Perpetrating Violence Increases Identification With Violent Groups: Survey Evidence From Former Combatants

Abstract

Heightened group identification motivates individuals to perpetrate violence, but can perpetrating violence—in and of itself—increase identification with violent groups? I test this idea using archival surveys of ex-combatants. In Liberia, where many combatants joined their violent group willingly, the data show a positive association between perpetrating violence and identification with one’s violent group (Study 1). These results hold even when controlling for potentially confounding variables such as being abducted into the group versus joining willingly, length of time in the group, and personally experiencing violence. Study 2 replicates and extends this finding with data from ex-combatants in Uganda who were abducted into their group, using a natural experiment in which some abductees were forced to perpetrate violence whereas other abductees were not. These findings support a cycle of violence in which perpetrating violence increases identification with violent groups and heightened identification increases future violent behavior.

Keywords

violence harm intergroup conflict group identification

Social psychologists have long been interested in the questions of how and why individuals engage in collective violence. Motivated in part by observations of extreme intergroup conflict and genocide, such as the Holocaust, Rwandan genocide, and Israeli–Palestinian conflict, psychologists have established that heightened identification with one’s ingroup can induce individuals to perpetrate violence on behalf of their group. Under certain conditions, ingroup love can pave the way to outgroup hate, making violence seem like a reasonable or even virtuous behavior (Fiske & Rai, 2014; Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Correlational studies and research from the lab show that highly identified group members, particularly those whose individual sense of self is fully integrated with that of their group, are more supportive of and willing to engage in violent behavior on behalf of their ingroup (Swann, Gomez, Huici, Morales, & Hixon, 2010). High identifiers may even come to associate subjective pleasure with outgroup pain, making it possible to overcome their aversion to harming competitive outgroup members (Cikara, 2015).

Although this research demonstrates that identification with a group can motivate ordinary people to perpetrate violence, in many cases in the real world, individuals do not initially identify strongly with their violent group (Cohen, 2013). Many violent groups are attractive for social or economic reasons. Only after joining are individuals faced with the reality of having to engage in violent behavior to stay in the group. For example, an individual might join the military to receive help paying for college in the future, rather than because of a particular ideology or preexisting allegiance (Kleykamp, 2006). Individuals may also be conscripted or even abducted into violent groups, which are relatively common “recruitment” strategies employed by militant and insurgent groups (Cohen, 2013). Such “recruits” likely exhibit low levels of identification with their violent group to begin with and may even harbor negative attitudes or active resentment toward the group. In these common cases, the encouragement to perpetrate violence on behalf of the group may come before the individual feels a sense of group identification.

I build upon the literature showing that group identification motivates violent behavior by asking whether this process also operates in the reverse direction. If perpetrating violence—in and of itself—increases group identification, this has important implications for future violent behavior and may help explain cycles of intergroup conflict. It suggests a cycle of violence in which violent behavior increases identification with violent groups and group identification increases future violent behavior. It also implies that individuals need not start off as high group identifiers to eventually become loyal group members. Violence itself may help trigger this process, even among individuals who are resistant to joining the group, or who join only for opportunistic reasons.

Research Hypothesis

I hypothesize that perpetrating violence on behalf of one’s group will increase identification with the group. This is consistent with previous work suggesting that violence creates bonds between group members through participation in an extreme shared experience (Decker, 1996; Stretesky & Pogrebin, 2007; Vigil, 1996). Even in groups that recruit members through coercion, violence can be used as a tool to engender loyalty among new members (Beber & Blattman, 2013; Cohen, 2013)

Much of the research related to this hypothesis focuses on the effects of experiencing, as opposed to perpetrating, violence on behalf of a group. Initiation rituals that involve perpetrating violence are relatively rare (Best & Hutchinson, 1996; Descormiers & Corrado, 2016). Instead, groups such as gangs, militaries, sports teams, and fraternities/sororities generally require the initiate to undergo violence or other forms of extreme discomfort (Johnson, 2011; Vigil, 1996; Wachira et al., 2015; Winslow, 1999). For example, initiates in gangs are often “beaten in” to the group, going through a rite in which they have to take a beating by multiple older group members (Decker, 1996; Stretesky & Pogrebin, 2007). These types of initiations test whether the new member is strong enough to handle group life and associated violence and allow for new members to signal their loyalty (Descormiers & Corrado, 2016; Vigil, 1996).

The empirical research examining whether initiations increase group identification is mixed. Two classic studies in social psychology demonstrate that undergoing an unpleasant or violent group initiation increases the attractiveness of a new group (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Gerard & Mathewson, 1966). Similarly, recent experimental work in the lab shows that collectively undergoing a painful task in a group setting (small groups of two to six university students) increases self-reported group identification (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014). However, a field study investigating this effect in Dutch sororities found that undergoing a more severe initiation actually decreased the attractiveness of the group (Lodewijkx & Syroit, 1997). Studies of hazing among sports teams similarly show that hazing can erode trust and decrease group cohesion (Johnson, 2011; Van Raalte, Cornelius, Linder, & Brewer, 2007). Although this research on initiations is informative, undergoing violence may not invoke the same psychological processes as perpetrating violence.

One previous article by Toosi, Masicampo, and Ambady (2014) examined the effect of aggressive behavior on group identification, in the context of players who switch teams in professional basketball and in a live-action tag game. The researchers found that engaging in aggressive acts against one’s former ingroup is the strongest predictor of commitment to one’s new group. Will this finding extend to more extreme scenarios, such as when individuals attack or kill another person in a war? I test this using archival data from ex-combatants who engaged in extreme physical violence, including forced violence against family members.

Theorizing the Path From Violent Behavior to Group Identification

In this section, I draw on social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the related uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007) to explain why perpetrating violence on behalf of one’s group is expected to increase identification with that group. According to uncertainty-identity theory, individuals identify with groups to reduce uncertainty about the self and their place in the world (Hogg, Hohman, & Rivera, 2008). I argue that committing violence may lead individuals to feel a sense of uncertainty about who they are and about how others will view them. Increasing their identification with the violent group may be a particularly effective method of reducing this uncertainty.

Reducing Uncertainty About the Self

Research from moral psychology and military history shows that individuals generally exhibit an aversion to harming others and will avoid causing harm even at personal cost (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Grossman, 1996). When individuals—particularly those who are inexperienced with violent behavior—do harm others, they experience psychological and physiological distress (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012; Maguen et al., 2010; Milgram, 1965; Navarrete, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012). This distress may arise when individuals consider the negative outcomes associated with harming others. It may also come from a learned, negative physiological response to the violent action itself (Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 2014).

When individuals perpetrate violence, the resulting distress may make them question their actions and even question the self. According to uncertainty-identity theory, a particularly effective way to reduce this uncertainty is for individuals to increase their identification with a group (Hogg & Adelman, 2013), even gangs and other unhealthy groups (Goldman, Giles, & Hogg, 2014; Hogg, Siegel, & Hohman, 2011). Focusing on the relevant group membership depersonalizes one’s behavior, as group membership comes with a set of prescribed ways to think, feel, and act. In the context of violent groups, violent behavior falls within the prescribed norms of the group and may even elicit positive feedback from other group members. Increasing their identification with the violent group helps the individual to stop feeling uncertain about the self, as their behavior is validated by the group.

Reducing Uncertainty About One’s Place in the World

According to SIT, individuals often categorize themselves as members of multiple groups and may identify strongly with more than one group at a time (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). However, this multiple group membership becomes complicated when the groups have different, and possibly conflicting, norms for behavior. Members of violent groups may perceive that meaningful others outside of the group do not endorse their violent behavior. This could lead the individual to disidentify with their other groups, for example, due to fear that they will be rejected for violating the standards of the group or because they feel that they no longer belong (Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011; Glasford, Pratto, & Dovidio, 2008).

This sense of uncertainty about where they stand in the social world can lead individuals to increase their identification with the group that still accepts them and validates their violent behavior (Hogg et al., 2008). In addition, as individuals have fewer identities, they come to identify more strongly with their existing identities (Grant & Hogg, 2012), in this case, the violent group. This theoretical idea has support from scholars who study violent groups such as gangs and insurgent groups (Beber & Blattman, 2013; Decker, 1996). For example, Beber and Blattman (2013) argued that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) used fear of rejection as an explicit tactic, forcing some abductees to engage in extreme violence against family and community members, and often telling abductees that they would be shunned or killed if they tried to return home.

Present Research: Survey Evidence From Former Combatants

In this article, I use surveys of former combatants in Liberia and Uganda to test whether engaging in violent behavior on behalf of a group increases identification with the violent group. In Uganda, I study a tragic natural experiment in which some members of the LRA were quasi-randomly assigned to perpetrate violence against loved ones whereas other group members were not. The LRA was comprised mostly of youth abducted from their homes and forced into the group; it should be extremely difficult to produce group identification in these circumstances. This natural experiment provides one of the most unlikely contexts in which to find a relationship between perpetrating violence and group identification.

Study 1: Violent Behavior and Group Identification in Liberia

In Study 1, I use survey data from ex-combatants in Liberia to examine whether there is a positive association between perpetrating violence and group identification, even when controlling for individual differences in demographic characteristics and war experiences.

Study Context

Liberia, a small West African nation of roughly 3.5 million people, experienced two long and brutal civil wars between 1989 and 2003. In 1989, following a decade of increasing political tensions and human rights abuses, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) began a revolt, which quickly escalated into a civil war. Taylor’s government proved to be little different from that of the previous regime, and by 1999, two anti-Taylor groups emerged to fight the government. The civil wars in Liberia left nearly 150,000 people dead and led to the complete breakdown of law and order (Ellis, 1999).

Description of Data

The archival data used in this study come from surveys with 1,099 ex-combatants (93.4% male), representing 11 fighting factions present during Liberia’s civil crisis. Some of the respondents were abducted into their fighting faction, whereas others were voluntary recruits. The data were collected by Blattman and Annan (2016) as part of the registration process for an ex-combatant agricultural training program run by the organization Action on Armed Violence (see Online Appendix 1 for more information on the survey and data collection procedures). Data collection took place from August through October 2009, approximately 6 years after the end of the conflict.

Analytic Approach

I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test whether there is a positive association between the violence that ex-combatants report committing during the war and their violent group identification. I predict group identification by violence perpetrated on behalf of the group, including fighting faction fixed effects and calculating robust standard errors. I also test for the positive association between perpetrating violence and group identification when controlling for a number of potentially confounding variables, including individual differences in demographic characteristics and war experiences described below. I typically report results from both the models with and without covariates, but when not specified, the reported results are from models with covariates.

Measures

Violent behavior

The independent variable in this study is a measure of violence perpetrated on behalf of one’s violent group. Approximately halfway through the interview, respondents completed a section on war experiences in which they were asked, “How many violent acts were you forced to commit: none, few, some, or plenty?” This question forms the measure of violence perpetrated, ranging from 0 (no violent acts) to 1 (plenty violent acts).

Group identification

The dependent variable is a measure of identification with one’s violent group during Liberia’s civil war. This consists of two questions that tap into different dimensions of group identification: “Did you enjoy being a member of this faction?” and “Was there a time when you really believed in this faction with your heart?” Answer options were on a 4-point scale of “not at all,” “small,” “some,” or “plenty.” Responses to these two questions were averaged to create a measure of group identification (0-3).

War experience covariates

I control for mode of joining (abducted vs. joined willingly), length of time in the fighting faction (using the log of the number of months), age at joining the faction, and whether the respondent carried a gun, was on the frontlines, served as a soldier in their main role, ever led others in the faction, and ever held rank. I also control for which faction they were a member of and the year they joined the group. Finally, I control for individual differences in exposure to violence. Respondents were asked a number of questions about whether they or their families ever witnessed or experienced different violent events. Examples include “Did someone attack you with a cutlass or other weapon?” “Did you see someone get killed?” and “Was your wife or husband killed during the war?” (see Online Appendix 1 for a full list of questions). As illustrated by these examples, the questions fall into three main categories: violence personally experienced (i.e., harm done to the respondent; seven items; Cronbach’s α = .62), violence personally witnessed (three items; Cronbach’s α = .43), and violence experienced by their loved ones (five items; Cronbach’s α = .47). Each category forms a control variable, for which a higher value indicates more violence experienced or witnessed.

Demographic covariates

In addition to war experiences, I control for several demographic characteristics, including age, gender, religion, and ethnicity.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Respondents in this sample come from 11 fighting groups active during Liberia’s civil conflict. The mean length of time spent in one’s group was 27.6 months (SD = 29.4), and the mean age at joining the group was 19.6 years old (SD = 6.78). Over half of respondents reported being abducted into their fighting group (57%), whereas the remaining 43% reported joining voluntarily. Turning to engagement in violent behavior, 66.4% of respondents reported perpetrating no violent acts, 17.9% reported “few” acts perpetrated, 5.7% “some” acts, and 10% “plenty” acts. When describing their level of identification with their fighting group, about 40% of respondents reported that they enjoyed being in their violent group, and that they really believed in the group with their heart, at least for a small amount of the time (see Table 1 for more descriptive statistics).

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics for the Liberian Ex-Combatant Sample.

	M	N
Index of group identification (0-3)	0.88 (1.14)	1,099
Enjoyed being a member of the violent group (0-3)	0.86 (1.21)	1,099
Believed in the group with their heart (0-3)	0.90 (1.24)	1,099
Index of violence perpetrated (0-1)	0.20 (0.33)	1,077
Index of violence personally experienced (0-1)	0.49 (0.24)	1,077
Index of violence witnessed (0-1)	0.78 (0.25)	1,077
Index of violence experienced by loved ones (0-1)	0.51 (0.21)	1,077
Length of time in violent group (months)	27.6 (29.4)	1,094
Age when joined violent group	19.6 (6.8)	1,090
Carried a gun while in violent group	79%	1,096
On the frontlines while in violent group	18%	1,099
Main role in violent group was as a soldier	71%	1,099
Held rank in violent group	30%	1,099
Held leadership position in violent group	42%	1,099
Abducted into violent group	57%	1,099
Most common violent groups
Member of LURD	28%	1,099
Member of NPFL	27%	1,099
Member of MODEL	12%	1,099
Member of GoL	12%	1,099
Member of LPC	8%	1,099

Note. This table includes descriptive statistics for the independent variable, dependent variable, and all war-experienced covariates used in the analysis for Study 1. LURD = Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy; NPFL = National Patriotic Front of Liberia; MODEL = Movement for Democracy in Liberia; GoL = Government of Liberia; LPC = Liberia Peace Council.

Association between perpetrating violence and group identification

As shown in Figure 1, there is a positive association between engaging in violent behavior and level of identification with the violent group (β = .262, 95% confidence interval (95% CI) = [0.046, 0.477], p = .017; see Online Appendix 4, Table 1, for full regression results). These results hold when controlling for individual differences in war experiences and demographic characteristics (β = .304, 95% CI = [0.092, 0.515], p = .005), such as length of time in the group, experiencing violence, and mode of joining the group.

Figure 1.

Perpetrating violence is positively associated with group identification in Liberia.

In fact, although respondents who joined their faction willingly report a higher level of group identification than those who were abducted (β = −.674, 95% CI = [–0.816, –0.531], p = .000), being abducted into the group does not moderate the effect of violent behavior on group identification (β = −.0251, 95% CI = [–0.699, 0.197], p = .272). Finally, the findings remain consistent when analyzing the two items in the group identification index separately (β = .372, 95% CI = [0.148, 0.595], p = .001 for enjoy; β = .236, 95% CI = [0.005, 0.467], p = .045 for believe).

Discussion

Survey data from former members of violent groups in Liberia provide initial evidence of a positive association between perpetrating violence and identification with one’s violent group, even when controlling for a number of potential confounds such as mode of joining, length of time in the group, and experiencing violence. However, this sample has a number of limitations, which are characteristic of the correlational data obtained in this literature more generally. First, there is an issue of directionality; the association between perpetrating violence and group identification could be explained in full by more highly identified group members engaging in more violent behavior. For example, highly identified group members may seek out opportunities to engage in violence and may be more likely to comply when ordered to carry out violent acts. Second, as perpetration of violence is not randomly assigned, I cannot rule out the possibility that the positive association between group identification and violent behavior is driven by an unobserved variable. In the next set of studies, I use survey data from ex-combatants in Uganda that address these limitations.

Study 2: Violent Behavior and Group Identification in Uganda

In Study 2, I replicate and extend the findings from Study 1, using survey data from former combatants who were abducted into the LRA in Uganda. I first test whether the findings in Study 1 replicate in this sample, even when controlling for additional potentially confounding variables that were not present in the Study 1 data set. Then I examine whether quasi-random assignment to violent behavior against loved ones increases group identification, allowing for a causal interpretation of the data.

Study Context

Northern Uganda was plagued by a state of internal conflict for nearly 20 years. After failing to garner widespread support for his movement, Joseph Kony and his rebel group, the LRA, turned against the local population. The LRA came to rely on the abduction of children and young adults to fill its ranks. Abductees were forced to loot, participate in battles, and mutilate or kill civilians. In extreme cases, the LRA leadership forced abductees to injure or kill members of their own communities and families (Blattman & Annan, 2010a; Eichstaedt, 2009). Estimates of the number of abducted youth range from 52,000 to 75,000 (Blattman & Annan, 2010b; Pham, Vinck, & Stover, 2008). The majority of abductees eventually escaped the LRA and returned to their communities of origin (Blattman & Annan, 2010a).

Description of Data

The survey data used in this study come from interviews with 351 male ex-combatants in Uganda who were abducted into the LRA for at least 2 weeks.¹ The data were collected as part of the Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY) Uganda in the Kitgum and Pader districts between September 2005 and March 2006 (Blattman & Annan, 2010a). Previously, the SWAY data set has been used to study the consequences of participation in an armed group on outcomes such as political engagement, human capital, psychological well-being, and labor market integration (Annan, Blattman, Mazurana, & Carlson, 2011; Blattman, 2009; Blattman & Annan, 2010a). In these studies, the authors compare respondents who were abducted into the LRA with those from the same communities who were never in the LRA.

The SWAY data set has also been used to examine why armed groups recruit child soldiers. In Beber and Blattman (2013), the authors use the subset of respondents who were abducted into the LRA and analyze how age influences the ease of manipulating abductees. In the present research, I also use the subset of abductees from the SWAY data set, but in this case, I examine the effect of violent behavior on group identification, comparing abductees of all ages who perpetrated violence with those who were abducted but did not perpetrate violence.

No initial identification with the LRA

There are a number of aspects of the SWAY data set and of the situation in Uganda more broadly that make it particularly well suited to examining the relationship between violent behavior and group identification. First, it is reasonable to assume that respondents in this sample did not identify with the LRA at the time of their abduction. Support for Kony and the LRA was nonexistent among the local Acholi population throughout the war (Acker, 2004). As this sample is tragically comprised of individuals who were abducted from the local population, any increase in respondents’ level of identification was triggered after joining the LRA.

Accounting for mortality and migration

Typically, one limitation of a data set of former violent group members is that individuals who leave violent groups and can be located for a survey may differ from those who were a part of the group but cannot be located. The SWAY data set was designed to mitigate the problem of missing data from those who died, were abducted and never returned home (most likely dead), and returned from the LRA but could not be located at the time of the survey (Beber & Blattman, 2013). This is achieved by giving more weight in the data set to respondents who are similar to dead or missing abductees in terms of prewar characteristics. In addition, respondents who are more similar to those who returned but could not be located for the survey in terms of pre- and postwar characteristics are given more weight. A detailed description of how the sampling weights were constructed can be found in Online Appendix 1. Results remain consistent when analyzed without the sampling weights (see Online Appendix 4, Table 6).

Quasi-random assignment to violent behavior

In previous research, the SWAY data set has been used to study the consequences of what Blattman (2009) referred to as a “tragic natural experiment.” Abduction into the LRA was essentially indiscriminate, allowing researchers to examine the effects of quasi-random assignment into a violent group (Beber & Blattman, 2013). Building on this idea, I examine another level of this tragic natural experiment. During the abduction incident, some abductees were forced to harm family members or friends, whereas other abductees were not forced to engage in such violence against loved ones (17% of abductees report harming a loved one in the SWAY data). I propose that just as abduction is quasi-random in this region, whether or not an abductee was forced to harm loved ones is quasi-random.² If this is the case, it allows us to examine the effect of perpetrating violence on group identification, addressing concerns in Study 1 about the directionality of the effect and the possibility of unobserved confounding variables.

In Online Appendix 3, I provide statistical support for the claim that forced violence perpetrated against loved ones was quasi-randomly assigned among new LRA members. To do so, I adapt the procedure used by Blattman (2009) to show that abduction into the LRA was quasi-randomly assigned. First, I compare conditional and unconditional differences in means on a number of prewar household characteristics to examine whether abductees forced to harm loved ones are observably different than those who were not forced to harm loved ones. Next, I calculate the predicted probability that an abductee was forced to perpetrate violence against loved ones based on prewar data, using a logistic regression of forced violence on indicators for year and location of birth, as well as prewar household characteristics. These analyses suggest that harming loved ones was quasi-randomly assigned, conditional on the abductee’s location, age, and the size of their household.

One threat to the claim that violence against loved ones was quasi-randomly assigned is that certain LRA commanders may have been more likely to force their abductees to harm loved ones, and these particular commanders may also have been more effective at engendering group identification. However, there is no significant relationship between harming loved ones and level of violence in one’s LRA unit (β = .020, 95% CI = [–0.068, 0.107], p = .659), suggesting that the effects are not driven by the dynamics of particularly violent units.

Analytic Approach

First I replicate the analysis in Study 1, examining whether there is a positive association between violent behavior and group identification. I use weighted least squares regression, in which I predict level of identification with the LRA by an index of violence perpetrated. Observations are weighted by their inverse survival and inverse absentee probabilities to account for abductees who died, never returned, or could not be located for the survey (Horvitz & Thompson, 1952). As in Study 1, I also test for the positive association between perpetrating violence and group identification when controlling for a number of potentially confounding prewar household and war experience covariates. Next, I extend the findings from Study 1 by testing whether there is a causal relationship between violent behavior and group identification. To do so, I replace the index of violent behavior with an indicator for whether the respondent perpetrated violence against loved ones in the weighted least squares regression.

Measures

Violent behavior

To form the first independent variable, I combine questions on six types of violent acts that an individual may have committed: killing a family member or friend, beating or “cutting” (i.e., with a machete) a family member or friend, killing a civilian, beating or cutting a civilian, killing an opposing soldier in battle, and raping someone. Respondents indicated whether they ever engaged in each behavior while they were with the LRA, and responses were averaged to create the violent behavior index. The second independent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent ever harmed a loved one, either killing or beating a family member or friend.

Group identification

The dependent variable is a measure tapping into different aspects of group identification while the respondent was a member of the LRA. Respondents were asked whether they felt allegiance toward the LRA and its leader, wanted to stay in the LRA and not escape, and felt like an important part of their unit. Answer options were on a 4-point scale of “never,” “rarely,” “sometimes,” or “often.” Responses to these three questions were averaged to create a measure of group identification (0-3).

War experience covariates

As in Study 1, I control for individual differences in exposure to violence using questions on violence witnessed (seven items; Cronbach’s α = .75), violence personally experienced (i.e., harm done to the respondent; eight items; Cronbach’s α = .72), and violence experienced by loved ones (five items; Cronbach’s α = .58; see Online Appendix 2 for a full list of the questions in these indices). In this data set, there are additional questions on level of violence in the respondent’s LRA unit (five items; Cronbach’s α = .52), for example: “Did the fighters in your unit ever mutilate civilians, such as cutting off their limbs, fingers, lips, noses, or ears?” I also control for length of time in the violent group (using the log of the number of months), year and age of joining, whether the respondent ever carried a gun, and whether they ever led others or held rank. Finally, I am able to control for additional war experience variables that were not present in the Study 1 data set. These include whether the respondent ever received indoctrination from the LRA, was rewarded for a job well done, and was forced to engage in the following behaviors: step on or abuse dead bodies; betray a loved one, putting the loved one at risk of injury or death; and betray a stranger, putting them at risk of injury or death.

Prewar household covariates

I also control for individual differences in prewar household characteristics. These variables come from a survey conducted with members of the respondent’s household, in which they were asked questions about what their household looked like in the year 1996 (Beber & Blattman, 2013). That particular year was chosen by the survey designers because it predated 85% of abductions and was easily remembered as the first presidential election since 1980 (Beber & Blattman, 2013). These prewar household characteristics include location, highest level of education obtained by the respondent’s father and mother, and indicators for whether the head of their household was a farmer, whether the respondent’s father and/or mother was dead, and whether the household owned a plow. Additional variables include the amount of land owned by the household (in acres), the size of the household, how many cattle the household owned, and how many other livestock the household owned.

Results

Descriptive statistics

The mean length of abduction in Uganda was 14.8 months (SD = 17.91), and nearly all respondents reported eventually leaving the LRA by escaping (94.8%). However, when respondents were asked to report their level of group identification while with the LRA, identification was relatively high given the circumstances (M = 1.15, SD = 0.73). Nearly three quarters reported that they felt like an important part of their unit either “rarely,” “sometimes,” or “often.” In addition, about half reported that they felt allegiance to Kony and the LRA at least “rarely,” “sometimes,” or “often.” Extreme violent behavior was also not uncommon in this sample. Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents who reported engaging in each of the six violent behaviors (see Table 2 for more descriptive statistics).³

Figure 2.

Percentage of Ugandan LRA ex-combatants who reported engaging in each violent act.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics for the Ugandan Ex-Combatant Sample.

	M	n
Index of group identification (0-3)	1.15 (0.73)	337
Felt allegiance to the violent group (0-3)	1.18 (1.24)	326
Felt like an important part of their unit (0-3)	1.79 (1.19)	325
Preferred to stay in the violent group (0-3)	0.45 (0.99)	310
Index of violence perpetrated (0-1)	0.14 (0.23)	348
Harmed a loved one on behalf of the LRA	17%	348
Forced to abuse the bodies of dead persons	26%	348
Forced to betray a family member or friend	9%	348
Forced to betray a stranger	12%	348
Index of violence personally experienced (0-1)	0.56 (0.24)	351
Index of violence experienced by loved ones (0-1)	0.41 (0.27)	350
Index of violence witnessed (0-1)	0.75 (0.18)	351
Index of violence in LRA unit (0-3)	1.06 (0.59)	334
Time spent in the LRA (months)	14.80 (17.91)	351
Age at longest abduction	16.49 (4.69)	351
Allowed to keep/sleep with the gun in LRA	53%	351
Ever rewarded for job well done in LRA	6%	351
Held rank or led other soldiers in LRA	23%	351
Received indoctrination in LRA	46%	351

Note. This table includes descriptive statistics for the independent variable, dependent variable, and all war experience covariates used in the analysis for Study 2. Observations are weighted to account for respondents selected into the sample who could not be located, never returned from the LRA, or are no longer alive (inverse survival and absentee probabilities). LRA = Lord’s Resistance Army.

Association between perpetrating violence and group identification

First, I test whether there is a positive association between perpetrating violence and group identification, replicating the results from Study 1 in this different sample and context. As shown in Figure 3, engaging in violent behavior is positively associated with group identification, even though all individuals in this sample were abducted into the LRA (β = .638, 95% CI = [0.252, 1.023], p = .001; see Online Appendix 4, Table 3, for regression results). The relationship between perpetrating violence and group identification remains statistically significant even when controlling for prewar household and war experience covariates (β = .612, 95% CI = [0.187, 1.036], p = .005), such as length of time in the LRA, level of violence in one’s LRA unit, and receiving indoctrination.

Figure 3.

Perpetrating violence on behalf of the LRA increases group identification.

Does perpetrating violence increase group identification?

Next, I test whether quasi-random assignment to violent behavior—harming loved ones on behalf of the LRA—increases identification with the violent group. As shown in Figure 3, engaging in violent behavior against family members or friends significantly increases identification with the LRA, compared with being in the LRA but not engaging in violence against loved ones (β = .392, 95% CI = [0.179, 0.605], p = .000; see Online Appendix 4, Table 3, for regression results). These results hold when controlling for prewar household characteristics and war experiences (β = .328, 95% CI = [0.101, 0.554], p = .005), and when additionally controlling for violence perpetrated against strangers (β = .288, 95% CI = [0.038, 0.537], p = .024; see Online Appendix 4, Table 7).

Discussion

Study 2 shows that perpetrating violence is positively associated with group identification among a sample of abductees in Uganda and provides suggestive evidence of a causal relationship between violent behavior and heightened group identification. The positive relationship holds even when controlling for a number of other war experiences that could engender increased group identification, suggesting that perpetrating violence—in and of itself—can increase identification with violent groups. This is a particularly remarkable finding in the context of Uganda as all ex-combatants in the sample were abducted into the LRA. Yet these individuals still exhibit the predicted effect that perpetrating violence increases identification with the LRA, a group they despised prior to their abduction. Moreover, this is not solely a feature of the extreme situation of abduction and forced violence against family members in Uganda. The same pattern of results emerged in the Study 1 context, in which many respondents joined their violent group willingly and violence against loved ones was rare.

However, this data set does show that there are bounds on this effect. Although perpetrating violence increases group identification among abductees, the level of identification reported by respondents in this sample is not particularly high. In addition, 95% of respondents in this sample eventually chose to leave the LRA through the risky action of escaping. This shows that although perpetrating violence does increase group identification, it is not enough to create blindly loyal followers who are highly motivated to stay in the group regardless of the consequences. Beber and Blattman (2013) described LRA abductees as experiencing an “awakening,” in which they realize that they have been fed misinformation about the LRA. They realize the group would not achieve its stated goals, become disillusioned, and decide to escape. This “awakening” may not be limited to the LRA. Even groups comprised of loyal members, such as gangs, see members phase out as they get older and decide to move on with their lives (Vigil, 1996).

General Discussion

In these studies, I tested the idea that perpetrating violence on behalf of a group increases identification with the violent group. In the context of Liberia, where nearly half of combatants reported joining their violent group willingly, the data show a positive association between perpetrating violence and group identification. This positive association holds even when controlling for other war experiences such as mode of joining, experiencing violence, length of time in the group, and status in the group. In Uganda, where all respondents were abducted into the LRA and some abductees were quasi-randomly assigned to perpetrate violence against loved ones, perpetrating violence increased identification with the LRA.

Exploring the Mechanism

I theorized that engaging in violent behavior on behalf of a group increases identification in part through its negative consequences on the individual’s other social identities. As individuals fear rejection by meaningful others outside of the violent group, they can reduce their uncertainty about their standing in the social world by increasing their identification with the violent group. In the case of the LRA, group leaders attempted to exploit this fear of rejection. They would make some abductees harm family or community members, and tell abductees that they would be shunned or killed by their communities if they tried to return home (Beber & Blattman, 2013).

A popular radio program developed by a station in Gulu, the largest town in northern Uganda, suggests this mechanism was at play. In December 2003, the radio station 102 Mega FM launched a program known locally as “Dwog Paco,” which translates to “Come Back Home.” The show features former LRA members who come on the air and talk about their life experiences. Importantly, these ex-combatants appeal to others who have not yet returned home, assuring them that they will not be killed upon surrender, and that they will receive forgiveness from their communities (Palmer, 2004). As one former child soldier described, “When I started listening to my fellow colleagues whom we were in the bush with [Sudan], it gave me the confidence to come back and join my friends at home” (Otim, 2009, p. 2). The program was so successful in encouraging combatants to leave the LRA that commanders attempted to ban junior soldiers from listening to the radio (Kimani, 2007; Otim, 2009).

Additional Theoretical Approaches

In addition to uncertainty-identity theory, the social psychological theories of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and self-perception (Bem, 1972) may be relevant to understanding these data. According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, individuals often feel distress after engaging in a behavior that violates personal beliefs or normative standards. To restore a positive view of the self, they must find ways to reduce this distress (Festinger, 1957; Stone & Cooper, 2001). Dissonance researchers have explored how individuals justify harming others by trivializing the suffering of their victim (Brock & Buss, 1962) or derogating the target of their violence (Glasford, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Glass, 1964). In the context of collective violence, individuals may also justify harming others by increasing their identification with the violent group. Drawing on self-perception theory, individuals may see themselves as more violent after harming others, and therefore feel like they belong more to their violent group.

Implications for Intergroup Conflict

The present research helps explain how low identifiers, such as those forced to join a violent group through conscription or abduction, can eventually become high identifiers who are willing to harm others on behalf of their group. Perpetrating violence—in and of itself—may help trigger this process from reluctant or opportunistic joiner to loyal group member. It also suggests a mutually reinforcing cycle of violence and group identification. Violent behavior increases group identification, and high identifiers become more willing to engage in violent behavior (Littman & Paluck, 2015).

In addition to increasing future violence, heightened identification can amplify other destructive dynamics in intergroup conflict. High group identifiers attribute more responsibility for the instigation and consequences of violent conflict to the outgroup. They perceive that more harm has been inflicted on the ingroup and less on the outgroup (Bilali, Tropp, & Dasgupta, 2012). Glorification of the ingroup also leads to increased dehumanization of the victims of violence, and influences decisions about the punishment of perpetrators and reparations to victims (Castano, 2008; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010).

Constraints on Generalization

Definition of violence

This research focuses on the perpetration of extreme physical harm, where the victim is gravely injured or killed. Future research is needed to determine whether the results would replicate with less-extreme forms of physical harm or with other types of antisocial behaviors.

Population

The sample in the Uganda data set is representative of the general population in Northern Uganda, and therefore, the results are expected to generalize even to those who do not self-select into a violent group. The respondents in the Liberian sample are only representative of a subset of ex-combatants within Liberia. Many were engaged in illicit economic activities at the time of the survey, 73% did not go through Liberia’s formal reintegration process after the war, and all of them expressed interest in attending a residential agricultural training program years after the war. Given that the results replicated across these two data sets, I would expect them to replicate in other similar civil war contexts around the world. Will they also generalize to other types of conflict (e.g., interstate wars) and other types of violent groups (e.g., gangs and terrorist organizations)? Theoretically I would expect the results to generalize, but this remains an open question.

Methodological approach

All respondents were surveyed once they left their violent group, and in many cases after their group was disbanded. Retrospective reports of group identification may not be accurate, especially for groups that have a negative reputation in society. In addition, all of the data are based on self-report, which may be subject to desirability bias and underreporting of sensitive behaviors such as violence (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Theoretically, I expect the results to generalize to data collected among current violent group members, and perhaps to be stronger as current members may feel comfortable reporting higher levels of group identification. I would also expect the results to generalize when using objective measures of violent behavior.

Finally, this research uses a correlational and quasi-experimental design to examine the relationship between perpetrating violence and group identification. Would the results replicate in an experimental paradigm in the lab? It simply may not be possible to explore this relationship in the lab. Experiments can simulate harm or model less-extreme versions of aggression, but they cannot ethically involve the perpetration of extreme violence. The results will only replicate in the lab if less-extreme harm invokes a similar psychological process as extreme violence. For now, survey and observational research of the sort in this article remains the best evidence that perpetrating violence on behalf of a group increases identification with the group.

In conclusion, using archival data from ex-combatants who fought in civil wars in Liberia and Uganda, I find that perpetrating violence on behalf of a group increases group identification. This relationship occurs even among a sample of individuals who were abducted into a group they despised and forced to carry out heinous acts of violence against loved ones. Violent behavior—in and of itself—can trigger group identification, possibly contributing to cycles of future violence and exacerbating intergroup conflict.

Supplemental Material

Supplementary Material

Supplemental material, Violence_and_Group_ID_Appendices for Perpetrating Violence Increases Identification With Violent Groups: Survey Evidence From Former Combatants by Rebecca Littman in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Joel Cooper, Bethany Park, Stathis Kalyvas, members of Elizabeth Levy Paluck’s lab, and participants in the CAPERS Conference and Princeton’s Joint Degree Program in Social Policy for helpful comments. I also thank Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan for providing full access to the data sets used in the studies.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

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