Abstract
The 2011-2013 assault on public sector collective bargaining rights is unprecedented in its breadth and depth. Legislative proposals that would roll back bargaining, limit unions’ ability to negotiate security arrangements, stop payroll deduction of union dues, and constrain labor’s political activity have been introduced in a majority of states. This coordinated attack from the Republican right has spurred an aggressive, unified response from a broad cross section of unions. Through labor unity tables at the national and state levels, unions are demonstrating a rare level of solidarity in the fight back. This ongoing experiment in movement building is encouraging, but challenges remain.
Public sector unions are under assault across the United States, and the labor movement is engaged in a coordinated defensive effort to protect rights long presumed to be secure. For over thirty years public sector labor’s strategic choice to prioritize political action yielded legislative gains and protective legislation in many states in the form of secure collective bargaining rights, agency fee, fair share, and contract fact-finding or arbitration. From 1980 through 2010 there was a complex array of state laws, extending comprehensive coverage in twenty-six states and at least limited coverage in sixteen others. Union density throughout this period was approximately 36 percent, which was a remarkable level to maintain given the political environment in the United States and the steady decline in private sector density. This extended period of stability led unions to an assumption of long-term security, an institutional curse 1 at the heart of public unions’ recent struggles.
This article discusses the sources of the assault on public sector collective bargaining rights, the implications for the labor movement, and labor’s strategic response; the discussion is framed with a review of the evolution of union strategy over the past quarter century. In Part One we detail the relevant political and labor history at the foundation of labor’s response and setting the stage for the contemporary struggle. In Part Two we look specifically at the right-wing political attack largely coordinated through the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). 2 Part Three explores labor’s multi-level strategic response to that coordinated assault and provides a summary of the state battles between the Republican right and public sector labor in terms of legislative change and worker actions.
Political History and Evolving Union Strategy
In order to evaluate labor’s response to the recent political and legislative attacks on public sector bargaining rights, it is important to step back and consider the evolution of labor strategy over the past quarter century, as well as public sector unions’ place within these discussions. In this section, we summarize several important strategic plans pursued by the labor movement to stem declining union density starting in the 1980s. We also review the internal debate over the appropriate model for union growth, as well as the various strategic options associated with the 2005 split in the movement.
From “The Changing Situation” to “Organizing for Change”
In the mid-1980s labor faced declining private sector density, adverse labor law rulings, the effects of globalization and deregulation, as well as technological change. To respond to those challenges, in 1985 the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) initiated a strategic planning process culminating in the release of The Changing Situation of Workers and their Unions. This blueprint for revitalizing the labor movement outlined new methods for advancing worker interests. Most of the endorsed tactics were gleaned from successful action on the ground by a range of unions, most notably Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees (HERE), and Service Employees International Union (SEIU). Included were corporate campaigns, mobilization of members, improved communications, and expanded organizing activity. It also proposed a restructuring of AFL-CIO to better serve the labor movement (AFL-CIO 1985). Although The Changing Situation blueprint did not result in significant membership gains, it did accomplish a strategic rethinking that produced the Organizing Institute, a refocus of unions on the organizing model, and the creation of an associate member program (Hurd 2004b).
As the heavy impact of neoliberalism continued to take its toll in the late 1980s and 1990s, it was difficult for unionized workers to compete in a global economy where policies such as deregulation were pursued by most industrialized countries (Hurd 2001, 454). 3 Consequently, the private sector labor movement’s struggle with declining density and concessionary bargaining intensified. Labor’s quest for alternative strategies for growth during that period led to additional questions of how it should run corporate campaigns and build worker participation. Subsequently, in the mid-1990s, organizing priorities were built around a new strategic plan referred to as Organizing for Change, Changing to Organize, which offered a formula for saving the labor movement. Organizing for Change was an outgrowth of AFL-CIO’s Organizing Institute, 4 whose programs were built on the grassroots organizing successes of the regional and local leadership of its participating national unions (Hurd 2001, 459). 5 Organizing for Change embraced four core strategies: devote resources to organizing, develop a strong organizing staff, create strategic plans, and mobilize members (Raynor 1996). Although the framework’s public distribution predated his presidency, John Sweeney embraced this approach during the first five years of his administration. Despite labor’s official adoption of the strategy, it did not yield increased union density notwithstanding a favorable political environment, namely, a Democratic administration in the White House and a reasonably sympathetic National Labor Relations Board. Proponents of Organizing for Change blamed its failure on union leaders who lent only rhetorical support to the framework without sufficient resources or commitment to organizational change (Hurd 2004b).
Continued Density Decline and Internal Debates over Strategic Models for Growth
In the early 2000s, amidst continued private sector union decline, AFL-CIO, in cooperation with the Economic Policy Institute, convened the Organizing Research Network, an informal association of union strategists and academics who held conferences to analyze and debate workable alternatives for growing the labor movement. Under the leadership of Fred Feinstein, the former general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, the Organizing Research Network held a 2003 conference at Harvard University at which Paul Booth, executive assistant to American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) President Gerald McEntee, presented a paper that summarized alternatives that were being pursued by the various unions at that time. 6 His framework divided labor strategies into two groups: strategies within the control of labor (resource shifting, member mobilization, restructuring, targeting, and associate membership) and strategies influenced by labor but not totally within their control (political action, employer neutrality, union security, and public support) (Booth 2003).
Of the five strategies Booth identifies as within labor’s control, the first two, calling for a shift in resources and mobilizing worker activism, were contained in the Organizing for Change framework. The fourth strategy, associate membership, which originated during the Kirkland years, remains a part of AFL-CIO’s solution today via Working America and is still perceived by labor as a viable option for growth. Of the four strategies influenced but not controlled by labor, two have been traditionally and successfully employed by public sector unions: political and legislative action in support of collective bargaining rights, and more narrowly to ensure union security via fair share, agency fee, and dues deduction provisions under state law. As Booth noted, Our preferences among growth strategies are likely to reflect whatever successful experiences we’ve had in a particular field of work. My own predilections toward the use of political influence must reflect my career in public service unionism. … We’ve attacked the open shop in the public sector, and extended agency shop in many jurisdictions. One comprehensive study of those developments, from California to Maine, might produce a startling large number, and unexpected proportion of our gains having come from enrolling former free-riders. (Booth 2003, 1, 7).
At around the same time that Booth presented his framework, the New Unity Partnership formed. This alliance of five major unions 7 convened initially in July 2003 to ponder the future of the labor movement and share concerns over its failure to combat the crisis of continued density decline. In particular the participating unions were concerned that most other unions were not embracing the foundation of an effective Organizing for Change program, especially the prescribed resource shift. As part of these discussions, the New Unity Partnership developed alternative strategies and agreed to propose that AFL-CIO change its approach to union revitalization. Under the unofficial leadership of Andy Stern, the group focused on Lerner’s (2003) “Immodest Proposal,” namely, that the labor movement should restructure into several industrial powerhouses that could exert bargaining power at a sectoral level.
It is important to note that, other than Booth’s observations, public sector labor law was not a significant part of these debates over labor’s strategic priorities. While private sector unions were considering strategies focused on restructuring, organizing, and/or political action, public sector unions were making modest changes in their overall programs to increase emphasis on organizing, but they never embraced the idea of shifting 30 to 40 percent of resources to support the new priority and always believed that their strongest route was to grow through political action and legislative change. Within large public sector unions like AFSCME, American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and National Education Association (NEA), state-level affiliates have significant autonomy due to the variance in state laws. Consequently, on the ground, at the state affiliate level there was not much effort to embrace change since it appeared that public sector density was stable under the existing framework of political action. Thus, while the private sector unions looked for a set of alternatives to counter declines in density, the public sector unions behaved as though they were exempt from the problems and to some extent impervious to the solutions. Although some key leaders and staff members in the public sector unions at the national level recognized that it was not viable in the long term to retain the comforts of this level of legislative protection and union security in the face of continued private sector decline (Hurd and Pinnock 2004), they made no substantive strategic adjustments.
The 2005 split between AFL-CIO and the Change to Win unions turned to a significant extent on the debate over how to reverse labor’s fortunes. While the Change to Win unions prioritized organizing and restructuring, AFL-CIO promoted coherent political action focused on private sector labor law reform via the Voice@Work campaign.
8
Specifically, in the aftermath of the split, AFL-CIO prepared a push for labor law reform under the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA). In spite of the association of the Change to Win federation with organizing and restructuring, not long after the split Andy Stern expressed a willingness to join with the rest of labor to “ride a political wave” (interview, 2005). By the time the 2008 presidential elections arrived, consistent with its strategic focus on political action, AFL-CIO had gained promises from all Democratic candidates that EFCA would be a priority if they won the election. The labor movement’s divisions were highlighted during the Democratic primaries as public sector unions supported Hillary Clinton and key private sector AFL-CIO unions preferred John Edwards, while the Change to Win unions were the first to endorse Barack Obama. However, notwithstanding the differences in political and strategic approaches, by the time Obama won the election, labor had united in its support for him and the associated push for legislative action under EFCA. With a progressive Democrat in the White House and strong Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate, the labor movement and its leaders were in a state of near euphoria and confident of the inevitability of their legislative pursuits. In describing the heightened post-election legislative and political expectations of both AFL-CIO and Change to Win, we have argued elsewhere, In light of Obama’s convincing win and a Democratic Congress, the AFL-CIO generated broad-ranging suggestions for administrative action and legislative reform. Detailed recommendations and supporting documents were prepared for “Day One Priorities,” the first 100 days, the first year, and longer-term initiatives. The “Day One Priorities” alone included nearly 150 specific actions that could be taken by the president through executive action or appointments to key positions. Although CTW had no similar extensive list of proposals, there was coordination with the AFL-CIO and the top priorities for early action were shared. (Hurd 2009, 579-80).
As labor attempted to ride the political wave of Obama’s 2008 election, it suffered a wipeout with the political stalling of EFCA. Labor law reform did not pass as expected in the first 100 days of the Obama administration. Predictably, moderate Democratic support never coalesced behind EFCA under the opposition from commerce, and consideration of the bill was indefinitely deferred. Despite Obama’s vocal support of the protective labor legislation, his administration failed even to make EFCA a top priority. The political reality was sealed as the president and his policy agenda came under a steady barrage of attacks from the right-wing media and conservative Republicans, all but ensuring that legislative victories in the new political environment would be difficult to achieve. Although deeply disappointing for the labor movement, the failure of the EFCA campaign was not perceived as particularly problematic by public sector unions, especially at the state and local level. The shortsightedness associated with the “institutional curse” left them rather oblivious to the problems that lay just beyond the horizon.
ALEC and the Coordinated Assault on Public Sector Collective Bargaining Rights
From labor’s perspective, the hostile political environment that prevailed during the eight years of the George W. Bush presidency appeared to shift with Obama’s 2008 victory. This buoyed the labor movement and its outlook for growth and legislative rewards. A progressive U.S. president allowed public sector unions to “breathe a sigh of relief” over federal labor policy. However, labor had the wind knocked out of it as the Republican Party and its fringe Tea Party radicals carried the 2010 mid-term elections, waking the public sector labor movement from the security of its institutional slumber. Partisan politics and right-wing opposition to public sector unionism is nothing new (Jost 2011, 327-28). 9 However, the assault on public sector bargaining rights since the 2010 elections has been unprecedented in its scope and reach. In fact, Republican majorities were established under which they controlled the executive branch and both legislative houses in twenty-one states (Ballotpedia 2011), setting the stage for a coordinated national campaign to destroy public sector unions. Weakening labor’s ability to engage in effective political action has been near the top of the Republican right’s policy agenda for quite some time but was only minimally successful prior to 2011. The most important of the groups leading the right wing’s coordinated effort is ALEC, whose model legislation has been instrumental in restricting public sector collective bargaining rights at the state level. 10
Founded in 1973, and supported by conservative foundations and corporations, ALEC has patiently sought to alter the laws and institutions that protect power and equality for working people and shift the legal landscape to one that protects and favors free-market neoliberalism through model legislation on labor and broader social and economic policy. 11 Legislative members (publicly elected state legislators, mostly Republicans) and private sector members (corporate sponsors) of ALEC work in “public-private” partnerships to “effectively promote the Jeffersonian principles of free markets, limited government, federalism, and individual liberty” (ALEC 2013b). Its 2,000 predominantly Republican legislative members and 250 private sector members convene formally three times a year in task forces charged with drafting model legislation on a broad set of policy issues. ALEC has sponsored the introduction of approximately 1,000 pieces of state legislation per year, with approximately 200 enacted to law on average (Greeley 2012; McIntire 2012).
At one of its formal meetings following the 2010 elections, ALEC explicitly prioritized an attack on public sector collective bargaining rights, including state labor law and right-to-work legislation. Its chief legislative goal was to impede unions’ ability to engage in effective political action by waging a multi-front attack on public sector collective bargaining rights, dues deduction, paycheck deduction for political action, and right-to-work legislation. ALEC’s legislative influence cannot be overstated given that many anti-labor bills introduced by state and local governments are almost exact copies of ALEC model legislation. For example, Michigan Republicans introduced two right-to-work bills for the private and public sectors. The public sector right-to-work bill, HB 4003, is virtually indistinguishable from ALEC’s Right-to-Work model legislation (Fischer 2013). 12 Similarly, Wisconsin Act 10, requiring annual union recertification, was modeled after ALEC’s Public Employee Freedom Act, Prohibition of Negative Check-Off Act, Paycheck Protection Act, and Right to Work Act. 13 The similarities of the proposed legislation to ALEC’s model policy demonstrates its influence on the changing legal landscape in state law as well as the coordinated attack being launched by the Republican right at the national and state levels. The key goal, with ALEC’s assistance and model legislation, was to weaken labor’s political activity by forcing unions to employ resources to mount a defense against the right-wing assault.
Labor’s Coordinated Response
The institutional security underlying labor’s presumption of stability meant that public sector unions did not prepare as well as they might have for what could happen down the road. Public sector unions had experienced legislatively protected security in the past and had assumed it for the future. Thus, the shock of the 2010 elections, when suddenly the anti-union right wing of the Republican party took over governments in states where the public sector unions had enjoyed strong collective bargaining rights and protections exposed the labor movement’s overconfidence in long-term security. The intriguing result of this crisis in the labor movement is the emergence of an unprecedented degree of cooperation and coordination among unions across the various divisions. Labor may not have been prepared in advance for the challenges it would face in the second half of President Obama’s first term, but once the 2010 election results were known, unions quickly crafted a national response.
National and State Unity Tables 14
In November and December 2010, AFL-CIO held regional “What Now” forums to raise awareness, to receive feedback regarding what had happened in each state, and to generate ideas for how to react. Perhaps more importantly, the large public sector unions joined forces. NEA, having long anticipated an ALEC offensive, had been closely monitoring its activity for years and had already acknowledged the destructive potential of its model legislation. At the conclusion of the mid-term elections, the president of NEA joined together with counterparts at AFSCME and SEIU to strategize a coordinated response. The three unions encouraged AFL-CIO to convene a national meeting of union presidents, including all Change to Win and AFL-CIO unions as well as NEA. In what was a remarkable shift under the leadership of Richard Trumka, AFL-CIO agreed. Out of this effort was born the National Unity Table, primarily a funding mechanism for unions to fight legislative battles at the state level. Such spirit of good will and cooperation had not been seen across the federations since the split in 2005.
Another way in which the National Unity Table represents an innovative approach to national labor campaigns is that neither the director, Aaron Pickrell, nor the field director, Jack Polidori, was from AFL-CIO or any of its member unions. Pickrell, who came out of the Democratic Party, was named by Politico magazine (2013) as one of “50 Politicos to Watch.” Pickrell was campaign manager in Ohio for Obama in 2008 and known for his savvy ability to run campaigns. Polidori, who worked briefly with SEIU as a political director during the 2004 election cycle, spent most of his career with NEA. Tom Russell and Jeani Murray, both Democratic Party operatives rather than labor staffers, were Pickrell’s successors in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
By January 2011, labor’s National Unity Table, funded and supported by eleven unions, 15 came into existence, though not without some controversy. Some unions felt AFL-CIO was the appropriate convening body and refused to participate. However, most of the key unions agreed that the National Unity Table was necessary to bring unions together in response to the expected continued attack from the Republican right. Although public sector unions primarily drove the formation of the table, key private sector unions were also active participants. The National Unity Table immediately became aggressive at influencing labor’s strategic response at the state level. Eleven states were designated as battleground states, and in each of these states unity tables were established. 16 Under the leadership of Pickrell and Polidori, these state unity tables were not always institutionally housed in the state AFL-CIOs. Given that AFL-CIO had separately required its state-level federations to create strategic plans to deal with the coming political fights, the location of state unity tables outside of that framework created problems and resulted in some cases in the superseding of existing strategic plans. In fact, in some states, the unity tables operated largely independently of the state federation, though the state AFL-CIO always had a place at the table or exercised effective control. However, it is important to note that control of state unity tables and the selection of their leadership at the state level was a decision based largely on the judgment of the National Unity Table, as implemented by its two non-AFL-CIO directors. Consequently selected strategic directors of the state unity tables came from varied backgrounds, including leaders from inside and outside of the labor movement and allied organizations.
Legislating Public Sector Union Decline, 2011-2013
Table 1 summarizes the various limitations and restrictions introduced and enacted across different states in 2011-2013 with respect to collective bargaining, dues deduction, paycheck deduction for political action, and right-to-work provisions.
State Legislative Initiatives to Limit Public Sector Bargaining Rights, 2011-2013.
Source: AFL-CIO Government Affairs, State Government Relations, 2011 State Battles Legislative Reports; Summary of 2012 State Battle Legislative Reports; Summary of 2013 State Battle Legislative Reports (as of May 29, 2013).
In spite of labor’s coordinated efforts via the Unity Tables at the national and state levels, we see that labor is still in trouble. Legislation that would limit collective bargaining in the public sector at the state level has been introduced in thirty-five states and enacted in fifteen. In Wisconsin, Governor Scott Walker’s legislative attack essentially killed public sector bargaining rights in the state, leaving labor unable to bargain over most terms and conditions of employment. Indeed, bargaining in Wisconsin has now been restricted to wages only, with wage increases capped at the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index. Additionally, Wisconsin’s law undermines unions by eliminating payroll deductions for union dues, prohibiting fair share agreements, and requiring annual union recertification. Wisconsin, an extreme case, is not the only state impacted by the legislative onslaught from the right. Two other states also eliminated dues deduction for public sector unions in 2011-2013; NEA reports that in twenty-two states it now collects dues directly from members (NEA 2012, 9). Further, versions of “Paycheck Protection” laws, legislation that places severe restrictions on unions’ ability to collect funds for political activity through employer payroll deductions, were introduced in twenty-one states and enacted in four. Right-to-work legislation was introduced in twenty-eight states and enacted in four, including new laws in Indiana and Michigan, and strengthened provisions in two other states. There are now twenty-four right-to-work states, up from twenty-two previously. 17
The 2012 Elections
The state unity tables transitioned from coordinating responses to the 2011 and 2012 attacks on collective bargaining rights to mobilization for the 2012 elections. Despite Obama’s electoral victory, and even with Obama’s carrying nine of the eleven unity table states, Republican control was actually enhanced. For example, Republican control was diminished in Maine, New Hampshire, and particularly in Minnesota where the Democrats took over all three branches of the state legislature. However, in Wisconsin, where labor and its supporters were able to recall senators who supported the regressive legislations during a special 2012 election, Republicans regained control of the state senate, and labor’s effort to recall governor Scott Walker failed. In fact, full Republican control increased from twenty-one states after the 2010 elections to twenty-three states after the 2012 elections. Thus, even if on the surface it appeared that labor was turning things around, the results were mixed, and the situation remained grim.
Assessing Labor’s Response 18
It is essential to acknowledge that the attack on public sector unions has weakened labor in key parts of the country. A few observations from key union officials reflect the intensity of the impact: “ … devastating to membership numbers.” “It is a tremendous challenge for us and all similarly situated unions.” “It impacts organizing because we are performing life saving in places like Detroit and Wisconsin.” “In the initial fight back people are riled up and in the streets, but it’s difficult long term.”
Clearly the situation is incredibly difficult; public sector unions are on the defensive in all twenty-three states where Republicans are in full control and to a lesser degree in a number of other states where moderate Democrats have embraced some specific aspects of the ALEC-inspired initiative.
It is also important to recognize the fragility of the alliance that underpins the national and state unity tables. Comments by those representing some of the participating unions reveal potential difficulties: “The unity table can be frustrating. … Non-AFL unions are not contributing to infrastructure, but if you want to play at the labor table you have to pay.” “We don’t need unity tables in states where we have competent states feds and labor councils.” “Keeping the NEA happy is a constant challenge.” “Re-affiliation is not as important now.”
This last quote comes from a non-AFL-CIO union and reflects the legitimacy of a concern voiced to us by several representatives of different AFL-CIO unions. As time passes cracks in solidarity are beginning to appear as unions and the federation pursue institutional priorities.
In spite of the dire situation and the difficulties associated with maintaining solidarity and a united front over the long term, it is clear that the unity table efforts have served a useful function in focusing labor’s response to this unprecedented attack. Although some state battles have been lost, others have clearly been won at least in part because of strategies and tactics developed by state unity tables. For example, in New Hampshire and Florida aggressive campaigns by the right were fended off by establishing alliances with moderate Republicans. The success of this more traditional lobbying approach did not sit well with some of the more militant participants in the unity table process. One staffer proclaimed to us that she was “underwhelmed by Florida.” In contrast, a long-time union political operative praised Florida’s effort: “Florida was destined to be a political wasteland for labor, but a deftly conceived and executed inside game with Senate Republicans prevented an outright pillaging of labor rights.”
A more activist approach led to success in Ohio, where comprehensive legislation parallel to Wisconsin’s was passed in 2011. In Ohio there is a window after a bill is enacted where a public referendum can be filed to overturn the legislation. Labor staged huge public rallies, conducted a successful signature-gathering campaign to take advantage of the referendum option, and prevailed in a special vote that voided the law. Rallies and mobilization were components of unity table strategy in most states, but the relative emphasis on traditional lobbying versus activism varied considerably.
It is important to consider what can be learned from labor’s fight back. One set of lessons relates to the curse of institutional security. Reflecting on the aftermath of labor’s failed Wisconsin struggle, Don Taylor of the University of Wisconsin School for Workers reminds us that “union security and contract arbitration have provided a wall of protection behind which public sector unions are fragile and service focused.” To Taylor, the reason for the fragility is clear: because of their tradition of staff-driven servicing, these unions “have trouble embracing internal organizing.” Even those leaders who advocate for change “still speak in terms of servicing [because] that is what they know.” Consistent with this approach, solutions are sought through political action, legislation, and electing Democrats.” Taylor concludes that “moving forward requires deep, thorough organizational change” (Taylor 2011).
SEIU’s Keith Willis echoes the concerns raised by Taylor: “Lots of our public sector locals are old school, grievance handling unions … not nimble enough to turn things around.” The struggle of Wisconsin unions observed by Taylor, and the parallel SEIU problems noted by Willis, are endemic across the public sector (Willis, interview, 2013).
Offering a slightly different perspective, Paul Booth (who has spearheaded AFSCME state battles activities) points to the following necessary conditions for success: labor unity, effective coordination with non-labor allies, ability to establish a firewall with moderate Republicans, broad and deep member engagement, and new faces and voices. But Booth adds cautions that extend the concerns voiced by Taylor and Willis. To the extent that unions are successful in mobilizing members, they must be prepared for burnout: “The intensity of the fight exhausts activists.” Even more troubling, although mobilization may seem essential, “Activism of members to carry on the fight is not determinative of how unions fare.” The complexity of the political situation ensures that the direction of the impact of activism is “not simple or even predictable.” Reflecting on the legislative fights in 2011 and 2012, including the recall campaigns in Wisconsin, Booth goes on to note that “in retrospect, extensive engagement in external struggle became a barrier to internal organizing.” And it is internal organizing that may be most important for the long run. In this context he points to the particular challenges faced by AFSCME’s “polyglot locals,” in contrast to “units with natural cohesion [which] are better” (Booth, interview, 2013).
Given all of the problems and requisites for success, what is important about labor’s process is that it demonstrates the remarkable shift toward a more collaborative labor movement pulling together, allowing it to identify a strategic advantage in finding workable solutions to the problems it faced, even if that solution required the destruction or circumvention of preexisting internal institutional structure. Progress was predicated on the will of the eleven participating unions making up the National Unity Table to overcome obstacles and plow forward in a coordinated effort.
Summary and Conclusions
In sum, the unity table process can be credited with labor’s effective coordinated response to restrictive legislation, especially in the Midwestern states where the movement is traditionally strong. Although there was mobilization in almost every state where legislative battles were waged, the degree of emphasis on lobbying versus grassroots activism has varied tremendously from one state to another depending on the strategic decisions of the state unity tables. The unity tables, through a new coordinated approach, have effectively transcended the divisions within the labor movement and reached out and engaged allies in the active development of response strategies.
Labor’s coordinated effort has succeeded in fending off ALEC-inspired legislation in many states, but (in spite of this) momentum has clearly been on the side of the opponents of public sector unions. In crisis, unions are pulling together in a surprising way given the divisions that have existed among and between them. On the heels of a sustained period of real divisiveness within the labor movement, combined with a longstanding AFL-CIO policy to engage only cautiously with non-AFL-CIO unions on strategic matters, unions inside and outside of the federation have found solidarity in the fight against the right-wing attack. Under this solidarity, there has been a shift in how state-level labor and political activity is approached. The national labor movement is exercising more control and influence over what is happening at the state level. It is now a national strategy, and a coordinated national leadership is directing state-level political action by state federations. This is an incredibly valuable and crucial strategic development given the ongoing attack on labor rights being waged by the right wing of the Republican Party.
However, the relative success of the effort is not cause for celebration or complacency. The reality is, as one high-level AFL-CIO staffer put it, “Only twenty percent of labor councils and state federations run programs effectively.” Much work remains to be done to build a lasting ability to conduct effective laborwide strategic campaigns at the state and local level. State federation, central labor council, and area labor federation leaders still defend their turf jealously, and the situation can get “ugly, ugly, ugly” (as one state-level situation in 2012 was described to us). The unity table process is an excellent start to addressing the weaknesses that exist, but the effort cannot be abandoned once the current widespread attack abates (if indeed that happens).
Equally important, public sector unions should not view this as simply a fight to resist negative legislative proposals emanating from the Republican right. The ongoing situation should be taken as a wake-up call to confront the internal weaknesses that exist in almost all public sector unions. As one NEA official reflected, “Public sector unions won collective bargaining too quickly and became servicing model organizations, we didn’t engage our members.” This reality needs to be at the forefront of public sector union strategy considerations going forward. As a Change to Win union representative put it, “We have to figure out how to get into continuous advocacy—they won’t join just for grievance protection.” Or as another public sector unionist observed, “We can’t obsess on how people pay dues. It’s what organization they are connecting with that matters. We have to create an organizing culture.”
The unity table process is an ongoing experiment in movement building—a necessary one to be sure, and an encouraging initiative emanating from a national labor structure that has not promoted movementwide solidarity very effectively in the past. It is essential that the process not devolve into simply a new bureaucratic form that becomes burdened with its own structures and cautions. Similarly, the increased awareness of the need to revitalize public sector unions has great potential, if only the commitment to revitalization and member engagement can survive once the current attack on legislated rights subsides. There is potential to enhance labor’s power at the base and to build a stronger movement going forward.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.