The Ego-Defensive Role of Legitimacy: How Threat-Based Justifications Protect the Self-Esteem of Discriminators

Abstract

This article analyzes the ego-defensive role played by legitimation, by examining the hypothesis that threat-based justifications attenuate the negative effect on an individual’s self-esteem caused by his or her becoming aware of his or her own discriminatory behavior. Across three studies (including a pilot experiment), participants who were led to believe that they had acted in a discriminatory way experienced a decrease in their self-esteem. In Study 1 (N = 116), this effect was nullified when discrimination was justified by either symbolic or realistic threat perceptions. Study 2 (N = 250) replicated this pattern of results and went further by showing that discrimination affects self-esteem only in more egalitarian individuals, whereas for those less egalitarian, it affects their social image. According to the ego-defensive role of legitimation, a meta-analytical integration of the results confirmed that the influence of discrimination in depressing self-esteem is moderated by threat-based justifications.

Keywords

discrimination legitimacy self-esteem threat perception egalitarianism

Self-esteem is a key concept for understanding the motivation underlying intergroup behavior. For instance, systematic research, carried out over the past five decades, has shown that individuals value their ingroup by discriminating against outgroups to positively distinguish their group of belonging from other groups. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) suggests that ingroup bias has a positive impact on personal and collective self-esteem because individuals are motivated to achieve, maintain, and enhance a positive social identity (for reviews, see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). It occurs especially in the minimal group contexts (e.g., Lemyre & Smith, 1985), but only when ingroup bias is in accordance with the ingroup norm (Iacoviello, Berent, Frederic, & Pereira, 2017).

In contemporary societies, however, individuals are socialized in cultural environments that disseminate a social discourse stressing that good people are egalitarian and nondiscriminatory and should treat others fairly. Consequently, acting in a discriminatory way could entail negative psychological consequences that affect individuals’ self-evaluation (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005). This occurs because they experience a value-based motivational conflict between the values that underpin unjust and prejudiced discriminatory behavior (e.g., the descriptive meritocracy; Knowles & Lowery, 2012; Son Hing et al., 2011) and the egalitarian values that stand against prejudice (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988). In fact, it has already been demonstrated that a similar value-based motivational conflict causes psychological discomfort, including feelings of compunction, guilt, and self-criticism (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993). These negative feelings are signals that being perceived as unjust and prejudiced can directly depress an individual’s image, because it is a person’s overall emotional evaluation of his or her own worth (Rosenberg, 1965). Accordingly, the different role played by discrimination in self-esteem suggests that individuals are influenced by two contrasting motivations: On one hand, they are motivated to discriminate because of the distinctiveness motive; on the other hand, they are motivated not to discriminate because they have internalized egalitarian values into their self-concept. Little attention is given to the ego-defensive strategies individuals use to protect their personal and social self-esteem in egalitarian contexts.

We argue that becoming aware of their own discriminatory behavior leads individuals to feel less positive self-esteem only when they cannot legitimate discrimination. In fact, recent theorizing and research on the legitimacy of social inequality suggests that individuals act as if they have adopted a compromise solution that allows them to discriminate against minority groups without threatening the egalitarian beliefs that they hold (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). This solution involves a legitimating process, in which discrimination is allowed when it can be justified on the basis of unprejudiced arguments (e.g., Tyler, 2010; Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). Indeed, the legitimation of discrimination may have an ego-defensive function, in which individuals can discriminate against minority groups and still maintain their positive self-esteem because legitimacy protects their self-concept of being fair and unprejudiced individuals. However, as far as we know, there is no experimental evidence concerning the specific effect that legitimation has on individuals’ self-esteem when they become aware that they are acting in a discriminatory way against a minority group. In this research, we, therefore, examined this issue by testing the hypothesis that when individuals become aware of their own discriminatory behavior, they experience a decrease in self-esteem, although only if they cannot engage in any legitimating process of discrimination. We also predicted that the ego-defensive role of legitimation is particularly necessary for individuals who endorse egalitarian values.

Threat Perceptions as Justifying Beliefs That Legitimate Discrimination

An action is legitimate when it is in accordance with the norms and procedures that are accepted as just and fair by a specific group or by society as a whole (Costa-Lopes, Dovidio, Pereira, & Jost, 2013; Tyler, 2006). In democratic societies, where the sense of justice and equality is one of the organizing principles, legitimization is crucial to individuals’ ability to manage their personal and social image and to develop a meaningful sense of self as worthwhile and fair individuals (see Jost, 2001). Thus, individuals need to justify their behavior to show that they are acting in a legitimate way (e.g., Tajfel, 1984). Accordingly, if individuals engage in unfair discrimination without recourse to a legitimating process, they could then experience a decrease in their feeling of personal and social worth. However, system justification theory (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2003) predicts that these negative feelings can be buffered because individuals legitimize the status quo by using justifying beliefs to maintain personal and social self-esteem (see also O’Brien & Major, 2005).

Perceiving the outgroup as a threat is a good example of justifying beliefs that legitimate discrimination (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010). Threat perceptions are beliefs that outgroup members represent a danger to the economic power and physical or material well-being (i.e., a realistic threat; Stephan et al., 2002) or to the culture and way of life of the ingroup (i.e., a symbolic threat; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Perceiving outgroups as a threat legitimates discrimination because it does not directly involve the idea of prejudice. It, thereby, allows individuals to contend that they have no prejudiced attitude against the outgroup, by arguing that outgroup members may represent a threat to the survival of the ingroup because they increase competition for scarce resources and disrupt the core values of the ingroup’s cultural matrix. Thus, individuals can discriminate against minority groups and dissociate their behavior from prejudice-motivated discrimination. Indeed, Pereira et al. (2010) demonstrated that symbolic and realistic threat perceptions legitimate discrimination, and so mediate the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. The legitimizing function of threat perception is especially important in egalitarian contexts (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009), where it is supposed that the use of symbolic or realistic threats as justifications could buffer the negative effect of discrimination on the self-esteem of those engaging in discriminatory behavior.

We argue that when an individual becomes aware that he or she has discriminated against a member of a minority group, he or she may perceive himself or herself to be less valuable than an individual who has also engaged in discrimination but justifies it by using nonprejudiced reasons. For instance, if individuals are confronted with evidence that they have unjustly opposed the presence of immigrants in their country, this confrontation might negatively affect their self-esteem because the meaning of this action contrasts with the antiprejudice norm, which prescribes that “good people are egalitarian and non-discriminatory.” However, individuals can reframe the situation by actively ascribing another meaning to the motivation behind their behavior. They can believe that their opposition to immigrants is not motivated by prejudice but rather reflects their genuine concern for the values, customs, and traditions that give their country its identity or even for the socioeconomic situation of the country, which can no longer receive more immigrants because immigration flows increase competition for very scarce resources. In other words, individuals may use the perception that the outgroup represents a threat to the ingroup as a justification for their behavior (Bahns, 2017). Thus, threat-based justification legitimizes discrimination and can, therefore, be ego defensive by preserving individuals’ self-esteem.

Maintenance of self-esteem involves a self-regulation process (Crocker & Park, 2004) that is moderated by individuals’ values (Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007). Accordingly, the ego-defensive role of threat-based justifications must be especially relevant for individuals who identify with egalitarianism and social justice. Indeed, the motivation to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998) is mainly based on egalitarian values (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). In this case, being perceived as a discriminator can represent a threat to individuals’ self-perception of being nonprejudiced, which can negatively affect their self-esteem. In the contrast, for individuals endorsing egalitarian values less, the compliance with the norm of behaving in a nondiscriminatory manner would involve an external motivation to maintain a positive social image and avoid the costs of being perceived as discriminators (Plant & Devine, 1998). Thus, becoming aware of one’s own discriminatory behavior should threaten the personal self-esteem of egalitarians and the social image of nonegalitarians.

Overview of Studies

This research examines whether individuals express less positive self-esteem after they become aware that they have acted in a discriminatory way toward immigrants. We analyze whether the influence of discriminatory behavior on self-esteem depends on whether or not individuals are able to justify their behavior. Specifically, we propose that the influence of discrimination on individuals’ self-esteem is moderated by threat-based justifications. This hypothesis was tested in two experiments and a pilot study.

In the pilot study (see full description in online supplementary materials), we developed an experimental paradigm in which the participants received fictitious feedback about their behavior toward immigrants (participants reported no suspicion following the study procedures). In this paradigm, participants (N = 52) were informed of how they had acted toward immigrants in a previous task and of the motivations for their behavior. The information about behavior characterized them as discriminatory (vs. nondiscriminatory), whereas the information about the motivations for their behaviors was designed to justify (vs. not justify) the discrimination on the basis of a perceived symbolic threat. After reading the feedback depicting their behaviors, the participants answered a self-esteem scale that measured how they were feeling at that moment. Results indicated that individuals’ self-esteem was affected when they became aware that they had discriminated against a minority group: They expressed less positive self-esteem (M = 3.92, SD = 0.46) than participants who had received feedback indicating that they had acted in a nondiscriminatory manner (M = 4.53, SD = 0.54), F(1, 48) = 9.19, p < .01, d = −0.87. Significantly, when symbolic threat was used as a justification for discrimination, the participants’ self-esteem was not affected when they were informed of their discriminatory behavior.

We then conducted two experiments using a test–posttest design aiming to analyze whether participants who were led to believe that they had acted in a discriminatory way toward immigrants experienced a decrease in their self-esteem (Study 1), because discrimination clashes with the idea that “good people are egalitarian and nondiscriminatory” (Study 2). Thus, a decrease in self-esteem should be observed, especially in individuals who support more egalitarian values. For less egalitarian people, justifications will have the function of restoring their social image. Thus, if legitimation plays an ego-defensive role by protecting individuals’ personal and social self-esteem, then discrimination should not influence participants with symbolic or realistic threat-based justifications for their behavior.

Study 1

Using the experimental paradigm developed in the pilot study, participants were informed of how they had acted toward immigrants in a previous task and of the motivations for their behavior. The information about behavior characterized them as discriminatory (vs. nondiscriminatory), whereas the information about the motivations for their behavior was designed to justify (vs. not justify) the discrimination on the basis of a perceived symbolic or realistic threat. We measured self-esteem before and after providing participants with feedback on how they had acted toward immigrants. According to our rationale, because unprejudiced values have been internalized into individuals’ self-concept, as predicted by contemporary theory on prejudice and discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), they should experience discomfort at being described as discriminatory and should, therefore, experience a decrease in self-esteem. Because symbolic and realistic threats are used by people as justification to legitimize discrimination (Bahns, 2017; Pereira et al., 2009), it should have an ego-defensive effect by buffering the negative consequences of discrimination on individual’s self-esteem. Thus, awareness of discrimination should not decrease the self-esteem of participants who have been provided with a symbolic or realistic threat-based justification as a reason for their behavior.

Method

Participants

One hundred sixteen undergraduates (60% women; M age = 19.17 years, SD = 2.22 years) voluntarily participated in this study. Applying G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to our research design, we estimated that this sample size provided 95% of power to detect a medium effect size of d = 0.34.

Procedures and Design

The procedures were made up of two phases. In the first (T1), participants completed a questionnaire consisting of a self-esteem measure and some questions about attitudes toward immigrants. One week later (T2), they were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions according to a 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) × 3 (threat-based justifications: symbolic vs. realistic vs. nonjustification) factorial design. Manipulation was carried out by giving participants fictitious feedback on how they had acted in Phase 1. The cover story stressed that they were receiving the results of their performance, which had ostensibly been calculated by the computer in the previous phase of the study. Thus, each participant was informed that he or she was receiving a personalized “psychological report” describing his or her pattern of behavior toward immigrants. The report contained one figure depicting the alleged participants’ performance that had supposedly been obtained from their reaction to several stimuli. In the first paragraph, participants read the following text, which informed them that the study contained a subliminal test assessing the extent to which they had acted in a discriminatory way toward immigrants:

The questionnaire that you have answered contained a subliminal test which evaluated your prejudiced attitudes and willingness to act in a discriminatory manner towards immigrants. The figure below shows your responses to critical stimuli and was generated by the data analysis software that traced the psychological profile of your attitudes. Look at the figure carefully.

The figure provided the participants with a text explaining what each stimuli evaluated. Specifically, the text indicated that

The stimuli measured the following aspects: a) Stimuli 1, 2 and 3 evaluated discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants; b) Stimuli 4, 5 and 6 evaluated the reasons why you expressed such attitudes; c) The stimuli ranging from 7 to 10 evaluate your intention to discriminate against immigrants in the future.

The second paragraph manipulated the participants’ discriminatory behavior (i.e., discriminatory vs. nondiscriminatory), whereas the third manipulated the threat-based justification for their behavior. Afterward, participants filled out a self-esteem questionnaire. Finally, all participants were thanked and fully debriefed.

Manipulation of discrimination

In the discriminatory-behavior condition, the participants read the following text describing a discriminatory profile:

Analyzing your results, we can observe high values of both discriminatory attitudes and intentions to discriminate against immigrants. We have therefore observed that you acted in a discriminatory way towards immigrants.

In the nondiscriminating condition, they read the following text describing a nondiscriminatory profile:

Analyzing your results, we can observe low values of both discriminatory attitudes and intentions to discriminate against immigrants. We therefore observed non-discriminatory responses towards immigrants.

Manipulation of threat-based justifications

This manipulation took place after reading that they had acted in a discriminatory (vs. nondiscriminatory) way against immigrants. In the non–threat-based justification condition, participants read no information concerning the reasons for their behavior. In the symbolic threat-based justifications condition, the participants read the following description of the reasons for their behavior:

The analysis of your responses to stimuli 4, 5 and 6 indicate the reasons for your behavior. Your answers were motivated by a sincere concern for the values and culture of our country. Your attitudes reveal a reaction to the threat posed by the presence of immigrant groups that could undermine our core values, culture and national traditions.

In the realistic threat-based justifications condition, the participants read the following description of the reasons for their behavior:

The analysis of your responses to stimuli 4, 5 and 6 indicate the reasons for your behavior. Your answers were motivated by a sincere concern for the socio-economic situation of our country. Your attitudes reveal a reaction to the threat posed by the presence of immigrant groups that could increase unemployment in some sectors of our economy, thereby weakening it and increasing crime rates in our country.

Self-esteem measurement

We used the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). The 10 items of this scale were originally drawn to evaluate individuals’ global self-worth and has been used as a trait self-esteem measure. However, in this and in subsequent research, our proposal was to evaluate contextual changes in participants’ self-esteem resulting from the feedback they received on their discriminatory behavior. Thus, our focus was to evaluate the state self-esteem, and, for this, we presented them with the following instructions: “Below is a list of statements dealing with your feelings about yourself at this moment. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement about what you are thinking at this moment.” So, participants indicated (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) the extent to which they agreed with each of the 10 items on the scale (e.g., “I feel that I have a number of good qualities”; “At times I think I am no good at all,” reversed). This measure showed adequate internal consistency both in T1 (α = .80) and T2 (α = .85) and a very strong test–retest reliability (r_T1–T2 = .87, p < .001). We then computed the general self-esteem measure by averaging the participants’ scores across the items in each phase (T1 and T2).

Manipulation check

We asked participants to gauge the extent to which they perceived themselves to be a person “with a tendency to discriminate against immigrants” (0 = nondiscriminatory tendency, 10 = discriminatory tendency). Factorial ANOVA showed that this perception was higher in the discrimination condition (M = 3.29, SD = 2.35) than in the nondiscrimination condition, M = 2.07, SD = 1.76, F(1, 110) = 10.25, p < .01, d = 0.59, which indicates that the manipulation of discrimination was successful in increasing individuals’ self-perception as potential discriminators. There was no reliable main (d = 0.20) or interaction effects (η² = .00) involving threat-based justifications, F(1, 110) < 1, ns.

Results

Preliminary analysis

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for self-esteem measured in T1 and T2 in the light of each experimental condition. We analyzed the self-esteem score obtained in T1 using a 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) × 3 (threat-based justifications: symbolic vs. realistic vs. nonjustification) between-subject factorial ANOVA. The results showed that none of the main or interaction effects was reliable: F_{Discrimination}(1, 110) = 2.07, ns, d = 0.27; F_{Justification}(2, 110) = 1.21, ns, d = 0.19; F_Interaction(2, 110) = 0.25, ns, η² = .00. These results showed the participants’ initial self-esteem did not differ between the experimental conditions.

Table 1.

Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Self-Esteem in Each Experimental Condition Before (T1) and After (T2) Discriminatory or Nondiscriminatory Feedback (Study 1).

	Nondiscrimination condition		Discrimination condition
	T1	T2	T1	T2
Nonjustification	4.03 (0.53)	4.12 (0.54)	4.13 (0.49)	3.89 (0.48)
Symbolic justification	3.88 (0.56)	3.92 (0.60)	3.97 (0.50)	3.95 (0.43)
Realistic justification	3.79 (0.44)	3.82 (0.48)	4.02 (0.60)	4.02 (0.65)
Total	3.90 (0.51)	3.95 (0.55)	4.03 (0.53)	3.96 (0.53)

Main analysis

We submitted the self-esteem scores to a 2 (time of measurement: T1 vs. T2) × 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) × 3 (threat-based justifications: symbolic vs. realistic vs. nonjustification) repeated measured factorial ANOVA in which the two last variables were between-subject factors. The results showed a reliable interaction between time and discrimination, F(1, 110) = 8.27, p < .01, η² = .07. As we predicted, self-esteem was less positive in T2 (M = 3.96, SD = 0.51) than in T1 (M = 4.03, SD = 0.53) in the discrimination condition, F(1, 110) = 5.64, p < .05, d = −0.44, whereas it was marginally more positive in T2 (M = 3.95, SD = 0.55) than in T1 (M = 3.90, SD = 0.51) in the nondiscrimination condition, F(1, 110) = 2.82, p = .096, d = 0.31, see the last row in Table 1. Significantly, these effects were qualified by a reliable interaction between time, discrimination, and justifications, F(2, 110) = 3.56, p < .05, η² = .06. As we can see in Table 1, self-esteem was less positive in T2 than in T1 in the discrimination condition when participants had no justification for their behavior, F(1, 110) = 12.60, p < .001, d = −0.67. We found no change due to discrimination in self-esteem when participants had either symbolic, F(1, 110) = 0.12, ns, d = –0.06, or realistic justifications for discrimination, F(1, 110) = 0.01, ns, d = 0.00. Thus, discrimination reduced self-esteem when participants did not have a threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior. None of the other main or interaction effects was reliable, Fs < 1.25, ns, d < 0.28.

We further analyzed the three-way interaction from another perspective to address an alternative possibility according to which threat-based justifications depress self-esteem overall, rather than buffering the discrimination effect. Results indicated this was not the case. First, we found no significant interaction between time and justification, F(2, 110) = 1.25, ns, η² = .02. Second, there was no reliable change in self-esteem in the nondiscrimination condition when participants did not have a justification, F(1, 110) = 2.66, ns, d = 0.30, or when they had symbolic, F(1, 110) = 0.36, ns, d = 0.11, or realistic justifications for their behavior, F(1, 110) = 0.46, ns, d = 0.13. Finally, threat-based justifications did not decrease self-esteem in T2 when participants discriminated, F(2, 110) = 0.26, ns, d = 0.14, or when they did not discriminate, F(2, 110) = 1.58, ns, d = 0.32.

We also analyzed the possibility that the effects obtained were stronger for those individuals who initially had a higher self-esteem, by performing an additional analysis in which we submitted the self-esteem scores measured in the T2 to a full factorial ANCOVA using the self-esteem measured in T1 as a covariate (see online supplementary material). Results showed no reliable interactions involving the manipulations and the self-esteem measured in T1, which means that becoming aware of discrimination affects individuals to the same extent, regardless of whether their previous self-esteem was low or high.

Discussion

The pattern of results found in this study are consistent with our prediction that the participants would express less positive self-esteem after receiving feedback describing them as discriminatory individuals. The discrimination effect on decreasing self-esteem was completely dissolved when individuals had a symbolic justification for their behavior. Moreover, the current study also showed that using the idea that immigration is a threat to national economic and social resources as a reason for discriminatory behavior plays the same ego-defensive role as the idea that it is necessary to protect the country’s values, customs, and traditions. It suggests that the mere accessibility of one or another kind of threat perception might be enough to allow individuals to maintain positive self-esteem even after being confronted with the socially undesirable aspects of their behavior, such as discriminatory attitudes.

In sum, the results of the current study represent a robust test for our hypothesis predicting that discrimination affects self-esteem when individuals become aware of their discriminatory behavior, employing the threat-based justification as a means of protecting their self-esteem. According to our rationale, discrimination affects self-esteem because it triggers a conflict between the motivation to pursue the egalitarian goals promoted by the antiprejudice norm and the individuals’ consciousness that they have contravened it. So, the threat-based justifications have the function of dissolving the conflict and protecting the threatened self-concept. This explanation suggests that the impact of discrimination on self-concept depends on the individuals’ motivation to commit to egalitarian goals. This possibility, however, was not addressed in previous studies and will be the focus of analysis in the next study.

Study 2

Study 1 showed that individuals have their self-esteem affected when they are informed that they discriminated against immigrants and that both realistic and symbolic threat-based justifications buffer the discrimination effect in self-esteem. Study 2 goes further by testing the hypothesis that this effect occurs in more egalitarian individuals, whereas for less egalitarian ones, discrimination should affect the concern about their social image. To address these ideas, we measured participants’ endorsement of egalitarian values in this current study. According to Schwartz (1992), values are trans-situational goals that serve as guidelines in an individual’s life or social group. In the recently refined theory of basic human values, Schwartz et al. (2012) identified universalism-concern values as a measure of the individual’s commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people. According to our rationale, becoming aware of having discriminated against immigrants should trigger different processes depending on individuals’ endorsement of universalism-concern values. Those who identify more with these type of values are more likely to experience a decrease in their self-esteem when they are accused of discrimination, whereas those who feel little identified with these type of values are more likely to be worried about the possibility of being disapproved of by others and, so, should experience an increase in their concern over their social image. However, because legitimization plays a defensive role by protecting both personal self-esteem and social image, discrimination should not affect participants provided with symbolic and realistic threat-based justifications for their behavior.

Method

Participants

Two hundred fifty undergraduates at Complutense University of Madrid (66% women; M age = 20.48 years, SD = 2.41 years) voluntarily participated in this study. Using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), we estimated that this sample size provided 95% of power to detect a small effect size of d = 0.23.

Procedures and Design

The procedure was identical to that of Study 1, with the addition of the universalism-concern measure at T1 when the participants also completed a self-esteem scale, a measure of concern about their public image, and some questions about attitudes toward immigrants. In the second phase (T2), they were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions according to a 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) × 2 (threat-based justifications vs. nonjustification) factorial design. The manipulation carried out was similar to that used in our previous study, in which participants received fictitious feedback on how they had acted in Phase 1. However, because Study 1 showed that both realistic and symbolic threats equally nullified the effect of discrimination on participants’ self-esteem, in the current research, we combined these two threats as the content of justification condition. Thus, participants read the following text about the reasons for their behavior:

The analysis of your responses to stimuli 4, 5 and 6 indicate the reasons for your behavior. Your answers were motivated by a sincere concern for the socio-economic situation and for the values and culture of our country. Your attitudes reveal a reaction to the threat posed by the presence of immigrant groups that could increase unemployment in some sectors of our economy, thereby weakening it and increasing crime rates in our country, besides undermining our core values, culture and national traditions.

Measurements

Universalism-concern values

At T1, we first asked participants to respond to the three universalism-concern items of the Schwartz et al. (2012) revised Portrait Values Questionnaire: “Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you” (1 = not like me at all, 6 = very much like me). The three items are as follows (α = .79): “Protecting society’s weak and vulnerable members is important to him[her]”; “He[she] thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal opportunities in life”; “He[she] thinks wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he[she] don’t know.”

Self-esteem

As in our previous study, we used the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale that showed adequate internal consistence both in T1 (α = .84) and T2 (α = .87) and a very strong test–retest reliability (r_T1–T2 = .88, p < .001).

Social image

Aiming to explore participants’ concern about their public image, we asked them to indicate the extent to which (1 = strongly disagreement to 5 = strongly agreement) they agreed with two items taken from the social self-esteem scale of Heatherton and Polivy (1991): “I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure”; “I am worried about what other people think of me.” The participants’ answers to these two items are positively correlated (r = .45, p < .001 in T1; r = .59, p < .001 in T2) and, so, we aggregate them in a measure of concern about their social image, which has a very strong test–retest reliability (r_T1–T2 = .86, p < .001).

Manipulation checks

We asked participants to rate the extent to which the feedback they received had showed they were a person “that discriminates against immigrants” (1 = nondiscriminator, 4 = discriminator) and we found this perception to be higher in the discrimination condition (M = 3.26, SD = 0.92) than in the nondiscrimination condition (M = 1.40, SD = 0.73), F(1, 246) = 335.20, p < .001, d = 2.26. It was also higher in the threat (M = 2.45, SD = 1.25) than in the nonthreat condition (M = 2.15, SD = 1.23), F(1, 246) = 12.71, p < .001, d = 0.29. Despite this difference, the perceived discrimination did not exceed the midpoint of the scale, t(125) = −0.43, ns. Importantly, there was no reliable interaction between discrimination and threat, F(1, 246) = 0.05, ns, η² = .00. We also asked the participants to rate two additional items in which they have to indicate how much (1 = not at all, 4 = very much) the feedback described them as “a person concerned with our values, culture and national traditions” (symbolic threat) and “a person who cares about the unemployment situation in our country, as well as its economic situation and criminality” (realistic threat). For symbolic and realistic items, scores were higher in the threat-based justification condition (M = 3.36, SD = 0.73; M = 3.25, SD = 0.74) than in the control condition (M = 2.50, SD = 0.82; M = 2.63, SD = 0.85), F(1, 246) = 75.77, p < .001, d = 1.10, and F(1, 246) = 38.08, p < .001, d = 0.78, respectively. There were no reliable main or interaction effects involving discrimination for symbolic or realistic threat perceptions, F(1, 246) < 1, ns, η² = .00. Thus, both discrimination and threat-based justification manipulation worked successfully.

Results

Preliminary analysis

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for self-esteem and for social image measured in T1 and T2 in each experimental condition. For each dependent variable, we analyzed the score obtained in T1 using a 2 (discriminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior feedback) × 2 (threat-based justification vs. control) between-subject factorial ANOVA. The results showed that none of the main or interaction effects was reliable for self-esteem or for social image: Fs(1, 246) < 1, ns, d < 0.07. These results showed the participants’ initial self-esteem and social image as measured in T1 did not differ between the experimental conditions. We then tested our prediction, first for self-esteem and then for participants’ concerns with their social image.

Table 2.

Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Self-Esteem in Each Experimental Condition Before (T1) and After (T2) Discriminating or Nondiscriminating Feedback (Study 2).

	Nondiscrimination condition		Discrimination condition
	T1	T2	T1	T2
No justifications	3.88 (0.69)	3.96 (0.73)	3.95 (0.58)	3.81 (0.60)
Justification	4.00 (0.68)	3.99 (0.71)	3.94 (0.67)	3.92 (0.63)
Total	3.94 (0.68)	3.97 (0.72)	3.95 (0.63)	3.87 (0.62)

Self-esteem

A repeated measured factorial ANOVA showed a reliable interaction between time and discrimination, F(1, 246) = 7.42, p < .01, η² = .03. Self-esteem was less positive in T2 (M = 3.87, SD = 0.62) than in T1 (M = 3.94, SD = 0.66) in the discrimination condition, F(1, 246) = 7.43, p < .01, d = −0.34, whereas there was no change in participants’ self-esteem in the nondiscrimination condition (M_T2 = 3.97, SD = 0.72 vs. M_T2 = 3.94, SD = 0.68), F(1, 246) = 1.21, ns, d = 0.14. This influence of discrimination was qualified by a reliable three-way interaction between time, discrimination, and justifications, F(1, 246) = 6.98, p < .01, η² = .03. As we can see in Table 2, self-esteem was less positive in T2 than in T1 in the discrimination condition when participants had no threat-based justification for their behavior, F(1, 246) = 12.44, p < .001, d = −0.45, whereas discrimination did not influence self-esteem in the justification condition, F(1, 246) = 0.13, ns, d = −0.04. None of the other main or interaction effects was reliable, Fs < 1.42, ns, d < 0.15. Thus, discrimination affected participants’ self-esteem only when they did not have a threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior.

We also analyzed whether the threat-based justifications depress self-esteem rather than buffer the discrimination effect. As in Study 1, it was not the case because there was no reliable interaction between time and justifications, F(1, 246) = 0.27, ns, η² = 0.00, indicating that changes in self-esteem between T1 and T2 were not caused by threat-based justifications. In addition, we found no change in self-esteem in the nondiscrimination condition when participants did not have a threat-based justification, F(1, 246) = 3.30, ns, d = 0.23, or when they had a justification, F(1, 246) = 0.09, ns, d = 0.04. Moreover, threat-based justification did not decrease self-esteem in T2 neither when participants discriminated, F(1, 246) = 0.82, ns, d = 0.01, nor when they did not, F(1, 246) = 0.06, ns, d = 0.00.

We also analyzed whether the decrease in self-esteem buffered by threat-based justification was due to individuals’ self-esteem scores in T1. We then submitted the self-esteem scores in T2 to a factorial ANCOVA using the self-esteem measured in T1 as a covariate (see online supplementary material). Replicating Study 1, there were no reliable interactions between discrimination and the self-esteem measured in T1, indicating that the effects were not driven by the self-esteem score in T1.

The role played by participants’ values in self-esteem

The current study proposed a further hypothesis predicting that being accused of discrimination should affect, in particular, individuals who are more motivated to pursuit egalitarian goals, such as those who endorse universalism-concern values more strongly. To test this prediction, we submitted, in each threat-based justification condition, the self-esteem scores to a 2 (time of measurement: T1 vs. T2) × 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) repeated measured factorial ANCOVA with universalism concern as covariates.

In the threat-based condition (see Figure 1b), we found no reliable main or interaction effects involving time, discrimination, or universalism-concern values, F(1, 122) < 1, ns, d = 0.00. In fact, self-esteem of participants with high (+1SD from universalism-concern mean) or low (–1SD from universalism-concern mean) endorsement of universalism-concern values was not affected by discrimination when they had a threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior.

Figure 1.

Self-esteem as a function of discrimination and threat-based justification (Study 2) in participants with low and high universalism-concern values.

Nevertheless, in the non–threat-based condition (see Figure 1a), we found a three-way interaction between time, discrimination, and universalism-concern values, F(1, 120) = 3.19, p = .07, η² = .03. In participants with a high endorsement of universalism-concern values (+1SD from the mean), self-esteem was less positive in T2 (point estimated = 3.91, SE = 0.13) than in T1 (point estimated = 4.17, SE = 0.12) in the discrimination condition, F(1, 120) = 15.10, p < .001, d = −0.70, whereas there was no difference in participants’ self-esteem between T2 (point estimated = 4.05, SE = 0.12) and T1 (point estimated = 3.96, SE = 0.12) in the nondiscrimination condition, F(1, 120) = 2.02, ns, d = 0.20. Importantly, in participants with low endorsement of universalism-concern values (–1SD from the mean), however, there was no change in their self-esteem when they were accused of discrimination, F(1, 120) = 0.83, ns, d = 0.00, or when they were not accused, F(1, 120) = 0.53, ns, d = 0.00. This pattern of results indicates that being accused of discrimination affects self-esteem only in participants who more strongly endorsed universalism-concern values.

Social image

As we predicted, participants’ concern about their social image was stronger in T2 than in T1 after receiving feedback describing them as discriminators without a threat-based justification (see Table 3, F(1, 246) = 4.78, p < .05, d = 0.28). However, the participants’ social image was not influenced by discrimination when they received a justification, F(1, 246) = 0.13, ns, d = −0.04. Furthermore, there was no change in social image in the nondiscrimination condition when participants did not have a threat-based justification, F(1, 246) = 0.05, ns, d = 0.03, or when they had a justification, F(1, 246) = 0.01, ns, d = 0.00. Despite this pattern of results being in accordance with our prediction demonstrating that discrimination affected participants’ concern about their social image only when they did not have a threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior, we found no reliable main or interaction effect of time, discrimination, and threat-based justification, F(1, 246) < 1.95, ns, d < 0.18.

Table 3.

Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Concern About Social Image in Each Experimental Condition Before (T1) and After (T2) Discriminating or Nondiscriminating Feedback (Study 2).

	Nondiscrimination condition		Discrimination condition
	T1	T2	T1	T2
No justifications	2.98 (1.09)	2.96 (1.15)	3.00 (0.95)	3.15 (1.00)
Justification	2.95 (1.00)	2.95 (1.09)	2.85 (1.00)	2.82 (1.09)
Total	2.96 (1.04)	2.95 (1.11)	2.93 (1.01)	2.99 (1.05)

The role played by participants’ values in social image

We submitted the social image scores to a 2 (time of measurement: T1 vs. T2) × 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) repeated measured factorial ANCOVA with universalism concern as covariates within each justification condition. In the threat-based condition (see Figure 2b), we found no reliable main or interaction effects involving time, discrimination, or universalism-concern values, F(1, 122) < 1, ns, d = 0.00, which indicates that social image of participants with high or low universalism-concern values was not affected by discrimination when they had a threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior.

Figure 2.

Social image concern as a function of discrimination and threat-based justification (Study 2) in participants with low and high universalism-concern values.

However, in the non–threat-based condition (see Figure 2a), we found a three-way interaction between time, discrimination, and universalism-concern values, F(1, 120) = 4.94, p = .01, η² = .04. The participants with a lower endorsement of universalism-concern values expressed more concern about their social image in T2 (point estimated = 3.20, SE = 0.18) than in T1 (point estimated = 3.00, SE = 0.17) in the discrimination condition, F(1, 120) = 5.39, p < .05, d = 0.41. In the no-discrimination condition, the participants tended to express lesser concern about their social image in T2 (point estimated = 3.08, SE = 0.22) than in T1 (point estimated = 3.28, SE = 0.21), F(1, 120) = 3.53, p = .06, d = 0.35.

In participants with a higher endorsement of universalism-concern values, however, there was no change in their social image concern when they were accused of discrimination, F(1, 120) = 0.97, ns, d = 0.00, or when they were not accused, F(1, 120) = 2.00, ns, d = 0.20. This pattern of results indicates that being accused of discrimination affects concern about social image only in participants who endorsed universalism-concern values less strongly.

Discussion

The pattern of results found in this study replicates the previous ones, in that the participants expressed less positive self-esteem after they received feedback describing them as discriminatory individuals. These results go further by demonstrating that only individuals more motivated to pursue egalitarian goals, as measured by universalism-concern values (Schwartz et al., 2012), showed less positive self-esteem after receiving feedback describing their behavior as discriminatory. Importantly, this effect occurred only when the participants did not have a threat-based justification for their behavior. For individuals less motivated to commit to egalitarian goals, the effect observed for those thought to have behaved in a discriminatory way was not on their self-esteem but on their social image. And, this was only observed for those with no justification for their behavior.

In sum, the current study follows the direction of our hypothesis according to which not all individuals are affected when being accused of discriminating. Only those who endorse values that promote egalitarianism feel affected in their self-esteem, just because acting in a discriminatory way threatens their self-concept that they are fair and egalitarian. Importantly, the mere accessibility of symbolic and realistic threat perceptions allow these individuals to maintain positive self-esteem even after being confronted with the socially undesirable aspects of their behavior, such as discriminatory attitudes. Thus, perceiving outgroup members as a threat to the ingroup’s prerogatives plays a defensive role in self-concept of egalitarian individuals, nullifying any dissonance between the image they have of themselves and the consequences of their behavior.

Small-Scale Meta-Analysis

We conducted a meta-analytic effect size for the influence of discrimination on self-esteem in each justification condition across the three studies (i.e., pilot study, Study 1, and Study 2). We considered seven effect sizes, three being in the nonjustification conditions (one condition in each study) and four in the justification conditions (one in the pilot, two in Study 1, and one in Study 2). We used Cohen’s d as an indicator of effect size and estimated meta-analytical effects with the meta-regression command in the R Package Meta (Schwarzer, 2017). We obtained meta-analytical effects both with random- and fixed-effects models by using the restricted maximum likelihood method of estimation. Figure 3 shows the effect size in each condition with its respective confidence interval, besides the estimated three meta-analytical effects. The estimated overall meta-analytical Cohen’s d = −0.28, confidence interval (CI) = [–0.52, –0.04], indicates that discrimination effectively decreased participants’ self-esteem across conditions. The reliable heterogeneity in the random effect model (tau² = 0.0694, p < .01) indicates that the estimated effect size is not constant, which means that it varies between experimental conditions. In fact, the meta-analytical Cohen’s d of –0.58, CI = [–0.80, –0.35], in the nonjustification conditions is reliably different from zero, but it is not in the threat-based justification conditions, d = −0.03, CI = [–0.20, 0.14]. This means that discrimination consistently decreased participants’ self-esteem when they were not provided with justification for their behaviors, and that discrimination did not affect self-esteem in the conditions where the participants received feedback with threat-based justifications for their discriminatory actions. Therefore, this set of results represents robust evidence for our proposal that becoming aware of one’s discriminatory behavior toward immigrants negatively affects self-esteem when there is no justification for discrimination.

Figure 3.

Forest plot of meta-analytic results.

General Discussion

Across three experiments and a meta-analytical summary of results, we provided a systematic investigation about the role played by threat-based justifications in protecting the self-esteem of individuals accused of discrimination against immigrants. In the pilot study, the participants expressed less positive self-esteem when they received feedback indicating that they had acted in a discriminatory way. By using a test–posttest design, Study 1 not only replicated this effect but also showed that individuals experienced a decrease in their self-esteem after being accused of discrimination. Study 2 reinforced the evidence for this effect and went further by demonstrating that only in more egalitarian individuals is their self-esteem affected after receiving feedback describing their behavior as discriminatory, whereas less egalitarian participants experienced an increase in the concern about their social image. This phenomenon occurs because of two main reasons. First, during the last half of the century, the majority of individuals living in democratic societies learned a norm prescribing that good people are egalitarian and nondiscriminatory. Consequently, acting in a discriminatory way entails negative psychological consequences that affect individuals’ self-evaluation. Accordingly, more egalitarian individuals experience a value-based motivational conflict between the values that underpin unjust and prejudiced discriminatory behavior and the egalitarian values that support the antiprejudice norm. In fact, previous research has demonstrated that these values are the motivational basis for individuals to control prejudiced attitudes (Plant & Devine, 1998) and any failure to control them leads to guilt and shame (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993). Second, even nonegalitarian individuals are affected by the antidiscrimination norm, but it occurs due to external reasons. Because they do not have an internal motivation to eliminate prejudiced attitudes and promote justice and equality, they only need to preserve a social image that adapts to social norms in the expression of prejudice (see Crandall et al., 2002).

Importantly, in each of the experiments, the influence of discrimination on self-esteem (and on individuals’ concern about their social image in Study 2) occurred when the participants had no threat-based justifications for their supposed discriminatory behavior. Discrimination had no effect when the participants were led to believe that their actions were motivated by a symbolic or realistic (Study 1) or by a combination of symbolic and realistic (Study 2) threat-based justification. This defensive effect of threat-based justifications is due to a well-documented role played by justifications in the legitimation of social inequality (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; Jost & Major, 2001). In fact, a justified act of discrimination allows individuals to maintain their positive self-esteem because legitimacy protects their personal and social image of fair and unprejudiced individuals. It is the defensive role of threat-based justifications that maintains the self-esteem of more egalitarian individuals and protects the social image of less egalitarian ones.

Theoretical Implications

This work provides new theoretical information about the role played by legitimization in the discrimination against minority groups. Research into contemporary prejudice and discrimination has been based on a widely accepted assumption that individuals need to justify discrimination to avoid any feelings that might threaten their self-concept as unprejudiced and egalitarian people (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Lima-Nunes, Pereira, & Correia, 2013; Vala, Pereira, Lima, & Leyens, 2012). The current set of experiments directly addressed this assumption by demonstrating that individuals evaluate themselves in a less positive way when they become aware of their discriminatory behavior. Importantly, the results showed that this phenomenon occurs only when individuals do not have a threat-based justification for their behavior. In fact, the self-esteem of participants who had symbolic or realistic justifications for their behavior did not change after they were informed that they had acted in a discriminatory way. Thus, engaging in a legitimating process of discrimination is an ego-defensive strategy used by individuals to maintain positive evaluations of their self-concept, especially for those who are motivated to pursue egalitarian goals.

The current studies also serve to combine different theories of discrimination in democratic societies that have disseminated egalitarian values. First, it supports theories concerning the contemporary expression of prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005), especially with regard to the role played by legitimization in helping individuals to discriminate without being personally and socially sanctioned. Second, the results are in accordance with the predictions derived from theorizing and research on the legitimacy of social inequality (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which proposes that individuals are pressured by the antidiscrimination norm to control prejudiced attitudes, and so use justifying factors to prevent their actions from being perceived as discriminatory (Lima-Nunes et al., 2013). Third, the results are consistent with recent research into the redefining of symbolic and realistic threat perceptions, not only as a key variable in predicting intergroup behavior (e.g., Stephan et al., 2002) but also as legitimizing factors for discrimination against outgroups (Bahns, 2017; Pereira et al., 2010). In fact, current research has shown that threat perceptions legitimate discrimination by buffering the negative effects of socially undesirable behavior on the self-esteem of perpetrators of discriminatory behavior. Finally, the Study 2 pattern of results represents the first explanation of why nonegalitarian individuals also need to legitimate discrimination. They are motivated by external sources of control over prejudice and discrimination, which is relevant to the literature on internal and external motivations to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998).

Finally, our work also offers additional meaning to the discussions about the psychological consequences of legitimacy (e.g., Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; Jost & Major, 2001; Tyler, 2010). Demonstrating that legitimacy plays an ego-defensive role in intergroup discrimination is important in understanding the psychological condition that allows individuals to accept their blatant discrimination without suffering any negative feelings associated with it. In fact, if individuals are not psychologically affected by their damaging behavior against minority groups, they might believe that it is not necessary to change any aspect of their behavior, making it more difficult to confront discrimination effectively. Indeed, one of the most important functions of legitimization is to support the maintenance of the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994), the first step of which involves not producing motivations for change, as revealed by the fact that participants’ self-esteem is unaffected when discrimination is justified. In the domain of discriminatory behavior, this function helps individuals to discriminate against minority groups despite social norms and laws prohibiting this behavior.

Limitations and Further Directions

There is more work to be done to fully understand the role played by threat-based justification on legitimacy of prejudiced attitudes and behaviors. The current research program only focused on deliberative effect of discrimination on individuals’ self-esteem. We do not know yet what would occur with individuals’ implicit self-esteem; also, we do not know how threat-based justifications affect at an implicit level. For instance, calling individuals implicitly racist can result in more, not less, automatic intergroup bias (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004) because of implicit self-esteem compensation (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007). It is possible that implicit self-esteem increases even when explicit self-esteem decreases when the individual’s self-concept is under threat. The current research introduces a new aspect in the study of self-esteem that is the role played by symbolic and realistic threat-based justifications as important regulators of the negative affect that occurs due to a breach of normative prescriptions. It is important to develop the study of the ego-defensive roles that are played by these justifications in implicit self-esteem and its regulatory function of intergroup attitudes. It would also be useful for future research to include a control group in which the participants did not have information about their attitudes toward immigrants. Furthermore, it would be highly beneficial for research such as this to be done with other groups than immigrants. Finally, our studies were circumscribed to undergraduate students at the same university, which precludes generalization into other socially relevant contexts.

Despite these limitations, the phenomenon reported in this work helps to open up new research possibilities that aim not only to increase understanding of the psychological consequences of discrimination but also, more generally, to enhance knowledge of how individuals manage the conflict between the need for distinctiveness that motivates them to show ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the antiprejudice values that motivate them not to discriminate (Lima-Nunes et al., 2013). In fact, the results demonstrated that merely being exposed to a justification for past negative behavior helps individuals to maintain a meaningful sense of themselves as worthwhile and fair individuals, as reflected by their ability to maintain a positive self-image.

Supplemental Material

pereira_online_appendix – Supplemental material for The Ego-Defensive Role of Legitimacy: How Threat-Based Justifications Protect the Self-Esteem of Discriminators

Supplemental material, pereira_online_appendix for The Ego-Defensive Role of Legitimacy: How Threat-Based Justifications Protect the Self-Esteem of Discriminators by Cicero Roberto Pereira, José Luis Álvaro, and Jorge Vala in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Chris Crandall and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that greatly contributed to improving this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by a grant from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (PTDC/PSI-PSO/114159/2009).

Supplemental Material

Supplementary material is available online with this article.

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