Abstract

Keywords
Increasingly, governments are replacing traditional forms of managing citizen identity, such as a passport, population register and driver’s licence, with new forms of citizen identity information management enabled by information and communication technologies (ICTs). These transactional e-government relationships not only offer governments opportunities to improve their efficiency and effectiveness, they also see advantages of a step-increase in fraud prevention, public safety protection and increased citizen trust. At the same time however, it is widely expected that the introduction of these digital identity information systems in citizen–government relationships will lead to fundamental changes in the management of citizen identity and, with that, the meaning of citizenship (Crossman, 2007; Lips et al., 2009a; LSE, 2005; OECD, 2009; UK House of Lords, 2009). For example, several scholars acknowledge digital citizen identity information systems as discriminatory ‘surveillance’ technologies as they sieve and ‘socially sort’ through obtained personal information for the purpose of judgment, thus affecting people’s life chances (Lyon, 2003a: 20, 2003b; Murakami-Wood et al., 2006).
Thus far, there is no systematic empirical evidence about what changes are happening in these ICT-enabled citizen–government relationships. Few available research findings indicate that change outcomes depend on the actual use of citizen identity information collected or generated via these digital systems (Lips et al., 2009b; Nissenbaum, 2010). In other words, changes in citizen–government relationships are determined by how citizen identity is reconstructed, attributed and fixated in an informational sense by government agencies.
This contribution will empirically explore ICT-enabled citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation in e-government service relationships and present a conceptual overview of shifts on citizen identity and citizenship dimensions in public service provision. To be able to unpack these citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation processes, we will need to take an informational perspective and focus on the ICT-enabled information flows between citizens and government. This then also requires that we will need to move away from more commonly used identity management concepts, such as citizen identification or the process whereby a person’s identity is revealed, and citizen authentication or establishing that identity claims made by or about a person are true (Whitley and Hosein, 2010: 244–5), and use alternative concepts that expose the informational processes and dimensions of citizen identity management without making any value judgments about potential outcomes. In this contribution, we will define ‘citizen identity reconstruction’ as the collection, processing and storage of identity information related to a citizen role identity (e.g. benefit claimant); ‘citizen identity attribution’ as associating identity information collected or generated in an e-government service environment with an individual (e.g. matching); and ‘citizen identity fixation’ as assigning (identity) information to causal explanations about a citizen (e.g. profiling).
Based on empirical research in the United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand (NZ), 1 three illustrative case studies are presented, which together provide an opportunity to broadly explore ICT-enabled citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation in varying e-government service environments and conceptualise resulting shifts on citizen identity and citizenship dimensions in public service delivery. As many e-government service environments are in fact converged online and offline environments, two cases present citizen experiences with a dominantly online service environment and one with a mixed online and offline service environment.
After a description of information flows in e-government service environments and an analysis of ICT-enabled citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation in each of the three cases, a conceptual outline of shifts on citizen identity and citizenship dimensions in public service relationships will be presented. Next, a summary overview is provided of a comparison between the three cases, followed by a conclusion.
Empirical cases
Case 1 – Online provisional driver’s licence application
UK citizens wanting to apply for a provisional driver’s licence used to go to a local post office branch where they submitted a form including their demographic details, accompanied with paper-based proofs of identity (e.g. passport). Since 2006, the UK Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) also offer this service online through the UK Central Government’s ‘Direct.gov’ web portal, which uses the ‘Government Gateway’ authentication infrastructure. Users need to register separately for online access to the DVLA service and to the Government Gateway infrastructure.
When registering for the online DVLA service, applicants need to complete an online form providing identity information, including surname, date of birth, UK passport number, National Insurance Number, driver number, credit card details, and previous addresses over the past three years. After submission, the identity information is digitally matched with DVLA’s database to retrieve any existing data for the applicant, including previous applications and driving disqualification information. If this data matching process doesn’t provide any matches then the applicant can continue with the online application process, creating a new record. Likewise, the applicant can proceed in case of one match with the DVLA database that does not prohibit progression (e.g. common surname). However, if multiple matches occur the application will need checking by a staff member and cannot be completed online.
In those cases where the applicant is allowed to proceed, the applicant’s identity information is automatically transferred to an information solutions provider who will search for data matches and check the reliability of the submitted information in a variety of private-sector and public-sector databases (e.g. mail-order catalogues, banking). Based on the hits during this ‘digital footprint’ assessment, a ‘trust score’ is generated and used by DVLA to determine whether the application can be completed online. An applicant who has failed the assessment will receive an instruction to complete the application through the traditional paper-based process. If the applicant proceeds through the assessment, they need to submit medical details to assess their qualification as a provisional driver (e.g. eye problems), and their passport number which will allow the UK Identity and Passport Service (IPS) to electronically transfer the digital passport photograph and signature from the applicant’s passport records to the DVLA for use on the applicant’s provisional driver’s licence. The applicant will then proceed to online payments using a credit or debit card and, finally, will be able to check through the full application details on a verification screen.
Analysis
Citizen identity reconstruction is separated into two informational processes: one related to the citizen as a Government Gateway user and another process focused on the citizen as a DVLA service consumer. Both processes require the individual to register first, before the online DVLA service can be accessed via the Direct.gov portal. Associated with multiple citizen role-identities (e.g. international traveller; tax payer; resident), the reconstructed identity information and the applicant’s identity information retrieved from the DVLA database are used for citizen identity attribution. Citizen identity fixation allows an individual with one match to proceed; those with more than one match will not be able to complete the online service. Subsequently, identity information is transferred to a private company for citizen identity attribution across varying databases and citizen identity fixation by creating a trust score. An acceptable trust score allows applicants to proceed with the online service and they are requested to submit their passport number and health-related identity information used for citizen identity attribution and fixation as a qualified provisional driver. Citizen identity attribution, fixation and reconstruction also take place based on IPS passport records transferred to the DVLA. Finally, citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation are used for organising online payment, after which the individual can check the reconstructed, attributed and fixated identity information for the full application.
Case 2 – Starting a company online
In the 1990s, the NZ Companies Office shifted the paper registry service into an online environment. Since then, NZ residents wanting to start a new company use the Companies Office website, for which users need to be registered. Nowadays, registering as a website user requires two steps. First, individuals need to create an ‘igovt’ logon by choosing a unique username, entering their email address and creating a password. Managed by the NZ Department of Internal Affairs (DIA), the igovt-programme allows users to use the same logon across various NZ government online services and, only at their request and with their consent, to verify their identity information to government service providers if needed. Moreover, the igovt logon process is separated from what a person does with a government service provider and only minimum identity information is used. Furthermore, government online service providers are not able to collect a citizen’s identity information from other service providers using the igovt-programme.
Second, after creating their igovt logon, users are automatically returned to the Companies Office website and need to set up a Companies Office account. A new user account can be created by entering personal details (e.g. name, email address, contact number). After logon to their account, users have access to an online dashboard where they can select the service of starting their company. Users need to reserve a company name by entering the proposed name, after having checked that this name is capable of being reserved. The submitted name will then be checked and approved by Companies Office staff. If the submission has been during business hours, a confirmation email will be sent back within two hours and, in case of a successful application, including the name reservation letter in an attachment. Users are then asked to pay for this name reservation service online by providing their debit or credit card details.
Once the name approval has been processed the online dashboard will be updated and a new task will be displayed, prompting the user to complete an online company application for incorporation with the Companies Office’s Register. The user then needs to provide basic details about the company (e.g. directors, shareholders, contact details) and has the option to apply for a company Inland Revenue Department (IRD) number by providing company details (e.g. trading name, contact details, email address), and register for tax. Once the online incorporation process is complete, the company’s certificate of incorporation and its tax details will be sent to the user. After reviewing the full application, the user is asked to pay an application fee online.
Applications are processed automatically and the user will receive an email including attached consent forms for the directors and shareholders to sign. The user needs to upload these signed forms to the online dashboard. If an application meets certain criteria (e.g. formed as a nominee company for overseas interests), the Companies Office will require additional evidence of the consent and identity verification for all individuals who have signed any documentation. Additional identity verification needs to be done via a person’s passport or certified copies of two identity verification means (e.g. identity card, driver’s licence, birth certificate). When all consents and, if required, additional identity verification documents have been accepted, the company is incorporated with the Companies Office’s register and a certificate of incorporation is sent via email. The user can also view a copy of the certificate online by searching the register.
Analysis
Citizen identity reconstruction for online service access is separated into two informational processes: one related to the citizen as an igovt-programme user and another process focused on the citizen as a Companies Office account holder. Both processes require the individual to register first before accessing the online Companies Office services. However, only minimum identity information is collected and used for citizen attribution. Next, citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation are used for online payment.
Citizen identity reconstruction and attribution for reserving a company name and applying for incorporation with the Companies Office’s Register are largely managed by the consumer. Subsequently, citizen identity fixation of the submitted company name happens through an email response to the individual; in the case of an application for incorporation with the Companies Office’s Register, the user needs to upload signed consent forms as a precondition for citizen identity fixation. If the application for incorporation meets certain criteria, additional citizen identity reconstruction and attribution processes are undertaken based on traditional citizen identity documents in order to fixate citizen identity.
Case 3 – e-benefits service provision
Since 2004, a UK local council has been using an e-benefits system to assist citizens with housing and council tax benefits services. In the past, a citizen would visit the council office and submit a form including various personal details, which then would be analysed by back-office staff for benefits calculation. At present, a council officer visits a benefit claimant at their home for an interview to calculate the benefit that can be claimed. Using a tablet PC with specialised software, the officer collects personal details from the benefit claimant, including information on the claimant’s living arrangements, income, bank account details, savings, and other benefits claimed. This information is put into an on-screen form, which then enables the software to calculate in real-time the benefits that will be received. In addition, the claimant is asked to show the officer multiple identity documents, such as a passport, driver’s licence and payslips. As the claimant’s signature is legally required to officially acknowledge the claim form, the digital form is signed with an electronic pen. The approved form is then sent as an email attachment via a wireless network to the council’s head office, where it is stored in a database together with all approved local benefit claims.
Data of local benefit claimants are electronically transferred by the council to the UK Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), where personal details of claimants are being matched with a variety of personal and group datasets held by the DWP and the UK HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). This matching process is used to find indications that the claimant may be mistakenly or fraudulently claiming benefits. Moreover, the DWP also uses local benefit claimants’ information to run an ICT-supported risk analysis leading to the attribution of a risk score to claimants, which puts them into a particular risk category indicating the likelihood of error or fraud associated with the individual. Outcomes of this matching process and the risk scores are sent to the local council to act upon at its discretion through follow-up in case reviews for instance, which can lead to the discovery of both overpayments and underpayments to claimants.
Analysis
Citizen identity reconstruction demonstrates similarities to traditional benefits service provision, with the exception of real-time processing of identity information, in particular address details, and signing a digital form. In contrast however, citizen identity attribution and fixation is done in real-time from the client’s home. New ICT-enabled forms of citizen identity attribution and fixation take place when citizen identity information is transferred to the DWP, matched with varying datasets, and an ICT-generated risk score is attributed to each individual client. Outcomes of these processes are sent to the local council for their confirmation of the suggested citizen identity fixations.
Shifts on citizen identity and citizenship dimensions
As a result of ICT-enabled citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation in transactional e-government service relationships, the following shifts can be conceptualised on citizen identity and citizenship dimensions.
Citizen identity dimensions
Physical vs. informational nature
Particularly cases 1 and 2 show a shift towards an informational nature of citizen identity attribution and fixation, compared to a physical nature of citizen identity in traditional service environments. Moreover, cases 1 and 3 demonstrate that citizen identity fixation takes place on the basis of stored information in databases, related to either a citizen’s identity information from past events (e.g. ‘digital footprints’) or abstracted demographical information of groups of citizens (e.g. DWP datasets).
Fragmented vs. federated nature
All three cases demonstrate that citizen role-identity information is no longer fragmented and restricted to a particular service relationship, but is used in cross-government service delivery. However, cases 1 and 2 also show new forms of fragmentation between citizen identity information management for online logon and verification, and for online service consumption. Moreover, case 2 points out that citizen identity information is not freely available across government but subject to restrictions. Furthermore, case 1 introduces the federated option of citizen identity information being reconstructed and attributed by an organisation outside government.
Single identity vs. multiple and plural identities
Cases 1 and 2 show that, in order to fixate citizen identity in e-government service provision, the citizen needs to make use of multiple and plural identities for public service access (e.g. registration), compared to the use of a single citizen identity document in traditional service environments. Moreover, multiple forms of citizen identity information are collected and processed, including information which is not located within that particular public service domain (e.g. mail-order behaviour information, medical details). Furthermore, government agencies use ICT-enabled citizen identity attribution for fixating citizen identity, such as matching citizen identity information with information stored in databases.
Asynchronous vs. real-time identity information management
Unlike traditional service environments where a citizen typically needs to wait for a service-related response, all cases show multiple examples that citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation are happening in real-time and away from the service provider’s office.
Fixed vs. flexible citizen identity
In contrast to traditionally fixed citizen identity (e.g. passport document), cases 1 and 3 show that the scope of citizen identity can be determined and assessed in variable ways in transactional e-government service relationships: the outcome of citizen identity fixation depends on databases used for matching identity information and creating trust and risk profiles. Depending on the discretionary ‘bandwidth’ of these profiles, such fixations can have direct implications for both ‘out-of-role’ and ‘role-compliant’ citizen identity assessments.
‘Hard’ certainty vs. ‘soft’ ambiguity
The expansion of citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation in cases 1 and 3 points at a shift away from ‘hard’ certainty around citizen identity (e.g. meeting the citizen-client in person) and towards ‘soft’ ambiguity around citizen identity fixation (e.g. risk scores for benefit claimants). Moreover, case 1 illustrates that, if ‘soft’ ambiguity points towards an increased risk-scenario around citizen identity fixation, public officials prefer to move back to the ‘hard’ certainty of traditional forms of citizen identity attribution and fixation. Alternatively, case 2 shows that ‘soft’ certainty in online service relationships can be managed by offering self-service options to the citizen in citizen identity reconstruction and attribution.
Citizenship dimensions
Location-based vs. location-less citizenship
Cases 1 and 2, and 3 to some extent, demonstrate that the geographical location of public service consumption is becoming less and less relevant: citizens can consume an e-government service from any location at their convenience as long as they have internet access (cases 1 and 2). An exception to this shift can be seen in case 3, with a location-based e-benefit service provided at the citizen’s home.
Universal vs. particularistic forms of citizenship
Moving away from traditional equity and universal access principles, cases 1 and 3 demonstrate particularistic citizenship conceptions through more individualised public service arrangements based on ICT-enabled citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation. An alternative form of particularistic citizenship is demonstrated in case 2, where the citizen is offered an individualised self-service citizen identity reconstruction and attribution arrangement. Another particularistic form of citizenship results from restricting service provision to an online environment (case 2).
Citizenship inclusion vs. exclusion
In all three cases, a development towards exclusive treatment of individuals as a result of ICT-enabled citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation can be observed: citizenship exclusion is managed through pre-set conditions around trusted citizens (case 1), internet access (case 2) and risk profiles (case 3).
Public-sector domain vs. private-sector domain of enacted citizenship
Case 1 demonstrates that citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation are no longer tasks and responsibilities exclusive to the public sector, but equally can be undertaken by private-sector organisations with access to citizen identity information. These organisations then are reconstructing and attributing citizens’ ‘digital footprints’, which constitute the basis for citizen identity fixation by public officials.
‘Opt-in’ vs. ‘locked-in’ citizenship
In digital-era government, the principle of universal service provision is no longer warranted, with citizens forced to exchange their identity information with government through the online channel (case 2), and ICT-enabled profiling of individual benefit claimants leading to ‘locked-in’ citizenship roles and categories (case 3). Alternatively, in case 1, the citizen has the option to use the online service channel besides other available channels.
Organisation-centric vs. citizen-centric identity information management
Case 2 shows that citizen identity reconstruction and attribution in e-government service relationships can be managed by the citizen instead of government. However, cases 1 and 3 demonstrate traditional organisation-centric forms of citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation in e-government service relationships with the citizen.
In summary, Table 1 provides an overview of how the three case studies compare regarding shifts on citizen identity and citizenship dimensions in public service provision.
Citizen identity and citizenship dimensions
Conclusion
In digital-era government, citizen identity reconstruction, attribution and fixation lead to shifts on multiple dimensions of citizen identity and citizenship in public service provision. These shifts create an interesting paradox between managing citizen identity information based on conceptions of fixed citizen identity and uniform, egalitarian citizenship in offline public service environments, and managing citizen identity information based on conceptions of fluid citizen identity and differentiated, exclusive citizenship in e-government service environments. The latter situation seems to imply the use of more and multiple processes of citizen identity reconstruction and attribution in order to fixate citizen identity and try to reclaim ‘hard’ certainty in ICT-enabled citizen – government relationships. Case 2 might also point us towards the importance of institutional context in using minimal citizen identity information and offering self-management identity reconstruction and attribution arrangements to citizens. However, more empirical research is needed to more broadly explore citizen identity information management processes in varying e-government service environments and across different institutional contexts and further test the presented initial conceptualisation of shifts on citizen identity and citizenship dimensions in public service provision.
