Abstract
This slim volume tells a familiar story: the rise of the United Farm Workers (UFW) and their boycott of California grapes under the charismatic leadership of Cesar Chavez. More importantly for union leaders, it also tells the less well-known story of the fall of the UFW. By so doing, it provides a lesson for all union leaders as to the common pitfalls they should avoid in order to have continued success.
Familiar to many labor historians, and in fact the general public, are the meteoric rise of Cesar Chavez and the successful boycott of California grapes that eventually led to a historic contract with the growers. Garcia explores a number of themes that are worth consideration by all leaders and, in particular, labor leaders. First is the racial and gender mix of leadership and input. While the popular picture of the California farm workers is that they were universally Hispanic, there were a large number of Filipino workers. Cultural conflicts were a major concern in building unity, and Chavez often did a poor job in resolving them. Similarly, the role of women in the farm worker movement led to many challenges. While Dolores Huerta was a powerful adviser to Chavez, many other women, whether they were theorists like Jessica Govea or organizers like Elaine Elison, had their contributions belittled. Finally, the conflict among labor organizations cannot be forgotten. After first negotiating a successful merger of the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee and the National Farm Workers Association, the UFW also had to fight off a raid by the Teamsters as well as a number of company unions.
However, it is the lesser-known “tragedy” of Chavez’s life that provides the larger lessons for labor leaders. From the highest peak of success, after the boycott leading to a contract with the growers, the descent downward was rapid and irreversible. Garcia identifies a number of factors, all of which can be attributed to Chavez’s leadership.
First, UFW’s reach extended beyond its abilities. This started with the defeat of Proposition 14, a referendum that would have guaranteed funding for the Agricultural Labor Relations Board. Faced with united opposition of the growers, who used as their spokesman a Japanese American who had been interned during World War II, Chavez and the UFW could not fathom how the electorate rejected what was to them a clear necessity.
Second, Chavez became involved with the drug treatment organization Synanon and its organizational tool “The Game.” Like something out of Communist China, The Game involved members’ sitting in a circle and telling each other what their shortcomings were. It was only Chavez and his inner circle who were enamored of The Game. The outcome was not, as they expected, a frank discussion and improvement of the UFW members’ abilities but rather a fracturing of the unity needed in a labor organization.
Finally, the uneasy alliance between Hispanic and Filipino members was shattered, in no small measure by Chavez accepting an invitation from Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, against advice of his Filipino advisers. All three of these actions and outcomes can be attributed to a growing centralization of power by Chavez and a reluctance to hear and accept dissenting views.
Garcia’s work is a cautionary tale: that all victories are not permanent and that the popular story of Chavez and the UFW’s winning a historic victory over the growers must also be seen in the light of the post-1970s defeats. As Garcia notes, “Today, not one field worker laboring in grape farms in California is covered by a labor contract” (p. 297). All gains won must be defended and new rights secured, but this is only possible with a unified union where all members, from the lowest rank and file to the highest officers, feel that their voices and contributions matter. The rise and, perhaps more importantly, the fall of the UFW provides needed lessons for unionists, and Garcia’s book reveals them well.