect receivers’ gift choices (b = 0.44, p = .272), givers chose the desirable gift in the component cost (vs. full cost) condition more often (b = 0.89, p = .035; OR = 0.41; 95% CI = 0.179, 0.941). In sum, framing partial gifts as complete subcomponents induced givers to focus more on desirability than partiality, causing their choices to more closely match receivers’ preferences. Importantly, the framing manipulation did not influence receivers’ choices. This finding is consistent with our theorizing that—in contrast to givers—receivers are less concerned with the norm of completeness in gift giving, provided that the gift fulfills the desirability norm (i.e., the gift matches the receiver’s preferences). As a result, receivers’ preference for the preferred gift in Study 4 was not influenced by whether or not the partial gift was framed as a partial gift.

Figure 4.

Percentage choosing the desirable gift in Study 4.

Along with the prior studies, Study 4 illuminates the range of techniques that givers employ to avoid giving partial gifts: Studies 1 to 3 suggest that givers’ desire to give complete gifts can lead them to give complete gifts in the same product domain in which receivers prefer a different option. Study 4 finds that givers’ desire to avoid giving partial gifts can also lead them to give a complete (but less preferred) gift in a different product domain than a receiver’s preferred gift.

General Discussion

When selecting gifts, givers try to infer receivers’ preferences as well as their perceptions of what the gift conveys about the giver’s thoughtfulness (Belk, 1976; McGrath, Sherry, & Levy, 1993). This seemingly simple process is complicated by people’s struggle to take others’ perspectives (e.g., Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000; Krüger, Mata, & Ihmels, 2014; Weaver, Garcia, & Schwarz, 2012)—and gift givers are no exception. We find that givers believe that giving a partial gift is a greater norm violation than do receivers, which in turn leads givers to incorrectly appraise the amount of value and thoughtfulness that receivers infer—and the amount of appreciation that receivers then experience—from receiving a more desirable but partial gift. Consistent with research revealing that receivers focus on whether givers attempt to give gifts that match receivers’ tastes (e.g., Flynn & Adams, 2009), receivers do not perceive adherence to the completeness norm to be of primary importance. Consequently, receivers do not perceive partial gifts to signal the low value and thoughtlessness that givers fear, and receivers thus appreciate partial but more desirable gifts more than givers expect.

Our results are robust across substantially different gift prices and contexts. For example, the asymmetry emerged when the total gift price was US$8 (Study 2), US$50 (Study 1 and Study 3), and US$1,000 (Study 4). It emerged when the focal gift options included restaurant meals (Study 1 and Study 3), electronics (Study 2), and home goods (Study 4). Furthermore, it emerged in real gift exchanges (Study 2) and in gifts for both birthdays (Studies 1-3) and weddings (Study 4). Thus, although the external validity of some of the current studies may be limited (e.g., a giver’s inability to part with an additional US$10 in Study 1), the complete set of studies reveals that the same asymmetry emerges in more externally valid contexts (e.g., a giver’s inability to part with an additional US$900 in Study 4). In sum, the strong generalizability of the results suggests that these findings may have wide-ranging implications for gift-giving practices.

This research makes several theoretical contributions. First, it demonstrates a novel—and meaningful—asymmetry in how givers and receivers value gifts. Specifically, our research reveals that recipients’ preferences for complete versus partial gifts is not intuitive to givers. Second, we extend existing research on the preference for completeness, which suggests that the preference for completeness influences people’s behavior in isolation (Evers et al., 2014). We find that it extends to interpersonal contexts, with less-than-ideal consequences for social exchange. Third, our findings contribute to an expanding literature suggesting that even when individuals have occupied the roles of others, they still have difficulty taking others’ perspectives. Indeed, despite the frequency with which people purchase and receive gifts, individuals frequently fail to choose gifts receivers want (National Retail Federation). We illuminate a novel reason why recipients dislike and subsequently return gifts—an asymmetric preference for completeness in gift exchange.

Givers are heavily swayed by many social norms in selecting gifts, but the desirability norm seems to take a backseat. Research suggests several ways in which givers underweight the desirability norm to honor other gift-giving norms they believe receivers deem more important. For example, givers endorse the “give an expensive gift” norm, “give a unique and exclusive gift” norm, and “give a surprising gift” norm more than receivers—who would prefer that givers honor the desirability norm (e.g., Flynn & Adams, 2009; Teigen, Olsen, & Solas, 2005). Our research illuminates a previously unexplored norm that contributes to givers’ frequent failure to select optimal gifts: Givers’ attempts to honor a completeness norm can cause them to further underweight the desirability norm, and then underestimate the extent to which receivers prefer a partial but more desirable gift to a complete but less desirable gift.

Future Directions

Future research might explore several questions that build on the present findings. First, because the current research documents givers’ overarching aversion to giving partial gifts, future research could profit from providing more precise insight into the strength of this aversion (e.g., by measuring how much effort or time people are willing to spend to avoid giving a partial gift). Second, we encourage future research to investigate the potential moderating role of the relationship between givers and receivers: Because gift giving can be a signal of commitment to a relationship (Camerer, 1988), givers may be less averse to purchasing incomplete gifts for extremely close receivers—who may be more aware of givers’ commitment. When uncertainty exists about the level of commitment, givers may be more likely to avoid gifts that they believe convey a lack of thoughtfulness: partial gifts. In a similar vein, because we find that givers avoid partial gifts to avoid signaling thoughtlessness, perhaps givers would no longer avoid partial gifts when they are anonymous (i.e., when givers will not receive attribution for their gift, and the gift therefore does not signal relational thoughtfulness). It is further possible that givers are more willing to give partial gifts if they can unambiguously signal their thoughtfulness through other mechanisms (e.g., devoting significant time to their gift choice).

A receiver’s ability to afford the ungifted portion of an incomplete gift might also moderate these results. In Study 1 and Study 3, receivers needed to contribute just US$10 to purchase their preferred gift, in Study 2, just US$3, and in Study 4, other givers might have purchased the remaining place settings. However, receivers may be less likely to appreciate partial gifts when they cannot afford to pay the remainder (e.g., US$5 toward a US$50,000 car). However, if the ungifted portion is extremely small (e.g., US$1), giving an incomplete gift may amplify the current effect. This is because givers may feel that a nominal ungifted amount signals a particularly high degree of thoughtlessness—when a gift’s completion requires a paltry investment, givers may fear that receivers will be even more likely to attribute the ungifted portion of the gift to thoughtlessness and a lack of commitment rather than to an external cause (e.g., a lack of financial resources).

Also relevant to the potential moderating role of gift type, we encourage future research to examine the context of coordinated gift exchanges. Perhaps the giver–receiver asymmetry disappears when a group of individuals coordinate to provide a single gift. In this case, a single giver may be relatively certain that others will give the remaining portion of a gift and may not perceive any violation of the completeness norm. To put this in context, a giver may be averse to giving newlyweds only the airfare in a honeymoon package if she or he is unsure whether other givers will cover the remaining portion of the honeymoon. However, if the focal giver knows that others are expected to commit to purchasing the remaining portions of the honeymoon package, the partial gift may not feel as incomplete and thus may not be as aversive. If this is indeed the case, then interventions that facilitate givers’ ability to contribute to group gifts may aid givers in choosing better gifts. With this approach, a partial gift may satisfy a receiver’s preference to obtain a more desirable gift and a giver’s preference to provide a complete gift.

Finally, the relative desirability between two gift options may further moderate the current results. One possibility is that givers (vs. receivers) continue to predominately focus on a gift’s completeness (vs. desirability) regardless of the relative desirability of the gift options, which leads the documented asymmetry to increase as the relative difference in the gifts’ desirability increases. Alternatively, it is possible that givers’ focus on the completeness norm follows a threshold model, such that givers predominately focus on a gift’s completeness only if the gift surpasses a baseline threshold of relative desirability. We encourage future research to examine both possibilities.

In a similar vein, the relative desirability of the gift options employed in the current studies may underlie the variance in the studies’ descriptive results. For example, it is possible that receivers perceived a relatively large difference in desirability between their favorite and second favorite options in Study 1 (which led the majority of receivers to choose the partial gift in Study 1), whereas receivers perceived a relatively small difference in desirability between the more and less expensive electronic products in Study 2 (which resulted in a smaller percentage of receivers choosing the partial gift in Study 2). Most important, the predicted asymmetry emerged across these substantially different gift contexts and manipulations of gift desirability, which speaks to its robustness. However, we encourage future research to investigate whether stronger manipulations of relative gift desirability increase the proportion of receivers who prefer partial gifts.

Practical Implications

Finally, we note our findings’ practical implications. Despite the significant time and effort that givers invest in choosing gifts that recipients will like and not return (Clarke & Belk, 1979; Grønhaug, 1972), givers often fall short (National Retail Federation). Giving a gift that a recipient dislikes and returns can negatively affect the recipient and the shared relationship—this experience can cause recipients to experience negative affect (e.g., frustration and guilt) and evaluate givers unfavorably (Ruth, Otnes, & Brunel, 1999; Sherry, McGrath, & Levy, 1992). We illuminate a possible means to reduce the number of gift returns. Specifically, givers may be more likely to give gifts that recipients want (and will not return) if givers recognize that receivers do not perceive partial gifts to signal the low value and thoughtlessness that givers fear, and that receivers thus appreciate partial but more desirable gifts more than givers expect.

Our research offers a practical solution to help givers achieve success. When retailers market products as potential gifts, referencing the prices of goods’ components could improve givers’ gift choices. Our results suggest that such framing may increase givers’ purchases of a partial but more desired good, which may increase receivers’ appreciation. Websites such as travelersjoy.com, for example, allow givers to buy segments of newlyweds’ honeymoons: Buying someone a one-way ticket to Hawaii may seem incomplete, but givers may be more willing to purchase such gifts if they are framed as complete segments of the honeymoon. Similarly, although giving someone US$100 toward the purchase of a car may seem incomplete, websites like dodgedartregistry.com enable givers to use that money to purchase a complete component of the recipient’s desired car (e.g., the engine). This framing not only increases givers’ willingness to buy but also leads them to buy gifts that are more likely to match receivers’ preferences. As a result, encouraging givers to forgo their preference for completeness has the potential to improve gift exchange for both parties involved.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Barbara Darcy, who inspired this research.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

Supplementary material is available online with this article.

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