Mind–Body Dissonance: A Catalyst to Creativity

Abstract

Mind–body dissonance (MBD) is the psychological experience of one’s bodily expressions contradicting one’s mental states. Across four experiments (total N = 887), the current research proposes and demonstrates that MBD can enhance creativity by facilitating an atypicality mind-set. First, two different instantiations of MBD (i.e., assuming a high-power/low-power role while adopting a constricted/expansive posture, or recalling a happy/sad memory while frowning/smiling) increased performance on creative association, insight, and generation tasks (Experiments 1 and 2). A third study showed that an atypicality mind-set was an underlying mechanism for the creativity effect (Experiment 3). Finally, the frequency of past MBD experiences was found to reduce MBD’s creativity effect (Experiment 4). The present research offers evidence for the positive functions of bodily expressions that contradict mental states and highlights the significance of understanding the interactive effects of psychological states and their physical analogues in studying creativity.

Keywords

mind–body dissonance creativity atypicality mind-set feelings-as-information self-perception

Intrapersonal contradictions abound in everyday life: a child’s forced smile as she cringes internally at the sight of an unwelcomed Christmas present, a job candidate’s confident posture as he agonizes over every little lapse at his only job interview, or an academic’s humble demeanor as her ego swells during the reception of a scholarly award. These contradictory experiences between the mind and body are a surprisingly understudied part of individuals’ phenomenological experiences, the consequences of which have only recently begun to receive attention in psychology research.

Previous research on disconnects between the mind and body has largely been limited to the experience of emotions, for example, the suppression of emotional expressions or emotional expressions that contradict feelings (Abraham, 1999; Gross, 1998). In addition, this work has almost exclusively uncovered negative consequences, including elevated sympathetic activation and blood pressure, greater stress, and reduced memory (Hopp, Rohrmann, Zapf, & Hodapp, 2010; Richards & Gross, 2000). Although some research has reported positive social functions of strategically expressed emotions (e.g., Tiedens, 2001), recent evidence suggests that such benefits are achieved through the simultaneous modification of internal feelings, and not from an actual disconnect between the mind and body (Groth, Hennig-Thurau, & Walsh, 2009).

The only previous work to directly examine the contradiction between the mind and body shows that, in addition to creating a sense of incongruence and hindering memory encoding, it leads to category inclusiveness (i.e., the use of broad conceptual categories; Huang & Galinsky, 2011), a likely antecedent to positive, creative processes such as cognitive flexibility (e.g., the flexible use of both broad and narrow categories; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990; Rietzschel, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2007) and negative outcomes such as an underdifferentiation among concepts that hinders knowledge acquisition (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Mandler, 1992).

Building on this preliminary work, the current research proposes that contradictions between the mind and body can have distinctively positive outcomes. In particular, it is proposed that mind–body dissonance (MBD),¹ an atypical psychological state that occurs when the mind and body experience two seemingly contradictory affective or nonaffective states (Huang & Galinsky, 2011), can positively contribute to creativity, that is, the production of novel, useful ideas, and problem solutions (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). Furthermore, MBD is expected to facilitate creativity via the activation of an atypicality mind-set or the inclination to dismiss conventional thinking.

MBD: An Atypical Experience

Typically, the mind and body work in tandem to reciprocally shape an individual’s experience of reality (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal, 2007). Although it is unclear whether each affective or nonaffective mental state has a specific physical analogue, previous research has identified some reliable correspondences. For example, smiles typically accompany happy thoughts and frowns sad thoughts (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972); expansive postures often accompany a subjective sense of power and constricted postures a sense of powerlessness (Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005).

As the examples at the outset of the article suggest, however, it is possible that in certain contexts, individuals’ bodily expressions can be at odds with their mental states (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). In particular, the current research focuses on the experience and consequences of MBD, the contradiction between individuals’ mental states and bodily expressions. MBD could occur when individuals adopt confident postures to cover fretfulness or feign humble looks to mask arrogance (Schneider, 1969). It could also occur when individuals adopt positive or negative emotional expressions that are polar opposites of their internal states (Sutton, 1991). Because humans expect to maintain coherence within themselves (Festinger, 1957), and typically do maintain a congruent relationship between the mind and body (Ekman et al., 1972; Hall et al., 2005), when explicitly instructed to mask their mental states with contradictory bodily expressions, they often find it novel and challenging (Ekman, Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988). Therefore, much like the fact that incoherent stimuli are perceived to be uncommon and even risky or exciting (Song & Schwarz, 2009), the diametrical opposition between the mental and bodily states is likely to render MBD a novel and atypical experience. As such, the present research predicts that individuals undergoing the experience of MBD as opposed to mind–body coherence (MBC) are likely to adopt an atypicality mind-set.

Does MBD Encourage an Atypicality Mind-Set?

Several lines of research suggest that MBD could lead to an atypicality mind-set, the inclination to dismiss conventional thinking, by affecting how individuals think, feel, or perceive themselves. First, this prediction is consistent with the literature on “mind-set priming” (e.g., Fujita & Trope, 2014; Gollwitzer, 1990). Mind-set priming refers to the process of “having participants engage in a particular cognitive procedure in one task promot(ing) the tendency for that same cognitive operation to be used in subsequently semantically unrelated tasks” (Fujita & Trope, 2014, p. 70). For example, thinking about hopes (vs. duties) activates a promotion (vs. prevention) mind-set, which affects risk-taking in subsequent tasks that are irrelevant in content (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). Similarly, priming two conflicting goals (e.g., academic vs. social) activates a conflict mind-set, which reduces confirmation biases in other domains (Kleiman & Hassin, 2013). Likewise, making salient creativity-related cues activates a “think different” mind-set, which reduces automatic stereotyping and enhances creativity in subsequent, unrelated tasks (Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008; Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005). Because MBD involves disrupting the typical correspondence between two central elements of our being, in a similar manner, it should activate a mind-set that dismisses typical associations and conventional thinking.

Research stemming from the feelings-as-information perspective also supports a possible connection between MBD and an atypicality mind-set. This perspective holds that phenomenological feelings offer diagnostic information about the current state of one’s world and their standing in it, and that cognitive processes become attuned to the environmental requirements signaled by these feelings (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). For example, it has been argued that the simultaneous experience of positive and negative emotions is an unusual feeling, signals an unusual environment, and increases sensitivity to unusual associations (Fong, 2006). Much like the mind-sets we adopt due to long-term participation in a specific culture or temporary exposure to certain cognitive cues (Fujita & Trope, 2014; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000), this “cognitive tuning” has been used to explain how people are able to flexibly adapt to and enhance their potential to flourish in their environments (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). Building on this literature, MBD may also signal to individuals that they are in an atypical environment, which should increase their likelihood of thinking in an atypical and unconventional manner.

Finally, this argument is in line with self-perception theory and attribution theory (Bem, 1972; Kelley, 1967), which postulate that individuals infer their attitudes, emotions, and mind-sets by perceiving their own expressive behaviors and their contexts and, subsequently, act in ways in which they believe someone who possesses those attributes would behave. For example, people who were formerly induced to comply with a smaller request tend to believe they have become “the kind of person. . . who cooperates with good causes” and are subsequently more likely to comply with a larger demand (Freedman & Fraser, 1966, p. 201). Therefore, when undergoing MBD, a similar process may occur. Having observed themselves behave in a way that is atypical to how one would behave in this context (e.g., I was able to act like I frowned when I was happy), individuals may infer that they possess an atypicality mind-set (i.e., “I am the kind of person who can think and act in unusual ways”), and proceed to behave accordingly.²

Thus, building on these three literatures, the present research predicts that the experience of MBD promotes an atypicality mind-set. This mind-set encourages a more favorable attitude toward novelty and ambiguity and, therefore, holds promise for creativity (Amabile, 1996; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995).

An Atypicality Mind-Set Facilitates Creativity

Creativity betters the world in myriad ways, stimulating artistic imaginations, facilitating scientific discoveries and technological innovations, and resolving social conflicts (e.g., De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008; Simonton, 1997). A widely adopted definition of creativity highlights the novelty of ideas relative to conventional practices and the appropriateness of ideas relative to the constraints of the particular domain (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). Accordingly, creativity is often achieved through the simultaneous exploration of novel ideas (Dollinger, 2003) and navigation of ambiguous and multifaceted constraints (Barron & Harrington, 1981).

As a result, a key facilitator of creativity is an atypicality mind-set, that is, the inclination to dismiss conventional thinking (Amabile, 1996; Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Guilford, 1967; Gupta, Jang, Mednick, & Huber, 2012). Previous research has found that the ability to dismiss conventions fuels creativity, regardless of whether it was triggered by the incongruence between own and interaction partner’s bodily expressions, forced adoption of an atypical thinking style, perceived social rejection, induced deception, or a sense of entitlement (Ashton-James & Chartrand, 2009; Dane, Baer, Pratt, & Oldham, 2011; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Kim, Vincent, & Goncalo, 2013; Zitek & Vincent, 2015). One reason that thinking “off the beaten path” is such a critical contributor to creativity may be because it is associated with the tendency to react favorably to novelty and ambiguity (Fu et al., 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), a tendency that characterizes individuals high in openness to experience (McCrae, 1987) and one that helps create a fertile ground for creativity (e.g., Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, 2004; Ip, Chen, & Chiu, 2006).

Therefore, taken together, it was expected that because MBD is an atypical experience, individuals undergoing MBD will adopt an atypicality mind-set, which in turn enhances creativity. This would be consistent with and an extension of previous research demonstrating that MBD increases the tendency to expand the boundaries of cognitive categories to include atypical exemplars (Huang & Galinsky, 2011).

Overview of Studies

Four experiments tested MBD’s effect on creativity and its mechanism, using two different operationalizations of MBD and three common operationalizations of creativity. Experiment 1 manipulated MBD by having participants play a manager/subordinate role while adopting a constricted/expansive posture, and examined its effects on two types of creative tasks often used to capture individual creativity: that is, insight (i.e., the disregarding of typical assumptions to solve a definable problem; for example, Duncker, 1945) and association (i.e., the forming of seemingly unrelated elements into new combinations; for example, Mednick, 1968). Experiment 2 manipulated MBD by having participants recall a happy/sad memory while contracting muscles involved in frowning/smiling, and examined its effects on insight, association, as well as a third, creative generation task (i.e., the generation of ideas or responses deemed novel by independent judges; for example, Guilford, 1967). Experiment 3 tested an atypicality mind-set as a mediator for MBD’s effect on creativity. Finally, Experiment 4 examined the frequency of past MBD experiences as a moderator and indirectly validated an atypicality mind-set as a mechanism.

Experiment 1: The Effect of MBD in Power Experiences on Novel Association and Insight

Experiment 1 examined whether MBD facilitates novel association and insight. It manipulated MBD through the contradiction between hierarchical roles and body expansiveness/constrictedness (Huang & Galinsky, 2011), postures reliably correlated with hierarchical roles and their associated sense of power (e.g., Hall et al., 2005).

Method

Participants and design

Two hundred forty-one undergraduate and graduate students (63 males, 178 females; M_age = 22.12, SD_age = 3.20) were randomly assigned to a 2 (mental experience: high power, manager vs. low power, subordinate) × 2 (bodily expression: high power, expansive vs. low power, constricted) between-subjects design. The sample size was above 171 suggested by a power analysis of a medium-size effect (f = 0.25) with 90% power and an alpha of .05 for interaction effects in a 2 × 2 ANOVA (analysis of variance).

Procedure

Upon arrival, participants sat down in individual cubicles and filled out a leadership questionnaire that ostensibly assigned roles in a two-person puzzle-building task they “will complete later in the study.” While participants waited for role assignments, the instructions introduced a “workplace ergonomics” study requiring them to sit in a computer chair in a specific posture for 3 to 5 min (Huang & Galinsky, 2011). While sitting in instructed postures, participants read their leadership questionnaire feedback on a computer screen, including role assignment and role-specific instruction for the two-person task.

To manipulate the bodily expression part of MBD, in the expansive posture condition, participants placed one arm on the armrest and the other on the back of an empty chair nearby while crossing one leg such that an ankle rested on the thigh of the other leg. In the constricted posture condition, participants placed their hands under their thighs, dropped their shoulders, and placed their legs together.³ For the mental experience part of the manipulation, the questionnaire feedback, which was unrelated to participants’ answers, randomly placed them into either a high-power role (i.e., manager) that would direct and evaluate a subordinate in the puzzle-building task, and reward the subordinate by distributing five lottery tickets between the two of them, or a low-power role (i.e., subordinate) that would follow the manager’s direction, build the puzzle, and be evaluated and rewarded by the manager. Participants were told that one lottery ticket from all participants in this study would win a prize. After reading the roles and studying the task instructions, participants were allowed to stop engaging in the postures.

Next, they took part in a series of “unrelated” tasks (i.e., the creative association and insight tasks) while the puzzle-building task was ostensibly “being set up.” In the end, each participant was carefully debriefed and each received five lottery tickets.

Novel association

Participants worked on 17 Remote Associates Test (RAT) triads, where they had to find a word logically linked to each triad of words provided (Mednick, 1968). After receiving two examples, participants were told to solve as many as possible in 3 min.

Insight

Then, participants worked on four insight problems, including two riddles and two puzzles (i.e., the Penny problem and the Matchsticks problem, T. M. Lewis, 2004; Ohlsson, 1992). The tasks are considered creative insight problems as they are only solvable by disregarding typical assumptions (Duncker, 1945). The number of correctly solved problems served as the insight measure (0-4).

Manipulation check

To ensure the validity of the manipulation procedure, participants reported how powerful they felt on a 10-item scale (1 = not at all, 11 = very much; α = .82; Huang, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Guillory, 2011). Items include “while working on the first two tasks, how powerful did you feel?” and “. . . how dependent did you feel?” (reverse-scored).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check

The manipulation instructions were successful. A two-way ANOVA revealed that being in the manager (M = 6.23, SD = 1.57) versus subordinate role (M = 5.35, SD = 1.44) produced a significantly higher sense of power, F(1, 237) = 20.46, p < .001, η² = .079, 90% confidence interval (CI) = [0.03, 1.14]. The expansive (M = 5.95, SD = 1.70) versus constricted body posture instruction (M = 5.63, SD = 1.41) also produced a directionally higher sense of power, F(1, 237) = 2.79, p = .096, η² = .012, 90% CI = [0, 0.04] ⁴ (see Table 1 for all means and pairwise comparisons in Experiment 1). The interaction was not significant (p = .98).

Table 1.

Experiment 1: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition.

	Sense of power	Association	Insight
Manager expansive posture	6.39^a (1.59)	4.22^a,b (2.26)	0.35^a (0.58)
Subordinate constricted posture	5.19^b (1.12)	3.35^a (2.05)	0.30^a,^*,† (0.53)
Manager constricted posture	6.06^a,c (1.55)	4.32^b (2.01)	0.48^a,† (0.70)
Subordinate expansive posture	5.51^b,c (1.70)	4.62^b (2.17)	0.49^a,* (0.72)

Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses next to the condition means. Means with different superscripts are significantly different at the p < .05 level, and those with “*” or “†" are significantly different at the p < .10 level (within the same column).

Insight

As predicted, a two-way ANOVA resulted in a significant mind–body interaction on the number of insight problems solved, F(1, 237) = 3.91, p = .049, η² = .016, 90% CI = [0.00003, 0.05], in that those in the MBD conditions (M = 0.49, SD = 0.71) solved more insight problems than those in the MBC conditions (M = 0.33, SD = 0.55), t(239) = 1.99, p = .048, d = 0.25, 95% CI = [0.001, 0.32]. Neither main effect was significant (ps > .72).

Novel association

As predicted, there was a significant interaction on novel association, F(1, 237) = 6.28, p = .013, η² = .026, 90% CI = [0.003, 0.07], in that those in the MBD conditions (M = 4.47, SD = 2.09) solved more RAT items than those in the MBC conditions (M = 3.78, SD = 2.19), t(239) = 2.49, p = .013, d = 0.32, 95% CI = [0.14, 1.23]. There was also an unpredicted main effect of bodily expression, with the expansive posture (M = 4.42, SD = 2.22) generating more novel associations than the constricted body posture (M = 3.83, SD = 2.08), F(1, 237) = 4.59, p = .033, η² = .019, 90% CI = [0.0008, 0.06]. The main effect of mental experience was not significant (p = .31).

Thus, Experiment 1 provided an initial demonstration that MBD has positive effects on at least two facets of creativity, novel association and creative insight. This study also provides evidence that MBD is not just a form of emotional dissonance and includes contradictions between the mind and body in nonaffective domains.

Experiment 2: MBD in Emotional Experiences and Creativity

To ensure that the effects found in Experiment 1 were not limited to contradictions between mental states of power and body expansiveness, Experiment 2 examined whether MBD in the emotional domain also facilitates creativity. In addition to association and insight, it measured judge-rated creative generation performance to improve the generalizability of the findings.

Method

Participants and design

Two hundred fifty-five undergraduate and graduate students (84 males, 171 females; M_age = 22.61, SD_age = 2.86) were randomly assigned to a 2 (mental experience: happy, sad) × 2 (facial expression: happy, sad) between-subjects design with an additional neutral condition. The sample size for the 2 × 2 ANOVA design was 200, which was more than 171 suggested by a power analysis of a medium-size effect (f = 0.25) with 90% power and an alpha of .05 for interaction effects. As the neutral condition was not central to the main research question, its sample size was 55, which was more than 51 (per group) suggested by a power analysis of a medium-size effect (d = 0.5) with 80% power and an alpha of .05 for one-tailed independent samples t tests.

Procedure

Participants performed a mental–physical coordination task in individual rooms. The cover story explained that the task “explores individuals’ ability to perform mental tasks while working on physical activities with parts of their body that they would not normally use for such tasks” (Huang & Galinsky, 2011, p. 353). Participants then completed the creativity tasks.

For the mental experience manipulations, participants recalled an experience in which they felt either happy or sad and typed a narrative account of the experience into a computer. They had 5 min to relive this emotional experience and describe it with as much detail as possible. For the facial expression manipulations, while performing the recall task, participants engaged the muscles involved in either smiling (i.e., the zygomaticus and orbicularis oculi) or frowning (i.e., the frontalis and corrugators) to manipulate facial expressions of happiness or sadness (Niedenthal, 2007). In the happy-face condition, participants held a marker with their front teeth without touching it with their lips. In the sad-face condition, participants affixed two golf tees on their foreheads right above the inside of their eyebrows using removable heavy-duty poster tape and made the tips of the golf tees touch by raising and squeezing the inner corners of eyebrows using only the muscles on their foreheads.⁵ They were told to release their muscles when it became uncomfortable and return to performing the task as soon as the discomfort subsided. This unobtrusive procedure was adopted to minimize participants’ tendency to achieve the required expressions through reappraising the recalled experiences and consequently altering their internal states (Gross, 1998). In the neutral condition, participants recalled their last trip to the supermarket while keeping their facial muscles “activity-free and tension-free.”

Creative generation

Next, participants had 2 min to generate as many uses as they could for a brick. Following a coding scheme based on Guilford (1967) and Markman, Lindberg, Kray, and Galinsky (2007), two judges blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions sorted all the uses into 20 mutually agreed-upon categories. After reviewing the definition of creativity (i.e., ideas that are novel and useful), they independently rated the creativity of each category on an 11-point scale (0 = not creative at all, 10 = very creative) and resolved the differences between their ratings through discussion. An example of a high-scoring category was “to insulate electrical conductivity” and an example of a low-scoring category was “to build something.” Judges then rated each participant on fluency (the number of uses), flexibility (the number of categories), and originality (mean creativity score per use). Reliability was high across the three types of ratings (αs = .99). Therefore, the averages of the two judges’ ratings served as the fluency, flexibility, and originality measures in subsequent analyses.

Novel association and insight

Participants also completed the same RAT and the same set of four insight problems from Experiment 1.

Manipulation check

To ensure the validity of the manipulation procedure, participants reported how they felt during the coordination task using two scales (1 = I didn’t feel happy at all to 11 = I have never felt this happy before and 1 = I didn’t feel sad at all to 11 = I have never felt this sad before). The average of the happiness and reverse-scored sadness ratings, which were significantly positively correlated (r = .30, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.18, 0.41]), served as the manipulation check.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check

The manipulation instructions were successful. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of mental experience, F(1, 195)⁶ = 99.84, p < .001, η² = .34, 90% CI = [0.25, 0.42], and a significant effect of facial expression, F(1, 195) = 4.99, p = .03, η² = .03, 90% CI = [0.002, 0.07] (see Table 2 for all means and pairwise comparisons including for the neutral condition in Experiment 2). The interaction was not significant (p = .86). Specifically, recalling a happy event (M = 7.31, SD = 1.79) produced more positive emotions than recalling a sad event (M = 4.94, SD = 1.60), t(197) = 9.84, p < .001, d = 1.40, 95% CI = [1.90, 2.85], but did not differ from recalling a neutral event (M = 6.83, SD = 1.93), t(154) = 1.57, p = .12, d = 0.26, 95% CI = [–0.13, 1.09]. Recalling a neutral event also produced more positive emotions than recalling a sad event, t(151) = 6.51, p < .001, d = 1.07, 95% CI = [1.32, 2.46]. In addition, while adopting a happy expression (M = 6.37, SD = 2.09) did not differ from adopting a neutral (M = 6.83, SD = 1.93), t(151) = 1.33, p = .19, d = 0.23, 95% CI = [–0.22, 1.13], or sad expression (M = 5.92, SD = 2.04), t(197) = 1.54, p = .12, d = 0.22, 95% CI = [–0.13, 1.03], adopting a neutral expression produced more positive emotions than adopting a sad expression, t(154) = 2.71, p = .008, d = 0.46, 95% CI = [0.25, 1.57].⁷

Table 2.

Experiment 2: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition.

	Positive emotions	Fluency	Flexibility	Originality	Association	Insight
Neutral-mind-neutral-face	6.83^a (1.93)	4.38^a (2.69)	3.30^a (1.89)	2.92^a (1.48)	4.25^a,b (2.14)	0.31^a (0.51)
Happy-mind-happy-face	7.61^b (1.75)	4.21^a (2.32)	3.31^a (1.74)	3.07^a (1.50)	3.77^a (1.91)	0.44^a,* (0.62)
Sad-mind-sad-face	4.69^c (1.50)	4.45^a,b (2.48)	3.38^a (1.87)	3.07^a (1.47)	3.69^a (1.91)	0.31^a (0.62)
Happy-mind-sad-face	7.04^a,b (1.80)	5.39^b,c (2.63)	4.16^b (1.75)	3.75^b (1.15)	4.62^b (2.29)	0.83^b (0.85)
Sad-mind-happy-face	5.18^c (1.66)	6.12^c (3.19)	4.63^b (1.54)	3.79^b (1.09)	4.74^b (2.21)	0.70^b,* (0.76)

Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses next to the condition means. Means with different superscripts are significantly different at the p < .05 level, and those with * are significantly different at the p < .10 level (within the same column).

Creative generation

As predicted, three two-way ANOVAs revealed significant mind–body interaction effects on fluency, flexibility, and originality, F(1, 196) = 14.10, p < .001, η² = .07, 90% CI = [0.02, 0.13]; F(1, 196) = 18.42, p < .001, η² = .09, 90% CI = [0.03, 0.15]; and F(1, 196) = 14.11, p < .001, η² = .07, 90% CI = [0.02, 0.13], respectively. Specifically, participants in the MBD conditions (M = 5.74, SD = 2.93) listed a greater number of uses than those in the MBC conditions (M = 4.33, SD = 2.40), t(198) = 3.72, p < .001, d = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.66, 2.16]. Furthermore, MBD (M = 4.39, SD = 1.66) led to uses that spanned more categories than MBC (M = 3.35, SD = 1.80), t(198) = 4.27, p < .001, d = 0.61, 95% CI = [0.56, 1.53]. Finally, MBD (M = 3.77, SD = 1.12) led to uses that were deemed more creative than MBC (M = 3.07, SD = 1.48), t(198) = 3.77, p < .001, d = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.33, 1.06]. None of the main effects was significant (ps > .20).

Novel association

As predicted, there was an interaction effect on novel association, F(1, 196) = 10.28, p = .002, η² = .05, 90% CI = [0.01, 0.11], in that participants in the MBD conditions (M = 4.68, SD = 2.24) solved more RAT items than those in the MBC conditions (M = 3.73, SD = 1.90), t(198) = 3.22, p = .002, d = 0.46, 95% CI = [0.37, 1.53]. Neither main effect was significant (ps > .73).

Insight

As predicted, there was also an interaction on the number of insight problems solved, F(1, 196) = 14.81, p < .001, η² = .07, 90% CI = [0.02, 0.13], in that participants in the MBD conditions (M = 0.77, SD = 0.81) solved more insight problems than those in the MBC conditions (M = 0.37, SD = 0.62), t(198) = 3.88, p < .001, d = 0.55, 95% CI = [0.20, 0.60]. Neither main effect was significant (ps > .21).

Thus, employing a second manipulation of MBD and three types of creativity tasks, Experiment 2 expanded the findings from Experiment 1 to demonstrate that MBD, experienced via the contradiction between emotional experiences and facial expressions, facilitated not only insight and association but also creative generation.

Experiment 3: Does an Atypicality Mind-Set Mediate the Effect of MBD on Creativity?

Experiment 3 investigated the prediction that MBD’s creativity effect is driven by an atypicality mind-set. It also conceptually replicated Experiment 2’s findings on creative generation by assessing whether participants’ drawings avoided copying a prominent feature of an example.

Method

Participants and design

One hundred seventy-six undergraduates (58 males, 114 females, four unreported, M_age = 20.03, SD_age = 1.47) were randomly assigned to a 2 (mental experience: happy, sad) × 2 (facial expression: happy, sad) between-subjects design with two additional baseline conditions. The baseline conditions were included to demonstrate that, without any manipulation, individuals are more likely to copy prominent examples when they are present versus not. The sample size for the 2 × 2 design was 115, which was more than 105 suggested by a power analysis of an interaction effect equal to the largest interaction effect obtained on creativity measures in Experiment 2 (f = 0.32) with 90% power and an alpha of .05. The sample size for the two baseline conditions was 61, which was more than 44 suggested by a power analysis of an effect equal to the largest effect obtained from comparisons between the neutral condition and an MBD condition in Experiment 2 (d = 0.77) with 80% power and an alpha of .05 for one-tailed independent samples t tests.

Procedure

Participants received the same mental–physical coordination task in Experiment 2, with those in the two baseline conditions receiving the same instruction as those in the neutral condition in Experiment 2. Then, they completed a generation task and answered questions on atypicality mind-set. Participants in the MBD, MBC, and baseline-with-example condition received “an example of what previous participants generated” before completing the generation task. Those in the baseline-without-example condition did not receive an example.

Creative generation task

Following Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, and Liljenquist (2008, p. 1454), participants were asked to “imagine going to another galaxy in the universe and visiting a planet very different from earth. On your trip, you discover a creature that is local to this planet.” Then, participants in the baseline-without-example condition proceeded directly to drawing their own creatures. Those in the other five conditions read the following before drawing: “On this page is an example that a previous participant produced. Keep in mind that you need not use or copy aspects of the example we have shown you.” A drawing of a creature with giant wings attached to its back followed. Two independent coders blind to the conditions coded the drawings for whether each had wing(s) attached to any part of the body. They agreed on all, but three of the drawings and a third coder resolved the disagreements. Whether participants drew a winged (0) or wingless (1) creature served as a dichotomous measure of creative generation.

Atypicality mind-set

Participants reported the extent to which they were inclined to dismiss conventional thinking, by indicating how much, “at this moment,” they agreed with 12 statements (1 = not at all, 11 = very much; α = .60; adapted from Snyder & Fromkin, 1977). Sample items include “It would bother me if people think I am too conventional” and “I would rather be known for trying new ideas than employing well-trusted methods.” Similar scales have been successfully employed as state measures and have been shown to respond positively to factors that encourage differentiation (Lynn & Snyder, 2002).

A manipulation check was not included.

Results and Discussion

Atypicality mind-set

As predicted, there was a mind–body interaction effect on the extent to which participants embraced an atypicality mind-set, F(1, 110)⁸ = 7.10, p = .009, η² = .061, 90% CI = [0.004, 0.162]. The main effects were not significant (ps > .23). Specifically, those in the MBD conditions (M = 6.61, SD = 0.96) were more inclined to embrace unconventional ideas than those in the MBC conditions (M = 6.15, SD = 0.80), t(112) = 2.82, p = .006, d = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.80], the baseline-with-example condition (M = 6.07, SD = 1.06), t(87) = 2.48, p = .015, d = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.98], or the baseline-without-example condition (M = 6.13, SD = 0.85), t(80) = 2.23, p = .029, d = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.92]. The other conditions did not differ from each other (ps > .70).

Direct and indirect effects on creativity

As predicted, a logistic regression regressing whether the drawing had wing(s) (0 = yes, 1 = no) on mental experience (0 = sad, 1 = happy), facial expression (0 = sad, 1 = happy), and their product produced a significant interaction effect, B = 2.88, SE = 1.20, exp(B) = 0.06, 95% CI = [0.005, 0.59], p = .016 (see Table 3 for all percentages and pairwise comparisons including for the baseline conditions in Experiment 3). The main effects were not significant (ps > .82). Specifically, participants in the MBD conditions (93%) produced more wingless drawings than those in the MBC conditions (75%), χ²(1, N = 115) = 6.54, p = .011, φ = .24, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.36], or the baseline-with-example condition (71%), χ²(1, N = 89) = 7.77, p = .005, φ = .24, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.46], and the latter two did not differ from each other, p = .64. In addition, those in the MBD conditions did not differ from those in the baseline-without-example condition (96%), p = .53, which also generated more wingless drawings than those in the MBC conditions, χ²(1, N = 87) = 5.63, p = .018, φ = .25, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.32], or the baseline-with-example condition, χ²(1, N = 61) = 6.73, p = .009, φ = .33, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.41]. These results suggest that MBD not only increased participants’ likelihood of generating wingless drawings compared with MBC, but also led to effects similar to not being given any manipulations or examples.

Table 3.

Experiment 3: Percentages, Means, and Standard Deviations by Condition.

Manipulation	Drawing task	Creative responses (%)	Atypicality mind-set
Happy-mind-happy-face	Example	75^a,c	6.06^a (0.73)
Sad-mind-sad-face	Example	75^a,c	6.25^a (0.88)
Happy-mind-sad-face	Example	92^a,b	6.50^a,b (1.11)
Sad-mind-happy-face	Example	94^b	6.70^b (0.85)
Baseline (no manipulation)	Example	71^c	6.07^a (1.06)
Baseline (no manipulation)	No example	96^b	6.13^a (0.85)

Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses next to the condition means. Means with different superscripts are significantly different at the p < .05 level (within the same column).

Controlling for MBD, an atypicality mind-set had a directionally positive effect on creativity, B = 0.65, SE = 0.35, exp(B) = 1.92, 95% CI = [0.97, 3.82], p = .06. A mediation analysis using Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) bootstrapping technique then examined whether an atypicality mind-set drives the effect of MBD (happy-mind-happy-face and sad-mind-sad-face = 0, and happy-mind-sad-face and sad-mind-happy-face = 1) on creativity (see Figure 1 for all coefficients). Using 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the data with replacement and a 95% confidence interval, this analysis produced a significant indirect effect of MBD on creativity through an atypicality mind-set (point estimate = .305; 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of [0.02, 0.93]).

Figure 1.

Experiment 3: An atypicality mind-set mediated the relationship between MBD and creativity.

Thus, supporting the predicted mechanism, the contradiction between individuals’ mental experiences and bodily expressions enabled them to embrace an atypicality mind-set, which in turn boosted creative generation. A limitation of this study is the lack of a manipulation check for the MBD manipulation, a procedure identical to the one used in Experiment 2. It is also worth noting that an experiment reported in the Supplementary Material employed the same manipulation, included two types of manipulation check, replicated the MBD–atypicality–creativity link, and made a preliminary attempt to rule out an alternative mechanism.

Experiment 4: Is the Creativity Effect Weakened by Frequent Past MBD Experiences?

The final study further explored the proposed generative mechanism through moderation. If MBD fuels creativity because it feels unusual and triggers an atypicality mind-set, then MBD’s creativity effect may be especially pronounced when participants have a paucity of past MBD experiences, whereas frequent MBD exposure may reduce this effect. This is because individuals habitually displaying bodily expressions that contradict their internal states may find MBD less unusual and are less likely to adopt an atypicality mind-set. For example, seasoned debt collectors may get used to displaying anger and irritation while feeling warm and sympathetic toward debtors (Sutton, 1991). Thus, a moderator of MBD’s creativity effect, namely, the frequency of individuals’ past MBD experiences, was the focus of this study.

Method

Participants and design

Two hundred fifteen undergraduate and graduate students (80 males, 135 females, M_age = 21.88, SD_age = 2.78) were randomly assigned to a 2 (mental experience: happy, sad) × 2 (facial expression: happy, sad) between-subjects design. The sample size was more than 171 suggested by a power analysis of a medium-size effect (f = 0.25) with 90% power and an alpha of .05 for two-way interaction effects in a 2 × 2 ANOVA.

Procedure

Participants took part in the same mental–physical coordination task used to manipulate MBD in Experiments 2 and 3, worked on the brick task that measured generation in Experiment 2, and indicated how often they had experienced a contradiction between their internal feelings and bodily expressions.

Creativity

Two judges blind to the hypotheses and conditions coded the uses of a brick on fluency (the number of uses), flexibility (the number of categories), and originality (mean creativity score per use) as they did in Experiment 2. Reliability between the two coders was high across the three types of ratings (αs > .97) and the averages of their ratings served as the fluency, flexibility, and originality measures in subsequent analyses.

Frequency of past MBD experiences

Instructions explained MBD experiences without referring to “mind–body dissonance” or the “mental–physical coordination task.” Then, participants answered four questions about their past MBD experiences, including “How often did your bodily expressions (i.e., facial expressions or body gestures) contradict your internal emotional states?” and “How often were your bodily expressions and internal emotional states consistent with each other? (Reverse scored)” (1 = not at all, 11 = all the time, α = .89).

A manipulation check was not included.

Results and Discussion

Creativity

As predicted, three two-way ANOVAs produced significant interaction effects on fluency, flexibility, and originality, F(1, 211) = 4.89, p = .028, η² = .02, 90% CI = [0.001, 0.065]; F(1, 211) = 14.01, p < .001, η² = .06, 90% CI = [0.02, 0.12]; and F(1, 211) = 17.45, p < .001, η² = .08, 90% CI = [0.03, 0.14], respectively (see Table 4 for all means and pairwise comparisons in Experiment 5). Specifically, participants in the MBD conditions (M = 5.78, SD = 2.71) listed a greater number of uses than those in the MBC conditions (M = 5.00, SD = 2.17), t(213) = 2.34, p = .02, d = 0.32, 95% CI = [0.12, 1.44]. Furthermore, MBD (M = 4.70, SD = 2.04) led to uses that spanned more categories than MBC (M = 3.76, SD = 1.50), t(213) = 3.85, p < .001, d = 0.53, 95% CI = [0.46, 1.42]. Finally, MBD (M = 3.89, SD = 1.37) led to uses that were deemed more creative than MBC (M = 3.09, SD = 1.41), t(213) = 4.21, p < .001, d = 0.57, 95% CI = [0.43, 1.18]. None of the main effects was significant (ps > .34).

Table 4.

Experiment 4: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition.

	MBD frequency	Fluency	Flexibility	Originality
Happy-mind-happy-face	6.06^a (1.77)	4.96^a (1.94)	3.72^a (1.47)	2.92^a (1.52)
Sad-mind-sad-face	6.18^a (1.93)	5.04^a (2.40)	3.79^a,c (1.55)	3.25^a (1.29)
Happy-mind-sad-face	5.93^a (1.95)	6.03^b (2.72)	4.84^b (1.88)	3.89^b (1.23)
Sad-mind-happy-face	6.27^a (1.86)	5.46^a,b (2.68)	4.52^b,c (2.23)	3.89^b (1.55)

Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses next to the condition means. Means with different superscripts are significantly different at the p < .05 level (within the same column). MBD = mind–body dissonance.

The moderating role of past MBD experiences

Participants across the four conditions did not differ on how frequently they experienced MBD in the past (ps > .37; also see Table 5 for correlations between all continuous variables). To prepare for regression analyses, the experimental condition was quadratic-coded, that is, happy-mind-happy-face and sad-mind-sad-face = −.5, and happy-mind-sad-face and sad-mind-happy-face = .5. Next, the frequency of past MBD experiences was centered to generate interpretable coefficients that are relatively free of multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991).

Table 5.

Experiment 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Continuous Variables (N = 215).

	M	SD	1	2	3	4
1. Frequency	6.10	1.87	—	−.176**	−.111	−.129
2. Flexibility	4.23	1.85		—	.507**	.798**
3. Originality	3.49	1.45			—	.232**
4. Fluency	5.39	2.48				—

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Three hierarchical multiple regressions, for flexibility, originality, and fluency, were performed to test the moderating role of frequency of past MBD experiences. In all analyses, quadratic-coded condition (MBD) and frequency were entered at Step 1 and the interaction term between the two was entered at Step 2. The regression of flexibility revealed a MBD main effect, a frequency main effect, and an interaction, B = 0.94, SE = 0.24, 95% CI = [0.46, 1.41], t(211) = 3.91, p < .001; B = −0.17, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [–0.29, –0.04], t(211) = −2.58, p = .01; and B = −0.26, SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [–0.51, –0.01], t(211) = −2.04, p = .04, respectively (see Table 6). The interaction (shown in Figure 2a) was decomposed by examining how MBD affected flexibility when participants had more or less frequent past MBD experiences. As predicted, MBD positively predicted flexibility at one standard deviation in frequency below the mean, B = 1.43, SE = 0.34, 95% CI = [0.76, 2.09], t(211) = 4.20, p < .001; at one standard deviation in frequency above the mean, MBD did not predict flexibility, t(211) = 1.31, p = .19.

Table 6.

Experiment 4: Linear Regressions Predicting Flexibility and Originality.

	Flexibility		Originality
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
MBD	.935***	.935***	.797***	.797***
Frequency	−.171**	−.166*	−.084	−.077
MBD × Frequency		−.262*		−.331**
R²	.095	.113	.089	.134
F	11.134***	8.921***	10.294***	10.898***

Note. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. MBD is quadratic-coded condition, wherein happy-mind-happy-face and sad-mind-sad-face = −.5, and happy-mind-sad-face and sad-mind-happy-face = .5. Frequency is mean centered. MBD = mind–body dissonance.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Figure 2.

(a) Experiment 4: Flexibility as a function of MBD (i.e., quadratic-coded condition) and the frequency of past MBD experiences and (b) Experiment 4: Originality as a function of MBD (i.e., quadratic-coded condition) and the frequency of past MBD experiences.

The regression of originality revealed a MBD main effect and an interaction, B = 0.80, SE = 0.19, 95% CI = [0.43, 1.16], t(211) = 4.31, p <.001 and B = −0.33, SE = 0.10, 95% CI = [–0.53, –0.14], t(211) = −3.34, p = .001, respectively (see Table 6). The frequency main effect was not significant, t(211) = −1.55, p = .12. This interaction (shown in Figure 2b) was decomposed to examine how MBD affected originality when participants had more or less frequent past MBD experiences. MBD positively predicted originality at one standard deviation in frequency below the mean, B = 1.42, SE = 0.26, 95% CI = [0.90, 1.93], t(211) = 5.40, p < .001; at one standard deviation in frequency above the mean, MBD did not predict originality, t(211) = 0.68, p = .50.

The regression of fluency revealed a significant MBD main effect, B = 0.78, SE = 0.33, 95% CI = [0.12, 1.43], t(211) = 2.33, p = .02. The frequency main effect and the interaction effect were not significant, B = −0.17, SE = 0.09, 95% CI = [–0.34, 0.01], t(211) = −1.85, p = .07, and t(211) = −1.05, p = .30, respectively. The lack of moderation on fluency may be because, unlike flexibility and originality, fluency captures the sheer number of ideas regardless of how novel or useful the ideas may be. As a result, factors such as MBD that affect flexibility and originality may not reliably affect fluency (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). It is also worth noting that, although negatively predicting flexibility, frequency, the moderator, did not have a significant main effect on originality or fluency and, therefore, did not seem to reliably predict creativity.

Overall, these findings conceptually replicated the effect of MBD on creativity in earlier experiments. More importantly, supporting the mechanism identified in Experiment 3, they demonstrated that MBD’s creativity effect is stronger with individuals who have experienced a paucity of MBD in the past, and weakens when individuals have had many MBD incidents, presumably because they experience MBD as less atypical and an atypicality mind-set is, therefore, not activated. A limitation of this study is the lack of a manipulation check for the MBD manipulation, a procedure identical to the one used in Experiment 2.

General Discussion

This work offers one of the first examinations of MBD, an understudied form of dissonance that goes beyond those created by the juxtaposition of two inconsistent cognitions, but is nonetheless accompanied by key features that define “dissonant” experiences (e.g., physiological arousal; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Festinger, 1957; Robinson & Demaree, 2007). Specifically, it constitutes the first theorization and direct test of MBD’s effect on creativity. It goes beyond previous research indicating MBD’s potential effect on cognitive flexibility (Huang & Galinsky, 2011)—a component of creativity that is neither necessary nor sufficient—to focus on creativity’s one necessary component, unconventionality or originality (Rietzschel et al., 2007).

It found that assuming a high-power/low-power role while adopting a constricted/expansive posture, or recalling a happy/sad memory while frowning/smiling led to original uses of an everyday object, nonconforming responses, novel associations, and fresh insights. In examinations of the generative mechanism, an atypicality mind-set that dismisses conventional thinking mediated this creativity effect. Finally, frequent past MBD experiences moderated this effect: Individuals who were less accustomed to MBD, presumably experiencing MBD as more atypical and adopting an atypicality mind-set, received a greater creativity boost; for individuals more accustomed to MBD, the creativity effect was attenuated.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

This work advances the broader literature on the positive functions of intrapersonal contradictory experiences. It goes beyond the existing work by demonstrating that not only do contradictions within the mind (e.g., pursuing conflicting goals) or between the mind and verbal expressions (e.g., being sarcastic through contradictory statements) trigger adaptive actions (e.g., Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Huang, Gino, & Galinsky, 2015; Kleiman & Hassin, 2013; Tadmor, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2012), contradictions between the mind and body can serve similar functions, that is, helping individuals survive and flourish in atypical situations through creativity. In addition, a mechanism examined or indicated in much of the work on intrapersonal contradiction is the inclination to consider alternative, unusual, or even opposing ideas and to embrace the ambiguity and multifacetedness of creativity-related problems. By explicitly hypothesizing and empirically demonstrating atypicality mind-set as a mechanism for MBD’s creativity effect, the current research corroborates the increasingly robust connection between creativity and this thinking style that encourages a favorable attitude toward novelty and ambiguity.

Furthermore, this work contributes to the creativity research by adopting a dualistic approach connecting two previously disjointed areas. Specifically, it introduces an interaction between individuals’ subjective feeling states and their physical analogues, two aspects of an individual that rarely exist in isolation from each other (Ekman & Friesen, 1969), yet have been, until now, studied independently in creativity research. In the first area, psychological states such as affect, power, and distrust have been found to shape individual creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Galinsky et al., 2008; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011). In the second area, physical states such as the contraction of the zygomatic muscles involved in smiling, openness of posture, fluidity of movement, or types of gestures (e.g., iconic and beat gestures) have also been found to contribute to creative performance (e.g., Andolfi, Di Nuzzo, & Antonietti, 2017; Fernández-Abascal & Díaz, 2013; C. Lewis, Lovatt, & Kirk, 2015; Slepian & Ambady, 2012). The current research sits at this theoretical juncture and highlights the importance of recognizing the mind and the body as each other’s context. In doing so, it suggests that a mismatch between psychological states and their physical analogues encourages an atypicality mind-set that allows individuals to better adapt to novel and ambiguous environments through creative thinking.

Finally, this work has practical implications as well. Although it is tempting to simultaneously adopt the mental and physical states that have been shown to independently contribute to individual creativity (e.g., happiness or openness of posture), the current research suggests that individuals pursuing creative ideas may be better off temporarily dabbling in MBD, that is, simultaneously adopting physical expressions that contradict their mental states. It is important to note that this practice may be more rewarding for individuals who have had little experience with MBD and would therefore embrace an atypicality mind-set as a result of MBD experiences. Given that not all of MBD’s consequences are adaptive, focusing on individuals who have had little experience with MBD will also help ensure that they reap MBD’s creative benefits while avoiding excessive MBD and its potentially negative health consequences (Richards & Gross, 2000).

Future Directions

These findings also open up a number of avenues for future research. First, bodily expressions can include not only movements, positions, qualities, or expressions of the body (e.g., face, head, arms, legs, hands, and feet) but also nonverbal vocalizations. Accordingly, MBD experiences may include nonverbal vocalizations contradicting internal states. For example, loudness is typically associated with dominance, laughters with happiness, and sobs with sadness (Hall et al., 2005; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010). Future research could examine whether speaking quietly/loudly while feeling powerful/powerless or making laughing/sobbing sounds while feeling sad/happy may also enhance creativity.

In addition, two alternative mechanisms may be considered. First, although the current research does not provide strong evidence for this possibility, recent meta-analyses depict small yet significant effects of bodily expressions on mental states (Coles, Larsen, & Lench, 2019; Jonas et al., 2017). Therefore, future research may explore whether MBD’s creativity effect is mediated by contradictions within the mind. Second, like other self-regulation processes, MBD can be an effortful experience (cf. Richards & Gross, 2000), which may prime effortful, controlled processing (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), a processing style that increases creativity under certain conditions (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2008).⁹ Consequently, it is possible that controlled processing may be an alternative mechanism for MBD’s effect on creativity. The study presented in the Supplementary Material makes a preliminary attempt at exploring this question, which is still very much open.

Relatedly, future research could also further confirm an atypicality mind-set as the mechanism using a moderation-of-process design. Although Experiment 3 (and the study presented in the Supplementary Material) provides preliminary mechanistic evidence, a causal relation between an atypicality mind-set and creativity could admittedly be better established when the former is manipulated (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Similarly, a manipulation or a direct record of the frequency of past MBD experiences could also improve the validity of Experiment 4’s findings, which currently rely on retrospective self-report.

Furthermore, future research could shed more light on whether and how an atypicality mind-set is related to other mechanisms examined in the creativity literature. For example, identifying with two inconsistent cultures or social identities has been found to promote creativity through cognitive flexibility (i.e., the ability to go beyond immediately activated knowledge; for example, Maddux, Adam, & Galinsky, 2010) and integrative complexity (i.e., an information processing capacity that involves considering and combining multiple perspectives; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014; Tadmor et al., 2012), both of which emphasize a multifaceted approach that takes into account uncommon knowledge and alternative perspectives. As such, an atypicality mind-set may be a crucial element or likely antecedent of such a flexible thinking style. A relevant, albeit indirect, piece of evidence can be found in Experiment 3, where an atypicality mind-set mediated the effect of MBD on the increased tendency to consider alternative ideas as opposed to copying an immediately available example.

Finally, future research could explore whether MBD explains the well-established connection between creativity and individual traits such as openness to experience (e.g., McCrae, 1987). Because high openness-to-experience individuals tend to demonstrate unconventional preferences (Feist, 1998), they may be particularly susceptible to MBD, especially when it is seen as an unconventional experience, which may mediate the effect of such traits on creativity.

Conclusion

The current research suggests that individuals’ ability to occasionally experience bodily expressions that contradict internal states may be an important and counterintuitive force underlying creativity. This atypical clash between the mind and body empowers individuals, allowing them to see hidden insights and explore unfettered associations.

Supplemental Material

Huang_Onlineappendix – Supplemental material for Mind–Body Dissonance: A Catalyst to Creativity

Supplemental material, Huang_Onlineappendix for Mind–Body Dissonance: A Catalyst to Creativity by Li Huang in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Supplemental Material

MBD_and_Creativity_Supplementary_RR4 – Supplemental material for Mind–Body Dissonance: A Catalyst to Creativity

Supplemental material, MBD_and_Creativity_Supplementary_RR4 for Mind–Body Dissonance: A Catalyst to Creativity by Li Huang in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Li Huang

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

Notes

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