Weakness as Strength

Abstract

It has been argued that bargainers may be able to extract concessions from one another by coupling an intransigent bargaining stance with the justification that one's hands have been tied by one's constituent. Intransigence justified by weakness (one's constituent's commitment to an inflexible position) was predicted to prove more effective in eliciting concessions than the same intransigence coupled with no such justification. Subjects were run in a variant of the Bilateral Monopoly paradigm played with three simulated others. Unexpectedly, the participants made fewer concessions when the opponent attributed his intransigence to his constituent's behavior. Several limiting conditions for the effective implementation of a "my hands are tied" ploy were discussed.

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