Abstract
Keywords
Globalization as a phenomenon affecting Africa could be said to have become prominent in the early 1990s through to the 2000s. It manifested itself in the political, economic, social, cultural, communications and media sphere in a number of ways. These various ways seemed to connect it or align its development with that of northern industrialized societies that follow liberal representative or social democratic systems of government, with market economies regulated in various ways.
Globalization also came after several decades of African independence from colonial control and domination. After the independence wave that began in the late 1950s, the continent’s politics were soon dominated by dictatorial regimes of various types. These included military-led governments which were the result of coups, and in some case multiple coups, against civilian rule. Another variety was the one-party state, characterized by leaders who ruled for anything up to three decades after independence. Others were regimes that carried out regular elections which were always won by one party: no opposition ever came close to winning. Even in the countries which seemed to be shining beacons of democracy in a sea of dictatorship and venal rule, elections were not necessarily free or fair or a genuine expression of the will of the people.
Globalization came also when Africa’s economies were on their knees. A combination of endogenous and exogenous factors contributed to this situation. Economic policies were ostensibly designed to redress colonial exclusion and inequalities but in reality they were hobbled by poor design and/or implementation, coupled with corruption and maladministration. Skewed economic relations with northern industrialized economies, included, among other things, the effects of colonial economic umbilical cords and unfair trade policies and practices. This toxic mix of factors resulted in an inability to deliver jobs, employment and sustainable livelihoods. Instead of the peace, love and development that some African leaders preached, Africa was a poster child for poverty, disease, misery and wars of various kinds, including civil and interstate wars. The Cold War did not help, entangling many African countries in superpower battles for control and influence. These had detrimental effects on political and democratic processes internally, and produced hardly any socio-economic benefits.
In that context a small urban-based elite, either occupying or with access to state power and resources, lived a luxurious life and was accountable to virtually no one. They showed no empathy with their fellow citizens, whom they had turned into subjects through the systematic denial of freedoms of expression and association, and deprivation of socio-economic and cultural rights.
To be sure, some countries made some progress in expanding access to education and health services to populations previously excluded by colonial regimes. Some provision of access to social services made a difference to levels of literacy, infant mortality and the eradication of preventable diseases. In general, however, progress was painfully slow, if it occurred at all. The right to a dignified life for both individuals and groups, in which they could fulfill their potential, was denied to most people.
The development of media and communications and the study of the media were marked by the same crisis. In the name of nation building, an elite project driven from above created a dominant state-owned and -controlled media system which was essentially a propagandistic megaphone for the ruling elite that allowed no diversity of voices. In many countries, private and commercially owned media were not allowed to operate, particularly in the broadcast sphere. Where they were allowed, censorship and repression was not unusual and some of these private media succumbed to pressures to support the regimes in power. The state was media owner, policy maker, regulator and operator in all the media and communications sectors. Media growth, diversity and access were limited and in turn limited the capacity for civil society to engage in any dialogue critical of state tutelage and direction. A rich legacy from the colonial era of laws, policies and regulations aimed directly at restricting freedom of expression and media freedom, supplemented by new inventions, reinforced a flourishing tradition of censorship. Arrests, killings and detentions of journalists, together with closures of media houses, were part of a repertoire of repression that some regimes tried to perfect. It is also true that a tradition of opposition to such repression developed, led by individual journalists and editors. Some publications gave a voice to the courageous people who tried to make power accountable to the public will.
By and large journalism and media education and training were the business of state-owned technical colleges and private correspondence colleges. This mode of training or education was not linked to any tradition of media critique and research. Some of the media houses provided cadet training on the job that produced good reporters. Most universities did not provide programmes in journalism or media studies and those in search of such education and training went abroad, usually to North America, Europe or the Soviet Union and its allies.
Second winds of change
The 1990s were a time of ‘change’. This change was partly influenced by changes in the former Soviet Union and East and Central Europe, as well as in Asia and Latin America. As in those contexts, ‘pro-democracy’ movements, made up of trade unions, university academics and students, human rights activists, some churches, individuals who believed in civil liberties and opposition parties, began to challenge ‘undemocratic’ rule and economic decay, and to demand ‘democratic freedoms’. These demands for democracy included freedom of expression and the media, freedom of association and assembly, better wages and salaries, multi-party elections, new constitutions limiting executive power and term limits for heads of states. It can be argued that the rise of these movements internally, as well as the support they received from northern industrialized countries for the ‘democracy agenda,’ is an element of globalization in Africa. The model of organizing politics adopted was sometimes presented not only as the best way to realize freedom but as the universal norm of democracy incarnate. It was also a rejection of African democracy and African socialism, as formulated by the likes of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.
In the economic sphere, opposition movements and some elites, and even some repressive governments seeking economic solutions, embraced what were often referred to as ‘western-style market reforms’. These required the retreat of the state from being a major economic player in every sector of the economy. The package of reforms included liberalization measures of various types, including the commercialization and privatization of state enterprises and encouraging market competition. The phrase ‘free market economy’ was bandied about in policy discourse as something that was natural. The ability to carry out economic and political reforms that would make a country an attractive destination for foreign direct investment was considered a panacea for economic malaise. By some accounts, including that of Nobel Laureate Columbia University Professor Joseph Stiglitz, a former Chief Economist at the World Bank, in his book Globalization and its Discontents economic structural adjustment measures of various types were either negotiated or imposed as a condition for aid.
An interesting element of this approach to economic reform is that it often went counter to the demands for more participation in decision-making that were made by a diversity of social and political forces in the ‘pro-democracy’ movements. This tension is worth noting because in a sense it speaks to what is a divergent discourse about globalization in Africa. It marks the difference between those who think globalization is a benign or even liberating force, often loosely called the ‘liberals’, and those coming from a long tradition of radical nationalist and left-leaning Marxist-oriented ideological viewpoints. For the latter, globalization is just the latest stage in the development of capitalism and imperialism, and works against Africa liberating itself. The optimists argued that it would modernize moribund economies and bridge the development gap between Africa as a ‘third world’, ‘developing’ or ‘underdeveloped’ region of the world and the ‘western’ developed world. Some among them adhered to the new discourse about ‘emerging markets’, which was based on the belief that the ‘free’ market would solve all of Africa’s ills.
Media developments
A new development of the 1990s ‘second winds of change’ in the media and communication sphere was media pluralization. In many African countries, the rhetoric of liberalization translated into varying degrees of licensing of FM radio and television stations to private owners. A democratic society was envisioned as one with a plurality of media that could hold the state to account. Alongside a process of pluralization of the media landscape there was meant to be a parallel process of dismantling state broadcasting monopolies and turning them into genuine public service broadcasters in the mould of western public service broadcasters like the BBC. In other words, the intention was to create media systems that approximated global norms of diversity and pluralism.
In particular, media policy advocacy groups adopted a discourse of press freedom that echoed the discourses on press freedom and broadcasting that were typical of northern industrialized societies. Often these advocacy groups were funded by ‘democracy’ supporting organizations from the North. It is important to note that media liberalization or the ‘open the airwaves’ campaign was both a home-grown demand, born of decades of suppression of freedom of expression and the media, as well as external pressures for democratization. However, often uncritical assumptions were made about media systems in the global North, and there was a failure to realize that processes of media concentration had reduced pluralism and diversity, had produced media conglomerates that were embedded within the dominant power elites and often functioned in ways that undermined democracy.
Nonetheless, in many countries there was an emergence of newspapers and magazines practising a crusading and feisty journalism that sought to address taboo topics and challenge institutions and individuals that were hitherto considered untouchable or beyond the scrutiny of the media. A tabloid journalism dealing with popular issues, entertainment and sport thrived in varying degrees, but also often met with heavy-handed post-publication censorship, including arrests of publishers and journalists. This new journalism, while sensational in its muckraking, also exposed corruption among the elite, discrediting them in ways that reduced their legitimacy and their hold on power. Such journalism had a democratizing effect. It is also true some of the newspapers were beholden to particular political interests and were used as tools to attack political opponents in ways that undermined editorial independence and journalistic ethics.
The FM radio stations also introduced a new form of radio journalism different from the official lectures that sometimes formed the staple of the state-controlled broadcasters. Phone-in programmes and debates allowed the public a voice. Their interactive style introduced some degree of dialogue and was in sharp contrast to the didactic monologues characteristic of state-controlled broadcasters. In a sense this can be called a public sphere of democratic debate. A similar trend was evident on new privately owned or commercialized television channels. A key feature of the new entrants into the television landscape was an increase in popular programming, from the USA in particular, but also from Europe, Brazil and India. Talk shows, music videos of the type broadcast on MTV networks, as well as popular sports like wrestling and English Premier League Soccer, became part of programming. On radio popular music genres like rap, hip hop and soul from the USA also came to prominence. Often this programming was supported by advertising and sponsorship from new companies seeking marketing and branding opportunities.
NGOs working on women’s and human rights issues, the environment and even market economics became part of programming, sometimes even on state broadcasters, which had lost some of their state subsidies during the economic reforms. To a lesser extent, some ‘local’ programming, often modelled on imported soap operas, talk shows and music videos, was produced.
One major limitation of the new FM radio stations was their concentration in urban areas, leaving out rural areas, which in many African countries are more populous. Another phenomenon was the ownership of FM radio stations by new movements linked to the religious right in the USA, preaching a gospel of redemption and material success. Some of these were aligned with ‘born again’ political leaders. A local tradition of televangelism developed. This development did not always enhance democratization and often came with a new cult of leadership worship based on religion. It also brought homophobic messages that ran counter to attempts to build an inclusive human rights culture accepting of all manner of social differences, including differences in sexuality.
The introduction of the internet and mobile cellular phones was another development that altered the communications and media landscape in Africa from the middle of the 1990s. Use of email for advocacy and short message services enabled a growing connectivity that was not typical of the era of fixed-line state-controlled telephony, which had all but ground to halt due to lack of investment. New technologies also increased access and empowered a growing youthful population that was sometimes at the forefront of protests against decades of authoritarian rule. The new media also allowed greater access to the global store and flow of information.
Yet it is also true that access to the internet was, and still is, extremely low by the standards of northern industrialized countries. Access follows patterns of media access and availability of communications infrastructure that is skewed towards the elite and the urban areas. In recent times, the laying of fibre optic cables around Africa’s coast is improving access and speeds, and lowering costs.
In some respects there was no change: for example, the dominance of international news agencies in supplying foreign news, especially to news media, is unchallenged. It is still the case, just as the UNESCO-commissioned McBride report of the 1980s demonstrated, that news about African countries in African news media often comes via the international news agencies which are owned by institutions in northern industrialized societies. These practice a form of journalism that is driven by normative values of those societies in ways that can be quite ethnocentric and crudely universalistic. The same report found that the flow of entertaining programming is unidirectional from North to South. This is still the case, despite the emergence of Nollywood in Nigeria and flows from Bollywood in India. The persistence and deepening of this imbalance proves the point that globalization is not a new phenomenon in Africa and that it is not necessarily a benign force.
The changed media landscape is in part a result of the emergence of a commercial private sector and its marketing, advertising and branding activities, which provide sources of revenue beyond state advertising. This has led to the growth of a consumer culture characterized by a love for branded goods, in particular clothing, accessories and fast food. In this regard, one could observe that Africa is becoming part of a global consumer culture. The attempts at commercialization of most things, including subsidized social services, and the increasing role of the financial sector that has come with deregulation of the economy, created a climate where the appearance of prosperity captured the imagination of some Africans.
Studies of the media
The changes in the media and communications landscape spurred some universities, as well as private colleges, to develop media studies or communication studies programmes. Hitherto the focus was on journalism training, usually in state-owned vocational colleges or private colleges, which offered certificates below the degree level.
Before the 1990s a few universities offered journalism programmes. The focus of these programmes was on practical skills training for the industry without, or with minimal, critical theory in media and cultural studies. In the pre-‘democratization’ era, the kind of journalism training offered was geared towards promoting government programmes, not journalism focused on informing the public as citizens who enjoy rights. Many of these trainees found employment in state-controlled media as adjunct civil servants.
In the current context, journalism programmes draw their inspiration very much from North American and European approaches, based on notions of journalism as something that seems almost an institution above society. In this regard one can note there is a globalization of a liberal form of journalism at play in a context in Africa where liberal democracy and notions of press freedom are nascent and fragile. Such programmes often also benefit from training schemes run by journalism training institutions in the North America and Europe, which offer short courses leading to certificates and diplomas as part of a package of ‘democratization’ support.
Similarly, communication studies programmes, both historically and in the current context, often also specialize in a form of communication analysis and training that takes an uncritical view of commercially driven media and its celebrity culture. They offer not only journalism training but also public relations, advertising and marketing programmes. These programmes have some currency in the context of deregulation, commercialization and privatization of the economy, both more broadly and the media sector, particularly for new careers linked to an emerging market-oriented economy.
A phenomenon linked to global developments in university education is that programmes in media studies, communications and journalism draw large numbers of students hoping to become part of the new commercially driven mediated culture and its promise of (instant) success and recognition.
Media studies programmes which adopt various critical theories as analytical frameworks, ranging from Marxism to critical political economy of the media, feminist media approaches and British cultural studies, try to combine critiques of the media with practical training. They hope to produce a reflective practitioner who is aware that the media ought to operate in the public interest and not simply as an adjunct of a commercial system focused on profits.
These programmes often emerge from English departments, or departments of literary studies, which seek to increase their student numbers or broaden their offerings. Consistent with their mission, they have as their focus the analysis of a range of media genres as representations of reality. Programmes in critical media studies are also characterized by attempts to produce research about media institutions, texts, audience reception and media policy and regulation, and are less invested in vocational training.
This theoretical and analytical bias is not popular with employers of graduates, nor with students, who want vocational skills. Their theoretical underpinnings in critical social theories, including Marxism, are also seen as outdated in a context where the belief is that capitalism has permanently triumphed over communism, and Marxism has been shown to be a false ideology.
The fact that critical media studies programmes are also distinguished by critiques of commercially driven media and the dominant global media system does not exactly endear them to a media in the throes of commercialization. In policy debates, academics in critical media studies offer suggestions for the creation of more genuinely pluralistic and diverse media systems. They also suggest independent regulation of the media as distinct from state regulation. These policy suggestions are not easily accepted, either by governments or the media sector generally, in part because the democratization agenda is often very weak.
In Africa the theoretical frameworks and research methods, and even choices of what aspects of the communications and media system to focus on, follow very much the traditions of critical communication and media studies in Europe and North America. They can hardly be said to constitute an ‘African’ media studies tradition. In a sense one can also talk about the ‘globalization’ of a northern variety of media studies. If one argues that African media systems are in a sense clones of the dominant ‘global’ media system this seems to make sense. African media systems, however, are not replicas of northern industrialized society’s media systems. In this context, it is worth noting that most academics in media studies are graduates of universities in the UK/Europe and North America, who have been trained in English or other European languages.
If there is a dominant global commercial media system, then it is important that there be a dominant global tradition of media critique and research. It is also important that this global critical tradition of media studies accommodates the realities and nuances of context and contributes new theoretical insights. African academics in Africa, and academics who study African media, are well placed to provide these insights because they are able to note the incongruity of media systems that exhibit elements of being transplanted, are not a society-wide system of communication, and, in some sections, use languages that are hardly the languages of daily use.
In conclusion, there was a time when Africans thought they knew what globalization was. Some perceived it as a benign force that would address the continent’s perennial problems of anaemic if not collapsed economies, poverty, inequality, ‘underdevelopment’ and dictatorial political regimes that had overstayed their time in power. In this narrative, political reforms would usher in liberal representative democracy and what are usually called ‘democratic free and fair elections’ and political pluralism – a second wind after the first winds of change that heralded the decolonization of the continent from imperial rule by European powers. Africa would join Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet Union and East and Central Europe in a wave of ‘democratization’ inspired by North America, Europe and Scandinavia. Globalization would bring foreign direct investment and rejuvenate moribund economies. It would dismantle state monopolies and the dead corrupt hand of the state that was stifling the economy. In their place, it would introduce private enterprise competition. In the media sphere, there would be ‘liberalization of the airwaves’, which would introduce privately owned radio and television stations free from state control and censorship. This would enable genuine freedom of expression and be a voice for the voiceless. State ownership and regulation of the media would give way to private ownership and the flourishing of freedom of expression and the media.
New information and technologies including mobile cellular telephony would enable Africa to leapfrog older technologies like fixed telephony which had failed to produce a society-wide communications system. These benign effects of globalization, or the idea of globalization as a force for good, are no longer taken for granted in Africa. There is a leftist critique that sees globalization as a form of neo-imperialism. Political and economic reforms have also had the effect of entrenching the power of elites and have not produced more transparent, clean and accountable government. Poverty and inequality remain major social and political problems. The global financial crisis and, earlier, the uneven success of economic structural adjustment programmes promoted by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the northern industrialized countries has created scepticism about market reforms. Investment has not necessarily flowed to Africa as promised. Financial publications like the Financial Times and The Economist, and major global financial institutions, continue to keep the hope alive by pointing at rates of economic growth that exceed that of the Eurozone, currently caught a debt crisis of frightening proportions.
The rise of China has put a different spin on globalization as integration with the northern industrialized societies. The idea of following a ‘western’ model of development, which can be summarized as liberal democracy and free market economies leading to a prosperous society, now faces a new critique. A phrase originally coined by Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe called for Africa to ‘look east’. China has come to be seen as an alternative model of development that is favoured by leaders who want state capitalism without what they perceive to be the western imposition of norms and values under the guise of democracy and universal human rights. With the northern industrialized societies caught in the throes of economic crises, China has emerged as a large but self-interested investor in Africa. This in turn has led to concerns among Africans about a new imperialist power looting its raw materials and reinforcing the power of political forces that are not keen on the democratization of power and access to resources in Africa.
The African media has yet to grapple in any coherent way with this changing global scenario, given their traditional dependence on ‘western media’ for foreign news and global affairs and lack of knowledge of Chinese or Chinese society. Media studies programmes, including the critical ones, are usually delivered in European languages and have followed theoretical frameworks that are largely based on studying media systems in North America and Europe and not the media systems of the rest of the world. They have yet to produce a coherent theoretical response to the emergence of China and its media systems. Despite this incoherence it can be said this is an emergent African critical media studies which seeks to establish itself as a tradition.