The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive

Abstract

The current research tested whether the possession of high status, compared with the possession of low status, makes individuals desire having high status even more. Five studies (total N = 6,426), four of which were preregistered, supported this hypothesis. Individuals with higher status in their social groups or who were randomly assigned to a high-status condition were more motivated to have high status than were individuals with low status. Furthermore, upper-class individuals had a stronger status motive than working-class individuals, in part, due to their high status. High-status individuals had a stronger status motive, in part, because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) high status, but not because of other possible mechanisms (e.g., task self-efficacy). These findings provide a possible explanation for why status hierarchies are so stable and why inequality rises in social collectives over time.

Keywords

status social class rank desire motive

Possessing high status brings myriad rewards, including enhanced rights and perquisites, more interpersonal influence, and better mental and physical health (Bales et al., 1951; Berger et al., 1972; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). People thus possess a fundamental status motive. They desire to have high status in their social groups and employ a wide range of cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes to pursue it (Anderson et al., 2015).

How does the successful attainment of high status, in turn, affect the status motive? It would be reasonable to assume that once people achieve high status, their status motive would diminish (Winter & Stewart, 1983). Many fundamental motives weaken after their target goal is achieved; for example, the hunger drive fades once people have eaten, and the need to belong wanes after people have formed close interpersonal relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Pickett et al., 2004). This would suggest that once people attain high status, their status motive would decline and they would focus on other life goals.

However, we propose that the status motive operates in the opposite way: Ironically, achieving high status boosts the status motive more than does attaining low status. Specifically, we hypothesize that having high status boosts individuals’ confidence in their ability to compete for status, which in turn stokes their status motive. We tested these hypotheses in five studies (total N = 6,426) that used field and experimental methods, assessed the status motive with self-report and behavioral indices, examined mediating mechanisms, and tested whether upper-class individuals have a stronger status motive than working-class individuals because of their elevated status.

If supported, these hypotheses have important implications. A positive effect of status on the status motive might help explain why status hierarchies are so stable over time. If high-status individuals are more motivated to compete for status than those with low status, this would likely perpetuate the existing status order; it would be akin to a footrace in which only some individuals are running their hardest (for a similar argument about social class, see Laurin et al., 2019). In fact, a motivational gap between high- and low-status individuals might even help explain why inequality within social collectives grows over time. As has been widely demonstrated, inequality is on the rise in many countries (e.g., Piketty & Saez, 2014), in part, because upper-class people continue to seek more wealth even after their basic needs are met (Donnelly et al., 2018). Why would they? One possibility is that upper-class individuals are more concerned about their status than are working-class individuals, and invest more in managing their status.

The Possession of High Status and the Status Motive

Status is the respect, admiration, and voluntary deference individuals are afforded by others (Anderson et al., 2015). A primary way people attain high status is by demonstrating their value to their group (e.g., Berger et al., 1972; Blau & Scott, 1962; Leary et al., 2014). Yet, the pursuit of status is a competitive endeavor. People strive to make stronger contributions to the group’s success than others to demonstrate their superior value (e.g., Flynn et al., 2006; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), and much research on status has begun to explore the antecedents and consequences of status competition in groups (Bendersky & Hays, 2012; Hays & Bendersky, 2015; Kilduff et al., 2016; Pettit et al., 2013).

Building on two well-established findings, we propose that having high status boosts the status motive more than having low status does. First, success and achievement in a given domain tend to increase individuals’ confidence in their abilities in that domain (for reviews, see Bandura, 1977, 1982; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Gecas, 1989; Iso-Ahola & Dotson, 2014). In short, individuals base expectations of their future success on their past success. In the domain of status competition, this suggests that individuals who have high status, and who have successfully competed for it in the past, will be more confident they can successfully compete for it moving forward (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1.

The proposed status motive model.

Second, much research has shown that having confidence in one’s abilities boosts one’s motivation. For example, individuals’ self-perceived abilities determine whether they exert effort toward a goal, how much effort they expend, and whether they persist in the face of obstacles (Bandura, 1977, 1982; Deci, 1971; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Vroom, 1964; Wuepper & Lybbert, 2017). Applying this effect to the realm of status competition, individuals who have more confidence in their ability to compete for high status should develop a stronger status motivation.

In contrast, individuals who have low status will be less confident in their ability to compete for status because they have been unsuccessful in the past. Their relative lack of confidence will lead them to disengage from status competition and to care less about pursuing high status (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Deci et al., 1973, 1991). These hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 1.

Indirect Evidence From Prior Research

Prior work provides indirect evidence for our hypotheses, though no study has tested them directly. Research on social class has found that individuals with more money and education pursue status more strongly (Belmi et al., 2019), a finding consistent with Laurin et al.’s (2019) theory of social class—an account very similar to our above arguments about status. However, Belmi and colleagues examined social class, which is distinct from status (e.g., Twenge & Campbell, 2002). Furthermore, they proposed that the effects of social class were due to individualism that pervades upper-class culture. They did not hypothesize or demonstrate that the possession of high status (i.e., respect, admiration, deference) enhances the value people place on it, compared with the possession of low status. We tested directly whether the link between social class and the status motive can be explained by status (in Study 5).

Pettit et al. (2010) found that people tend to place more weight on the prospect of losing status than they do on gaining higher status, consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It seems possible that compared with those with low status, the possession of high status leads individuals to value status more strongly simply because they have more status to lose. However, possessing high status might not arouse fears of losing status. The degree to which people experience fear of an outcome depends on the aversiveness of that outcome and on the perceived likelihood of it occurring (e.g., Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Gray, 1987; Lazarus, 1968; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). These are two distinct appraisals. For example, people might view a plane crash as highly aversive but also exceedingly unlikely and thus experience little fear of flying (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Accordingly, possessing high status might lead individuals to put more weight on the prospect of losing status, but it might also lead them to view losing status as very unlikely (consistent with our hypothesis about confidence). Therefore, we examined the role of fear of losing status in Studies 3 and 4 as an open research question.

Overview of Studies

We conducted five studies (total N = 6,426), four of which were preregistered. Study 1 tested the link between the possession of status and the status motive in real-world, extant social groups. Study 2 experimentally manipulated status mindsets and tested their effects on the status motive and behaviors aimed at achieving high status. Studies 3 and 4 manipulated status in laboratory groups and examined potential mediators. Study 5 tested whether upper-class individuals possess a stronger status motive than working-class individuals because of an elevated sense of status.

Study 1

Study 1 was preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/4qd85.pdf) and tested the link between the possession of status and the status motive in real-world groups. To rule out the possibility that any relationship found would be spurious, caused by personality traits acting as third variables, we controlled for narcissism (Raskin & Terry, 1988) and self-monitoring (Flynn et al., 2006), which have been associated with the attainment of status and with the status motive.

Method

Participants

A total of 401 individuals participated (56% male, 44% female) via Amazon Mechanical Turk, with an average age of 36.72 years (SD = 11.67 years). Using the application G*Power, we calculated that, with an alpha of .05 and 95% power, a regression equation with three predictors would need a sample size of 401 participants to detect a small-to-medium effect. Participants were asked to select all racial–ethnic categories to which they belonged; 72% selected White, 13% selected African American, 6% selected Latino, 6% selected Asian American, 7% selected Native American, and 1% selected Other categories. Participants were paid US$1.00 for an approximately 8-min survey.

Status

Based on previous studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012), we asked people to list the three most important face-to-face groups to which they belonged (e.g., friends, work group, but not family). Participants were told,

A person’s status is the level of respect, admiration, and voluntary deference he or she is given by others in a group. People with high status in a group are highly respected and admired by others, and their wishes, desires, and suggestions tend to be followed. People with low status in a group are not well respected or admired, and their wishes, desires, and suggestions tend to be ignored.

Participants then rated their status in each of the groups from 1 (very little) to 7 (a lot). Self-perceptions of status tend to be highly accurate (Anderson et al., 2006). Participants’ status across their three groups were combined (α = .64; M = 4.77, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [4.66, 4.88]).

The status motive

We assessed the status motive with a well-established scale (Flynn et al., 2006). It includes eight items such as “I want my peers to respect me and hold me in high esteem” and “It would please me to have a position of prestige and social standing,” rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), α = .88, M = 3.44, 95% CI = [3.36, 3.53].

Narcissism and self-monitoring

We also included the 40-item Narcissism Personality (Raskin & Terry, 1988; α = .92, M = 1.32, 95% CI = [1.30, 1.35]) and Snyder’s (1974) 25-item Self-Monitoring Scale (α = .75, M = 1.42, 95% CI = [1.40, 1.44]).

Results

As predicted, the possession of higher status was correlated with a stronger status motive, r(400) = .32, p < .001. (Zero-order correlations between all variables are presented in the SOM.) Moreover, in a multiple regression, we found that higher status correlated with the status motive (ß = .26, 95% CI = [0.18, 0.33]), F(1, 399) = 46.41, p < .001, $R_{adj}^{2}$ = .10, even after controlling for narcissism and self-monitoring (ß = .18, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.26]), F(3, 397) = 34.70, p < .001, $R_{adj}^{2}$ = .20. Therefore, these two personality traits did not drive the link between the possession of status and the status motive.¹

Study 2

Study 2, also preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/sx2zx.pdf), had two aims. First, it employed an experimental design. This was important to identify causal origins. Otherwise, participants in Study 1 with a stronger desire for status than others might have selectively recalled groups in which they had higher status. Second, it tested whether people afforded high status, as compared with those afforded low status, are more likely to engage in status-pursuing behavior because of their heightened status motive. A primary way in which people compete for status is by making contributions to the group (e.g., Anderson et al., 2015; Flynn et al., 2006; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). We thus tested whether individuals afforded high status would exert more effort on a group task than those afforded low status because of their heightened status motive.

Method

Participants

A total of 306 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (47% male, 53% female, M age = 36.24 years, SD = 10.91 years). The target sample size of 300 was based on similar past studies. Participants were asked to select all racial–ethnic categories to which they belonged; 75% selected White, 11% selected African American, 5% selected Latino, 5% selected Asian American, 1% selected Native American, and 2% selected Other categories. Participants were paid US$1.00.

Design and status manipulation

To avoid demand effects, participants were first given a cover story:

In the following pages we are “pilot testing” materials for a few different studies we hope to run in the near future. Before running these studies, we want to know whether our instructions are clear, how people will answer certain questions, and so forth. So please complete the following pages diligently and thoughtfully.

Therefore, the manipulation of status and the measure of status motives seemed unconnected.

Participants completed a 10-item measure of personality that contained attention checks. Participants who failed any check were automatically removed from the study. Participants were then told, “In this study, we are interested in how groups interact on different tasks. Before you begin working on these tasks, however, we would first like to learn more about you as an individual.”

To manipulate status mindsets, we adapted a manipulation of power mindsets (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003) and told participants in the high (low) status condition,

Please recall a particular time in which you had HIGH [LOW] status. By status, we mean a time in which you had a high level of respect and admiration in the eyes of others [had little respect in the eyes of others and were not admired], and in which people deferred to your opinions and ideas [ignored your opinions and ideas]. Please describe this situation in which you had high [low] status—what happened, how you felt, etc.

We also included a control condition to examine whether the effect of status is due to the effects of possessing high status, possessing low status, or both. In the control condition, participants were asked to “Please describe your experiences yesterday—what happened, how you felt, etc.” All participants were then asked to “Please try to fill in the text box with your thoughts and spend around 5 minutes recalling this situation in as much detail as you can.”

The status motive at the general level

After the status manipulation, participants were given the same status motive measure used in Study 1 (α = .89, M = 3.37, 95% CI = [3.27, 3.46]).

The status motive in a laboratory group

Participants were told,

In a laboratory study we are launching soon, participants will work together in groups for an hour. Within these groups there will be differences in status among members. That is, some group members will have high status: they will be highly respected and admired, and they will have more influence over the group’s activities and decisions. Other group members will have low status: they will be less respected and have little influence in the group, and their opinions and ideas will have little impact. If you were a participant in this study, how important would it be that you have high status in the group?

Participants rated this question from 1 (not important to me at all) to 7 (extremely important to me), M = 4.13, 95% CI = [3.93, 4.33].

Status-pursuing behavior

Participants were also told,

Before participants work together in groups, they will also have the opportunity to prepare by themselves at home. The time they spend preparing will not be paid, but people who spend more time preparing will tend to achieve higher status in the group because they will come better informed about the group task. That is, they will tend to be more respected and admired and have more influence over the group’s activities and decisions. With that in mind, how much time would you be willing to invest before the group task, on your own time, to prepare for it?

Participants indicated the time they were willing to invest, from 0 to 120 min (M = 28.96 min, 95% CI = [25.98, 32.05]).

Manipulation check and hypothesis guesses

Finally, participants were asked to recall the situation they wrote about earlier and rate two statements: “In that situation, I had high status”; and “I had a lot of respect and admiration in the eyes of others,” both on a 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly) scale. These items correlated highly (r = .94, p < .001) and were combined (M = 3.88, 95% CI = [3.63, 4.14]). When participants were asked to guess the hypotheses being tested, only two participants correctly did so. No findings changed when including or excluding these participants, so they were included in the sample.

Results

The status mindset manipulation was successful. Participants in the high-status condition (M = 6.11, 95% CI = [5.88, 6.32]) reported having higher status than those in the low-status condition (M = 1.79, 95% CI = [1.54, 2.07]), t(202) = 24.74, d = 3.46, p < .001, and those in the control condition (M = 3.83, 95% CI = [3.52, 4.15]), t(200) = 11.41, d = 1.61, p < .001. Those in the control condition also reported having higher status than those in the low-status condition, t(204) = 9.64, d = 1.34, p < .001.

The tests of our main hypothesis are displayed in Figure 2. As shown, participants in the high-status mindset condition had a stronger status motive than those in the low-status mindset condition, both at the general level, t(202) = 3.30, p = .001, d = 0.46, and in the laboratory group, t(202) = 2.67, p = .008, d = 0.37. They also showed a greater willingness to engage in status-pursuing behavior, specifically to invest more time preparing for the group task, t(202) = 2.01, p = .046, d = 0.28.

Figure 2.

The status motive and status-seeking behavior in Study 2.

The effect of status mindset on the willingness to engage in status-pursuing behavior was mediated by the status motive. We used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 resamples with replacement to derive a 95% bias-corrected CI for the indirect effect of status mindset (coded as 1 = high status, −1 = low status) on the willingness to engage in status-pursuing behavior as transmitted via the status motive. This analysis revealed an indirect effect of 1.04 with a 95% CI = [0.25, 2.49].

The differences between high- and low-status mindset conditions appear largely due to the high-status mindset condition. Compared with those in the control condition, participants in the high-status mindset condition reported a stronger status motive at the general level, t(200) = 4.03, p < .001, d = 0.57, and in the laboratory group, t(200) = 2.15, p = .033, d = 0.30, and were willing to spend marginally more time preparing for the task, t(200) = 1.75, p = .082, d = 0.25. However, participants in the low-status mindset condition did not differ from those in the control condition in the status motive at the general level, t(204) = −0.58, p = .562, or in the laboratory group, t(204) = 0.52, p = .604, or in the willingness to prepare for the task, t(204) = 0.21, p = .838.

In sum, an experimental manipulation of status mindsets positively affected the status motive. Compared with those made to feel lower in status, participants made to feel higher in status valued status more highly and were willing to invest more time preparing for a task to have high status.

Study 3

Study 3, also preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/tg7x4.pdf), had several aims. First, it manipulated status in laboratory groups rather than status mindsets. Second, it examined a different status-pursuing behavior than in Study 2 to help establish generalizability: namely, whether individuals would select a more difficult role in a subsequent group task to achieve high status. Third, it tested our hypothesized mechanism, individuals’ confidence in their ability to attain (or retain) high status. Along an exploratory vein, we also examined other possible mediating mechanisms. Recall that Pettit et al. (2010) found people fear losing status more than they value gaining higher status. We examined whether possessing high status boosts the status motive simply because high-status individuals are more fearful of losing status than are low-status individuals. Inspired by Laurin and colleagues’ (2019) theorizing, we also examined two additional expectancy beliefs: (a) task self-efficacy beliefs, or participants’ perceptions they had the task skills needed to perform well; and (b) outcome expectations, or participants’ belief they would achieve higher status if they took on the more difficult role.

Method

Participants

One hundred ninety-five undergraduate students (34% male, 66% female; average age = 20.36 years, SD = 2.53 years) were recruited and paid US$15 or course credit. The study was completed when the participant pool ran out. Students selected all racial–ethnic categories to which they belonged; 48% selected Asian American, 37% White, 11% Latino, 7% African American, 3% Native American, and 6% “other.” Twenty students failed attention check questions or raised suspicions about the group feedback and were thus excluded from the analyses, in accordance with the preregistered methodology, leaving 175 participants.

Procedure and status manipulation

Based on prior studies (e.g., Kennedy & Anderson, 2017; Leary et al., 2001; Willer, 2009), participants were recruited in groups of five and completed the experiment at individual stations. As part of the status manipulation, they first completed measures of demographic information, personality, and emotion recognition. They then received (false) feedback on other group members’ personality and emotion-recognition skills and were asked to rate the status of each other member of their group. They were told (falsely) that these ratings would be used to determine which member of the group would be selected to lead the group’s first task. After all participants rated each other’s status, participants received (false) feedback about their status in the group. In the high-status (/low-status) condition, they were told that their own status was 6 (/3) in the first group task, whereas the median status of other group members was 3 (/6), out of a range from 1 (low) to 7 (high). After receiving this feedback about their status in the first group task (Group Task 1), participants completed a manipulation check. They were also told that their group would later work on a second group task (Group Task 2) and asked about that task with items described below.

Manipulation check

Participants reported their status in Group Task 1 using a scale from 1 (lower status than everyone else) to 7 (higher status than everyone else). Participants in the high-status condition reported having higher status (M_high = 5.31, SD = 0.94) than those in the low-status condition (M_low = 3.82, SD = 1.44), t(153.9) = 8.11, 95% CI for the mean difference = [1.12, 1.85], p < .001, d = 1.21.

Confidence in achieving status

Participants reported their confidence in achieving high status in the second group task (i.e., Group Task 2) with three items: “I am confident that I will achieve high status in the group,” “I believe I will be held in high esteem by the group,” and “I doubt that I will gain the group’s respect” (reverse-scored), rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), M = 4.63, SD = 1.13, α = .83.

Selection of more difficult, high-status role

Participants were also told that in

Group Task 2, you will have the opportunity to choose the role in the group that you want. Some roles are easier, whereas others are far more difficult. In previous studies, we have found that individuals who choose the more difficult roles tend to achieve higher status in Group Task 2 because they take on the harder work. That is, they tend to be more respected and admired and have more influence over the group’s activities and decisions in Group Task 2.

Role A was described as the most difficult and as according the highest status, and Role E being as the easiest and as according the lowest status. Their selections were recorded from 1 (easiest work/lowest potential status) to 5 (most difficult work/highest potential status).

The status motive

Participants rated three items (to increase the reliability of the measure) about their status in Group Task 2: “I would like to have high status in the group,” “My status in the group isn’t important to me” (reverse scored), and “I want the group to respect me and hold me in high esteem,” using the scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items were combined (M = 4.73, SD = 1.10, α = .75).

Exploratory analyses

We measured participants’ fear of losing status with two items (these and all other items used a scale of 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree): “I do not want to have lower status in Group Task 2 than I had in Group Task 1” and “I do not want to lose status in Group Task 2” (r(175) = .78, p < .001, M = 5.12, SD = 1.12). We measured task self-efficacy with two items: “I have the ability to perform the more difficult work” and “I am confident that I can do well in the higher status / more difficult role” (r(175) = .79, p < .001, M = 5.46, SD = 0.96). Finally, we measured expectancy beliefs with two items: “If I take on the more difficult role, it will give me high status”; and “I am confident that I will attain high status in Group Task 2 if I tackle the more difficult work” (r(175) = .69, p < .001, M = 4.99, SD = 1.03).

Results and Discussion

As predicted, participants with high status in the Group Task 1 were more confident they would have high status in Group Task 2, as compared with those with low status in Group Task 1 (M_high = 4.96, SD = 0.80; M_low = 4.28, SD = 1.18), t(157.7) = 4.50, p < .001, d = 0.67, observed power = .993. They also selected more difficult, higher status roles (M_high = 4.05, SD = 0.82; M_low = 3.72, SD = 0.91), t(172.5) = 2.49, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.58], p = .014, d = 0.38, observed power = .707. Furthermore, high-status participants’ confidence in achieving higher status in Group Task 2, relative to low-status participants, helped explain their status-pursuing behavior: A bootstrap analysis (5,000 samples with replacement) revealed that the 95% bias-corrected CI for the indirect effect of status (high vs. low) on status-pursuing behavior through confidence excluded zero: B = 0.12, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.24]. Participants with high status in Group Task 1 were thus more likely to choose the more difficult role because they were more confident they would be able to attain high status in Group Task 2.

In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, the effect of the status manipulation on the status motive was not significant (M_high = 4.73, SD = 1.03; M_low = 4.70, SD = 1.17), t(173) = 0.34, p = .734. It is possible that this null effect is simply the product of chance. Lakens and Etz (2017) concluded that it is very unlikely that a set of studies yields exclusively significant results, even when an effect is true. Nonetheless, upon closer examination, we found many (71) participants reported being on a status level discordant with their condition (e.g., reported having low status even though they had high status). This might have been because we conducted this study at the end of the semester when students are distracted with exams. Excluding those participants, we found the status manipulation had a significant effect on the status motive (M_high = 4.92, SD = 0.99; M_low = 4.43, SD = 1.36), t(102) = 2.10, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.95], p = .038, d = 0.41, observed power = .513. This finding should be interpreted with caution, as this analysis was not preregistered.

Finally, along an exploratory vein, we found that participants with high status in the first task were less fearful of losing status than those with low status (M_high = 4.83, SD = 1.22; M_low = 5.33, SD = 1.01), t(193) = −3.08, d = 0.44, p = .002. High status thus did not boost the status motive simply because it stoked the fear of losing status. High-status participants also did not report higher task self-efficacy (M_high = 5.47, SD = 0.95; M_low = 5.46, SD = 0.97), t(173) = 0.06, 95% CI = [0.28, 0.30], p = .950, d = 0.01, or stronger beliefs that adopting the high-status role would garner them higher status, as compared with low-status participants (M_high = 4.99, SD = 1.16; M_low = 4.98, SD = 0.91), t(159.5) = 0.03, 95% CI = [0.31, 0.32], p = .975, d = 0.01. The null effect on task self-efficacy suggests our manipulation did not merely boost high-status participants’ feelings of task self-efficacy, leading them to choose the more difficult role. Instead, participants with high status in the first task selected the more difficult/high-status role in Group Task 2 more than low-status participants because they were more confident that they would achieve high status in that task.

Study 4

Study 4, also preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/dm25d.pdf), aimed to replicate the results of Study 3 with a stronger test. Participants were told they would work in two different laboratory groups on different tasks. We examined whether affording high status to participants in the first group would cause them to desire status more strongly in the second, separate group, as compared with participants afforded low status in the first group. Along exploratory lines, we also examined other possible mediators: self-perceived agency, which is a model of the self as an agent who strives to affect change in his or her social and physical environment (Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Snibbe & Markus, 2005), and the sense of control, which is the belief that events are contingent upon one’s own behavior rather than external forces (Rotter, 1966). Both have been linked to the possession of high status (e.g., Lachman & Weaver, 1998) and to higher personal ambitions (for a review, see Laurin et al., 2019). Finally, our hypothesis that possessing high status enhances the status motive can mean high-status individuals strive to gain even higher status than they currently have, or they simply wish to maintain their current position. We examined this issue along an exploratory vein.

Method

Participants

We recruited 220 undergraduate students who were paid US$10 or course credit. Eleven participants failed basic attention checks and one participant failed a basic comprehension check; all were excluded from the data in accordance with our preregistration, leaving 208 participants (64% female; average age = 19.9 years, SD = 1.32 years). Participants selected all ethnic categories to which they belonged; 44% selected Asian American, 42% White, 13% Latino, 8% African American, 1% Native American, and 6% “other.”

Procedure and status manipulation

Participants completed the same status manipulation as in Study 3. The changes to the procedure were that participants (a) answered three comprehension questions immediately following the status feedback, (b) were told they would be joining a new and different group (Group 2) to work on a different task, (c) answered questions about the new group (Group 2) rather than their current group (Group 1), (d) also completed measures of agency and self-control, and (e) reported their desired rank in Group 2.

Confidence in achieving status

Participants reported how confident they were that they would achieve high status in their new group (Group 2), using the same measure used in Study 3 (M = 4.37, SD = 1.04, α = .78).

Selection of more difficult exercises to achieve high status

Participants read,

[b]efore starting Group Task 2 with your NEW group, you will have the opportunity to prepare individually for that task. There are different exercises you can choose to prepare for Group Task 2. Some preparation exercises are easier and more fun, whereas others are far more difficult and less fun. In previous studies, we have found that individuals who choose the more difficult exercises tend to achieve higher status in Group Task 2 because they are better prepared for the group task. That is, they tend to be more respected and admired and have more influence over the group’s activities and decisions in Group Task 2.

Participants selected their exercise on a 10-point scale (1 = easy and fun to 10 = extremely difficult; M = 6.78, SD = 2.41).

The status motive

Participants indicated their agreement with same three questions used in Study 3, but the items were adapted to refer to their new group, Group 2 (M = 4.68, SD = 1.26, α = .83).

Desire to maintain or increase status

Participants reported the rank they desired in Group 2, from first to fifth (fifth scored as highest; M = 3.93, SD = 0.87).

Exploratory analyses

We measured participants’ fear of losing status using the same measure from Study 3, but adapted to refer to Group 2, M = 4.93, SD = 1.16, r(208) = .39, p < .001. Based on Lachman and Weaver (1998), we measured agency with two items, “I can do just about anything I really set my mind to” and “When I really want to do something, I usually find a way to succeed at it,” 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree; M = 5.79, SD = 0.94, r(207) = .63, p < .001; and sense of control with two items: “I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life” and “What happens in my life is often beyond my control,” with the same 7-point Likert-type scale, M = 4.60, SD = 1.20, r(207) = .47, p < .001.

Results and Discussion

Replicating the results of Study 3, participants with high status in Group 1 reported higher confidence that they would achieve high status in Group 2 than did participants with low status in Group 1 (M_high = 4.63, SD = 0.10; M_low = 4.11, SD = 1.01), t(206) = 3.78, p < .001, d = 0.53. They also selected more difficult preparation exercises for Group 2 (M_high = 7.29, SD = 2.16; M_low = 6.29, SD = 2.55), t(205) = 3.03, p = .003, d = 0.42. Also replicating Study 3, compared with those with low status in Group 1, participants with high status in Group 1 were more likely to commit to the more difficult exercise because they were more confident they would be able to attain high status in Group 2: A bootstrap analysis (5,000 samples) revealed that the 95% bias-corrected CI for the indirect effect of status (high vs. low) on status-pursuing behavior through confidence excluded zero [0.04, 0.50].

This time, the effect of the status manipulation on the status motive was also significant (M_high = 4.87, SD = 1.22; M_low = 4.51, SD = 1.27), t(206) = 2.07, p = .040, d = 0.29. This is consistent with Studies 1 and 2, and gives more confidence in our hypothesis as well as the methods used in Study 3.

We next focused on participants’ specific desired rank in Group 2. First, participants with high status in Group 1 desired even higher rank in Group 2 (M = 4.15, SD = 0.67) than their rank in Group 1 (4.00), t(100) = 2.23, p = .028. Moreover, participants with high status in Group 1 desired a higher status rank in Group 2 (M = 4.15, SD = 0.67) than did participants with low status in Group 1 (M = 3.73, SD = 0.98), t(186.0) = 3.63, p < .001, d = 0.50, consistent with the above findings. These results thus suggest high status led to a desire for even higher status than did low status.

Participants with high status in Group 1 were again less fearful of losing status in Group 2 than were those with low status in Group 1 (M_high = 4.78, SD = 1.28; M_low = 5.06, SD = 1.01), t(189.8) = −1.75, p = .085, d = −0.24. We also found no effect of the status manipulation on agency (M_high = 5.71, SD = 1.07; M_low = 5.86, SD = 0.79) or on the sense of control (M_high = 4.56, SD = 1.28; M_low = 4.63, SD = 1.14), t(205) = 1.19, p = .235, d = 0.17, and t(205) = −0.38, p = .708, d = 0.05. Therefore, the effect of the status manipulation on status-seeking behavior was not mediated by either of these variables.

In sum, the results of Study 4 replicated and extended those from Study 3. Participants with high status in Group 1 selected more difficult preparation exercises that were more likely to garner them high status in Group 2 than did participants with low status in Group 1, and they did so because they were more confident that they would achieve high status in Group 2.

Study 5

Do upper-class individuals value status more than working-class individuals because they have a higher sense of status? Study 5 focused on social class, status, and the status motive. Although our primary focus was on participants’ current (adult) social class, we also assessed their social class while growing up (childhood). This allowed two exploratory analyses: First, whether people’s childhood social class has an independent effect on their status motive in adulthood. If so, this would imply that the effects of childhood social class endure across the life span (Griskevicius et al., 2011). It would also mean social class can affect the status motive even when people are born into their class and did not earn entry into it.

Second, we were able to test whether childhood and current social class interact in predicting the status motive. Individuals who have been consistently upper-class throughout their life span might possess the strongest status motive because they have always been upper-class, and thus always successful in their competition for status. In contrast, people who have either risen or fallen in social class might see status as more tenuous and fluid and thus have less confidence that they will always be upper-class.

Method

Participants

A total of 5,324 individuals participated as part of a broader study of social class in the United States. The goal was to recruit 5,000 participants—20 participants in each economic quintile of each state—using Prime Panels, an online provider of research panels. This sample composition would be geographically representative and economically diverse, and would provide the power to test for interactions. At least 100 participants were recruited in 47 states; the remaining three states came close before exhausting the sample (Alaska = 85, North Dakota = 99, and Vermont = 91). The sample was 47% male, 52.7% female, and 0.3% other, with an average age of 43.07 years (SD = 15.44 years). Participants were asked to select all racial–ethnic categories to which they belonged; 81% selected White, 7% selected African American, 4% selected Latino, 5% selected Asian American, and 3% selected Other categories. Participants were each paid US$3.00. In the total sample, 185 participants (3%) were students. No findings changed when including or excluding these students, so they were included.

Social class

Following previous studies (e.g., Kraus et al., 2009), social class was measured with household income and education. Household income was measured with a standard index (Adler et al., 2000): 1 = Less than US$25,000, 2 = US$25,000 to US$34,999, 3 = US$35,000 to US$49,999, 4 = US$50,000 to US$74,999, 5 = US$75,000 to US$99,999, 6 = US$100,000 to US$149,999, and 7 = US$150,000 or more (M = 3.59, SD = 1.95). Education was also measured with a standard index (Kraus et al., 2009), a scale from 1 (some high school) to 7 (postgraduate degree), M = 4.14, SD = 1.70. These measures were standardized and combined (e.g., Kraus et al., 2009).

Childhood social class

All participants also reported their total household income when they were growing up, using the same scale (M = 3.06, SD = 1.71. Participants also reported their father’s (M = 3.67, SD = 2.06) and mother’s education (M = 3.40, SD = 1.88) with the same scale, and these measures were standardized and combined.

Status

We measured participants’ status in general with five items: “I have a high level of respect in others’ eyes,” “Others admire me,” “I have high social standing,” “Others look up to me,” and “I have high status.” These items were rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), α = .92, M = 4.40, SD = 1.24.

The status motive

We assessed the status motive with the same scale as in Studies 1 and 2 (α = .86, M = 4.24, 95% CI = [4.21, 4.27]).

Results

Regression results are displayed in Table 1. As shown in Model 1, social class correlated with the status motive. Upper-class individuals had a stronger status motive than did working-class individuals. In fact, both income (β = .15, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.17], p < .001) and education (β = .15, 95% CI = [0.13, 0.16], p < .001) independently predicted the status motive.

Table 1.

Hierarchical Regressions Predicting the Status Motive (Study 5).

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Adult social class	.25*** (.02)	.25*** (.02)	.19*** (.02)
Social class squared		.00 (.02)
Childhood social class			.16*** (.02)
Childhood × Adult social class			.07** (.02)
Adjusted R²	.03	.03	.04
F for change in R²	173.30***	0.00	33.16***

p < .01. ***p < .001.

As Model 2 shows, the quadratic equation was not significant. This suggests the relationship between social class and the status motive was linear.

As shown in Model 3, childhood social class also independently correlated with the status motive, suggesting that even when individuals born into their social standing develop a stronger status motive. Model 3 also shows a small but positive significant interaction between current and childhood social class. This indicates the effect of being upper-class in adulthood is magnified if one also grew up in an upper-class family. It is consistent with the idea that being upper-class consistently across the life span gives individuals the strongest confidence that they can compete for status.

Finally, the relationship between social class and the status motive was explained by status. A bootstrapping analysis of mediation (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) revealed an indirect effect of .14 with a 95% CI = [0.12, 0.16]. Upper-class participants had a stronger status motive than working-class participants because they had a higher sense of status. This might help explain the link between social class and the status motive found by Belmi et al. (2019).

General Discussion

Summary of Findings

Evidence from five studies, four of which were preregistered, suggests that possessing high status strengthens the status motive more than does possessing low status. Individuals with higher status in their social groups and those randomly assigned to high-status mindsets or roles cared more about having high status and placed more importance on it than did those with lower status. This effect extended to social class as well: Upper-class individuals cared more about status and valued it more highly than working-class individuals, in part because of their higher sense of status. Furthermore, compared with low-status individuals, high-status individuals were more likely to engage in behavior aimed at protecting or enhancing their status. They chose to spend more time preparing for a group task and were more likely to select a role that would help them achieve (or retain) high status, even if it was more difficult and less enjoyable.

Why did possessing higher status boost the status motive more than did possessing lower status? Compared with having low status, having high status enhanced individuals’ confidence that they would have high status in the future, which in turn enhanced their status motivation. These mediation findings coincide with prior work showing that success in a given domain increases individuals’ confidence in their abilities in that domain, which in turn boosts their motivation. Here, individuals who had more confidence in their ability to compete for high status developed a stronger motivation to possess it than those who had less confidence in their status-competing abilities.

Implications

These findings have many important implications. First, they might help explain why status hierarchies are so stable over time (e.g., Blau & Scott, 1962): Once a status hierarchy forms, it seems to create a motivational divide between those at the top and the bottom. Those at the top become more driven to manage their status and invest more in keeping their position, whereas those at the bottom become increasingly uninterested in status and ultimately disengage from status competition. This motivational divide likely helps perpetuate the existing status order and might even contribute to the growth in inequality over time. Understanding the rise in inequality is a critical aim for researchers right now. Our findings point to a psychological mechanism. If high-status individuals work to enhance their status and low-status individuals disengage from status competition, the status gap between them is likely to grow (for similar arguments, see Laurin et al., 2019).

Our findings might also help explain a number of findings that have long puzzled status researchers. For example, why are people more likely to engage in socially valued behaviors—namely, those that lead to high status—after they are afforded high status than when they are afforded low status (e.g., Blader & Chen, 2012; Willer, 2009)? Why do people afforded high status experience stronger stress reactions to social-evaluative threats than people afforded low status, even though they tend to feel lower stress levels in general (e.g., Gruenewald et al., 2006)? Why do upper-class individuals continue to strive for higher wealth (Donnelly et al., 2018) and become less generous than working-class individuals (e.g., Côté et al., 2015), even though they possess an abundance of resources? It is possible that the possession of high status boosts the status motive, leading individuals to work harder to protect and enhance their status and to be more sensitive to serious status challenges.

Future Directions

The current findings also point to future research directions. First, future research should test hypotheses implied in the previous section, such as whether the motivational divide between high- and low-status individuals can help account for the stability of hierarchies or even the rise in inequality. Along related lines, prior work has shown individuals who are rising or falling in status are perceived by others as particularly high or low in status, respectively (Pettit et al., 2013). It is possible that these reputational effects combine with the motivational effects we have observed here to contribute to the growth of inequality.

Future research should also examine whether the patterns we observed in these studies apply to power. Possessing high power might enhance the need for power, especially because it focuses people on rewards and their own need for gratification (Guinote, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003).

Finally, it is important for future research to examine boundary conditions to our effects. Hays and Bendersky (2015) found that when hierarchies were perceived as more mutable or changeable, low-status individuals engaged in more competitive behavior, as compared with when hierarchies were perceived as more fixed and unchangeable. Therefore, high- and low-status individuals might jockey for status to the same degree and desire status more equally when hierarchies seem more mutable.

Conclusion

The current studies are an important first step in what needs to be a longer research inquiry. We found that in comparison with possessing low status, possessing high status leads individuals to value status more and to place more importance on it. With the study of status and inequality continuing to expand in the social sciences, it is important to shed light on how individuals’ status ambitions shape emergent status orderings and how these orderings in turn shape status ambitions.

Supplemental Material

Anderson_Online_Appendix – Supplemental material for The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive

Supplemental material, Anderson_Online_Appendix for The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive by Cameron Anderson, John Angus D. Hildreth and Daron L. Sharps in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Supplemental Material

SOM_200518 – Supplemental material for The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive

Supplemental material, SOM_200518 for The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive by Cameron Anderson, John Angus D. Hildreth and Daron L. Sharps in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Cameron Anderson

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

Notes

References

Adler

N. E.

Epel

E. S.

Castellazzo

Ickovics

J. R.

(2000). Relationship of subjective and objective social status with psychological and physiological functioning: Preliminary data in healthy, White women. Health Psychology, 19(6), 586–592.

Anderson

Hildreth

J. A. D.

Howland

(2015). Is the desire for status a fundamental human motive? A review of the empirical literature. Psychological Bulletin, 141(3), 574–601.

Anderson

Kraus

M. W.

Galinsky

A. D.

Keltner

(2012). The local-ladder effect: Social status and subjective well-being. Psychological Science, 23(7), 764–771.

Anderson

Srivastava

Beer

J. S.

Spataro

S. E.

Chatman

J. A.

(2006). Knowing your place: Self-perceptions of status in face-to-face groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(6), 1094–1110.

Bales

R. F.

Strodtbeck

F. L.

Mills

T. M.

Roseborough

M. E.

(1951). Channels of communication in small groups. American Sociological Review, 16, 461–468.

Bandura

(1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84(2), 191–215.

Bandura

(1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist, 37(2), 122–147.

Baumeister

R. F.

Leary

M. R.

(1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497–529.

Belmi

Neale

M. A.

Reiff

Ulfe

(2019). The social advantage of miscalibrated individuals: The relationship between social class and overconfidence and its implications for class-based inequality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 118(2), 254–282.

10.

Bendersky

Hays

N. A.

(2012). Status conflict in groups. Organization Science, 23(2), 323–340.

11.

Berger

Cohen

B. P.

Zelditch

Jr (1972). Status characteristics and social interaction. American Sociological Review, 37, 241–255.

12.

Blader

S. L.

Chen

Y. R.

(2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 994–1014.

13.

Blau

P. M.

Scott

W. R.

(1962). Formal organizations: A comparative approach. Chandler.

14.

Carver

C. S.

Scheier

M. F.

(1990). Principles of self-regulation: Action and emotion. Guilford Press.

15.

Carver

C. S.

Scheier

M. F.

(1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. Cambridge University Press.

16.

Côté

House

Willer

(2015). High economic inequality leads higher-income individuals to be less generous. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(52), 15838–15843.

17.

Deci

E. L.

(1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18(1), 105–115.

18.

Deci

E. L.

Cascio

W. F.

Krusell

(1973, May). Sex differences, verbal reinforcement, and intrinsic motivation. Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Washington, DC.

19.

Deci

E. L.

Ryan

R. M.

(2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), 227–268.

20.

Deci

E. L.

Vallerand

R. J.

Pelletier

L. G.

Ryan

R. M.

(1991). Motivation and education: The self-determination perspective. Educational Psychologist, 26(3–4), 325–346.

21.

Donnelly

G. E.

Zheng

Haisley

Norton

M. I.

(2018). The amount and source of millionaires’ wealth (moderately) predict their happiness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(5), 684–699.

22.

Eccles

J. S.

Wigfield

(2002). Motivational beliefs, values, and goals. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 109–132.

23.

Flynn

F. J.

Reagans

R. E.

Amanatullah

E. T.

Ames

D. R.

(2006). Helping one’s way to the top: Self-monitors achieve status by helping others and knowing who helps whom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(6), 1123–1137.

24.

Galinsky

A. D.

Gruenfeld

D. H.

Magee

J. C.

(2003). From power to action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 453–466.

25.

Gecas

(1989). The social psychology of self-efficacy. Annual Review of Sociology, 15(1), 291–316.

26.

Gonzalez

(1999). On the shape of the probability weighting function. Cognitive Psychology, 38(1), 129–166.

27.

Gray

J. A.

(1987). The psychology of fear and stress (Vol. 5). Cambridge University Press.

28.

Griskevicius

Tybur

J. M.

Delton

A. W.

Robertson

T. E.

(2011). The influence of mortality and socioeconomic status on risk and delayed rewards: A life history theory approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(6), 1015–1026.

29.

Gruenewald

T. L.

Kemeny

M. E.

Aziz

(2006). Subjective social status moderates cortisol responses to social threat. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 20(4), 410–419.

30.

Guinote

(2007). Power and goal pursuit. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(8), 1076–1087.

31.

Hardy

C. L.

Van Vugt

(2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 1402–1413.

32.

Hays

N. A.

Bendersky

(2015). Not all inequality is created equal: Effects of status versus power hierarchies on competition for upward mobility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108(6), 867–882.

33.

Henrich

Gil-White

F. J.

(2001). The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior, 22(3), 165–196.

34.

Iso-Ahola

S. E.

Dotson

C. O.

(2014). Psychological momentum: Why success breeds success. Review of General Psychology, 18(1), 19–33.

35.

Johnson

E. J.

Tversky

(1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 20–31.

36.

Kahneman

Tversky

(1979). Prospect theory. Econo-metrica, 47, 263–292.

37.

Keltner

Gruenfeld

D. H.

Anderson

(2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychological Review, 110(2), 265–284.

38.

Kennedy

J. A.

Anderson

(2017). Hierarchical rank and principled dissent: How holding higher rank suppresses objection to unethical practices. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 139, 30–49.

39.

Kilduff

G. J.

Willer

Anderson

(2016). Hierarchy and its discontents: Status disagreement leads to withdrawal of contribution and lower group performance. Organization Science, 27(2), 373–390.

40.

Kraus

M. W.

Piff

P. K.

Keltner

(2009). Social class, sense of control, and social explanation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(6), 992–1004.

41.

Lachman

M. E.

Weaver

S. L.

(1998). The sense of control as a moderator of social class differences in health and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(3), 763–773.

42.

Lakens

Etz

A. J.

(2017). Too true to be bad: When sets of studies with significant and nonsignificant findings are probably true. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8(8), 875–881.

43.

Laurin

Engstrom

H. R.

Alic

(2019). Motivational accounts of the vicious cycle of social status: An integrative framework using the United States as a case study. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(2), 107–137.

44.

Lazarus

R. S.

(1968). Emotions and adaptation: Conceptual and empirical relations. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 16, 175–266.

45.

Leary

M. R.

Cottrell

C. A.

Phillips

(2001). Deconfounding the effects of dominance and social acceptance on self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(5),898–909.

46.

Leary

M. R.

Jongman-Sereno

K. P.

Diebels

K. J.

(2014). The pursuit of status: A self-presentational perspective on the quest for social value. In Cheng

Tracy

Anderson

(Eds.), The psychology of social status (pp. 159–178). Springer.

47.

Lerner

J. S.

Keltner

(2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(1), 146–159.

48.

Markus

H. R.

Kitayama

(2003). Culture, self, and the reality of the social. Psychological Inquiry, 14(3–4), 277–283.

49.

Pettit

N. C.

Sivanathan

Gladstone

Marr

J. C.

(2013). Rising stars and sinking ships: Consequences of status momentum. Psychological Science, 24(8), 1579–1584.

50.

Pettit

N. C.

Yong

Spataro

S. E.

(2010). Holding your place: Reactions to the prospect of status gains and losses. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 396–401.

51.

Pickett

C. L.

Gardner

W. L.

Knowles

(2004). Getting a cue: The need to belong and enhanced sensitivity to social cues. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1095–1107.

52.

Piketty

Saez

(2014). Inequality in the long run. Science, 344(6186), 838–843.

53.

Preacher

K. J.

Hayes

A. F.

(2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40(3), 879–891.

54.

Raskin

Terry

(1988). A principal-components analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and further evidence of its construct validity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(5), 890–902.

55.

Rotter

J. B.

(1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 80(1), 1–28.

56.

Snibbe

A. C.

Markus

H. R.

(2005). You can’t always get what you want: Educational attainment, agency, and choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88(4), 703–720.

57.

Snyder

(1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30(4), 526–537.

58.

Twenge

J. M.

Campbell

W. K.

(2002). Self-esteem and socioeconomic status: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(1), 59–71.

59.

Vroom

V. H.

(1964). Work and motivation (Vol. 54). John Wiley.

60.

Willer

(2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective action problem. American Sociological Review, 74(1), 23–43.

61.

Winter

D. G.

Stewart

A. J.

(1983). The power motive. In London

Exner

J. E.

(Eds.), Dimensions of personality (pp. 391–447). John Wiley.

62.

Wuepper

Lybbert

T. J.

(2017). Perceived self-efficacy, poverty, and economic development. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 9, 383–404.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.83 MB

0.02 MB