Narrowcasting collective memory online: ‘liking’ Stalin in Russian social media

Introduction

The development of communication technologies led to a broadening of audiences – from the invention of the printing press to the establishment of newspapers, to mass TV, and, finally, the Internet. The overall audience of the Internet is broader than any audience of any other media before. Moreover, the Internet, and social media in particular, facilitates another process: the spread of narrowcasting – the promotion of a nuanced version of information. This process is especially evident in collective memory fields where social media has created opportunities for a larger number of memory agents to promote their narratives about the past.

Existing research focuses on several significant changes that the Internet brings in relation to memory. First of all, individual memories can now be stored online (Landsberg, 2004). Second, narratives and images can be spread quickly and to more audiences (Hoskins, 2009). Finally, commemorative projects online are often co-created (Jenkins, 2006). Some scholars assumed that the Internet should be more democratic and free of national memory frameworks than other forms of media because anyone can create web pages and social media groups (Kulyk, 2013). In other words, the understanding of the past should not conform to dominant state versions. It turned out that Internet users often reiterate their national interpretations of history (Drinot, 2011). My claim is that the democratic nature of the Internet results in a fragmentation of narratives, where even seemingly homogeneous collective memories divide into more specific versions online. Some of these versions can align with dominant national narratives; others can be influenced by international tendencies. They can praise a state or criticize it, follow different political agendas, find roots in different cultures. The Internet indeed introduced a new environment for memory narratives, one that is conducive to fragmentation.

I show the fragmentation of memory and narrowcasting using the case of a seemingly unified position on the past: pro-Stalin attitudes and a tendency to valorize Stalin in contemporary Russia. It is assumed that current Russian political regime finds Stalinism effective and inspires positive views on his government (Adler, 2012; Merridale, 2003). However, my analysis of Russian social media groups dedicated to the commemoration of Stalin shows that narratives represented there vary significantly. Only one type among such groups corresponds to the national memory framework. Another is a pushback against the proliferation of the cosmopolitanization of memory, a change in memory culture that commonly condemns the memory of perpetrators. Finally, the third type of social media group uses Stalin to criticize Russia’s current political regime and its most prominent problems, such as corruption.

The Internet and collective memories

Every development in media technologies has transformed collective memory in some significant way (Hutton, 1993; Yates, 1974). This holds true for the establishment of writing, the invention of printing, the spreading of mass media, and now the Internet (Erll and Rigney, 2009). The proliferation of new communicative technologies, gadgets, and, more specifically, the Internet created so-called digital memories: memories stored, shared, and promoted online (Garde-Hansen et al., 2009). People can now create repositories of their memorabilia, photos, and stories ‘on the fly’. Memory is not embodied in one particular space; rather, it is spread across digital networks (Hoskins, 2009). The devices that store memories are portable and the amount of data that can be kept is more than one needs (Van House and Churchill, 2008). The Internet has become a vast archive where space never runs out and everyone with a connection has access to it (Haskins, 2007). In a way, people have delegated the necessity to remember to technologies: they have created so-called prosthetic memories (Landsberg, 2004). Hoskins (2011) calls this development the connective turn: memories are produced, stored, and restored in social networks of people and machines. Finally, everyone is a witness in the age of global broadcast and new media (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2008; Papailias, 2016). Thus, the shared memories of recent events are created by many people collectively (Reading, 2011).

The shared, or, in Jenkins’ (2006) terms, convergent, culture of the Internet, as well as its accessibility, has created new opportunities for agents producing and broadcasting representations of past or collective memory. The accessibility of the Internet and the cooperative nature of creativity online are interconnected. Before, commemorative efforts needed financial and political resources: to set up a museum or to erect a monument is a pricey undertaking. The Internet made it possible for anyone to set up a museum or a memorial. Online memorials of 9/11 (Foot et al., 2005; Hess, 2007; Walker, 2007) and Hurricane Katrina (Recuber, 2012) are some of the examples of such online commemorative projects. The cost of traditional forms of commemoration led to the need to create a unifying and univocal interpretation. ‘Architects of public memorials seek to frame the significance and meaning of the precipitating event for everyone, and furthermore construct their audiences largely as spectators and cocelebrants – but not as coproducers’ (Foot et al., 2005: 75).

The Internet has seemed to push forward ‘the democratization of the mediated identities and the erosion of the national framework for their reproduction’ (Kulyk, 2013: 65). The fact that it gives voice to anyone interested in memory work creates an impression that the Internet is undermining states’ leading role in shaping people’s beliefs. This quality of co-creation and constant commenting and reframing might create spaces of dissent (Knudsen and Stage, 2012) which is especially important in the countries where there are contestations over memory but for some reasons they do not find adequate representation in traditional media, as happens in post-socialist countries (Rutten et al., 2013) and in Russia in particular (Trubina, 2010). However, further research has shown that states’ interpretations of the past also find their way online. A telling example of the debates about the War in the Pacific in the comments section of a YouTube video on the topic shows how strong national identities are. Instead of assuming the stance of a ‘global citizen’, most of the commenters from different countries promote their national vision of the conflict (Drinot, 2011).

The Internet facilitates the emergence and co-existence of varying memory narratives or a fragmentation of memory. In this respect, some communities may promote nationally framed interpretations of the past, while others promulgate cosmopolitan memories (Levy and Sznaider, 2006), and still others some other version of history. This is the major feature of the Internet as a space for memory work: it does not filter appropriate and inappropriate versions of history. As literally anyone can set up a web page promoting any narrative about the past, the Internet facilitates a fragmented landscape of memories. Unlike in the case of monuments and museums, the Internet memory agents do not need a large audience to keep on going; a dedicated group of followers can suffice. As there are no costs associated with setting up a webpage or a social media group, there is no need to generalize the agenda and appeal to a larger public. Thus, the Internet creates a space where memory agents can narrowcast versions of state-supported narratives or dissent.

Usually, scholars attribute narrowcasting to television broadcasts on cable channels. (Lotz, 2014; Nightingale, 1996). Narrowcasting describes a different logic of creating and spreading content that is aimed less at broadening an audience and more toward catering to the specific tastes and needs of some audiences. Lately, the term ‘narrowcasting’ has been used by scholars to describe marketing and political targeting (Dewan et al., 2002; Karlsen, 2011; Polat, 2005) and behavior online (posting in social media for different groups of ‘friends’) (Barasch and Berger, 2014; Goncalves et al., 2013). I use this term to show that memory work as well is not necessarily aimed at national or global audiences. It is often aimed at smaller audiences interested in specific narratives and agendas.

I use in this article the case of Russian social media groups dedicated to Stalin and show that while it is easy to write them off as supporters of Stalin and possibly of the current Russian regime, the groups are rather different, and there are, in fact, at least three types of Stalinist social media groups.

Stalin in Russian memory

It might seem surprising, but Stalin is still one of the most controversial figures in Russia. Stalin’s period is infamous for the Great Terror – a series of state-sponsored purges against Soviet population. The memory of Stalin’s purges is intertwined with the memory of victory in the Great Patriotic War (the common name for the Second World War in the post-Soviet states) that has become the origin myth for Russia (Smith, 1999). The sufferings, famine, and extreme poverty during the war and afterward are for the most part forgotten (Gudkov, 2005).

Stalin’s purges came to light even before the break-up of the Soviet Union. Three periods of dealing with the memory of repressions in the USSR can be outlined: Khrushchev’s, Brezhnev’s, and Gorbachev’s. In 1956, Khrushchev gave the so-called ‘Secret Speech’, ‘On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences’, at the 20th Party Congress. The extent to which Stalin and, for that matter, the Party, could be criticized was limited. The attempts to control the narrative ‘ranged from the use of armed force (as in Tbilisi) to party sanctions (as in the Moscow Thermo-Technical Laboratory and many other institutions and party organizations around the country) to prescriptions in the press and secret circulars’ (Jones, 2013: 50). Stalin was presented as the sole criminal, who acted under the pressure of a complicated political context. During Brezhnev’s time in power, anti-Stalinist sentiment weakened. Moreover, one could detect indicators of re-Stalinization. For instance, after the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago in the West, the central newspaper Pravda launched a full-scale campaign against Solzhenitsyn’s book. The situation changed drastically under Gorbachev. This period was the second wave of de-Stalinization. Stalin and his regime were criticized in much harsher terms, another wave of rehabilitation began, commemorative efforts were undertaken. However, even though some of these developments continued in Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union, in contemporary Russia, there is still no consensus within society over the role of Stalin.

Many Russian memory scholars assume that the contestation of the memory of Stalinism takes place between two agents: the Russian state which is largely ‘Stalinist’ and the ‘anti-Stalinist’ civil society (represented primarily by the Memorial Society, an NGO dedicated to commemoration of Stalin’s purges’ victims) (Adler, 1993, 2012; Merridale, 2009; Roginskij, 2009). Such a depiction is simplified. While the state seems to be more interested in the glorification of the past, it does not consistently follow a pro-Stalinist ideology. School curricula controlled by the state limit the time dedicated to the discussion of purges but do not deny them; instead, history textbooks present narratives with ‘the absence of agency in the perpetration of the Stalinist Terror, obfuscation of the scope and significance of the Terror, the suggestion that there are only certain perspectives appropriate in analyzing the Terror, valorization of the Great Patriotic War’ (Nelson, 2015: 42). However, there is a state program for the commemoration of victims of Soviet political purges (whether it is effective is a different question). The state Gulag museum in Moscow recently moved to a larger building, and a new, partly state-funded monument to the victims of political purges was erected in the center of Moscow. In sum, state memory politics is not consistent: there are efforts to commemorate the victims of the purges and efforts to whitewash the repressions.

There is not much known about people who commemorate Stalin. Mass surveys show that more and more Russians have a positive outlook on Stalin (Levada Center, 2016, 2017). Recently, around 90 non-state monuments to Stalin have been erected (Varkentina, 2017). Some researchers suggest that the popularity of Stalin is related to a general disregard for the current regime (Arhipova, 2017). The problem with this scattered analysis is that it deals with the commemoration of Stalin as a cohesive practice and, consequently, with the communities behind it as a homogeneous group of Stalinists. In this respect, pro-Stalin social media groups can be seen as one of the types of memory work done by this Stalinist community. While it is tempting to write these media groups off as basically the same, analysis shows that they differ in their narratives, agendas, and audiences.

Methodology

Russians use some international social media platforms as well as national ones. Groups and communities dedicated to Stalin exist on all of them. However, I confine this case to a graspable sample from the most popular service, Vkontakte (VK), an analogue of Facebook, that at the time of study had a monthly audience of approximately 50 million people (which is more than one-third of Russian population), among which there are 21 million active writers creating content (approximately 13 messages a month) (Brand Analytics, 2015).

A VK group looks like a collective blog. It is usually moderated by an administrator or a group of administrators. Messages are posted by the members of the group but administrators can delete them. Thus, every VK group dedicated to Stalin is a curated collection of postings by the members of the group (original posts or re-posts from other users).

Any approximation of the number of groups dedicated to Stalin and his time is impossible. I assumed that groups that use ‘Stalin’ in their titles would be devoted to him in one way or another. However, such a search criterion eliminated from my sample some popular pro-Stalin groups or groups dedicated to pro-Stalin historians. Consequently, I started with 45 groups in VK that have more than 100 members and have been updated in the year prior to coding in November 2015 with postings mentioning Stalin. This last criterion was introduced as some of the groups have mutated into a different sort of group even though they still have ‘Stalin’ in their name or description.

For each group, I coded 10 most recent posts. As other information about the groups, including their description and number of members was gathered only once at that particular time, it makes sense to analyze the most recent posts that correspond with the state of a group at the time. However, this makes the analysis presented only a snapshot of the groups’ activities. The posts were coded using different variables. First, the date of posts and type of information (texts, images, music, videos). Second, the genre of posts, such as educational posts or humor. Third, the topics covered in posts, including mentions of Stalin, contemporary politics, the United States, the Second World War, and so on.

Finally, I assume that these groups have different agendas to recall Stalin’s memory, so I coded them according to a typology of claims about the past described by DeGloma (2015): claims about the existence of events, their nature, and relevance to current issues. If posts were claiming that certain events actually happened or were only describing these events, then they were coded as being messages about the existence of events. If a certain interpretation of past events was discussed, the posts were considered to be messages about events’ nature. Finally, if claims about relevance or comparisons with current events, characters, or issues were made, those were messages on the relevance of past events.

The last variable, the type of a claim about the past, became in my analysis the basis of cluster analysis: my assumption being that if the memory landscape of social media is fragmented, as I hypothesize, one will see variation across these different issues. If they are homogeneous, the groups under consideration will be approximately similar in the type of issues they raise. The results of cluster analysis (K-means) are presented in the next section. Descriptions of the resulting types are based on the comparison of means (analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, p < 0.05).

Like my Stalin: types of Stalin VK groups

The list of 45 VK groups I am working with looks uniform: ‘Stalin Lived, Stalin Lives, Stalin Will Live’, ‘Stalin: The More I Learn, The More Admire’, ‘Truth about Stalin’s Epoch’, and so on. However, they are not that similar under closer investigation. Even after filtering out groups that were inactive for the past year (before constructing the sample of 45 groups), a big portion (17) of the remaining groups do not represent any particular stance on Stalin or his period: while there are references to his name, the content of the posts mostly covers current events or topics of general interest. These groups are filled with the same reposts, such as a campaign petitioning the administration of VK to create a Soviet-style set of emoticons. This type of group is the first cluster, but as these groups do not represent any real stance, this cluster is not discussed further.

The remaining 28 groups fall into three types of memory agency using Stalin as a point of reference. The typology is based on the differences between the groups in the types of issues their messages raise. There is a significant difference between these groups with regard to the popularity of specific topics covered in the posts. These variations suggest a difference in the agendas of the groups. Another important indicator of groups’ variation is that there is little intersection in members’ lists. First of all, not all of the 28 groups that fall into these three types of interpretation of Stalin’s heritage share members. Among those that do, the average percentage of the members shared is at 13.7% of a smaller group’s members list, with the maximum of 39% for one group (there are only five groups that share more than a third of their members’ list with another group). In general, even though these groups are very similar in topic, they are not identical regarding their followers.

‘Stalin would have dealt with you’: debating purges

The second type comprises 10 groups. These groups use an educational tone in their posts. One of the topics that was covered significantly more than in other groups is the theme of purges.

One would hardly think of a cosmopolitan turn among Stalin’s fans. The cosmopolitanization of memory (Levy and Sznaider, 2006) is usually associated with the memories of victims. The Holocaust became a pattern for commemorations of other atrocities. This new global cosmopolitan memory that researchers pay attention to celebrates human rights and downplays national triumphs; it creates the so-called ‘victims culture’ (Barkan, 2000), or, as Olick (2007) puts it, ‘politics of regret’. However, while some memory agents adopt this frame of reference, others seem to push back. The second type of pro-Stalin group seems to react to the spread of de-Stalinization and criticism of the purges.

Stalin’s purges are debated in these groups with regard to both their nature and relevance. These groups’ stance on the nature of the purges has a twofold argument. First, that the purges were not Stalin’s: it was Stalin who condemned the unlawful practices and prosecuted those in charge. ‘During 1939-1940 around a million cases were reviewed. Approximately 400 thousand people were freed. Almost the same number got lighter sentences. If this is not the triumph of the law, what is?’ – one of the authors of the posts cites a controversial self-proclaimed historian Starikov (https://vk.com/wall-25551619_4638). Some authors of posts go even further and claim that the commemorated victims are not Stalin’s victims and that the commemorative efforts dedicated to their memory are erroneous. For instance, the commemorative ritual on 30 October, the Day of Memory for the Victims of Political Repression, that was organized by the Memorial Society, an NGO dedicating to gathering and preserving evidence of the Soviet purges, triggered such a discussion. Opponents claim that the whole idea behind this action is based on false facts:

On October 30, the Day of Memory for the Victims of Political Repression, authentic Russian liberals are bringing flowers to the ‘Solovetsky Stone’. As the Solovetsky Islands became symbols of ‘communist Gulag’, the place where it allegedly began. […] But what a pity, our liberals, as usual, are lazy and not curious. They do not know history well. Otherwise, they would have come up with a different symbol for their events. The historical truth is that the camp on the Solovetsky Islands was created in the 1920s by the White movement. (https://vk.com/wall-25551619_4639)

Second, the purges are described as being a necessary action against ‘the fifth column’ and as being a part of a set of effective policies, such as fighting corruption. Two points should be made here. First, that the rhetoric of the fifth column was invented by Stalin but is re-emerging now in Putin’s Russia and being used in reference to the opposition. On the contrary, corruption is one of the issues that is discussed in the media and presented as a crucial Russian problem by both ruling elites and the opposition. What we see is a reframing of past events to suit current challenges. There is no working mechanism for fighting corruption in contemporary Russia and the past seems to provide a solution. Consequently, state terror is presented as an effective measure for problems outlined by the current regime (Photo 1).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Photo 1.

‘The Day of Memory of Stalin’s Purges’.

However, these groups are not in full support of the current state politics. When, on 15 August, the state’s new memory policies were unraveled, members of these groups were highly critical of the proclaimed necessity to remember Soviet victims of political purges and to establish a system of commemorative and educational institutions and practices to overcome the difficult past. The official Communist party, CPRF, criticized this document, and this criticism can be found in the posts of groups of this type. The document is labeled anti-Soviet, and claims about the purges are written off as nonsensical and a mere stunt to distract people from problems within the current government.

Consequently, the goal of these groups seems to be to present a point of view that serves as an alternative to the cosmopolitanized memory, to undermine the efforts of victims’ commemoration. To do so, they connect the history of purges to the framework of current national problems, such as economic problems and corruption – and thus present them as positive solutions, or at the very least, not the biggest problems for contemporary Russia.

To balance opponents’ criticism, Stalin is shown in an overly celebratory light. Accusations of unlawfulness and crimes (such as the murder of Kirov, his comrade in arms) are debunked. Stalin’s leadership and managerial skills are praised. The usual elements of the cult of personality, such as paintings of the period and poetry, are used to present an image of an ideal leader of the country. Quotes from Stalin’s contemporaries are presented to show that his genius was vastly recognized during his lifetime – and, consequently, should be valued nowadays. Even though research suggests that positive emotions toward Stalin are closely connected with the memory of victory in the Second World War (Levada Center, 2016), these groups successfully find other features of Stalin’s character to valorize. The theme of the Great Patriotic War is relatively weak in the posts, in contrast to groups of the first type.

Communist world, Lenin, Stalin, socialism: keying to Stalin

Six groups fall into the last category. The coding occurred in early November on the eve of the celebration of Unity Day, and this was the topic that was discussed in these groups, significantly more actively than in other groups.

Unity Day, celebrated on 4 November, is a holiday invented in 2005. The date commemorates the uprising against Polish occupation in 1612. The event used to be celebrated in the Russian Empire until 1917, when it was replaced by the celebration of 7 November, the day of the Russian Revolution. This was one of the major, if not the most important, dates in the Soviet calendar. After the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, 7 November has still been celebrated, though the manner and places of commemorations have been changing (Smith, 2002). However, on the official level, the holiday’s fate was complicated. A decision to continue or stop celebrating it was not just a decision about another non-working day, but rather an interpretation of the Russian Revolution. A sort of compromise was made in 1996 when the holiday was renamed the Day of Reconciliation. However, in 2005, this day stopped being a non-working day, and Unity Day was introduced and made a holiday instead. The communist party challenged this decision, but with no luck. The reasoning behind banning 7 November is unclear. It might be related to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the resulting anti-revolutionary turn in Russian symbolic politics. Putin’s personal attitudes could also play a role: while he would describe the break-up of the Soviet Union a geopolitical tragedy, he has never expressed admiration toward the revolution that led to the establishment of the USSR (Malinova, 2015).

Groups of this type protest the diminishing of the role of the October Revolution, criticize the new holiday and its meaning, and call for the reinstatement of the old one. Two points are made. First of all, that people with Soviet, or communist, or socialist identity celebrate the 7th of November and should have a right to do so:

On November 7, 1941, the Red Army marched on the Red Square. Later any Soviet person could access the main square of the country. Now, in Russia, there are such ‘freedom and democracy’ that it is impossible to get to the Red Square just like that […] We have submitted a memo to the capital’s government about our rally in the center of the city and laying flowers at Red Square. We are curious how these gentlemen are going to respond. (https://vk.com/wall-11218742_12409)

Second, the opposition of the two holidays symbolizes the opposition of two economic (and, consequently, political) systems: socialism and capitalism.

In a country where the ruling oligarchy openly flaunts its riches in the face of terrifying poverty, closing hospitals and minuscule wages of millions of compatriots – there can be no unity. In a country where the law serves the wealthy and fat thieving bastards, but tries people for ‘likes’ on the Internet – there can be no unity. In a country where they hold ostentatious grandiose parades on Victory day while offering veterans sale prices for funeral services – there can be no unity. (https://vk.com/wall-39843875_5245)

In other words, the commemorative initiative of remembering the Russian Revolution is related to the more general political claim and line of criticism. The current regime in Russia is described as fraudulent and criminal, and communist parties suggest an alternative route, which also entails reestablishing the lost link with the Soviet past. Stalin then becomes a character representing larger ideas: the USSR, socialism, communism, the criticism of capitalism, figures responsible for the break-up of the Soviet Union, and a rupture of the link with the Soviet past. As Lincoln has been used in the United States in the second half of the 20th century to frame political events (in other words, political events were ‘keyed’ to his life) (Schwartz, 2000), Stalin is used to frame criticism of the contemporary political situation (Photo 2).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Photo 2.

‘The History Made Its Judgment’: Yeltsin’s monument covered in ink (on the left) and Stalin’s bust with flowers on the right.

Stalin in the posts of these groups is presented as a theorist of socialism and communism, and a leader who implemented wise economic decisions (i.e. decoupling the ruble from the dollar). Under him, the posts claim, the USSR was far better off than ever before or after regarding economics, the level of life satisfaction, and political strength. Consequently, the groups celebrate news of his relevance, such as Mexico publishing Stalin’s works or Eastern Ukrainian separatists decorating the city with his portraits. Stalin’s role in the victory in the Second World War is mentioned but significantly less frequently than in posts of the first type. The purges are also mentioned; however, they appear less frequently than in posts of the second category.

Conclusion

The emergence of the Internet and social media produced a situation where memory work is accessible to more people. Anyone can tell their story, find their audience, and narrowcast their point of view. Is there a similarity in the framework for online stories? Does the Internet become a space for dissent or yet another medium for the retranslation of states’ memory politics? In fact, the Internet does not facilitate the promotion of either type of narrative; it facilitates fragmentation of memory and narrowcasting. Using the case of Russian social media groups dedicated to Stalin, I show that they do not have a unified narrative and they use Stalin to tell different stories.

The existing scholarship on Russian memory aligns ‘Stalinist’ narratives with the state. However, two types of groups I investigate show dissent: one is openly critical of the current regime, and the other criticizes the state’s approach to the commemoration of Stalin’s victims. Only the first group can be seen as conforming to the dominant memory narrative. The first type, dedicated to the memory of the Great Patriotic War, consists of groups that are rather static and uninterested in the relevance of the narratives they promote. Or, to put it differently, they promote the classic, triumphant national memory, the relevance of which is rarely questioned. Stalin is needed as a heroic figure in this epic narrative of great victory. Like any heroic figure, he is presented as an almost ideal war hero who is never on the battlefield but whose name inspires soldiers.

The other two types are more reactive and perceptive to the political situation. They can be seen as groups producing dissent, contrary to the general belief that memory dissent in Russia is related to ‘anti Stalinist’ positions. However, even in this case, there are differences. The second type of groups is more interested in the memory politics and strategies of their counterparts, including non-state agents. Their discontent with the state is due to their belief that the state supports traumatic narratives. Agents promoting the traumatic narrative of Gulag victims are pushing toward commemorating victims of Stalinism and condemning Stalin. The second type of group is preoccupied with responses to these tactics – and is claiming errors in commemoration, the innocence of Stalin, and the practical value of Stalin’s politics. In essence, they react to the international tendency to commemorate victims, to promote human rights, and condemn state-sponsored terror. The narratives they present can be interpreted as a backlash to the cosmopolitanization of memory.

The groups of the third type demonstrate a similar perceptiveness to the political environment. For them, Stalin is more interesting as a symbol for larger entities: the USSR and communist ideals. Protesting against the current political regime, these groups do not turn to particular policies but call for complete change – from capitalism to socialism. Consequently, the most prominent topic in their discussions does not refer to Stalin per se. During the period under investigation, they were preoccupied with the recovery of the Soviet memory model and the reinstatement of the Russian Revolution holiday as a significant national event. Stalin for them is a convenient character that enables talk about socialism and the USSR. Stalin means an effective state, and the memory of him is closely connected with a general dissatisfaction with the current regime.

To conclude, even though all of these groups are dedicated to Stalin and populated with posts about him, they are rather different from each other. They do not represent a unified narrative of any sort: groups of one type can be aligned with the dominant memory, the other two see themselves as promoting counter-memory. Even they have different standpoints and focuses. This shows that social media that can operate for an audience of several thousand people does not need an overarching narrative. It can cater to specific interests and views of smaller groups. Thus, the landscape of memory work online is prone to less unification and more fragmentation.