How Long Has It Been? Self-Construal and Subjective Time Perception

Abstract

Do people with independent and interdependent self-construals perceive the amount of time that has passed differently? Results from four experiments (one preregistered) and three supplementary ones reveal that an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal elongates time perception by making individuals feel that more time has passed than in reality. We find evidence that this is likely because an independent self-construal increases arousal that affects one’s “internal clock,” which determines the subjective passage of time. We find this effect with externally valid and practical measures, such as by measuring how long an online video feels, how long loading a webpage feels, and how long waiting in a line feels. Our research adds to an understanding of the consequences of self-construal for one of human beings’ most important judgments—time. We discuss the theoretical and practical considerations of our results as well as research limitations in closing.

Keywords

subjective time perception self-construal arousal influence goals

Estimating how much time has passed has vital consequences for well-being, decision-making, and even marketing activities. For example, individuals in physical pain “expands” a perception of time, which then makes score lower on measures of subjective well-being because the pain is felt to be longer than reality (Rey et al., 2017). In many settings, the perceived passage of time can have mixed effects. For example, while waiting in a queue generally solicits negative emotions such as anger, tension, and frustration, and increases the perceived quality of the service being provided. Accordingly, understanding the factors that influence subjective time perception is vital to many aspects of daily life.

Indeed, there are many factors that affect the subjective perception of time, which we formally define as the perceived estimation of time that has already passed. Consider an advertisement that is 30 s long. People can perceive it to be more or less than 30 s depending on emotion, attention, and anxiety, among other factors. For example, construal level impacts time perception (Wang et al., 2017), higher body temperatures elongate perceived time (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995), and greater arousal also leads people to think more time has passed (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Maricq et al., 1981). Accordingly, 30 s is not necessarily felt as 30 s.

This research examines whether individuals’ self-construal influences their subjective time perception. We hypothesize that an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal elongates individuals’ subjective time perception. To advance such a hypothesis, we posit that a salient interdependent self-construal increases felt arousal, which in turn elongates time perception by making one feel more time has passed than in reality. We test this hypothesis in four experiments, one of which is preregistered and three further ones that are accessible in our online Methodology File, using various measures of subjective time perception that are commonly experienced by individuals, including how long it feels to watch a commercial, load a webpage, and wait in line.

Independent and interdependent self-construals refer to how individuals see the self in relation to others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Self-construals offer a “lens” through which people experience and make sense of the world. Self-construals impact myriad choices and domains, possibly even subjective time perception. At the present moment, although there is no direct link between self-construal and subjective time perception, there are notable differences between cultures on myriad variables related to time, such as impulsivity (Zhang & Shrum, 2008), temporal distance (Lee et al., 2011), and temporal orientation (Gao, 2016). Given that self-construals offer a cognitive-based explanation for differences in cultures, it may also be the case that self-construals could affect time-related outcomes, perhaps even subjective time perception. The current work explores this possibility. In our “General Discussion” section, we will discuss how our results relate to previous research on culture and time.

Conceptual Framework

Culture and Influence Versus Adjustment Goals

The literature in cross-cultural psychology is replete with findings that individuals from different cultures around the world think and behave differently (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995). The foremost prominent dimensions on which to evaluate the many distinctions between different cultures are Hofstede’s that relate to individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and temporal orientation. What is common across this and other models of culture (e.g., Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness [GLOBE]) is that cultures differ on the dimension of individualism-versus-collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, Coon, et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995). In cultures that are individualistic people see themselves to be separate from others, but members of collectivistic cultures see others in relation to and even a part of the self.

More important to our current research is that members of individualistic cultures aim to influence others more so than those from collectivistic cultures. That is, Western cultural members value the self over others and influence the social and/or the physical environment to suit themselves more than non-Western cultural members do, who instead value others over the self. In short, members of Western, individualistic cultures tend to hold “influence goals”; those of Eastern, collectivistic cultures tend to hold “adjustment” goals (Tsai et al., 2007). Indeed, even at an early age, parents in Western cultures teach children to “stand up” for their rights, whereas parents in Eastern ones teach children to control themselves and to comply with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As adults, members of Western cultures communicate in a direct, active, and clear manner that facilitates influencing others (Tsai, 2007), whereas, in contrast, members of Eastern cultures communicate in indirect, ambiguous styles that help them accommodate others’ needs (Ting-Toomey et al., 2000).

Meanwhile, influencing others requires asserting the self, establishing or demonstrating that one’s needs and preferences are special and unique. Consequently, to do so, individuals must try to change others’ thoughts and behaviors to be consistent with one’s personal needs, desires, and preferences. Importantly, influencing others requires action, such as expressing an opinion or asking someone to do something. Consistent with this, Gifford and O’Connor (1987) found that, during an open-ended group conversation, individuals with influence goals were more likely to speak and initiate action (i.e., they were more active) than those with weaker influencing goals. In contrast, adjustment goals require suppressing the self and conforming to others. This includes suppressing one’s thoughts and actions by not revealing one’s thoughts or opinions and instead waiting for others to speak. Consequently, suppressing oneself involves “suspended action” (Tsai et al., 2007) as one acts only after assessing others’ needs and preferences. To be sure, to some extent, everyone has both influence and adjustment goals and engages in influencing and adjusting on a daily basis, but prior work has established that, on the whole, Western cultures such as the United States place more emphasis on influence goals and non-Western ones place more emphases on adjustment goals instead (Tsai et al., 2007).

Influence (vs. Adjustment) Goals, Action, and Arousal

These differences, cross-culturally in the strength of influence versus adjustment goals, influence the levels of arousal that people in different cultures actually feel. Arousal is often defined as the state of increasing activation along a continuum that varies from drowsiness to frantic excitement (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974), that is, members of individualistic cultures tend to experience greater arousal levels than their collectivistic counterparts. Influence and adjustment goals can explain such differences in arousal levels.

To influence others necessitates action, for which arousal “prepares.” In contrast, to adjust to others, as mentioned, requires “suspended action,” and suspending action leads to a decrease in arousal. Indeed, it is low-arousal states that broaden one’s attention to and allow one to “take in” the environmental stimuli (Libby et al., 1973). These differences between influence and adjustment goals thus explain the correlations between taking action and arousal (Obrist, 1981; Tomaka et al., 1993), between influence (vs. adjustment) goals and lower relaxation (Murray & Nakajima, 1999), and between influence (vs. adjustment) goals and higher arousal (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). Indeed, in the autonomic nervous system, the sympathetic branch is responsible for mobilizing the body to be ready for action, typically reflected in the “flight-or-fight” response, leading to high-arousal emotions such as anger and fear (Canon, 1932). In contrast, the parasympathetic nervous system is concerned with calming and reducing arousal. Although there is no established relation yet between individualistic versus collectivistic culture and the autonomic nervous system, to the extent that influencing others requires action, and the sympathetic branch readies the body of action by increasing arousal, this also provides an indication for a link, physiologically, between individualistic cultures and arousal.

Self-Construal Differences in Arousal?

The discussion and literature review thus far relate to differences between (members of) individualistic and collectivistic cultures and influence or adjustment goals on arousal. What about self-construal? In recent decades, cross-cultural research has shifted away from variations between individualistic and collectivistic cultures onto studying the likely underlying differences in cognition between independent and interdependent self-construals, respectively (Mandel, 2003). Importantly, self-construal is a mediator for the impact of culture on behavior. For example, an interdependent self-construal increases risk-seeking in money but not social spheres (Mandel, 2003), explaining why and how members from Eastern cultures take more financial risk (Hsee & Weber, 1999).

An independent self-construal, therefore, might offer the cognitive basis for the influence goals underlying individualistic cultures, whereas an interdependent self-construal might, instead, provide the cognitive basis for the adjustment goals that underlie collectivistic cultures. An independent self-construal stresses an independent view of the self; an interdependent self-construal stresses an interdependent view of the self. Oyserman described an independent self-construal as a “separate-and-pull-apart” cognitive style that is distinct from a situation-specific “embed-and-connect” style that underlies an interdependent self-construal (Markus & Oyserman, 1989; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Therefore, an independent self-construal may explain individualistic cultural members’ greater desire to influence others, whereas an interdependent self-construal may explain collectivistic cultural members’ greater preference to adjust to others instead. However, this also implies that if an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal offers the cognitive basis for the influence goals of individualistic cultures then an independent self-construal should also increase arousal because it is the “individualizing” goals of an independent self-construal that increases arousal to prepare the body for action to influence others.

Arousal and Subjective Time Perception

In the cognitive psychology literature, highly aroused individuals estimate time as longer than objective reality. For example, dopaminergic agents increase people’s perception of time (Maricq et al., 1981); people who jump from a high vertical position level, which is arousing, overestimate the duration of their fall to the ground (Stetson et al., 2007); people who merely see pictures of other people with intense emotions such as happiness or anger also estimate a duration of time to be longer than those who see emotionally neutral faces (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007); and even emotional sounds are perceived to be longer than neutral sounds (Noulhiane et al., 2007).

The accepted reasoning is that arousal accelerates the internal psychological pacemaker, causing more pulses to accumulate within the same physical unit of time. This then elongates people’s time perceptions. Indeed, the perceived duration of time is largely dependent upon how many pulses are captured or “paid attention to” (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995), that is, as time duration estimates are mainly based on how many pulses are accrued or “counted” within a block, people perceive time as longer than it is (Penton-Voak et al., 1996). Indeed, emotional inputs (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Noulhiane et al., 2007), physiological manipulations that include changes in body temperature (Fox et al., 1967; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995), and sensory inputs such as click train (Penton-Voak et al., 1996), all of which are arousing, can affect people’s estimations of how much time has passed. Thus, given that an independent self-construal is likely linked to greater arousal and arousal elongates subjective time perception, then an independent self-construal might, through arousal, elongate felt time.

The Current Research

In sum, we propose that an independent self-construal increases people’s estimate of the passage of time, compared with an interdependent self-construal. This should be because the influence goals of an independent self-construal increases arousal. We test this possibility in four main experiments. Our goal in Experiment 1 is to test the main effect of an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal on subjective time perception through arousal, which we then replicate in a preregistered Experiment 2. Thereafter, Experiment 3 manipulates arousal to see whether doing so moderates the effect of an independent self-construal on subjective time perception to complement the mediation-based results in the first two experiments. Finally, Experiment 4 tests whether the need to influence others explains why an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal will increase subjective time perception. We now summarize the experiments in turn.

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 tests our main effect, which is that an independent self-construal increases arousal, which then increases subjective time perception. We manipulate self-construal and measure subjective time perception as well as arousal. We use mediation analysis to determine whether arousal mediates the effect.

Participants

Britons from Prolific (N = 190; M_age = 36.93 years, SD = 11.88 years) took part for £1. We originally recruited 200, but 10 failed an attention check. Our sensitivity analysis, according to G*Power, revealed that a sample size of 190 could detect an effect size of d = .36 at the α = .05 and power = .80 levels.

Procedure

We first made salient either an independent or interdependent self-construal, employing the pronoun-circling task (Gardner et al., 1999). Here, participants read a story about a trip and circled the relevant pronouns. Pronouns in the independent self-construal condition were personal (e.g., “I”), whereas pronouns in the interdependent one were group based (e.g., “us”). As participants completed this experiment online, we had them “click” on the relevant pronouns, in contrast to the original method that was pen-and-pencil based.

Participants then watched a 60-s online ad for Energy Australia, a utility company based in Australia.¹ We chose a company from Australia as our participants, who were British, would likely have no a priori exposure to Energy Australia or the ad. After seeing the ad, participants then indicated how short or long they felt the ad was on a scale ranging from 1 (very short) to 9 (very long). We then measured self-reported arousal, using the single-item Felt Arousal Scale (FAS) on a scale ranging from 1 (low arousal) to 9 (high arousal). We asked all participants how professional (1 = not at all to 9 = very professional) and creative the ad was (1 = not at all to 9 = very creative), which we considered as control items to see whether our manipulations affect non-focal measures. Finally, all participants completed the Ten-Statement Task (TST; that is, “I am __”) as a self-construal manipulation check (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954).

Results

Ten-Statement Task

Two hypothesis-blinded research assistants coded participants’ responses, as either idiocentric (e.g., personal qualities, attitudes, and beliefs) or allocentric (e.g., relationships, memberships in groups, and commonalities), in line with prior work (Mandel, 2003). There was high correlation between the two coders (r = .85, p < .001). Higher scores indicated a more independent way of seeing the self. Participants with a salient independent self-construal scored higher (M = 6.87, SD = 1.92) than those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 6.14, SD = 2.04), t(188) = 2.51, p = .01, d = .36 (95% confidence interval [CI] = [.07, .65]).

Subjective time perception

Participants with an independent self-construal felt the ad was longer (M = 5.59, SD = 2.45) than those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 3.86, SD = 2.32), t(188) = 4.99, p < .001, d = .72 (95% CI = [0.43, 1.02]).

Felt Arousal Scale

Participants with an independent self-construal scored higher on arousal (M = 5.15, SD = 2.04) than those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 4.11, SD = 1.99), t(188) = 3.53, p < .001, d = .51 (95% CI = [0.22, 0.80]).

Mediation analysis

We conducted a mediation analysis using Model 4 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to see whether self-construal would affect arousal to then influence subjective time perception. Thus, self-construal was our independent variable, subjective time perception was our dependent variable, and arousal was our presumed mediating variable. The indirect effect was significant, B = 0.21, SE = 0.11 (95% CI = [0.02, 0.47]). The individual pathways are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Experiment 1: Individual pathways in mediation analysis.

Ad professionalism and creativity

On ad professionalism, participants with a salient independent self-construal scored similarly as those with a salient interdependent self-construal, t(188) = .88, p = .37. On ad creativity, participants with an independent self-construal also scored similarly as those with an interdependent self-construal, t(188) = 1.60, p = .11.

Discussion

These findings confirm our proposition concerning how an independent self-construal might increase or elongate individuals’ subjective time perception. This is likely because an independent self-construal increases arousal, which influences time perception. Our manipulations did not affect other attitudes toward the ad. Although there is work on the link from arousal to subjective time perception (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007), these results, to our knowledge, are the first to report links between self-construal (vs. culture) on arousal and subjective time perception.

However, there are three limitations to Experiment 1. The first concerns our measure of subjective time perception. Might an independent self-construal lead individuals to actually estimate the passage of time to be longer than it really is? The second concerns our measure of arousal. We utilized a single-item Felt Arousal Scale, which has validity in the scholarship, but there are other measures of arousal. The third concern is related to the second, in that arousal is only one half of affect, with the other half being valence. Might an independent self-construal change affect, which then biases time perception, which Droit-Volet et al. (2011) suggest is possible? To address these concerns singly, we therefore turn to Experiment 2.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, with the intent of replicating the key effect while addressing the three limitations described above, measures subjective time perception and arousal differently. We also manipulate self-construal differently to confirm that our previous finding was not specific to circling pronouns. We preregistered this experiment with AsPredicted (No. 55570).²

Participants

Americans from CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017; N = 300; M_age = 40.21 years, SD = 13.24 years) took part for US$0.91. We included an attention check at the start of the experiment and those who failed were thus unable to proceed to the remainder of the study. The 300 participants thus are those who passed the attention check. Our sensitivity analysis with G*Power revealed that our sample size of 300 could detect an effect size of d = .28 at the α = .05 and power = .80 levels.

Procedure

We made salient either an independent or an interdependent self-construal, employing a sentence-formation task that we adapted from Srull and Wyer (1979). In the independent self-construal condition, participants received 27 words with which they had to form grammatically correct sentences for each. All words were independent pronouns (I, me, mine, different, competitive, own, free, unique, dissociate, assertive, unusual, autonomy, alone, apart, autonomous, detached, different, dissimilar, distinct, diverge, independence, individual, isolate, separate, solitude, split, and self-contained), with three other neutral ones In the interdependent self-construal condition, the task was the same, but the 27 words were interdependent pronouns (we, us, ours, join, similar, alike, share, cooperative, agreeable, help, group, respect, partnership, joint, together, team, support, others, attached, alliance, closeness, cohesive, connection, inseparable, interdependence, intimate, and merged). These words were from Srull and Wyer who originally used them in a sentence-scrambling task.

Participants thereafter immediately completed a self-construal manipulation check consisting of four items: “I’d rather say ‘no’ directly than risk being misunderstood,” “I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects,” “I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments,” and “It is important for me to respect decisions made by the group.” The first two items tapped into an independent self-construal, whereas the latter two tapped into an interdependent self-construal. Participants indicated their agreement to each statement on 9-point scales.

Afterward, the webpage informed all participants that “the rest of the study is loading, please wait a moment!” The webpage automatically reloaded in 22 s (this time was not presented to participants) after which participants were asked how many minutes they felt that had waited (open-ended).

Finally, participants completed the Affect Grid (Russell et al., 1989), which we presented as a 9 × 9 grid, allowing participants to simultaneously indicate affective valence and affective arousal. This stands in contrast to the Felt Arousal Scale that not only did not define (to participants) what “arousal” meant but also did not distinguish between valence and arousal. We expected only arousal, not valence, to mediate the impact of self-construal on participants’ subjective time perception.

Results

Exclusion reporting

In addition to the attention check that resulted in a sample size of 300, we excluded two further participants, one who indicated a time estimate (for the wait) that was more than 3 SDs beyond the mean and another who did not put down a time estimate, and thus our final dataset included 298 participants.

Self-construal manipulation check

We averaged the two independent and interdependent self-construal items (r = .89, p < .001 and r = .94, p < .001, respectively) to produce single indices. Participants with an independent self-construal scored higher on the independent self-construal index (M = 6.27, SD = 2.20) than those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 5.44, SD = 2.44), t(296) = 2.09, p = .003, d = .34 (95% CI = [0.11, 0.57]). In contrast, participants with an independent self-construal scored lower on the interdependent self-construal index (M = 4.36, SD = 3.37) than those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 6.12, SD = 2.80), t(296) = 5.02, p < .001, d = .58 (95% CI = [0.34, 0.81]).

Subjective time perception

Participants with an independent self-construal estimated the wait to be longer (M = 28.21 s, SD = 19.74 s) than those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 23.00 s, SD = 16.31 s), t(296) = 2.48, p = .01, d = .28 (95% CI = [0.05, 0.51]).

Arousal and valence

Participants with an independent self-construal scored higher on arousal (M = 4.29, SD = 2.51) than those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 3.72, SD = 2.27), t(296) = 2.05, p = .04, d = .23 (95% CI = [0.01, 0.46]). However, participants with an independent self-construal scored similarly on valence as those with an independent self-construal, t(296) = 1.26, p = .20.

Mediation analysis

We conducted a mediation analysis using Model 4 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The indirect effect was significant, B = 0.70, SE = 0.43 (95% CI = [0.01, 1.67]). The individual pathways are presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Experiment 2: Individual pathways in mediation analysis.

Discussion

These findings replicate those in Experiment 1, using a different manipulation of self-construal and different measurements of both arousal and subjective time perception. Still, we observe that a salient independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal increases arousal to then increase estimation of time. Thus, this gives us further support and lends credence to our posited effect of self-construal on subjective time perception through arousal. Importantly, despite prior research linking mood with subjective time perception (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007), our manipulation here did not affect valence, thereby suggesting that valence cannot explain our results, whereas arousal can.

Experiment 3

Two experiments thus far illustrate the mediating role of arousal, measured using the Felt Arousal Scale and the Affect Grid. Here, we manipulate arousal (instead of measuring it) after the self-construal manipulation, allowing us to ascertain the possible modulating influence of an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal on subjective time perception. We had three experimental predictions. First, an independent self-construal should increase subjective time perception, as before. Second, manipulating arousal should increase it as well (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Maricq et al., 1981; Noulhiane et al., 2007). Third, we expect a two-way interaction. For participants with an independent self-construal, manipulating arousal should have no effect on subjective time perception as they are higher on arousal, in any case, which Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate. However, for participants with an interdependent self-construal, who do not feel as aroused as those with an independent self-construal, manipulating arousal should increase their subjective time perception, similar to those with an independent self-construal. These findings should support an arousal account for our posited impact of self-construal on subjective time perception, consistent with a moderation-of-process strategy to test for mediation (Spencer et al., 2005).

Participants

Australian undergraduates (N = 386; M_age = 19.63 years, SD = 1.36 years) completed the study in exchange for course credit. We had posted a study in the subject pool for 400 participants, but only 386 showed up. Moreover, 15 participants on a screening questionnaire indicated that they did not own a smartphone, they did not bring it with them, or they did not have headphones (which we asked for in the study description); therefore, our final sample size was 371. They completed the study on a one-on-one basis, not part of a group. A sensitivity analysis revealed that our sample size could detect an effect size of f = .17 at the α = .05 and power = .80 levels, with df = 3 and 4 groups.

Procedure

The study took place in the behavioral lab. Upon arrival, participants checked in with the research assistant, who informed them that the study was being set up but they could take part in the first set of tasks by going to a provided online link on their (students’) smartphones. Participants sat or stood in the waiting hall while they completed this study. Here, the first study was our self-construal manipulation. We adapted a writing task that Trafimow et al. (1991; their Study 1) developed in which participants wrote about how they are different from (independent self-construal condition) or similar to (interdependent self-construal condition) their family and close friends. Students spent about 4 min on this writing task.

We conducted a manipulation check with 36 students from the same course in an earlier term (M_age = 19.33 years, SD = 1.06 years), using the TST task. Those writing about differences scored higher (M = 5.34, SD = 1.04) than those writing about similarities (M = 4.55, SD = 1.26), t(34) = 2.05, p = .04, d = .70 (95% CI = [0.01, 1.39]).

Thereafter, while still on their smartphones, all participants received either the arousal or the control condition. Prior work investigating the role of affective arousal has often used videos (Leith & Baumeister, 1996). Videos have been used successfully to differ only on arousal and not mood (Fedorikhin & Patrick, 2010). We followed this procedure. We asked participants to put on their headphones. In the arousal condition, participants saw a high-speed car chase from Fast and the Furious. In the control condition, the video clip was of landscapes from Planet Earth. Both clips were 5 min in length. Immediately after the video finished playing, participants indicated how much they enjoyed watching it, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much.)

To ensure that the videos differed along arousal, we conducted another manipulation check with 45 students (M_age = 19.44 years, SD = 1.28 years) by showing them either the same control or arousing clip, and then asking them to indicate how they felt on the 9 × 9 Affect Ground. The arousing clip increased arousal (M = 6.58, SD = 1.73) over the control one (M = 4.18, SD = 1.88), t(43) = 4.33, p < .001, d = 1.32 (95% CI = [0.66, 1.98]). However, there was no difference in mood between the two clips, t(43) = .29, p = .99.

At this point, participants received a number after watching the video akin to “take-a-number” queues that individuals often receive while waiting in line, as at the butcher. The webpage informed participants that the research assistant would call their number “soon,” at which time the study would “officially” begin. Inside the behavioral lab, our research assistant had access to the Qualtrics system that allowed her to note the exact time at which each participant finished the first set of tasks. This also allowed her to call each participant exactly 3 min 20 s later into the room.

Inside the room, all participants completed the “remaining tasks” on the lab-provided computers. The first asked participants to indicate how long they felt they had to wait for the study to begin as part of “a campus-wide student satisfaction survey” on a scale ranging from 1 (very short) to 9 (very long). This was our main dependent variable. They also reported mood on a scale ranging from 1 (very sad) to 9 (very happy). Finally, all participants indicated a few questions about McDonalds: how often they go to McDonalds, how much they liked the logo for McDonalds (which we showed them), and suggestions offered by them for a “new burger creation.” These questions were fillers. Thus, we will not report the findings.

Results

Subjective time perception

A 2 (self-construal) × 2 (video) ANOVA revealed a main effect of self-construal, F(1, 367) = 14.08, p < .001, d = .39 (95% CI = [0.18, 0.59]): An independent self-construal increased their felt time (M = 4.96, SD = 2.96) relative to an interdependent self-construal (M = 3.87, SD = 2.46), replicating our posited overall effect. There further was a main effect of video, F(1, 367) = 4.09, p = .04, d = .21 (95% CI = [0.06, 0.41]), with the arousing video increasing felt time (M = 4.71, SD = 2.75) compared with the control video (M = 4.09, SD = 2.75), which is consistent with how arousal directly influences subjective time perception.

Importantly, the two-way interaction was significant, F(1, 367) = 5.51, p = .01, d = .24 (95% CI = [0.03, 0.45]): The effect of self-construal on subjective time perception was moderated by the control or arousing video. For an independent self-construal, the arousing video did not influence subjective time perception (M = 4.91, SD = 2.76) compared with the control video (M = 5.00, SD = 3.51), t(176) = .20, p = .83. For an interdependent self-construal, the arousal video increased it (M = 4.52, SD = 2.74) compared with the control one (M = 3.29, SD = 2.03), t(191) = 3.53, p < .001, d = .51 (95% CI = [0.22, 0.79]). Please see Figure 3.

Figure 3.

Experiment 3: Self-construal × Video on subjective time perception.

We also conducted planned contrasts from another angle, this time examining whether the two self-construal conditions would differ on felt time depending on the video. For the control video, an independent self-construal increased felt time compared with an interdependent self-construal, t(190) = 4.50, p < .001, d = .65 (95% CI = [0.36, 0.94]). This is consistent with the main findings we have reported so far in this research. However, for the arousing video, there was no difference in self-construal, t(177) = .95, p = .34. In other words, when the video was highly arousing, participants, regardless of self-construal condition, perceived time to be longer than actuality. Thus, we replicated our overall effect, but mainly for those in the control “calming” condition and priming arousal elongated felt time for all participants.

Video liking and mood

For video liking, a 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed no main effect of self-construal, F(1, 367) = .71, p = .39. There was no main effect of video, F(1, 167) = 1.05, p = .30. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 167) = .13, p = .71. For mood, a 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed no main effect of self-construal, F(1, 367) = .51, p = .47. There was also no main effect of video, F(1, 167) = .31, p = .57. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 167) = 1.59, p = .20.

Discussion

Here, the effect of self-construal on individuals’ subjective time perception is apparent for those in a control, non-arousing condition. But for those in the arousal condition, felt time increases even for those with an interdependent self-construal. They typically do not feel as aroused as those with an independent self-construal, but watching the video clip elicited arousal, producing similar effects on felt time as those with an independent self-construal. We rule out mood. We are thus confident that our arousal manipulation (through video) did not affect mood and mood did not explain our effects, which is consistent with Experiment 2. These findings offer further evidence for the likely role of arousal, but not mood/valence, supplementing the evidence for arousal we have found through mediation in two earlier experiments.

Experiment 4

In Experiment 4, we test our key premise that a salient independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal both increases arousal and elongates subjective time perception because of influence goals. Here, we assess individuals’ desire to influence others as a trait, expecting it to moderate our results. We have the following predictions: For participants low on this trait, a salient independent self-construal should both increase arousal and elongate felt time. Indeed, this would likely be because such self-construals increase their desire for influence. However, for participants already high on this trait, the effects of manipulating an independent self-construal on both arousal and felt time should be dampened. These individuals are already high on the desire to influence, so manipulating this desire should only produce marginal effects. We test the predictions here in Experiment 4. These findings would test our prediction that an independent self-construal offers a cognitive explanation for why independent cultural members report higher arousal levels, which the findings would suggest are due to influence goals.

Participants

Britons from Prolific (N = 186; M_age = 37.42 years, SD = 12.80) took part for £1. We originally recruited 200, but 14 failed an initial attention check and so they did not complete the reminder of the experiment. A sensitivity analysis with G*Power revealed that our sample size of 186 could test an effect size of d = .36 at the α = .05 and power = .80 levels.

Procedure

The procedure was largely identical to Experiment 1 but we did not include measures of perceived ad professionalism and ad creativity. Furthermore, we assessed participants’ desire for influence at the end of the experiment, after several filler tasks, that is, we used the Need for Power and Influence Scale by Bennett (1988). Some sample items from the Need for Influence subscale included “I would like to be able to influence the actions of others” and “I like to feel that others are affected by what I have to say.” We used this measurement because it tapped into the desire for, instead of ability to, influence. Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Importantly, we included the Need for Power and Influence Scale. As this is a measure of dispositional traits, we did not expect our manipulations to have any effect. However, to be conservative, we included this scale that has two separate subscales for Need for Power and Need for Influence, after some filler items. Although Need for Influence and Power are logically correlated, we posited a moderating impact of only Need for Influence but not Need for Power. The filler items asked participants how much they enjoyed completing surveys on Prolific, whether they also have a Mechanical Turk account, and finally how much they would like to be paid for a 10-min study on Prolific (in GBP).

Results

Need for influence and need for power

We averaged the items for Need for Influence (α = .83) and Need for Power (α = .89). The two subscales only moderately correlated with each other (r = .45, p < .01), revealing discriminant validity between the two, similar to the r = .48 reported by Bennett (1988). We checked initially whether our manipulations affected these measures because we assessed them after the manipulations. On Need for Influence, those with an independent self-construal scored similarly (M = 6.84, SD = 1.49) as those with an interdependent self-construal (M = 6.52, SD = 1.46), t(184) = 1.45, p = .14. Moreover, on Need for Power, those with an independent self-construal also scored similarly (M = 6.52, SD = 1.78) as those who had an interdependent self-construal (M = 6.59, SD = 1.91), t(184) = .26, p = .78.

Ten-Statement Task

We used Model 1 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) as it allowed us to test for the moderating effect of Need for Influence on the impact of self-construal on our manipulation check for self-construal. Here, an independent self-construal predicted TST scores, B = 2.28, SE = 1.06 (95% CI = [0.22, 4.78]), replicating our overall effects thus far. Need for Influence did not predict TST scores, B = 0.13, SE = 0.89 (95% CI = –0.62, 1.16); neither did the interaction term, B = –0.26, SE = 0.18 (95% CI = –0.62, 0.10).

Subjective time perception

Using Model 1 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) once again, those with an independent self-construal felt the ad was longer, B = 2.02, SE = 0.53 (95% CI = [0.96, 3.09]). Need for Influence also predicted felt time, B = 1.81, SE = 0.54 (95% CI = [0.74, 2.88]). The interaction term was also significant, B = –1.79, SE = 0.74 (95% CI = [–3.26, –0.33]). For those low on Need for Influence (–1 SD), an independent self-construal increased felt ad length, B = 2.92, SE = 0.51 (95% CI = [1.02, 3.86]); however, for those high on Need for Influence (+1 SD), an independent self-construal did not, B = 0.23, SE = 0.51 (95% CI = [–0.77, 1.24]). Please see Figure 4 for the individual pathways in the moderated mediation analysis, examining the effect of the self-construal (1 = independent, 0 = interdependent) × 2 (need for influence subscale) interaction on felt arousal and subjective time perception.

Figure 4.

Experiment 4: Individual pathways in moderated mediation analysis.

Felt Arousal Scale

Using Model 1 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) once again, those with an independent self-construal scored higher on arousal, B = 1.80, SE = 0.47 (95% CI = [0.86, 2.74]). Need for Influence also predicted arousal, B = 2.09, SE = 0.47 (95% CI = [1.14, 3.03]). The interaction term was also significant, B = –1.65, SE = 0.65 (95% CI = [–2.95, –0.36]). For those low on need for influence, an independent self-construal increased arousal, B = 2.44, SE = 0.51 (95% CI = [1.22, 4.04]); however, for those high on need for influence, an independent self-construal did not, B = 0.14, SE = 0.45 (95% CI = [–0.74, 1.03]).

Moderated mediation analysis

We used Model 8 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to test whether the Self-construal (1 = independent, 0 = interdependent) × Need for Influence interaction affected arousal, to then influence participants’ subjective time perception. For participants low on Need for Influence (–1 SD), the indirect effect was significant, B = 0.16, SE = 0.08 (95% CI = [0.05, 0.41]). Thus, for these individuals, an independent self-construal increased arousal, which then elongated time perception. But for participants high on Need for Influence (+1 SD), the indirect effect was insignificant, B = 0.04, SE = 0.07 (95% CI = [–0.04, 0.29]). Thus, for this group, an independent self-construal did not influence subjective time perception through arousal. Importantly, the index of moderated mediation was significant, B = 0.12, SE = 0.05 (95% CI = [0.02, 0.22]). Thus, the two indirect effects for participants who were low on Need for Influence versus participants high on it were significantly different from each other.

We examined the possibility that Need for Influence might moderate the relationship between arousal and felt time instead, using Model 15. The indirect effect was insignificant for those low on Need for Influence, B = –0.08, SE = 0.11 (95% CI = [–0.38, 0.10]), or those high on it, B = 0.04, SE = 0.07 (95% CI = [–0.08, 0.24]); the index of moderated mediation was insignificant, B = 0.08, SE = 0.06 (95% CI = [–0.01, 0.24]). Thus, Need for Influence only modulated the linkage between self-construal and arousal, not arousal and felt time.

Supplementary Analyses

For further analyses, please see the online Methodology File. These included whether Need for Power moderated the influence of self-construal on the TST, on subjective time perception, on arousal, and our mediation analysis. Briefly, Need for Power did not moderate any of these outcomes.

Discussion

The findings are supportive of our key premise that self-construal increases arousal, thereby influencing subjective time perception because it increases the desire to influence others, or influence (instead of adjustment) goals. If influence goals do not explain why such a self-construal increases arousal (and elongates subjective time perception), then it conceptually should not moderate any of the effects. But we observe that an independent self-construal only affects arousal and thereby felt length of the Energy Australia ad among participants who are low on this desire dispositionally, and so priming an independent self-construal likely increases this desire. For those high on this desire dispositionally, priming an independent self-construal should produce marginal, diminishing effects.

General Discussion

In this research, we hypothesize that an independent self-construal elongates subjective time perception, relative to an interdependent self-construal. This is likely as an independent self-construal increases arousal, and arousal increases felt time. In Experiments 1 and 2, the latter preregistered, we show the overall effect of an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal on elongating subjective time through greater arousal levels, without changes in mood. We also then, in Experiment 3, manipulate arousal directly to show that it moderates the effect of self-construal on subjective time perception. Finally, in Experiment 4, the effect is moderated by individuals’ trait Need for Influence; thus, influence (vs. adjustment) goals can explain why an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal affects arousal and subjective time perception. We use diverse self-construal manipulations and time perception measures, yet the results consistently are in line with our postulations, linking self-construal to arousal and felt time.

In our online Methodology File, besides providing further analyses for Experiment 4, we also present the results of three further experiments that provide robust evidence for our hypothesizing, using different ways of manipulating self-construal and measures of both arousal and subjective time perception—some of which are pragmatic to adopt, given that the main experiments reported here are using manipulations and measures ideal for laboratory settings, but therefore also pose concerns for external validity. In online Experiments 1 and 2, we report evidence for the mediating of arousal but not valence, consistent with Experiments 1 and 2 reported here, in the main article. In online Experiment 3, we find evidence for the moderating role of arousal, consistent with Experiment 3 reported here. Thus, these findings offer further evidence for our research postulations.

Theoretical Contributions

Prior work has focused on cultures and other constructs regarding time (e.g., time preferences). But self-construal forms the cognitive basis of culture and estimating how “long” or “short” time feels is a fundamental assessment in everyday life and in everyday and/or practical contexts. Meanwhile, members of individualistic cultures are more shortsighted in terms of their temporal orientation, in that they opt for smaller, sooner rewards over larger, later ones. If members of such cultures, insofar as an independent self-construal is dominant for people in individualistic cultures, perceive time to be longer, then this can explain why these individuals choose more smaller sooner rewards over larger later ones. Indeed, the farther away the future, the more impatient a person may feel that they have to wait longer, which they do not want (Zauberman et al., 2009).

That said, our findings are consistent with prior work that can be said or interpreted as studying the perceived length of time. For example, there is the finding that individualistic cultures such as the United States and Western Europe perceive past (vs. future) events as further away, psychologically, than collectivistic cultures such as East Asia (Guo & Spina, 2019; Ji et al., 2009). Our work is consistent. We find that an independent self-construal makes time feel longer than it really is, which is consistent with this prior work that Americans and Western Europeans consider historic events to be even further away in time than they really are. What is interesting is that this effect was demonstrated for past events—with both Westerners and non-Westerners showing no difference in psychological temporal distance for anticipated and future events. This is also consistent with our findings as we only measure the perceived duration of time that people actually experience when they have a salient independent or interdependent self-construal. Our work does not address whether self-construals affect the perceived duration of expected (vs. past) time. Indeed, in the arousal literature, arousal speeds up the internal clock by capturing “more pulses” than reality (or under low-arousal levels). Because by definition anticipated time has not been experienced, there is no capturing of pulses, or attention paid to the internal pacemaker.

Our findings also suggest that considerations and studies about time need to be precise. Consider how Eastern cultures tend to observe a longer temporal orientation than Western cultures. For example, Chinese consider outcomes in the long term than Americans. On the surface, this seemingly conflicts with our findings, suggesting that Western cultural members, vis-à-vis an independent self-construal, have a longer temporal orientation. This may seem to contradict how these individuals, per our findings, estimate time to be longer. However, just because individuals with an individualistic self-construal see time to be longer does not mean that they might focus more on the future. Thus, cultural differences in time—whatever the foci might be—need to specify what it is about time is being studied. Thus, how self-construals and cultures influence time in one aspect need not translate to another—even if the contexts can seem superficially similar. Our work is not the first to study how self-construal affects “time” (consider Lee et al.’s, 2011, study on self-construal and temporal distance) but we are the first to focus on subjective time perception.

We are also the first authors to find a relationship between self-construal and arousal, in contrast to the extant body of work on culture and arousal. This prior literature indicates that individualistic cultures tend to not only value but also report higher arousal levels, compared with collectivistic cultures. Such results have been explained in terms of “desired” or “ideal” affect: Members of individualistic cultures want to feel more arousal, and thus they tend to experience more arousal (Tsai, 2007; Tsai et al., 2006; Tsai & Levenson, 1997; but for exceptions, see Levenson et al., 1992). However, because self-construals are the cognitive basis of culture, our research is the first, to our knowledge, to suggest a cognitive explanation for why individualistic cultural members have greater influence (vs. adjustment) goals and higher arousal levels. The individualizing goals of an independent self-construal offers an explanation.

Practical Contributions

Regarding the felt length of a commercial, at times it may make sense for advertisers to increase or reduce the perceived length (Pan & Hanusch, 2011). Although the perceived length of a commercial has no direct bearing on attitudes toward the ad, it does affect one’s felt emotions. When individuals perceive ads to be longer, it allows for the ad to build toward an emotional peak, which may be desirable for certain products such as emotionally or hedonically charging products or even experiences. Consider a commercial aimed to provoke emotion, such as an ad by a nonprofit aimed to get individuals “connected.” The advertiser might wish to lengthen felt time to allow the audience to connect and identify emotionally. Our work would suggest that a salient independent self-construal might be effective. For example, the advertiser could emphasize the “individual” rather than “group.” However, in other cases, it may make sense to focus on the “group” to reduce felt length because longer ads often are perceived as boring (Oakes & North, 2006).

Regarding perceived waiting time, our work may extend to downloading files, such as music, movies, and software, or even the time it takes for smartphone “app” to load. A major criticism about modern technology is that it simply is not “fast enough.” Individuals are seeking the latest internet connection or 5G mobile service so that they do not have to “wait” for their downloads to arrive. Thus, in these cases, it appears that felt time should be reduced. Perhaps, then, priming an interdependent self-construal can achieve such a goal. For example, consider a media downloading (or streaming) service such as Netflix. It might make sense for Netflix to trigger an interdependent self-construal in their customers, who may then perceive the time it takes to download a file to be shorter, in comparison with triggering an independent self-construal. While it would not be realistic to have individuals think about being a Sumerian warrior interested in family goals, it may be possible to show collectivistic movies or movie trailers such as those that stress family matters or even using collectivizing language.

Regarding waiting time in “real life,” such as in a queue, again, similar to perceived ad length, the goals of the marketer, retailer, or service provider likely differ. Individuals tend to dislike waiting in line while waiting for coffee, at the retail store, or waiting to speak to an agent at the Department of Motor Vehicles. In these cases, a salient interdependent self-construal might be effective at reducing individuals’ felt time in the queue. Perhaps, posters emphasizing collectivism may achieve this goal. In contrast, it may be beneficial to increase felt waiting time for professional service providers such as lawyers and doctors because wait time is correlated with perceived quality often. In these cases, priming an independent self-construal, such as by diffusing an arousing scent in the waiting room, may lead individuals to rate the service provider greater in expertise. Posters emphasizing individualism scattered around the lobby may achieve this goal. Perhaps music that stress independence rather than interdependence might also achieve this goal.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

One immediate possibility for future investigation would be to examine other potential explanations. Once again, our emphasis was on cognitive, but perhaps an independent self-construal, when salient, might increase one’s valuation of influence goals? This valuation-based account might parallel our cognition-based account, given the complex nature of culture and its relationship with self-construal. And regarding arousal, we measured self-reported arousal, but arousal can be measured in other ways, such as heart rates and skin conductance tests (Chan & Maglio, 2019). Given the multifaceted nature of arousal, it is crucial to show that an independent self-construal can increase arousal however measured. There are, moreover, distinctions between self-reported and physiological arousal; thus, self-construals might influence self-reported but not physiological arousal.

Also, there is the chance that, in some situations, an interdependent self-construal might elongate felt time instead. Individuals with an interdependent self-construal may require the presence of others, and so the absence of others may be arousing, which then increases felt time. Our manipulations primed self-construal among participants in socially isolated situations (they sat at desks in a lab or home), but stressing the absence of others might increase arousal for those with an interdependent self-construal. In places such as service settings and hospitals that are busy, it may be possible for individuals to be waiting by themselves. The perceived passage of time in a quiet place might influence time perception differently compared with in a busy place. As individuals can wait in quiet and busy places, understanding how people perceive time in such and other milieus within the presence of others is of import for researchers and policy officials to better understand self-construals’ impact on subjective time perception.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-psp-10.1177_01461672211016919 – Supplemental material for How Long Has It Been? Self-Construal and Subjective Time Perception

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-psp-10.1177_01461672211016919 for How Long Has It Been? Self-Construal and Subjective Time Perception by Eugene Y. Chan and Najam U. Saqib in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Eugene Y. Chan

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

Notes

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