The ongoing significance of national media systems in the context of media globalization

Comparative studies and media systems

Cross-national comparative research in media studies has gained much needed attention in recent years (Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012). This is a welcome development to correct two long-standing limitations in the field. First, it contributes to reducing the one-way traffic of academic ideas that has characterized the study of media, politics, and policies. Just like communication and media studies in general, the study of media politics and policies has been largely embedded in scholarship produced in the United States and Britain, and central research questions in the field have reflected particular scholarly priorities and empirical developments in both countries. The problem of this geographical bias is that the media–politics–policy nexus in both countries has been unique. Consequently, the analytical scaffolding has largely reflected particular political-media settings. Against this backdrop, renewed interest in comparative research has sparked growing scholarly dialogue across borders and stimulated a cosmopolitan academic sensitivity interested in theoretical questions and cross-national processes (Waisbord, 2015).

Second, comparative research helps us to interrogate the relevance of country and regional studies in the context of global communication and media studies. The field of media politics has been ‘de-Westernized’ for a long time, if this means the availability of studies about, and produced in, non-Western settings. A significant limitation has, however, been the propensity toward largely descriptive comparative studies primarily interested in understanding national differences, rather than developing alternative explanations and theories. Cross-national comparative work mitigates the limitations of parallel academic discussions by fostering interest in common theoretical and conceptual questions. It encourages scholars to be mindful of the significance of national/regional cases for a global academic community. Comparative research has renewed the debate about units of analysis of the study of media and politics. Recent comparative studies have examined topics such as media systems (Dobek-Ostrowska et al., 2010; Hallin and Mancini, 2004, 2012; Thomass and Kleinstuber, 2011), news coverage (Benson, 2013), journalistic cultures and practice (Örnebring, 2012), and the impact of media structures and content on citizens’ knowledge about public affairs (Aalberg and Curran, 2012; Esser et al., 2012). There is also a growing comparative media policy literature, where the concept of comparative media governance is being drawn upon to move from simply listing institutional and regulatory differences between nations, toward the generation of ‘causal comparisons [which] involve hypothesis testing in order to explain similarities and differences’ (Puppis and d’Haenens, 2012: 214; cf. Puppis, 2010).

Of particular relevance in this discussion is the significance, and the continuing relevance, of studying media systems bounded by nations and states (Livingstone, 2012). The obvious question raised by globalization is that if it is the transformative process of our times, why should we study media systems mapped onto the boundaries of nations and states? As Jonathan Hardy (2012) observes, comparative media systems research grapples with ‘a tension between analysis of the cluster of features that have shaped and differentiated media systems, organized largely on national lines, and the transnational and transcultural dynamics that are reshaping these systems’ (p. 185). There are those who argue that such approaches retain a state-centric ‘methodological nationalism’ that is inappropriate in an age of global communication networks, social processes, and planetary risks (Beck and Sznaider, 2006; Steger, 2009). The related point is that media systems are seen as isolating the national scale, in a world where political, economic, and cultural relations are increasingly multi-scalar, moving between the local (city-regions), the national, and the regional–transnational.

The critique of ‘media systems’ as analytical units

Three critiques have been leveled against focusing on ‘media systems’ as the primary unit of comparative research: that the concept is outdated and methodologically flawed; that it ties media cultures to nation-states in ways that are no longer appropriate; and that a ‘system’ itself is not an analytical unit for comparative study.

One criticism is that the notion of ‘media system’ is outdated and flawed, as both ‘media’ and ‘system’ are embedded in questionable premises about the analysis of social phenomena, rooted in normative and essentialist accounts such as the classic Four Theories of the Press (Siebert et al., 1956). The concept of ‘media’ assumes the mass communication context of discrete technologies and industries that provide separate ‘channels’ which make possible the mass production and distribution of content. This conception is seen as passé in a convergent media order where digital technologies have collapsed old divisions across media industries and formats, and lines between inter/personal and mass media are being fundamentally blurred if not completely erased. The concept of ‘media’ fails to acknowledge recent changes that put in question traditional ideas of channels that ‘mediate’ communication. The notion of ‘system’ is seen as a conceptual leftover of mid-century functionalist sociology that envisioned society as constituted by interdependent parts with distinct functions, as components articulated around a common center and purpose that shape and reinforce a closed and stable order. Alternative concepts such as ‘information/news ecology’ (Napoli, 2011; Scolari, 2012) and ‘media order’ (Chalaby, 2005) have been suggested to displace the concept of ‘media systems’.

A second critique is that the notion of ‘media system’ is mapped over the boundaries and power of nation-states (Couldry and Hepp, 2009, 2012). The focus on ‘media systems’ tacitly assumes the primacy of nation-states, which is seen as a questionable premise at a time of increased trans-border cultural/media processes. This premise is at the root of a twofold problem. One is whether it downplays the extent to which media processes have become unmoored from media systems and nation-states so that media systems and nation-states are no longer the primary sites of communication/media/culture. A related problem is the analytical ‘tunnel vision’ of ‘media systems’ studies. By focusing on national media systems, they lose sight of phenomena that transcend the boundaries of nation-states. The intensification of diasporic and hybrid media cultures, as well as transnational activism and global digital/social media networks, challenges the media-cultural sovereignty of modern nation-states. Moreover, global media production networks are focused on cities rather than nations: cities as diverse as Mumbai, Vancouver, Hong Kong, and Miami serve as ‘key nodes or “switching points” for flows of capital and labor’ (Punathambekar, 2013: 11), with only a limited degree of articulation back into national media cultures.

A third criticism is that ‘media systems’ are not appropriate analytical units, as they consist of component elements such as laws, politics, economics, cultures, and institutions which should instead be the focus of scholarly inquiry. Humphreys (2011) has argued that the particular institutions that constitute media systems offer better explanatory variables for understanding the differing relationship between media and politics across countries, as seen through empirical indicators such as types of news coverage, relations between governments and the media, or governmental communication strategies. Rather than discussing the constitutive elements of media systems through various typologies, it is proposed that we should focus on the characteristics of institutions (e.g. markets, political parties, laws, journalism) and inter-institutional relations. Because ‘media systems’ do not explain the nature and characteristics of particular political-communication phenomena, grounded empirical studies should instead focus upon these institutional structures and dynamics to explain differences and similarities.

This line of argument is supported by recent comparative studies that explain differences across countries by focusing on specific characteristics of media systems. For example, different relations between journalism and politics (Esser and Umbricht, 2013; Benson and Hallin, 2007) explain variations in news coverage, type of media source (public vs private) accounts for disparities in citizens’ knowledge about public affairs in European countries, and journalists’ occupational values and newsroom norms explain different journalistic practices across countries (Aalberg and Curran, 2012). These conclusions may suggest that specific institutions and practices within national media, rather than media systems as an aggregating category, best explain similarities and differences across countries.

Our intention in this article is to offer a qualified defense for why the concept of ‘media systems’ remains a relevant and useful analytical unit for comparative media studies and media policy studies, even if we acknowledge the critique of functionalism, the importance of globalization, and the specificities of particular institutional forms and grounded professional media practice. The concept of ‘media systems’ is a conceptual construction that enables an aggregation of structures and dynamics in ways that allow for the systematic study of media, politics, and policies. It assumes that important structures and dynamics ‘thicken’ around ‘media systems’ that are bounded by the politics of nation-states, without denying the significance of globalization. As the rigorous study of the intersection among media, politics, and policies demands clear units of analysis, and we propose that while the concept of ‘media systems’ is not the only relevant analytical unit, it remains important for comparative research interested in contrasting cases and assessing the impact of global trends, and alternatives proposed are not particularly persuasive. This in turn implies, as Nitin Govil (2009) has argued that,

the national remains a powerful mode for engaging the spatial and temporal practices that organize the contemporary media industries across various economies of scale … [and] have created a powerful incentive for media industries to continue to ‘think nationally’ even in a globally dispersed field of cultural production. (p. 140)

Moreover, we argue that this is the case of the ostensibly ‘stateless’ Internet-based media as it is for the territorially defined print and broadcasting industries.

‘Media system’ and its alternatives

Recent work on ‘media systems’ has moved away from normative visions that underpinned classic studies about press and media systems. Rather than providing arguments about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases, or simply identifying quantitative differences between nations, they are interested in identifying central variables that shape the nexus between media–politics–policies in order to examine cross-national differences and similarities. In particular, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Comparing Media Systems reinvigorated the concept of ‘media systems’ and showed the importance of taxonomic studies for comparative research. While their study captures essential, historical features of Western European media systems, it has also generated a significant amount of debate and subsequent studies to probe the features of media systems outside Europe (Hallin and Mancini, 2012).

At the same time, Hallin and Mancini’s comparative framework has emerged in the context of technological, political, and cultural changes associated with globalization and the Internet. The question arises as to whether a comparative model that gives analytical primacy to the nation-state ‘runs the risk of reproducing outdated understandings of “mass” communication, media “systems” and “nation-state”-bound communication flows which no longer fit the realities of today’s globalized, multimedia world’ (Pfetsch and Esser, 2012: 26). The digital revolution has profoundly shaken up the old order by multiplying media offerings, further fragmenting media audiences, causing changes in news consumption habits, ushering new forms of information sharing (e.g. citizen journalism), and facilitating the rise and consolidation of Internet companies. The media systems that Hallin and Mancini analyzed may still retain some of its essential historical features, but they are significantly more complex than they were in the late 20th century.

The concept of ‘media systems’ can indeed be challenged given that both ideas are far from simple. The concept of ‘media’ is changing in the face of technological, industry, and cultural convergence. In contrast to the 20th century when media technologies, institutions, and industries were relatively stable and distinctive, we are now witnessing the rapid erosion of distinctions between platforms and the content they carry. These developments have not, however, rendered the idea of ‘media’ meaningless, as it still refers to technologies used for sharing information and facilitating communication among large numbers of people. The digital revolution had added platforms, collapsed past distinctions between interpersonal and mass communication, and eroded the dichotomy between ‘producers’ and ‘receivers’, but the concept of ‘media’ is itself sufficiently flexible to still refer to platforms, institutions, and practices that ‘mediate’ information and communication processes.

The problems with the concept of ‘system’ are of a different order. The concept is historically embedded in the functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons and others that was influential up to the 1960s and subject to a series of withering critiques since that time (e.g. Hall, 1982). The question is whether ‘system’ is an analytical construct that can be applied to the media without carrying the Parsonian baggage about inherent tendencies toward social stability or having a single, dominant center. We argue that the concept of ‘system’ alludes to a set of institutions, practices, and interactions among media industries, technologies, and users that do not presume a functionalist model, or an underlying value consensus or bias toward order or stability.

Moreover, proposed alternatives to ‘media system’ do not significantly advance understanding of the field, and also present their own problems. Yochai Benkler (2006) has referred to digital networks as forming a ‘hybrid media ecology’, but it can be argued that ‘media ecology’ and the related concept of ‘media environments’ are overly determined by the biases of specific technologies, as well as assumptions about the interconnectedness among constitutive elements derived from biology. Terms such as ‘media space’ and ‘media landscape’ may suggest openness as compared to an implied closure associated with ‘media system’, but these are geographical metaphors that lack a focus on the role of nation-states within geographical spaces that is a core feature of the media systems approach. Other concepts such as ‘media sphere’ and ‘media field’ are very much tied to the works of particular authors – Jürgen Habermas and Pierre Bourdieu, respectively – making it very difficult to use those ideas without importing specific theoretical frameworks and normative assumptions. In summary, then, the alternatives proposed to ‘media system’ are neither problem-free nor do they capture the connections among media institutions, technologies, and practices. Despite the risk that it may imply as functionalist inflection, the concept of ‘media system’ does not assume specific dynamics or relations among its elements, set normative horizons, or anchor the analysis in particular theoretical views, all of which are benefits in maintaining an open analytical framework for comparative media studies.

Media systems and nation-states: the question of scale

The more substantive criticism of the concept of media systems is that it is overly tied to a 20th century framework of mass communications, predominantly national media, and the dominance of nation-states. As such, it fails to adequately account for the 21st century realities of globalization, multicultural societies, and the rise of globally networked digital media largely outside the control of national governments. Globalization has challenged conventional understandings of ‘national’ media systems by intensifying the flows of information and ideas beyond geo-political borders. The political and territorial boundaries of nation-states no longer cordon off news and information offerings or mediated communication processes, particularly those accessed through the Internet, and media users have also become producers and acquired more control over their personal media environments. With societies becoming increasingly multicultural, there is also greater use of diasporic media, making transnational and transcultural media flows more significant, and throwing into question the manner in which nation-states and both supported and regulated national media in order to promote a territorially defined national culture.

The argument that comparative media studies need to move beyond the national ‘containers’ of media systems theories toward a global or ‘transcultural’ approach has been proposed most strongly by Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp (2009, 2012). Following Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Manuel Castells, and others, Couldry and Hepp (2009) argue that comparative media systems models take the nation-state as the principal reference point for comparative research and that this constitutes a form of ‘territorial essentialism’ which loses sight of the extent to which ‘contemporary media cultures are not per se bound in such national containers, and so are not necessarily available to be compared in this way’ (p. 37). It is only by recognizing the limits of taking the ‘state territory as a reified starting point’, it is argued, that media cultures can be thought of as being transnational, transcultural, or deterritorialized and hence able to be thought of ‘outside of a reductive national frame’ (Couldry and Hepp, 2012: 257, 258).

It must be noted that this debate can become overly polarized. Comparative media systems theorists are quite aware of the degree to which media and cultural globalization challenge nationally based media systems as a unit for comparative analysis. Hallin and Mancini (2004) identified globalization as a force that could promote greater homogenization among European media systems, particularly in its association with a global media culture where ‘the media are closer to the world of business, and further from the world of politics’ (p. 76). In a similar vein, Voltmer (2012: 231) has asked whether the globalization of media markets promotes convergence between media systems. For their part, Couldry and Hepp (2009) emphasize that they are not only interested in global media phenomena and that the national space ‘continues to have a high relevance as a reference point for constructing national community’ (p. 39). But there is a larger difference here that needs close discussion, which is whether the nation-state and national territory retain a sufficient degree of primacy in relation to media industries, cultures, markets, and flows to indicate the continuing analytical value of a media systems approach or whether this represents a form of ‘methodological nationalism’ and allegiance to a ‘traditional place-bound notion of culture’ (Couldry and Hepp, 2009: 44) that has become progressively less able to capture the ascendant dynamics of transnational media flows and cultures.

Long-standing assumptions about the nation-state and its ability to effectively regulate and manage aspects of national culture are clearly under challenge. Globalization does challenge the authority and decision-making capacities of nation-states at several levels, ranging from the ways in which hyper-mobile financial capital sets limits to Keynesian models of demand management, to the role played by supra-national institutions, laws, and treaties in making it inevitable that effective political power is now ‘shared and bartered by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels’ (Held et al., 1999: 80). Successive waves of large-scale global migration – in many instances from the ‘Global South’ to the ‘Global North’ – have seen national population become more ethnically heterogeneous and societies become increasingly multicultural, challenging traditional conceptions of the role of the nation-state in animating and securing a distinctive national culture. Projects of nation-building that aimed to harmonize culture and politics within a single nation-state have had, at best, limited results, and the persistence (and growth) of cultural pluralism and the constant dynamics of hybridization attest to the limitations of long-standing political ambitions to sculpt cultural monoliths (García Canclini, 1995). This is particularly apparent in the area of media, where diasporic media consumption and transnational media entities typically operate outside of the policy purview of national governments, whose regulatory frameworks have typically been designed for territorially based national media. The degree to which media flows are becoming global and hence ‘stateless’ if of course enhanced greatly by the rise of the Internet and social media: seeking to identify the ‘nationality’ of YouTube videos, and where jurisdictional authority might lie in relation to them, is clearly a fraught task (Flew, 2012).

A strong case can, however, be made for the continuing centrality of the nation-state to media processes and the significance of the national space in an age of media globalization. One of the fallacies of globalization theory is what Ash Amin (2002) has described as the assumption that it entails ‘a shift in the balance of power between different spatial scales’ (p. 291), particularly from the national to the global. When we think about so-called global processes, it is striking how many of these rest upon agreements between sovereign nation-states: binding free trade agreements are negotiated between national governments, supra-national organizations derive their capacity to act from the support of national governments, the most powerful nation-states can restrict the scope for action by such supra-national entities, and so on. As Hirst et al. (2009) observed, the metaphor of a ‘scalarshift’ from national to global governance ignores the extent to which the nation-state remained central to the ‘suturing’ of relations between local, national, and international levels of governance. Even when nation-states appear to acquiesce to globalization processes, Linda Weiss (2003) has identified this as involving the implementation of policies that actively promote greater international economic integration in ways beneficial to local interests. Referring in particular to the ‘developmental states’ of East Asia, Weiss has argued that these national governments were not simply subordinating sovereignty to the dictates of global finance capital or supra-national agencies; rather, these governments sought to maximize the opportunities for companies within their own nations in a more open international trading environment.

For the most part, media corporations are considerably less transnational than those in other industries. Using the distinction made by economic geographer Peter Dicken (2003) between national corporations with international operations (i.e. foreign subsidiaries), and global corporations ‘whose geographically-dispersed activities are functionally integrated, and not merely a diverse portfolio of activities’ (p. 30), virtually all large media corporations – with the possible exception of News Corporation – are in the former rather than the latter category (Flew, 2007), and no media companies were among the world’s 50 most transnational corporations (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2007).

Further issues could be raised about the continuing salience of the national space and the centrality of nation-states to global media processes. While there may be media globalization in terms of the free flow of information and entertainment content, there remain strong local preferences for locally produced content in most parts of the world (Straubhaar, 2007). Even where media technologies and formats are explicitly transnational, as with satellite and cable TV, considerable adaptation to local and regional languages, cultures, and expectations concerning program genres has been a condition of viability for operating in different countries (Waisbord, 2004). This phenomenon has been termed cultural discount, or the extent to which a media product is ‘valued to a lesser extent by foreign audiences that lack the cultural background and knowledge needed for full appreciation of the product’ (Lee, 2006: 259).

In terms of production, the rise of global media production networks is often seen as subverting national media systems, in two ways. First, these networks are seen to reveal an increasingly deterritorialized logic of capitalist production: as Michael Curtin (2009) has argued, ‘capitalism as a social process … shapes the spatial contours of media, bearing only a contingent or “not necessary” relation to the nation-state’ (p. 112). Second, they point to the centrality of cities, rather than nations, as the decisive ‘switching points’ in these global networks so that one speaks of Bollywood cinema rather than Indian cinema, Vancouver as a media production hub rather than as part of the Canadian screen industries, or of London as part of the global creative industries network rather than distinctly British industries. Such a ‘reconfiguration of national space in transnational terms’ (Punathambekar, 2013: 3) aligns with a broader literature on the rise of ‘global cities’ in an age of economic and cultural globalization, where ‘cities, as compared with nation-states, appear to be interacting more dynamically, even proactively, with the challenges and opportunities of globalization’ (Isar et al., 2012: 3).

While such work has generated important insights, it does not necessarily negate the continuing centrality of national media systems. The politics of cities and regions remains largely embedded within national politics, and the number of genuinely ‘breakaway’ movements worldwide remains relatively limited, even if the politics of uneven development generates internal political tensions. Moreover, global media production networks continue to rely upon a range of enabling support structures provided by nation-states that range from communications infrastructure and tax incentives to labor laws and the policing of copyright. They are not ‘stateless’ modes of production, and this is particularly apparent when movements of creative labor are considered: the ‘trajectories of creative migration’ that Curtin (2009: 113–115) discusses hinge upon national laws governing the movement of persons across national borders that are not necessarily becoming more relaxed and are in many parts of the world becoming more stringent. Finally, as suggested above, the extent to which media and cultural consumption has become cosmopolitan and deracinated is often overstated, and global networks of media production and distribution such as Bollywood remain strongly reliant upon the – admittedly large and growing – diasporic communities with ties to the home country.

The ‘global turn’ in media studies has correctly drawn attention to the need for an epistemology that properly recognizes transformations that challenge neat distinctions between local/national/transnational. We argue that it does not, however, properly recognize the continuous importance of domestic politics and the power pull of the nation-state, and we still need fine-grained approaches that examine the influence of local and national politics on media systems. ¹ Such approaches direct our attention to old yet relevant issues in social theory, namely, the architecture and autonomy of state politics and the scope of collective action to transform policies. These issues remain important to examine the power of transnational actors and globally connected citizens in media policies. We should continue to try to understand how particular political contexts and forms of state interventionism affect structures and dynamics of media systems. Just as the type of political regimes has obviously different impact on media performance (Voltmer, 2012), a host of political issues also need to be considered to understand the overall characteristics of media systems: the types of democratic state; the institutional architecture of democracies; how political systems channel demands and public expression, elitist and democratic forms of media policy-making, and collective mobilization around media policies and content. These issues need to be at the forefront of the research agenda of comparative studies to produce nuanced understandings about the articulation between media and politics.

Media systems and the analysis of global phenomena: the case of Internet policies

What are ‘media systems’ good for in comparative media studies? ‘Media systems’ may not be explanatory variables to account for similarities and differences in media politics and media policies, but they remain central analytical units to understand various global phenomena. Media systems as a whole do not explain global phenomena, as their existence transcends the national space by definition, and it may be the case that, as Humphreys (2011) has observed, specific variables may offer more parsimonious explanations to understand similarities and differences among countries than ‘media systems’ in their totality. But the underlying architecture of media systems analysis remains central to assessing the impact of global media developments in particular contexts, and the impact of globalization (capital, technology, policies, media flows, and content) on media systems cannot be properly understood without addressing how states and domestic media politics function (Nielsen, 2013).

A good area of research to assess the value of ‘media systems’ in the study of globalization is the role of states in Internet policies, precisely because the Internet has been conventionally viewed as the epitome of the libertarian dream of borderless cyberspace that renders state sovereignty and control obsolete. Ongoing debates about Internet neutrality, freedom, and privacy, however, attest to efforts in a different direction – namely, the intention to ‘nationalize’ cyberspace and build a parochial, fragmented Internet anchored by national laws. From ‘national security’ concerns to corporate espionage, states have appealed to various arguments to justify controls that essentially contradict the libertarian aspiration for a global, stateless network. Three national cases, China, Australia, and Brazil, offer evidence of this trend, showing that states retain power to shape the legal boundaries of ‘media systems’ not only in legacy media industries such as broadcasting but also on the Internet.

Even the most ardent advocates of the proposition that the Internet is a force for globalization would acknowledge that China presents a complicating case. Early in the 2000s, Boas and Kalathil (2003) identified China as being a counterpoint to the conventional wisdom that the Internet was a democratizing force that would challenge one-party rule, observing at the time that the Chinese government was promoting local forms of Internet development that would ‘serve state-defined interests rather than challenging them’ (p. 3). A decade later, Evgeny Morozov (2012) would discuss the Chinese case as establishing how the Internet could enable greater state surveillance of citizens, due to the ‘traces’ left by online communication, challenging what he referred to as ‘the Net delusion’ of social media as a democratizing force. As China is now by far the world’s largest Internet-using nation, with over 500 million people online – more than double the number of the second largest Internet-using nation, the United States – there is clearly a need to rethink assumptions about the Internet as a force for global liberal democracy (Bolsover et al., 2013). The recurring difficulties that Google has faced operating in China are also indicative of the very different nature of the relationship between state agencies and corporations that prevails in the Chinese context as compared to the United States.

It can be argued, however, that the distinctive features of the Internet in China, that challenge conceptions of it as a globalizing force that is disruptive of national media systems, extend well beyond the impact of the Communist Party’s one-party rule and the use of media to promote its political leadership. Companies such as Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu have come to dominate the Chinese Internet market even when they have faced strong competition from Google, Microsoft, Paypal, Yahoo!, and others, as they have been consistently more responsive to specific developments in Internet use in China, in ways that are far more difficult for a Chinese subsidiary of a Western company to achieve. The Oxford Internet Institute survey of worldwide Internet use found that Chinese Internet users were more than twice as likely as US users to make online purchases (59% compared to 23%) and watch videos (85% to 39%) and three times as likely to download music online (80% compared to 19%) (Bolsover et al., 2013: 12). The differences they reported for the use of mobile phone (mobile Internet) to make purchases, watch videos, and download music in China as compared to the United States were even starker. In a nation where political connections are paramount to success as a media-related business (Huang, 2012), the proximity of Chinese Internet companies to the Chinese state and their ability to respond quickly to fast-changing government edicts concerning online information access and use are obviously advantageous, but so too is their grounding in the culture of a nation where the take-up of online services is moving very quickly. The point to be made is that the rapid take-up of the Internet in China is not diminishing the degree to which we can identify a distinctive Chinese national media system.

In contrast to the Chinese media system, which remains largely national even after almost 40 years of opening up to globalization, the Australian media system has always been highly open to international influences. About 40% of television viewed in Australia is produced overseas – with at least 90% of imported content from the United States – and locally produced films only account for about 4%–5% of Australian box office receipts (Screen Australia, 2013). In relation to the Internet, the scope for Australian government agencies to regulate online flows is minimal, although this has not stopped governments from proposing that they do so. Under Schedules 5 and 7 of the Broadcasting Services (Online Services) Amendment 1999, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA, 2011) can require Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block access to content that could be considered to be ‘prohibited content’ or ‘potentially prohibited content’ under Australian classification laws, and in some instances can act on content that is rated R18+ (i.e. only suitable for adults) where that content is not subject to some form of ‘restricted access system’, such as some form of age verification as a condition of accessing the content (Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), 2012: 52–53). As almost all higher-level online content is produced and distributed from outside of Australia, such provisions have been widely criticized as being largely ineffectual, yet at the same time infringing the civil liberties of Australians (Coroneos, 2008; Crawford and Lumby, 2011).

The latter criticisms intensified when the Australian Government announced in late 2009 that it intended to introduce legislative amendments to the Broadcasting Services Act to require all ISPs in Australia to filter or ‘block’ all content that would be Refused Classification (RC) under Australian laws hosted on overseas servers. While the mandatory Internet filtering proposal was ultimately abandoned, the extended discussion surrounding its introduction was a reminder of how

it had become well established that nation states had both the right to regulate, and an interest in regulating, the Internet … as the Internet ceased to be the plaything of only academics, researchers and geeks, and became part of daily social and family life. (Edwards, 2009: 626)

In the Convergence Review (Convergence Review Committee, 2012), and in other reviews such as the National Classification Scheme Review (ALRC, 2012), the benchmark for whether regulations related to ownership, content, and standards should apply was identified as a mix of ability to attract a significant local audience, deriving significant revenues from Australian activities and distributing professionally produced content aimed at Australian audiences. What the Convergence Review termed Content Service Enterprises met this definition, and while their criteria only included Australian media companies in the report, it was flagged that companies such as Google and Apple could be subject to such regulations were their Australian operations to expand sufficiently (Convergence Review Committee, 2012: 10–13).

Brazil is another interesting case showing the persistence of state policies in shaping the contours and functioning of the Internet. President Dilma Rousseff delivered a blistering speech before the United Nations General Assembly in October 2013 in which she accused the United States of spying and being responsible for ‘a breach of international law’ and ‘an affront’ to Brazil’s independence. The speech came in the aftermath of former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden’s revelations about US government spying on its Brazilian counterpart and oil giant Petrobras and Canadian interests monitoring Internet information related to Brazil’s mining industry.

Right after the information became public, the government threw its support behind a congressional bill on Internet governance that had been championed by freedom of expression and data privacy advocates. President Rousseff urged Congress to fast-track the bill in 90 days. The bill was introduced in August 2013 and was drafted on the basis of the Marco Civil Regulatorio da Internet (Internet Civilian Regulatory Framework), a declaration developed by civil society after years of consultation and debates. It is based on Marco’s five points: (1) freedom of expression, privacy of the individual, and respect for human rights; (2) open, multilateral, and democratic governance, carried out with transparency, by stimulating collective creativity, and the participation of society, Governments, and the private sector; (3) universality that ensures the social and human development and the construction of inclusive and nondiscriminatory societies; (4) cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, customs, and values; and (5) neutrality of the network, guided only by technical and ethical criteria, rendering it inadmissible to restrict it for political, commercial, religious, or any other purpose. The framework was originally developed by a partnership between the Ministry of Justice and a prestigious think tank and was finalized through a participatory process that involved a range of civic, public, and private actors.

The government’s sudden push for the initiative reflected a turning point in its position vis-à-vis Internet policies. The government had previously tolerated actions by public officials to censor content as well as legal actions, including the arrest of a Google executive for refusing to take down a video that was critical of mayoral candidate. Suddenly, the government showed interest in ensuring a ‘Brazilian’ Internet and protecting ‘Brazilian’ data, in President Dilma Rousseff’s words, and reaffirmed its intention to become a global leader on this matter together with other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries. Freedom of expression and Internet neutrality groups have applauded Rousseff’s critique of digital surveillance, but raised questions about the problems for free flow of information if data localization requirements become effective. It is too soon to draw conclusions about the impact of Brazil’s newfound ‘nationalism’ in Internet policies, yet the government’s actions and words attest to the possibility that states remain committed to a ‘national’ Internet that reflects specific principles. This decision builds on its long-standing interest in strengthening a ‘Brazilian’ Internet infrastructure by increasing domestic bandwidth, content production, and network equipment, as well as being grounded in traditional arguments about the need to defend ‘national sovereignty’ vis-à-vis foreign governments and corporations through state-supported policies.

Conclusion

The persistent analytical value of ‘media systems’ suggests that adopting ‘methodological statism’, to use Ulrich Beck’s expression, seems warranted in comparative studies of media politics and policies. As long as critical interactions among media institutions, technologies, and practices are ‘sutured’ or thicken in state-bounded media systems, it would be mistaken to discount their significance or consider them analytical relics. Domestic actors continue to largely shape the dynamics of media politics, and the ability of nation-states to control key aspects of media governance remains central to how media businesses operate. The concept of ‘media systems’ retains analytical value to study structures and dynamics both within the political confines of the states and globally. It is incorrect to discard this concept based on its presumed irrelevance amidst media globalization.

We should move past the debate between ‘the global’ and ‘the state’ in media studies in order to better understand the interaction among competing forces. Just as certain media/social/cultural processes cannot be examined if the analysis remains focused on states, other issues that are central to media systems need to be considered by studying state institutions and dynamics. There is no inevitable, straightforward shift from the local and the national to the global, particularly in relation to legacy media industries and content. Nor does it seem that the Internet represents a uniform shift toward globalization as demonstrated by patterns of use and governance. A global mediated sphere is neither the only possibility nor an unstoppable development that overshadows, let alone surpasses, local and national media processes. This is why it is important to go beyond framing the debate in terms of ‘the passing’ or ‘the persistence’ of the state and instead understand how local, national, and global forces shape media politics and policies.

To capture this dynamics and encourage comparative studies, ‘media system’ remains better than other concepts, precisely because it condenses multiple dynamics at work and directs attention to forces and institutions that continue to agglutinate media politics, policies, content, and uses. Media systems are points of convergence of political, economic, social, and cultural forces grounded in the local, the national, and the global. They should be seen neither as self-contained entities nor as extensions or epiphenomena of global developments. Instead, we should think of ‘media systems’ as analytical units to understand how and where multiple dynamics intersect as well as the comparative weight of actors and institutions in shaping the media.