Benevolent Conformity: The Influence of Perceived Motives on Judgments of Conformity

Abstract

Although people often disapprove of conformity, they also dislike when others deviate from group norms. What explains this ambivalence? We hypothesized that judgments of conformity would be affected by whether people view it as motivated by self-interested or benevolent motives. Four studies (N = 808), using both hypothetical and real-life instances of conformity, support this prediction. We find that people judge those who conform to gain social approval (self-interested conformity) as weak-willed, but those who conform out of concern for their group (benevolent conformity) as competent and possessing strong character. In addition, we predict and find that people view self-interested conformity as “fake” but benevolent conformity as revealing one’s true self. Finally, we show that differences in perceived intentions explain how people sustain positive self-regard while succumbing to group pressures and why people judge their own conformity more favorably than others’ conformity. We discuss implications for encouraging and discouraging conformity.

Keywords

conformity social judgment attributions self–other difference authenticity

People often see conformists as weak, timid, and lacking a backbone. At the same time, people often praise those who are willing to conform, toe the party line, and go along with the group (Schachter, 1951). What explains this ambivalence toward conformity? Why is conformity sometimes seen as a failure to withstand social pressures and other times seen as an honorable ability to adapt oneself to the group’s demands and “be a team player”?

In this article, we put forth a novel theoretical framework that emphasizes the importance of perceived motives to better understand this seeming ambivalence toward conformity. We suggest that judgments of conformity are nuanced and sensitive to the presumed motives that underlie a conformist’s behavior. As such, we suggest that understanding how people evaluate conformity requires considering why they believe it occurred in the first place. We argue that people draw a distinction between self-interested conformity (i.e., conforming for the benefit of one’s status within the group) and benevolent conformity (i.e., conforming for the benefit of one’s fellow group members or the group as a whole), and examine whether this distinction can explain why the same act of conformity is sometimes seen as a sign of strong character and other times as an indication of weak character.

Perceptions of Conformity

Ever since the topic of conformity has been the subject of scientific inquiry, research has demonstrated that people hold a certain level of ambivalence toward it. People often encourage others to conform (e.g., Marques & Paez, 1994; Sampson & Brandon, 1964; Schachter, 1951), especially when doing so bolsters their own group identity (Marques et al., 1988), their cultural worldviews (Greenberg et al., 1990), or their shared sense of reality (Mannetti et al., 2010). At the same time, people frequently discourage others from yielding to group pressure (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014; Stamkou et al., 2018; van Kleef et al., 2011, 2012), are tolerant toward slight deviations from the majority opinion (Miller & Anderson, 1979), and hold in high regard those who resist social influence (Cialdini et al., 1974), exert willpower to break from accepted norms (Stamkou et al., 2018), and “march to the beat of their own drum” (Gino, 2018). Thus, although people like when others conform to their group, they also value honesty, sincerity, and autonomy (Anderson, 1968; Cottrell et al., 2007; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Schwartz, 1992), all of which can be signaled through resisting social influence (van Kleef et al., 2011). This variability in judgments of conformity raises questions regarding when an act of conformity is seen as desirable or undesirable.

Benevolent Conformity and the Role of Perceived Motives

We propose that focusing on the perceived motives for why people conform can shed new light on this seeming ambiguity in judgments of conformity. Sometimes, people yield to group pressures out of pure self-interest. They express opinions they don’t agree with to gain social acceptance, refrain from speaking their mind to avoid social rejection, and do things they wouldn’t otherwise do to earn others’ approval (e.g., Mead et al., 2010; Papyrina, 2012; Wang et al., 2012). Other times, people conform out of benevolent intentions. They say things they don’t believe to be true so as to not offend other people, refrain from speaking their mind to maintain group harmony, and do things they wouldn’t otherwise do to make others feel accepted and supported (Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Triandis, 2001). Yet, despite these different reasons for conforming, research has yet to examine how perceived motives influence judgments of conformity.

On the one hand, people’s motives for conforming may have no influence on how they are judged by their peers. Just as people overlook others’ goals when forecasting their performance (Buehler et al., 1994), discount others’ ambitions when predicting their achievements (Helzer & Dunning, 2012), and neglect others’ intentions when evaluating their behaviors (Kruger et al., 2006; Sezer et al., 2016), they may pay little heed to motives when seeing others conform. Because people typically believe that others’ actions speak louder than their intentions (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004; Pronin, 2008), they may disregard motives when judging conformity.

On the other hand, people do sometimes rely on mental states to understand others’ behavior (e.g., Heider, 1958; Malle & Knobe, 1997) and may take intentions into consideration when judging conformity. For example, people may judge someone who changes their behavior out of self-interest as dishonest and lacking in character but someone who conforms for others’ benefit as compassionate, self-sacrificing, and having strong character. Thus, the very meaning people ascribe to an act of conformity may depend on their subjective construal of why it occurred in the first place (Asch, 1948; Davidai et al., 2012; Griffin & Ross, 1991), which may help explain the prevalence of conflicting findings regarding judgments of conformity.

The idea that perceived intentions influence judgments of conformity is consistent with research on judgments of rule-breaking and deception. Although people generally dislike rule-breakers, they show a preference for leaders who break rules to benefit others in need (van Kleef et al., 2012). Similarly, although lying is generally seen as negative and undesirable, some lies are viewed more favorably than others. For example, people view lies that benefit others more positively than lies that benefit oneself (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Levine & Schweitzer, 2015), and may even prefer such benevolent lying to self-interested honesty (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014). Given that conformity necessarily involves deception (i.e., publicly exhibiting attitudes or behaviors that are inconsistent with one’s privately held beliefs), people may judge benevolent conformity that is motivated by a concern for others more favorably than self-interested conformity that is motivated by a concern for the self. Thus, people may view benevolent conformity as a noble act that benefits the group rather than the individual.

Self–Other Differences in Perceptions of Benevolent Conformity

Focusing on the perceived motives for why people conform can help explain how people sustain a positive self-regard while still succumbing to group pressures. Although people are generally motivated to think positively of themselves (e.g., Dunning et al., 2004; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008), maintaining positive self-regard can be difficult when people realize that they have failed to act according to their privately held beliefs and convictions. One way to resolve this difficulty is by viewing one’s conformity as motivated by a benevolent concern for other people. Thus, by reconstruing their personal acts of conformity as motivated by a genuine benevolence toward their groups, people may be able to reconcile their conforming behaviors with their need for positive self-regard.

The same may not be true for perceptions of other people’s conformity. As viewing other people conforming is not threatening to one’s own self-regard, people may feel comfortable attributing others’ conformity to less honorable and more self-focused motives. And, because people tend to assume that other people’s behaviors are governed by self-interest (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004; Miller, 1999), they may attribute others’ acts of conformity (but not their own acts of conformity) to a self-focused desire to fit in and avoid group scrutiny. Thus, people may believe that they personally conform out of other-oriented motives but infer that others do so out of a self-interested desire to fit in.

We are, of course, not the first to propose a self–other difference in perceptions of conformity (Hornsey & Jetten, 2011; Pronin et al., 2007). Because people have more access to their own mental states, they view their own behavior as less susceptible to social influence than others’ behavior (Pronin et al., 2004). In contrast, because people do not have the same access to others’ thoughts and feelings, they often perceive others as more easily swayed by social pressures and more susceptible to conformity. Notice, however, that whereas past research focused on self–other differences in perceived likelihood of conforming, we explore a novel self–other difference in perceived motives for conforming. As people acknowledge that they do, at times, conform (Pronin et al., 2007), it is important to understand how they construe what they believe to be their less frequent instances of conformity. Rather than examining whether people believe that they conform less than others, we investigate whether they believe that they conform for different reasons. Specifically, we examine whether people attribute their own conformity to benevolent intentions (e.g., I changed my behavior because I wanted everyone else to have a good time), but others’ conformity to self-interest (e.g., She changed her behavior because she wanted everyone to like her). Consequently, we examine whether these differences in perceived motives account for (i.e., mediate) differences in people’s judgments of their and others’ conformity.

Research Overview

In four studies, we examine how perceived intentions influence judgments of conformity. In Studies 1A and 1B, we compare how people evaluate individuals who conform out of self-interest with how they evaluate individuals who conform out of benevolent intentions. In Study 2, we present participants with a vignette of someone who either conforms or refuses to conform and examine their judgments of this person’s character. Finally, in Study 3, we examine people’s inferences about why they and others conform. We find that people are more prone to attribute others’ conformity to self-interest than their own conformity. As a consequence, we show that differences in perceived intentions affect judgments of conformity, prompting people to believe that their own (but not others’) conformity reveals a strength rather than a weakness of character.

For each study, we report all conditions run and measures collected. We determined sample sizes in advance to maximize power for detecting small-to-medium effect sizes (0.1–0.3) and conducted analyses once data collection was complete. The research we report follows American Psychological Association’s (APA) ethical standards and received Institutional Review Board’s approval. All data and materials are available through the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/s7a5q/?view_only=e8551a04fbee4edb8ba4d554f4547751).

Studies 1A and 1B

Studies 1A and 1B examine the influence of perceived intentions on judgments of conformity. We predicted that conformists would be judged favorably when they conform out of other-focused motives (e.g., taking others’ emotions into consideration or maintaining the group harmony) but unfavorably when they are believed to conform out of self-focused motives (e.g., being liked by others).

In addition, we examined in Study 1A people’s baseline judgments of conformity (i.e., in the absence of information regarding why it occurred). Given the widespread (but often incorrect) assumption that people are motivated by narrow self-interest (Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Miller, 1999), we hypothesized that participants, by default, would assume that conformity is self-interested and judge conformists accordingly. Thus, we predicted that participants would judge a person whose motives are unclear similarly to how they would judge a conformist who is motivated by self-focus and differently from how they would judge a conformist who is motivated by other-oriented motives.

Study 1A

Method

Participants

In total, 301 U.S. residents were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid US$0.45 for their participation. Eight participants who did not complete the prompt were excluded from analyses, leaving a final sample of 293 participants (161 females, M_age = 35.61), although including these participants in the analyses does not change the direction or significance of the results. This sample size allows us to detect fixed-effect omnibus effects as small as .18 with 80% power.

Materials and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the baseline condition, participants described a time when someone they know conformed to a group:

Think back to a time when someone you know (other than yourself) adjusted their behavior to match how people in their group were behaving. This may be a time when this person was in a group and acted differently from how they usually act, expressed opinions that are different from what they actually believe, spent money on things they wouldn’t usually purchase, and so forth.

The self-focus condition and group-focus condition were identical to the baseline condition, except that participants were asked about a time in which someone conformed for a specific motive or reason. In the self-focus condition, participants described a time when someone changed their behavior “because they wanted to be liked by the group.” In the group-focus condition, they described a time when someone changed their behavior “because they cared about the feelings of other people in the group.”

Next, participants evaluated the character of the person about whom they wrote in their response (To what extent do you feel that this person’s behavior in the group was a sign of strength or weakness of character? 1 = sign of extremely weak character, 4 = sign of neither weak nor strong character, 7 = sign of extremely strong character).¹

Finally, participants indicated how much the behavior they wrote about was motivated by self-interest (To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their desire to be liked by other members of the group? and To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their concern about being excluded from the group?; α = .673) versus benevolent intentions (To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their desire to maintain the harmony within the group? and To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their concern about the feelings of other group members?; α = .655). Participants indicated their responses on Likert-scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) (for correlations between all variables, see Table S.1. in the Supplemental Material).

Results

We began by assessing the effectiveness of the manipulation. A two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant Condition × Motive interaction, F(2, 290) = 19.96, p < .001, η² = .121, suggesting that the manipulation influenced the type of conformity participants brought to mind. Participants in the self-focus condition described an instance of conformity that was significantly more motivated by self-focus (M = 5.81, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [5.53, 6.09]) than by other-oriented motives (M = 4.95, 95% CI = [4.67, 5.23]), F(1, 290) = 21.63, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .58. In contrast, participants in the group-focus condition described an instance of conformity that was significantly less motivated by self-focus (M = 4.82, 95% CI = [4.54, 5.10]) than by other-oriented motives (M = 5.56, 95% CI = [5.27, 5.84]), F(1, 290) = 15.58, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .34. Similar to the self-focus condition, participants in the baseline condition described an act of conformity that was significantly more motivated by self-focus (M = 5.23, 95% CI = [4.96, 5.50]) than by other-oriented motives (M = 4.78, 95% CI = [4.50, 5.05]), F(1, 290) = 6.23, p = .013, Cohen’s d =.26. Thus, unless prompted otherwise, participants assumed that people conform out of self-interest rather than benevolent intentions to benefit others.

We next examined how perceived intentions influenced judgments of the conformist’s character. As predicted, the conformist’s perceived motives significantly influenced whether they were seen as possessing a strong or weak character, F(2, 290) = 14.57, p <. 001, η² = .091 (Figure 1). Participants viewed conforming to fit in as more revealing of one’s weak character (M = 3.04, 95% CI = [2.70, 3.38]) than a similar act of conformity in which someone changed their behavior out of concern for the group (M = 4.26, 95% CI = [3.92, 4.60], p < .001, Cohen’s d = .71). In addition, participants in the baseline condition judged conformity as more revealing of one’s weakness of character (M = 3.23, 95% CI = [2.90, 3.56], p < .001, Cohen’s d = .58) than participants in the group-focus condition, but practically identical to participants in the self-focus condition (ps > .713). Thus, when participants assumed that conformity was motivated out of a self-focused desire to fit in, they viewed it as a sign of weakness of character. In contrast, when they assumed it was motivated by a desire to benefit one’s peers, participants viewed conformity as reflecting a much stronger character.

Figure 1.

Perceived strength of character of people who conform out of group-focused motives (right), self-focused motives (middle), or when motives are unclear (left).

Study 1B

We ran a direct replication of Study 1A with three important changes. First, we added a more extensive and commonly used measure of perceived character. Specifically, we examined participants’ judgments of two distinct and fundamental aspects of social perception—competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 2002). Because competence and warmth represent two essential dimensions on which people judge others’ character, adding these measures allowed us to more deeply examine how the motives that underlie why people conform affect judgments of disparate aspects of their character. We asked participants to describe a situation in which someone conformed to fit in or to maintain group harmony, and to rate this person on how warm they seem to be and on how strong-minded and competent they are.

Second, given that baseline perceptions of conformity were almost identical to perceptions of self-focused conformity, we did not include this condition in Study 1B.

Finally, we included in Study 1B a measure of perceived authenticity. Being authentic requires people to act according to their personal values “as opposed to acting merely to please others or to attain rewards” (Kernis, 2003, p. 14). Because conformity inherently involves exhibiting attitudes or behaviors that are inconsistent with one’s privately held beliefs, people may view it as fake and inauthentic regardless of why someone chooses to conform. Indeed, people dislike when conformists pretend to be someone they are not and applaud nonconformists for being genuine, authentic, and “real.” On the other hand, because people tend to believe that the true self is fundamentally good and that morally virtuous traits are essential parts of one’s identity (De Freitas et al., 2018; Newman et al., 2014), they may view benevolent conformity (that benefits the group) as reflecting a person’s genuine and true self. Thus, although conformity requires people to change their behavior in ways that contradict their personal beliefs and convictions, people may nevertheless view benevolent conformists as being true to their authentic self.

Method

Participants

In total, 204 U.S. residents were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid US$0.50 for their participation. Twenty-eight participants who did not complete the prompt were excluded from analyses, leaving a final sample of 176 participants (84 females, M_age = 35.25), although including these participants in the analyses does not change the direction or significance of the results. This sample size allows us to detect between-participant effects as small as .43 with 80% power.

Materials and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the self-focus condition, participants described a time when someone conformed to a group “because they cared about being liked by other people and didn’t want to be excluded from the group.” In the group-focus condition, participants described a time when someone conformed “because they cared about other people and didn’t want to hurt their feelings.” As a manipulation check, participants indicated how much the person they wrote about was motivated to conform out of self-focused concerns (To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their desire to be liked by other members of the group? and To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their concern about being excluded from the group?; α = .62) versus benevolent, other-oriented concerns (To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their desire to maintain the harmony within the group? and To what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their concern about the feelings of other group members?; α = .74).

Next, participants evaluated the conforming individual’s character. First, participants completed the measure from Study 1A, indicating the extent to which this person has a strong versus weak character (To what extent do you feel that this person’s behavior in the group was a sign of strength or weakness of character? 1 = sign of extremely weak character, 4 = sign of neither weak nor strong character, 7 = sign of extremely strong character). Second, participants indicated, on 7-point Likert-scales, how much this person’s behavior showed that they are a warm person (a tolerant person, a warm person, a good-natured person, and a modest person; α = .85) and how much it showed that they are a competent person (a confident person, a strong-minded person, a competent person, and a persistent person; α = .83) (Fiske et al., 2002). The presentation of the two measures was counterbalanced.

Finally, participants indicated the extent to which conforming to the group revealed this person’s true, authentic self (To what extent do you feel that this person’s behavior reflected who they really are as a person (their true self)?) and the extent to which it revealed their true values and morals (To what extent do you feel that this person’s behavior reflected what they believed deep inside is the right thing to do (their values and morals)?) (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so; α = .81) (for correlations between all variables, see Table S.2. in the Supplemental Material).

Results

We first examined whether the manipulation was successful in prompting participants to think about someone who conformed out of self-focused motives versus other-oriented, group-focused motives. As expected, participants in the self-focus condition believed that the person they wrote about was significantly more concerned about being liked (M = 5.56, SD = 1.29) than about protecting other group members’ feelings (M = 4.84, SD = 1.48), matched-pairs t(95) = 3.82, p = .0002, d = .39. In contrast, participants in the group-focus condition believed that the person they wrote about was more concerned about other group members’ feeling (M = 5.89, SD = 1.14) than about fitting in (M = 4.79, SD = 1.36), matched-pairs t(79) = 5.21, p < .0001, d = .58. The 2 × 2 interaction with condition as a between-participants factor and motive (self-focused vs. other-focused) as a within-participants factor was significant, F(1, 174) = 41.27, p < .0001.

Next, we examined judgments of the conformist’s character. Replicating Study 1A, participants judged self-focused conformity as a sign of weaker character (M = 3.31, SD = 1.68) than a similar act of benevolent conformity (M = 4.91, SD = 1.61), t(174) = 6.41, p < .0001, d = .97. Whereas participants in the self-focus condition believed that conformity revealed weak character (as compared with the scale’s midpoint), one-sample t(95) = 4.01, p = .0001, participants in the group-focus condition viewed conformity as a sign of one’s strength, not weakness, of character, one-sample t(79) = 4.91, p < .0001. An analysis of perceived warmth and competence exhibited a similar pattern. Participants judged someone who conformed out of a self-focused desire to fit in as significantly less competent (M = 3.83, SD = 1.43) and less warm (M = 4.21, SD = 1.38) than someone who conformed out of concern for their group members (M_competence = 4.82, SD = 1.56; M_warmth = 5.58, SD = 1.51), ts > 4.36, ps < .0001. Thus, people who conform just to fit in and to avoid social exclusion are seen as less competent, less warm, and as having an overall weaker character than people who conform to preserve group harmony and avoid hurting others’ feelings.

Finally, we examined how a person’s motives for conforming influenced their perceived authenticity. Although participants in both conditions recalled a time when someone deliberately changed their behavior in a group, those in the group-focus condition believed that conforming for others’ benefit is significantly more revealing of one’s true character (M = 4.71, SD = 1.73) than those in the self-focus condition (M = 3.50, SD = 1.70), t(174) = 4.65, p < .0001, d = .70. Thus, instead of viewing conformity as fake and inauthentic, participants believed that conforming out of benevolent, other-focused motives unveils a person’s authentic self and allows them to be true to their personal morals and values. Although conformity necessarily involves deception, people seem to believe that it is only “fake” when done to benefit the self.²

Study 2

Why people conform affects how they are judged by others. Participants in Studies 1A and 1B denounced people who conform out of self-interest, but they held in high regard people who conform out of benevolent concern for others. Moreover, we found that despite their failure to act according to their privately held beliefs and convictions, benevolent conformists are seen as less “fake” and more authentic than conformists who are motivated by a desire to fit in. In Study 2, we examine how judgments of self-interested and benevolent conformity compare with judgments of nonconformity. Specifically, we examine how the perceived mental states of nonconformists influence people’s judgments of them.

We predicted that people would judge conformity as a sign of strong character when it is motivated by one’s desire to benefit their group but not when motivated by the desire to benefit the self. In contrast, we predicted that judgments of nonconformity would be equally positive regardless of the person’s motives for not conforming. According to the Normative Conflict Model (Packer, 2008), people deviate from their groups by either dissenting (i.e., challenging norms they wish to change) or disengaging (i.e., distancing themselves from the group) (Packer & Miners, 2014). Although people may (correctly) view dissenters as more conscientious and collectively oriented than nonconformists who simply disengage from the group (e.g., Packer & Chasteen, 2010; Packer et al., 2013), it is possible that the general reverence of nonconformity overrides such judgments. That is, people may view anyone who breaks a group’s norms as possessing strong character, regardless of why they refuse to conform (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014). Indeed, we found in a pilot study that participants viewed someone who didn’t conform despite the substantial personal consequences of doing so as equally strong-willed as someone who didn’t conform despite the consequences for the group as a whole (see Supplemental Material). Thus, although we predicted that people would, in general, judge nonconformity more positively than conformity, we did not expect them to differentiate between self-focused and other-focused nonconformity.

To examine our predictions, we gave participants a short description of someone who either conformed or refused to conform to their group. In the conformity conditions, we told participants that the person yielded to their group because he cared a lot about what people think about him and “just wants everyone to like him” (self-focused conformity) or because he cared about the group and “just wants it to be successful” (other-focused conformity). In the nonconformity conditions, we told participants that the person refused to conform because he cared about his independence and “doesn’t want to cave into peer pressure” (self-focused nonconformity) or because he cared about the group and “doesn’t want it to make a wrong decision” (group-focused nonconformity). We predicted that judgments of conformity would be influenced by whether the person conformed out of self-interest or benevolent intentions, but that judgments of nonconformity would be relatively immune to the person’s motives for doing so.

Method

Participants and design

In total, 205 U.S. residents were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid US$0.50 for their participation. Three participants who did not complete two simple comprehension checks and 46 participants who completed them incorrectly were excluded from analyses, leaving a final sample of 156 participants (65 females, M_age = 36.92), although including these participants in the analyses does not change the direction or significance of the results. This sample size allows us to detect between-participant effects as small as .45 with 80% power.

Materials and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (decision: conformity vs. nonconformity) × 2 (motive: self-focus vs. group-focus) between-participant design. They began by reading a vignette describing a graduate student preparing to cast his vote in his university’s student senate:

John is a member of the Student Senate at his university. During a recent meeting, members were voting on how to allocate some of the university’s funds. Some people proposed that the funds should be used to support the renovation of the Student Center. In order to pass this initiative, the vote must be unanimously in favor of the decision. John feels that the Senate could have better uses for the funds and is leaning against the initiative. However, he really doesn’t feel strongly about the issue one way or the other and could go either way. He decides to wait for the day of the vote to make up his mind. When the vote commences, John notices that all the rest of the members of the student senate are voting in favor of the initiative.

In the two conformity conditions, participants read that despite his misgivings, John conformed to the group and voted in favor of the initiative (see the appendix). In the self-focus conformity condition, they read that John conformed because he cares a lot about what the other group members think about him and because he wanted to make sure he fits in. In the group-focus conformity condition, participants read that John conformed because he cares a lot about the group’s success and because he knew that it won’t be able to pass the initiative without his vote.

In the two nonconformity conditions, participants read that John refused to conform to the group and voted against the initiative. In the self-focus nonconformity condition, they read that John refused to conform because he cares a lot about being independent and self-reliant and because he didn’t want to cave into peer pressure. In the group-focus nonconformity condition, participants read that John did not conform because he wanted to do what’s best for the group and because he was worried that the group would be making the wrong decision by passing the initiative.

Following, participants indicated their thoughts about John’s character using the same measures from Study 1B. First, participants indicated how much they viewed John as having a strong character (To what extent do you feel that John’s decision to vote in favor of/against the initiative a sign of strength or weakness of character? 1 = sign of extremely weak character, 4 = sign of neither weak nor strong character, 7 = sign of extremely strong character). Second, participants indicated, on 7-point Likert-scales, how much John’s behavior showed that he was a warm person (a tolerant person, a warm person, a good-natured person, and a modest person; α = .84) and how much it showed that he was a competent person (a confident person, a strong-minded person, a competent person, and a persistent person; α = .91) (for correlations between all variables, see Table S.3. in the Supplemental Material).

Results

We began by examining participants’ overall judgments of the conformist’s and nonconformist’s character. Not surprisingly, participants viewed nonconformity as reflecting stronger character (M = 5.26, 95% CI = [4.88, 5.63]) than conformity (M = 4.03, 95% CI = [3.69, 4.36]), F(1, 155) = 23.29, p < .0001, η² = .121. This main effect, however, was qualified by a significant Decision × Motive interaction, F(1, 152) = 14.08, p = .018, η² = .030 (Figure 2). Participants viewed a person who voted against his convictions to benefit his group (i.e., a benevolent conformist) as possessing significantly stronger character (M = 4.68, 95% CI = [4.18, 5.17]) than someone who did so to fit in (M = 3.38, 95% CI = [2.93, 3.84]), F(1, 152) = 14.54, p = .0002, Cohen’s d = .82. In contrast, participants viewed other-focused nonconformity as equally revealing of strong character (M = 5.30, 95% CI = [4.79, 5.81]) as self-focused nonconformity (M = 5.22, 95% CI = [4.67, 5.77]), F(1, 152) = 0.043, p = .837, Cohen’s d = .050. Thus, although nonconformity was seen as equally reflective of one’s strong character regardless of the person’s motives, conforming to a group was judged as substantially more revealing of one’s character when people did so to benefit others rather than themselves.

Figure 2.

Judgments of a conformist’s (left) and a nonconformist’s (right) character, based on their motives for conforming or not conforming (Study 2).

A similar pattern of results emerged when examining judgments of the conformist’s/nonconformist’s competence. Although participants viewed the nonconforming protagonists as more competent (M = 5.28, 95% CI = [4.95, 5.61]) than the conforming protagonists (M = 4.02, 95% CI = [3.72, 4.31]), F(1, 152) = 61.16, p < .0001, η² = .157, this main effect was qualified by a significant Decision × Motive interaction, F(1, 152) = 4.57, p = .034, η² = .023. Specifically, participants viewed a conformist who voted against his own convictions for the benefit of the group as more competent (M = 4.58, 95% CI = [4.14, 5.01]) than someone who did so to fit in (M = 3.46, 95% CI = [3.06, 3.86]), F(1, 152) = 13.93, p = .0003, Cohen’s d = .80. In contrast, participants viewed an other-focused nonconformist (M = 5.36, 95% CI = [4.91, 5.81]) as equally competent to a self-focused nonconformist (M = 5.20, 95% CI = [4.72, 5.69]), F(1, 152) = 0.213, p = .645, Cohen’s d = .11.

Finally, we examined the conformist’s/nonconformist’s perceived warmth. In contrast to judgments of competence, participants viewed the nonconforming protagonists as less warm and tolerant (M = 4.33, 95% CI = [4.09, 4.57]) than the conforming protagonists (M = 5.18, 95% CI = [4.96, 5.40]), F(1, 152) = 26.47, p < .0001, η² = .148. This main effect was not qualified by a Decision × Motive interaction, F(1, 152) = 0.77, p = .383, η² = .004. A series of post hoc contrasts revealed that participants viewed an other-focused conformist as significantly warmer (M = 5.53, 95% CI = [5.20, 5.85]) than a self-focused conformist (M = 4.84, 95% CI = [4.54, 5.14]), F(1, 152) = 9.64, p = .002, Cohen’s d = .67, but an other-focused nonconformist as equally warm (M = 4.53, 95% CI = [4.19, 4.86]) as a self-focused nonconformist (M = 4.13, 95% CI = [3.77, 4.49]), F(1, 152) = 2.54, p = .11, Cohen’s d = .38.

Thus, whereas judgments of a conformist’s character were significantly influenced by whether they conformed to benefit their group rather than themselves, judgments of a nonconformist’s character seemed to be relatively immune to the person’s underlying motives. When judging a conformist’s behavior, participants viewed someone who voted against his personal convictions as significantly more competent, warm, and possessing strong character if they did so to benefit their group rather than fit in. In contrast, judgments of a nonconformist’s behavior were not affected by why the person stood their ground and refused to yield to group pressure.

Study 3

Judgments of conformity are influenced by why people conform. Although people disapprove of self-focused conformity, they judge favorably those who conform out of benevolent intentions to benefit other group members or the group as a whole. And, as shown in Study 2, these favorable judgments of benevolent conformists are not due to a general liking of those who put their group’s interest over their personal interest. When it came to nonconformity, participants judged a self-focused nonconformist as equally positive as a nonconformist who was motivated by the benefit of the group.

The influence of perceived motives on judgments of conformity helps explain how people maintain a positive self-regard while succumbing to group pressure. People often fail to act in public according to their privately held beliefs, yet they nonetheless view themselves as having strong character. We argue that this is achieved by focusing on the intentions underlying one’s conformity. Because people attribute their own acts of conformity to other-oriented motives, they can maintain a positive self-regard while still failing to act according to their personal beliefs and convictions. In contrast, because others’ conformity does not threaten people’s self-perceptions, and because of the widespread assumption that others are motivated by self-interest (Miller, 1999), people may readily attribute others’ conformity (but not their own conformity) to more self-focused and less benevolent intentions. Consequently, we argue that these differences in attributions mediate the difference in people’s judgments of their and others’ conformity.

Study 3 investigates people’s judgments of their own and others’ conformity. We examined whether people attribute their own conformity to benevolent intentions but other people’s conformity to more questionable, self-focused motives. Following, we examined whether people view instances when they conform as more revealing of strong character than similar instances when others do so, and whether this difference is mediated by people’s tendency to attribute more benevolent motives to themselves relative to others. We predicted that participants would view their own conformity as motivated by benevolent intentions and, as a result, judge it as a strength of character. In contrast, we predicted that participants would attribute others’ conformity to self-interest and therefore judge them as weak-willed and lacking in character.

Method

Participants

In total, 98 U.S. residents were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid US$1.50 for their participation One participant who did not respond to the prompt was removed from analyses, yielding at total of 97 participants (56 females, M_age = 34.52). This sample size enables detection of within-participant effects as small as .14 with 80% power.

Materials and procedure

Participants described, in counterbalanced order, a time when they and someone they know conformed to their respective groups:

Think back to a time when you [someone you know (other than yourself)] adjusted your [their] behavior to match how people in your [their] group were behaving. This may be a time when you [they] were in a group and acted differently from how you [they] usually act, expressed opinions that are different from what you [they] actually believe, spent money on things you [they] wouldn’t usually purchase, and so forth.

To examine whether the perceived intentions differed based on the target of judgment, participants indicated how much their/this person’s conformity was motivated by self-focused concerns (i.e., desire for social acceptance and concern about social rejection; α = .830 for self-target, α = .705 for other-target) versus benevolent, other-oriented concerns (i.e., desire to maintain group harmony and concern about other group members’ feelings; α = .789 for self-target, α = .656 for other-target).

Finally, participants rated the extent to which conforming revealed one’s strength/weakness of character (To what extent do you feel that your/this person’s behavior in the group was a sign of strength or weakness of character?) (for correlations between all variables, see Table S.4. in the Supplemental Material).

Results

As predicted, a repeated-measures factorial ANOVA revealed a significant Target (self vs. other) × Motive (self-focused concerns vs. other-oriented concerns) interaction, F(1, 96) = 16.42, p < .001, η² = .146.³ Participants attributed less self-interest to their own conformity (M = 4.99 95% CI = [4.64, 5.34]) than to other people’s acts of conformity (M = 5.69, 95% CI = [5.45, 5.93]), F(1, 96) = 12.60, p = .001, d_z = .36. They also believed that their own conformity was motivated marginally more by a desire to benefit their fellow group members (M = 5.23, 95% CI = [4.93, 5.53]) than was the conformity of others (M = 4.91, 95% CI = [4.60, 5.22]), F(1, 96) = 3.42, p = .067, d_z = .18.⁴ Thus, participants believed that other people’s conformity was motivated more by self-interest, and less by benevolent intentions, than was their own conformity.

Next, we examined participants’ judgments of their own and others’ conformity. As predicted, participants rated the times when they yielded to social pressure as more revealing of their strong character (M = 3.99, 95% CI = [3.67, 4.31]) than similar instances when others did so (M = 3.46, 95% CI = [3.13, 3.80]), F(1, 96) = 7.57. p = .007, d_z = .32.

Finally, we examined whether the perceived difference in motives mediated the difference in participants’ judgments of their own and others’ conformity. We predicted that people would view their own acts of conformity as having been less motivated by self-interest than other people’s conformity and that this difference in perceived motives would explain the difference in judgments of one’s own versus others’ conformity. To examine this, we ran a bootstrapping analysis with 5,000 bootstrapped samples in the MEMORE macro for SPSS (designed for mediation analyses for within-participant designs; Montoya & Hayes, 2017), using target (self/other) as the predictor, self-focused motives as the mediator, and perceived strength of character as the outcome variable. This mediation analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of target (self/other) on judgments of conformity via inferences of self-interest (b = .264, 95% CI = [0.069, 0.535]). The direct effect of target on judgments of conformity was not significant (b = .262, 95% CI = [–0.114, 0.637], p = .170). Thus, because participants believed that other people—but not themselves—conformed out of self-interest, they judged others’ acts of conformity as revealing of their lack of character.

General Discussion

People are seemingly ambivalent about conformity. Whereas they quickly reject those who deviate from group norms, they also aspire to stand out from the group and hold in high-esteem individuals who break from accepted norms or traditions. In four studies, we explored this ambivalence by focusing on people’s perceived intentions for conforming. We found that judgments of conformity depend on why people believe it occurred in the first place. Whereas participants judged favorably conformists who changed their behavior for others’ benefit, they viewed conformity that was motivated by a desire to fit in unfavorably (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, despite the fact that conformity inherently involves concealing one’s true attitudes and privately held beliefs, participants viewed benevolent conformity as less fake and more genuine than self-interested conformity (Study 1B). This was not due to a general preference for people who put their group’s interest over their personal interest. Whereas participants differentiated between self-focused and other-focused conformity, they judged a nonconformist who acted for their personal benefit as positively as a nonconformist who acted for the benefit of their group (Study 2). Finally, because participants attributed their own, but not others’, conformity to benevolent intentions (Study 3), they saw it as more revealing of strong character. In contrast, because participants’ attributions for why other people yield to social pressures were not as charitable, they viewed others’ conformity as a sign of weak character.

Although people differentiate between benevolent and self-interested conformity, our research provides insight into why they are nevertheless quite suspicious about people who conform. We found that people typically assume that conformity is motivated by self-focused motives, leading them to look down on those who yield to social pressures. Participants assumed, by default, that people conform out of self-interest (Study 1A) and believed that others are more motivated by self-interest than by a desire to benefit their fellow group members (Study 3). Thus, we find that underlying judgments of conformity is often an assumption of self-interest (Miller, 1999).

Theoretical Implications and Future Directions

Highlighting the role of intentions in judgments of conformity advances the field’s understanding of when people condemn conformity and when they applaud it. For instance, to the extent that people believe their ingroup members have more noble intentions than outgroup members, we would expect them to view conformity more favorably when enacted by member of their own group. This difference in judgment may even be exhibited in the words people use to talk about conformity, describing outgroup members as “mindless conformists” but ingroup members as “showing solidarity.” Future research could explore these and other factors that influence people’s perceived intentions for conformity.

More generally, our findings advance the field’s understanding of social perceptions of any instance when a person’s private beliefs are at odds with their public behavior. Just as outright lying erodes trust only when motivated by self-interest (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015), perceived intentions may play a fundamental role in judgments of any deceitful or misleading behavior. For instance, how people judge someone who masks their true feelings in public may depend on why they think the person is doing so in the first place. Whereas an overly cheerful salesperson may seem self-interested and fake, people may view someone who masks their emotions for others’ benefit as benevolent and authentic. Indeed, as shown in Study 1B, conformists are seen as inauthentic only when they conform out of a desire to fit in and avoid social exclusion. Future research can examine how much judgments of benevolent and self-interested conformity reflect a more general pattern in social judgment.

Future research would also benefit from examining the divergence between how conformists and nonconformists view themselves and how others view them. According to the Normative Conflict Model, the decision to either dissent or disengage from one’s group is affected by how personally identified people feel with their group (Packer, 2008; see also Leigh & Melwani, 2019). Therefore, it would stand to reason that judgments of nonconformists would be affected by whether they deviate from their groups out of other-oriented or self-oriented concerns. However, unlike judgments of conformity, we found that judgments of nonconformity were not affected by the person’s motives. Thus, although people seem to pay close attention to others’ motives for conforming, they may be much less attuned to the motives underlying why people refuse to conform.

Of course, there are different types of conformity, and future research could examine how people judge each type. Although conformity is typically thought of as a public display of behavior that is at odds with one’s privately held beliefs (i.e., normative social influence; Asch, 1952), it can also involve a change in people’s personally held beliefs (i.e., informational social influence; Sherif, 1936). However, people can only infer others’ mental states from their observable behaviors, making it difficult to detect instances of informational social influence outside of the lab. Given the difficulty of distinguishing between people who internalize their group’s attitudes and people whose attitudes are merely aligned with their group, we focused on judgments of normative social influence. Examining judgments of benevolent conformity that involves internalization of the group’s beliefs may be similarly fruitful.

Finally, it is important to note that we recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk—a sample which tends to be more diverse than traditional samples in psychological research (Buhrmester et al., 2011) but which may still differ from the general population. Although there is no reason to believe that participants from this sample are unique in how they view conformity, future research may benefit from examining perceptions of conformity among other populations and research samples.

Implications for Encouraging and Discouraging Conformity

The willingness to uphold social norms constitutes a fundamental aspect of human cooperation, and societies have developed various ways to ensure adherence to group norms (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Gouldner, 1960; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). Nevertheless, people often hope that breaking social norms would gain them reverence and respect. Populist politicians try to rally the support of their base by promising to “shake things up” rather than adhere to time-tested rules of civility and propriety, provocateurs hope to gain recognition by breaking social norms, rebellious teenagers wish to impress their friends by putting themselves at harm’s way, and so forth.

Although nonconformity may help people achieve these goals, our research suggests an alternative route to gaining recognition that does not require breaking norms: benevolent conformity. Fostering an environment in which people feel free to adhere to social norms out of sincere regard for others may help discourage unconstructive acts of going against the grain. Furthermore, encouraging such acts of benevolent conformity could be extremely instrumental in helping society deal with complex social issues, such as global health crises which call for extensive and rapid behavioral changes (e.g., the COVID-19 global pandemic; Van Bavel et al., 2020). Thus, when nonconformity poses concrete risks for others’ well-being, encouraging people to engage in benevolent conformity may help quickly disseminate new social norms. As a consequence, reverence may arise from upholding (rather than abandoning) social norms, motivating people to conform not for their own sake but for the sake of their fellow group members.

This is not to say that admiring benevolent conformists is always good. Blind admiration for benevolent conformity may lead people to passively endorse behaviors with which they don’t necessarily agree. As some nonconformity surely contributes to creativity and innovation (Gino, 2018), and given that collectively minded nonconformists often bring about positive change (Packer, 2008; Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004), admiring certain levels of nonconformity can be valuable. Nevertheless, social structures may be seriously jeopardized when self-interested nonconformists are admired for breaking social norms just for the sake of standing out.

Conclusion

Although people often conform to their friends, colleagues, and family members, they are also quite ambivalent about doing so. People often praise the virtue of “paving one’s own path,” but they also applaud others for “being a team player” and not “sticking out like a sore thumb.” Focusing on people’s intentions for conforming helps explain this seeming ambivalence. Although people who conform out of benevolent intentions are typically applauded, the same is not true for those who conform out of a self-focused desire to fit in. Society, it seems, neither approves nor disapproves of those who do as others do. When it comes to conformity, intentions matter.

Supplemental Material

Davidai_Online_Appendix – Supplemental material for Benevolent Conformity: The Influence of Perceived Motives on Judgments of Conformity

Supplemental material, Davidai_Online_Appendix for Benevolent Conformity: The Influence of Perceived Motives on Judgments of Conformity by Matthew Wice and Shai Davidai in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Supplemental Material

Supplementary_Materials – Supplemental material for Benevolent Conformity: The Influence of Perceived Motives on Judgments of Conformity

Supplemental material, Supplementary_Materials for Benevolent Conformity: The Influence of Perceived Motives on Judgments of Conformity by Matthew Wice and Shai Davidai in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Appendix

Vignettes Used in Study 2.

Conformity	Self-focus	Fitting in with everyone else is especially important to John, and he is concerned about how the other members of the Student Senate will feel about him if he votes against the initiative. John cares a lot about what people think about him and just wants everyone to like him. Because John wants everyone to like him, he decides to vote like everyone else to make sure he fits in. So, despite his misgivings, John ends up voting in favor of the initiative.
Conformity	Group-focus	The Student Senate is especially important to John, and he is concerned that the Senate won’t be able to pass the initiative without his vote. John cares a lot about the goals of the Student Senate and just wants it to be successful. Because John wants the Senate to be successful, he decides to vote like everyone else to make sure the vote is passed. So, despite his misgivings, John ends up voting in favor of the initiative.
Nonconformity	Self-focus	Self-reliance is especially important to John, and he is concerned that voting in favor of the initiative would go against his personal beliefs. John cares a lot about his independence and doesn’t want to cave into peer pressure. Because John doesn’t want to cave into peer pressure, he decides to make up his own mind and to vote according to his own views and beliefs. So, because of his misgivings, John ends up voting against the initiative.
Nonconformity	Group-focus	The Student Senate is especially important to John, and he is concerned that the Senate will be making a wrong decision by passing the initiative. John cares a lot about the goals of the Student Senate and doesn’t want it to make a wrong decision. Because John doesn’t want the Senate to make the wrong decision, he decides to make up his own mind and to vote according to what he thinks is best for the Senate. So, because of his misgivings, John ends up voting against the initiative.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported, in part, by an SPSP Small Research Grant awarded to the first author.

ORCID iD

Shai Davidai

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

Notes

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