Discovery channel’s Jungle Gold in Ghana: hegemonic globalization sparks resistance and policy action

Abstract

Discovery Channel’s Jungle Gold follows two American real estate moguls who lost their fortunes in the 2008 economic collapse to the Ashanti region of Ghana, West Africa, where they unabashedly engage in illegal gold mining (galamsey). This article examines the dialectic between the forces of hegemonic globalization and resistance by critically examining the content of the television series, the ensuing discourse, and policy actions in Ghana. Borrowing the concept of interlocalization, this article argues that Jungle Gold, although a hegemonic global form, amplifies a serious development challenge, sparking a debate, leading to mobilization, policy actions, and potential for social change and development. We also examine the role of local television co-producers, social media, and activists in the interlocalization process.

Keywords

galamsey Ghana globalization glocalization interlocalization media and development media and policy reality television resistance

In Discovery Channel’s ‘reality television documentary’ Jungle Gold, two American investors, Scott Lomu and George Wright, who had lost their fortunes in the real estate collapse of 2008, travel to the Ashanti region of Ghana, West Africa, in a quest to regain wealth quickly by illegally mining gold. The show aired for two seasons with 14 episodes, 8 in Season 1 and 6 in Season 2. In many ways, this television series, which premiered on 26 October 2012 to an audience of nearly 3 million, affirms postcolonial critiques of cultural and economic globalization. The narrative includes Scott and George borrowing US$150,000 from an investor, malfunctioning excavators, flooded access roads, illegal roadblocks where the actors bribe residents to pass, near-accident and near-death scenarios, and clashes between Chinese illegal miners and the actors. Thus, the mining area is portrayed as a lawless, perilous jungle with gun-wielding illegal miners, impoverished natives, and vast reserves of gold waiting to be grabbed. The show portrays the ruthless exploitation of Ghana’s natural resources, as the surface mining Scott and George pursue involves destroying large tracts of virgin forest and family farms and contaminating the landscape and water with toxic chemicals such as mercury.

Jungle Gold readily fits critiques of Africa’s commodification by Western media. This study, however, examines the backlash and dialogue in Ghana that ensued as providing conduits for the expression and amplification of a serious problem – ‘galamsey’ or illegal gold mining – with the possibility of influencing policy outcomes. In recent years, galamsey has been prominent in Ghana’s local and national news, with reports of, for instance, chiefs and local authorities succumbing to miners’ bribes. Similar to what is seen in some episodes of Jungle Gold, Ghanaian news media have often shown or reported on Chinese miners attacking persons who attempt to stop (or compete with) them.

This study, therefore, examines the dialectic between the forces of globalization and resistance by critically analyzing local responses to the television series and to the galamsey problem as a result of Jungle Gold’s exposure. We find Szalvai’s (2008) concept of interlocalization useful in our analysis of the backlash in Ghana after the airing of Jungle Gold.

Background

The West African coastal country, Ghana, has been among the world’s 10 fastest growing economies in the past decade (Chuhan-Pole, 2011 [The Sun, 2008]). Gross domestic product (GDP) growth, however, has not translated into a wholesale improvement in living conditions. While the country recorded an average GDP growth rate between 7% and 9% from 2005 to 2012 (AfDB, 2013), it only managed less than 1% (i.e. 0.9%) increase in its Human Development Index (HDI) between 1980 and 2012 (Human Development Report, 2013).

Ghana has valuable natural resources, historically exporting minerals such as gold, diamonds, bauxite, and manganese and more recently petroleum. The mining industry, which is the focus of this article, accounts for about 7% of the country’s GDP and is one of the largest contributors to government revenue and corporate income tax, 27.6% and 38.3%, respectively, in 2011. In fact, Ghana is the second largest gold producer in Africa (after South Africa; Aryee, 2012).

Large corporations do not exclusively control gold mining in Ghana. Small-scale artisanal miners are involved and make enormous contributions to this sector. For instance, according to Benjamin Aryee, the Chief Executive Officer of the Mineral Commission (the regulatory agency for mineral resources) in Ghana, while the large-scale mining sector employs 28,000 people, the small-scale sector employs about a million (Aryee, 2012). In addition, in 2011, when the country’s gold production hit an all-time high, the small-scale mining sub-sector contributed about 28% of the total gold production.

One thing that distinguishes small-scale, legal mining from galamsey is licensing. Since legal artisanal miners are licensed, it is easier to regulate them, ensuring that, for example, mercury and other crude methods are not used. But unfortunately, much of the small-scale mining in Ghana is done illegally. And this makes it difficult to regulate, leading to the destruction of forests and cash crops such as cocoa, water pollution, health problems, and the loss of livelihoods, as some greedy chiefs and state officials sell family or communal farm lands to illegal miners. There have been numerous media reports about illegal artisanal gold miners polluting water bodies. In December 2011, for example, the Ghana Water Company was compelled to shut its treatment plant because its water source had been polluted by ‘galamseyers’ (Bonsu, 2011).

Galamsey not only poses a risk to people’s livelihoods, health, and the natural environment; it is also a danger to individual lives. Hundreds of galamseyers have been trapped in dugout pits, and many have died as a result. In 2010, 112 of 135 illegal miners were buried alive after the collapse of an underground mining pit due to a torrential rainfall (Adu and Dapaah, 2010). Although it is illegal for foreign nationals to engage in any form of small-scale mining, there is currently an influx of Chinese ‘galamseyers’ into Ghana. Bloody clashes between local and Chinese illegal miners due to squabbles over land and mining concessions are often reported in the news media (see Daily Graphic, 2013).

It was within this socio-economic milieu that Jungle Gold was filmed, produced, and experienced by Ghanaians who viewed or heard about the show. As noted above, Jungle Gold follows two Americans to the Ashanti region of Ghana to mine gold. The two reality actors and their investor partners engage – illegally – in galamsey. Their modus operandi entails using bulldozers and excavators to clear forestlands and dig water-filled pits, using mercury to separate the gold from the mud, washing in rivers and streams, and in the process polluting water sources for entire communities. Raw Television, a UK-based company, produced Jungle Gold. While it may seem contradictory that Discovery Channel (2013), an organization whose mission aligns with the values of environmentalism and social responsibility, would be the purveyor of such absurd commodification of nature and mineral resources, this is not entirely surprising. Discovery Channel also shows the popular series, Gold Rush. As the titles of the two shows suggest, both are based on a similar treatments: Groups seeking to recover from the 2008 economic meltdown turn to gold mining.

This article argues that although Ghanaian media had already given considerable attention to the galamsey menace, Jungle Gold, because it was perceived as an outside threat, sparked the necessary outrage to galvanize action against galamsey. As we argue later in this article, the show’s synopsis, which was presented to secure an initial permit for a recce (exploratory visit to test out locations and identify resources), differed substantially from the actual show that was aired on television.

Theoretical framework and literature review

Globalization and associated inequalities in power dynamics, information flow, and access to media and information technologies have raised many concerns (e.g. Boyd-Barrett, 2010; McPhail, 2009; Tomlinson, 2003; Mansell and Nordenstreng, 2006). Postcolonial scholars examine processes of colonization that continue to the present via globalization. This dimension of globalization, characterized by global domination, is what we term ‘hegemonic globalization’. In Jungle Gold, the subject of this study, hegemonic globalization manifests in how Raw Television and Discovery Channel as agents of globalization commodify people’s everyday lives, exploit and pollute the environment, and show disregard for Ghana’s laws.

More specifically, hegemonic globalization refers to the processes by which dominant groups remain dominant via their power over ideological, political, and economic institutions or behaviors. Hegemonic power is ongoing, and it is secured via the active consent of subaltern groups (Gramsci, 1971; Mouffe, 1979). In media, this is commonly exercised by allowing some alternative points of view but not enough to jeopardize dominant interests.

Also scholars, initially inspired by Said (1978), argue that globalized media are implicated in the larger totality of domination through homogenization and commodification of otherwise complex cultures through erasure, the denial of agency or voice, and hybridity processes, all of which reveal asymmetrical power relations (e.g. Delisle, 2003; Kraidy, 2005; Parameswaran, 2002; Shome and Hegde, 2002; Spivak, 1994). Muspratt and Steeves (2012), among others, have argued that erasure is particularly significant in the commodification and homogenization of public life and places such as sub-Saharan Africa, as processes of agency and hybridity accentuate the erasure of such places from media texts. Numerous studies of Africa’s media representation in particular have observed patterns of erasure via homogenization or a ‘single story’ of poverty and victimization (Adichie, 2009), the absence of voice, and of colonial superiority from pre-colonial missionary and exploratory ventures to the globalized present (Brookes, 1995; Hawk, 1992; Hubbard and Mathers, 2004; Steeves, 2008).

However, the hegemonic process is not seamless. Hall (1980) explains that discourses, while being encoded to carry preferred or dominant meanings, are polysemic – carry multiple meanings. Also, alternative perspectives can be incorporated at the encoding stage. For instance, Steeves (2011) points out that even though episodes of the US CBS reality show, The Amazing Race set in Burkina Faso, favored dominant views, local co-producers exerted some influence, vetoing culturally offensive images and subverting other images. Muspratt and Steeves (2012) argue that The Amazing Race in Ghana pushed the boundaries of conventional representations in several ways including its silence on poverty, engagement with ordinary people, and avoidance of iconic images. These representations allow more options for audience interpretation. Hall (1980) has theorized the possibility of reading dominant representations in ways that resist their intended meanings. Hence, even the most hegemonic content may be challenged, and oppositional groups may occasionally find openings to reverse the dialogue and effectively contest the interests of globally powerful groups.

Further arguing that local cultures are not merely at the mercy of dominant power centers, Robertson (1992, 1995) uses the term ‘glocalization’ to describe how recipient cultures localize the global such that eventually the global form is aligned to local nuances and needs. Szalvai and Boyd-Barrett (in press), however, point out that even when glocalization is taking place, power imbalances usually remain. For example, even though Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) may have adapted its menu to local tastes and preferences in Ghana, this does not neutralize the power imbalance between KFC (a global form) and Ghana.

How then can such hegemony be effectively resisted? Bates’ (1975) assertion that every state ‘bares’ its teeth when ‘confronted by a serious challenger whether from outside or from within’ (p. 352, emphasis added) is useful here. In a Gramscian sense, the hegemonic relationship is layered and exists between global media and, for instance, the people of an African country, as well as between political authority and the citizenry of that country. A similar relationship exists between local media and ordinary citizens (McChesney, 2007; Mosco, 2008).

Bates (1975) further observes that public opinion that may result from local–global and/or leader–citizen clashes, when coupled with civic dialogue, may then offer potential for social action and change. Similarly, Cunningham (2001) recommends that the best way to deal with ‘propaganda’ is to reclaim the public space via political debate and action, using what he calls ‘eloquence’. He defines eloquence as ‘a kind of communication inspired by great ideas’, by ‘passionate commitment’, and by the ‘highest social values’ (p. 142, italics in original). We observe that the discourse around Jungle Gold reduces its hegemonic power by encouraging citizens to support local advocates and activists, which, in turn, energizes otherwise passive citizens, forcing political authority to act on the issue of illegal gold mining.

Cunningham’s propositions resonate with Szalvai (2008) and Szalvai and Boyd-Barrett’s (in press) interlocalization concept. These scholars suggest interlocalization as a possible third outcome when globalized media meet local realities. Interlocalization refers to the horizontal aspect of globalization. The concept as first proposed by Szalvai (2008) represents global interconnectedness, which manifests (a) knowledge exchange and (b) no cultural domination or homogenization. To these two, we add a third: unique beneficial outcomes. We also suggest that interlocalization and hegemonic globalization may be co-present. In this study, interlocalization is defined both as a tool and a process. As a tool, interlocalization (as seen in television co-production) promotes an interconnectedness based on knowledge exchanges and equal power relations and outcomes. As a process, interlocalization manifests in the amplification of development challenges, leading to dialogue, debate, mobilization, policy actions, and a potential for social change. Similar to Bates’ (1975) and Cunningham’s (2001) views on the role of public opinion and eloquence in negotiating hegemony, dialogue is essential to the interlocalization process. (These two features demonstrate how hegemonic globalization and interlocalization might be co-present.) We note that our view on social change as a communicative practice is not new. As early as 1922, Ogburn’s (1922) cultural lag theory emphasized media technology as an imperative for social change.

From the above, a broader assertion can be made: communication is the most significant carrier of social change. The position that interlocalization is necessarily a communicative process is congruent with the view that ideas not only have conservative powers but also creative powers, and communication is the vehicle through which shared ideas are created, modified, and transformed (Bates, 1975; Carey, 2008; Geertz, 1994). Jungle Gold’s showing, ensuing dialogue, and subsequent policy actions reveal the creative powers of such communication.

In this study, therefore, we ask whether and in what ways Jungle Gold sparked resistance leading to an interlocalization process. We consider the (potential) influence of local co-production companies on the content of reality television shows in general and Jungle Gold in particular, serving as an interlocalization tool. We also consider the role of social media, activists, and policy-makers in negotiating outcomes.

Method

We qualitatively viewed and examined all eight episodes of the first season of Jungle Gold. We also examined global and local public discourse surrounding the show, as well as local policy actions as a result of the show. Analyzing these symbolic phenomena and subsequent actions require interpretations that are hinged on an understanding of both the material conditions and the sociocultural complexities of Ghana (see Geertz, 1973; Morley, 2004). Both authors’ first-hand familiarity with Ghana was useful for the analyses. To understand local reactions, we conducted interviews with individual Ghanaians who saw the show, with activists and civil society groups, and with those who had not seen the show at all but had heard about it. We intended to interview the co-production company that worked on the show, but the identity of the co-producers still remains a secret due to the government of Ghana’s assertion that the producers did not obtain the required permit to film. Consequently, we could only identify and speak with the co-production company that helped the producers with the recce (as noted earlier, a preliminary, reconnaissance visit to identify resources and do some filming – checking out sound, locations, contributors, etc.). To fully appreciate the discourse surrounding the show, this analysis additionally benefited from carefully collected supplemental texts from news websites, social media (primarily Facebook), and change.org.

Analysis

In analyzing the conversations surrounding Jungle Gold, we find ample evidence supporting the dialectical criticism of hegemonic globalization. The reality program ignores the broader social, cultural, and economic realities of Ghana. The show erases by imposing a single, simple, and bizarre identity on the people it seeks to represent. It also affirms dominant conceptions of Africa in general and Ghana in particular. Although ‘jungle’ as used in this show refers to the forest locations shown, the use of the word may easily be viewed as a metaphor for the entire country and even continent.

In Jungle Gold, the African country, Ghana, is represented as a lawless, dangerous jungle, full of natural resources to exploit. Thus, the show commodifies not just the place or setting but also the ‘pseudo lives’ of the people and their resources. As seen in the deliberate destruction and contamination of the vegetation, soil, and water, natural resources are represented not only as economic commodities to be exploited for livelihood but also as cultural commodities whose exploitation and abuse make good television. Curiously, Discovery Channel, which claims it is ‘committed to managing its business activities in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations and to ensuring honest and ethical behavior by its directors, officers, employees and contingent workers’ (Adomako, n.d.), is the culprit, in clear violation of its mission. As one person comments on Ewura-Abena Adomako’s petition at change.org,

Exploitation of people and their environment is bad enough when done by locals, but to have a show such as this by a network that claims a higher standard [is unpardonable]. Stop; just stop! … The Discovery Channel is supposed to be doing things that support our planet. You are encouraging and giving incentive to illegal pillaging of the land, which leaks mercury into the water supply, destroys farms, and trees and ponds. This show is disgusting and completely irresponsible.

In sum, Jungle Gold supports and goes beyond previous critiques of Africa’s media image: it commodifies while also legitimizing plunder. Adomako’s above noted petition rightly observes that Jungle Gold has caused irreversible damage to the rainforest and rivers at the show’s illegal mining sites and, especially egregious, has ‘knowingly exposed people and whole communities to dangerous chemicals and neurotoxins such as mercury’.

At the same time, we note that Scott and George – the lead American stars in the show – are not represented as white-male saviors, as other studies of Africa’s media image might suggest. At best, these stars are portrayed as stupid, myopic, and greedy. Furthermore, Scott and George lack full agency in that they rely on an African partner (Victor Kpah) for direction. We agree that Victor could be seen as a ‘comprador’, who, according to critiques of global dependency, furthers the agenda of the exploiters (Chirot & Hall, 1982). But the relationship does frequently represent an exchange of local knowledge between two cultures and thereby also constitutes a small counterbalance to the otherwise overwhelmingly homogenized, erroneous, and negative representations – of Ghana as a lawless, perilous jungle, noted earlier.

Our argument of Jungle Gold as resistance and interlocalization requires looking beyond the offensive content. Our interviews and examination of the dialogue surrounding the program reveal three overlapping ways in which interlocalization, as a process and a tool, is evident. The first occurred before the airing of the show, during the production process, when the international producers worked with a local co-production firm. The second occurred after the airing when Jungle Gold set in motion an interlocalization process by amplifying local development challenges that were not being addressed by political elites. Third, the resulting dialogue culminated in policy action. We discuss each in turn.

Television co-production

Typically, when international producers travel to another country to film, co-producers are hired to assist in varied ways. Hence, co-producers may serve as agents of resistance or at least moderating influences. In Ghana, the Information Services Department of the Ministry of Information, the government department responsible for official communications, must grant international producers permits before they do any kind of filming. And these producers typically use local co-production firms to help them navigate these processes. Once permits are obtained, our research finds that co-producers in Ghana are expected to play four types of overlapping roles in the actual filming process: as facilitators, as regulators, as the soul and conscience of society, and as co-managers. First, as facilitators, co-producer’s role underscores the balance of power between the global and local. Even if we view the facilitation role as a superior-subordinate relationship, the regulatory and social conscience roles, which co-producers also play, may neutralize the power dynamic in this dialectical relationship. Second, as regulators, co-producers are representatives of the Information Services Department of the Ministry of Information. They ensure that international crews operate within the confines of their filming permits. Third, as the conscience of society, co-producers normatively ensure that outsiders do not violate the moral values and sensitivities of the culture, ensuring that local people are not dehumanized through misrepresentation. Fourth, as co-managers, they are equally answerable for any mishaps or noncompliance with official protocols. Together, these roles ideally capture essential elements in interlocalization as a horizontal component of globalization: a domination-free interconnectedness of different cultures and/or cultural actors.

In the case of Jungle Gold, things did not work out as the above ideal model describes. The co-production team did little to alter the representations, or it is possible there was simply no co-producer, as the co-producer who was hired to assist with the recce for the show said that his company (name withheld) was not invited to participate in the final production. This is plausible because, as the CEO of this local company explained several times during our interviews, one of the show’s two main characters had a close relative living and working in Kumasi, Ghana, not far from the production sites. With the relative’s contacts and connections, it would be easy for the UK-based production crew to return to Ghana after the recce and do their own filming, without the assistance of the initially contracted or other local co-producers.

Whether or not a Ghanaian co-production team was involved, the Ministry of Information claimed the producers did not secure a permit before filming. Since permits are granted for specific time periods, it is plausible that the producers of Jungle Gold received permits for the recce only, facilitated by the production company we interviewed, but never did seek permits for the final filming. National security operatives attempted unsuccessfully to identify and investigate local collaborators, as they are viewed as ‘co-managers’ and, therefore, equally liable for nonconformity to standards, but none would own up to the show. Ideally, this shared responsibility compels co-producers to perform a better role as the conscience of Ghanaian society and as regulators (on behalf the state) while performing their role as facilitators for their international partners, an expression of interlocalization.

The CEO for the local co-production company who assisted with the recce for Jungle Gold offers a brief but lucid layout of this role:

[A]s a facilitator you must understand what you are getting yourself involved with … because if the Ministry of Information asks you … why do you want to go to a particular place to film, you would have to defend it … We’ve become very sensitive to the kind of materials foreign media houses come to collect from here and exhibit on their networks … For ages now, anything African is negative, so with that consciousness, I wouldn’t allow anybody to come into this country to do this.

To support his assertions, this CEO further recounts how he once walked off a prestigious International Monetary Fund (IMF) project due to attempts by international media partners to violate the stipulations in the permit:

National security had given clearance [for filming] at a specific location. The Information Ministry had granted permit for … a given location. We got on set and these guys wanted to film outside [of the approved location], and it became a tug of war. And for them [they thought] … because they carry UN (sic) passport [I] don’t have any authority to tell them where to film. I immediately wrote to the IMF, copied to the National Security [Secretariat] and the Ministry of Information about what was going on, and the National Security stepped in. I just walked out despite the fact that with freelance work, you could be there [for a long time] without any job. But should … the money make me sell my conscience? I wouldn’t do that!

In another instance, the company declined a contract because of the content and improper manner in which the foreign company planned to film:

There was this production about the prison; the foreign production company wanted to go into some of our minor prisons, and I know how deplorable the situation is [in these prisons]. Despite the money they were ready to pay for my production services I turned it down … There was another job about the witch camp in Tamale that they wanted me to facilitate. After looking at the treatment, I said no! … My conscience will not allow me … They even wanted to increase my fee but I said no.

Although the ability of co-production firms to perform their regulatory and social conscience roles largely depends on their personal or business values and convictions, filming permits, when granted to production firms, require co-producers to be the arbiter between institutions of global domination (represented by Discovery Channel in the case of Jungle Gold) and the local culture and its institutions. A typical filming permit states that ‘This permit has been granted to “A” to film “B” at location “C”. Local production company “D” is instructed to make sure that the crew films within the mandate given them’. This affirms what we refer to as the ‘co-manager’ role of local co-producers.

Based on our interviews with the co-producer and observations by other scholars (e.g. Muspratt and Steeves, 2012), we argue that the use of co-producers, if they effectively perform their roles, may be important tools for interlocalization since they represent a system of knowledge exchange based on balanced power relations.

Amplification of a development problem

In international business, the more culturally specific goods and services a firm produces, the more likely it is to observe interlocalization (Szalvai and Boyd-Barrett, in press). Similarly, when the issues highlighted in a media presentation are particularly relevant to a local culture, the likelihood of interlocalization increases. Galamsey is a problem that most Ghanaians know about and detest because of its negative impact on the environment, health, and livelihood of rural farmers. Thus, galamsey has ‘cultural relevance’ within Ghana’s ideological, political, and economic milieu. Therefore, for many, Jungle Gold’s ‘glorification of the illegal exploitation of others, total disregard for the well being of other human beings and environment’ (Adomako, n.d.) did two things: (a) it placed this development challenge on the international stage and (b) exposed the inherent weaknesses of Ghana’s state institutions.

Cultural relevance, as used here, refers to the fact that most Ghanaians who saw Jungle Gold believe that galamsey is a serious issue that needs to be addressed. They thought Discovery Channel should not have been allowed to engage in galamsey and film it. However, the show raised the salience of the issue and made Jungle Gold a rallying point for civil society groups and ordinary citizens to dialogue, debate, and mobilize, with the goal of effecting social change. For political authority and policy actors, the show represented a disregard for Ghanaian institutional and legal frameworks – a stimulant for some policy actions, making social change more probable.

It is important to point out that although the laws of Ghana do allow artisanal miners to engage in legitimate gold mining, the laws frown on the involvement of non-Ghanaians in this sector. This notwithstanding, it is an open secret that many foreigners – mainly from China – are involved in the sector. This fact was not lost in the discourse around Jungle Gold in Ghana. One of our interviewees admonished, ‘Look let’s not deceive ourselves. What the Americans did is just the tip of the iceberg. What the Chinese are doing is much, much worse. Our leaders have to wake up and smell the coffee!’.

The Minister for Lands and Natural Resources, in an interview on Joy FM, a prominent Ghanaian media organization, condemned Jungle Gold and its actors, warning that ‘the two Americans would be tracked down and arrested’ for representing Ghana so negatively on the international stage (Joy News, 2013a). At the same time, and in opposition to the Minister’s threats, truth stood out as a theme in the debate that ensued after Jungle Gold’s airing (especially among Ghanaians). Commenting on the Minister for Lands and Natural Resources’ interview on Joy FM, a Facebook commentator had this to say:

I heard about [this show] a couple of months ago. [There was] a National Geographic trailer on the documentary. This video truly depicts what’s happening in our gold belt today … After listening to [Joy FM’s] interview [with the Minister, he] seemed more upset about the video ‘putting Ghana in bad light’ than the issue of illegal gold mining. (Emphasis added)

Similarly, Kofi Bentil, the Vice President of IMANI Ghana, one of the most well-known and vociferous think tanks in Ghana, verged on praising Jungle Gold for exposing the truth:

How many people have [engaged in galamsey] but didn’t make a film out of it? So for me, Jungle Gold is representative of the problem we have, but that itself is not the problem. I don’t see a problem with the people themselves doing what they did. I think they helped us; they really highlighted the problem … My problem is not with the portrayal. My problem is with the fact. They fact is, are we like that? If they said things that were wrong, they exaggerated issues, did things that were out of norm, I would have an issue with them … But by and large, what you saw in Jungle Gold is the truth. [What we have here is] the truth hurting, and people wanting to kill the messenger. What [the show] did was reveal to us what was going on … For me, what I saw in Jungle Gold was no news.

To these individuals and many others, although Jungle Gold should be condemned for flagrantly violating Ghana’s laws and for its negative representations, it also raises urgent development and policy concerns. Cynicism and impatience with the government’s inability or perhaps unwillingness to address concerns about galamsey and its attendant problems are indicated in Kofi Bentil’s comment below:

This [program] shows that the Government in Ghana is just a waste and a joke! This problem has been there way before these people came and made a documentary out of it. Now what are you [i.e. the government of Ghana] doing about the Chinese problem? Nothing!

An additional theme in Jungle Gold that communicators on Facebook, radio, television, and online news portals found relevant to the galamsey situation in Ghana was the complicity of traditional authorities and politicians in illegal gold mining. As seen in the show, but also often reported in the local media, chiefs, who according to Ghanaian customary laws are the custodians of land, commonly sell vast acres of farm lands for illegal gold mining. With the influx of Chinese investors, this means local authorities can give out land to the highest bidder. In 2011 Okyehene Osagyefo Amoatia Ofori Panyin II, a prominent chief, was compelled to publicly deny allegations that he was involved in galamsey (Joy News, 2011). This is just one of the many news reports about traditional authorities and politicians who have been accused of engaging in or supporting galamsey. This point was also emphasized in much of the dialogue surrounding Jungle Gold. For example, Kofi Bentil, cited above, observed that,

Some [political authorities] are beneficiaries of galamsey. There are a lot of rumors, and I am saying rumors, that a lot of parliamentarians fund their campaigns through illegal mining. And I have heard some very serious people make this allegation, but because I can’t substantiate it, I call them rumors. But the truth is that nobody can say they didn’t know these things were there … Then you have the Jungle Gold situation; people like myself make a lot of noise about that thing and then all of a sudden there is a task force … I think government is part of the problem. We have enough laws; we have enough institutions; they should just do their job!

While these commentaries do not justify the exploitation of natural and human resources coupled with negative and inaccurate representations of Ghana in Jungle Gold, they do not absolve political authority from blame. These comments indicate the ‘cultural relevance’ of the issues raised in Jungle Gold. Also, these issues, to many people, transcend the reality show.

Institutional change

As indicated above, Jungle Gold further exposed Ghana’s institutional frameworks in two broad areas: media regulations and mining.

First, as previously noted, Ghana requires that international production companies secure the appropriate permits in advance. These permits, especially for films and documentaries, are given for specific time periods and locations. This is common globally. For instance, even though an accomplished producer who has worked with reputable international production companies, the CEO we interviewed had to undertake a 2-week ‘intensive’ training as a clapper loader before he could go on production with a British friend while in London. He opined,

If we had the Film Bill and … the Film Council just like other countries … when they [international producers] come, they’ll know the processes. You don’t go anywhere in the world and just mount a camera and start filming. But here in Ghana, anyone … could come in and just start filming.

The system failed in the case of Jungle Gold, and the Discovery Channel crew filmed without permits and probably without a Ghanaian co-production company following the recce, which indicates the inadequacy of Ghana’s structural and regulatory framework. Thus, if the Information Services Department effectively performed its role, Jungle Gold could not have been filmed without authorization. Furthermore, our source informed us that the show’s synopsis used to secure an initial permit for the recce differed substantially from what appeared on television. The original vision was simply a documentary about galamsey without the dramatization and exploitation of Jungle Gold. In this instance, the Discovery Channel may have misled the co-producers who worked on the recce.

In addition to a problem with permits, the show exposed the Minerals Commission’s and the Environmental Projection Agency’s failure to effectively regulate the small-scale mining sector and ensure that miners adhere to laws. Franklin Cudjoe’s (the Founding President of IMANI Ghana) Facebook comment encapsulates this point:

Once again, any time IMANI predicts the results of bad behavior on the policy front, people think all we do is doom mongering. No, not at all. See, this Discovery Channel promotion of illegal mining underscores what IMANI said of the illogical policy making in this country in November 2012. The Minerals Commission and allied agencies have proved so ineffectual, despite claims of restructuring the prospecting and exploration system … The illegal small-scale mining problem in Ghana has been deepened by an invasion of foreign plunderers. The inability to decentralize the enforcement of mineral rights and holdings … and the confusion inherent in the land control regime as it affects mineral rights management has made mining administration in this country a joke!

Beyond viewing Jungle Gold as an example of Ghana’s overall institutional failure, many Ghanaians thought political authorities should be held responsible, both for allowing Scott and George to do what they did and for their long-standing ambivalence toward galamsey. As offensive as Jungle Gold is, unfortunately, what is seen in the show is just a small example of the much larger reality for people living in communities affected by environmentally toxic practices. To the outside world, it is just another reality show. But for those to whom the issues are ‘culturally relevant’, Jungle Gold is not just a show. Because of its global form, the reality show inadvertently amplifies a pertinent developmental challenge.

The airing of the reality show, as we have shown, was met with public condemnation in Ghanaian media. There were several petitions on change.org to stop the airing of the show. Activist groups were energized to challenge state actors for failing to perform their duties. Through these communicative processes, sparked by the intrusion of a hegemonic global form, institutions of state policy were in conflict not only with civil society but also with the hegemonic forces of global power – Discovery Channel and Jungle Gold. The state had to engage in legitimizing policy actions to address galamsey. Also, by so doing, the state sought to reclaim the legitimacy of its institutions.

In fact, the government of Ghana has discussed a number of policy actions as a direct result of Jungle Gold. By reporting these discussions, we do not presume that such actions or measures are necessarily most desirable or logical. What we seek to demonstrate is the potential that the amplification of development challenges through an interlocalization process has for broader policy and social change. Although such change could be positive or negative, if properly harnessed, this potential for change could benefit society as a whole, upholding values such as equity and social justice.

First, as a form of resistance to external hegemonic forces, the government of Ghana was quick to condemn Scott and George’s gold mining escapades as illegal and even ordered their arrest. Also, there are currently steps toward a more stringent regulation of permit requirements for international television producers coming to Ghana to film. In addition to securing permits from the Information Services Department, international production companies are required to seek clearance from the National Security Secretariat in Ghana. Notably, the President of Ghana commissioned an interministerial task force to regulate the small-scale mining sector and clamp down on all galamsey activities. At the inauguration of the task force, the president articulated its mandate as follows:

Government is not against small-scale mining. Your mandate is to ensure that our laws in the small-scale mining [industry] are fully enforced. It may include the following: seize equipment of those who fail to comply with the new directives of obtaining or renewing licenses, arrest and prosecute anybody, both Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian, engaged in illegal small scale mining, deport non-Ghanaians involved, revoke the licenses of Ghanaians who have subleased their concessions to non-Ghanaians [which is] against the rules, revoke the licenses of Ghanaians who have engaged the services of non-Ghanaians … in ways that are contrary to the rules. (Joy News, 2013b)

This policy action signaled a recognition and affirmation of higher societal values, and the President spoke plainly about the need to send the right signals to perpetrators:

He was sending a clear signal to the offending individuals and groupings that the government will not allow their activities to cause conflict, dislocation, environmental degradation and unemployment when in fact the sector should rather benefit our communities and our country. (Joy News, 2013b)

The timing of the task force was no mere coincidence. As the Minister for Lands and Natural Resources confirmed, Jungle Gold sparked a direct reaction to the television show and public outpouring of concern and anger about galamsey and the involvement of non-Ghanaians. The task force, however, is only a first step. A complex solution would require a holistic look at the country’s land administration regime, property laws, institutional oversight ambiguities, and gaps. Even though the policy actions constitute initial steps and not a final solution, they demonstrate reflection on higher societal values such as equity and social justice. They offer hope for continued attention to the galamsey problem and real change.

We believe that the above reactions and steps constitute a process of interlocalization via communication, with clear power outcomes for the different participants. While there may be different outcomes for participants (i.e., local and global), such outcomes are uniquely beneficial to participating power groups. Interlocalization in this case manifests as a process toward improvement and social change through the clash of the global and the local and a subsequent clash of competing interests within the local culture. The discourse and modest policy decisions and actions taken as a result of the show at least indicate how interlocalization could result in social outcomes and real benefits.

Conclusion

In Jungle Gold, we observe a dialectic between the global and the local. The hegemonic expressions of globalization (erasure, misrepresentation, and commodification) and local Ghanaian realities interact through an interlocalization process in a manner that resulted in some policy actions via discourse. The content of the show is problematic in many different ways. But because it represents an important development concern (i.e. galamsey) that Ghanaians want policy-makers to address, it became a rallying point for reflecting on the higher values of Ghanaian society: environment, health, and social justice.

Thus, in as much as the show reveals the power imbalance of global information flow, it also exposes Ghana’s inherent policy and institutional weaknesses. Jungle Gold, as experienced in Ghana, was a symbolic communicative form, a source of creative tension, that broke through the apathy and indifference of policy-makers, the media, and the general citizenry to the problem of illegal small-scale mining. At the global level, the airing of Jungle Gold sparked dialogue about media as tools for domination and natural resource exploitation. But nationally and locally, it ignited debate on a nexus of issues concerning galamsey, institutional weaknesses and political inaction, regulation of the mining industry, the involvement of non-Ghanaians in illegal mining, and the broad social, environmental, economic impacts of galamsey activities.

In a democratic environment, debate and dialogue have the potential for policy actions and eventually development and social change. Having demonstrated the importance of symbolic communication in the interlocalization processes that accompanied Jungle Gold in Ghana, we restate that the show alone did not cause change. The show, coupled with meanings that the subject matter – galamsey – evokes among local residents, local activists, and policy makers, was what made it a source of potential change. The sociocultural context defined how the television show was interpreted, making it a rallying point for resistance. As Samuelson and Barnett (2007) emphasize, everything depends on context.

This study has argued that reality television such as Jungle Gold could function as a catalyst for policy change, as modestly seen in the Ghanaian case, although obviously not by the design of the producers. Whether enduring changes will result from the airing of the show remains to be seen, but actions thus far indicate the possibilities of interlocalization. Hence, using Jungle Gold as an example, we have demonstrated ways interlocalization may manifest in a communication and development context. Via interlocalization as a tool in the co-production process, local intermediaries may gain agency. Furthermore, through the amplification of social issues and development challenges, another process of interlocalization is observed, where the weaknesses in both the global form and local conditions are exposed, with the possibility of real policy change. While the first instance of interlocalization operates through cooperation, the second operates through both contest and collaboration and consequent social change and development.

Footnotes

Funding

This research was funded by a Dean’s Grant from the School of Journalism and Communication, University of Oregon, USA.

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