Unintentional Inception: When a Premium Is Offered to Unintentional Creations

Abstract

Creations can be fundamentally intended or unintended from their outset. Past work has focused on intentional creations, finding that people place a premium on effort. We examine the role of unintentionality in the inception of creations in six studies using a variety of stimuli (N = 1,965), finding that people offer a premium to unintentional creations versus otherwise identical intentional creations. We demonstrate that the unintentionality involved in the inception of a creation results in greater downward counterfactual thought about how the unintentional creation may have never been created at all, and this in turn heightens perceptions that the creation was a product of fate, causing people to place a premium on such creations. We provide evidence for this causal pathway using a combination of mediation and moderation approaches. Further, we illuminate that this premium is not offered when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation.

Keywords

unintentionality quality and preference premium creation counterfactual thinking fate perceptions

“You’re a poet and you don’t even know it.”

—Anonymous

Creation can be fundamentally intended or unintended from its outset. A person can intend to write a poem, or she can journal her thoughts, only to read them later and realize that without meaning to, she created a poem. She could set out to draw a cartoon character or could find herself aimlessly doodling and inadvertently sketch out a cartoon.

These examples illustrate how otherwise identical creations might differ solely in the intentionality involved in their inception. Presumably, this should not influence how the features of the creations are perceived or how much these creations are valued since the objective qualities and content of the creations are identical. However, research has demonstrated how powerful the awareness of intentionality behind otherwise identical outcomes can be in shaping perceptions of and preference for outcomes (Ames & Fiske, 2015; Bellezza et al., 2013; Caruso et al., 2010; Kupor et al., 2018; Malle, 2010; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Newman et al., 2014; Pizarro et al., 2003; Reich et al., 2018). In light of this work, the current research explores how quality perceptions of creations and preference for creations can be influenced by the intentionality involved in their inception. We define an unintentional creation as a creation for which the ultimate outcome was not a product of an actor’s planning or intention (Cameron et al., 2017; Caruso et al., 2010; Mele & Moser, 1994). In our earlier examples of a person unintentionally writing a poem or creating a cartoon character, while the action of putting a pen to paper is intended, the ultimate outcome of that action (the creation itself) was not intended. Such creations are examples of artistic expression, which are considered inherently positive (Ciszewski, 2016; Guest, 2002; Karaca, 2021). We propose that positive outcomes of unintentional creation result in greater downward counterfactual thought about how the unintentional creation may have never been created at all, and this in turn heightens perceptions that the creation was a product of fate, causing people to place a premium on such creations.

The Influences of Intentionality on Perception and Preference

Prior work largely documents positive influences of intentionality on quality perceptions of and preference for creations. There exists a psychological association between intention and effort (Ajzen, 1991; Caruso et al., 2010; Malle, 2010; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Weiner, 1972), and in turn, perceptions of effort have been shown to heighten quality perceptions and preference. For instance, creations such as paintings and poetry that were believed to have taken more time to create were perceived to be of higher quality and value (Cho & Schwarz, 2008; Kruger et al., 2004). This influence of perceived effort in creation on perceptions of quality and valuation, and the association between intention and effort (Ajzen, 1991; Caruso et al., 2010; Malle, 2010; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Weiner, 1972), would suggest that people will offer a premium to intentional creations rather than unintentional creations.

Indeed, skill is implicitly assumed in intentional actions (Malle, 2010), indicating that intentional creations might be considered more favorably because of skill assumed in their production. Further, people ascribe less skill and exertion of effort to an agent whose unintentional actions produce an outcome than if the same action taken by the agent was intended (Caruso et al., 2010; Malle & Knobe, 1997). This psychological link between intentionality and skill suggests that quality perceptions of and preference for intentional creations will be higher than those of unintentional creations.

Counterfactual Thinking, Fate Perceptions, and Enhanced Appreciation

Despite work cataloging the positive influence of intentionality and effort, the present research demonstrates a premium that is placed on unintentionality. Our theoretical framework integrates and extends lines of work on counterfactual thinking, intentionality, and perceptions of fate to propose why a premium is offered to unintentional creations over otherwise identical intentional creations. Because counterfactual thinking is readily triggered by unexpected events (Sanna & Turley, 1996), and a positive outcome of unintentional creation is inherently unexpected because unintentionality is frequently perceived to result in negative consequences (Caruso et al., 2010; Palmer et al., 2010), we propose that a positive outcome of unintentional creation inspires counterfactual thought. When thinking counterfactually in response to positive outcomes, people typically generate downward counterfactuals (Sanna et al., 2001). Therefore, spontaneous counterfactual thoughts generated in response to the unexpected nature of a positive outcome of unintentional creation should tend to be downward in direction. Counterfactual thinking about an event has been shown to increase the “hindsight bias” (Roese et al., 2004; Roese & Vohs, 2012), the tendency to inflate the perceived likelihood that an outcome would occur after the fact (Zwick et al., 1995). Further, direct causality has been drawn between downward counterfactual thinking about an event not occurring and heightened perceptions that the event was a product of fate (Kray et al., 2010). Specifically, when people considered how a pivotal moment in their life might not have occurred, their perceptions that the event was a product of fate increased (Kray et al., 2010). Because of this causal link between downward counterfactual thinking and perceptions of fate, we propose that greater downward counterfactual thinking about how the positive outcome of unintentional creation might never have occurred in the first place (i.e., the absence of the creation) should lead to heightened perceptions that the creation was a product of fate.

Perceptions of fate, characterized as the perceived predetermination and inevitability of an outcome (Kray et al., 2010; Norenzayan & Lee, 2010), have been shown to heighten appreciation for the consequences of the outcome (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2010; Kray et al., 2010). For example, perceptions that employment at a company was fated increased people’s organizational commitment to the company (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2010), and perceptions that a pivotal event in one’s life was fated enhanced the meaning that people perceive in the consequences of that event (Kray et al., 2010). We build upon these lines of research to propose that heightened perceptions that a positive outcome of unintentional creation was a product of fate will lead to greater appreciation of the consequences of the event of creation (i.e., of the creation itself). Specifically, this appreciation will manifest as increased quality perceptions of the creation and preference for the creation.

Notably, this theoretical framework predicts that people will not always offer a premium to unintentional creations. Because unintentionality is frequently perceived to result in negative consequences (Caruso et al., 2010; Palmer et al., 2010), we propose that when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation, this outcome is not unexpected and would therefore not inspire counterfactual thought. Only positive outcomes of unintentional creation should cause greater downward counterfactual thought about the creation to emerge. Our theory posits that the downward counterfactuals inspired by the unexpected nature of positive outcomes of unintentional creation drive the premium offered to unintentional creations by heightening perceptions that such creations were fated. Therefore, we predict that this effect should be eliminated when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation. As a corollary of this prediction, we initially explored this phenomenon in Studies 1A-4 with creations of artistic expression, which are considered inherently positive (Ciszewski, 2016; Guest, 2002; Karaca, 2021). Further, our test to determine if the ascribed outcome of the creation moderated the relationship between intentionality in the inception of the creation and a premium offered to the creation (Study 5) compared the unintentional creation of a chair by an engineer to the intentional creation of the chair with the ascribed outcome of the chair manipulated as a separate factor.

We formally predict the following about inherently positive outcomes of creation:

H1: People will offer a premium to creations whose inception was unintentional (vs. intentional).

H2A: People exhibit greater downward counterfactual thought about how creations whose inception was unintentional (vs. intentional) might never have been created at all.

H2B: People will perceive creations whose inception was unintentional (vs. intentional) to be the product of fate to a greater extent.

H2C: Greater downward counterfactual thoughts about how a creation might never have been created at all and perceptions that its creation was a product of fate will serially mediate the relationship between unintentional creation and a premium offered to the creation.

Furthermore, we formally predict:

H3: People will offer a premium when a positive outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation (vs. an intentional creation), but will not offer a premium when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation (vs. an intentional creation).

Overview of Studies

Six studies examined the premium offered to unintentional creations. By having people evaluate a poem, Study 1A tested our core prediction—that people would offer a premium to an unintentional creation compared to an otherwise identical intentional creation. Study 1B demonstrated the robustness of this effect of unintentional creation by replicating it with visual art. Study 2 used mediation analysis to examine our proposed mechanism of greater downward counterfactual thinking about how an unintentionally created slogan might never have been created at all driving the premium offered to it. Further, Study 2 provided evidence inconsistent with an alternative explanation that the premium offered to unintentional creations is due to heightened perceptions of divine intervention in unintentional creation. Through a process by moderation design, Study 3 provided converging evidence for the underlying role of downward counterfactual thought. Study 4 documented the serial mediation of downward counterfactual thought about how an unintentionally created poem might never have been created at all leading to perceptions that the creation was a product of fate, consequently increasing preference for the unintentional creation. Additionally, Study 4 provided evidence inconsistent with an alternative explanation that lower perceived effort exerted by a creator implies that the creator holds higher ability. Finally, Study 5 provided converging evidence to support our theoretical framework using a moderated serial mediation approach, showing that this premium for unintentional creation is not offered when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation. Further, Study 5 provided additional evidence inconsistent with the alternative explanation that lower effort exerted by a creator implies higher ability.

For all studies, we report all measures and conditions and have no data exclusions. Target sample sizes for each experiment were determined in advance of data collection based on the principle that researchers should collect at least 50 participants per condition (Simmons et al., 2013). Data collection did not continue after data analysis for any studies.

Study 1A

Study 1A provided an initial test of whether people offer a premium to unintentional creations versus otherwise identical intentional creations. We hypothesized that people would perceive a poem’s quality as higher when its inception was unintentional.

Method

Participants

273 participants (M_age = 39.45, SD = 12.41; 56% female) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in exchange for monetary payment. A sensitivity power analysis indicated an 80% chance to detect a small-to-medium effect size (d = .34) in a two-condition between-participant design with a .05 significance level (Faul et al., 2017). Data and materials of this study and all subsequent studies can be found at https://researchbox.org/334&PEER_REVIEW_passcpde=TFHBOJ.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two creation conditions: intentional or unintentional. In the intentional creation condition, participants read the following: “On the next page you will read a poem. The creator said the following about the poem: ‘I was writing down my thoughts with the intention of making a poem.’” In the unintentional creation condition, participants read the following: “On the next page, you will read a poem. The creator said the following about the poem: ‘I was writing down my thoughts. I didn’t intend for it to be a poem.’” On the next page, all participants read the same poem.

We assessed perceptions of quality using a five-item scale adapted from previous research (Smith & Newman, 2014). Specifically, participants reported to what extent they agree with the following statements about the poem they just read: “This poem is high quality; This poem is praiseworthy; This poem is impressive; This poem is unique; This poem is creative.” Participants responded on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all, 9 = very much so). These responses were then averaged together to create a single index of quality (α = .94). Finally, participants completed demographic measures (age and gender).

Results and Discussion

As predicted, participants rated the poem as higher quality when its creation was unintentional (M = 5.69, SD = 1.94) than when its creation was intentional (M = 5.17, SD = 1.87); t(271) = 2.26, p = .024, d = .27, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the mean difference = [0.07, 0.98].

This result demonstrates our core effect—people offered a quality premium to an unintentional creation versus an otherwise identical intentional creation.

Study 1B

Study 1B demonstrated the robustness of the effect of unintentional creation by replicating the effect with visual art.

Method

Participants

316 participants (M_age = 30.25, SD = 11.02; 65.2% female) from an East Coast university participated in an in-lab study in exchange for monetary payment. A sensitivity power analysis indicated an 80% chance to detect a small-to-medium effect size (d = .32) in a two-condition between-participant design with a .05 significance level (Faul et al., 2017).

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two creation conditions: intentional or unintentional. In the intentional creation condition, participants read the following: “On the next page you will view a cartoon character. The creator said the following about the cartoon character: ‘I was doodling with the intention of making a cartoon character.’” In the unintentional creation condition, participants read the following: “On the next page you will view a cartoon character. The creator said the following about the cartoon character: ‘I was doodling. I didn’t intend for it to be a cartoon character.’” On the next page, all participants viewed the same cartoon character.

Participants then completed the same quality index measures as in Study 1A (α = .92) before completing demographic measures (age and gender).

Results and Discussion

As predicted, participants rated the cartoon character as higher quality when its creation was unintentional (M = 4.14, SD = 1.70) than when its creation was intentional (M = 3.74, SD = 1.62); t(314) = 2.14, p = .033, d = .24, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.03, 0.77].

This result provides evidence for the robustness of the effect of unintentional creation by replicating it with visual art.

Study 2

Study 2 explored the underlying mechanism driving the effect of unintentional creation. Research has shown that counterfactual thoughts are elicited by unexpected events (Sanna & Turley, 1996). Because unintentionality is frequently perceived to result in negative consequences (Caruso et al., 2010; Palmer et al., 2010), we propose that a positive outcome of unintentional creation, like creations of artistic expression such as those used in Studies 1A and 1B, will elicit greater downward counterfactual thought about how the creation might not have occurred because it is unexpected. Further, we predict that increased thought about how an unintentional creation might not have occurred will drive the premium offered to the creation. To test this, we directly measured the extent to which people considered the counterfactual possibility of a slogan never having been created. Additionally, we measured a competing potential explanation: the extent to which people believed that unintentional creation involved divine intervention. Past work has documented a lay belief carried forward from early civilizations such as ancient Greece that inspiration and creation are consequences of divine intervention, a feeling that may still be alive and well today (Batey, 2012; Griffiths, 2008).

Method

Participants

402 participants (M_age = 37.29, SD = 12.11; 51.2% female) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in exchange for monetary payment. A sensitivity power analysis indicated an 80% chance to detect a small-to-medium effect size (d = .28) in a two-condition between-participant design with a .05 significance level (Faul et al., 2017).

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two creation conditions: intentional or unintentional. In the intentional creation condition, participants read the following: “Below you will read a slogan. The creator said the following about the slogan: ‘I was writing down my thoughts with the intention of making a slogan.’” In the unintentional creation condition, participants read the following: “Below you will read a slogan. The creator said the following about the slogan: ‘I was writing down my thoughts. I didn’t intend for it to be a slogan.’” All participants read the same slogan: “Tonight, let it be chocolate.”

Participants then completed the same quality index measures as in Studies 1A and 1B (α = .95). To assess our two competing mechanisms, participants also indicated “To what extent do you feel this slogan’s creation involved divine intervention?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much so) and “How much did you think about how the slogan could have not been created at all?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). Participants then completed demographic measures (age and gender).

Results and Discussion

Participants rated the slogan as higher quality when its creation was unintentional (M = 4.64, SD = 2.03) than when its creation was intentional (M = 4.09, SD = 1.99); t(400) = 2.74, p = .006, d = .27, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.16, 0.94].

Participants did not believe that divine intervention’s involvement in the slogan’s creation differed between the unintentional creation (M = 2.94, SD = 2.37) and the intentional creation conditions (M = 2.56, SD = 2.15); t(395.23) = 1.66, p = .097, d = .17, and Levene’s test was significant, F(1, 400) = 4.14, p = .043; thus, equal variances were not assumed; 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.07, 0.82].

Participants reported that they thought more about the counterfactual of how the slogan could have not been created at all when the slogan’s creation was unintentional (M = 3.93, SD = 2.56) than when its creation was intentional (M = 3.38, SD = 2.28); t(394.05) = 2.29, p = .023, d = .23, and Levene’s test was significant, F(1, 400) = 4.02, p = .046; thus, equal variances were not assumed; 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.08, 1.03].

To test our proposed process, we conducted a bootstrap analysis with 5,000 samples (Hayes, 2013) using creation as the independent variable, counterfactual thoughts as the mediator, and quality index ratings as the dependent variable. Consistent with our theorizing, the analysis revealed that participants in the unintentional creation condition thought more about how the slogan could have never been created at all, resulting in greater perceptions of quality [95% CI: 0.01, 0.19]; see Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Mediation model in Study 2.

Offering support for our theoretical framework, unintentional creation of a slogan causes people to think more about how its creation could have never occurred than does otherwise identical intentional creation, and this downward counterfactual thought leads people to perceive the unintentional creation’s quality as higher. However, it should be noted that while the mediation was significant, the effect size of the mediation was small, reducing the direct effect of creation condition on quality perceptions somewhat but not enough to render the direct effect nonsignificant. While these results provide support that downward counterfactual thoughts about how an unintentional creation may never have been created are a key driver of the premium offered to unintentional creations, they also inspire further investigation into what else may play a critical role in the underlying mechanism. We examine this question in Studies 4 and 5. Additionally, these results provide initial evidence against the alternative explanation that a premium is offered to unintentional creations because people perceive the involvement of divine intervention in unintentional creation to a greater extent. However, the slogan in this study is a relatively simple creation, and it is possible that people may reserve ascriptions of divine intervention for unintentional creations of higher complexity. We discuss this possibility further in the General Discussion.

Study 3

While Study 2 provided mediation evidence for the role of heightened downward counterfactual thought about how an unintentional creation might never have been created at all, Study 3 provides converging evidence for this mechanism using a moderation approach. If the premium offered to unintentional creations is indeed driven by greater spontaneous downward counterfactual thinking about how unintentional creation might never have occurred, we predict that quality perceptions of intentional creations will rise to the level of quality perceptions of otherwise identical unintentional creations when people are encouraged to consider how an intentional creation might never have been created at all.

Method

Participants

372 participants (M_age = 36.35, SD = 11.49; 53.5% female) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in exchange for monetary payment. A sensitivity power analysis indicated an 80% chance to detect a small-to-medium effect size (f = .15) in a 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a .05 significance level (Faul et al., 2017).

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (creation: unintentional or intentional) × 2 (counterfactual salience: low or high) between-participant design. In the intentional creation conditions, participants read the following: “Below you will read a slogan. The creator said the following about the slogan: ‘I was writing down my thoughts with the intention of making a slogan.’” In the unintentional creation conditions, participants read the following: “Below you will read a slogan. The creator said the following about the slogan: ‘I was writing down my thoughts. I didn’t intend for it to be a slogan.’” In the high counterfactual salience conditions, in addition to the creator’s statement, participants read, “As you read the slogan consider how the slogan could have not been created at all.” Then, all participants read the same slogan: “Tonight, let it be chocolate.” In the low counterfactual salience conditions, participants proceeded to read the slogan after reading the creator’s statement as in the studies so far.

Participants then completed the same quality index measures as in Studies 1A-2 (α = .96) before completing demographic measures (age and gender).

Results and Discussion

We submitted the quality index ratings data to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with creation (intentional or unintentional) and counterfactual salience (low or high) as the independent variables. This analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect of creation, F(1, 368) = 3.61, p = .058, η² = .01, such that unintentional creations’ quality index ratings were marginally higher (M = 4.34, SD = 2.05) than intentional creations’ quality index ratings (M = 3.94, SD = 2.12), and no significant main effect of counterfactual salience, F(1, 368) < 1, p = .639, η² < .01. Importantly, we found the predicted significant interaction between creation and counterfactual salience on the quality index ratings, F(1, 368) = 5.08, p = .025, η² = .01. Planned contrasts revealed that in the low counterfactual salience conditions, participants who were told that the slogan’s creation was unintentional perceived it to be of higher quality (M = 4.54, SD = 2.00) than participants who were told that the slogan’s creation was intentional (M = 3.64, SD = 2.12); F(1, 368) = 8.44, p = .004, η² = .05, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.29, 1.50]. However, in the high counterfactual salience conditions, when participants were encouraged to think of the counterfactual that the slogan may never have been created at all, there was no difference in quality perceptions between those who had been told that the slogan’s creation was unintentional (M = 4.15, SD = 2.09) and those who were told that the slogan’s creation was intentional (M = 4.23, SD = 2.09); F(1, 368) < 1, p = .801, η² < .01, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.67, 0.52]; see Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Quality index ratings as a function of creation and counterfactual salience in Study 3. (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).

Decomposed differently, in the intentional creation conditions, participants who were told to consider the counterfactual that the slogan might not have been created perceived it to be of marginally higher quality (M = 4.23, SD = 2.09) than participants who were not told to consider this counterfactual (M = 3.64, SD = 2.12); F(1, 368) = 3.77, p = .053, η² = .02, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.01, 1.18]. However, in the unintentional creation conditions, there was no difference in quality perceptions between those who had been told to consider the counterfactual that the slogan might not have been created (M = 4.15, SD = 2.09) and those who were not told to consider this counterfactual (M = 4.54, SD = 2.00); F(1, 368) = 1.57, p = .212, η² < .01, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.99, 0.22].

These results provide converging evidence that increased downward counterfactual thinking about how unintentional creation might never have occurred at all drives the premium offered to unintentional creations. By encouraging participants to consider how the slogan might not have been created at all, we artificially supplied them with the line of downward counterfactual thought that we propose spontaneously occurs when participants learn about its unintentional creation. Based on our theoretical framework, such downward counterfactual thought about the event of creation should lead to heightened perceptions that the creation was fated (Kray et al., 2010; Roese et al., 2004; Roese & Vohs, 2012). Further, perceptions that an event was fated increase appreciation of its consequences (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2010; Kray et al., 2010)—in this case, the slogan itself. In showing that quality perceptions of an intentional creation rise to the level of an unintentional creation when this causal chain is set in motion by supplying the kind of downward counterfactual which we propose ultimately leads to the premium offered to unintentional creations, the results provide moderation of process evidence for our mechanistic framework.

Study 4

While Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that the premium offered to unintentional creations is driven by greater downward counterfactual thinking about how unintentional creation might not have occurred, Study 4 unpacked the full mechanistic chain underlying the influence of unintentional creation. Counterfactual thoughts about an event have been shown to increase the hindsight bias and heighten perceptions that the event was fated (Kray et al., 2010; Roese et al., 2004; Roese & Vohs, 2012), and perceptions that a pivotal event in one’s life was fated enhanced appreciation for the consequences of that event (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2010; Kray et al., 2010). Because counterfactual thoughts about an event increase perceptions that the event was fated, we predict that the counterfactual thoughts about how an unintentional creation might never have occurred will heighten perceptions that the creation was a product of fate. Further, because perceptions that an event was fated heighten appreciation of the consequences of the event (in this case, the creation itself), we propose that people will pay more for an unintentional creation than an otherwise identical intentional creation. Study 4 examined whether greater downward counterfactual thoughts about how a poem’s creation might not have occurred increased perceptions that the creation of the poem was fated and demonstrated that these mechanisms work together sequentially to heighten willingness to pay for the poem.

Additionally, Study 4 measured perceptions of the effort exerted by the creator of the poem as well as perceptions of the creator’s ability to provide evidence inconsistent with the alternative explanation that lower perceived effort exerted by a creator implies that the creator holds higher ability. Dweck and Leggett (1988) purport that perceptions of effort and ability may be inversely related to each other, such that lower effort exerted by an unintentional creator leads to higher perceptions of the creator’s ability. However, we propose that when a creation’s inception deviated from its creator’s intent, perceptions of effort involved in the process of creation are decoupled from perceptions of the creator’s own abilities, and this will allow people to recognize lower effort in unintentional creation without such perceptions implying higher ability held by an unintentional creator. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/D8V_TSQ).

Method

Participants

200 (M_age = 40.88, SD = 12.15; 49.5% female) CloudResearch Approved participants participated in exchange for monetary payment. A sensitivity power analysis indicated an 80% chance to detect a small-to-medium effect size (d = .40) in a two-condition between-participant design with a .05 significance level (Faul et al., 2017). Utilizing CloudResearch Approved participants allowed us to include only high-quality participants who had been vetted based on their previous engagement in online studies.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two creation conditions: intentional or unintentional. We used the same paradigm and manipulations as in Study 1A.

All participants then answered “How much would you be willing to pay for the poem?” (0% of the retail value to 120% of the retail value; a measure of willingness to pay adapted from Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). Next, participants indicated in random order “How much did you think about how the poem could have not been created at all?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much) and “To what extent was the creation of the poem a product of fate?” (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely; a measure of fate perceptions adapted from Kray et al., 2010). Additionally, participants answered “How much effort did the creator put into creating the poem?” (1 = no effort at all, 9 = a lot of effort). Participants then indicated in random order “How talented do you think the creator of this poem is?” (1 = not talented at all, 9 = extremely talented) and “How competent do you think the creator of this poem is?” (1 = not competent at all, 9 = extremely competent). These responses were then averaged together to create a single index of ability (r = .88, p < .001). Finally, participants completed demographic measures (gender and age).

Results and Discussion

Participants reported that they would be willing to pay more for the poem when the poem’s creation was unintentional (M = 4.17, SD = 3.62) than when its creation was intentional (M = 3.07, SD = 3.46); t(198) = 2.21, p = .028, d = .31, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.12, 2.09].

Participants reported that they thought more about the counterfactual of how the poem could have not been created at all when the poem’s creation was unintentional (M = 3.96, SD = 2.47) than when its creation was intentional (M = 3.13, SD = 2.17); t(198) = 2.53, p = .012, d = .36, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.18, 1.48].

Participants reported higher perceptions that the creation of the poem was a product of fate when it was unintentional (M = 5.30, SD = 2.55) than when it was intentional (M = 3.85, SD = 2.51); t(198) = 4.03, p < .001, d = .57, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.74, 2.15].

Participants reported lower perceptions of effort exerted by the creator of the poem when the creation of the poem was unintentional (M = 4.68, SD = 2.17) than when it was intentional (M = 6.13, SD = 1.89); t(198) = −5.02, p < .001, d = −.71, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−2.01, −0.88].

Participants’ perceptions of the creator’s ability were no higher when the creation of the poem was unintentional (M = 6.13, SD = 1.94) than when it was intentional (M = 6.20, SD = 1.95); t(198) = −0.23, p = .818, d = −.03, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.61, 0.48].

To test our proposed process, we conducted a bootstrap analysis with 5,000 samples (Hayes, 2013) using creation as the independent variable, counterfactual thoughts and perceptions of fate as sequential mediators, and willingness to pay as the dependent variable. Consistent with our theorizing, the analysis revealed that participants in the unintentional creation condition thought more about how the creation of the poem might not have occurred, which increased perceptions that the creation of the poem was a product of fate, resulting in greater willingness to pay for the poem [95% CI: 0.02, 0.31]; see Figure 3.

Figure 3.

Mediation model in Study 4.

Study 4 unpacked the full mechanistic model driving the effect of unintentional creation. Specifically, the unintentional creation of the poem elicited heightened downward counterfactual thoughts about how the poem might not have been created at all, which led to increased perceptions that the creation of the poem was a product of fate, ultimately driving higher willingness to pay for the poem. Additionally, while Studies 1A-3 measured quality perceptions of creations, Study 4 used a different operationalization of a premium granted to unintentional creations by demonstrating that people are willing to pay more for such creations, offering converging evidence for the phenomenon we present.

Further, the results of Study 4 provided evidence inconsistent with an alternative explanation that lower perceived effort exerted by a creator implies that the creator holds higher ability. While participants did perceive unintentional creation of the poem as less effortful than intentional creation of the poem, participants perceived no differences in the creator’s ability as a function of the intentionality of the poem’s inception. This result is consistent with our proposal that when the creation’s inception deviated from the creator’s intent, people decoupled the lower effort in unintentional creation from the ability of the creator.

Study 5

While Study 4 unpacked the full mechanism underlying the effect of unintentional creation, Study 5 provided converging evidence for this framework through a moderated serial mediation design. Because the counterfactuals inspired by the unexpected nature of a positive outcome of unintentional creation are a key driver of the premium offered to unintentional creations, our framework predicts that this effect should be eliminated when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation (as such an outcome would not be unexpected; Caruso et al., 2010; Palmer et al., 2010). Of note, Studies 1A-4 examined the premium offered to unintentional creations using creations of artistic expression, which are considered inherently positive (Ciszewski, 2016; Guest, 2002; Karaca, 2021). Study 5 tested if the outcome of unintentional creation indeed moderates the relationship between a creation’s unintentional inception and subsequent preference for it by explicitly manipulating the ascription of the outcome as a separate factor. Participants in Study 5 indicated willingness to pay for either an incredibly comfortable or an incredibly uncomfortable chair created either intentionally or unintentionally by an engineer while helping his daughter with her homework. Additionally, Study 5 measured our key mediators of downward counterfactual thought about the chair’s creation and perceptions that its creation was a product of fate. By examining our effect in the context of preference for a chair created by an engineer, Study 5 also tested whether the phenomenon we propose extends beyond artistic creations. One may wonder if the premium we see offered to unintentional creations in Studies 1A-4 is influenced by studying contexts in which an unintentional outcome might be the natural conclusion of an intentional action (i.e., an unintentionally created poem could be the natural result of the intentional action of writing down one’s thoughts). Because it is less arguable an engineer helping his daughter with her homework is a natural part of the creation process of a new type of chair than writing down one’s thoughts is a natural part of the artistic process, the scenario in Study 5 investigated if the effect emerges when the intentional action is disconnected further from an unintentional outcome. Finally, Study 5 provided additional evidence inconsistent with the alternative explanation that lower perceived effort exerted by a creator implies that the creator holds higher ability (Dweck & Legett, 1988). This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org (https://aspredicted.org/PP3_PYM).

Method

Participants

402 (M_age = 38.72, SD = 11.72; 53.2% female) CloudResearch Approved participants participated in exchange for monetary payment. A sensitivity power analysis indicated an 80% chance to detect a small-to-medium effect size (f = .14) in a 2 × 2 ANOVA with a 0.05 significance level (Faul et al., 2017). Utilizing CloudResearch Approved participants allowed us to include only high-quality participants who had been vetted based on their previous engagement in online studies.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (creation: unintentional or intentional) × 2 (outcome: positive or negative) between-participant design. Participants in all conditions read that “An engineer was helping his daughter with her homework when he created a new type of chair.” In the intentional creation conditions, participants read that when asked about the chair, the engineer said “‘I was helping my daughter with her homework, with the intention of inventing a new type of chair.’” In the unintentional creation conditions, participants read that when asked about the chair, the engineer said “‘I was helping my daughter with her homework, I did not intend to invent a new type of chair.’” In the positive outcome conditions, participants read that the new type of chair is “incredibly comfortable.” In the negative outcome conditions, participants read that the new type of chair is “incredibly uncomfortable.”

All participants then answered “How much would you be willing to pay for this new type of chair?” (0% of the retail value to 120% of the retail value). Next, participants indicated in random order “How much did you think about how the chair could have not been created at all?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much) and “To what extent was the creation of the chair a product of fate?” (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely). Additionally, participants answered “How much effort did the engineer put into creating the chair?” (1 = no effort at all, 9 = a lot of effort). Participants then indicated in random order “How talented do you think the engineer is?” (1 = not talented at all, 9 = extremely talented) and “How competent do you think the engineer is?” (1 = not competent at all, 9 = extremely competent). These responses were then averaged together to create a single index of ability (r = .92, p < .001). Finally, participants completed demographic measures (gender and age).

Results and Discussion

We submitted the willingness to pay data to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with creation (intentional or unintentional) and outcome (positive or negative) as the independent variables. This analysis revealed no main effect of creation, F(1, 398) = 1.94, p = .165, η² < .01, and a significant main effect of outcome, F(1, 398) = 259.77, p < .001, η² = .40, such that participants were willing to pay more for a positive outcome of creation (M = 6.09, SD = 3.33) than for a negative outcome of creation (M = 1.38, SD = 2.52). Importantly, we found the predicted significant interaction between creation and outcome on willingness to pay, F(1, 398) = 5.08, p = .025, η² = .01. Planned contrasts revealed that in the positive outcome conditions, participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional were willing to pay more for it (M = 6.64, SD = 3.09) than participants who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 5.57, SD = 3.48); F(1, 398) = 6.65, p = .010, η² = .03, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.25, 1.88]. However, in the negative outcome conditions, there was no difference in willingness to pay between participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional (M = 1.26, SD = 2.22) and those who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 1.51, SD = 2.80); F(1, 398) < 1, p = .542, η² < .01, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−1.07, 0.56]; see Figure 4.

Figure 4.

Willingness to pay (top panel), counterfactual thoughts (middle panel), and fate perceptions (bottom panel) as a function of creation and outcome in Study 5. (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).

We submitted the counterfactual thought data to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with creation (intentional or unintentional) and outcome (positive or negative) as the independent variables. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of creation, F(1, 398) = 10.69, p = .001, η² = .03, such that participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional reported that they thought more about the counterfactual of how the chair could have not been created at all (M = 4.41, SD = 2.52) than participants who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 3.60, SD = 2.47), and no main effect of outcome, F(1, 398) < 1, p = .542, η² < .01. Importantly, we found the predicted significant interaction between creation and outcome on counterfactual thoughts, F(1, 398) = 7.09, p = .008, η² = .02. Planned contrasts revealed that in the positive outcome conditions, participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional reported that they thought more about the counterfactual of how the chair could have not been created at all (M = 4.82, SD = 2.37) than participants who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 3.35, SD = 2.21); F(1, 398) = 17.60, p < .001, η² = .09, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.78, 2.15]. However, in the negative outcome conditions, there was no difference in reported counterfactual thought between participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional (M = 4.01, SD = 2.61) and those who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 3.86, SD = 2.69); F(1, 398) < 1, p = .668, η² < .01, 95% CI for the mean difference = [−0.54, 0.84].

We submitted the fate perceptions data to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with creation (intentional or unintentional) and outcome (positive or negative) as the independent variables. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of creation, F(1, 398) = 31.84, p < .001, η² = .07, such that participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional perceived the creation of the chair to be a product of fate to a greater extent (M = 5.25, SD = 2.55) than participants who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 3.89, SD = 2.43). This analysis also revealed a significant main effect of outcome, F(1, 398) = 11.58, p < .001, η² = .03, such that participants who read that the chair was comfortable perceived the creation of the chair to be a product of fate to a greater extent (M = 4.97, SD = 2.57) than participants who read that the chair was uncomfortable (M = 4.16, SD = 2.52). Importantly, we found the predicted significant interaction between creation and outcome on fate perceptions, F(1, 398) = 6.45, p = .011, η² = .02. Planned contrasts revealed that in the positive outcome conditions, participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional perceived the creation of the chair to be a product of fate to a greater extent (M = 5.98, SD = 2.26) than participants who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 3.99, SD = 2.49); F(1, 398) = 33.46, p < .001, η² = .15, 95% CI for the mean difference = [1.31, 2.67]. However, in the negative outcome conditions, the difference significantly attenuated between participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional (M = 4.53, SD = 2.62) and those who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 3.78, SD = 2.37); F(1, 398) = 4.82, p = .029, η² = .02, 95% CI for the mean difference = [0.08, 1.43].

We submitted the perceived effort exerted by the creator data to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with creation (intentional or unintentional) and outcome (positive or negative) as the independent variables. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of creation, F(1, 398) = 51.38, p < .001, η² = .11, such that participants who read that the chair’s creation was unintentional perceived the creator of the chair to have exerted less effort in creation (M = 4.27, SD = 2.13) than participants who read that the chair’s creation was intentional (M = 5.71, SD = 2.30). This analysis also revealed a significant main effect of outcome, F(1, 398) = 95.89, p < .001, η² = .19, such that participants who read that the chair was comfortable perceived the creator of the chair to have exerted more effort in creation (M = 5.98, SD = 1.95) than participants who read that the chair was uncomfortable (M = 4.01, SD = 2.27). The interaction between creation and outcome on perceived effort exerted by the creator was not significant, F(1, 398) = 1.70, p = .193, η² < .01.

We submitted the creator ability data to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with creation (intentional or unintentional) and outcome (positive or negative) as the independent variables. This analysis revealed no main effect of creation, F(1, 398) < 1, p = .906, η² < .01, and a significant main effect of outcome, F(1, 398) = 241.92, p < .001, η² = .38, such that participants who read that the chair was comfortable perceived the creator of the chair to have greater ability (M = 7.50, SD = 1.27) than participants who read that the chair was uncomfortable (M = 4.67, SD = 2.23). The interaction between creation and outcome on creator ability was not significant, F(1, 398) < 1, p = .541, η² < .01.

To test our proposed process, we ran a moderated serial mediation with 5,000 bootstraps (Model 83 in Process, Hayes, 2013), with creation as the independent variable (1 = intentional, 2 = unintentional), counterfactual thinking and perceptions of fate as sequential mediators, willingness to pay as the dependent variable, and outcome as the moderator. As predicted, the model revealed a significant moderated mediation (95% CI for the index of moderated mediation: [−0.20, −0.01]). For positive outcomes, when a creation was unintentional (vs. when a creation was intentional), participants reported thinking more about the counterfactual of the creation never having occurred, which increased the extent to which participants perceived the creation to be a product of fate, resulting in increased willingness to pay (b = .09, SE = .04, 95% CI for the indirect effect: [0.03, 0.19]). In contrast, for negative outcomes, there was no significant indirect effect (b = .01, SE = .03, 95% CI for the indirect effect: [−0.04, 0.06]).

Study 5 provides converging evidence for our theoretical framework through a moderated serial mediation design. Only when a positive outcome was ascribed to an unintentional creation (and therefore the outcome was unexpected) were people willing to pay more for the creation, and counterfactual thoughts and fate perceptions worked in sequence to drive this heightened preference. Further, by replicating this premium offered to unintentional creations with a creation outside of the artistic domain, a chair created by an engineer, Study 5 demonstrates that the phenomenon we propose is not limited to unintentional artistic creations. Finally, Study 5 provides additional evidence inconsistent with the alternative explanation that lower perceived effort exerted by a creator implies that the creator holds higher ability.

General Discussion

Literature has largely documented that intentionality and effort in creation and action lead to higher quality perceptions and preference (Bellezza et al., 2013; Caruso et al., 2010; Cho & Schwarz, 2008; Kruger et al., 2004; Malle, 2010; Malle & Knobe, 1997). However, we find that people perceive creations whose inception was unintentional as higher quality and prefer these creations to otherwise identical intentional creations. Further, we find that these heightened quality perceptions and increased preference are driven by greater downward counterfactual thinking about how a positive outcome of unintentional creation might never have occurred at all, which consequently causes the creation to seem more fated.

We document the premium offered to unintentional creations in Studies 1A-5. Study 1A revealed that an unintentionally created poem was perceived as higher quality than an otherwise identical intentionally created poem. Study 1B demonstrated this effect’s robustness by replicating it with visual art. Study 2 explored competing mechanisms, identifying that the premium awarded to unintentional creations is mediated by greater downward counterfactual thinking about how the creation might never have occurred at all rather than divine intervention. Study 3 provided process by moderation evidence that the premium awarded to unintentional creations is driven by greater downward counterfactual thought about how their creation may never have occurred at all. Through serial mediation, Study 4 showed that greater downward counterfactual thoughts about how an unintentionally created poem might not have been created increase perceptions that its creation was a product of fate, consequently driving preference. Further, Study 4 provided evidence inconsistent with the alternative explanation that a premium is offered to unintentional creations because lower perceived effort in creation implies higher creator ability. Additionally, Study 4 replicated the effect using a new operationalization of a premium offered to unintentional creations by showing that people are willing to pay more for unintentional creations than for otherwise identical intentional creations. Through a moderated serial mediation design, Study 5 provided converging evidence for our theoretical framework. Further, Study 5 revealed that the premium offered to unintentional creations is not granted when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation. Additionally, Study 5 illuminated that the premium offered to unintentional creations does not only apply to artistic creations by demonstrating that people are willing to pay more for a comfortable chair created by an engineer when the chair’s creation was unintentional.

Theoretical Contributions

The current research is the first to reveal that people place a premium on unintentional creations over otherwise identical intentional creations and that this premium is offered because of greater spontaneous downward counterfactual thought about how a positive outcome of unintentional creation might never have occurred at all leading to heightened perceptions that the creation was fated. This demonstrates a novel mechanism through which information about the mere intention behind creations influences a premium offered to the resultant creations, and in doing so contributes to work illuminating antecedents to spontaneous downward counterfactual thought. Prior research examining antecedents to spontaneous downward counterfactual thought has indicated that greater spontaneous downward counterfactual thinking is elicited by just barely achieving positive outcomes (Medvec et al., 1995), narrowly avoiding tragic outcomes (McMullen & Markman, 2000), considering recent (vs. distant) past events (Rim & Summerville, 2014), or in order to self-enhance in response to negative life events (Rim & Summerville, 2014; White & Lehman, 2005). The current research adds to such work by revealing the observance of a positive outcome of unintentional creation as a novel antecedent to spontaneous downward counterfactual thought.

Our findings also contribute to understanding the importance of perceptions of fate for constructing quality perceptions and preference. Previous research on fate perceptions has indicated that perceptions that an event was fated strengthened meaningfulness of the consequences of the event (Kray et al., 2010) and increased organizational commitment and patriotism (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2010). The present work builds upon these findings to identify that perceptions that a positive outcome of creation was the product of fate are a novel antecedent of quality perceptions of and preference for the creation.

Additionally, the current research adds to previous work that has indicated that specific kinds of unintentionality such as incompetent mistakes in the manufacture of hedonic products (Reich et al., 2018), unintentionally making a product environmentally friendly (Newman et al., 2014), and coincidence in the duplication of original artwork (Newman & Bloom, 2012), can increase preference and valuation. This article illustrates a novel cognitive mechanism that allows pure unintentionality in the inception of a creation to change quality perceptions of and preference for the creation in multiple domains.

Limitations and Future Directions

The present research proposes a broad effect extending beyond the artistic domain. However, future research specifically examining unintentional creation within the artistic domain could address the question of how the complexity of an artistic creation might moderate the effect of intentionality involved in its inception on a premium offered to it. While Studies 1A-4 in the current research all examine a premium offered to fairly simple artistic creations, the complexity of artistic creation can vary widely. Future work could determine if a premium is still offered to unintentional artistic creations of great complexity, such as a symphony or novel, for which the depth of content carried by the creation may overwhelm the effect of awareness of intentionality involved in its inception. If such work finds that a premium is still offered to highly complex unintentional artistic creations, it could further explore whether the mechanism leading to this premium is the same as the causal chain illuminated in the present research. The results of Study 2 of the present research provide evidence inconsistent with the alternative explanation that heightened perceptions of divine intervention drive the premium offered to unintentional creations. However, if future work finds that a similar premium emerges for highly complex unintentional artistic creations, it is conceivable that divine intervention may play a greater role in the underlying mechanism than it appears to in the present research.

Conclusion

While the inception of a creation is more often intended than not, people do find themselves in situations in which they inadvertently create. We find that people offer a premium to unintentional creations compared to otherwise identical intentional creations because the unintentionality involved in the inception of such creations causes people to consider how positive outcomes of creation may never have occurred at all, consequently leading them to perceive the creations as a product of fate to a greater extent. This new understanding of the psychological implications of unintentionality in creation, counterfactual thought, and perceptions of fate, helps us to appreciate and recognize better why people perceive distinctions of quality and construct preference in the way that they do.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-psp-10.1177_01461672211063750 – Supplemental material for Unintentional Inception: When a Premium Is Offered to Unintentional Creations

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-psp-10.1177_01461672211063750 for Unintentional Inception: When a Premium Is Offered to Unintentional Creations by Alexander G. Fulmer and Taly Reich in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Taly Reich

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

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