Who Is Most Likely to Wear Rose-Colored Glasses? How Regulatory Mode Moderates Self-Flattery

Abstract

In general, people prefer to view themselves positively. But some individuals are more prone to self-flattery than others, that is, holding an unjustifiably high opinion of oneself. Applying regulatory mode theory, we identify motivational factors that predict which individuals are and are not prone to self-flattery. In four studies, using both chronic (Studies 1-3) and experimental (Study 4) conditions, we found that those with high locomotion concerns about effecting change (control) are more inclined to flatter themselves, whereas those with high assessment concerns about making the right choices (truth) are less inclined to flatter themselves. The relation between stronger locomotion and greater self-flattery, and stronger assessment and lesser self-flattery, was mediated by locomotors’ low self-criticism and assessors’ high self-criticism. These results shed light on how locomotion and assessment differ in the motivation to flatter oneself.

Keywords

regulatory mode self-criticism self-esteem self-flattery self-enhancement social desirability

To some extent, everyone prefers to believe that they possess desirable traits (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Moreover, people often do their best to ensure that others think that they are helpful, kind, intelligent, and so on as well. Our research considers a particular version of this self-positivity bias—the case of self-flattery. Self-flattery refers to holding and reporting an unjustifiably high opinion of oneself. It concerns your own high opinion of yourself while reporting to others, and thus is not the same as trying to have others have a high opinion of you (impression management). It is also not the same as higher (vs. lower) self-esteem or lesser (vs. greater) proneness to self-criticism per se because both of these may or may not be realistic. What matters about self-flattery is that it is unrealistic.

Individuals can be more or less susceptible to the tendency to flatter themselves while reporting about their desirable traits. Some people are quite eager to don rose-colored glasses, whereas others are too concerned with discerning reality—the true state of affairs—to allow themselves to be biased in their self-evaluations. These latter individuals insist on accurately identifying their own characteristics even, or perhaps especially when those characteristics are negative or undesirable. Our research is about general motivational concerns that could increase or decrease the likelihood of self-flattery.

Regulatory mode theory (RMT) offers one perspective on these individual differences. RMT postulates the existence of two essential aspects of self-regulation: locomotion and assessment (Higgins, 2012; Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & Higgins, 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Locomotion is the facet of self-regulation that is concerned with initiating and maintaining goal-related movement in the service of effecting change (control). Locomotors are motivated to effect change without interruption and dislike obstacles that interfere with it. Assessment, on the contrary, is the facet of self-regulation that is concerned with critically evaluating means and goals in the service of making the right choices (truth).

RMT posits that the two regulatory modes are independent: at any given time, an individual can be high on both locomotion and assessment, low on both, or high on one and low on the other (see Higgins et al., 2003). Locomotion and assessment can be either measured as chronic individual differences or manipulated as state variables. The regulatory mode scales were developed to measure individuals’ chronic levels of locomotion and assessment (Kruglanski et al., 2000). The scales contain 12 items measuring locomotion (e.g., “I enjoy actively doing things, more than just watching and observing,” “I feel excited just before I am about to reach a goal,” and “When I decide to do something, I can’t wait to get started”) and 12 items measuring assessment (e.g., “I often critique work done by myself or others,” “I am a critical person,” and “I spend a great deal of time taking inventory of my positive and negative characteristics”). The two regulatory modes can also be induced situationally. Past studies have manipulated state locomotion and assessment by asking participants to write about 3 times in the past when they acted like a locomotor (e.g., “Think back to the times when you decided to do something and could not wait to get started”) or 3 times they acted like an assessor (e.g., “Think back to the times when you critiqued work done by others or yourself”; Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Pierro, Pica, Klein, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2013; Pierro, Presaghi, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2009). We suggest that locomotion and assessment are relevant to self-flattery because the two modes influence how individuals evaluate themselves and, more specifically, whether they are more or less likely to positively exaggerate their self-reports (i.e., be less realistic or more realistic in their self-reports).

Due to locomotors’ focus on moving forward and taking action, they want to believe that they are effective in making things happen, effective in control (Higgins, 2012). Self-doubt and a low opinion of oneself can be crippling, impeding moving forward or making progress in goal pursuits (e.g., Lent, Brown, & Larkin, 1984; Multon, Brown, & Lent, 1991). Thus, to ensure smooth and unimpeded motion toward their goals, locomotors are inclined to believe in their own effectiveness in managing to make things happen, managing to be successful in their goal pursuits. Furthermore, to be effective in control, locomotors should avoid criticizing themselves, to reduce the doubts and obstacles that such high self-criticism could produce. Reducing self-criticism would increase the likelihood of their having unrealistically high beliefs in their positive characteristics and flattering themselves in self-reports. In addition, the low propensity for critical self-evaluation of high (vs. low) locomotors will also cause their self-esteem to be high (i.e., rose-colored glasses). Thus, low self-criticism, and thereby unrealistically high self-esteem, would be positively related and could even contribute to the self-flattery, which would be revealed in a mediating effect of high self-esteem and low self-criticism between high locomotion concerns and high tendency of self-flattery.

Prior research provides some support for these proposals, showing that higher locomotion is positively associated with high self-esteem and increased optimism (Kruglanski et al., 2000). High locomotors¹ are also more likely to perceive their lives as purposeful, implying an overall positive evaluation of themselves and their lives (Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, Orehek, & Scheier, 2017). High locomotors are more willing to forgive themselves, indicating a reluctance to hold on to negative feelings about themselves (Pierro, Pica, Kruglanski, & Higgins, in press). People with high locomotion concerns experience less regret about their past decisions, and are less likely to engage in counterfactual thinking about those decisions, again suggesting a generally positive appraisal of their past and their lives (Pierro et al., 2008). Finally, locomotion is associated with less depression, anxiety, and psychological strain, and increased feelings of well-being (de Carlo et al., 2014; Kruglanski et al., 2000). These findings support our prediction that low self-criticism would contribute to high locomotors’ reporting on their personal characteristics in an unrealistically positive manner (high self-flattery), and they would do so not for impression management purposes but in the service of their self-regulatory concerns, specifically to support their belief that they are effective in making things happen, effective in control.

Assessors, on the contrary, emphasize critical evaluation to arrive at the right conclusion. They are less concerned with making things happen than with making the right choices and evaluating things accurately—being effective in truth (Higgins, 2012). They are concerned with identifying the actual, real state of affairs—the realistic truth—even if such critical analysis reveals unpleasant details about their own characteristics. High assessors (but not high locomotors) feel distressed from making wrong decisions, as they need their decision to be the “right” one (Chen, Rossignac-Milon, & Higgins, 2018). They are willing to critique themselves and identify any weaknesses in their own character in the service of ensuring a realistic and accurate self-evaluation that supports making the right choices. This explains why high assessors are high in self-criticism: self-criticism is in the service of not making any mistakes, including in self-evaluation. This realistic self-criticism (which in turn lowers their self-esteem) makes them less likely to exaggerate when they report about themselves. Given this, there could be a mediating effect of high self-criticism and low self-esteem between high assessment concerns and low tendency of self-flattery.

Once again, prior research provides some support for these proposals. High assessment is negatively associated with self-esteem and optimism (Kruglanski et al., 2000; see also Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis et al., 2017). People with high assessment concerns are less inclined to forgive themselves, suggesting that they are unwilling to let go of negative feelings about themselves (Pierro et al., in press). High assessors experience more regret about their past decisions, and are more likely to engage in counterfactual thinking about those decisions, again suggesting an overall negative appraisal of their past and their lives (Pierro et al., 2008). Finally, assessment is associated with more depression, anxiety, and psychological strain, and lower feelings of well-being (de Carlo et al., 2014; Kruglanski et al., 2000). These studies suggest that high assessors are not prone to think unrealistically highly about themselves: their high tendency to engage in self-criticism buffers any exaggeration, both in private evaluations (self-esteem) and in public reports (self-flattery).

Importantly, previous research has not directly tested whether there is a relation between regulatory mode and self-flattery, nor has the literature considered what factors might underlie such a relation. To our knowledge, a study conducted by Lalwani, Shrum, and Chiu (2009) is the only study that is relevant to our research. It examined motivational underpinnings of self-enhancement and impression management and found that promotion focus mediated the relation between individualism and self-deceptive enhancement, and prevention focus mediated the relation between collectivism and impression management. This study is relevant to our research because promotion concerns are typically positively correlated with locomotion concerns (Higgins, 2008). Given this, we included a regulatory focus measure (Higgins et al., 2001) in our research.

The present research aimed to demonstrate the role of locomotion concerns and assessment concerns in self-flattery, and examine the factors that underlie the relations. We proposed the following hypotheses. First, high (vs. low) locomotors should be more prone to self-flattery (Hypothesis 1 [H1]), whereas high (vs. low) assessors should be less prone to self-flattery¹ (Hypothesis 2 [H2]). Notably, these hypothesized effects of regulatory mode concerns on self-flattery arise from regulatory mode differences in the need for self-deception rather than the need for impression management (Hypothesis 1a [H1a], Hypothesis 2a [H2a]), with high locomotors needing self-deception in the service of exaggerating their control over making things happen (e.g., exaggerating the likelihood of goal pursuit success) and high assessors needing to eliminate self-deception in the service of accuracy and truth.

Second, the relation between locomotion and self-flattery in self-reports could be mediated by locomotors’ tendency to believe in their control effectiveness, as reflected in higher self-esteem (Hypothesis 3 [H3]) and lower propensity to criticize themselves (Hypothesis 5 [H5]). The relation between assessment and self-flattery could be mediated by their low self-esteem (Hypothesis 4 [H4]) and greater propensity to criticize themselves (Hypothesis 6 [H6]).

We tested these hypotheses in four studies. In the first study, we examined the first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) by having participants complete the locomotion and assessment scales and a self-report measuring the tendency to flatter themselves (operationalized as a Social Desirability Scale). For the reason mentioned earlier, we included the regulatory focus measure in this study as well. In the second study, participants again completed the locomotion and assessment scales, as well as a different social desirability measure that, importantly, differentiated impression management and self-deception (providing another test of H1 and H2 as well as test of H1a and H2a). This study also tested our first mediation hypotheses (H3 and H4) by including measures of self-esteem. The third study included the locomotion and assessment scales and utilized a new experimental (rather than questionnaire) measure of self-flattery (providing the third test of H1 and H2). This study also tested our second mediation hypotheses (H5 and H6) by including a scale that measured participants’ tendency to be critical of themselves, while controlling for self-esteem. Finally, the fourth study aimed to provide evidence of the causal influence of regulatory mode on self-flattery by manipulating locomotion and assessment and utilizing the same experimental measure of self-flattery as in the previous study (thus providing a fourth test of H1 and H2).²

Study 1: Association Between Chronic Regulatory Mode and Social Desirability Tendencies

In Study 1, we used self-report data to examine the association between individuals’ chronic regulatory mode orientations and their tendency to flatter themselves in self-reports. We predicted that individuals with higher locomotion (controlling for assessment) would have a greater tendency to exaggerate their positive qualities (operationalized as scores on a Social Desirability Scale). We also predicted that individuals with higher assessment (controlling for locomotion) would be less likely to exaggerate their positive qualities. Taking into account the findings of Lalwani et al. (2009) about promotion focus being positively correlated with social desirability, and the findings that locomotion and promotion are positively correlated (Higgins, 2008), we included the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ) in our survey. By doing so, we aimed to ensure that locomotion explains a unique portion of the variance for self-flattery, even after controlling for promotion.

Method

Participants

Two hundred twenty-four U.S. residents (123 males) were recruited to complete an online survey on MTurk in exchange for monetary compensation of US$1.50. The acceptance rate was set at 97% (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2013). Participants’ age ranged from 19 to 69 (M = 33.3; SD = 10.17).

Materials and procedure

Three questionnaires were administered: the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire (RMQ; Kruglanski et al., 2000), the Social Desirability Scale–17 (SDS-17; Stöber, 2001; validated in the American context by Blake, Valdiserri, Neuendorf, & Nemeth, 2006), and the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001). The scales were presented in this order to all participants via the Qualtrics online survey platform.

The RMQ measures individual differences in participants’ chronic locomotion and assessment concerns. Respondents answered one set of 12-item statements regarding their locomotion levels (e.g., “By the time I accomplish a task, I already have the next one in mind”) and a second set of 12-item statements regarding their assessment levels (e.g., “I spend a great deal of time taking inventory of my positive and negative characteristics”). They rated each statement on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Responses were averaged to create a locomotion (α = .89) and assessment (α = .84) score for each participant.

The SDS-17 measures individuals’ tendency to respond to questions about themselves in a socially desirable manner. Participants were asked to read 16 statements and indicate whether the item described them by checking either “true” or “false” (α = .81). These statements describe either behaviors which are socially desirable but infrequent (e.g., “I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative consequences”) or socially undesirable but frequent (e.g., “There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that I borrowed”; reverse-coded). Participants’ scores on this scale were calculated by averaging all the items.

The RFQ measures assess individuals’ orientations toward prevention and promotion. Respondents answered one set of six-item questions regarding their promotion focus (e.g., “How often have you accomplished things that got you ‘psyched’ to work even harder?”) and a second set of five-item statements regarding their prevention focus (e.g., “How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents?”). They rated their agreement with each statement on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never or seldom) to 5 (very often). Responses were averaged to create a promotion (α = .74) and prevention (α = .84) score for each participant.

Results

SDS-17 scores were unrelated to age (r = –.05, ns) but were significantly related to gender with males being more prone to this tendency than females (M = 1.55 ± 0.25 vs. M = 1.48 ± 0.23), t(222) = 2.189, p = .03, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.01, 0.13]; therefore, we controlled for gender in our analysis. As shown in Table 1, preliminary results of bivariate correlations established that social desirability score of the respondents was positively correlated with locomotion and negatively with assessment; we also found predicted positive association between locomotion and promotion.

Table 1.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations for Regulatory Mode, Regulatory Foci, and Social Desirability (Study 1).

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Locomotion
2. Assessment	.16*
3. Promotion	.62**	−.07
4. Prevention	.13*	−.08	.21**
5. Social desirability	.30**	−.19**	.16*	.20**
M	4.25	3.96	3.46	3.39	1.52
SD	0.82	0.80	0.65	0.81	0.24

p < .05. **p < .01.

To assess the link between participants’ regulatory modes and their tendency to present themselves as more socially desirable and to check that regulatory mode has its unique contribution to the variability of social desirability score, above and beyond promotion focus of participants, we regressed social desirability score on locomotion, assessment, promotion, and prevention of participants, controlling for gender. Participants’ scores on regulatory mode and regulatory focus explained a significant portion of the variance in SDS-17, R² = .21, F(5, 218) = 11.28, p < .001, with higher locomotion positively predicting social desirability tendencies (β = 0.12, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.17]) and higher assessment negatively predicting social desirability tendencies (β = −0.07, p < .001, 95% CI = [–0.11, –0.03]). Promotion focus score did not predict social desirability (β = −0.06, p = .059, 95% CI = [–0.12, 0.00]), while prevention score predicted it positively (β = 0.05, p = .006, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.09]). Gender was still related to social desirability scores (β = −0.08, p = .006, 95% CI = [–0.14, –0.02]). These results remained after excluding gender as a control variable from the analyses.

Discussion

Results of the first study supported our first two hypotheses that high (vs. low) locomotors (controlling for assessment) should be more prone to self-flattery (H1), whereas high (vs. low) assessors (controlling for locomotion) should be less prone to self-flattery (H2). Moreover, we demonstrated that locomotion has its own unique influence on self-flattery above and beyond the regulatory focus of the respondents.

Study 2

To investigate further the link between participants’ regulatory modes and their tendency to present themselves in unrealistically high manner, we conducted a second study, this time using a different measure of social desirability with two factors: Self-Deception and Impression Management. Study 2 also aimed to examine the hypothesized underlying mechanism of this tendency, and thus, we included a measure of self-esteem. We expected that the high self-esteem of high locomotors would be related to their engaging in self-deception but not in impression management. As for high assessors, we predicted that their low self-esteem would be related to their negative association with self-deception but not impression management.

Method

Participants

Two hundred seven U.S. residents (114 males) were recruited to complete an online survey on MTurk in exchange for monetary compensation of US$1. The acceptance rate was set at 97% (Peer et al., 2013). Participants’ age ranged from 20 to 69 (M = 36.50; SD = 10.10).

Materials and procedure

Participants responded to three questionnaires: the RMQ (Kruglanski et al., 2000), the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1994), and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1979). The scales were presented in this order to all participants via the Qualtrics online survey platform.

The RMQ was the same as the one used in the previous study; it demonstrated high internal validity for both locomotion (α = .91) and assessment (α = .82).

The BIDR consists of two subscales. The first subscale contains 20 items that capture Impression Management, or the tendency to respond to items with the conscious goal of making a favorable impression on others (e.g., “When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening” and “I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit,” reverse-coded). The second subscale contains 20 items that capture Self-Deception, or a positive bias in item responses with the aim of protecting one’s self-esteem (e.g., “I always know why I like things” and “I am very frustrated with myself when I don’t meet the standards I have for myself”). Items are answered on a 7-point rating scale from not true (1) to very true (7). As only extreme answers indicate socially desirable responding, item ratings were dichotomized (following Paulhus, 1994). Ratings of 6 or 7 on positively coded items and ratings of 1 or 2 on reverse-coded items were recoded to a value of 1; all other ratings were recoded to a value of 0. Scale scores were then computed by averaging across items. Cronbach’s α was .84 for the entire scale, .82 for the Self-Deception subscale, and .71 for the Impression Management subscale.³

The RSE is a 10-item scale that assesses global self-worth by measuring both positive and negative feelings about the self (e.g., “I feel that I’m a person of worth”; “I certainly feel useless at times,” reverse-coded). Items were answered on a 4-point scale from disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). The score was calculated as the average of all the answers, after reverse-coding of the negatively worded items (α = .95).

Results

Preliminary analyses

To verify that the Paulhus (1994) conceptualization of the two factors of social desirability was reflected in the participants’ responses, we conducted principal components analysis, using a direct Oblimin rotation, with criteria of two numbers of factors to extract (Cattell, 1966). This analysis suggested that the two-factor model could be retained. Subsequent parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000) supported the two-factor model as well. We used the items that had a minimum pattern loading of .40 on their expected factor; one cross-loading was excluded (the statement “There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone” could indeed be seen both as Self-Deception and as Impression Management). The 16-items Self-Deception factor had an eigenvalue of 7.87; the 11-items Impression Management factor had an eigenvalue of 2.91. These factors accounted for 27% of the common variance. Scale scores were then computed by averaging across dichotomized items. Cronbach’s α was .84 for the entire scale, .82 for the Self-Deception subscale, and .71 for the Impression Management subscale.⁴

The correlations between all variables can be found in Table 2.

Table 2.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Variables in the Mediation Model: Regulatory Mode, Self-Esteem, General Social Desirability, Self-Deception and Impression Management (Study 2).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Locomotion
2. Assessment	.037
3. General BIDR	.49**	−.26**
4. Self-Deception	.46**	−.29**	.87**
5. Impression Management	.35**	−.16**	.81**	.51**
6. Self-Esteem	.55**	−.15*	.48**	.50**	.28**
M	4.13	3.66	0.29	0.26	0.34	2.98
SD	0.95	0.83	0.18	0.22	0.24	0.7

Note. BIDR = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding.

p < .05. **p < .01.

A preliminary examination of the correlations shows the expected pattern of results for all the subscales: the two regulatory modes are orthogonal, and the General BIDR, Self-Deception, and Impression Management scores are all positively intercorrelated. As expected, we replicated the findings from Study 1, while using a different measure of social desirability: all of the social desirability measures were positively correlated with locomotion and negatively correlated with assessment. More importantly, these correlations provide initial support for predicted indirect effects of the two regulatory modes (both locomotion and assessment) on subscales of the BIDR through self-esteem. Social desirability scores on the BIDR were unrelated to age (r = –.07, ns) or gender, t(199) = –.04, p = .71; therefore, we did not include age or gender in our analysis.

Main analyses

First, we conducted three linear regression analyses—regressing total BIDR, Self-Deception, and Impression Management scores on locomotion and assessment scores of respondents. Expected results emerged, replicating Study 1 and supporting our hypotheses. Participants’ locomotion and assessment scores explained a significant portion of the variance in the BIDR, R² = .32, F(2, 204) = 47.58, p < .001, with higher locomotion positively predicting social desirability tendencies (β = 0.09, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.11]) and higher assessment negatively predicting the total social desirability score of the respondent (β = −0.06, p < .001, 95% CI = [–0.08, –0.04]). The Self-Deception and Impression Management subscales exhibited similar patterns (in both regressions, we controlled for the other factor). Locomotion and assessment explained 41% of the variance in the Self-Deception subscale, F(3, 203) = 47.6, p < .001, with higher locomotion positively predicting self-deception tendencies (β = 0.08, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.11]) and higher assessment negatively predicting the self-deception score of the respondent (β = −0.07, p < .001, 95% CI = [–0.10, –0.04]). Similarly, for the Impression Management subscale, 28% of variance was explained by the regulatory mode scores of the participants, F(3, 203) = 26.22, p < .001: higher locomotion positively predicted impression management tendencies (β = 0.04, p = .029, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.07]), while higher assessment was not associated with them (β = −0.12, p = .55).

To test the hypothesized mediation effect of self-esteem, we used PROCESS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013). The bootstrapping method allowed us to test the indirect effects of locomotion and assessment on self-deception through self-esteem, while controlling for the other regulatory mode and Impression Management score; the results of the mediation analyses are presented in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1.

The indirect effect of locomotion on self-deception through self-esteem, controlling for assessment and impression management (Study 2).

Figure 2.

The indirect effect of assessment on self-deception through self-esteem, controlling for locomotion and impression management (Study 2).

As expected, the bootstrapping analysis supported indirect effect of locomotion on self-deception through self-esteem (point estimate = 0.03, unstandardized 95% CI = [0.02, 0.05]). Also as hypothesized, we found an indirect effect of assessment on self-deception through self-esteem (point estimate = −0.01, unstandardized 95% CI = [–0.02, –0.00]). As predicted, there were no indirect effects of either regulatory mode (neither locomotion nor assessment) on impression management through self-esteem. In all analyses, we controlled for the second social desirability factor, as well as the other regulatory mode.⁵

Discussion

The results of Study 2 replicated those of Study 1, which supported again our first two hypotheses that high (vs. low) locomotors are more prone to self-flattery (H1), whereas high (vs. low) assessors are less prone to self-flattery (H2). The proposed first mediation hypotheses (H3 and H4) was supported in this study too: the relationship between locomotion and self-flattery was explained by locomotors’ tendency to believe in their effectiveness and worth, as reflected in their higher self-esteem (H3), and the negative relationship between high assessors and self-flattery was explained by their low self-esteem (H4).

Importantly, Study 2 also shed light on which type of self-flattery is affected by regulatory mode: it showed that when high locomotors exaggerate their positive qualities through their high self-esteem, they are engaging in self-deception and not in impression management (H1a), and when high assessors do not exaggerate their positive qualities through their low self-esteem, they are reducing self-deception rather than impression management (H2a). In sum, regulatory mode explains the self-deception side of self-flattery rather than the impression management side.

The results of the first two studies support the predictions that higher locomotion and higher assessment have opposite relations to self-flattery, with the former being positive and the latter being negative. They also have the same opposite relations with both self-esteem and self-criticism (Kruglanski et al., 2000). The question that arises from these patterns is whether self-esteem has a unique mediating role between regulatory mode and self-flattery, or is it just a “by-product” of self-criticism, given that these two constructs are typically negatively correlated. To clarify whether self-esteem indeed contributes its unique explanation for the variance in self-flattery as a function of regulatory mode, Study 3 included both self-esteem and self-criticism as possible mediators and checked for two mediation models.

Study 3

To further assess the link between participants’ regulatory modes and their tendencies to exaggerate their positive qualities, we conducted a third study, which utilized a new different measure of self-flattery than the social desirability measures. To replicate the Study 2 finding that the reason for self-flattery is self-deception and not impression management, we designed an experimental study where participants knew that we are interested only in the validity of “the new program” that assessed their personal characteristics. So if high locomotors (but not high assessors) would still choose to move the ruler up and thus exaggerate their good-enough above-average personal score on different positive characteristics even more, they indeed would engage in self-deception and not in impression management.

In addition, the new feature of this study is that instead of reporting about positive views about self only this direct measure accounted for how much respondents flattered themselves while comparing with others. For this matter, we asked participants to evaluate themselves on six personality characteristics in comparison with other respondents of the survey, testing the extent to which one flatters oneself by judging oneself to be better than others. The goal of Study 3 was to replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2 with the measure of self-flattery comparing with others, as well as to assess the potential mediating effect of another factor—self-criticism. To test this hypothesis, we included a self-report measure of general self-criticism that had two subscales: Internalized Self-Criticism (ISC) and Comparative Self-Criticism (CSC). Moreover, to check whether self-criticism explains self-flattery on its own, or is it just inverse of self-esteem, we controlled for self-esteem in the analyses checking the mediating role of self-criticism and vice versa.

We predicted that participants who were high on locomotion would be more likely to flatter themselves and that this association would be explained by lower levels of general and CSC, controlling for self-esteem and assessment score. On the contrary, we predicted that respondents who were high on assessment would be less likely to flatter themselves and that this association would be mediated by higher levels of general and CSC, controlling for self-esteem and locomotion score.

Method

Participants

One hundred ninety-two U.S. residents (110 males) were recruited to complete an online survey on MTurk for monetary compensation of US$1. The acceptance rate was set at 97% (Peer et al., 2013). Participants’ age ranged from 20 to 75 (M = 34.35; SD = 10.19).

Materials and procedure

Participants completed three questionnaires in a randomized order: the RMQ (Kruglanski et al., 2000), the Level of Self-Criticism Scale (LOSC; Thompson & Zuroff, 2004), and the RSE (Rosenberg, 1979).

The RMQ scale was the same as the one used in the previous studies; it demonstrated good internal validity for both locomotion (α = .85) and assessment (α = .83).

The LOSC Scale (α = .92) measured two forms of negative self-evaluation: CSC and ISC. The 12 items of the CSC subscale (α = .83) capture a negative view of the self compared with others, who are seen as either superior to or critical of oneself (e.g., “I often worry that other people will find out what I am really like and be upset with me”). The 10 items of the ISC subscale (α = .91) reflect a negative view of the self compared with one’s internal standards (e.g., “I often get very angry with myself when I fail”).

The RSE scale was the same as the one used in the previous study; it demonstrated good internal validity (α = .91).

Social comparison measure of self-flattery

After participants responded to the scales described above, we asked them to help us check the validity of our new “personality analysis program” in a short, unrelated survey. They were told that this new experimental program calculates each person’s scores on different personality traits based on their answers to various questionnaires (compared with the answers of others in our sample). We asked participants to tell us whether the program had accurately identified what they really believe about themselves. They were further informed that the average of all corrections from all respondents would be used to demonstrate the overall accuracy of the new program.

Unbeknownst to respondents, each participant saw the same picture of a “trait ruler” and was given identical scores on each trait: slightly above average (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; see Figure 3). We did this so our participants would be generally satisfied with what they got and we could check how much they would exaggerate this good-enough above-average score. This design also ruled out the impression management part of social desirability effect because participants knew that we were interested in aggravated answers “for validating our new program,” and were not watching their personal evaluations. This helped us to check whether the person truly believes in this high self-assessment or does it for good impression only. We explained that each number on this “trait ruler” reflected the percentage of participants in our sample who were lower on that trait than the participant himself. The traits listed on the ruler were brave, creative, humorous, respectful, helpful, and imaginative. The respondents were instructed to assess the accuracy of our new program by changing the score on each characteristic as they thought necessary, or leaving it unchanged. The average of the changes made by each participant served as an indicator of her positive bias about herself. Greater positive changes reflect greater self-flattery.⁶

Figure 3.

Trait ruler (Study 3).

Results

Preliminary analyses

To verify that conceptualization of the two factors (CSC and ISC) was reflected in the participants’ responses, we conducted a principal components analysis, using an Oblimin rotation, with criteria of eigenvalue > 1 and scree plot (Cattell, 1966). This analysis suggested that the two-factor model could be retained. Subsequent parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000) supported the two-factor model as well. The correlations between all variables can be found in Table 3.

Table 3.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Variables in the Mediation Model: Regulatory Mode, General Self-Criticism, Internal Self-Criticism, Comparative Self-Criticism, Self-Esteem, Age, and Change on the Ruler (Study 3).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Locomotion
2. Assessment	−.17*
3. General LOSC	−.36**	.63**
4. Internal Self-Criticism	−.22**	.62**	.93**
5. Comparative Self-Criticism	−.45**	.54**	.91**	.70**
6. Self-Esteem	.30**	−.34**	−.50**	−.40**	−.53**
7. Change on the ruler	.44**	−.21**	−.34**	−.27**	−.36**	.17*
8. Age	.15*	−.24**	−.15*	−.119	−.17*	.134	.18*
M	4.40	3.72	3.71	4.25	3.27	20.28	69.84	34.35
SD	0.75	0.82	1.02	1.29	0.96	16.25	12.14	10.19

Note. LOSC = Level of Self-Criticism Scale.

p < .05. **p < .01.

A preliminary examination of the correlations shows the expected pattern of results for all of the subscales. The two regulatory modes were slightly negatively correlated in this sample (r = –.166, p =.022). The General, Internal, and CSC measures were positively intercorrelated. We replicated the findings of the previous two studies, while using a new social comparison measure of social desirability: Changing the ruler to flatter oneself in comparison with others was significantly positively correlated with locomotion concern and significantly negatively correlated with assessment. Replicating the results of Study 2, self-esteem was positively correlated with this measure of self-flattery, while positively correlating with locomotion and negatively with assessment. As expected, this self-flattery measure was negatively correlated with all three measures of self-criticism. More importantly, the correlations provided initial support for the predicted indirect effect of the self-criticism scales, which were expected to mediate the relationship between the two regulatory modes and changing the ruler to flatter oneself. Self-esteem was also negatively correlated with all three scores of self-criticism and thus included as control variable in all analyses.

Respondents’ age was correlated with General Self-Criticism score (r = –.153, p = .035) and with CSC score (r = –.165, p = .022). It was also correlated with the change on the ruler (r = .177, p = .014), with locomotion (r = .148, p = .041), and with assessment(r = –.243, p = .001); we, therefore, included age in all our analyses. All these correlations demonstrated that people are less critical and more flattering to themselves with the age. There were no gender differences in any of the variables; hence, we did not include gender in our analyses.

Main analyses

First, we regressed the number of points by which individuals changed their rate on the ruler to flatter themselves onto their locomotion and assessment scores, controlling for age and their other regulatory mode. Participants’ locomotion and assessment scores and age explained a significant portion of the variance in number of points changed on the ruler, R² = .22, F(3, 187) = 17.22, p < .001, with higher locomotion positively predicting the tendency to change the ruler in a more self-flattering manner (β = 6.51, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.40, 8.62]) and higher assessment negatively predicting this tendency (although this effect was only trending toward significance; β = −1.83, p = .068, 95% CI = [–3.79, 0.014]). Individuals in the top quartile of locomotion had 12% more changes than the rest of respondents, whereas individuals in the top quartile of assessment had 6% less changes. The effect of age was not significant (p = .194).

To test the hypothesized mediating effect of self-criticism, we used PROCESS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013). The bootstrapping method allowed us to test the indirect effects of locomotion and assessment on changing the ruler in a self-flattering manner through each of three scores of self-criticism, while controlling for other regulatory mode, self-esteem, and age of the participants; the results of the mediation analyses are presented in Figures 4 to 7.

Figure 4.

Locomotion, General Self-Criticism, & Change on the ruler. This figure illustrates the relationship between these factors, controlling for assessment, self-esteem and age (Study 3).

Figure 5.

Locomotion, Comparative Self-Criticism, & Change on the ruler. This figure illustrates the relationship between these factors, controlling for assessment, self-esteem and age (Study 3).

Figure 6.

Assessment, General Self-Criticism, & Change on the ruler. This figure illustrates the relationship between these factors, controlling for locomotion, self-esteem and age (Study 3).

Figure 7.

Assessment, Comparative Self-Criticism, & Change on the ruler. This figure illustrates the relationship between these factors, controlling for locomotion, self-esteem and age (Study 3).

As expected, the bootstrapping analysis supported indirect effect of locomotion on self-flattery through general self-criticism (point estimate = 0.68, unstandardized 95% CI = [0.11, 1.70]) and through CSC (point estimate = 0.93, unstandardized 95% CI = [0.17, 2.09]).

Also as hypothesized, we found an indirect effect of assessment on self-flattery through general self-criticism (point estimate = −1.62, unstandardized 95% CI = [–3.75, –0.18]) and through CSC (point estimate = −1.10, unstandardized 95% CI = [–2.48, –0.10]).

As expected, there were no significant indirect effects of either regulatory mode on self-flattery through ISC. In all analyses, we controlled for the other regulatory mode, self-esteem, and participants’ age.⁷

To test the mediating effect of self-esteem, above and beyond being inverse of self-criticism, we used PROCESS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013). The bootstrapping method allowed us to test the indirect effects of locomotion and assessment on changing the ruler in a self-flattering manner through self-esteem, while controlling for other regulatory mode, self-criticism, and age of the participants. The results of the self-esteem mediation analyses for each of three self-criticism scores were all insignificant, leading us to conclude that self-esteem does not have its mediation role in relations between regulatory mode and self-flattery above and beyond being negatively related to self-criticism.

Discussion

Study 3 replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2, as well as examined the potential mediating effect of self-criticism while controlling for the effect of self-esteem. By utilizing a new social comparison measure of self-flattery, we demonstrated that participants who were high on locomotion (controlling for assessment) adjusted the social comparison ruler in a self-flattering way and that this association was mediated by lower levels of general and CSC. In contrast, respondents who were high on assessment (controlling for locomotion) did not exaggerate their positive qualities, and this association was mediated by higher levels of general and CSC. Moreover, Study 3 concluded that self-criticism is more important than self-esteem in explaining the opposite effects of locomotion and assessment on self-flattery.

There is one possible limitation of Study 3 that needs to be addressed. It has been found that locomotors are prone to mistakes in circumstances where discrepancy spotting may take away from the opportunity for movement. In addition, they are not as concerned with making the right choices as are assessors (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Given this, it is possible that respondents high in locomotion did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that they were already placed in an above-average percentile position and instead responded too quickly just to get on with it. It should be noted, however, that this could have produced negative rule changes as much as positive rule changes, which is not what happened. What happened was positive rule changes. Nonetheless, to address this issue, Study 4 used a ruler with more extreme numbers (i.e., more noticeable numbers) and used instructions that highlighted the above-average score before asking participants to adjust the ruler if needed. In addition, Study 4 situationally primed locomotion and assessment rather than measuring them as chronic individual differences to replicate our basic effect with a motivational state manipulation and to attest causality.

Study 4

Participants

Two hundred forty-three U.S. residents (152 males) were recruited to complete an online survey on MTurk for monetary compensation of US$1. The acceptance rate was set at 97% (Peer et al., 2013). Participants’ age ranged from 20 to 75 (M = 34.25; SD = 10.30).

Materials and Procedure

Upon entering the survey, participants were randomly assigned to either a locomotion (n = 121) or an assessment (n = 122) induction, following Avnet and Higgins (2003). They were asked to recall three different behaviors they have used successfully in the past and to write a short example for each behavior. In the locomotion condition, they were asked to write about times when they acted like a “doer,” when they finished one project and did not wait long before starting a new one, and when they decided to do something and could not wait to get started. In the assessment condition, they were asked to write about times when they compared themselves with other people, thought about their positive and negative characteristics, and critiqued work done by themselves or others. In both conditions, respondents were asked to write an essay elaborating on these three examples, asking them either to focus on evaluations and comparison of all alternatives in these examples (for assessment) or to focus on how these examples demonstrate why the propensity to remain “in motion” is an important part of their life (for locomotion).

Afterward, participants completed the same Study 3 social comparison self-flattery measure of “adjusting scores on personality traits created by our program,” with a little modification to address the issue discussed earlier. To make the above-the-average person score more obvious, and make positively changing the scale to be more self-flattering even more telling, the participants in Study 3 were given higher initial scores on “the ruler.” In addition, the instructions explicitly explained what a percentile means: “We will show you the ratings our program calculated for your various personality characteristics, compared with other respondents in this sample (e.g., if your score is 76, it means that on this personality characteristic you are better than 76% of this sample).” In the end, we provided respondents with the opportunity to write a comment to the researchers and debriefed them.

Results

There were no differences between experimental groups in either gender or age. To compare the difference in changes between manipulation groups, we calculated all the same indicators of self-flattery from Study 3 and compared the average of numbers of positive and negative changes for each participant in each trait. As expected, participants in the locomotion condition scored higher on self-flattery than participants in the assessment condition. Over all six traits, the locomotion group (M_locomotion = 415.83 ± 68.74) adjusted their rating by adding on average 17.26 more points than the assessment group (M_assessment = 398.57 ± 57.78), t(241) = 2.12, p = .035, 95% CI = [1.21, 33.30], Cohen’s d = 0.30. Thus, the basic effect was found again, this time as a result of different manipulation for two groups.⁸

Discussion

The results of Study 4 replicate the basic effect found in Studies 1 to 3 of locomotion being associated with more self-flattery than assessment. Study 4 replicated this effect for the case of locomotion and assessment being current motivational states that were situationally induced, experimentally, rather than chronic individual differences. In addition, the social comparison self-flattery measure was improved by making the above-average starting position more salient and by providing explicit instructions about what the score meant. Interestingly, one of the respondents in the locomotion-induced condition wrote in the comments: “This was an extremely engaging, and at times uncomfortable survey. Must confess, I was sorely tempted to skew some of the answers to make myself look better (to whom, I don’t know—myself, I suppose). But I think I’ve been honest in my responses and in the final ‘tweaks’ to the assessment. Good luck with your survey, hope to see the results sometime.”

General Discussion

Across four studies, we found that locomotors tended to flatter themselves more, whereas assessors tended to flatter themselves less. These relations held with both measured chronic locomotion and assessment and situationally manipulated locomotion and assessment, and with different measures of individuals’ tendency to unrealistically (i.e., unjustified) exaggerate their positive characteristics. Furthermore, our findings consistently found that the social desirability tendency is different between people with higher locomotion and people with higher assessment concerns: the former being prone to self-flatter themselves by really believing their high qualities, as explained by their low self-criticism, while the latter are not flattering themselves at all—not for impression management and not in their private thoughts—and the reason for this is their high self-criticism (general and comparative). This finding shows that social desirability is not a common tendency for all people and its increase or decrease can be explained by different levels of self-criticism for individuals with different regulatory mode concerns.

Consistent with the previous literature on self-enhancement (e.g., meta-analyses of Dufner, Gebauer, Sedikides, & Denissen, 2018), we support a distinction between self-enhancement and impression management tendencies: the former refers to the motive to create the self-perception that one is a competent and capable individual, regardless of reality, and the latter is the conscious manipulation of others for a favorable social judgment. Our findings clarify why regulatory mode would apply only to self-deceptive enhancement but not impression management, demonstrating the mediating role of engaging in self-criticism. Furthermore, both high regulatory modes exclude impression management as a goal for self-flattery but for different reasons: high locomotors will naively report that they are indeed that good because they need to personally believe it themselves (see the anecdotal citation from one of our Mturkers), and high assessors are too concerned with finding the real truth to try to impress others.

Our finding about locomotors (vs. assessors) being prone more to self-enhancement is consistent with the latest meta-analyses about positive relations between self-enhancement and personal adjustment (life satisfaction, positive affect, negative affect, depression; Dufner et al., 2018). High locomotors (but not high assessors) are both high in personal adjustment and more inclined to self-flattery. Future research needs to check whether the personal adjustment is the goal or the by-product of the self-flattery tendencies of high locomotors.

This line of research has some intriguing practical implications. We show that individuals who are high on locomotion may be reluctant to admit to having faults, while high assessors are willing to criticize themselves. This means that high assessors might be at a significant disadvantage in job interviews, wherein the inclination to promote oneself can be a valuable tactic that increases one’s chances of being hired (Proost, Schreurs, De Witte, & Derous, 2010). This is not only problematic for the high assessment candidate. It is also problematic for the employers if they are trying to hire individuals for job roles that would benefit from employees who have high assessment (e.g., jobs where making the right choice is critical and complex jobs or jobs that involve a large amount of information processing; Chernikova et al., 2016).

Importantly, we demonstrated that situationally induced locomotion and assessment shows the same basic difference in self-flattery between locomotion and assessment as individuals’ chronic regulatory mode orientations. This suggests that in situations when employers or other interaction partners wish to accurately identify individuals’ potential flaws or weaknesses, they would do well to prime them with assessment. Alternatively, when individuals are in a scenario in which self-promotion would serve them well (e.g., the job interview described above), they may wish to temporarily raise their locomotion levels.

Of course, this research has limitations. First, all four of our studies were conducted with online samples. Although experiments have shown that the quality of data collected in online samples is as high as, or even higher, than that collected in laboratory samples (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013), future research should nonetheless aim to replicate our results in a more controlled lab environment. In addition, our measures of self-flattery did not involve any face-to-face interactions with others, and it is possible that individuals who flatter themselves on a computer task may behave differently in a face-to-face conversation with another person. Indeed, this is where the impression management aspect of self-flattery may be more apparent. Thus, future studies should extend our results to examine whether they remain robust for face-to-face interactions.

There are several future directions for this research. If high locomotors and high assessors differ in their self-flattery tendencies, for example, then regulatory mode could be an important moderator of findings on self-serving bias and self-enhancement, heuristic thinking, the above-average effect, and overconfidence in knowledge (Sloman & Rabb, 2016).

Our studies focused on individuals’ perceptions of their own traits, but many interesting questions remain. For instance, do locomotors also tend to see others in a rosier light when evaluating them, or is this effect limited to perceptions of their own qualities? Similarly, are assessors as harshly critical of others as they are of themselves? Research on regulatory mode and forgiveness (Webb, Coleman, Tomasulo, & Higgins, 2017) offers a hint of an answer to this question: locomotors (vs. assessors) have a stronger tendency to forgive others, which implies that they will also be more likely to believe the best about others. Nonetheless, future research should test this intriguing notion directly.

Relatedly, it would be interesting to examine how high locomotors’ and high assessors’ differential propensity to flatter themselves affects others’ evaluations of them. In other words, are high (vs. low) locomotors liked more because they think and speak highly of themselves, or do they experience a sort of backlash, in which they are disliked because they violate society’s general expectations of modesty and humility? Are high (vs. low) assessors liked more because they speak honestly about their flaws, or are they viewed as “downers” who are dour and unnecessarily critical? Evaluations of high locomotors and high assessors could also vary by culture: boastful locomotors may be highly valued in individualistic cultures, where self-promotion is viewed as acceptable and even desirable, while self-deprecating assessors may be valued in collectivistic cultures, where modesty and diffidence are considered to be important traits (cf. Kurman, 2003). Future research should address these intriguing questions.

Another direction for future studies would be to investigate how high locomotors’ and high assessors’ tendencies to flatter themselves impact other aspects of their daily lives. Does high assessors’ propensity to think less of themselves lead to lower happiness and well-being (as compared with high locomotors)? Prior research has indeed found that locomotion is negatively associated with depression whereas assessment is positively associated with it (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2000). However, the possibility that these relations are mediated by individuals’ greater or lesser tendency for self-flattery has not yet been investigated and could provide a fruitful avenue for new research.

Finally, it is important to investigate how the inclination for self-flattery affects high locomotors’ and high assessors’ performance. On one hand, the tendency to think highly of oneself could plausibly have detrimental consequences: if locomotors (vs. assessors) are resistant to thinking negatively of themselves, they may be unlikely to change in response to critical feedback, which could impair their work performance (cf. Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1985; de Stobbeleir, Ashford, & Buyens, 2011). On the other hand, the tendency to hold a high opinion of themselves could also have positive consequences, as it could lead locomotors (but not assessors) to optimistically take on challenging and difficult projects, and persevere at them in the belief that they are capable of succeeding (cf. Luthans, Avolio, Walumbwa, & Li, 2005; Youssef & Luthans, 2007). Previous research offers some support for the latter notion, as studies have shown that high locomotors generally exhibit better work performance (Chernikova et al., 2016; Lo Destro, Chernikova, Pierro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2016; Pierro, Pica, Mauro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2012; Pierro, Presaghi, Higgins, Klein, & Kruglanski, 2012). Nonetheless, the question of whether and how such performance is influenced by locomotors’ and assessors’ high (or low) opinions of themselves has yet to be examined.

In conclusion, our studies show that individuals who are high on locomotion are more prone to engaging in self-flattery, whereas those who are high on assessment are less prone to exaggerate their positive qualities in self-reports. We also demonstrated that these relations are mediated by individuals’ propensity to be self-critical. This research provides new insights into how locomotion and assessment differ in the motivation to create and report about one’s positive self-views.

Supplemental Material

Sapplemental_material – Supplemental material for Who Is Most Likely to Wear Rose-Colored Glasses? How Regulatory Mode Moderates Self-Flattery

Supplemental material, Sapplemental_material for Who Is Most Likely to Wear Rose-Colored Glasses? How Regulatory Mode Moderates Self-Flattery by Svetlana Komissarouk, Marina Chernikova, Arie W. Kruglanski and E. Tory Higgins in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Supplemental Material

Supplementary material is available online with this article.

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