Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case of CEOs Hired after the Imposition of 162(m)

This study analyzes the effect of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) on the compensation package of those chief executive officers (CEOs) hired after the imposition of this code section. Research documents that CEO compensation has increased dramatically since the imposition of section 162(m); yet, this research has not distinguished between the effects on the compensation of CEOs already in place when section 162(m) was imposed from those CEOs hired post-162(m) imposition. We focus our analysis on the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of section 162(m), because when firms hire a new CEO, they have a better opportunity to redesign the executive pay package. Consequently, we posit that section 162(m) will have its greatest effect when the affected companies change CEOs. Our analysis provides evidence that the increase in salary normally associated with the hiring of a new CEO has been mitigated and there has been an increase in the sensitivity of firm performance to bonus pay for CEOs appointed after 1994 in affected firms.