Because people often do not moderate trait inferences when consensus is manipulated, it has been concluded that people neglect consensus information. Use of a Bayesian model, how ever, shows that there is no logical imperative that behavioral base-rate information must moderate trait inferences for a target's behavior. Instead, changes in consensus information can be accommodated by changes in the assumed prevalence of relevant traits in the population. Across two scenarios (N= 84), consensus manipulations had no effect on participants' trait inferences from the target's behavior but had robust effects on participants' assumptions about traits for the average person in a relevant population. Although attributors are unlikely to be using a Bayesian reasoning process, their responses do not violate Bayesian reasoning, and they clearly are not neglecting consensus information. A distinction is drawn between neglecting consensus information and using consensus information in a manner consistent with a dispositional bias.
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