Thinking Styles (And How We Measure Them) Matter: A Four-Component Model of Thinking Styles Tested with a Balanced Version of the 4-Component Thinking Styles Questionnaire
Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online July, 2026
Thinking Styles (And How We Measure Them) Matter: A Four-Component Model of Thinking Styles Tested with a Balanced Version of the 4-Component Thinking Styles Questionnaire
The study addresses limitations of the 4-Component Thinking Styles Questionnaire (4-CTSQ) measuring actively open-minded thinking (AOT), close-minded thinking (CMT), preference for effortful thinking (PET), and preference for intuitive thinking (PIT). The aim was to validate the 4-CTSQ in a non-U.S./Canadian population, to explore the nomological networks of thinking styles, and to test whether the 4-CTSQ predicts unfounded beliefs over and beyond analytic thinking. The secondary aim was to address the issue of acquiescence linked with the one-directional wording of the items and to develop a balanced version of the 4-CTSQ (4-CTSQ-B). In two studies (N1 = 1,233, N2 = 712), 4-factor models had an acceptable model fit, and both the 4-CTSQ and the 4-CTSQ-B predicted unfounded beliefs. Conceptual and psychometric issues with AOT and CMT were identified and possible solutions were discussed. The 4-CTSQ, and somewhat more so the 4-CTSQ-B, appear to be good scales sensitive to distinct thinking styles.
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