Migration Patterns and Marriage Equality

Abstract

Attitudes toward marriage equality have gradually become more accepting as more and more states have passed legislation that acknowledged full or partial recognition of marriage equality. Given the traditionally conservative behavior of the South, this article analyzes how regional migration patterns and time affect attitudes toward marriage equality from the 1988 and the 2004 to 2014 General Social Survey data sets using a generalized linear mixed model. We find that migrant southerners, migrant northerners, and native northerners are more likely to support marriage equality than native southerners are. Furthermore, time seems to also play a significant role in understanding trends in attitudes toward marriage equality. We conclude by suggesting future research.

Keywords

internal migration marriage equality same-sex marriage

Personal Reflexive Statement

We are a sociology faculty mentor and a former graduate student. Our research focused upon critical theory and the intersections of marginalized identities. The sociologists’ research focuses upon intersections of marginalized identities of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. The former graduate student’s thesis focused upon marriage equality, migration, and attitudes toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer people.

Over the last few decades, attitudes toward lesbians and gays have become more positive and supportive of marriage equality and gay civil rights (Armenia and Troia 2017; Becker 2012b; Brewer 2003b; Craig et al. 2005; Jones 2010; Loftus 2001). In June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of marriage equality for same-sex couples, striking down the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and state DOMA’s. Many individuals, such as former Republican presidential candidates Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, Bobby Jindal, and Rick Santorum, publicly signed a pledge with the National Organization of Marriage to add a constitutional amendment to define a traditional marriage as between one man and one woman (Duffy 2015). Even though a clear majority of Americans now favor marriage equality and there is little political will to overturn the outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court decision (Brewer 2017; Lennon-Dearing and Delavega 2016), people living in the U.S. South (South) have not been as supportive of same-sex marriage as the general population (Armenia and Troia 2017; Lennon-Dearing and Delavega 2016). Armenia and Troia (2017) find that those living in the South are less likely to support marriage equality and only 26 percent of Tennesseans, for instance, favor allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry prior to Obergefell v. Hodges (Middle Tennessee State University 2014). Additionally, those living in the South who are evangelical Christians do not support marriage equality (Baunach 2012; Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada 2011; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Sherkat et al. 2011; Whitehead 2010). Because of the prevalence of Christianity in the South, attitudes of marriage equality continually need to be measured to tease out opinions about lesbian and gay civil rights. This article examines how support for marriage equality has changed based upon time and internal migration prior to the Supreme Court ruling.

While studies have examined the relationship between conservative, religious beliefs, and decreased support for marriage equality, few studies have examined the influence of internal migration on attitudes about marriage equality. A gap exists in the literature on whether or not migration is related to attitudes for marriage equality. Therefore, we ask, does migration from southern regions to Northern regions increase positive attitudes for marriage equality? We utilize the 1988 and 2004 to 2014 General Social Survey (GSS) and implement a generalized linear mixed model. We find that U.S. internal migration patterns strongly predict attitudes for marriage equality. Migrant southerners, people who resided in the South prior to the age of 16 but have migrated to the North, have just as high of a likelihood to support marriage equality as those who never lived in the South, which we call native northerners. Furthermore, time seems to play a significant role in understanding trends in attitudes for marriage equality, that is, attitudes in support of marriage equality have increased from 1988 and 2004 to 2014 (see Armenia and Troia 2017; Loftus 2001 for similar findings). Additionally, individuals who hold more conservative political views and religious attitudes are less supportive of marriage equality. We do not know the causal mechanism of individuals holding negative attitudes and internal migration. Therefore, we conclude by suggesting future research into the influence of migration and its impact on attitudes about marriage equality.

Attitudes Shifts toward Marriage Equality

Since 2000, hostility toward homosexuality and gay right movements have steadily declined in the general U.S. population (Armenia and Troia 2017; Brewer 2003b; Craig et al. 2005; Jones 2010; Loftus 2001). Wilcox and Wolpert (2000) noted a gradual increase in public support for many policy questions affecting gay and lesbian communities such as inheritance, health insurance, military service, employment discrimination, and social security benefits (Brewer 2003a). Lewis and Oh (2008) found that the percentage of people who supported same-sex marriage increased by as much as 55 percent to 65 percent from previous years.

However, social characteristics such as gender, race, education, generational cohort, conservative political views, religious factors and affiliation, and region of the country influence support for marriage equality. We describe six social factors that influence support for marriage equality. First, research suggests that women are more tolerant of homosexuality than men (Calzo and Ward 2009; Connell 1995; Kimmel 1994; Lee and Hicks 2011; Moskowitz, Rieger, and Roloff 2010; Strand 1998). Herek, Cogan, and Gillis (2002) found that young men tend to receive more negative messages about homosexuality than young women. Furthermore, previous literature suggests that Blacks, Latinos, and Asians hold more negative views toward homosexuality, while Whites tend to hold more positive views of homosexuality (Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Dubé, Savin-Williams, and Diamond 2001; Lemelle and Battle 2004; Nagel 2000; Pleck, Sonenstein, and Ku 1994; Savin-Williams 1996; Yoshioka and Schustack 2001). Blacks respondents tend to perceive homosexuality as being perverse and unnatural (Calzo and Ward 2009). Additionally, an increase in education usually suggests increase in tolerance for same-sex marriage (Baunach 2012; Becker and Scheufele 2011; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lewis 2003). Cohorts differ in attitudes toward sexuality with older cohorts holding more negative attitudes toward homosexuality (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Andersen and Fetner 2008; Baunach 2011, 2012; Becker 2012a; Becker and Scheufele 2011; Brewer and Wilcox 2005; Scott 1998). Political views are also strongly correlated with attitudes about lesbians and gays. People who identify as politically conservative are associated with less support for marriage equality, while individuals who identify as politically liberal are more favorable toward gay civil rights and marriage (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Sherkat et al. 2011). Recent literature about the relationship between religion and homosexuality suggests that conservative and evangelical religious affiliation will support marriage equality less (Brewer and Wilcox 2005; Calzo and Ward 2009; Finlay and Walther 2003; Gaines and Garand 2010; Herek 2002; Sherkat et al. 2011). People who attend evangelical churches, are Muslim, or attend Black Protestant churches hold more depressed views of same-sex unions than those who identify as mainline Protestants, Jews, or religiously unaffiliated (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Brewer 2003a; Cotton-Huston and Waite 2000; Finlay and Walther 2003; Herek and Glunt 1993; Lottes and Kuriloff 1992; Olson et al. 2006; Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek 2010; Wills and Crawford 2000). People who hold more conservative religious beliefs, such as a literal view of the Bible, are less likely to support same-sex marriage (Sherkat et al. 2011; Whitehead 2010). Hoffman and Miller (1998) found that Catholics are more likely to support marriage equality than Protestants. They suggested that Catholics have liberalized their beliefs about marriage equality. Moreover, the South has greater traditionalism, conservatism, and evangelicalism found in many locales that can influence attitudes about marriage equality (Lennon-Dearing and Delavega 2016; Valentino and Sears 2005; Woodberry and Smith 1998). In summary, older, racial minority men who are religious conservatives or evangelical, who live in the South or rural areas, and who are politically conservative will be less supportive of marriage equality than younger, white women who are not religious, who live in the North, and who are politically liberal.

As stated above, social characteristics impact how individuals view same-sex marriage. However, few researchers have noted how internal migration influences attitudes about marriage equality in regions of the United States. We now turn to a discussion of how context and environment influences sexual activity, sexual identity, and support for marriage equality. We then discuss internal migration and marriage equality attitudes that have not been explored in detail.

Migration

To date, studies have examined how context and environment influences sexual activity, sexual identity, and support for marriage equality, but the studies have lacked analyses of migration patterns. For instance, Baunach and Burgess (2013) found that sexual activity and relationships were important predictors of sexual identification in the South, more so than in other areas of the country. Their findings suggest that individuals with rural and southern backgrounds at age 12 are less likely to identify as bisexual or homosexual and sexual activity, relationships, and identification tend to be in accordance. In other words, individuals growing up in the South and rural areas who had participated in heterosexual activities and relationships tended to identify as heterosexual. Baunach and Burgess (2013) findings suggest that the geographic context that one experiences at age 12 and as an adult influences sexual activity and identification.

For people raised in the South, currently residing in the South, or raised in more rural locales, in general, coming out may be more difficult and different than living elsewhere in the United States. The greater social conservatism, traditionalism, and religiosity often found in rural areas and in the South may impede supporting marriage equality (Armenia and Troia 2017; Sherkat et al. 2010; Valentino and Sears 2005; Woodberry and Smith 1998). Ethnographic, qualitative accounts, and narratives from Southern gay men and lesbians highlight the extreme challenges and difficulties they face both inside and outside the closet (Barton 2010; Dews and Law 2001; Gray 2009; Johnson 2008). Southerners who attend evangelical religious denominations or are members of racial/ethnic minority groups may be particularly affected by these cultural influences and be less supportive of marriage equality (Barton 2010; Pitt 2010).

Additionally, Flores (2014) examined the impact of relationship recognition among individuals and political districts in high lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB) population density. Political districts with an increase in LGB population density influenced attitudes about same-sex marriage, that is, as the LGB population density increased so did support for same-sex marriage. Flores (2014) did not specifically examine internal migration, however, Flores (2014) results demonstrated that the context or the environment influences people’s attitudes about same-sex marriage.

One of the few studies that examine migration patterns affecting attitudes of a variety of public opinion questions such as racism, religion, gender roles, sexuality, and civic values is Rice and Pepper’s (1997) study. They demonstrated that native southerners were the most conservative across 15 measures, while migrant southerners were the second most conservative group. The native northerners had the most liberal views, while the migrant northerners had the second most liberal views. Rice and Pepper (1997) theorized that native southerners were more insulated from non-Southern culture, and southerners maintained stronger conservative values. Migrant southerners moved out of the insulated South and were more likely to be exposed to and learn more liberal ideas. Migrant southerners may be more likely to be less conservative and want to move out of a conservative area (see Baumle and Compton 2015; Baumle, Compton, and Poston 2009; Chauncey 1995; Valentine and Skelton 2003, about lesbians and gays migration from conservative and rural geographic areas to urban centers). In other words, the geographic area influenced one’s attitudes about a variety of measurements such as race, gender inequality, and marriage equality.

However, Rice and Pepper’s (1997) study has several methodological, contextual, and theoretical limitations. First, Rice and Pepper (1997) did not account for standard errors or to see whether the groups, native northerners and southerners, migrant northerners and southerners, are statistically different between each other. Moreover, Whites’ migrant patterns are historically different then Blacks or Latinos (Frey 2004; South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005), however, they did not examine Whites’ migrant patterns and other covariates to see whether the migration pattern influences the 15 measures. Third, Rice and Pepper’s study does not account for the significant altitudinal shifts of same-sex marriage prior to the dramatic sequence of events and opinion shifts regarding marriage equality, including the 2003 and 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Thus, the evolution of attitudes on this issue provides an ideal opportunity to examine the role of migration patterns in explaining public opinion. Because of these limitations, Rice and Pepper (1997) cannot theoretical or statistically support their findings. In this article, we account for these methodological, contextual, and theoretical limitations by specifically examining the standard errors, determining statistically significant difference between the four categories of migrant and nonmigrant southerners and northerners, and examining covariates in the migration patterns prior to the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision.

Because of methodological, contextual, and theoretical limitations discussed above, we suggest the following hypotheses. First, we suggest that time explains the variation in support of marriage equality (Hypothesis 1). Second, native southerners will be less likely to support marriage equality compared to all other groups (Hypothesis 2). Third, migrant southerners will support marriage equality more than native southerners (Hypothesis 3). Fourth, migrant northerners will support marriage equality more than migrant southerners (Hypothesis 4). Fifth, native northerners will support marriage equality the most compared to all other migrant and nonmigrant categories (Hypothesis 5)_.

Data and Methods

We used the 1988 and 2004 to 2014 GSS data. The population that the GSS samples is noninstitutionalized adults 18 years old or older. The GSS has specific sampling designs for each specific year that the data were collected. The years that the GSS asked the question about marriage equality constrains the years that we focus on. The GSS has been collecting data since 1972 by conducting face-to-face interviews in February, March, and April (Smith et al. 2013). The data used in this article were based on the years that had asked for a respondent’s opinion on marriage equality, which were in 1988, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014.

Measures

We next discuss the measures that we utilized for this study. We focus on variables that were measured in each year of the GSS. The dependent variable is support for marriage equality, with demographic, political ideology, religious affiliation as control variables and migration as the independent variable of interest. Please refer to Table 1 for the definition of migration.

Table 1.

Definitions of Migrants and Native Southerners and Northerners.

Migrant	Characteristics
Native southerners	All individuals living in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia and did not move out of these states
Migrant southerners	Person who lived in the South prior to the age of 16 but has since moved to a Northern state
Native northerners	Individual who has not moved from Northern states
Migrant northerners	Lived in a Northern state prior to the age of 16 but has since moved to a Southern state or district

Outcome Variable

The dependent variable is support for marriage equality. Support for marriage equality is measured through the question: “Do you agree or disagree? J. Homosexual couples should have the right to marry one another.” The responses are strongly agreed to strongly disagree. Table 2 reports the number of respondents asked about support for marriage equality and the total GSS sample. The 1988 GSS sample was the smallest number of people who were asked the marriage equality question but had the largest portion of responses for the question, 88 percent of the sample. The 2006 GSS constituted the largest portion of the entire sample who were asked about support for marriage equality. Starting in 2008, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) asked about two-thirds of each sample about support for marriage equality. The entire sample is 10,048 respondents.

Table 2.

Sample Size of 1988, and 2004 to 2014 GSS of Marriage Equality.

Year	GSS Sample Size	Answered Question about Marriage Equality
Year	N	N (%)
1988	1,481	1,307 (88.25)
2004	2,812	1,184 (42.11)
2006	4,510	1,982 (43.95)
2008	2,023	1,336 (66.04)
2010	2,044	1,262 (61.74)
2012	1,1974	1,287 (65.20)
2014	2,538	1,690 (66.59)
Total	17,382	10,048 (57.81)

Note: GSS = General Social Survey.

Figure 1 reports the percentages of respondents who strongly agreed to strongly disagreed by year. In 1988, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, the modal response was strongly disagreed with support for marriage equality. In 2012 and 2014, the modal category was strongly agreed. In 1988, 46.9 percent of respondents in the GSS strongly disagreed with support for marriage equality. This response has decreased over time to 19.35 percent in 2014. Respondents who strongly agreed with support for marriage equality has increased from 3.37 percent in 1988 to 31.48 percent in 2014. Furthermore, the total percentage of respondents who either strongly agreed or agreed with support for marriage equality increased from 12.4 percent in 1988 to 56.51 percent in 2014. Individuals who reported neither agreeing nor disagreeing with support for marriage equality slightly decreased from 15.0 percent (1988) to 10.95 percent (2014). In sum, individuals have steadily increased supporting marriage equality.

Figure 1.

Distribution of attitudes toward marriage equality by year, 1988 and 2004 to 2014 General Social Survey.

Control Variables

We have six control variables. They are listed below:

Gender: We expect that men, relative to women, will hold less supportive attitudes toward marriage equality.

Race: We expect that Whites, relative to People of Color, will support marriage equality.¹

Education: We expect that respondents with higher educational attainment, relative to lower educational attainment, will support marriage equality.²

Generational cohorts: We measure generational cohorts by age. We expect that younger respondents, relative to older respondents, will support marriage equality.

Political ideology is measured using a liberal to conservative scale (extremely liberal = 1 to extremely conservative = 7). We expect that political liberal respondents, relative to political conservative respondents, will support marriage equality.

Religious affiliation is categorical with Protestants, Catholics, other affiliations (Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu) and no religious affiliation. We expect respondents who identify as other affiliations and no religious affiliation, relative to all other religious affiliation, will be supportive of marriage equality.³

Independent Variable

Migrants

We measured migration patterns with two questions. The first question asked the respondent where they lived at the age of 16. The GSS had 10 possible responses for regions. Using Rice and Pepper’s (1997) method, this variable was transformed into a dichotomous Southern and Northern region prior to the age of 16. Using the possible responses of the region at the time of 16 and at the time of the interview, a four-point nominal migration variable was created. The possible outcomes for the internal migration variable are native northerners, migrant northerners, migrant southerners, and native southerners. Rice and Pepper (1997) defined native southerners as all individuals living in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia (South) and did not move out of these states. A migrant Southerner is a person who lived in the South prior to the age of 16 but has since moved to a Northern state. A native northerner is an individual who has remained in a northern state, while a migrant northerner lived in a Northern state prior to the age of 16 but has since moved to a Southern state or district.

There is one primary drawback of the migration variables: The respondents are not tracked across time. Therefore, we cannot be absolutely certain when respondents migrated. For example, a migrant southerner may have migrated from a Northern area to a Southern area many times. It is impossible to examine this with cross-sectional data.

In Table 3, the native northerners and southerners constituted about 87 percent of the sample. Sixty percent of the sample are native northerners, and 26.83 percent of the sample are native southerners. The majority of the respondents did not migrate. The remaining 13 percent of the sample were people who migrated between the South and the North or from the North to the South. About 10 percent of the respondents moved from the Northern region to the Southern region, and 3.5 percent of the respondents were those who moved out of the South to the North. This suggests that people were more likely to migrate to the South than to the Northern regions.

Table 3.

Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis, 1988, and 2004-2014 General Social Survey.

Variable	N	1988	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Control
Male (female = 0)	10,048	0.56	0.56	0.57	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.55	0.55
White (Nonwhite = 0)	10,048	0.16	0.20	0.26	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.23
Education	10,039	12.59	13.87	13.35	13.50	13.57	13.52	13.69	13.44
Age	10,023	44.74	45.21	47.25	47.94	47.78	48.18	48.93	47.24
Conservative (liberal < 4)	9,982	2.75	2.91	2.92	2.77	2.82	2.75	2.75	2.81
Religion
No religion	1637	0.08	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.16
Catholic	2,369	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.24
Protestant	5,124	0.62	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.48	0.47	0.44	0.51
Other	881	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.09
Migration
Native northerner	5,996	0.61	0.61	0.58	0.60	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.60
Migrant northerner	1,001	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10
Migrant southerner	355	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
Native southerner	2,696	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.24	0.27

Analytic Plan

The method used to analyze the data is a hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM) analyzing the effect migration patterns have on a respondent’s attitudes toward marriage equality by incorporating the abovementioned demographic variables. There is an exploration of other covariates to ensure there is no spuriousness or confounding variables that are not accounted for and to test the effect of the variables of interest. The dependent variable measures the varying amounts of support a person has toward marriage equality on a five-point Likert-type scale. Since the responses have an underlying order from strongly agree to strongly disagree, an ordinal logistic model is necessary to help calculate the cumulative probability of support for marriage equality. Therefore, the HGLM is used for the ordinal structure of the data using a cumulative logit link function.

Since time is one of the variables of interest, it is important to discuss the analysis strategy. First, we look at the differences of the variables over time. Accounting for the change of these variables can help shed light on the possible mechanisms for the change in the trend of attitudes about marriage equality. The predicted probability, used in model I, explains the probability of the sample that strongly agree, agree, neither agrees nor disagrees, disagrees, and strongly disagrees to what is expected and see if the probability matches. The predicted probability was calculated by taking the odds ratio (OR) and dividing it by the OR + 1.

Second, constructing a predictive model that accounts for variation by year, and the variables of interest will be used to see how the effects of migration and other covariates on attitudes toward marriage equality change. Demographic variables were added in the first model. The variables measuring gender, race, age, and education will be the main demographic variables used in this model. The next model adds the variables religious affiliation and political ideology. The third model introduced migration patterns.

Models

Table 4 has all five models with the fixed effects, error variance, and model fit reported. In the intercept only model, model I, the intercepts are reported as OR. The predicted cumulative percentage of respondents that strongly agreed and agreed with marriage equality is 38 percent. The predicted probability of a person neither agreeing nor disagreeing with marriage equality is 14 percent. The total predicted probability of those who disagreed and strongly disagreed is 48 percent. This model also supports that the variation within support for marriage equality is explained by years with an intercept variance of 0.29. Using the intercept variance, the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated using Snijders and Bosker’s (1999) recommendation and resulted in an 8.16 percent of the variation of support for marriage equality explained by years.⁴ In sum, individuals’ attitudes shifted from negative to positive support for marriage equality. This supports Hypothesis 1, that time explains the variation of supportive attitudes toward marriage equality and is similar to Armenia and Troia’s (2017) findings.

Table 4.

Estimates for Hierarchical Generalized Linear Ordinal Models of Marriage Equality Migration Models, 1988 and 2004 to 2014 General Social Survey.

Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Variables	OR (Standard Error)	OR (Standard Error)	OR (Standard Error)	OR (Standard Error)
Fixed effects
Strongly agree	0.21*** (0.21)	0.11*** (0.25)	0.17*** (0.25)	0.13*** (0.26)
Agree	0.62 (0.20)	0.38** (0.25)	0.63 (0.25)	0.48* (0.26)
Neither	1.09 (0.20)	0.69 (0.25)	1.22 (0.25)	0.95 (0.26)
Disagree	2.33*** (0.20)	1.54 (0.25)	2.99*** (0.25)	2.35 (0.26)
Demographic characteristics
Male		0.69*** (0.04)	0.65*** (0.04)	0.65*** (0.04)
White		1.33*** (0.04)	1.78*** (0.05)	1.72*** (0.05)
Education		1.12*** (0.01)	1.13*** (0.01)	1.12*** (0.01)
Age		0.98*** (0.00)	0.98*** (0.00)	0.98*** (0.00)
Political and religious
Conservative political ideology			0.78*** (0.01)	0.78*** (0.01)
No religion			1.63*** (0.08)	1.60*** (0.08)
Catholic			0.94 (0.07)	0.92 (0.07)
Protestant			0.49*** (0.07)	0.54*** (0.07)
Migration
Native northerner				1.71*** (0.05)
Migrant northerner				1.24*** (0.07)
Migrant southerner				1.73*** (0.11)
Intercept	0.29* (0.17)	0.36* (0.21)	0.34* (0.19)	0.36* (0.21)
−2 LL	105,144.3	110,066.9	115,239.3	116,089.5

Note: OR = odds ratio; -2LL = -2 Log Likelihood.

*p < .05. **p < .01. *p < 0.01.

Model II introduces the basic demographic variables: gender, race, education, and age. The variation is still significant in explaining attitudes toward marriage equality with a model variation of 0.36. The ICC calculated shows that model explains 9.8 percent of the variation within support for marriage equality. Demographic variables are in the direction and statistically significant, as previous literature suggests. For instance, men and older respondents, relative to women and younger respondents, decrease the likelihood a person would support marriage equality. Respondents who identified as White and had more years of education, relative to People of Color and less educational attainment, increases the likelihood of supporting marriage equality.

Model III, conservative values, incorporates conservative political ideology and religious affiliations. The variation is significant in explaining attitudes toward marriage equality with a model variation of 0.34. The ICC calculated shows that the model explains 9.8 percent of the variation within support for marriage equality. Gender, White, years of education, and cohort variables all maintain the same pattern and statistical significance as in model II, with slight variation. Conservative political ideology and religious affiliations decrease the likelihood of support for marriage equality, as previous literature suggests. In summary, respondents who are political and religious conservatives are less likely to support marriage equality.

Model IV, internal migration, shows the full model by adding internal migration with all other variables. The variation is significant in explaining attitudes toward marriage equality with a model variation of 0.34. The ICC calculated shows that the model explains 9.8 percent of the variation within support for marriage equality.⁵ Gender, race, education, age, conservative political ideology, no religious affiliation, being Catholic, and being Protestant have slight variations, but all maintain the same statistical significant patterns as model III.

With the native southern migrants as the reference group, all migration patterns are statistically significant. The migrant southerners are most likely to support marriage equality by 73 percent over native southerners (OR = 1.73, p < .001). We find support that migrant southerners were more supportive of marriage equality than native southerners were. The native northerners, individuals who did not migrate from the Northern states, increased their support of marriage equality by 71 percent when compared to native southerners (OR = 1.71, p < .001). We find partial support that native northerners have the most liberal attitudes toward marriage equality. By percentage, native northerners held the second most tolerant views of marriage equality behind migrant southerners. Migrant northerners increased support of marriage equality by 24 percent (OR = 1.24, p = .0029) when compared to native southern migrants. Please see Figure 2 that demonstrates the predicted increases in support of marriage equality compared to native southerners. It shows that migrant southerners are the most supportive of marriage equality when compared to native southerners. Native northerners are the second most supportive of marriage equality when compared to native southerners. Migrant northerners are the third supportive of marriage equality when compared to native southerners. We find that those who migrate from the South are just as likely to support marriage equality as those who never lived in the South. Furthermore, we find support that native southerners hold more negative attitudes toward marriage equality, especially over time, relative to all other migrant categories.

Figure 2.

Predicted increases in support of marriage equality compared to native southerners, 1988 and 2004 to 2014 General Social Survey.

Migration seems to play a role in predicting the probability that someone will support marriage equality. Native northerners, migrant northerners, and migrant southerners hold more support for marriage equality than native southerners do. Rice and Pepper (1997) suggested that migration from the South liberalized people’s attitudes, but they did not address migration to the South from the North. The results for migrant northerners suggest that current geographic location influences support for marriage equality. We suggest that migrant northerners were exposed to more conservative and traditional ideas in the South. People may begin to adapt to the attitudes of the region when they migrate or internal migrants may be self-selecting the regions that they are migrating to and away from. These findings suggest support for the idea of political migration—changing political landscapes can have an effect on the person or they are choosing to live in regions that are more likely to match their political ideology (Brown 1988).

Conclusion

These findings suggest that, in general, internal migration can liberalize attitudes about marriage equality. We used cross-sectional data across time to determine whether marriage equality attitudes are becoming more supportive. Similar to previous research (Armenia and Troia 2017; Loftus 2001), we find that attitudes over years have liberalized. Second, our results are similar to Rice and Pepper’s (1997) study, that is, migrants support marriage equality more than native southerners do. Specifically, we have extended their study to examine support for marriage equality and found that migrant northerners and migrant southerners attitudes about marriage equality are more supportive than native southerners are. Migrant northerners are more supportive than native southerners by 24 percent, but their attitudes of support for marriage equality are more similar to native southerners than migrant southerners and native northerners. This suggests that geographic location influences attitudes about support for marriage equality.

This study has four limitations. First, political migration is broadly defined. We operationalized political migration using two questions from the GSS: Where did you grow up prior to the age of 16 and where are you living now? Migration was only measured two times in a person’s life. We do not capture migration across the life span. Additionally, we did not examine moving between and within smaller geographical areas such as counties or census tracts. As Flores (2014) demonstrated as the LGB density increases, the LGB density impacts political behaviors, we would also expect that examining smaller geographical areas to provide insight to migration and supportive marriage equality attitudes. The second limitation is the way in which we measured general attitude of support for marriage equality to see whether political landscape shapes individuals’ attitudes. Third, we do not have a measure of changing attitudes across a person’s life span. For instance, a person’s political ideology, religious affiliation, and attitudes about marriage equality can change over one’s life span. However, measuring variables across one’s life span may not be a factor in support of marriage equality. Armenia and Troia (2017) used three waves of GSS data to examine marriage equality. Specifically, they examined time varying variables that remained stable across three waves of data: political views (62 percent), religious attendance (61 percent), married (92 percent), and parenting (95 percent) (p. 190). Fourth, we cannot determine the causal chain. Baumle and Compton (2015) found that gay migrant southerners are less conservative and want to move to more liberal geographical areas. Therefore, do individuals who migrate, first, and then support marriage equality or do people who support marriage equality migrate? Future research should examine the stability of migration in the three waves of the GSS to better determine the causal mechanism of migration and same-sex attitudes.

We analyzed migration based upon region of the United States and found that even with such large geographical areas that the environment that individuals currently live in may influence their support for marriage equality. First, better migration measurements could provide a more nuanced analysis of internal migration and support for marriage equality. Annes and Redlin (2012) wrote that for gays and lesbians, cities are “homosexual paradises whose tolerance of nonheterosexual identities and sexual practices attract numerous rural individuals trying to escape the conservative culture of their place of birth” (p. 57). In this article, we examined heterosexual individuals, who may just as nonheterosexual individuals try to do the same, escape the conservative culture of their place of birth. Second, future research could examine smaller and finer geographical areas such as counties, census tracts, and neighborhoods, specifically examining migration flows of urban and rural counties that may provide even more complex findings about support for marriage equality. Finally, a longitudinal approach is needed to examine attitudinal and migration shifts over people’s life spans to tease out the causal mechanism of attitudes and internal migration, similar to Armenia and Troia’s (2017) work.

In conclusion, our findings suggest that environment or context that one lives in currently and prior to the age of 16 influences attitudes of support for marriage equality. Even with a large geographical area, southern states, and migrating from the South to the North, support for marriage equality increased prior to 2003 and 2015 Supreme Court rulings. We would expect that having even more refined geographical areas would increase predictions of support for marriage equality and internal migration.

Footnotes

Authors’ Note

Dennis Corbin III is now affiliated to Minitab Inc., Chicago, IL, USA.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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